Intergenerational Transfers in Broad Perspective Ronald Lee Demography and Economics University of...

Intergenerational Transfers in Broad Perspective

Ronald Lee

Demography and Economics

University of California, Berkeley

Ronald Lee, Univ Calif, Berkeley; Sept 13, 2005

1. Intergenerational transfers in an evolutionary context

• Parents in many species leave offspring after birth, with no parental care. Then:– Over the life course, each individual can use only the food it forages for

itself at each period and age– Rigid, restrictive budget constraint limits possibilities for development

• Two alternatives for relaxing budget constraint of young– 1. Bequests: parent leaves offspring a capital endowment

• paralyzed prey• a foraging territory • Large nutritious egg, etc.

– 2. Inter vivos intergenerational transfers: with overlapping generations, continuing parental care and investment in offspring is an option, allowing for:

• Postponement of nutritional independence• larger expenditures on growth and development• Pursuit of long term strategies with a high payoff, like brain development.

• I will emphasize inter vivos intergenerational transfers.


The human evolutionary strategy: key features of contemporary hunter-gatherers

• Long period of child dependency, with heavy adult investments

• Short birth intervals relative to similar primates• Nonetheless overall fertility not high, due to late start. • A mother may have a number of dependent children at

the same time. • This strategy is feasible only with economic contributions

from other family members besides mother (cooperative breeders)– Father and other males– Grandmother and grandfather


Some data from Kaplan’s studies of three Amazon Basin Hunter-gatherer

groups

• Kaplan has constructed estimates from the raw data in two ways.

• I am reporting on his work published in 1994 which I believe is correct.


Production and Consumption by Age for the Average of Three Amazonian Hunter-gatherer Groups (Daily Calories)

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es

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Consumption

Source: Calculated from Kaplan (1994), see Lee (2000).

Production and Consumption by Age Averaged Across Three Amazon Basin Hunter-Gatherer Groups (Daily Calories)

Production

Consumption



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Production

Consumption

Nutritional independence after age 20



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Production

Consumption

Raising one child to maturity costs 10+ years of adult consumption



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Production

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Elderly remain net producers



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Consumption

Population weighted average ages

Ac = 24 yrs

Ayl = 35 yrs



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Production

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3524

The average calorie is consumed by someone 11 years younger than the producer: income flows downward, from older to younger.


2. Intergenerational transfers in a modern context

• As in past, transfers allow life course divergence of earnings and consumption.– young can be net consumers– Now old can also be net consumers –

something “new” in last 10,000 years.

• Terminology: I take intergenerational transfers to mean the same as inter-age transfers, not necessarily between discrete generations in the same family.


Stylized human life cycle for surviving individuals

Age

Output per person per year

Labor earnings, y(x)

Consumption, c(x)

+ +

-

-

-

-


How do these reallocations across age and time take place?

• By institution, through the family, the market and the state (public sector)

• By mechanism, through borrowing and lending, through investing in physical capital, and through transfers.


Resource Reallocation Across Age and Time Form of Reallocation

Family

Institution

Market Public Sector

Capital HouseCarConsumer DurablesInventoriesEducation

Factories Inventories Farms

Social Infrastructure(Hospitals, Roads,Airports, Govt. Bldgs)

Transfers Child RearingCollege CostsGiftsBequestsHelp to Elderly

Government Debt Public EducationMedicaid, MedicareSocial SecurityFood StampsAFDC

Borrowing/Lending

Familial Loans"Transfers" with a quid pro quo

Credit Markets (mortgages, credit cards, bond issues)

Government Loans



Family

Institution







Borrowing/Lending



Government Loans

Hunter-gatherers


How can we measure and interpret this rich variety of resource flows across age and time?

• One strategy: measure each of these flows in detail, which requires:– Rich data from many sources– Strong assumptions, in some cases– But is surprisingly possible.

• An alternative indirect strategy: estimate broad patterns of production and consumption, and infer the flows that must have occurred.

• I will show methods and results for both approaches, time permitting, but start with second.


US Consumption and Labor Earning by Age in 2000

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Age

US

$ (

2000

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labor earnings

consumption



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$ (

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labor earnings

consumption

Earnings decline rapidly in 50s and 60s



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consumption

Consumption rises in old age



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consumption

Pop wtd Average ages

Ac = 41 yrs

Ayl = 43 yrs


4. Comparative Direction of Transfer Flows


United States [Lee & Miller]-2

+3 2050


What has caused these changes?

• Population aging over demographic transition• Behavioral choices with rising wealth

– Retirement age in US dropped from 74 in 1900 to 63 today; most of Europe is similar or more so.

– Choice of privacy over co-residence for elderly– Choice of expensive medical interventions for chronic

diseases of elderly

• Institutional change, particularly the growth of massive public sector transfer programs.

• Now examine public sector transfers in US



Family

Institution







Borrowing/Lending



Government Loans

Rest of my talk


Do public sector transfer programs redirect resources from children to elderly?

• Two ways in which societal investment in children may have declined– Over the life cycle, reallocation across ages

• allocations of resources to children by adults may be declining

– Across generations, loss of life time wealth• Younger generations of today may be exploited by older

generations through the public sector – unsustainable, transitory situation; “greedy geezers”.

• I will discuss both in US context. Believe similar to other industrialized nations.


5. The growth of public transfer programs in the US

• Examine changing age patterns of major govt transfer programs– Education– Pensions– Health Care

• Cross-sectional view


Spending on Public Education, Social Security and Medicare as % of GDP, Actual 1850-2000; Projected to 2050


The changing age profiles of taxes and benefits in the US: 1850, 1930 and 2000 (cross-sectional) (Soc Sec, Educ, Medicare)

1850

1930

2000

Relative to per capita GDP

0 80


The changing age profiles of taxes and benefits in the US: 1900, 1930 and 2000 (cross-sectional) (Soc Sec, Educ, Medicare)

1850

1930

2000

% per capita gdp

0 80

Note enormous increase in benefits for the elderly


Public Sector Transfer Flows Reversed Direction in the 1970s, and Their Size Increased Relative to GDP (Soc Sec, Ed, Medicare)


Public Sector Transfer Flows Reversed Direction in the 1970s, and Their Size Increased Relative to GDP

Length of arrow is difference in average ages of paying taxes, and getting benefits.

Width is benefits as % GDP

Area is transfer wealth as % GDP


Public Sector Transfer Flows Reversed Direction in the 1970s, and Their Size Increased Relative to GDP

Programs will generate large transfer wealth by 2050 – 126% GDP (net of education).


6. Intergenerational redistribution of these public sector transfers

• Do public transfer programs permit the current elderly to live well at the unfair expense of today’s youth and tomorrow’s newborns?

• “The living and well organized are taking money from the weak and unborn. Over the past few decades we have seen a gigantic transfer of wealth from struggling young families and the next generation to members of the AARP [Elderly].” (David Brooks, NYT, 2/5/05)

• Schematic view: Transfer programs and generational windfall gains


Net Present Value of life time benefits minus taxes (NPV) by generation for upward transfers versus downward transfers

Upward, e.g. Soc Sec, Medicare

NPV ($)

First gens

Steady state < 0

When upward transfers start up, first generations get a windfall gain; later generations pay the price with negative NPVs.

Year of birth of generation




Downward, e.g. Educ

NPV ($)

NPV ($)


First gens

First gens

Steady state < 0

Steady state > 0




Downward, e.g. Educ

NPV ($)

NPV ($)


First gens

First gens

Steady state < 0

Steady state > 0

When downward transfers start up, the opposite happens: first generation loses, later ones gain.


Net Present Value at birth of expected life time benefits for Social Security, Medicare and Public Education as % of lifetime earnings, for generations born 1850 to 2090

Total

Upward (pensions + Medicare)

Downward (public educ)


Net Present Value at birth of expected life time benefits for Social Security, Medicare and Public Education as % of lifetime earnings, for generations born 1850 to 2090

Total

One dollar of education is worth $12 in old age.


Generational redistribution is opposite to our expectations

• Today’s young are the biggest winners, due to importance of public education. – Also their children– Even their grandchildren gain

• Today’s elderly, age 57 to 74, are net losers (slightly).

• As expected, those born in decades around 1900 are also big winners.

• Almost all generations from 1880 through 2050 gain. But…

• Eventually, generations after 2050 will suffer increasingly large losses.


7. Financial Pressures of Population Aging

• Hold age profiles of labor earnings and consumption constant at 2000 levels

• Multiply by changing population age distribution over 21st century.

• How would aggregate consumption need to change to maintain same ratio to labor earnings as in 2000?

• Calculate the support ratio, adjusted to 1.0 for 2000.


General Support ratio for US, 2000 to 2100, 1.0 for 2000. Based on labor earnings and consumption profiles, plus projected pop age distr.


Initial slight increase, due to small cohorts turning 65

Support ratio for US, 2000 to 2100, normalized to 1.0 for 2000. Based on labor earnings and consumption profiles shown earlier, plus projected pop age distr.General Support ratio for US, 2000 to 2100, 1.0 for 2000. Based on labor earnings and consumption profiles, plus projected pop age distr.


Then population aging raises consumption costs faster than labor earnings, so consumption must fall – but only by 16%.



Average effect on consumption averages < -.2%/yr over century



We can also use this same exercise to calculate the average ages of

consumption and earnings.


Av age of consumption

Av age of labor earning

Average ages for Consumption and Labor Earning from the Same Data


Direction of flows reverses in 2020, due solely to population aging

Average ages for Consumption and Labor Earning from the Same Data


We can do similar calculations to find fiscal support ratio, based on taxes and benefits

• Here show benefits by age, for several major programs and in total


Fiscal Support Ratio Projections, 2000-2100


No pressure of population aging on state and local budgets – education dominates their budgets.



There is major pressure on the Federal budget, which covers public pensions (Social Security) and health care for the elderly (Medicare)



Full-blown fiscal projections also include projected changes in

relative costs of programs, such as rising costs of health care


Total govt expenditures double relative to GDP

26% rises to 52%


Expenditures on the elderly triple relative to GDP, from 8% to 26%


But what will actually happen as populations age?

• Fiscal support ratio tells what benefits we could buy for given tax rate

• Population aging raises price of age-vector of benefits, relative to after tax income

• Expect to substitute away from these benefits as they get more expensive

• Reduce expenditures per elderly and per child, but net effect unknown


Past experience in OECD consistent with this

• Gruber and Wise do cross-section time series analysis since 1960

• 1% increase in proportion elderly– Raises total expend on elderly by .5%– Reduces expend per elderly by .5%– No increase in total govt expends– Reduction in other expends, including kids

• Lindert does similar analysis, reaches similar conclusions, but less severe.


8. Discussion

• Originally strongly downward transfers to children by all adults—age asymmetry.

• Now moved to symmetric life cycle – Upward transfers through public sector– Downward transfers within family– Net effect is balance and symmetry

• As population ages, strong fiscal and life cycle pressures from older populations may undercut public and private investments in kids


Standardized net production by age for US today, and the average for three hunter-gatherer groups (Kaplan, Amazon Basin)


Are we shortchanging our children for the sake of a pampered old age?

• Comparisons to our evolutionary past are interesting, but cannot guide us today.

• Nonetheless, we should be aware of these changes and their implications.

• Our individual and social choices about work, consumption and leisure, and resources for children and the elderly, should be informed and thoughtful.

• We should consider the options proactively, rather than leaving our existing institutions to grind out their own answers in an aging world.


END

Intergenerational Transfers in Broad Perspective Ronald Lee Demography and Economics University of...

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