Intergovernmental transfers Taxonomy, objectives and results.

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Intergovernmental transfers Taxonomy, objectives and results

Transcript of Intergovernmental transfers Taxonomy, objectives and results.

Page 1: Intergovernmental transfers Taxonomy, objectives and results.

Intergovernmental transfers

Taxonomy, objectives and results

Page 2: Intergovernmental transfers Taxonomy, objectives and results.

Empirical findings of the OECD survey

No clear relation between fiscal autonomy and financial decentralisation

The gap between sub-national tax and expenditure shares has been widening

A high share of grants is often the result of large horizontal imbalances (tax base and spending needs)

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Typology of grants

Non-earmarked Mandatory

General purpose grants Block grants

Discretionary

Earmarked Mandatory

Non-matching grants Matching grants

Discretionary Capital grants Current grants

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Use of grants – results of the survey

Resources other than taxes and grants are scarce Grants are on average 50% for states, regions and

provinces States receive over 6% of GDP in grants (1% in

Canada to over 10% in Belgium) Grants are on average 40% for local governments Local governments receive on average over 4% of

GDP in grants (12.4% in Denmark, to less than 1% in Belgium, Canada, Iceland and Turkey)

The central government is by far the most important source of grants

In some states, international bodies are an important source of grants

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Objectives of grants

Financing sub-national services and investments

SubsidisationEqualisation

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Objective 1: Financing

Why choose grants over sub-national taxes? Central government is better able to control sub-national spending Sub-national taxes may have distortionary effects Sub-national taxation may lead to high inequalities Sub-national taxes may have high administrative and collection costs

Why NOT choose grants over taxes? Taxes allow sub-national authorities to adapt the level of services to

local preferences Asymmetric information and efficient allocation of resources Taxes come with increased accountability Sub-national authorities can’t blame grants for the poor quality of

services

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Objective 1: Financing

Aims of financing grants:

Enable sub-national authorities to finance a basic package of services

Best: non-earmarked general purpose grants

Provide (new) services imposed by the central governement or reach imposed standards

Best: non-earmarked grants

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Objective 1: Financing

Distribution criteriaLaw-based versus discretionaryStable and predictable versus buoyant

and evolutiveComplex versus simpleBased on norm costs, average costs or

actual costs?

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Objective 2 - Subsidisation

Aim: compensate for spillover effects

Most efficient:National spillovers: earmarked matching

grantsRegional spillovers: stimulation of horizontal

co-operation

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Objective 3: Equalisation

Aim: enable sub-national governments to provide similar services at roughly similar tax effort

Types Equalisation of tax capacity Equalisation of service capacity (of spending

needs)

Best grants: non-earmarked general purpose and horizontal transfers

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Equalisation of tax capacity

Solidarity, but also economic reasons (incentive to inefficient migration)

Measure of tax capacity: revenue collected if depleted at a certain uniform (usually average) rate

Caveat: full equalisation removes incentives to increase tax base

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Equalisation of service capacity (spending needs)

Solidarity and regional/spatial planning (not economic) reasons

Reasons for inequal cost per unit of service: Special situation/location Socio-demographic conditions

Requires calculation of service cost indicators which Are based on average or norm costs Cannot be influenced by sub-national authorities

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Decision making

Government is a unitary actor that maximizes the social welfare of the nation

But there exists: Central-local loyalties Assymetric information Various forms of lobbying

Critical points in grant design: Choice earmarked – non earmarked Distribution formulas Determining tax and service capacity and equalisation level Discretionary grants

Efficient decision making: Neutral expertise Limit the influence of lobbying Involve sub-national governments In a setting that encourages objective debate

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Council of Europe acquis

European Charter of Local Self-Government (Art. 9)

Rec(2004)1 on financial and budgetary management at local and regional levels

Rec(2005)1 on the financial resources of local and regional authorities

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On-going and planned work in the Council of Europe

Finalisation of a recommendation on the provision of services at local and regional levels

A new general report on local finance in Europe (update of a 1996 report)

Finalisation of reports on:Accounting rules and practice at local levelPerformance management at local level Internal audit at local level