Intergovernmental Governance: (Mis) Understanding Canadian Federalism

Presentation to “Modes of Governance” University of Victoria

October 14-15, 2011

Herman Bakvis

Overview

• Intergovernmental Governance (IG)

• Structural Features Shaping IG

• Inter- vs. Intrastate/jurisdictional vs horizontal federalism

• Primary Forums

• Common (Mis)perceptions

• Five brief policy vignettes

• Discussion/Conclusion

Intergovernmental Governance (IG)

• The making of authoritative decisions and the coordination of policies and activities of different orders of government in order to achieve mutual objectives.

• In federations where functions and jurisdictions are invariably intertwined and power tends to be shared, most decisions are invariably joint decisions, even if not formally labelled as such.

Structural Features Shaping IG

• Beyond basic definition of federalism (areal division of powers, two orders of government relating to same citizen body etc), variety of different designs:

– Inter vs. intrastate distinction

– Dual/Jurisdictional vs horizontal/administrative federalism

– Concurrent vs exclusive jurisdiction

– General vs. specific powers

Dual-Horizontal

Jurisdictional

Federalism

Horizontal

Federalism

U.S.Canada Germany/EU

• Canada exceptional in degree to which powers of 2 orders of government spelled out

• Canada: competition between governments

• U.S: Competition between three branches of government

• German/EU direct representation in central institutions

Canadian Interstate Federalism

• Based on model of dual jurisdictions (even watertight compartments at times), despite high level of interdependence in different policy areas

• Direct representation of constituent units in central institutions lacking (weak second chamber with representatives appointed by federal government)

Consequences

• Relations between governments, not within governments (e.g. European Council, Council of Ministers)

• Executive federalism

• Primary venues for interaction are meetings of first ministers, ministers and senior officials

• Varies from area to area, but overall little scope for participation municipalities, interest groups, and citizens

Forums/Arenas

• First Minister Conferences (FMC) or First Minister Meetings (FMM) – latter more informal and more common – Premiers and Prime Minister

• Council of the Federation – Premiers (10 provinces and 3 territories) only

• Ministerial Councils

• Meetings of officials – preparatory work, support councils, implementation of agreements

Forums/Arenas

• Operate at federal-provincial and interprovincial level

• Other bodies:

– Federal cabinet – informal representation and linkages with provinces

– Supreme Court – arena for final authoritative, resolution of disputes, though governments often reluctant parties to constitutional/jurisdictional disputes

– Very low level of institutionalization!

Distinctive Features of Canadian Executive Federalism

• 1st ministers, close advisers, 2-3 ministers and selected top officials) predominant actors in the system; minimal role for legislatures

• Power reinforced by Westminster system:

– Executive dominance of the legislature

• Reinforced further by recent trends:

– ‘Governing from the Centre’ (Savoie); ‘New Political Governance’ (Aucoin)

Issues and Conflict

• Structure of system shapes conflicts and their outcomes:

– Provincial governments see themselves as exclusive guardians and representatives of regional and provincial interests

– Conflict channelled through and articulated by provinces to Ottawa

Issues and Conflict

• Major issues/cleavages:

– Quebec’s role in confederation

– Position of First Nations

– Symmetrical vs asymmetrical federalism

– East vs West

– Have vs have-not provinces

– Rural vs urban

• Major issues revolve around, and played out through, debates over fiscal transfers

East-west tensions

Common (Mis)perceptions

• Canadian federalism generally conflict ridden

• Ottawa and provinces constantly at loggerheads

• Lack of coordination in policy development and implementation

• Policy drift/paralysis

• Canada one of the most decentralized federations in the world

Conflict as theatre

Five policy vignettes

• Education Attainment Standards

• Welfare Reform

• Health Care

• Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards

• WTO Compliance

Education Attainment Standards

• Interprovincial agreement (no federal involvement)

• The Pan-Canadian Assessment Program (2006) agreed upon by all 10 provinces and one territorial government

• Provides standardized assessment through cyclical tests of student achievement

• No transfer of funds, or sanctions. Assessment reports are public

• Policy coordination provided by Interprovincial Council of Education Ministers

Welfare Reform

• National Child Benefit (1997) – new federal entitlement program delivered through tax system to parents of eligible children

• Provinces agree to reinvest savings in social assistance in enhanced and redirected social services

• Broad national framework, flexible enough for Quebec

• No intergovernmental transfer of funds and no formal intergovernmental agreement

Health care

• Canada Health Act (1984) and Canada Health Transfer (since 1996), provides loosely conditional funding to provinces for universal medical and hospital insurance

• Block grants account for 25 % of actual P/T expenditures

• The unconditional transfer program of Equalization provides additional funding to 6 of 10 provinces

• Since 1999 feds pursue reforms (cost containment, accountability and innovation) through nonbinding framework agreements and incremental, conditional funding

Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards

• Federal parliament ratifies Kyoto Accord (2002)

• Elaborate but ineffectual intergovernmental (F/P/T) and government-industry collaboration, fails to produce binding emission standards

• Harper federal government admits failure on Kyoto, 2006

• No new binding national legislation. Major polluting provinces (Alberta) oppose Kyoto process

• British Columbia introduces carbon tax

WTO Compliance

• Federal Parliament cannot implement treaties in matters of provincial jurisdiction – some claim WTO trade agreements within federal jurisdiction – not tested in courts

• Since 1980s extensive mechanisms for F-P-T consultation (but no veto)

• Successful consultation and cooperation for WTO negotiation and implementation; provincial interests reflected in Agreements including exceptions, exemptions and other provisions

• Compliance issues continue to be dealt with on a cooperative basis

Discussion

• Health care the only really fractious area

• Education (provinces only) and WTO compliance (fed-province) characterized by high level of cooperation and coordination

• Welfare reform – mutual adjustment and cooperation

• Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards – unilateralism by Ottawa, then reversal with certain provinces taking the lead

Conclusion

• In Canada mutual objectives achieved through jurisdictional autonomy and bargaining, & through mutual adjustment and competition, rather than central coordination

• Canadian case suggests that, given the right conditions, the objectives can be achieved in a system that accords the constituent units greater autonomy