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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism About Emotion

Angela Mendelovici

University of Western Ontario / Australian National University

Wayne State University - October 13, 2011

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Emotions

Mental states like fear, euphoria, jealously, sadness, angerIt’s an open question exactly which states will fall under thesame category in a final classification

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions

Mental states like fear, euphoria, jealously, sadness, angerIt’s an open question exactly which states will fall under thesame category in a final classification

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotion’s mental profile

Emotion’s mental profile:1 Phenomenal aspect: There is something distinctive it is like

to have an emotion2 Intentional aspect: Emotions exhibit intentionality

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotion’s mental profile

Emotion’s mental profile:1 Phenomenal aspect: There is something distinctive it is like

to have an emotion2 Intentional aspect: Emotions exhibit intentionality

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotion’s mental profile

Emotion’s mental profile:1 Phenomenal aspect: There is something distinctive it is like

to have an emotion2 Intentional aspect: Emotions exhibit intentionality

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotion’s mental profile

Emotion’s mental profile:1 Phenomenal aspect: There is something distinctive it is like

to have an emotion2 Intentional aspect: Emotions exhibit intentionality

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

My project

My project is to offer an account of emotion’s mental profileWhat features of emotions explains their phenomenal andintentional aspects?

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

My project

My project is to offer an account of emotion’s mental profileWhat features of emotions explains their phenomenal andintentional aspects?

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Other projects related to emotion

Other projects that I’m not engaged in ask questions such asHow did emotions evolve?What role do emotions play in the mental economy?What is the neural basis of emotions?When are emotions appropriate or inappropriate?Do emotions form a natural kind? If so, which of their featuresunifies them?

These questions might be related to my project, but it is notmy aim to address them

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Other projects related to emotion

Other projects that I’m not engaged in ask questions such asHow did emotions evolve?What role do emotions play in the mental economy?What is the neural basis of emotions?When are emotions appropriate or inappropriate?Do emotions form a natural kind? If so, which of their featuresunifies them?

These questions might be related to my project, but it is notmy aim to address them

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Other projects related to emotion

Other projects that I’m not engaged in ask questions such asHow did emotions evolve?What role do emotions play in the mental economy?What is the neural basis of emotions?When are emotions appropriate or inappropriate?Do emotions form a natural kind? If so, which of their featuresunifies them?

These questions might be related to my project, but it is notmy aim to address them

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Other projects related to emotion

Other projects that I’m not engaged in ask questions such asHow did emotions evolve?What role do emotions play in the mental economy?What is the neural basis of emotions?When are emotions appropriate or inappropriate?Do emotions form a natural kind? If so, which of their featuresunifies them?

These questions might be related to my project, but it is notmy aim to address them

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Other projects related to emotion

Other projects that I’m not engaged in ask questions such asHow did emotions evolve?What role do emotions play in the mental economy?What is the neural basis of emotions?When are emotions appropriate or inappropriate?Do emotions form a natural kind? If so, which of their featuresunifies them?

These questions might be related to my project, but it is notmy aim to address them

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Other projects related to emotion

Other projects that I’m not engaged in ask questions such asHow did emotions evolve?What role do emotions play in the mental economy?What is the neural basis of emotions?When are emotions appropriate or inappropriate?Do emotions form a natural kind? If so, which of their featuresunifies them?

These questions might be related to my project, but it is notmy aim to address them

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Other projects related to emotion

Other projects that I’m not engaged in ask questions such asHow did emotions evolve?What role do emotions play in the mental economy?What is the neural basis of emotions?When are emotions appropriate or inappropriate?Do emotions form a natural kind? If so, which of their featuresunifies them?

These questions might be related to my project, but it is notmy aim to address them

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

The claim

I will argue that intentionalism about emotions accounts foremotion’s mental profile better than its competitors

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotion’s mental profile

Emotion’s mental profile:1 Phenomenal aspect2 Intentional aspect

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Theories of emotion

1 Feeling theories2 Cognitivism3 Hybrid theories4 Intentionalism

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Theories of emotion

1 Feeling theories2 Cognitivism3 Hybrid theories4 Intentionalism

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Feeling theories

Emotions are feelings (mere phenomenal characters, oralternatively, bodily feelings)William James, Carl Lange

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Feeling theories

Emotions are feelings (mere phenomenal characters, oralternatively, bodily feelings)William James, Carl Lange

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Feeling theories

Emotions are feelings (mere phenomenal characters, oralternatively, bodily feelings)William James, Carl Lange

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Feeling theories

Emotions are feelings (mere phenomenal characters, oralternatively, bodily feelings)William James, Carl Lange

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with feeling theories

Accounts for phenomenal aspect of emotionsDifficulty accounting for the intentional aspect of emotionsDoesn’t say much about why emotions seem to have anintentional aspect

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with feeling theories

Accounts for phenomenal aspect of emotionsDifficulty accounting for the intentional aspect of emotionsDoesn’t say much about why emotions seem to have anintentional aspect

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with feeling theories

Accounts for phenomenal aspect of emotionsDifficulty accounting for the intentional aspect of emotionsDoesn’t say much about why emotions seem to have anintentional aspect

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with feeling theories

More sophisticated versions of the theory can avoid this byadding new elements to the theory to account for emotion’sintentional aspectI will call such theories hybrid theories and consider them later

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with feeling theories

More sophisticated versions of the theory can avoid this byadding new elements to the theory to account for emotion’sintentional aspectI will call such theories hybrid theories and consider them later

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Cognitivism

Emotions are cognitive states (e.g. beliefs, judgments)Robert Solomon, Jerome Neu, Martha Nussbaum

E.g. The dog is represented as being dangerous or harmful

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Cognitivism

Emotions are cognitive states (e.g. beliefs, judgments)Robert Solomon, Jerome Neu, Martha Nussbaum

E.g. The dog is represented as being dangerous or harmful

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Cognitivism

Emotions are cognitive states (e.g. beliefs, judgments)Robert Solomon, Jerome Neu, Martha Nussbaum

E.g. The dog is represented as being dangerous or harmful

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Cognitivism

Emotions are cognitive states (e.g. beliefs, judgments)Robert Solomon, Jerome Neu, Martha Nussbaum

E.g. The dog is represented as being dangerous or harmful

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Cognitivism

Emotions are cognitive states (e.g. beliefs, judgments)Robert Solomon, Jerome Neu, Martha Nussbaum

E.g. The dog is represented as being dangerous or harmful

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with cognitivism

Accounts for the intentional aspect of emotionsDifficulty accounting for the phenomenal aspect of emotionsIt’s possible to have a cognitive state that the dog isdangerous without the phenomenal character of fear, and it’spossible to have the phenomenal character of fear withoutjudging that the dog is dangerous (Stocker)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with cognitivism

Accounts for the intentional aspect of emotionsDifficulty accounting for the phenomenal aspect of emotionsIt’s possible to have a cognitive state that the dog isdangerous without the phenomenal character of fear, and it’spossible to have the phenomenal character of fear withoutjudging that the dog is dangerous (Stocker)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with cognitivism

Accounts for the intentional aspect of emotionsDifficulty accounting for the phenomenal aspect of emotionsIt’s possible to have a cognitive state that the dog isdangerous without the phenomenal character of fear, and it’spossible to have the phenomenal character of fear withoutjudging that the dog is dangerous (Stocker)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Hybrid theories

Emotions have distinct components accounting for their twomental aspectsA crude hybrid theory:

Combine our best feeling theory (say, bodily feelings view)with our best cognitivist theory (say, judgment view)Emotions are complex states composed of bodily sensationsand judgments

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Hybrid theories

Emotions have distinct components accounting for their twomental aspectsA crude hybrid theory:

Combine our best feeling theory (say, bodily feelings view)with our best cognitivist theory (say, judgment view)Emotions are complex states composed of bodily sensationsand judgments

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Hybrid theories

Emotions have distinct components accounting for their twomental aspectsA crude hybrid theory:

Combine our best feeling theory (say, bodily feelings view)with our best cognitivist theory (say, judgment view)Emotions are complex states composed of bodily sensationsand judgments

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Hybrid theories

Emotions have distinct components accounting for their twomental aspectsA crude hybrid theory:

Combine our best feeling theory (say, bodily feelings view)with our best cognitivist theory (say, judgment view)Emotions are complex states composed of bodily sensationsand judgments

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with the crude hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state

2 Difficulty accounting for the intimate relationship betweenemotion’s two mental aspects - the intentional aspect seemsimbued with phenomenology (Goldie)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with the crude hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state

2 Difficulty accounting for the intimate relationship betweenemotion’s two mental aspects - the intentional aspect seemsimbued with phenomenology (Goldie)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with the crude hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state

2 Difficulty accounting for the intimate relationship betweenemotion’s two mental aspects - the intentional aspect seemsimbued with phenomenology (Goldie)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with the crude hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state

2 Difficulty accounting for the intimate relationship betweenemotion’s two mental aspects - the intentional aspect seemsimbued with phenomenology (Goldie)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Imbuement

Not only do emotions seem to have a phenomenal aspect andan intentional aspect, but the two aspects are related

The intentional aspect is itself imbued with phenomenalcharacterThe phenomenal character of emotions doesn’t justaccompany the intentional content of emotions - instead, itseems to attach to the very intentional objects of emotion

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Imbuement

Not only do emotions seem to have a phenomenal aspect andan intentional aspect, but the two aspects are related

The intentional aspect is itself imbued with phenomenalcharacterThe phenomenal character of emotions doesn’t justaccompany the intentional content of emotions - instead, itseems to attach to the very intentional objects of emotion

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Imbuement

Not only do emotions seem to have a phenomenal aspect andan intentional aspect, but the two aspects are related

The intentional aspect is itself imbued with phenomenalcharacterThe phenomenal character of emotions doesn’t justaccompany the intentional content of emotions - instead, itseems to attach to the very intentional objects of emotion

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Imbuement

Another example: LoveThe phenomenal character of love is itself directed at theintentional object of love

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Imbuement

Another example: LoveThe phenomenal character of love is itself directed at theintentional object of love

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotion’s revised mental profile

1 Phenomenal aspect2 Intentional aspect

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

3 Imbuement: Emotion’s intentional content is imbued withphenomenal character

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotion’s revised mental profile

1 Phenomenal aspect2 Intentional aspect

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

3 Imbuement: Emotion’s intentional content is imbued withphenomenal character

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Back to the crude hybrid theories

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state

2 Difficulty accounting for the intimate relationship betweenemotion’s two mental aspects - the intentional aspect seemsimbued with phenomenology (Goldie)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Back to the crude hybrid theories

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state

2 Difficulty accounting for the intimate relationship betweenemotion’s two mental aspects - the intentional aspect seemsimbued with phenomenology (Goldie)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Back to the crude hybrid theories

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state

2 Difficulty accounting for the intimate relationship betweenemotion’s two mental aspects - the intentional aspect seemsimbued with phenomenology (Goldie)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Jesse Prinz’s hybrid theory

An emotion is a mental state E such that1 E is a perceptual representation of bodily states2 E indirectly represent the typical causes of these bodily states

(e.g. danger, loss, threat)

The phenomenal aspect of emotion is explained by theperception of bodily statesThe intentional aspect of emotion is explained by the indirectrepresentation of typical causes of these bodily states

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Jesse Prinz’s hybrid theory

An emotion is a mental state E such that1 E is a perceptual representation of bodily states2 E indirectly represent the typical causes of these bodily states

(e.g. danger, loss, threat)

The phenomenal aspect of emotion is explained by theperception of bodily statesThe intentional aspect of emotion is explained by the indirectrepresentation of typical causes of these bodily states

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Jesse Prinz’s hybrid theory

An emotion is a mental state E such that1 E is a perceptual representation of bodily states2 E indirectly represent the typical causes of these bodily states

(e.g. danger, loss, threat)

The phenomenal aspect of emotion is explained by theperception of bodily statesThe intentional aspect of emotion is explained by the indirectrepresentation of typical causes of these bodily states

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Jesse Prinz’s hybrid theory

An emotion is a mental state E such that1 E is a perceptual representation of bodily states2 E indirectly represent the typical causes of these bodily states

(e.g. danger, loss, threat)

The phenomenal aspect of emotion is explained by theperception of bodily statesThe intentional aspect of emotion is explained by the indirectrepresentation of typical causes of these bodily states

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Jesse Prinz’s hybrid theory

An emotion is a mental state E such that1 E is a perceptual representation of bodily states2 E indirectly represent the typical causes of these bodily states

(e.g. danger, loss, threat)

The phenomenal aspect of emotion is explained by theperception of bodily statesThe intentional aspect of emotion is explained by the indirectrepresentation of typical causes of these bodily states

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with Prinz’s hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state?

Prinz has no problem here - the two components are featuresof one and the same mental state

2 Difficulty accounting for imbuement?All phenomenal character arises from the awareness of bodilystatesThere is no phenomenal character corresponding to theintentional aspect of emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with Prinz’s hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state?

Prinz has no problem here - the two components are featuresof one and the same mental state

2 Difficulty accounting for imbuement?All phenomenal character arises from the awareness of bodilystatesThere is no phenomenal character corresponding to theintentional aspect of emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with Prinz’s hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state?

Prinz has no problem here - the two components are featuresof one and the same mental state

2 Difficulty accounting for imbuement?All phenomenal character arises from the awareness of bodilystatesThere is no phenomenal character corresponding to theintentional aspect of emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with Prinz’s hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state?

Prinz has no problem here - the two components are featuresof one and the same mental state

2 Difficulty accounting for imbuement?All phenomenal character arises from the awareness of bodilystatesThere is no phenomenal character corresponding to theintentional aspect of emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Problem with Prinz’s hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state?

Prinz has no problem here - the two components are featuresof one and the same mental state

2 Difficulty accounting for imbuement?All phenomenal character arises from the awareness of bodilystatesThere is no phenomenal character corresponding to theintentional aspect of emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

Emotions consist in1 An awareness of bodily states2 A “feeling towards” an intentional object

A kind of intentional state imbued with phenomenal character

The intentional aspect of emotions is explained by the “feelingtowards”The phenomenal aspect is explained by both components

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

Emotions consist in1 An awareness of bodily states2 A “feeling towards” an intentional object

A kind of intentional state imbued with phenomenal character

The intentional aspect of emotions is explained by the “feelingtowards”The phenomenal aspect is explained by both components

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

Emotions consist in1 An awareness of bodily states2 A “feeling towards” an intentional object

A kind of intentional state imbued with phenomenal character

The intentional aspect of emotions is explained by the “feelingtowards”The phenomenal aspect is explained by both components

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

Emotions consist in1 An awareness of bodily states2 A “feeling towards” an intentional object

A kind of intentional state imbued with phenomenal character

The intentional aspect of emotions is explained by the “feelingtowards”The phenomenal aspect is explained by both components

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

Emotions consist in1 An awareness of bodily states2 A “feeling towards” an intentional object

A kind of intentional state imbued with phenomenal character

The intentional aspect of emotions is explained by the “feelingtowards”The phenomenal aspect is explained by both components

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

Emotions consist in1 An awareness of bodily states2 A “feeling towards” an intentional object

A kind of intentional state imbued with phenomenal character

The intentional aspect of emotions is explained by the “feelingtowards”The phenomenal aspect is explained by both components

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

2 Difficulty accounting for imbuement?

No difficulty, since imbued intentional states are one of thecomponents of emotion

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

2 Difficulty accounting for imbuement?

No difficulty, since imbued intentional states are one of thecomponents of emotion

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state?

The two components are features of two distinct statesGoldie: The two states are unified in one “substantial event”,where “a substantial event is an event which has a certain kindof unity, partly explained by its nature.” (Goldie, 2002,“Emotions, feelings and intentionality”, p. 252, n. 26)

But this is obscure

Relatedly, if the two components aren’t unified in someinteresting way, we might wonder why we should include theawareness of bodily states as part of emotion in the first place- the “feeling towards” seems to be sufficient for explainingemotion’s mental profile

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state?

The two components are features of two distinct statesGoldie: The two states are unified in one “substantial event”,where “a substantial event is an event which has a certain kindof unity, partly explained by its nature.” (Goldie, 2002,“Emotions, feelings and intentionality”, p. 252, n. 26)

But this is obscure

Relatedly, if the two components aren’t unified in someinteresting way, we might wonder why we should include theawareness of bodily states as part of emotion in the first place- the “feeling towards” seems to be sufficient for explainingemotion’s mental profile

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state?

The two components are features of two distinct statesGoldie: The two states are unified in one “substantial event”,where “a substantial event is an event which has a certain kindof unity, partly explained by its nature.” (Goldie, 2002,“Emotions, feelings and intentionality”, p. 252, n. 26)

But this is obscure

Relatedly, if the two components aren’t unified in someinteresting way, we might wonder why we should include theawareness of bodily states as part of emotion in the first place- the “feeling towards” seems to be sufficient for explainingemotion’s mental profile

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state?

The two components are features of two distinct statesGoldie: The two states are unified in one “substantial event”,where “a substantial event is an event which has a certain kindof unity, partly explained by its nature.” (Goldie, 2002,“Emotions, feelings and intentionality”, p. 252, n. 26)

But this is obscure

Relatedly, if the two components aren’t unified in someinteresting way, we might wonder why we should include theawareness of bodily states as part of emotion in the first place- the “feeling towards” seems to be sufficient for explainingemotion’s mental profile

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Goldie’s hybrid theory

1 Difficulty in accounting for how the two components areunified in one state?

The two components are features of two distinct statesGoldie: The two states are unified in one “substantial event”,where “a substantial event is an event which has a certain kindof unity, partly explained by its nature.” (Goldie, 2002,“Emotions, feelings and intentionality”, p. 252, n. 26)

But this is obscure

Relatedly, if the two components aren’t unified in someinteresting way, we might wonder why we should include theawareness of bodily states as part of emotion in the first place- the “feeling towards” seems to be sufficient for explainingemotion’s mental profile

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism

IntentionalismPhenomenal character is determined by/identical to/supervenienton intentional content

Intentionalists generally take intentionalism to apply to allphenomenal statesBut it’s also possible to hold restricted versions of the viewRelatively little attention has been given to how intentionalismmight apply to emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism

IntentionalismPhenomenal character is determined by/identical to/supervenienton intentional content

Intentionalists generally take intentionalism to apply to allphenomenal statesBut it’s also possible to hold restricted versions of the viewRelatively little attention has been given to how intentionalismmight apply to emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism

IntentionalismPhenomenal character is determined by/identical to/supervenienton intentional content

Intentionalists generally take intentionalism to apply to allphenomenal statesBut it’s also possible to hold restricted versions of the viewRelatively little attention has been given to how intentionalismmight apply to emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism

IntentionalismPhenomenal character is determined by/identical to/supervenienton intentional content

Intentionalists generally take intentionalism to apply to allphenomenal statesBut it’s also possible to hold restricted versions of the viewRelatively little attention has been given to how intentionalismmight apply to emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism

IntentionalismPhenomenal character is determined by/identical to/supervenienton intentional content

Intentionalists generally take intentionalism to apply to allphenomenal statesBut it’s also possible to hold restricted versions of the viewRelatively little attention has been given to how intentionalismmight apply to emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Comparison to perception

Intentionalism is generally motivated by consideration ofperceptual experiencesTo motivate an intentionalist account of the mental profile ofemotions, I will first consider the motivations forintentionalism about perception

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Comparison to perception

Intentionalism is generally motivated by consideration ofperceptual experiencesTo motivate an intentionalist account of the mental profile ofemotions, I will first consider the motivations forintentionalism about perception

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Perception’s mental profile

Perception exhibits a mental profile similar to that of emotions

1 Phenomenal aspect: There is something it is like to have aperceptual experience

2 Intentional aspect: Perceptual experiences exhibitintentionality

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

3 Transparency: The intentional and phenomenal aspects arenot wholly distinct, but rather intimately related

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Perception’s mental profile

Perception exhibits a mental profile similar to that of emotions

1 Phenomenal aspect: There is something it is like to have aperceptual experience

2 Intentional aspect: Perceptual experiences exhibitintentionality

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

3 Transparency: The intentional and phenomenal aspects arenot wholly distinct, but rather intimately related

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Perception’s mental profile

Perception exhibits a mental profile similar to that of emotions

1 Phenomenal aspect: There is something it is like to have aperceptual experience

2 Intentional aspect: Perceptual experiences exhibitintentionality

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

3 Transparency: The intentional and phenomenal aspects arenot wholly distinct, but rather intimately related

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Perception’s mental profile

Perception exhibits a mental profile similar to that of emotions

1 Phenomenal aspect: There is something it is like to have aperceptual experience

2 Intentional aspect: Perceptual experiences exhibitintentionality

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

3 Transparency: The intentional and phenomenal aspects arenot wholly distinct, but rather intimately related

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Perception’s mental profile

Perception exhibits a mental profile similar to that of emotions

1 Phenomenal aspect: There is something it is like to have aperceptual experience

2 Intentional aspect: Perceptual experiences exhibitintentionality

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

3 Transparency: The intentional and phenomenal aspects arenot wholly distinct, but rather intimately related

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Perception’s mental profile

Perception exhibits a mental profile similar to that of emotions

1 Phenomenal aspect: There is something it is like to have aperceptual experience

2 Intentional aspect: Perceptual experiences exhibitintentionality

1 Intentional object2 Qualification of intentional object

3 Transparency: The intentional and phenomenal aspects arenot wholly distinct, but rather intimately related

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Transparency

When we introspect on a visual experience of a bunch ofbananas, we notice represented contentsBut we don’t also represent distinct phenomenal charactersRather, whatever phenomenal character we do notice is tiedto the represented bananasTransparency is analogous to imbuement (actually,transparency is stronger than imbuement)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Transparency

When we introspect on a visual experience of a bunch ofbananas, we notice represented contentsBut we don’t also represent distinct phenomenal charactersRather, whatever phenomenal character we do notice is tiedto the represented bananasTransparency is analogous to imbuement (actually,transparency is stronger than imbuement)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Transparency

When we introspect on a visual experience of a bunch ofbananas, we notice represented contentsBut we don’t also represent distinct phenomenal charactersRather, whatever phenomenal character we do notice is tiedto the represented bananasTransparency is analogous to imbuement (actually,transparency is stronger than imbuement)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Transparency

When we introspect on a visual experience of a bunch ofbananas, we notice represented contentsBut we don’t also represent distinct phenomenal charactersRather, whatever phenomenal character we do notice is tiedto the represented bananasTransparency is analogous to imbuement (actually,transparency is stronger than imbuement)

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Theories of perception

Emotion PerceptionFeeling theory Sense-data theoryCognitivism Belief/judgment theoryHybrid theory Hybrid theoryIntentionalism Intentionalism

An emotion’s distinctive phenomenal character is (type ortoken) identical to (or supervenient on, determined by) (somepart of) its intentional content

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Theories of perception

Emotion PerceptionFeeling theory Sense-data theoryCognitivism Belief/judgment theoryHybrid theory Hybrid theoryIntentionalism Intentionalism

E.g. Frank JacksonPrecisely fit the bill for capturing phenomenal character ofperceptual experienceProblem: Doesn’t capture intentional aspectAn emotion’s distinctive phenomenal character is (type ortoken) identical to (or supervenient on, determined by) (somepart of) its intentional content

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Theories of perception

Emotion PerceptionFeeling theory Sense-data theoryCognitivism Belief/judgment theoryHybrid theory Hybrid theoryIntentionalism Intentionalism

E.g. David Armstrong, George PitcherCaptures intentional aspectProblem: Neglects phenomenal aspectAn emotion’s distinctive phenomenal character is (type ortoken) identical to (or supervenient on, determined by) (somepart of) its intentional content

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Theories of perception

Emotion PerceptionFeeling theory Sense-data theoryCognitivism Belief/judgment theoryHybrid theory Hybrid theoryIntentionalism Intentionalism

E.g. Thomas Reid: Perceptual experiences are combinationsof sensations and conceptionsE.g. Mental paint view (Block): Perceptual experiencesconsist of narrow functional roles/material constitution andcausal/informational relationsProblem: TransparencyAn emotion’s distinctive phenomenal character is (type ortoken) identical to (or supervenient on, determined by) (somepart of) its intentional content

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Theories of perception

Emotion PerceptionFeeling theory Sense-data theoryCognitivism Belief/judgment theoryHybrid theory Hybrid theoryIntentionalism Intentionalism

E.g. Gilbert Harman, Fred Dretske, Michael TyePerceptual experience have intentional contents whichautomatically determine or are identical to their phenomenalcharactersAn emotion’s distinctive phenomenal character is (type ortoken) identical to (or supervenient on, determined by) (somepart of) its intentional content 29 / 46

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Theories of perception

Emotion PerceptionFeeling theory Sense-data theoryCognitivism Belief/judgment theoryHybrid theory Hybrid theoryIntentionalism Intentionalism

An emotion’s distinctive phenomenal character is (type ortoken) identical to (or supervenient on, determined by) (somepart of) its intentional content

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism explains perception’s mental profile

1 Phenomenal aspectPhenomenal features are identical to intentional features

2 Intentional aspectPerceptual experience has intentional content

3 TransparencyThe intentional and phenomenal features are identical

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism explains perception’s mental profile

1 Phenomenal aspectPhenomenal features are identical to intentional features

2 Intentional aspectPerceptual experience has intentional content

3 TransparencyThe intentional and phenomenal features are identical

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism explains perception’s mental profile

1 Phenomenal aspectPhenomenal features are identical to intentional features

2 Intentional aspectPerceptual experience has intentional content

3 TransparencyThe intentional and phenomenal features are identical

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism explains perception’s mental profile

1 Phenomenal aspectPhenomenal features are identical to intentional features

2 Intentional aspectPerceptual experience has intentional content

3 TransparencyThe intentional and phenomenal features are identical

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism about emotion

Intentionalism about emotionAn emotion’s distinctive phenomenal character is (type or token)identical to (some part of) its intentional content.

Emotions have intentional contentSome part of this content is identical to the phenomenalcharacter of emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism about emotion

Intentionalism about emotionAn emotion’s distinctive phenomenal character is (type or token)identical to (some part of) its intentional content.

Emotions have intentional contentSome part of this content is identical to the phenomenalcharacter of emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism about emotion

Intentionalism about emotionAn emotion’s distinctive phenomenal character is (type or token)identical to (some part of) its intentional content.

Emotions have intentional contentSome part of this content is identical to the phenomenalcharacter of emotions

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism explains emotion’s mental profile

1 Phenomenal aspectPhenomenal features are identical to intentional features

2 Intentional aspectEmotions have intentional content

3 ImbuementThe intentional and phenomenal features are identical

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism explains emotion’s mental profile

1 Phenomenal aspectPhenomenal features are identical to intentional features

2 Intentional aspectEmotions have intentional content

3 ImbuementThe intentional and phenomenal features are identical

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism explains emotion’s mental profile

1 Phenomenal aspectPhenomenal features are identical to intentional features

2 Intentional aspectEmotions have intentional content

3 ImbuementThe intentional and phenomenal features are identical

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentionalism explains emotion’s mental profile

1 Phenomenal aspectPhenomenal features are identical to intentional features

2 Intentional aspectEmotions have intentional content

3 ImbuementThe intentional and phenomenal features are identical

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Two main issues dividing intentionalists about emotion

1 What are the contents of emotions that determine theirphenomenal characters?

2 What should we say about undirected emotions?

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Two main issues dividing intentionalists about emotion

1 What are the contents of emotions that determine theirphenomenal characters?

2 What should we say about undirected emotions?

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

The contents of emotions that determine their phenomenalcharacters

The options:Intentional objectsQualification of intentional objects

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentional objects

Intentional objects are unlikely candidatesThe same intentional objects can be represented by mentalstates that lack the phenomenal character of emotionsE.g. one can perceive a dog without experiencing fear

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentional objects

Intentional objects are unlikely candidatesThe same intentional objects can be represented by mentalstates that lack the phenomenal character of emotionsE.g. one can perceive a dog without experiencing fear

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Intentional objects

Intentional objects are unlikely candidatesThe same intentional objects can be represented by mentalstates that lack the phenomenal character of emotionsE.g. one can perceive a dog without experiencing fear

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Properties

Better candidate: the way intentional objects are represented -how they are qualifiedOr, in other words, the properties our emotions attribute tothemE.g. In the case of fearing the dog, we represent the dog asscary. But what property is scariness?

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Properties

Better candidate: the way intentional objects are represented -how they are qualifiedOr, in other words, the properties our emotions attribute tothemE.g. In the case of fearing the dog, we represent the dog asscary. But what property is scariness?

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Properties

Better candidate: the way intentional objects are represented -how they are qualifiedOr, in other words, the properties our emotions attribute tothemE.g. In the case of fearing the dog, we represent the dog asscary. But what property is scariness?

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What properties do emotions represent?

1 Ordinary physical propertiesE.g. Some ordinary physical property that all scary things havein commonProblem: Disjunctive, gruesome (e.g. no natural property thatall scary things have in common); phenomenologically foreign

2 Properties of having various dispositions to affect usE.g. The disposition to cause certain, say, behavioral reactionsin usProblem: Dispositional; phenomenologically foreign (nodispositional phenomenology)

3 Sui generis propertiesE.g. scariness, elation, sadness, anxietinessEmotion-properties cannot be further elucidated in terms ofother more basic properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What properties do emotions represent?

1 Ordinary physical propertiesE.g. Some ordinary physical property that all scary things havein commonProblem: Disjunctive, gruesome (e.g. no natural property thatall scary things have in common); phenomenologically foreign

2 Properties of having various dispositions to affect usE.g. The disposition to cause certain, say, behavioral reactionsin usProblem: Dispositional; phenomenologically foreign (nodispositional phenomenology)

3 Sui generis propertiesE.g. scariness, elation, sadness, anxietinessEmotion-properties cannot be further elucidated in terms ofother more basic properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What properties do emotions represent?

1 Ordinary physical propertiesE.g. Some ordinary physical property that all scary things havein commonProblem: Disjunctive, gruesome (e.g. no natural property thatall scary things have in common); phenomenologically foreign

2 Properties of having various dispositions to affect usE.g. The disposition to cause certain, say, behavioral reactionsin usProblem: Dispositional; phenomenologically foreign (nodispositional phenomenology)

3 Sui generis propertiesE.g. scariness, elation, sadness, anxietinessEmotion-properties cannot be further elucidated in terms ofother more basic properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What properties do emotions represent?

1 Ordinary physical propertiesE.g. Some ordinary physical property that all scary things havein commonProblem: Disjunctive, gruesome (e.g. no natural property thatall scary things have in common); phenomenologically foreign

2 Properties of having various dispositions to affect usE.g. The disposition to cause certain, say, behavioral reactionsin usProblem: Dispositional; phenomenologically foreign (nodispositional phenomenology)

3 Sui generis propertiesE.g. scariness, elation, sadness, anxietinessEmotion-properties cannot be further elucidated in terms ofother more basic properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What properties do emotions represent?

1 Ordinary physical propertiesE.g. Some ordinary physical property that all scary things havein commonProblem: Disjunctive, gruesome (e.g. no natural property thatall scary things have in common); phenomenologically foreign

2 Properties of having various dispositions to affect usE.g. The disposition to cause certain, say, behavioral reactionsin usProblem: Dispositional; phenomenologically foreign (nodispositional phenomenology)

3 Sui generis propertiesE.g. scariness, elation, sadness, anxietinessEmotion-properties cannot be further elucidated in terms ofother more basic properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What properties do emotions represent?

1 Ordinary physical propertiesE.g. Some ordinary physical property that all scary things havein commonProblem: Disjunctive, gruesome (e.g. no natural property thatall scary things have in common); phenomenologically foreign

2 Properties of having various dispositions to affect usE.g. The disposition to cause certain, say, behavioral reactionsin usProblem: Dispositional; phenomenologically foreign (nodispositional phenomenology)

3 Sui generis propertiesE.g. scariness, elation, sadness, anxietinessEmotion-properties cannot be further elucidated in terms ofother more basic properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What properties do emotions represent?

1 Ordinary physical propertiesE.g. Some ordinary physical property that all scary things havein commonProblem: Disjunctive, gruesome (e.g. no natural property thatall scary things have in common); phenomenologically foreign

2 Properties of having various dispositions to affect usE.g. The disposition to cause certain, say, behavioral reactionsin usProblem: Dispositional; phenomenologically foreign (nodispositional phenomenology)

3 Sui generis propertiesE.g. scariness, elation, sadness, anxietinessEmotion-properties cannot be further elucidated in terms ofother more basic properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What properties do emotions represent?

1 Ordinary physical propertiesE.g. Some ordinary physical property that all scary things havein commonProblem: Disjunctive, gruesome (e.g. no natural property thatall scary things have in common); phenomenologically foreign

2 Properties of having various dispositions to affect usE.g. The disposition to cause certain, say, behavioral reactionsin usProblem: Dispositional; phenomenologically foreign (nodispositional phenomenology)

3 Sui generis propertiesE.g. scariness, elation, sadness, anxietinessEmotion-properties cannot be further elucidated in terms ofother more basic properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What properties do emotions represent?

1 Ordinary physical propertiesE.g. Some ordinary physical property that all scary things havein commonProblem: Disjunctive, gruesome (e.g. no natural property thatall scary things have in common); phenomenologically foreign

2 Properties of having various dispositions to affect usE.g. The disposition to cause certain, say, behavioral reactionsin usProblem: Dispositional; phenomenologically foreign (nodispositional phenomenology)

3 Sui generis propertiesE.g. scariness, elation, sadness, anxietinessEmotion-properties cannot be further elucidated in terms ofother more basic properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions represent sui generis properties

Takes phenomenal character at face valuePhenomenologically adequateEmotion-properties need only be sui generis as a class -perhaps some emotion-properties are reducible to othersEmotion-properties need not be instantiated - our emotionsmight systematically misrepresent

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions represent sui generis properties

Takes phenomenal character at face valuePhenomenologically adequateEmotion-properties need only be sui generis as a class -perhaps some emotion-properties are reducible to othersEmotion-properties need not be instantiated - our emotionsmight systematically misrepresent

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions represent sui generis properties

Takes phenomenal character at face valuePhenomenologically adequateEmotion-properties need only be sui generis as a class -perhaps some emotion-properties are reducible to othersEmotion-properties need not be instantiated - our emotionsmight systematically misrepresent

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions represent sui generis properties

Takes phenomenal character at face valuePhenomenologically adequateEmotion-properties need only be sui generis as a class -perhaps some emotion-properties are reducible to othersEmotion-properties need not be instantiated - our emotionsmight systematically misrepresent

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions as mental highlighting

We can think of emotions as highlighting our inner world withproperties that need only be relevant to us

This kind of mental highlighting can be useful even if objectsdon’t have the properties we highlight them with - as long asthey have correlated properties that are relevant to ourwell-being

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions as mental highlighting

We can think of emotions as highlighting our inner world withproperties that need only be relevant to us

This kind of mental highlighting can be useful even if objectsdon’t have the properties we highlight them with - as long asthey have correlated properties that are relevant to ourwell-being

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions as mental highlighting

We can think of emotions as highlighting our inner world withproperties that need only be relevant to us

This kind of mental highlighting can be useful even if objectsdon’t have the properties we highlight them with - as long asthey have correlated properties that are relevant to ourwell-being

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions as mental highlighting

We can think of emotions as highlighting our inner world withproperties that need only be relevant to us

This kind of mental highlighting can be useful even if objectsdon’t have the properties we highlight them with - as long asthey have correlated properties that are relevant to ourwell-being

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions as mental highlighting

We can think of emotions as highlighting our inner world withproperties that need only be relevant to us

This kind of mental highlighting can be useful even if objectsdon’t have the properties we highlight them with - as long asthey have correlated properties that are relevant to ourwell-being

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Emotions as mental highlighting

We can think of emotions as highlighting our inner world withproperties that need only be relevant to us

This kind of mental highlighting can be useful even if objectsdon’t have the properties we highlight them with - as long asthey have correlated properties that are relevant to ourwell-being

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Undirected emotions

So far, we have been focusing on directed emotions -emotions that are obviously directed towards particularintentional objectsWhat about undirected emotions - emotions that appear notto be directed at any objects?

E.g. pangs of anxiety, pervasive feelings of sadness, suddenfeelings of elation

Undirected emotions appear not to have an intentional object,so they appear to resist an intentionalist treatment

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Undirected emotions

So far, we have been focusing on directed emotions -emotions that are obviously directed towards particularintentional objectsWhat about undirected emotions - emotions that appear notto be directed at any objects?

E.g. pangs of anxiety, pervasive feelings of sadness, suddenfeelings of elation

Undirected emotions appear not to have an intentional object,so they appear to resist an intentionalist treatment

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Undirected emotions

So far, we have been focusing on directed emotions -emotions that are obviously directed towards particularintentional objectsWhat about undirected emotions - emotions that appear notto be directed at any objects?

E.g. pangs of anxiety, pervasive feelings of sadness, suddenfeelings of elation

Undirected emotions appear not to have an intentional object,so they appear to resist an intentionalist treatment

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Undirected emotions

So far, we have been focusing on directed emotions -emotions that are obviously directed towards particularintentional objectsWhat about undirected emotions - emotions that appear notto be directed at any objects?

E.g. pangs of anxiety, pervasive feelings of sadness, suddenfeelings of elation

Undirected emotions appear not to have an intentional object,so they appear to resist an intentionalist treatment

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What to say about undirected emotions

1 Undirected emotions have changing intentional objects (Tye)E.g. Road rage might appear to lack an intentional object, butreally it has multiple changing intentional objectsProblem: This doesn’t account for all the cases - what aboutpervasive feelings of sadness or sudden pangs of elation?

2 Undirected emotions have everything or the entire world astheir intentional object(s) (Tye)

E.g. The emotion expressed by “everything sucks!”Problem: This doesn’t account for all the remaining cases -there still seem to be cases where we just feel a certain way,without our feeling that way being directed at any intentionalobjects, not even these special ones

3 Undirected emotions represent unbound propertiesRepresentations of emotion-properties can occur withoutqualifying any intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What to say about undirected emotions

1 Undirected emotions have changing intentional objects (Tye)E.g. Road rage might appear to lack an intentional object, butreally it has multiple changing intentional objectsProblem: This doesn’t account for all the cases - what aboutpervasive feelings of sadness or sudden pangs of elation?

2 Undirected emotions have everything or the entire world astheir intentional object(s) (Tye)

E.g. The emotion expressed by “everything sucks!”Problem: This doesn’t account for all the remaining cases -there still seem to be cases where we just feel a certain way,without our feeling that way being directed at any intentionalobjects, not even these special ones

3 Undirected emotions represent unbound propertiesRepresentations of emotion-properties can occur withoutqualifying any intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What to say about undirected emotions

1 Undirected emotions have changing intentional objects (Tye)E.g. Road rage might appear to lack an intentional object, butreally it has multiple changing intentional objectsProblem: This doesn’t account for all the cases - what aboutpervasive feelings of sadness or sudden pangs of elation?

2 Undirected emotions have everything or the entire world astheir intentional object(s) (Tye)

E.g. The emotion expressed by “everything sucks!”Problem: This doesn’t account for all the remaining cases -there still seem to be cases where we just feel a certain way,without our feeling that way being directed at any intentionalobjects, not even these special ones

3 Undirected emotions represent unbound propertiesRepresentations of emotion-properties can occur withoutqualifying any intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What to say about undirected emotions

1 Undirected emotions have changing intentional objects (Tye)E.g. Road rage might appear to lack an intentional object, butreally it has multiple changing intentional objectsProblem: This doesn’t account for all the cases - what aboutpervasive feelings of sadness or sudden pangs of elation?

2 Undirected emotions have everything or the entire world astheir intentional object(s) (Tye)

E.g. The emotion expressed by “everything sucks!”Problem: This doesn’t account for all the remaining cases -there still seem to be cases where we just feel a certain way,without our feeling that way being directed at any intentionalobjects, not even these special ones

3 Undirected emotions represent unbound propertiesRepresentations of emotion-properties can occur withoutqualifying any intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What to say about undirected emotions

1 Undirected emotions have changing intentional objects (Tye)E.g. Road rage might appear to lack an intentional object, butreally it has multiple changing intentional objectsProblem: This doesn’t account for all the cases - what aboutpervasive feelings of sadness or sudden pangs of elation?

2 Undirected emotions have everything or the entire world astheir intentional object(s) (Tye)

E.g. The emotion expressed by “everything sucks!”Problem: This doesn’t account for all the remaining cases -there still seem to be cases where we just feel a certain way,without our feeling that way being directed at any intentionalobjects, not even these special ones

3 Undirected emotions represent unbound propertiesRepresentations of emotion-properties can occur withoutqualifying any intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What to say about undirected emotions

1 Undirected emotions have changing intentional objects (Tye)E.g. Road rage might appear to lack an intentional object, butreally it has multiple changing intentional objectsProblem: This doesn’t account for all the cases - what aboutpervasive feelings of sadness or sudden pangs of elation?

2 Undirected emotions have everything or the entire world astheir intentional object(s) (Tye)

E.g. The emotion expressed by “everything sucks!”Problem: This doesn’t account for all the remaining cases -there still seem to be cases where we just feel a certain way,without our feeling that way being directed at any intentionalobjects, not even these special ones

3 Undirected emotions represent unbound propertiesRepresentations of emotion-properties can occur withoutqualifying any intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What to say about undirected emotions

1 Undirected emotions have changing intentional objects (Tye)E.g. Road rage might appear to lack an intentional object, butreally it has multiple changing intentional objectsProblem: This doesn’t account for all the cases - what aboutpervasive feelings of sadness or sudden pangs of elation?

2 Undirected emotions have everything or the entire world astheir intentional object(s) (Tye)

E.g. The emotion expressed by “everything sucks!”Problem: This doesn’t account for all the remaining cases -there still seem to be cases where we just feel a certain way,without our feeling that way being directed at any intentionalobjects, not even these special ones

3 Undirected emotions represent unbound propertiesRepresentations of emotion-properties can occur withoutqualifying any intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

What to say about undirected emotions

1 Undirected emotions have changing intentional objects (Tye)E.g. Road rage might appear to lack an intentional object, butreally it has multiple changing intentional objectsProblem: This doesn’t account for all the cases - what aboutpervasive feelings of sadness or sudden pangs of elation?

2 Undirected emotions have everything or the entire world astheir intentional object(s) (Tye)

E.g. The emotion expressed by “everything sucks!”Problem: This doesn’t account for all the remaining cases -there still seem to be cases where we just feel a certain way,without our feeling that way being directed at any intentionalobjects, not even these special ones

3 Undirected emotions represent unbound propertiesRepresentations of emotion-properties can occur withoutqualifying any intentional object

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Unbound emotion-properties

Visual representations of colors do not (maybe cannot) occurwithout being bound to represented objects - you can’t justsee blue without seeing something as blueIn contrast, concepts can occur unbound - you can think catwithout thinking that anything is a catEmotion-representations are like concepts - they can occurunbound

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Unbound emotion-properties

Visual representations of colors do not (maybe cannot) occurwithout being bound to represented objects - you can’t justsee blue without seeing something as blueIn contrast, concepts can occur unbound - you can think catwithout thinking that anything is a catEmotion-representations are like concepts - they can occurunbound

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Unbound emotion-properties

Visual representations of colors do not (maybe cannot) occurwithout being bound to represented objects - you can’t justsee blue without seeing something as blueIn contrast, concepts can occur unbound - you can think catwithout thinking that anything is a catEmotion-representations are like concepts - they can occurunbound

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Return to bodily sensations

What about bodily sensations? Do they play any role indetermining the mental profile of emotions?

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Return to bodily sensations

Emotions are accompanied by physiological changesAnd these might contribute to the phenomenal character ofone’s overall state when one is experiencing an emotionBut we don’t have to say that these phenomenal charactersare part of emotion’s phenomenal character, as opposed tomere accompaniments

Perhaps the issue is terminological44 / 46

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Return to bodily sensations

Emotions are accompanied by physiological changesAnd these might contribute to the phenomenal character ofone’s overall state when one is experiencing an emotionBut we don’t have to say that these phenomenal charactersare part of emotion’s phenomenal character, as opposed tomere accompaniments

Perhaps the issue is terminological44 / 46

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Return to bodily sensations

Emotions are accompanied by physiological changesAnd these might contribute to the phenomenal character ofone’s overall state when one is experiencing an emotionBut we don’t have to say that these phenomenal charactersare part of emotion’s phenomenal character, as opposed tomere accompaniments

Perhaps the issue is terminological44 / 46

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Return to bodily sensations

Emotions are accompanied by physiological changesAnd these might contribute to the phenomenal character ofone’s overall state when one is experiencing an emotionBut we don’t have to say that these phenomenal charactersare part of emotion’s phenomenal character, as opposed tomere accompaniments

Perhaps the issue is terminological44 / 46

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Return to bodily sensations

Emotions are accompanied by physiological changesAnd these might contribute to the phenomenal character ofone’s overall state when one is experiencing an emotionBut we don’t have to say that these phenomenal charactersare part of emotion’s phenomenal character, as opposed tomere accompaniments

Perhaps the issue is terminological44 / 46

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Summary

Emotions have an interesting mental profileThis mental profile is not adequately accounted for by existingtheories of emotionsPerceptual experience has a similar mental profileIntentionalism is considered a promising theory for accountingfor perception’s mental profileIntentionalism is also a promising theory for accounting foremotion’s mental profileThere are different versions of intentionalism about emotionsOn my version

Emotions represent uninstantiated sui generisemotion-propertiesUndirected emotions lack intentional objects - they representmere emotion-properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Summary

Emotions have an interesting mental profileThis mental profile is not adequately accounted for by existingtheories of emotionsPerceptual experience has a similar mental profileIntentionalism is considered a promising theory for accountingfor perception’s mental profileIntentionalism is also a promising theory for accounting foremotion’s mental profileThere are different versions of intentionalism about emotionsOn my version

Emotions represent uninstantiated sui generisemotion-propertiesUndirected emotions lack intentional objects - they representmere emotion-properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Summary

Emotions have an interesting mental profileThis mental profile is not adequately accounted for by existingtheories of emotionsPerceptual experience has a similar mental profileIntentionalism is considered a promising theory for accountingfor perception’s mental profileIntentionalism is also a promising theory for accounting foremotion’s mental profileThere are different versions of intentionalism about emotionsOn my version

Emotions represent uninstantiated sui generisemotion-propertiesUndirected emotions lack intentional objects - they representmere emotion-properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Summary

Emotions have an interesting mental profileThis mental profile is not adequately accounted for by existingtheories of emotionsPerceptual experience has a similar mental profileIntentionalism is considered a promising theory for accountingfor perception’s mental profileIntentionalism is also a promising theory for accounting foremotion’s mental profileThere are different versions of intentionalism about emotionsOn my version

Emotions represent uninstantiated sui generisemotion-propertiesUndirected emotions lack intentional objects - they representmere emotion-properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Summary

Emotions have an interesting mental profileThis mental profile is not adequately accounted for by existingtheories of emotionsPerceptual experience has a similar mental profileIntentionalism is considered a promising theory for accountingfor perception’s mental profileIntentionalism is also a promising theory for accounting foremotion’s mental profileThere are different versions of intentionalism about emotionsOn my version

Emotions represent uninstantiated sui generisemotion-propertiesUndirected emotions lack intentional objects - they representmere emotion-properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Summary

Emotions have an interesting mental profileThis mental profile is not adequately accounted for by existingtheories of emotionsPerceptual experience has a similar mental profileIntentionalism is considered a promising theory for accountingfor perception’s mental profileIntentionalism is also a promising theory for accounting foremotion’s mental profileThere are different versions of intentionalism about emotionsOn my version

Emotions represent uninstantiated sui generisemotion-propertiesUndirected emotions lack intentional objects - they representmere emotion-properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Summary

Emotions have an interesting mental profileThis mental profile is not adequately accounted for by existingtheories of emotionsPerceptual experience has a similar mental profileIntentionalism is considered a promising theory for accountingfor perception’s mental profileIntentionalism is also a promising theory for accounting foremotion’s mental profileThere are different versions of intentionalism about emotionsOn my version

Emotions represent uninstantiated sui generisemotion-propertiesUndirected emotions lack intentional objects - they representmere emotion-properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Summary

Emotions have an interesting mental profileThis mental profile is not adequately accounted for by existingtheories of emotionsPerceptual experience has a similar mental profileIntentionalism is considered a promising theory for accountingfor perception’s mental profileIntentionalism is also a promising theory for accounting foremotion’s mental profileThere are different versions of intentionalism about emotionsOn my version

Emotions represent uninstantiated sui generisemotion-propertiesUndirected emotions lack intentional objects - they representmere emotion-properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

Summary

Emotions have an interesting mental profileThis mental profile is not adequately accounted for by existingtheories of emotionsPerceptual experience has a similar mental profileIntentionalism is considered a promising theory for accountingfor perception’s mental profileIntentionalism is also a promising theory for accounting foremotion’s mental profileThere are different versions of intentionalism about emotionsOn my version

Emotions represent uninstantiated sui generisemotion-propertiesUndirected emotions lack intentional objects - they representmere emotion-properties

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The project Existing theories of emotion Intentionalism Versions of intentionalism about emotion Conclusion

The end

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