Intentionality

06.06.2015 Intentionality(StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy)

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ 1/29

Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyIntentionalityFirstpublishedThuAug7,2003substantiverevisionWedOct15,2014

Intentionalityisthepowerofmindstobeabout,torepresent,ortostandfor,things,propertiesandstatesofaffairs.Thepuzzlesofintentionalitylieattheinterfacebetweenthephilosophyofmindandthephilosophyoflanguage.Theworditself,whichisofmedievalScholasticorigin,wasrehabilitatedbythephilosopherFranzBrentanotowardstheendofthenineteenthcentury.Intentionalityisaphilosopher'sword.ItderivesfromtheLatinwordintentio,whichinturnderivesfromtheverbintendere,whichmeansbeingdirectedtowardssomegoalorthing.Theentryfallsintoelevensections:

1.Whyisintentionalitysocalled?2.Intentionalinexistence3.Therelationalnatureofsingularthoughts4.Howcandistinctbeliefsbeaboutoneandthesameobject?5.Thepuzzleoftruenegativeexistentialbeliefs6.Directreference7.Arethereintentionalobjects?8.Isintensionalityacriterionofintentionality?9.Canintentionalitybenaturalized?10.Isintentionalityexhibitedbyallmentalstates?11.ExternalismandtheexplanatoryroleofintentionalityBibliographyAcademicToolsOtherInternetResourcesRelatedEntries

1.Whyisintentionalitysocalled?

Contemporarydiscussionsofthenatureofintentionalityareanintegralpartofdiscussionsofthenatureofminds:whataremindsandwhatisittohaveamind?Theyariseinthecontextofontologicalandmetaphysicalquestionsaboutthefundamentalnatureofmentalstates:statessuchasperceiving,remembering,believing,desiring,hoping,knowing,intending,feeling,experiencing,andsoon.Whatisittohavesuchmentalstates?Howdoesthementalrelatetothephysical,i.e.,howarementalstatesrelatedtoanindividual'sbody,tostatesofhisorherbrain,tohisorherbehaviorandtostatesofaffairsintheworld?

Whyisintentionalitysocalled?Forreasonssoontobeexplained,initsphilosophicalusage,themeaningofthewordintentionalityshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeordinarymeaningofthewordintention.AstheLatinetymologyofintentionalityindicates,therelevantideaofdirectednessortension(anEnglishwordwhichderivesfromtheLatinverbtendere)arisesfrompointingtowardsorattendingtosometarget.Inmedievallogicandphilosophy,theLatinwordintentiowasusedforwhatcontemporaryphilosophersandlogiciansnowadayscallaconceptoranintension:somethingthatcanbebothtrueofnonmentalthingsandpropertiesthingsandpropertieslyingoutsidethemindandpresenttothemind.Ontheassumptionthataconceptisitselfsomethingmental,anintentiomayalsobetrueofmentalthings.Forexample,theconceptofadog,whichisafirstlevelintentio,applies



toindividualdogsortothepropertyofbeingadog.Italsofallsundervarioushigherlevelconceptsthatapplytoit,suchasbeingaconcept,beingmental,etc.Ifso,thenwhilethefirstlevelconceptistrueofnonmentalthings,thehigherlevelconceptsmaybetrueofsomethingmental.Noticethatonthiswayofthinking,conceptsthataretrueofmentalthingsarepresumablylogicallymorecomplexthanconceptsthataretrueofnonmentalthings.

Althoughthemeaningofthewordintentionalityincontemporaryphilosophyisrelatedtothemeaningsofsuchwordsasintension(orintensionalitywithans)andintention,nonethelessitoughtnottobeconfusedwitheitherofthem.Ontheonehand,incontemporaryEnglish,intensionalandintensionalitymeannonextensionalandnonextensionality,wherebothextensionalityandintensionalityarelogicalfeaturesofwordsandsentences.Forexample,creaturewithaheartandcreaturewithakidneyhavethesameextensionbecausetheyaretrueofthesameindividuals:allthecreatureswithakidneyarecreatureswithaheart.Butthetwoexpressionshavedifferentintensionsbecausethewordheartdoesnothavethesameextension,letalonethesamemeaning,asthewordkidney.Ontheotherhand,intentionandintendingarespecificstatesofmindthat,unlikebeliefs,judgments,hopes,desiresorfears,playadistinctiveroleintheetiologyofactions(seesection11).Bycontrast,intentionalityisapervasivefeatureofmanydifferentmentalstates:beliefs,hopes,judgments,intentions,loveandhatredallexhibitintentionality.Infact,Brentanoheldthatintentionalityisthehallmarkofthemental:muchoftwentiethcenturyphilosophyofmindhasbeenshapedbywhat,inthisentry,willbereferredtoasBrentano'sthirdthesis.

Furthermore,itisworthwhiletodistinguishbetweenlevelsofintentionality.Manyofanindividual'spsychologicalstateswithintentionality(e.g.beliefs)areabout(orrepresent)nonmentalthings,propertiesandstatesofaffairs.Manyarealsoaboutanother'spsychologicalstates(e.g.another'sbeliefs).Beliefsaboutothers'beliefsdisplaywhatisknownashigherorderintentionality.Sincetheseminal(1978)paperbyprimatologistsDavidPremackandGuyWoodruffentitledDoesthechimpanzeehaveatheoryofmind?,undertheheadingtheoryofmind,muchempiricalresearchofthepastthirtyyearshasbeendevotedtothepsychologicalquestionswhethernonhumanprimatescanascribepsychologicalstateswithintentionalitytoothersandhowhumanchildrendeveloptheircapacitytoascribetootherspsychologicalstateswithintentionality(cf.thecommentsbyphilosophersJonathanBennett,DanielDennettandGilbertHarmantoPremackandWoodruff'spaperandtheSEPentryfolkpsychology:asatheory).

Theconceptofintentionalityhasplayedacentralrolebothinthetraditionofanalyticphilosophyandinthephenomenologicaltradition.Asweshallsee,somephilosophersgosofarasclaimingthatintentionalityischaracteristicofallmentalstates.Brentano'scharacterizationofintentionalityisquitecomplex.AttheheartofitisBrentano'snotionoftheintentionalinexistenceofanobject,whichisanalyzedinthenextsection.

2.Intentionalinexistence

ContemporarydiscussionsofthenatureofintentionalitywerelaunchedandmanyofthemwereanticipatedbyFranzBrentano(1874,8889)inhisbook,PsychologyFromanEmpiricalStandpoint,fromwhichIquotetwofamousparagraphs:

EverymentalphenomenonischaracterizedbywhattheScholasticsoftheMiddleAgescalledtheintentional(ormental)inexistenceofanobject,andwhatwemightcall,thoughnotwhollyunambiguously,referencetoacontent,directiontowardanobject(whichisnottobeunderstoodhereasmeaningathing),orimmanentobjectivity.Everymentalphenomenonincludessomethingasobjectwithinitself,althoughtheydonotdosointhesameway.Inpresentation,somethingispresented,injudgmentsomethingisaffirmedordenied,inloveloved,inhatehated,indesiredesiredandsoon.

Thisintentionalinexistenceischaracteristicexclusivelyofmentalphenomena.No



physicalphenomenonexhibitsanythinglikeit.Wecan,therefore,definementalphenomenabysayingthattheyarethosephenomenawhichcontainanobjectintentionallywithinthemselves.

Asonereadstheselines,numerousquestionsarise:whatdoesBrentanomeanwhenhesaysthattheobjecttowardswhichtheminddirectsitselfisnottobeunderstoodasmeaningathing?Whatcanitbeforaphenomenon(mentalorotherwise)toexhibittheintentionalinexistenceofanobject?Whatisitforaphenomenontoincludesomethingasobjectwithinitself?Doreferencetoacontentanddirectiontowardanobjectexpresstwodistinctideas?Oraretheytwodistinctwaysofexpressingoneandthesameidea?Ifintentionalitycanrelateamindtosomethingthateitherdoesnotexistorexistswhollywithinthemind,whatsortofrelationcanitbe?

Repleteastheyarewithcomplex,abstractandcontroversialideas,thesetwoshortparagraphshavesettheagendaforallsubsequentphilosophicaldiscussionsofintentionalityinthelatenineteenthandthetwentiethcentury.TherehasbeensomediscussionoverthemeaningofBrentano'sexpressionintentionalinexistence.DidBrentanomeanthattheobjectsontowhichthemindisdirectedareinternaltotheminditself(inexistinthemind)?Ordidhemeanthatthemindcanbedirectedontononexistentobjects?Ordidhemeanboth?(SeeCrane,1998forfurtherdiscussion.)

Someoftheleadingideasofthephenomenologicaltraditioncanbetracedbacktothisissue.FollowingtheleadofEdmundHusserl(1900,1913),whowasboththefounderofphenomenologyandastudentofBrentano's,thepointofthephenomenologicalanalysishasbeentoshowthattheessentialpropertyofintentionalityofbeingdirectedontosomethingisnotcontingentuponwhethersomerealphysicaltargetexistsindependentlyoftheintentionalactitself.Toachievethisgoal,twoconceptshavebeencentraltoHusserl'sinternalistinterpretationofintentionality:theconceptofanoema(pluralnoemata)andtheconceptofepoche(i.e.,bracketing)orphenomenologicalreduction.Bythewordnoema,Husserlreferstotheinternalstructureofmentalacts.Thephenomenologicalreductionismeanttohelpgetattheessenceofmentalactsbysuspendingallnaivepresuppositionsaboutthedifferencebetweenrealandfictitiousentities(onthesecomplexphenomenologicalconcepts,seethepapersbyFllesdalandothersconvenientlygatheredinDreyfus(1982).Forfurtherdiscussion,seeBell(1990)andDummett(1993).

Inthetwoparagraphsquotedabove,Brentanosketchesanentireresearchprogrammebasedonthreedistincttheses.Accordingtothefirstthesis,itisconstitutiveofthephenomenonofintentionality,asitisexhibitedbymentalstatessuchasloving,hating,desiring,believing,judging,perceiving,hopingandmanyothers,thatthesementalstatesaredirectedtowardsthingsdifferentfromthemselves.Accordingtothesecondthesis,itischaracteristicoftheobjectstowardswhichthemindisdirectedbyvirtueofintentionalitythattheyhavethepropertywhichBrentanocallsintentionalinexistence.Accordingtothethirdthesis,intentionalityisthemarkofthemental:allandonlymentalstatesexhibitintentionality.

UnlikeBrentano'sthirdthesis,Brentano'sfirsttwothesescanhardlybedivorcedfromeachother.Thefirstthesiscaneasilyberecastsoastobeunacceptableunlessthesecondthesisisaccepted.Supposethatitisconstitutiveofthenatureofintentionalitythatonecouldnotexemplifysuchmentalstatesasloving,hating,desiring,believing,judging,perceiving,hoping,andsoon,unlesstherewassomethingtobeloved,hated,desired,believed,judged,perceived,hoped,andsoon.Ifso,thenitfollowsfromtheverynatureofintentionality(asdescribedbythefirstthesis)thatnothingcouldexhibitintentionalityunlesstherewereobjectsintentionalobjectsthatsatisfiedthepropertyBrentanocalledintentionalinexistence.

Now,thefullacceptanceofBrentano'sfirsttwothesesraisesafundamentalontologicalquestioninphilosophicallogic.Thequestionis:aretheresuchintentionalobjects?Doesduerecognitionofintentionalityforceustopostulatetheontologicalcategoryofintentionalobjects?Thisquestionhasgivenrisetoamajordivisionwithinanalyticphilosophy.Theprevailing(ororthodox)responsehasbeenaresoundingNo.Butanimportantminorityofphilosophers,whomIshallcalltheintentional



objecttheorists,havearguedforapositiveresponsetothequestion.Sinceintentionalobjectsneednotexist,accordingtointentionalobjecttheorists,therearethingsthatdonotexist.Accordingtotheircritics,therearenosuchthings.(Forfurtherdiscussionseesection7).

3.Therelationalnatureofsingularthoughts

Manynonintentionalrelationsholdofconcreteparticularsinspaceandtime.Ifandwhentheydo,theirrelatacannotfailtoexist.IfCleopatrakissesCaesar,thenbothCleopatraandCaesarmustexist.Notsowithintentionalrelations.IfCleopatralovesCaesar,thenpresumablythereissomeconcreteparticularinspaceandtimewhomCleopatraloves.ButonemayalsoloveAnnaKarenina(notaconcreteparticularinspaceandtime,butafictitiouscharacter).Similarly,therelataoftheadmirationrelation(anotherintentionalrelation)arenotlimitedtoconcreteparticularsinspaceandtime.OnemayadmirenotonlyAlbertEinsteinbutalsoSherlockHolmes(afictitiouscharacter).AsthefollowingpassagefromtheAppendixtothe1911editionofhis1874booktestifies,thisasymmetrybetweennonintentionalandintentionalrelationspuzzledBrentano:

Whatischaracteristicofeverymentalactivityis,asIbelieveIhaveshown,thereferencetosomethingasanobject.Inthisrespect,everymentalactivityseemstobesomethingrelational.[]Inotherrelationsbothtermsboththefundamentandtheterminusarereal,buthereonlythefirsttermthefundamentisreal.[]IfItakesomethingrelative[]somethinglargerorsmallerforexample,then,ifthelargerthingexists,thesmalleroneexiststoo.[]Somethinglikewhatistrueofrelationsofsimilarityanddifferenceholdstrueforrelationsofcauseandeffect.Fortheretobesucharelation,boththethingthatcausesandthethingthatiscausedmustexist.[]Itisentirelydifferentwithmentalreference.Ifsomeonethinksofsomething,theonewhoisthinkingmustcertainlyexist,buttheobjectofhisthinkingneednotexistatall.Infact,ifheisdenyingsomething,theexistenceoftheobjectispreciselywhatisexcludedwheneverhisdenialiscorrect.Sotheonlythingwhichisrequiredbymentalreferenceisthepersonthinking.Theterminusofthesocalledrelationdoesnotneedtoexistinrealityatall.Forthisreason,onecoulddoubtwhetherwereallyaredealingwithsomethingrelationalhere,andnot,rather,withsomethingsomewhatsimilartosomethingrelationalinacertainrespect,whichmight,therefore,betterbecalledquasirelational.

Tworelatedassumptionslieatthecoreoftheorthodoxparadigm.Oneistheassumptionthatthemysteryoftheintentionalrelationshouldbeelucidatedagainstthebackgroundofnonintentionalrelations.Theotheristheassumptionthatintentionalrelationsinvolvingnonexistent(e.g.,fictitious)entitiesshouldbeclarifiedbyreferencetointentionalrelationsinvolvingparticularsexistinginspaceandtime.

Theparadigmoftheintentionalrelationthatsatisfiesorthodoxprejudicesistheintentionalityofwhatcanbecalledsingularthoughts,namelythosetruethoughtsthataredirectedtowardsconcreteindividualsorparticularsthatexistinspaceandtime.Asingularthoughtissuchthatitwouldnotbeavailableitcouldnotbeentertainedunlesstheconcreteindividualthatisthetargetofthethoughtexisted.Unlikethepropositionalcontentsofgeneralthoughtsthatinvolveonlyabstractuniversalssuchaspropertiesand/orrelations,thepropositionalcontentofasingularthoughtmayinvolveinadditionarelationtoaconcreteindividualorparticular.ThecontrastbetweensingularandgeneralpropositionshasbeenmuchemphasizedbyKaplan(1978,1989).Inaslightlydifferentperspective,TylerBurge(1977)hascharacterizedsingularthoughtsasincompletelyconceptualizedorderethoughtswhoserelationtotheobjectstheyareaboutissuppliedbythecontext.Onsomeviews,theobjectofthesingularthoughtisevenpartofit.Ontheorthodoxview,partoftheimportanceoftruesingularthoughtsforaclarificationofintentionalityliesinthefactthatsometruesingularthoughtsareaboutconcreteperceptibleobjects.Singularthoughtsaboutconcreteperceptibleobjectsmayseemsimplerandmoreprimitivethaneithergeneralonesorthoughtsaboutabstractentities.



Consider,forexample,whatmustbethecaseforbeliefascription(1)tobetrue:

1. AvabelievesthatLionelJospinisaSocialist.

Intuitively,thebeliefascribedtoAvaby(1)hasintentionalityinthesensethatitisoforaboutLionelJospinandthepropertyofbeingaSocialist.Besidesbeingabelief(i.e.,aspecialattitudedifferentfromawish,adesire,afearoranintention),theidentityofAva'sbeliefdependsonitspropositionalcontent.WhatAvabelievesisidentifiedbytheembeddedthatclausethatcanstandallbyitselfasin(2):

2. LionelJospinisaSocialist.

Onthefaceofit,anutteranceof(2)istrueifandonlyifagivenconcreteindividualdoesexemplifythepropertyofbeingaSocialist.Arguably,itisessentialtothepropositionthatAvabelievesthepropositionexpressedbyanutteranceof(2)thatitisaboutJospinandthepropertyofbeingaSocialist.Justbyvirtueofhavingsuchatruebelief,AvamustthereforestandinrelationthebeliefrelationtoJospinandthepropertyofbeingaSocialist.NoticethatAvacanhaveabeliefaboutJospinandthepropertyofbeingaSocialisteventhoughshehasneverseenJospininperson.

Fromwithintheorthodoxparadigm,onecentralpieceofthemysteryofintentionalitycanbebroughtoutbyreflectionontheconditionsinwhichsimplesingularthoughtsaboutconcreteindividualsaretrue.Thisistheproblemoftherelationalnatureofthecontentsoftruesingularbeliefs.Inordertogeneratethisproblem,itisnotnecessarytoascendtofalseorabstractbeliefsaboutfictionalentities.Itisenoughtoconsiderhowatruethoughtaboutaconcreteindividualthatexistsinspaceandtimecanarise.Ontheonehand,Ava'sbeliefseemstobeasingularbeliefaboutaconcreteindividual.ItseemsessentialtoAva'sbeliefthatithasthepropositionalcontentthatithas.AnditseemsessentialtothepropositionalcontentofAva'sbeliefthatAvamuststandinrelationtosomebodyelsewhocanbeveryremotefromherineitherspaceortime.Ontheotherhand,Ava'sbeliefisastateinternaltoAva.AsJohnPerry(1994,187)putsit,beliefsandothersocalledpropositionalattitudesseemtobelocalmentalphenomena.HowcanitbeessentialtoaninternalstateofAva'sthatAvastandsinrelationtosomeoneelse?Howcanonereconcilethelocalandtherelationalcharactersofpropositionalattitudes?

4.Howcandistinctbeliefsbeaboutoneandthesameobject?

TheproblemoftherelationalnatureofthecontentsoftruesingularthoughtscanbemademoreacutebythefollowingpuzzlethatexercisedGottlobFrege(1892):howcanonerationallyholdtwodistinctsingularbeliefsthatarebothaboutoneandthesameobject?Asweshallseemomentarily,thispuzzleisrelatedtoasecondpuzzle:thepuzzleofhowastatementexpressingabeliefaboutidentitycanbothbetrueandinformative.Ifthebeliefrelationisagenuinerelation,thenitwouldseemthatitislikekicking:ifJacquesChirackickedLionelJospinandifLionelJospinwastheFrenchPrimeministerin2001,thenJacquesChirackickedtheFrenchPrimeministerin2001.Notsowithbelief,asweshallseemomentarily.Noticethatinordinarycontexts,thewordbeliefcanbeusedtodenoteeitheraperson'sstateorthecontentofthatstate.

EversinceFrege,ithasbeenstandardpracticeinanalyticphilosophytoinvestigatetheintentionalstructureofmuchhumanthoughtbyinquiringintothelogicalstructureofthelanguageusedbyspeakerstoexpressitortoascribeittoothers.(See,e.g.,Dummett(1973)foraforcefuljustification.)SupposethatAvacorrectlybelievesthatHesperusisshiningasaresultofseeingthatHesperusshines.SupposealsothatshefailstobelievethatPhosphorusisshiningbecause,althoughshecorrectlybelievesthatHesperusiscalledHesperus,sheincorrectlybelievesthatPhosphorusisthenameofadifferentplanet(thatsheisnotcurrentlyseeing)andshefailstoknowthatPhosphorusisinfactanothernameforHesperus.Sowhereasthefirstbeliefreportistrue,thesecondbeliefreportisfalse:



3. AvabelievesthatHesperusisshining.4. AvabelievesthatPhosphorusisshining.

GiventhatHesperusandPhosphorusarejustnamesofthesameobject,howcanAvabelieveonethinganddisbelievetheother?GiventhatHesperusandPhosphorusapplytothesameobject,itwouldseemthatHesperusisshiningistrueifandonlyifPhosphorusisshiningistrueandthatthesetwosentencesexpressoneandthesameproposition.IfwhatisessentialtothepropositionthatAvabelievesisthatitisaboutHesperusandthepropertyofshining,howcanshebelieveonethingandfailtobelievetheothersincebothareaboutHesperus?

Anotherrelatedpuzzleisthepuzzleofhowidentitystatementscanbothbetrueandinformative.ItseemsclearthatAvacouldnotdoubtthatHesperusisHesperusexpressesatruth.ButitseemsclearthatshecaninfactshedoesdoubtthatHesperusisPhosphorusexpressesatruth.Infact,whenshelearnsthatHesperusisPhosphorusdoesexpressatruth,sheissurprised.Howcanitbe?(SeeRichard1990andSalmon1986.)

Frege(1892)offeredaveryinfluentialsolutiontobothpuzzles.Thiscommonsolutionisbasedonhisfamousdistinctionbetweenthereference(orBedeutung)andthesense(orSinn)ofanEnglishpropername.Thesense,whichisthemodeofpresentationofthereference,ispresumablysomethingabstractthatcanbothbeinstantiatedbyaconcreteindividualandpresentto,orgraspedby,amind.ThisdistinctionisinsomewaysreminiscentofthedistinctionbetweenextensionandintensionandisinconsistentwithJohnStuartMill's(1884)viewthatpropernameshaveadenotationandnoconnotation.

Thereason(3)and(4)can,onFrege'sview,havedifferenttruthvaluesisthattheembeddedsentencesorthatclausesin(3)and(4)namely(5)and(6)donotexpressoneandthesameproposition.Theyexpressdifferentpropositions(orthoughts).FregeusestheGermanGedankeforthought.

5. Hesperusisshining.6. Phosphorusisshining.

Howcan(5)and(6)expressdifferentpropositions?Unlikenonordinarycontextssuchas(3)and(4),inwhichtheyarepartofanembeddedthatclause,inordinarycontextssuchas(5)and(6),HesperusandPhosphorushavethesameBedeutung(orreference).Buttheyhavedifferentsenses(Sinn)ordifferentmodesofpresentationoftheircommonreference.OntheFregeanview,whatisessentialtothethoughtorpropositionexpressedbyanutteranceofasentencecontainingasingulartermisitssense,notitsreference.Propositionshavesenses,notindividuals,asconstituents.Avalacksapieceofknowledge.Butgiventhatignoranceisnotirrationality,AvacanrationallybelievethatHesperusisshiningandfailtobelievethatPhosphorusisshining.Similarly,astatementexpressingabeliefaboutidentitycanbothbetrueandinformativebecausethetwosingulartermsthatflanktheidentitysigninanidentitystatementhavebothasenseandareference.Theidentitystatementistruebecausetheyhavethesamereference.Itisinformativebecausetheyhavedifferentsensesortheypresenttheircommonreferenceviadifferentmodesofpresentation.

OntheFregeanview,in(3)and(4),HesperusandPhosphorusdonothavetheirordinaryreference(orBedeutung),namelytheplanettowhichtheybothapply:theyhaveanobliquereference.In(3),theobliquereferenceofHesperusisitsordinarysense.In(4),theobliquereferenceofPhosphorusisitsordinarysense.AndwealreadyagreedthatHesperusandPhosphorusin(5)and(6)havedifferentordinarysenses.Soin(3),Hesperushasanobliqueorindirectsense,whichisthemodeofpresentationoftheordinarysenseHesperushasin(5).Similarly,in(4)Phosphorushasanobliquesense,whichisthemodeofpresentationoftheordinarysensePhosphorushasin(5).OntheFregeanview,athoughtorbeliefcanbeaboutaconcreteindividual(itsreference),butwhatmatterstotheindividuation(ortheidentity)ofthethought'scontentisnotthereferenceofthesingularterm,butthesenseormodeofpresentationofthereference,i.e.,somethingabstract.Forfurtherdiscussion,seetheentryonGottlobFrege.



5.Truenegativeexistentialbeliefs

WhenBrentanoreflectedonthequasirelationalnatureoftheintentionalityofthoughtsaboutthingsthatneednotexist,hewrotethatifoneisdenyingsomething,theexistenceoftheobjectispreciselywhatisexcludedwhenever[one's]denialiscorrect.Hethusassumedthatonecancorrectlyandcoherentlydenytheexistenceofthingsthatdonotexist.Toshowthatonecandoso,however,isnoeasytask.TheversionofthepuzzlethatexercisedbothAlexiusMeinong(adiscipleofBrentano's)andBertrandRussellattheturnofthetwentiethcenturyisthepuzzleoftruenegativeexistentialbeliefs.HowcanapersoncorrectlybelievethatPegasusdoesnotexist?ForapersontocorrectlybelievethatPegasusdoesnotexist,shemusthaveabeliefwhosecontentisthesameasthecontentexpressedbyatrueutteranceofsentence(7).

7. Pegasusdoesnotexist.

Howcanthepropositionexpressedbyanutteranceof(7)bebothtrueandaboutPegasus?Thepuzzlearisesfromtheobservationthatifthepropositionistrue,thenpresumablyitisnotaboutPegasussinceitsaysthatPegasusdoesnotexist.Conversely,ifitisaboutPegasus,thenPegasusmustexist.Butifso,thenitcannotbetruesinceitdeniestheexistenceofPegasus.Thus,thepuzzlehastheformofadilemma:eitherthepropositionexpressedby(7)isfalseoritisnotaboutPegasus.Atleast,thepuzzleisgeneratedbythepairofassumptionsthatPegasusisapropernameandthatpropernamesmusthaveareference.Isthefirstassumptionright?

Inhis1905paper,Ondenoting,RussellembracedtheviewthatneitherPegasusnorinfactmostpropernamesofnaturallanguagesaregenuinelogicalpropernames.Heheldtheepistemologicalviewthatunlessoneisdirectlyacquaintedwithsomething,onecannotuseinthoughtorlanguageagenuinelogicalpropernamereferringtoit.Norcanoneentertainagenuinesingularthoughtaboutit.Ifoneisnotdirectlyacquaintedwithanobject,thenonemustinsteadformageneralthoughtthatisnotaboutanyparticularindividual.Infact,Russell's(1911,1919)heldadualviewofacquaintance:ontheonehand,hethoughtthatacquaintanceisarelationthatcanonlyholdbetweensomeone'smindandhisorherownsensedata.Ontheotherhand,heheldtheviewthatonecanbeacquaintedwithuniversals(suchase.g.,colors).Ifmostifnotallnamesofnaturallanguagesarenotgenuinelogicalnames,thenwhataretheyandwhatistheirfunctioninhumanthoughtandcommunication?OnRussell'sview,theyaredisguisedorabbreviateddefinitedescriptions,i.e.,theyareshortforsomedefinitedescription.Theirlogicalfunctionisthatofadefinitedescription.

Onthefaceofit,thegrammaticalformofthequasiEnglishsentencetheFisGindicatesthatitservestoexpressasubjectpredicate(orsingular)propositiontrueifandonlyiftheobjectthatexemplifiesthepropertyexpressedbypredicateFalsoexemplifiesthepropertyexpressedbypredicateG.ButRussell(1905)designedamethodhisfamoustheoryofdefinitedescriptionsforeliminatingtheEnglishdefinitearticlethe(asintheF)bymeansofalogicalformulaoffirstorderlogicinvolvingonlyquantifiersandvariables.Onhisanalysis,theFisGcanbeparaphrasedintothegeneralexistentiallyquantifiedproposition(8):

8. x[Fx&y(Fyy=x)&Gx]

(8)istrueifandonlyifthereisoneandonlyoneindividualthatisFandG.ThispropositionwillbefalsejustincasenothingormorethanonethingisbothFandG.

CombinedwiththeassumptionthatPegasusisnotanamebutadisguiseddefinitedescriptionthatitisshortfore.g.,thewingedhorseRussell'stheoryofdefinitedescriptionsthusleadstoasolutiontothepuzzleoftruenegativeexistentialbeliefs.Thesolutionistoacceptthesecondhornofthedilemma:thepropositionisnotaboutPegasus.Onthisaccount,onecancorrectlybelievethatPegasusdoesnotexist,sincewhatonebelievesiswhatisexpressedbyanutteranceof(7),namelythetruepropositionthattheredoesnotexistauniqueindividualthatisawingedhorse.Clearly,Russell's



solutiontothepuzzleoftruenegativeexistentialbeliefsshowshow,inBrentano'sownterms,ifsomeonethinksofsomething,theonewhoisthinkingmustcertainlyexist,buttheobjectofhisthinkingneednotexistatallandfurthermorethethoughtmaybetrue.Forfurtherdiscussion,seetheentryonBertrandRussell.

6.Directreference

Withintheorthodoxparadigminthephilosophyofmindandlanguageofthe1960'sand1970's,therewasanimportantswingofthependulumawayfromtheimplicationsofFrege'sandespeciallyRussell'sdoctrinesforintentionality.ThesocalledtheoryofdirectreferencehascontributedtorehabilitatetheviewthatconcreteindividualsmattermoretotheidentityofthesingularthoughtsthathumansentertainthantheFrege/Russelldoctrinesallow.AccordingtoFrege'sdistinctionbetweensenseandreference,whatmatterstotheidentityofathoughtaboutaconcreteindividualisnottheindividualthoughtaboutbuttheabstractsensebymeansofwhichheisthoughtabout.AccordingtoRussell,mostthoughtsthatseemprimafacietobeaboutconcreteindividualsareinfactnotsingularthoughtsbutgenerallyquantifiedpropositions.Muchoftheimpetusforthetheoryofdirectreferencecamefromtheimplicationsofthesemanticsofmodallogicfortheintentionalityofsingularthoughtsandbeliefs.

SaulKripke(1972)noticedanimportantdifferencebetweenthebehaviorofapropernameandthebehaviorofacoreferentialdefinitedescriptionexpressingacontingentornonessentialpropertyofitsreferent,inmodalcontexts.Considertwosentences(9)and(10),eachcontainingsomemodaloperatorlikemight(thatexpressesapossibility)andsuchthattheformercontainsapropernamewhilethelattercontainsacoreferentialdefinitedescription:

9. JacquesChiracmighthavebeenaSocialist.10. ThepresidentofFranceelectedin2002mighthaveabeenaSocialist.

ThedefinitedescriptionthepresidentofFranceelectedin2002happenstobetrueofJacquesChiracofwhomitexpressesacontingentproperty.TherecertainlyexistsametaphysicallypossibleworldinwhicheitherChiracwasnotacandidateinthe2002Frenchpresidentialelectionsorhewasacandidatebuthelosttheelection.

Anutteranceof(9)assertsthatthereexistsapossibleworldinwhichJacquesChiracisamemberoftheSocialistparty,whichheinfactisnot.Giventhedeepconnectionbetweenthespeechactofassertionandspeaker'sbelief,anutteranceof(9)expressesthecounterfactualbeliefaboutChiracthathecouldhavebeenaSocialist.Unlikeanutteranceof(9),anutteranceof(10)isambiguous.Ononereading,ithasthesametruthconditionsasdoesanutteranceof(9)anditservestoexpressthesamebelief.Alternatively,anutteranceof(10)saysofsomeonewhoisinfactaSocialist,andwhothereforeisnotChirac,thathecouldhavebeenelectedpresidentin2002.

Thus,thefollowingcontrastemerges.Anutteranceof(9)canonlyservetoexpressacounterfactualbelieforthoughtaboutChirac,i.e.,thebeliefascribingtoChiracthecounterfactualpropertyofbeingaSocialist.Anutteranceof(10)canservetoexpressthesamebeliefaboutChirac.Butitcanalsoservetoexpressanentirelydifferentcounterfactualbeliefaboutadifferentindividual,whoasamatteroffacthappenstobeaSocialist.Thisdifferentcounterfactualbeliefwouldbetruee.g.,inapossibleworldinwhichJospin(whoisaSocialist)wonthe2002presidentialelections.

Onthebasisofthefactthat,unlike(9),(10)canservetoexpresstwodistinctcounterfactualbeliefs,Kripke(1972)hypothesizesthatapropernameiswhathecallsarigiddesignator.JacquesChiracin(9)isrigidforinallpossibleworldsitreferstooneandthesameconcreteindividual,i.e.,theindividualtowhomitinfactrefersintheactualworld.Bycontrast,thedefinitedescriptionthepresidentofFranceelectedin2002,whichhappenstoexpressacontingentpropertyofChirac,isnotarigiddesignatorbecauseitdoesnotpickoneandthesameindividualinallpossibleworlds.When



evaluatedwithrespecttodifferentworlds,itistrueofdifferentindividuals.Ofcourse,somedefinitedescriptions(e.g.,thesquarerootof21)doexpressessentialpropertiesofwhattheyaretrueof(inthiscase,anumber).AccordingtoKripke(1980),unlikepropernames,whoserigidityisdejure,definitedescriptionsexpressingessentialpropertiesofanobjectarerigiddefacto.Forfurtherdiscussion,seetheentryonreference.

Arguably,thegoalofthetheoryofdirectreferenceistoemphasizethedepthofthegapbetweentheintentionalityofsingularthoughtsandtheintentionalityofgeneralthoughts.Concreteindividualsarenotconstituentsofthecontentsofthelatter.Buttheyareconstituentsofthecontentsoftheformer.ThreeargumentshavebeenbuttressedtodismantletheRusselliandisdainforthepeculiarintentionalityofsingularthoughtsexpressiblebypropernames:amodalargument,anepistemologicalargumentandwhatcanbecalledatranscendentalargument.

Accordingtothemodalargument,ifthepropernameCicerowerejustshortforsomedefinitedescription,e.g.,theRomanoratorwhodenouncedCatiline,thenitwouldfollowthatthesentenceCiceroistheRomanoratorwhodenouncedCatilinewouldexpressanecessarytruth,i.e.,apropositiontrueinallpossibleworlds.Butthisseemsabsurd:therecertainlyisapossibleworldinwhichCicerodidnotdenounceCatiline.

Accordingtotheepistemologicalargument,fromthesameassumption,itfollowsthatthesentenceCiceroistheRomanoratorwhodenouncedCatilineexpressesapropositionknowableapriori,sothatitmakesnosensetoimaginethathistoriansmaydiscoverbyempiricalresearchthatinfactsomebodyelsedenouncedCatilineorthatnobodydid.Butthistooseemsabsurd.

Finally,accordingtothetranscendentalargument,peopleusepropernamesinthoughtandinverbalcommunicationtotrack,pickoutandexchangevaluableinformationaboutconcreteparticulars.Althoughtheymaylackinformationexpressiblebysomedefinitedescriptionletalonebyasingledefinitedescriptionforuniquelyidentifyingmanyconcreteparticulars,stillpeoplemanagetosecurereferencetothem.Furthermore,asapersoncomestolearnmoreandmoreinformationaboutanobjectoraperson,shecomestoassociatedifferentdefinitedescriptionstothereferentofapropername.Iffollowsthatnoonedefinitedescriptionseemssuitabletocapturethecontentofapropername.

Accordingtothetheoryofdirectreference,thefunctionofsuchlinguisticdevicesaspropernames,indexicalsanddemonstrativesistointroduceaconcreteindividualorparticularintothepropositionand/orbeliefexpressed.TouseDavidKaplan's(1979,387)revealingword,aconcreteindividualistrappedwithinasingularproposition.ThetheoryofdirectreferenceseemslikeausefulantidoteagainsttheFrege/Russelltendencytominimizethecontributionofconcreteparticularstotheindividuationofhumansingularthoughts.Threetrendsofthoughtsinrecentphilosophyofmindandlanguagehavebuiltonthetheoryofdirectreference.First,manyoftheinsightsofthetheoryofdirectreferencehavebeenextendedfromthoughtsaboutconcreteindividualstothoughtsaboutnaturalkindsbyKripke(1972)andPutnam(1974).Thisextensionplaysacrucialroleintheexternalistviewofintentionalmentalstates(aboutwhichseesection10).Secondly,neoFregeanshaverespondedtothechallengeofthetheoryofdirectreferencebyprovidingasuitablenotionofobjectdependentorderesense(seeEvans,1982andMcDowell,1984).(ForaresponsetoFrege'spuzzleabouthowtwodistinctbeliefscanbeaboutthesameobjectonbehalfofthetheoryofdirectreference,seeSalmon,1986).Thirdly,themetaphysicalandepistemologicalunderpinningsofsingularthoughts(andsingularpropositions)havegivenrisetoarichdiscussionofthecontrastbetweentwobroadperspectives:descriptivismandsingularism.Accordingtodescriptivism,wecanonlythinkaboutobjectsbythinkingaboutthepropertieswhichtheyinstantiate.Butaccordingtosingularism,notallthoughtsaboutobjectsaremediatedbythoughtsabouttheirproperties.Forfurtherdiscussion,seethepaperscollectedinJeshion(ed.)(2010),inparticularRecanati(2010).

7.Arethereintentionalobjects?



Sections4,5and6describedthreemovesmadewithintheorthodoxparadigminanalyticphilosophyinresponsetopuzzlesraisedbytheintentionalityofsingularthoughtsaboutconcreteparticulars.Inparticular,thedisputebetweenthetheoryofdirectreferenceandeithertheFregeandistinctionbetweensenseandreferenceortheRussellianassumptionthatordinarypropernamesaredisguiseddefinitedescriptionscanbeseenasinternaltotheorthodoxparadigmaccordingtowhichthereareonlyexistingobjects,i.e.,concreteparticularsinspaceandtime.Brentano,however,sketchedthepossibilityofanalternativeparadigmbasedontheacceptanceoftheviewthatintentionalobjectsmaybenonexistentobjectsorabstractobjects.(ForageneralsurveyoftheroleofBrentanointheemergenceofthenonorthodoxtheoryofintentionalobjectsinAustrianphilosophy,seeSmith,1994.)

ToseehowthetheoryofintentionalobjectsflowsfromBrentano'scharacterizationofintentionality,recall(fromsection2)thatitfollowsfromthenatureofintentionality(asdescribedbyBrentano'sfirstthesis)thatnothingcouldexhibitintentionalityunlesstherewereobjectsintentionalobjectsthatsatisfiedthepropertyBrentanocalledintentionalinexistence.ConsiderthefollowinginferenceschemalicensedbytheruleofexistentialgeneralizationandinstantiatedbythenonintentionalrelationexpressedbytheEnglishverbkissin(11):

11a.CleopatrakissedCaesar.11b.Cleopatrakissedsomething.

If(11a)istrue,sois(11b).Thequestionis:isthisvalidinferenceschemaalsoinstantiatedbythefollowingpairs(12)(15)involvingintentionalrelations?

12a.CleopatralovedCaesar.12b.Cleopatralovedsomething.

13a.TheAncientGreeksworshipedZeus.13b.TheAncientGreeksworshipedsomething.

14a.PoncedeLeonsearchedforthefountainofyouth.14b.PoncedeLeonsearchedforsomething.

15a.ModerncriminologistsadmireSherlockHolmes.15b.Moderncriminologistsadmiresomething.

Ontheonehand,unlike(11),(12)(15)involveintentionalrelations.Ontheotherhand,unliketheintentionalrelationin(12),theintentionalrelationsin(13)(15)seemtoinvolveparticularswhichdon'texist(orhaven'texisted)inspaceandtime.Intentionalobjecttheoristsholdthattheaboveinferencesinvolvingbothnonintentionalandintentionalrelationsconstitutedatathatcallforaconsistentexplanation.Inotherwords,theintentionalobjecttheoristaccepts,whereashiscriticrejects,theunrestrictedvalidityoftheruleofexistentialgeneralizationforbothintentionalandnonintentionalrelations,whethertherelataoftheintentionalrelationsareconcreteparticularsinspaceandtimeornot.Onthenonorthodoxassumptionthattheinferenceschemainstantiatedby(11)canbeinstantiatedby(12)(15)aswell,theninlogicalnotation,thesecondcoordinateofeverypair(11)(15)shouldbesymbolizedthus:

11c.x(Cleopatrakissedx)12c.x(Cleopatralovedx)13c.x(AncientGreeksworshipedx)14c.x(PoncedeLeonsearchedforx)15c.x(Moderncriminologistsadmirex)

Thus,theissuebetweentheintentionalobjecttheoristandhiscriticiswhetherthevariableboundby



thestandardexistentialquantifieroffirstorderlogicshouldrangenotmerelyoverconcreteparticularsexistinginspaceandtimebutalsooverallsortsofotherentitiesaswell.Notethattheissueisorthogonaltothecontrastbetweentheobjectualandthesubstitutionalinterpretationoftheexistentialquantifiersincethedisputeovertheadmissionofintentionalobjectsiswhollyinternaltotheobjectualinterpretationofthequantifier.Thequestionthatarisesfortheintentionalobjecttheoristis:whatisthebesttheoryoftheobjectsoverwhich(13c)(15c)seemtoquantify?

Meinong(1904)supposedthatobjectslikeZeus,thefountainofyouth,SherlockHolmes,etc.,arenonexistentobjectswhichexemplifythepropertiesattributedtothem.Onhisview,thefountainofyouthisanobjectthatinstantiatesboththepropertyofbeingafountainandthatofhavingwaterswhichconfereverlastinglife.Butitfailstoinstantiatethepropertyofexistence.Meinongseemedtosupposethatforanygroupofproperties,thereisanobjectwhichinstantiatesthoseproperties.Someoftheresultingobjectsexistandothersdonot.Russell(1905)foundthisviewofintentionalobjectsontologicallyunacceptablesinceitinvolvestheacceptanceofentitiessuchasgoldenmountains(whichareinconsistentwithphysicalandchemicallaws)androundsquares(whichareinconsistentwiththelawsofgeometry).Histheoryofdefinitedescriptionswaspreciselydesignedtoavoidtheseontologicalconsequences(seesection5).However,byclarifyingdistinctionsproposedbybothMeinongandhisstudentErnstMally,Parsons(1980)hasrecentlyofferedatheoryofnonexistentobjects,whichisbasedontheassumptionthatexistenceisaspecialkindofproperty.Thistheoryusesaquantifier,whichdoesnotimplyexistence.Toassertexistence,heusesthepredicateE!.Thus,theassertionthattherearenonexistentobjectscanberepresentedinParsons'theorywithoutcontradictionbythelogicalformulax(~E!x).Furthermore,Parsonsdistinguishesbetweennuclearandextranuclearproperties.Onlytheformer,whichareordinary,nonintentionalkindsofproperties,contributetoindividuatingobjects.Thesetofextranuclearpropertiesinvolveintentionalproperties,modalpropertiesandexistence.Armedwiththisdistinctionamongproperties,Parsons(1980)hasbeenabletoavoidRussell'sobjectionstoMeinong'snaivetheoryofintentionalobjects.(Forfurtherdetails,seeParsons,1980.)Anoriginalaccountofthepossibilityofentertainingtruethoughtsaboutnonexistentobjects,basedonthecontrastbetweenpleonastic(orrepresentationdependent)andnonpleonastic(naturalorsubstantial)properties,hasbeendevelopedbyCrane(2013).

Thetheoryofintentionalobjectshasalsobeendevelopedinaslightlydifferentway.Meinong'sstudentErnstMally(1912)proposedthatfictionalandmythicalobjects,aswellasobjectslikeroundsquares,donotinstantiatethepropertiesattributedtothembuthavethosepropertiesinadifferentway.ForMally,thefountainofyouthisdeterminedbythepropertiesofbeingafountainandhavingwaterswhichconfereverlastinglife,butthisobjectdoesn'tinstantiatethosepropertiesinthetraditionalsense.GivenMally'sdistinction,thefactthatthereisanobjectwhichisdeterminedbythepropertiesofbeinggoldenandofbeingamountaindoesnotcontradictthecontingentfactthatnothinginstantiatesthesetwoproperties,nordoesMallyhavetothinkofintentionalobjectsasnonexistent.Rather,hetreatsthemasexistingabstractobjects.Thus,whereasParsonsusestwokindsofpropertiestodevelopatheoryofnonexistentobjects,aneoMallyansuchasZalta(1988)usestwokindsofpredicationexemplification(whichcorrespondstoinstantiation)andencoding(whichcorrespondstoMally'snotionofdetermination)todevelopatheoryofabstractobjects.Theseabstractobjectsarepartoftheexplanationsofboththetruthsexpressedby(13a)(15a)andthevalidityoftheinferencesin(13a,b)(15a,b).Assuch,abstractobjectsmaywellexist.Nonetheless,someabstractobjects(e.g.,SherlockHolmesandZeus)maybesaidnottoexistinthesensethatnothingexemplifiesthepropertieswhichtheyencode.

ThoughQuine's(1948)wellknownpaperOnwhatthereis,raisesseriousontologicalquestionsforintentionalobjecttheories,bothParsonsandZaltahaveprovidedanswerstoQuine'squeries,intheirrespectivework.Nonetheless,tothisday,manycontemporaryphilosophershavebeenreluctanttoembraceintentionalobjecttheoriesfortworelatedreasons.Firstofall,theyhavebeeneagertoavoidwhattheyseeastheheavyontologicalcommitmentsincurredbyintentionalobjecttheories.Secondly,theontologyofnonexistentandabstractobjectshasseemeddifficulttosquarewiththe



ontologyofthecontemporarynaturalsciencesaccordingtowhichtheworldcontainsonlyconcreteobjectsthatexistinspaceandtime.(SeeSection9forfurtherdiscussion.)

Thetheoryofintentionalobjects,however,mayderivesupportfromthefollowing,arguablycounterintuitive,consequencesofFrege'sandRussell'sviews,respectively.Frege'stheoryfacestwoproblems.First(13a)(15a)wouldappeartoexpresstruths.ButonFrege'sview,theylackatruthvalue,sincetheyinvolvesingulartermsdevoidofreferenceand,accordingtoFrege,ifpartofasentencelacksareference,thenthesentenceitselffailstohaveatruthvalue(seesection4).Secondly,theinferencesin(13)(15)appeartobevalid.ButonFrege'sview,onecannotvalidlyinfer(13b)from(13a)if(13a)hasnotruthvalue.Similarlyfortheotherpairofsentences(14)and(15).Russell'sviewfacestwoanalogousproblems.First,asnotedabove,(13a)(15a)appeartobetrue.ButonRussell'sanalysis,propernamessuchasZeusin(13a)andSherlockHolmesin(15a)areabbreviateddefinitedescriptionsand,givenhisanalysisofdefinitedescriptions,both(13a)and(15a)turnouttoexpressfalseexistentiallyquantifiedpropositions(seesection5).Secondly,if(13a)(15a)areindeedfalse,asRussell'sviewwouldhaveit,thenonecannotvalidlyinfer(13b)(15b),respectively,fromtheircorrespondingpremisses.Forarecentnovelaccountofthedistinctionbetweentrueandfalsethoughtsaboutnonexistentobjects,cf.Crane(2013)andforfurtherdiscussionofthegeneraltopicofexistence,seetheSEPentryonexistence.

8.Isintensionalityacriterionofintentionality?

Withintheorthodoxparadigm,anentirelydifferentreactiontothepuzzlesofintentionalinexistencehasbeentotrytoclarifytheontologicaldifficultiesbyascendingtoahighersemanticlevelthatcan,asWillardVanOrmanQuine(1960,272)says,carrythediscussionintoadomainwherebothpartiesarebetteragreedontheobjects(viz.,words).Semanticascentallowsonetorisefromtalkaboutthingstotalkabouttalkaboutthings,i.e.,words.Incontemporaryanalyticphilosophy,RoderickChisholm(1957,298)wasthefirsttocontemplatetheformulationofaworkingcriterionbymeansofwhichwecandistinguishsentencesthatareintentional,orareusedintentionally,inacertainlanguagefromsentencesthatarenot.Theideaistoexaminesentencesthatreportintentionalityratherthanintentionalityitself.

Intensionality(withans)isnonextensionality.Twofeaturesarecharacteristicofextensionality.First,ifalinguisticcontextisextensional,twocoreferentialtermscanbesubstitutedonefortheothersalvaveritateasillustratedby(16)and(17):

16. Hesperusshines.17. Phosphorusshines.

If(16)istrue,sois(17).Secondly,thelawofexistentialgeneralizationappliestoeither(16)or(17)toyieldx(xshines).Notsowithintensionality.Asillustratedbyexamples(3)and(4)repeatedhere,thetruthof(3)doesnotalwaysentailthetruthof(4):

3. AvabelievesthatHesperusisshining.4. AvabelievesthatPhosphorusisshining.

Norcanexistentialgeneralizationalwaysbevalidlyappliedtosentencesreportingbeliefs,sincefromthefactthatJohnbelievesthatangelshavewings,itdoesnotfollowthattherearethingssuchthatJohnbelievesofthemthattheyhavewings.

Chisholm'scriterionofintensionalityisthreefold.First,asentencereportsanintentionalphenomenonifitcontainsasingulartermthatpurportstorefertosomeobjectanditissuchthatneitheritnoritsnegationimpliesthatthepurportedreferenceofthesingulartermdoesordoesnotexist.Thefirstcriterionamountstotherecognitionthatifasentencecontainingasingulartermreportsanintentional



phenomenon,thenitfailstosatisfythelawofexistentialgeneralization(fromFainferxFx).Secondly,atruesentencereportsanintentionalphenomenonifitcontainsasingulartermaandifreplacementofabycoreferentialtermbresultsintransformingthetruesentenceintoafalsesentencethatdiffersonlyfromtheformerinthatbreplacesa.Thesecondcriterionamountstorecognitionthatifasentencecontainingasingulartermreportsanintentionalphenomenon,thenitfailsthetestofthesubstitutivityofcoreferentialtermssalvaveritate.Finally,ifacomplexsentencecontaininganembeddedthatclausereportsanintentionalphenomenon,thenneitheritnoritsnegationentailthetruthofthepropositionexpressedbytheembeddedthatclause.

Chisholm(1957)arguedthatreportsordescriptionsofintentionalorpsychologicalphenomenacannotbereducedto(oreliminatedinfavorof)descriptionsofbehavior.Theintensionalityornonextensionalityofreportsofintentionalitywastakentoshowthatdescriptionsandexplanationsofpsychologicalphenomenacannotbedescribednorexplainedintermsofavocabularydescribingnonintentionalphenomena.AsQuine(1960,220)putit,thereisnobreakingoutoftheintentionalvocabularybyexplainingitsmembersinotherterms.Chisholm(1957)tookthisconclusiontoshowthecorrectnessofBrentano'ssecondthesisthatintentionalityisthemarkofthemental.

Thequestioncanbedecomposedintotwoquestions.Ontheonehand,bymakingintensionalitythecriterionofintentionality,oneineffectespousesagenerallinguisticviewofintentionality.Whatmatterstothenonlinguisticstatereportedarethepropertiesofthelinguisticreport.Thereareatleasttworeasonsforscepticismaboutthelinguisticviewofintentionality.Ontheotherhand,therearesomespecificreasonsforquestioningtwoofChisholm'scriteria.Istartwiththelatter.Itseemshardtodenythatstatesofknowledgearestateswithintentionality.Atleast,reportsofknowledgestatessatisfyChisholm'ssecondnonsubstitutivitycriterion.Fromthefactthatknowledgeascription(18)istrue,itdoesnotfollowthat(19)is,eventhoughCiceroandTullyarecoreferential:

18. TomknowsthatCicerodenouncedCatiline.19. TomknowsthatTullydenouncedCatiline.20. CicerodenouncedCatiline.

However,unlikebeliefreports,reportsofknowledgearefactive:(18)couldnotbetrueunless(20)wastrueandCicerodidinfactdenounceCatiline.Thus,unlikebeliefreports,reportsofknowledgefailChisholm'sthirdcriterion.Giventhat(20)isextensional,itobeysthelawofexistentialgeneralization.Ifthetruthof(20)followsfromthetruthof(18)andif(20)satisfiesthelawofexistentialgeneralization,thensodoes(18).Ifso,thenknowledgereportsalsofailtosatisfyChisholm'sfirstcriterion.

Onewaytodealwiththisobjectionmightbetoarguethatknowledgereportsfailthetestofexistentialgeneralizationpreciselybecause,unlikebeliefstates,statesofknowledgefailtoexhibitBrentano'sintentionalinexistence:onlybeliefs,notstatesofknowledge,canbedirectedtowardsstatesofaffairsthatfailtoobtainandtowardsnonexistententities.Alternatively,onemightmakeadistinctionbetweenstateswithastrongerandstateswithaweakerintentionality.Reportsoftheformer(likebeliefs)satisfyChisholm'sthreecriteria.Reportsofthelatter(likestatesofknowledge)onlyfailthesubstitutivitytest.

Theproblemwiththisstrategyisthattherearesentencesthatseemtodescribeintentionalrelationsandthat,unlikeknowledgereports,arenotintensionalatall,fortheypassthesubstitutivitytest.ThisisthecaseofsentencesaboutwhatFredDretske(1969)callsnonepistemicperception.If,whenhewasalive,someonesawtheFrenchwriterRomainGary,thensheipsofactosawAjar,forAjarwasnootherthanRomainGary.However,ifshefailedtoknowthatAjarwasanothernameforRomainGary,whileseeingRomainGary,shemayhavefailedtoseethatthemaninfrontofherwasAjar.Afortiori,inthisnonepistemicsense,onecannotseeanindividualunlessthereisanindividualtobeseen.Onepossibleresponsemightbetobitethebulletanddenythatnonepistemicperceptionisanintentionalstateatall.Ifso,then,asZalta(1988,13)notes,linguisticreportsofintentional



phenomenadosatisfyatleastoneofChisholm'scriteriaofintensionality.

Ifseeingisintentional,thennotallreportsofintentionalityareintensional.Thatnotallreportsofintentionalityareintensionalisaproblemforthelinguisticviewaccordingtowhichintensionalityisthecriterionofintentionality.Asecondproblemisthatintensionalityisalsoafeatureofsentencesthatareaboutphenomenaotherthanintentionality.Sentencesthatinvolveorareaboutmodalitiessuchasnecessity,aboutnaturallaws,aboutcausationallexhibitintensionality.So,forexample,thetruthof(21)doesnotentailthetruthof(22)eventhougheverythingthathappenstoexemplifypropertyQhappenstoexemplifypropertyR:

21. ItisanaturallawthatallPsareQ.22. ItisanaturallawthatallPsareR.

Butnecessity,naturallawsorcausationdonot,onthefaceofit,exhibitwhatBrentanotooktobedefiningcharacteristicsofintentionality.Soitseemsasiftheintensionalityofthereportofaphenomenonisneithernecessarynorsufficientfortheintentionalityofthereportedphenomenon.Arguably,P,QandRin(21)(22)arenotsingulartermsatall.Iftheyaretreatedassuch,then,eventhoughtheymaybetrueofthesamesetofindividuals,theydonotreferorexpressoneandthesameproperty.Still,thepointillustratedbynomicityisthattheintensionalityofalinguisticreportisnotsufficientfortheintentionalityofthereportedphenomenon.

9.Canintentionalitybenaturalized?

Aswesawinsection8,Quine(1960,220),aleadingcriticofintentionalobjects(inthesenseofsection7),agreeswithChisholm(1957)thattheintentionalvocabularycannotbereducedtosomenonintentionalvocabulary.Chisholm(1957)tookthisconclusiontoshowthecorrectnessofBrentano'ssecondthesisthatintentionalityisthemarkofthemental.Fromthesameconclusion,Quine(1960,221)presentedaninfluentialdilemmawithbothepistemologicalandontologicalimplications.Thefirsthornofthedilemmaistoaccepttheindispensabilityofintentionalidiomsandtheimportanceofanautonomousscienceofintentionandtorejectaphysicalistontology.Thesecondhornofthesamedilemmaistoacceptphysicalismandrenouncethebaselessnessoftheintentionalidiomsandtheemptinessofascienceofintention.Thisdilemmahasbeeninfluentialincontemporaryphilosophyofmind.

ThecommonlegacyofChisholm(1957)andQuine(1960)isthelinguisticviewofintentionality(acceptedbye.g.,Dennett1969).Whetherintensionalityisindeedthedefiningcriterionofintentionality,onecancertainlyquestionBrentano'sthesisthatonlymentalphenomenaexhibitintentionalitybynoticingthatsomenonmentalthingsexhibitsomethingverymuchlikeBrentano'sintentionalinexistence,namelysentencesofnaturallanguages.Sentencesofnaturallanguageshavemeaningandbyvirtueofhavingmeaning,theycanbe,justlikestatesofmind,directedtowardsthingsotherthanthemselves,someofwhichneednotexistinspaceandtime.Sentencesofnaturallanguages,however,arenonmentalthings.

OneinfluentialresponsetothisobjectiontothispartofBrentano'ssecondthesishasbeentograntasecondrate,i.e.,adegradedanddependent,intentionalstatustosentences(seeHaugeland1981,Searle1980,1983,1992,Fodor1987).Onthisview,sentencesofnaturallanguageshavenointrinsicmeaningofandbythemselves.Nordoutterancesofsentenceshaveanintrinsiccontent.Sentencesofnaturallanguageswouldfailtohaveanymeaningunlessitwasconferredtothembypeoplewhousethemtoexpresstheirthoughtsandcommunicatethemtoothers.Utterancesborrowwhateverderivedintentionalitytheyhavefromtheoriginal(orprimitive)intentionalityofhumanbeingswithmindsthatusethemfortheirpurposes(seeDennett1987fordissent).If,asJerryFodor(1975,1987,1994,1998,2008)hasargued,thereexistsalanguageofthoughtconsistingofmentalsymbolswithsyntacticandsemanticproperties,thenpossiblythesemanticpropertiesofmentalsymbolsaretheprimarybearersoforiginalintentionality.(SeetheSEPentryforthelanguageof



thoughthypothesis.)

Sothequestionis:doesanynonmentalthingexhibitoriginalintentionality?ThequestionismademorepressingbyQuine'sdilemma:ifBrentano'ssecondthesisiscorrect,thenonemustchoosebetweenitandaphysicalistontology.Socalledeliminativematerialists(seeChurchland1989)resolutelyoptforthesecondhornofQuine'sdilemmaanddenypurelyandsimplytherealityofhumanbeliefsanddesires.Asaconsequenceoftheirdenialoftherealityofbeliefsanddesires,theeliminativematerialistsmustfacethechallengeraisedbytheexistenceofphysicalobjectswhoseexistencedependsontheintentions,beliefsanddesiresoftheirdesigners,i.e.,humanartifacts.Others,likeDanielDennett(1971,1978,1987),whorejectthedistinctionbetweenoriginalandderivedintentionality,takeasocalledinstrumentalistposition.Ontheirview,theintentionalidiomfailstodescribeorexplainanyrealphenomenon.However,intheabsenceofdetailedknowledgeofthephysicallawsthatgovernthebehaviorofaphysicalsystem,theintentionalidiomisausefulstanceforpredictingasystem'sbehavior.Amongphilosophersattractedtoaphysicalistontology,fewhaveacceptedtheoutrighteliminativistmaterialistdenialoftherealityofbeliefsanddesires.Norhavemanyofthemfounditeasytoanswerthepuzzlingquestionraisedbytheinstrumentalistposition:howcantheintentionalidiommakeusefulpredictionsifitfailstodescribeandexplainanythingreal?

Asignificantnumberofphysicalistphilosopherssubscribetothetaskofreconcilingtheexistenceofintentionalitywithaphysicalistontology(foraforcefulexpositionseeField1978,7879).Ontheassumptionthatintentionalityiscentraltothemental,thetaskistoshow,inDennett's(1969,21)terms,thatthereisnotanunbridgeablegulfbetweenthementalandthephysicalorthatonecansubscribetobothphysicalismandintentionalrealism.Becauseintentionalstatesareoforaboutthingsotherthanthemselves,forastatetohaveintentionalityisforittohavesemanticproperties.AsJerryFodor(1984)putit,thenaturalisticworryofintentionalrealistswhoarephysicalistsisthatthesemanticprovespermanentlyrecalcitranttointegrationtothenaturalorder.Giventhatonaphysicalistontology,intentionalityorsemanticpropertiescannotbefundamentalfeaturesoftheworld,thetaskistoshowhowanentirelyphysicalsystemcouldneverthelessexhibitintentionalstates(Fodor,1987).AsDretske(1981)putsit,thetaskistoshowhowtobakeamentalcakeusingonlyphysicalyeastandflour.NoticethatBrentano'sownviewthatnophysicalphenomenonmanifestsintentionalityissimplyunacceptabletoaphysicalist.Ifphysicalismistrue,thensomephysicalthingsarealsomentalthings.Thequestionforaphysicalistis:doesanynonmentalthingmanifestintentionality?

Clearly,onewaytorelievethetensionbetweenphysicalismandintentionalrealismistoarguethatintentionalitycanbe,andinfactis,exhibitedbynonmentalthings.Therehavebeenseveralproposalsinanalyticphilosophyinthepasttwentyyearstosuggestwaysofaccomplishingthisprogram,whichhasbeencalledthenaturalizationofintentionality.ThecommonstrategyistoshowthatBrentanowaswronginclaimingthatonlymentalthingscanexhibitintentionality.Thisstrategyisrelatedtotheassumptionthatintentionalrelationswhoserelataareconcreteparticularsshouldhaveprimacyoverintentionalrelationswhoserelataarenot(seesection6).Ishallillustratetwodistinctproposalsforimplementingthiscommongoal.

OneinfluentialstrategyforshowingthatnonmentalthingscanexhibitintentionalityhasbeenFredDretske's(1980,1981,1994)informationtheoreticproposalthatadevicethatcarriesinformationdoesexhibitsomedegreeofintentionality.TheviewisanextensionofPaulGrice's(1957)notionofnaturalmeaning:unliketheEnglishwordfire,whichnonnaturallymeansfire,smokenaturallymeansfire.Thewordfirecanbetokenedintheabsenceofanyfireeitherforthepurposeofexpressingathoughtaboutwhattodoiftherewasoneorperhapstomisleadsomebodyelseintofalselythinkingthatthereisone.Buttherecannotbeanysmokeunlessthereisafire.Asweshallseemomentarily,itisafeatureofboththeoriginalintentionalityofbeliefsandthederivedintentionalityofutterancesthattheycanbemisrepresentations.

Inessence,theinformationtheoreticproposalisthatdeviceScarriesinformationaboutinstantiations



ofpropertyGifandonlyifS'sbeingFisnomicallycorrelatedwithinstantiationsofG.IfSwouldnotbeFunlesspropertyGwereinstantiated,thenS'sbeingFcarriesinformationabout,orasDretskelikestosay,indicatesGness.Afingerprintcarriesinformationabouttheidentityofthehumanbeingwhosefingerwasimprinted.Spotsonahumanfacecarryinformationaboutadisease.Theheightofthecolumnofmercuryinathermometercarriesinformationaboutthetemperature.Agasgaugeonthedashboardofacarcarriesinformationabouttheamountoffuelinthecartank.Thepositionofaneedleinagalvanometercarriesinformationabouttheflowofelectriccurrent.AcompasscarriesinformationaboutthelocationoftheNorthpole.Inallsuchcases,apropertyofaphysicaldevicenomicallycovarieswithsomephysicalpropertyinstantiatedinitsenvironment(forcriticaldiscussionoftheinformationalprogram,seeKistler2000,Loewer1987,1998andPutnam1986).

Now,insofarasitisnotalawthatpolarbearsliveattheNorthpole,eventhoughtheyhappentolivethere,acompasswillfailtocarryinformationaboutwherepolarbearshappentoliveinspiteofthefactthatitdoescarryinformationabouttheNorthpole.Ifso,thenreportsofwhatacompassindicatesexhibitoneofChisholm'sfeaturesofintensionality,namelycoextensivetermsarenotfreelysubstitutablesalvaveritateinsuchreports.Bycontrast,ifitislawthatvariationsoftemperaturecovarywithvariationsinatmosphericpressure,thenbyvirtueofindicatingthetemperature,theheightofthecolumnofmercuryinathermometerwillalsoindicateatmosphericpressure.Ifthereisalawrelatingcurrentflowtovoltagedifferences,thenbyindicatingtheformer,agalvanometerwillindicatethelatter.Onecan,however,believeandevenknowthatthereisacurrentflowbetweentwopointswithoutbelieving,letaloneknowing,thatthereisavoltagedifferencebetweenthetwopoints,ifonefailstoknowthatitisalawthatifthereisflowofelectriccurrentbetweentwopoints,thenthereisavoltagedifferencebetweenthesetwopoints(seeJacob1997fordiscussion).

Soalthoughreportsoftheinformationcarriedbysuchphysicaldevicesexhibitsomeoftheintensionalityexhibitedbyreportsofintentionalmentalstates,theintensionalityexhibitedbythelatterisclearlystrongerthantheintensionalityexhibitedbytheformer.Ontheonehand,itisdifficulttogeneratethestrongintentionalityofmentalstatesfromtheinformationtheoreticaccountoftheweakintentionalityofnonmentalthings.Ontheotherhand,giventhattheinformationrelationistheconverseofanomiccorrelation,itisdifficultforinformationalsemanticstoaccountformisrepresentationaswellasforthenormativityofthecontentsofmentalstates.Seetheentryoncausaltheoriesofmentalcontent..

AsecondinfluentialproposalfordealingwiththedifficultiesleftpendingbytheinformationtheoreticapproachandforshowingthatsomenonmentalthingscanexhibitintentionalityhasbeenRuthMillikan's(1984,1993,2000,2004)teleosemanticapproach.Millikan'steleosemanticapproachrestsontwobasicassumptions,thefirstofwhichisthat(unlikeanaturalsign)anintentionalrepresentationisarelatuminathreeplacerelationinvolvingtwomechanisms:aproduceroftherepresentationandaconsumer,bothofwhicharecooperativedeviceswhoseactivitiesarebeneficialtoboth.Millikan'ssecondassumptionisthatBrentano'srelationofintentionalinexistenceisexhibitedbybiologicalfunctions.Givenanysortofbiologicalpurposeordesign,itmightfailtobefulfilled.Forexample,ifitisthefunctionorpurposeofamammal'shearttopumpblood,thenamammal'sheartoughttopumpbloodeventhoughitmightfailtodoso.Notice,however,thatwhereasbiologicalorganshavefunctionsthatmayfailtobefulfilled,theydonotipsofactoexhibitintentionalityinBrentano'sfullsense:neitheraheartnorastomachareoforaboutanything.Millikan'sclaim,however,isnotthathavingafunctionissufficientforaboutness,butthatitisnecessary.Arguably,adevicecannotbeaboutorrepresentanythingunlessitcanmisrepresentwhatitisabout.Presumably,foradevicetomisrepresentwhatitisaboutisforittomisfunction.Butunlessthedevicehadsomefunction,itcouldsimplynotmisfunction.Ifthisiscorrect,thennothingcouldbearepresentationalsystemnothingcouldhavecontentorintentionalityunlessithadwhatMillikan(1984)callsaproperfunction.

Therelevantnotionofafunctionhereisthebiologicalteleological,notthedispositionalone:thefunctionofanorganisnotwhattheorganisdisposedtodo,butwhatitwasselectedtodo(see



Millikan1984andNeander1995).Arguably,nothingcanhaveafunctionunlessitresultsfromsomehistoricalprocessofselectionorother.Selectionprocessesaredesignprocesses.Mostadvocatesofteleosemanticsaccepttheetiologicalaccountoffunctionsaccordingtowhichthefunctionofadeviceisaselectedeffect,i.e.aneffectproducedbythedevicethatexplainsthecontinuedproliferationoftokensofthistypeofdevice.Thus,accordingtoteleosemantictheories,designisthemainsourceoffunction,whichinturnisthesourceofcontentorintentionality.Suchtheoriesarecalledteleosemantictheoriesinvirtueoftheconnectionbetweendesignorteleologyandcontent.OnecontentiousissueiswhethertheteleologicalapproachchampionedbyMillikancanbecombinedwithinformationalsemanticssothatScanbesaidtorepresentinstancesofpropertyFifandonlyifitisS'sfunctiontocarryinformationaboutF.Againstthisproposal,Millikan(2004)hasarguedthattheinformationcarriedbyasigndependsonitscauses,notitseffects.Butaccordingtoteleosemanticsandtheetiologicalapproachtofunctions,thefunctionofadeviceisoneofitseffects:itdoesnotdependonitscauses.Forfurtherdiscussion,seetheSEPentryonteleologicaltheoriesofmentalcontentandthepaperscollectedinRyder,KinsburyandWilliford(eds.)(2011).

Now,selectionprocessescanbeintentionalornonintentional.Artifacts(includingwordsandothersymbolsofnaturallanguages)derivetheirfunctionsfromsomeintentionalprocess.Whilepsychologicalmechanisms(e.g.beliefformingmechanisms)derivetheirproperfunctionsfromanonintentionalselectionprocess,particularbeliefstateshavederivedproperfunctions.TheparadigmaticnonintentionalprocessistheprocessofnaturalselectionbywhichCharlesDarwinexplainedthephylogeneticevolutionofbiologicalspecies:naturalselectionsortsorganismsthatsurvive.Butnointentionalagentisresponsibleforthesorting.Millikan(1984,2004,2005)hasalsoextendedherteleosemanticapproachtothecontentsofintentionalconventionalsigns(i.e.linguisticsymbols).Ifthissortofteleosemanticproposalcouldbefullyworkedout,thenitwouldkilltwobirdswithonestone.Ontheonehand,itwouldpointawayinwhichtheintentionalityofmindsderivesfromtheintentionalityofbiologicalthings(seeRowlands1999fordiscussion).Ontheotherhand,itwouldshowthatsomeofthenormativityofmentalstatesisalreadyexhibitedbybiologicalfunctions(seeNeander,1995).Bothquestionsarecurrentlytopicsofmuchdiscussioninthephilosophyofmind.ManyphilosopherssuchasDavidson(1980),Kripke(1982),McDowell(1994)andPutnam(1988,1994),forexample,haveeitherexpressedseriousreservationsabouttheprogramorprovidedreasonsforscepticism.Forfurtherdiscussion,seetheessaysinMacDonaldandPapineau(eds.)(2006)andalsotheentriesonteleologicaltheoriesofmentalcontentandteleologicalnotionsinbiology.

10.Isintentionalityexhibitedbyallmentalphenomena?

Perceptions,beliefs,desiresandintentionsandmanyotherpropositionalattitudesarementalstateswithintentionality.Theyareaboutorrepresentobjectsandstatesofaffairsunderaparticularpsychologicalmodeorformat.Perceptions,beliefs,desiresandintentionsillustrateabasicdualityoftheintentionalityofthemental:thedualitybetweenmindtoworldandworldtominddirectionsoffit.Inordertoclarifythisduality,ElizabethAnscombe(1957,56)considersamereshoppinglist.Thelistmayeitherbeusedasasetofinstructions(orablueprint)foractionbyacustomerinastoreoritcanbeusedasaninventorybyadetectivewhosepurposeistodrawarecordofwhatthecustomerisbuying.Intheformercase,thelistisnottoberevisedinthelightofwhatliesinthecustomer'sgrocerybag.Butinthelattercase,itis.Ifamismatchshouldoccurbetweenthecontentofthegrocerybagandthelistusedbythecustomer,thentheblameshouldbeputonthecustomer,notonthelist.Inthecaseofamismatchbetweenthecontentofthebagandthelistdrawnbythedetective,thedetectiveshouldcorrecthislist.

BuildingonAnscombe'sinsight,Searle(1983)arguesthattherearetwooppositedirectionsoffitthateitherspeechactsormentalstatescanexemplify:justasthespeechactofassertionhasawordtoworlddirectionoffit,beliefsandperceptionshaveamindtoworlddirectionoffit.Itisthefunctionofanassertiontostateafactoranactualstateofaffairs.Similarly,itisthefunctionofabeliefandaperceptiontomatchafact.Unlikeassertions,ordershaveaworldtoworddirectionoffit.



Unlikebeliefsandperceptions,desiresandintentionshaveaworldtominddirectionoffit.Itisthefunctionofanordertorepresentanonactualpossibleorimpossiblestateofaffairs.Similarly,itisthefunctionofadesireandanintentiontorepresentanonactualpossibleorimpossiblestateofaffairs.

Nowthefollowingquestionsarise:areBrentanoandthephenomenologicaltraditionright?Doallmentalstatesexhibitintentionality?Isintentionalityafeatureofeveryaspectofhumanexperience?Areallformsofconsciousnessconsciousnessofsomething?Doeseverymentalstatepossessoneortheotherdirectionoffit?Dosensations(e.g.,pains),feelings,emotions(e.g.,depression)allexhibitintentionality?Thesequestionsareverycontroversialincontemporaryphilosophyofmind.Beforeexaminingvariouscontradictoryanswerstothesequestions,apreliminaryquestionisrelevant.WhetherBrentanowasrightornot,whyshouldwewantamarkoracriterionofthementalatall?

ThequestionofwhyweshouldseekacriterionofthementalatallhasbeenmadepressingbysomerecentremarksofthelinguistNoamChomsky(2000,75,106),accordingtowhommethodologicalnaturalismmandatesthatweusetermslikemindandmentalonaparwithtermslikechemical,opticalorelectrical.Sincewedonotseektodeterminethetruecriterionoftheelectricalorthemarkofthechemical,bynaturalisticparityofreasoning,Chomskyargues,weshouldnomoreseekacriterionofthemental.Whetherweneedcriteriarespectivelyforthechemicalandfortheoptical,itisagenuineissuewhethertheEnglishwordmentalcanjustifiablyapplytothingsasdiversease.g.,apainandthebeliefthat5isaprimenumber.AsRichardRorty(1979,22)hasputit,theattempttohitchpainsandbeliefstogetherseemsadhoctheydon'tseemtohaveanythingincommonexceptourrefusaltocallthemphysical.Hisconclusionisthatthewordmentalexpressesnosingleproperty,letaloneanaturalkind.OnRorty'sirrealistview,thewordmentalisjustpartofanacademiclanguagegamewithnoscientificexplanatoryimport.

Thus,Rorty'sradicalirrealistpictureofthemindreliesontheobservationthatpainsandarithmeticalbeliefsseemtohavenothingincommon.NotmanycontemporaryphilosophersofmindwouldacceptRorty'sirrealistpictureofthemind.Butmostdorecognizethatifmindsarereal,thentwoproblemsarise:theproblemofintentionalityandtheproblemofconsciousnessorconsciousphenomenalexperience.Mostwouldclaimthatasolutiontotheproblemofintentionalityisnotipsofactoasolutiontotheproblemofconsciousness.Whyisthatso?

Humanbeingscanexperiencetheworldinvariouswaysbymeansofseveraldistinctsensorymodalities(vision,audition,touch,olfaction).Theyarealsoawareofpartsoftheirbodiesaswhentheysufferpains.Theproblemofconsciousnessisoftencalledtheproblemofqualiabecausestateswithastrongphenomenalcharacterlikepains,visualorolfactorysensationsarestatesthatintrospectivelyseemendowedwithastrongintrinsicsubjectivequality.Thegeneralproblemofconsciousnessistoexplain,inThomasNagel's(1974)famousphrase,whatitisliketobeacertaincreaturewithaphenomenalexperience.Whatisthephenomenalcharacterthephenomenologyofthevariousformsofhumanexperience?Fewifanyphilosophersphysicalistorotherwiseareinclinedtoassumethat,unlikeintentionality,phenomenalconsciousnesscanbeexemplifiedbynonmentalthings.Notmanywoulddenythat,althoughpains,visualsensations,olfactorysensations,auditivesensationsareverydifferentexperiences,nonethelesstheyallexhibitacommonpropertycalledphenomenalconsciousness.Frombothascientificandaphysicalistperspective,thequestionsarisewhetherphenomenalconsciousnessisphysicalandwhetheritcanbeexplainedinphysicalterms,i.e.,asaresultofprocesseshappeninginthebrain.

Asmanyphilosophersarewillingtorecognize,theconceptexpressedbythewordconsciousnessismuchinneedofclarification.Threesuchclarificationsareworthmentioning.TwoofthemconsistinapairofdistinctionsdrawnbyDavidRosenthal(1986).Onedistinctionisbetweencreatureconsciousnessandstateconsciousness.Theotherdistinctionisbetweentransitiveandintransitiveconsciousness.Acreaturecanbesaidtobeintransitivelyconsciousifsheisaliveandnormallyresponsivetoongoingstimuli.Shestopsbeingintransitivelyconsciouswhileinadreamlesssleep,ifsheisknockedout,druggedorcomatose.Acreaturecanbesaidtobetransitivelyconsciousifsheisconsciousofthings,propertiesandrelationsinherenvironment.Whereasacreaturecanbeboth



intransitivelyconsciousandtransitivelyconsciousofsomething,amentalstatecanonlybeintransitivelyconscious.Oneimportantaspectoftheproblemofconsciousnessistheproblemofhowtodrawthelinebetweenconsciousandunconsciousmentalstates.AthirdclarificationhasbeenNedBlock's(1995)distinctionbetweenaccessconsciousness(orAconsciousness)andphenomenalconsciousness(orPconsciousness).WhereasastateissaidtobeAconsciousifitispoisedforfreeuseinreasoningandfordirectrationalcontrolofactionandspeech(i.e.availableoraccessibletoseveralcognitivemechanisms),thePconsciousnessofastateiswhatitisliketobeinthatstate(whetherornotithasAconsciousness).Inrecentwork,Block(2007)hasarguedthatmuchevidencefromthecognitivescientificinvestigationofthevisualsystemcorroborateshisdistinctionbetweenPandAconsciousness.Forexample,onhisinterpretation,experimentsonchangeblindnessandalsotheneuropsychologicalinvestigationofbrainlesionedhumanpatientswithneglectshowthatattentionandworkingmemoryarenecessarypartsofAconsciousness,butnotofPconsciousness.WhatmakesastateAconsciousisthatitscontentismadeavailabletovariouscognitivesystems(e.g.attentionandmemory).Furthermore,notunlessavisualstimulusisattendedandstoredinworkingmemorycananindividualreporthavingseenit.ButBlock(2007)takestheevidencetoshowthatanindividualcanbePconsciousofthecontentofanunreportablestimulus,i.e.astimuluswhosecontenthasnotbeeneitherattendedorstoredinworkingmemory.Forsupportingarguments,seeDretske(2004,2007).Block'sinterpretationofthecognitivescientificdatahasbeencriticizedbyscientificadvocatesofthesocalledglobalneuronalworkspacemodelofconsciousness:seee.g.Dehaeneetal.(2006)andNaccacheandDehaene(2007),whichisacommentarytoBlock(2007).TheglobalneuronalworkspacemodelofconsciousnessnicelyfitswithDennett's(1991,2005)positiononintentionalityandconsciousness(whichhehashimselfdubbedthefame(inthebrain)theoryofconsciousness.(Forfurtherdiscussionoftheseissues,seetheSEPentryonattention.)

Ontheonehand,thenotionoftransitivecreatureconsciousnessseemslikeaclosecousintothenotionofintentionality.Ontheotherhand,whatmakesaperson'smentalstateAconsciousisthatthepersonmayhaveaccesstoit.Presumably,apersonmayhaveconsciousaccesstooneofherAconsciousmentalstatesinvirtueofhavingsomeothermentalstate(e.g.,athoughtorbelief)directedtoit.SohavingstateswithintentionalityseemslikeaconditionforanymentalstatetobeAconscious.Itfollowsthatiftheproblemofconsciousnessistobeclearlydistinguishedfromtheproblemofintentionality,thekeyquestionisthatofexplaininghowamentalstatecanbePconscious.

ManyphilosophersdonotacceptBrentano'sthirdthesisthatintentionalityisthemarkofallmentalstates.TheydonotrejectBrentano'ssecondthesisonthegroundsthatintentionalitycanbeexhibitedbysomenonmentalthings.Theyrejectitbecause,likeBlock(1996)andPeacocke(1983),theysubscribetoaviewthatcanbecalledantiintentionalism,accordingtowhichaperson'sconsciousmentalstatehasaphenomenalcharacterthatcannotbeaccountedeitherbyitsownintentionality(ifithasany)orbytheintentionalityofsomeotherofhisorhermentalstates.NordotheyembraceRorty'sirrealistattitudetowardsthemental.Someofthephilosophers,whofallunderthelabelantiintentionalism,mayacceptthethesisthatintentionalityandthementalhappentocoincide.Butsincetheyclaimthatintentionalityinturnderivesfromphenomenalconsciousness,theyarenotquitefaithfultothespiritofBrentano'sthesisthatintentionalityistheconstitutivefeatureofthemental.

Theantiintentionalists,whorejectbothRorty'sirrealismandBrentano'sthesisthatintentionalityisthetruemarkofthemental,canbedividedintotwogroups.Some,likeNedBlock(1995,1996),wouldacceptadualviewaccordingtowhichmentalstatesfallintoadivisionbetweenintentionalstatesandphenomenalstates.Asweshallseemomentarily,thisdivisionisdeniedbytheintentionalists.Inbetweentheintentionalistsandthephenomenalrealists,whoacceptthedualview,liestheintermediateviewofphilosopherssuchasColinMcGinn(1989),SydneyShoemaker(1996)andCharlesSiewert(1998),whoseeanintimateconnectionbetweenintentionalandphenomenalstates.

Otherantiintentionalists,likeJohnSearle(1990,1992)andGalenStrawson(1994),goonestep



furtherandrejectbothBrentano'sthesisandthedualviewofthemind.Theyholdconsciousnesstobethetruecriterionofthemental.Arguably,asnotedabove,theymightacceptthethesisthatintentionalitycoincideswiththemental,buttheyholdtheviewthatintentionalityderivesfromconsciousness.Ontheonehand,Strawson(1994)clearlyholdsphenomenalconsciousnesstobethetruecriterionofthemental.Ontheotherhand,Searle(1992)embraceswhathecallstheConnectionprinciple,accordingtowhichunlessamentalstateisavailabletoconsciousness,itdoesnotqualifyasgenuinelymental.Asaresult,Searle(1992)seemstoendorsetheviewthatavailabilitytoconsciousnessisthecriterionofthemental.Now,theviewthatavailabilitytoconsciousnessisthetruecriterionofthementalentailsthatstatesandprocessesthatareinvestigatedbycognitivescienceandthatareunavailabletoconsciousnesswillfailtoqualifyasgenuinementalstates.ThisviewhasbeenvigorouslydisputedbyChomsky(2000).Onthenaturalassumptionthatbeliefsareparadigmaticmentalstates,theviewthatphenomenalconsciousnessisthetruecriterionofthementalfurtherentailsthatthereissomethingitisliketohavesuchapropositionalattitudeasbelievingthat5isaprimenumberaconsequencesomefinddoubtful.Iftherewasnothingitisliketobelievethat5isaprimenumber,then,accordingtotheviewthatphenomenalconsciousnessisthecriterionofthemental,manypropositionalattitudeswouldfailtoqualifyasgenuinementalstates.However,muchrecentworkinthephilosophyofmindhasbeenrecentlydevotedtothedefenseofsocalled"cognitivephenomenology,"accordingtowhichthereissomethingitisliketobelievethate.g.5isaprimenumber.SeetheSEPentryonconsciousnessandthepaperscollectedinBayneandMontague(eds.)(2011).

ManyofthephilosopherswhoacceptaversionofBrentano'sthesisthatallmentalstatesexhibitintentionalitytrytoshowthatthemysteriesofphenomenalconsciousnesscaneitherbeexplainedaway(i.e.,dissolved)orthatphenomenalconsciousnessderivesfromintentionality.DanielDennett(1988,1991,2001)hasbeenthemostconsistentadvocateoftheviewthatthedistinctionbetweenphenomenalconsciousnessandaccessconsciousnesshasbeenoverratedandthatqualiaoughttoquined,i.e.,resolutelydeniedanddispensedwith.

Socalledintentionalistsarephilosopherswhothinkthatphenomenalconsciousnesscanreallybeexplainedbyintentionalitybecausetheythinkthatphenomenalstatesareintentionalstates.Ontheintentionalistaccount,thephenomenalqualitiesofanexperiencearethepropertiesthatobjectsarerepresentedashavingintheexperience.Someintentionalists,likeFredDretske(1995)andMichaelTye(1995),thinkthatwhereasthoughtsandpropositionalattitudesarementalrepresentationswithconceptualcontent,qualiaorconsciousexperiencesarementalrepresentationswithnonconceptualcontent(aboutwhichseeDretske1981,Peacocke1992,2001andtheessaysinCrane1992).Ontheirview,tohavephenomenalfeaturesistohaveacertainsortofnonconceptualcontent.OnTye's(1995)view,forexample,painsarementalrepresentationsofbodilypartsandthephenomenalexperienceofapainisthenonconceptualcontentofthebodilyrepresentation.OtherintentionalistssuchasElizabethAnscombe(1965)andespeciallyJohnMcDowell(1994),whoareskepticalofthedistinctionbetweenconceptualandnonconceptualcontent,willappealtoothercriteria,e.g.,functionalrole,toaccountforphenomenalstates(seetheSEPentryonNonconceptualmentalcontent).Forexample,McDowell(1994)arguesthatthephenomenalcontentofexperiencecanbeexplainedintermsofasuitablenotionofdemonstrativeconceptualcontent.Whethertheintentionalistaccountcanbeextendedtothephenomenalcharacterofallexperiencesisatpresentanopenquestion(cf.Crane,2007).

Finally,accordingtoDavidRosenthal'shigherorderthoughttheoryofconsciousness,whatmakesaperson'smentalstateconsciousisthatthepersonisconsciousofitbyvirtueofhavingformedahigherorderthought(orHOT)aboutit.Furthermore,thephenomenalcharacterofaperson'ssensoryexperiencewhatitislikeforthepersontobeinthatstatearisesfromthefactthatthepersonhasformedaHOTaboutit.TheproblemwiththeHOTtheoryofphenomenalconsciousnessisthatthetheoryentailsthatcreatureswho,likenonhumananimalsandhumanbabies,lacktheabilitytoformHOTswillbedeprivedofphenomenalconsciousnessaconsequencemanywillfindimplausible(cf.Rosenthal,1986,2005).Forfurtherdiscussion,seetheSEPentriesonconsciousnessand



intentionalityandhigherordertheoriesofconsciousness.

11.Externalismandtheexplanatoryroleofintentionality

Section2endedonthequestion:howcanwereconcilethefactthatsingularthoughtsarelocalmentalphenomenawiththerelationalcharacteroftheirintentionality?Itisuncontroversialthatmanyofanindividual'spropositionalattitudesareaboutorofobjects.HilaryPutnam(1974)hasarguedinfavorofamorecontroversialdoctrinecalledexternalismaccordingtowhichtheidentity(orindividuation)ofthecontentsofmanyofanindividual'sthoughtsandpropositionalattitudesmaydependonobjects,propertiesandrelationsexemplifiedintheindividual'senvironment.Putnamimaginesaplanet,TwinEarth,onwhichthesubstanceXYZ(differentfromH2O)playsexactlythesameroleasH2OplaysonEarth:itistheodorlesssubstancethatinaliquidstatefillsrivers,lakesandoceans.Itcanevaporateandfreezeintoice.Peopledrinkitandsoandsoforth.SupposeEnglishspeakersonTwinEarthcallXYZwater.NowconsiderOscar,anEnglishspeakeronEarth,andOscar'stwin,Twoscar,anEnglishspeakeronTwinEarth.SupposethattheyareinexactlythesamebrainstatewhentheyentertainsimultaneouslyathoughttheywouldbothexpresswiththeEnglishsentenceWaterflows.Oscar'sthoughtandutterancearetrueifandonlyifH2Oflows.Twoscar'sthoughtandutterancearetrueifandonlyifXYZflows.Thus,thecontentofOscar'sthoughtisdifferentfromthecontentofTwoscar'sthought.Onthebasisofhisthoughtexperiment,Putnamconcludedthatbroadlyindividuated,thecontentofanindividual'sthoughtaboutanaturalkinddependsonthenatureoftheenvironment.Itisnotentirelyfixedbytheinternalphysicalandfunctionalstateoftheindividual'sbrain.TheexternalistconclusionthatthemeaningoftheEnglishword'water'(orthecontentoftheconcepttherebyexpressed)cruciallydependsontheassumptionthatthedifferencebetweenEarthandTwinEarthdonotcauseanyrelevantdistinctionbetweenOscar'sandTwoscar'sbrains(and/orinternalcognitiveresources).

TylerBurge(1979)hasdesignedmoregeneralthoughtexperimentswhosescopeisbroaderthanthoughtsaboutnaturalkinds:theyapplytothoughtsaboutanything.Ontheirbasis,hearguesforasocialversionofexternalismaccordingtowhichwhatanindividualthinksmaydependuponwhatmembersofhisorherlinguisticcommunitythink.Ifexternalism(eithersocialornonsocial)iscorrect,thenitraisesanimportantpuzzleformentalcausation.

Beforeexaminingthetensionbetweencontent(ormeaning)externalismandmentalcausation,however,itisworthbrieflydiscussingastillmorerecentdoctrinefirstadvocatedbyAndyClarkandDavidChalmers(1998)andknownastheextendedmindthesis,activeexternalismorvehicleexternalism.AdvocatesofcontentexternalismbasedonTwinEarthargumentshavestressedthecontributionofdistanthistoricaland/orspatialfeaturesofthe(socialandnonsocial)environmenttotheindividuationofthecontentsofanindividual'spsychologicalstates.Advocatesoftheextendedmindthesisstressinsteadthefactthatthecontributionofnonmentalvehicleswithcontent(e.g.maps),locatedoutsideanindividual'sskullandskin,isnotdissociablefromthecontributionofanindividual'sinternalbrainprocessestotheexecutionofmanyofanindividual'shighercognitiveprocesses(e.g.arithmeticalcalculations)(cf.alsoRowlands,1999).BuildingonandsystematizingearlierideasofDennett(1996)andHaugeland(1995),ClarkandChalmers(1998)haveofferedtwocomplementaryargumentsinfavoroftheextendedmindthesis:thecognitiveenhancementandthefunctionalequivalencearguments.

Themainpremissofthecognitiveenhancementargumentdisplaystheroleoftools(penandpapertoperformlongmultiplications,physicalrearrangementsoflettertilestopromptwordrecallinScrabble,thenauticalsliderule,andthegeneralparaphernaliaoflanguage,books,diagrams,andculture)infacilitatingandpromotinganindividual'ssuccessinachievinganumberofcognitivetasks.Theconclusionisthatsuchnonmentaltoolsarepartandparceloftherelevantcognitiveprocesses.Arguably,thecognitiveenhancementargumentappliesnotonlytononbodilytoolsbuttobodilytools(e.g.anindividual'shandsusedintasksofcounting)aswell.Ifso,thenthefurtherquestion



arisestowhatextenttheideaofembodiedcognitioncouldornotbeseenasaparticularcaseoftheextendedmindthesis,accordingtowhichanindividual'smindshouldnotbeidentifiedtoherbrainalone.Somephilosophers(especiallyinthephenomenologicaltradition)aretemptedtoembracewhatClark(2008)dubs"bodycentrism"andtoarguethatsincethesenseofbodilyownershipappliestobodilytoolsonly,nottononbodilytools,embodiedcognitionshouldnotbeconstruedmerelyasaspecialcaseoftheextendedmindthesis,onthegroundsthatthespecialsenseofbodilyownershipappliestobodilytools,nottononbodilytools.(SeetheSEPentriesonembodiedcognitionandbodilyawareness.)

ClarkandChalmers'ssecondfunctionalequivalenceargumentisathoughtexperimentinvolvingtwoseparateindividuals,IngaandOtto,withthesamedesiretovisittheMuseumofModernArt(MOMA)inNewYorkCity.WhereasInga,ahealthyadult,reliesonherbiologicalmemory,Otto,apatientwithAlzheimer'sdisease,mustconsulthisnotebookinordertoretrievetheaddressoftheMuseum.AccordingtoClarkandChalmers,notonlydoIngaandOttosharethesamedesiretovisittheMOMA,buttheirrespectiveactionisalsoguidedbyabeliefwithoneandthesamecontentabouttheaddressoftheMOMA.SinceOtto'snotebookhasplayedthesamefunctionalroleasInga'sbiologicalmemoryingeneratingtheirrespectivebeliefandinaccountingfortheirrespectiveaction,theconclusionisthatthevehiclesofanindividual'sbeliefscanbelocatedoutsidetheindividual'sskull.

Thus,theleadingintuitionunderlyingtheextendedmindthesisisthatstoringinformationinsomeexternalmemorydevicemayoffloadsomeoftheburdenofinternalcognitiveprocesses.ThewaytheextendedmindthesissupportscontentexternalismseemstodifferfromstandardTwinEarthargumentsinatleastoneinterestingrespect.StandardTwinEarthargumentsforcontentexternalismpresupposethatanindividual'sbrainand/orcognitiveresourcesarekeptconstantthroughoutvariationsintheindividual'senvironmentrelevanttoestablishingthecontributionofthesocialornonsocialenvironmenttotheindividuationofthecontentoftheindividual'spsychologicalstate.Bycontrast,argumentsforcontentexternalismbasedontheextendedmindthesisseemtorequirechangesinanindividual'sbrainand/orcognitiveresources,atsomepointorother,throughoutvariationsintheindividual'senvironment.Forexample,someoftheargumentsbasedontheextendedmindthesisdependonacognitivetradeoff.Ottocouldnotstorein,andretrievefrom,hisnotebooktheaddressoftheMOMAunlesshisbrainenabledhimtoreadandwrite.ButunlikeOtto,Inga'sbrainneednotenablehertoreadandwriteinordertovisittheMOMA.Havingmemorizedtheaddress,shemightrelyonverbalcommunicationinordertofindtherightbuilding.

InthespiritofTwinEartharguments,ClarkandChalmers(1998)doconsidertwinOtto,who,unlikeOtto,waswronglytold,andwrotedowninhisnotebook,thattheMOMAison51ststreet,noton53rdstreet.Ofcourse,fromthenon,unlikeOscaronEarthandhistwinonTwinEarth,OttoandtwinOttowillnotbebehavioraltwins:giventheiridenticaldesiretovisittheMOMA,Ottowillgoto53rdstreetandtwinOttowillgoto51ststreet.ClarkandChalmers(1998)furtherassumethatatsomelaterpointintheirlives,allmemorytracesintherespectivebrainsofOttoandtwinOttoarewipedout.Afterthisoccurs,OttoandtwinOttohavedifferentbeliefsaboutthelocationoftheMOMA,buttheirbrainsarephysicallyindistinguishable.Sowhattheybelievedoesnotsuperveneonthecurrentstateoftheirrespectivebrainsalone.Butalthoughtheyarenowsynchronicphysicaltwins,unlikeOscaronEarthandtwinOscaronTwinEarth,theyarenotdiachronicphysicaltwinsbecauseofpastdifferences.Withoutachangeinthephysicalpropertiesoftheirrespectivebrainsatsomepointinthepast,OttoandtwinOttocouldnotbephysicaltwinsnow.Forfurthercriticaldiscussionoftheextendedmindthesis,cf.e.g.AdamsandAizawa(2001)andforrepliestocriticismscf.Clark(2008).

Wenowturntothetensionbetweencontentexternalismandmentalcausation.Thegeneralformoftheproblemofmentalcausationistheproblemofhowthemindcanproducecausaleffectsonthephysicalworld.Inparticular,theproblemis:howcananindividual'sstatesofmindcausehimtoproducesomebodilymovement?Thisproblem,whichhasdifferentfacets(seeKim1998fora



discussionoftheseveralfacetsoftheproblemofmentalcausation),turnedouttobeadifficultproblemforDescartes'ontologicaldualism.Theissuerelevanttointentionalityarisesfromtheconflictbetweenexternalismandthelocalityassumptionaccordingtowhichcausalprocessesarelocalprocesses.Thisissuehasnothingespeciallytodowithontologicaldualism:itarisesonphysicalistassumptions.

Therearegoodreasonswhy,unliketheintrinsicpropertiesofacausec,itsextrinsicpropertiescannotbecausallyefficaciousintheprocesswherebycproducesitseffect.Forexample,whatmakesaEurocoinworthoneEuroisthat,inadditiontoitsintrinsicphysicalproperties,itbearsanextrinsichistoricalrelationtosomeEuropeangovernmentalagency.Eventhoughtwometaldisksmightbephysicallyindistinguishable,onemightbeagenuineEurocoinandtheothermightbeacounterfeit.Ifso,thenthecoin'smonetaryvalueisnotidenticaltoitsintrinsicphysicalproperties.Nordoesitsuperveneonitsintrinsicphysicalproperties(seeKim,1993fortheconceptofsupervenience):fixingtheirintrinsicphysicalpropertiesdoesnotsufficetofixtheirrespectivemonetaryvalue.Acoin'smonetaryvaluealsodependsonitshistory.ConsideravendingmachinedesignedtoyielddrinksuponreceivingcoinsworthoneEuro.Itissensitivetothecoin'sphysicalproperties,nottoitsmonetaryvalueperse.Ifthecontentorintentionalityofanindividual'sbeliefand/ordesireis,likeacoin'smonetaryvalue,oneofitsextrinsicproperties,thenhowcanitbecausallyefficaciousintheproductionofoneoftheindividual'sbodilymovements?Howcanthebeliefordesireproduceaphysicaleffectinvirtueofitscontent?

OnereactiontotheconflictbetweenthelocalityofcausationandexternalismhasbeentoquestiontherequirementthatunlesssomepropertyPofacauseciseitheroneofc'sintrinsicpropertiesoritsupervenesonsomeofc'sintrinsicproperties,Pcannotbecausallyefficacious.Baker(1993)andBurge(1986,1993)arguethatmuchvalidexplanatorypracticeinthespecialsciencesshowsthatthisassumptionissimplynotacceptable.

Anotherreactionhasbeenjusttoconcedethatintentionalityisepiphenomenalorthatnomentalstatecaneverbecausallyefficaciousinvirtueofitsintentionalcontent.Ifso,then(contrarytocommonsense)whatonedoesisnotcausallyexplainedbywhatoneintends,believesanddesires.OneexampleoftheepiphenomenalistviewofintentionalityisStephenStich's(1983)syntacticalviewofthemind.If,asFodorhasargued(seesection8),thereisalanguageofthoughtconsistingofmentalsymbols,then,accordingtothesyntacticalviewofthemind,onlythesyntacticproperties,notthesemanticproperties,ofmentalsymbolscanbecausallyefficacious.AnotherexamplehasbeenDanielDennett(1987),accordingtowhomtheintentionalstanceismerelyausefulpredictiveheuristicwithnoexplanatoryimport.OnDennett'sview,therecannotbewhatHaugeland(1981)callsasemanticengine.

Intentionalrealists,however,willnoteasilyconcedetheepiphenomenalismofintentionality,sinceforthem,atestoftherealityofapropertyisthatitcanbecausallyefficacious.Intentionalrealistswhowanttosavethecausalefficacyofintentionalitydivideintotwobroadgroups.Someaccepttherequirementthatonlyifitsupervenesontheintrinsicphysicalpropertiesofanindividual'sbraincantheintentionalityofamentalstatebecausallyefficacious.Thechallengethenistoelaborateatwotieredaccountofintentionalityaccordingtowhichonedimensionofintentionalitydoes,andtheotherdoesnot,superveneontheintrinsicpropertiesofanindividual'sbrain.Otherintentionalrealistsdenythesuperveniencerequirementandelaborateasuitablenotionofwhatintentionalityissupposedtoexplainorwhatistheproperexplanandumofacausalexplanationintheexplanansofwhichintentionalitymightfigureprominently.

Inthecaseofsingularbeliefs,thetwotieredaccountofintentionalityismotivatedbytheconsiderationsreviewedinsection3thatledFregetodistinguishtwodimensionsofthecontentofabelief,whichhecalledrespectivelythesense(Sinn)ormodeofpresentationandthereference(Bedeutung).RecallAvawhobelievedthatHesperusisshiningandwhodidnotbelievethatPhosphorusisshiningonthegroundsthatshebelievedthatHesperusandPhosphorusaretwodistinctcelestialbodies.Althoughbothbeliefsareofoneandthesameobject(sinceHesperusisPhosphorus),



thereisasenseinwhichthetwobeliefshavedistinctcontentsfortheyrepresentoneandthesameobjectindistinctways.Whatisrepresentedisthesame.Howitisrepresentedisnot.

Manyphilosophershavetriedtorespondtothechallengeofepiphenomenalismbydrawingadistinctionbetweenthebroadandthenarrowcontentofabelief(seee.g.,Fodor1981,1987,Kaplan1989,Perry1993).Lettwoidenticaltwinsbothsimultaneouslybelievethatthecupinfrontofthemcontainscoffee.Supposethatthedistinctcupscandcareperceptuallyindistinguishablefromeachother.Thetwins'beliefshavedifferentbroadcontentsbecausetheyhavedifferenttruthconditions:oneistrueifandonlyifccontainscoffee.Theotheristrueifandonlyifccontainscoffeeandcisdistinctfromc.Onthetwotieredaccount,however,bothbeliefssharethesamenarrowcontent.Thisiswhy,giventhattheybothhaveadesireforasipofcoffee,theydothesamething:namely,graspthecupinfrontofthem.Onthetwotieredaccount,externalismistrueofbroadcontent.Butnarrowcontentisinternaltoanindividual'smind.Aproblemwithth

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