Intellectual Estuaries- Connecting Learning and Creativity in Programs of Advanced Academics

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V lume 20 ✤ Number 2 ✤ Winter 2009 ✤ pp. 296–324

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Intellectual Estuaries:C nnecting Learning and Creativityin Pr grams f Advanced Academics

Ronald A. BeghettoUniversity of Oregon

James C. KaufmanCalifornia State University at San Bernardino

Te emergence o ability testing in the United States during

the early 20th century sparked interest in identi ying studentsor placement in advanced academic programs ( or a review see Kau man et al., in press). Early on, administrators used IQ scores almost exclusively as the criterion or placing students inadvanced academic programs. However, not long a ter Lewis

erman rst used intelligence tests to identi y “gi ted” school-children, psychologists and educators in the United Statesappealed or broader conceptions o learning that speci cally included creativity (e.g., Guil ord, 1950; Marland, 1972). Tesecalls or broadened conceptions o learning were orti ed by researchers (e.g., orrance, 1959a, 1959b, 1959c; Yamamoto,1964) who demonstrated empirical links between creativity and academic achievement.

Un ortunately, the prototypical K–12 curriculum o ten ailsto include creative thinking as an explicit curricular goal. Tesituation is somewhat better in the curriculum and instruction o advanced academic programs where creativity typically is identi-

ed as an important ability to be cultivated. However, even whennurturing creativity is identi ed as a curricular goal, it o ten



C pyright © 2009 Prufr ck Press, P.o. B x 8813, Wac , TX 76714

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Beghett , R. A., & Kaufman, J. C. (2009). Intellectual estuaries: C nnecting learning andcreativity in pr grams f advanced academics. Journal of Advanced Academics, 20,296–324.

Academic learning and creativity sh uld be verlapping g als that

can be simultane usly pursued in pr grams f advanced academics.

H wever, eff rts aimed at nurturing creativity and academic learning

s metimes are represented as tw related but separate paths; this sepa-

rati n is unnecessary and can undermine the devel pment f creative

and academic p tential. The idea that pr grams f advanced academ-

ics have “tw paths” ( ne f r creativity and ne f r academic learning)

needs t be replaced with a new metaph r, and appr priate peda-

g gical strategies need t be devel ped t supp rt that new metaph r.

In rder t facilitate this pr cess, educat rs will need t br aden their

traditi nal c ncepti ns f learning and creativity t include interpre-

tive perspectives n learning and creativity. A new metaph r,intellec-

tual estuary,illustrates the n ti n that streams f creative and academic

interpretati ns can c nverge and thrive when educat rs in pr grams

f advanced academic simultane usly supp rt learning and creativity.

P ssible pedag gical strategies that utilize intellectual estuaries include

expl rat ry talk and S cratic seminars.



298 Journal of Advanced Academics

INTELLECTUAL ESTUARIES

is represented as separate rom academic learning goals. Forinstance, Renzulli (1999, 2005) de ned two types o gi tedness:“schoolhouse gi tedness” and “creative-productive gi tedness.”Similarly, Callahan and Miller (2005), ollowing annenbaum(1986), described an “academic” and “innovative” path in theirchild-responsive model o gi tedness. Notably, Callahan andMiller also pointed out that the distinction between academicsand creativity should be viewed as a “fuid guideline,” as theresometimes is overlap in particular students.

In the present article, we endeavor to re-voice the long-standing but o ten overlooked position that curricular andinstructional e orts aimed at cultivating creativity and academiclearning can, and should, travel along the same path (rather thanbe split into two separate paths). Moreover, we argue that ailingto recognize this union can undermine the development o cre-ative and academic potential. o this end, we highlight the long-recognized link between creativity and learning, and we discusspotential reasons or the split between academics and creativity. We then propose a new metaphor that may be help ul in helpingeducators consider the merging o creativity and learning in pro-grams o advanced academics. We close by highlighting severalpromising pedagogical strategies, programs, and considerationsthat alignment with our metaphor.

(Re)establishing the Link

Calls or educators to recognize the link between creativ-ity and academic learning are nothing new. For instance, J. P.Guil ord (in his 1950 presidential address to the AmericanPsychological Association) stressed the need or research ocusedon discovering and nurturing the “creative promise in our chil-dren” (p. 445). Te urgency o his message was underscored by his recognition o the social importance o creativity, the neglecto creativity as an area o general research, and learning theorists’

ailure to account or creative insights in their conceptualizationso learning. He called or the inclusion o “a creative act [as] an



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instance o learning . . . a comprehensive learning theory musttake into account both insight and creative activity” (p. 446).

Guil ord was not alone in stressing the importance o linkingcreativity with learning; rom his earliest writings, E. P. orrance(1959a) devoted a large portion o his pro essional li e to explor-ing and increasing awareness o this link. He also voiced hisconcern that the impoverished imaginations o many studentsresulted rom the “concerted e orts” o teachers and parents toeliminate creative and imaginative thinking at too early an age.Upon refecting on nearly hal a century o work in this area, orrance (1995) expressed his rustration that his work on thebene ts o approaching learning with a creative mind largely hadbeen ignored by the educational community.

O course, there are numerous examples o creative teachers,creative curricula, and e orts aimed at supporting creativity andlearning in the U.S. and throughout the world (see, or example,Kau man & Sternberg, 2006; Piirto, 2004, 2007; an, 2007).

We also recognize that curricular programs that represent cre-ativity and academic learning as important, yet separate, paths(c ., Callahan & Miller, 2005) are ar better than curricular pro-grams that ail to allow any path or creativity. Still, we wouldlike to see educators working toward merging these two pathsinto one. For this to happen, educators need to challenge thecommonly held conception that creativity and learning are twoseparate enterprises.

Conceptions That Split Learning and Creativity

Acquisition models o learning represent a common andpersistent view o learning (S ard, 1998). Tese models comparehuman learning and memory to computer models or storage andretrieval o in ormation. In this view, learning is portrayed as aprocess o accumulating prepackaged knowledge, which has beentransmitted by teachers or some other external storehouse o in or-mation (e.g., textbooks, CD-ROMs, in ormational Web sites). In

the acquisition model, the teacher’s role is to help students acquireand retrieve as much ready-made knowledge as possible.





Tere are various explanations or the popularity and sus-tainability o the accumulation view o learning (e.g., Egan & Gajdamaschko, 2003; Hatano, 1993). According to Egan andGajdamaschko, education conceptualized as the “accumulationo coded knowledge” may have been a response to the inventiono writing that resulted in the storage o signi cant amounts o important knowledge in “coded orm.” Because the “educatedmind” was thought to be one that had accumulated a “great dealo the most important knowledge” (Egan & Gajdamaschko,2003, p. 84), the educator’s task was to teach as much o thisstored knowledge as possible. Hatano has o ered the Americanempiricist tradition as a di erent reason or the popularity o the accumulative view o learning; still, he recognizes the sameresult: “the core educational process is the transmission o ready-made knowledge rom the outside to the individual mind, whichis like a blank slate” (p. 154).

Not surprisingly, the accumulation view o learning has oundits way into models o advanced academics. In such models,exceptional students are thought to have the ability to accumu-late more (larger amounts o ) knowledge than average studentsand generally at a more rapid pace then their same-age peers. Inaddition, this representation o learning suggests that knowledgeis assimilated, without alteration, by the learner. Tese assump-tions can be seen in the language used to describe the process o learning, such as students “absorbing [italics added] new under-standings o the world and how it works” (Callahan & Miller,2005, p. 3). Such descriptions can result in exceptional learners

being conceptualized as voracious copy machines, as opposed tointerpretive beings. We do not take issue with the claim that advanced students

may have the capacity to attain more in ormation at a aster pacethan average students. In act, there is compelling evidence insupport o this claim (e.g., Steiner & Carr, 2003). However, inour view, there is more to learning than the accumulation andaccurate reproduction o in ormation. As Beghetto and Plucker

(2006) have discussed, there are multiple examples o studentsbeing able to produce accurate responses with no meaning ul




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understanding o why the responses are accurate. Consider, orinstance, the requent phenomena o students who memorize analgorithm or solving a certain type o math problem and can(when prompted) e ciently apply it to generate accurate solu-tions, yet have no meaning ul understanding o the mathemati-cal concepts underlying the algorithm or when to apply it. Tislack o a personally meaning ul understanding is why, accordingto Shepard (2001), “students o ten lose track o the problem they are trying to solve or give silly answers, such as ‘3 buses withremainder 3’ are needed to take the class to the zoo” (p. 1079).

We expect that most educators would agree that the ability to recall answers and in ormation without understanding whatthose answers mean, how they are produced, and when and why they should be employed can hardly be called learning. Whenacademic learning is represented as a set o “ acts” to be accumu-lated (Greene, 1995), it can have the e ect o rei ying the learn-ing experience, “making our experience resistant to reevaluationand change rather than open to imagination” (p. 127). Such a view stands in direct contrast to what it means to be an “activelearner . . . one awakened to pursue meaning” (Greene, 1995,p. 132). Indeed, meaning ul learning also requires students todevelop a personal and accurate understanding o the knowledgethey are accumulating.

Current accountability movements in public education,marked by increased use o high-stakes testing, can contributeto teachers eeling pressured to quickly cover content. eachersmay eel that they simply do not have the time (or resources) to

allow their students to adequately explore, interpret, and mean-ing ully engage in all o the topics that they teach. We recognizethis tension; however, we still believe that teachers can strikea balance between covering required content and encouragingstudents to explore, interpret, and make personal meaning o

what they are learning. For teachers to move to this more bal-anced approach, educators must shi t away rom viewing learn-ing as merely accumulation and develop a more interpretative

view o learning.





Learning as Interpretation and Transformation

Bakhtin’s (1981) concept o ideological becoming serves asa compelling ramework or considering the interpretative andtrans ormative nature o learning. Tis concept re ers to how wedevelop our system o ideas (Freedman & Ball, 2004). Central toideological becoming is Bakhtin’s distinction betweenauthorita-tive discourse and internally persuasive discourse . Authoritative dis-course can be thought o as knowledge that is prepackaged andalready vetted by some external authority. Conversely, internally persuasive discourse is what “each person thinks or him- or her-sel , what ultimately is persuasive to the individual” (Freedman& Ball, 2004, p. 8). Internally persuasive discourse does not sug-gest some orm o radical subjectivity in which the isolated individual mind constructs its own reality; rather, it occurs in thecontext o active social interaction whereby new understandingsand creative insights are awakened and generated:

. . . the internally persuasive word is hal -ours and hal -

someone else’s. Its creativity and productiveness consistsprecisely in the act that such a word awakens new andindependent words, that it organizes masses o our words

rom within, and does not remain in an isolated andstatic condition . . . it is urther, that is, reely, developed,applied to new material, new conditions. . . . (Bakhtin,1981, pp. 345–346)

According to this perspective, individuals develop their ownsystem o ideas through contact with multiple voices and throughthe struggle o trans orming external ideas into their own per-sonally persuasive words and understandings. As Cazden (2001)explained,

when we trans orm the authoritative discourse o othersinto our own words, it may start to lose its authority and

become more open. We can test it, consider it in dialog—




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private or public—with other ideas, and “reaccentuate” it. . . in our own way. (p. 76)

Meaning making, even i the ideas started out as prepackagedin ormation, transmitted by some external authority, is a processo interpretation and trans ormation.

Learning as Constructing

Interpretive and trans ormative views o learning typically all under the broad heading o constructivism. Constructivism

sometimes connotes unguided learning experiences (i.e., teach-ers stepping aside and letting students reely discover new understandings without any direction or guidance). Most learn-ing theorists, particularly those who endorse social-constructiv-ist perspectives, recognize that having students engage in suchunguided, independent explorations is a costly overreaction toaccumulative models o learning and “has o ten led to the acqui-sition o immature concepts and [to the] neglect o importantschool skills” (Kozulin, 2003, p. 16). Rather, contemporary viewso constructivism (particularly social-constructivist perspec-tives—see Kozulin, Gindis, Ageyev, & Miller, 2003) recognizethat meaning making is mediated by skilled others (e.g., teach-ers, parents, more advanced peers) and sociocultural tools (e.g.,books, the Internet, language, symbol systems).

Tus, the concept o constructivism is meant to signal that,although external supports and guidance are necessary or learn-

ing, much internal work remains on the part o individual learn-ers as they make sense o new experiences, new in ormation, andinstructional interactions. As Cazden (2001) explained, what stu-dents “internalize, or appropriate, rom other people still requiressigni cant mental work on the part o the learner. Tat mental work is what ‘constructivism’ re ers to” (p. 77). Moreover, learn-ing rom a constructivist perspective (as opposed to an accumu-lative perspective) opens the door or recognizing that meaning

making is not simply a cold process o memorizing and reciting,but rather is one imbued with and reliant upon imagination.





The Role of Imagination in Learning

Philosophers (e.g., Dewey) and classic learning theorists(e.g., Vygotsky) recognized the role o imagination in meaningmaking and, at the same time, appreciated that this connection was o ten obscured by overly narrow conceptions o intellectual

unctioning and development. For instance, Dewey (1934/2005)argued that a persistent and pernicious alse belie is that imagi-nation is a cognitive process limited only to aesthetic experi-ences. Tis alse belie “obscures the larger act that all conscious experience has o necessity some degree o imaginative quality”(Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 283). Moreover, according to Dewey,imagination serves as the gateway through which meaning ismade out o new experiences. Similarly, Vygotsky (1967/2004)argued that imagination plays a central role in conceptual devel-opment and “is the basis o all creative activity” (p. 3); Vygotsky also observed that the imagination o ten is viewed as lacking“any serious practical signi cance” (p. 3) and thereby dismissedor discounted.

By highlighting the interpretative and imaginative aspects o learning, we hope that the conceptual bridge between creativity and academic learning can be rmly reestablished in programso advanced academics. Although we believe that broader con-ceptions o learning will help to establish this conceptual bridge, we also believe that this goal cannot be accomplished withoutrecognizing how traditional conceptualizations o creativity haveserved to preclude the conceptual connection between creativity

and academic learning.

Creativity as Product vs. Process

Most recent de nitions inspired by some o the earliest sci-enti c conceptions o creativity (Guil ord, 1950) de ne creativ-ity as the ability to produce products that are novel (i.e., original,unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., use ul, o ten high quality) as

de ned by a particular sociocultural context (Plucker, Beghetto,& Dow, 2004; Sternberg, Lubart, Kau man, & Pretz, 2005).




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ypically, creativity scholars classi y creativity into two levels o magnitude, little-c (everyday, ubiquitous creativity) andBig-C (revolutionary, eminent creativity).

Little-c creativity re ers to more ubiquitous examples o creative expression (e.g., developing a prize-winning BBQ rub-recipe or making up a story to entertain a small child). Little-ccreative expression is thought to be widely distributed (Kau man& Baer, 2006; Runco & Richards, 1998; Sternberg, Grigorenko,& Singer, 2004) and there ore accessible by nearly everyoneand expressed in just about any everyday activity (e.g., a ourthgrader’s historical diorama, a pro essional jeweler’s arrangemento precious stones in a ring, a physics pro essor’s demonstrationo momentum).

Big-C creativity, on the other hand, ocuses on eminent,unambiguous, and enduring examples o creative expression(e.g., Shakespeare’sHamlet , Langston Hughes’s poetry , Salk’s work on the polio vaccine). Big-C creativity represents a level o achievement that only a select ew will ever attain. A per ectly solid little-c composer may love music and write pretty melo-dies, but could spend 10 li etimes writing songs without creatingsomething o truly lasting importance.

Most theories o creativity ocus on Big-C. In the propul-sion model o creative contributions (Sternberg, 1999; Sternberg,Kau man, & Pretz, 2002), the creativity o a product is categorizeddepending on how it propels or trans orms the existing paradigm.Csikszentmihalyi’s (1999) systems model looks at the interactionbetween domain, feld, and person. In Csikszentmihalyi’s theory,

the domain, feld, and person work interactively. Te feld (e.g.,artists, critics, pro essors o art) determines whether some product(e.g., Picasso’sGuernica ) is creative in a given domain (such as art).Simonton’s (2004) recent work on scientifc creativity highlightsgenius, chance, logic, and zeitgeist. Teories, such as the invest-ment theory o creativity (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995, 1996), thecomponential model o creativity (Amabile, 1996), and the amuse-ment park theoretical model (Baer & Kau man, 2005; Kau man

& Baer, 2004), do not ocus specifcally on Big-C but still includeBig-C as a goal to be reached.





Although Big-C and little-c creativity ocus on di erent lev-els o creative magnitude , both are similar in that they share aproduct-oriented ocus. Speci cally, both Big-C and little-c con-ceptions o creativity ocus on externally judged creative products(albeit at qualitatively di erent levels o impact). For instance, .S. Eliot’s “Te Love Song o J. Al red Pru rock” is considered tobe creative because o its unique stream o consciousness styleand enduring impact. A local slam poet who might otherwise beconsidered quite ordinary when compared to . S. Eliot can stillbe considered creative at the little-c level because o her originaland adaptive approach to poetry. Although the products di erin creative magnitude, in both cases creativity is determined by the creative products. Ideally, these products are also both judgedby appropriate experts, as described by Amabile (1996) in her work on the consensual assessment technique. Academics andhistorians may be the more requent judges o Big-C creativity, whereas experts at the little-c level may include not only scholarsbut teachers, ellow creators, or advanced students.

In many domains, a product- ocused approach to creativity is per ectly ne, i not bene cial. Artists are considered creativebased on their art, just as scientists are judged by their scien-ti c contributions. Tis type o evaluation certainly seems air;a writer with unlimited potential who never nishes a novel will not quali y as creative by most de nitions. Indeed, the very ingredients so essential to the creative process, such as motiva-tion, personality, knowledge, thinking styles, intelligence, andenvironment (e.g., Sternberg & Lubart, 1995, 1996) typically

serve the creative product as well.One reason or the prevalence o a ocus on product is theimportance levied on assessment. When pro essors go up ortenure, actors are nominated or awards, or scientists are awardedgrants there must be some basis or evaluation. Some versiono Amabile’s (1996) product assessment is there ore needed inmost domains. As much as the process o rehearsing a play orplanning a study may refect creativity, it can be argued that there

needs to be ollow-through and a nalized product in order to betruly assessed as a creative act.




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However, we believe that there are levels o creativity that existbeyond the traditional little-c and Big-C conceptions. Cramond(2005) noted that some creativity scholars have proposed modelso creativity that go beyond the little-c versus Big-C distinc-tion. For instance, aylor (1959) proposed ve hierarchical lev-els o creativity. Tese levels (as discussed by Cramond, 2005)include: expressive creativity(e.g., spontaneous artwork o chil-dren); productive creativity(e.g., artistic and scienti c expressionso creativity);inventive creativity(e.g., creative use o materials,methods, and techniques);innovative creativity(e.g., using con-ceptual skills to create modi cations that lead to some orm o improvement); and emergenative creativity(entirely new prin-ciples, paradigms, or assumptions that result in new schools o thought and movements in a domain).

Even with these additional levels o creative expression,there still is a danger in ocusing solely on observable, externalmani estations o creativity. As Runco (2005) has argued, the“extremely product-orientated” conceptualizations o creativity may result in educators and researchers ailing to acknowledgethe creative potential o individuals who have not “impressedsome quali ed audience” (p. 616). Tis product-oriented ocuscon ounds productivity with creativity (Runco, 2004).

Te most problematic aspect o this narrow product-orientedocus is that it obscures the interpretive process rom which both

little-c and Big-C creativity develops. Tis interpretative pro-cess–—what we have calledmini-c creativity—involves novel andpersonally meaning ul interpretations o experiences, actions,

and events (Beghetto & Kau man, 2007). Tis de nition ollowsRunco’s (1996, 2004) conception o “personal creativity” as wellas recent developmental conceptions o creativity (Beghetto & Plucker, 2006; Cohen, 1989; Niu & Sternberg, 2006; Sawyer etal., 2003).

Both mini-c creativity and “personal creativity” (Runco,1996) share a ocus on the creative interpretations made by individuals. As such, mini-c creative expressions need not be recog-

nized as novel or even meaning ul to others in order to still be





considered creative. For instance, Vygotsky (1967/2004) recog-nized nearly hal a century ago:

any human act that gives rise to something new is re erredto as a creative act, regardless o whether what is createdis a physical object or some mental or emotional construct that lives within the person who created it and is known onlyto him [italics added]. (p. 7)

Tus, personal and mini-c conceptions o creativity help tobroaden traditional conceptions o creativity by recognizingthat intrapersonal insights and interpretations are, in act, cre-ative acts.

Although mini-c creativity and personal creativity bothocus on the intrapersonal expressions o creativity, these con-

structs di er on epistemological and ontological grounds. Tepersonal creativity (Runco, 1996) construct is closer to andmore clearly inspired by Piagetian (or individual constructivist)

views o knowledge creation. In this view, the ocus is on thedevelopment o new knowledge and insights being mediated by internal mental structures (e.g., knowledge schemes) and opera-tions (e.g., assimilation, disequilibrium, and accommodation).In addition, Piagetian (individual constructivist) accounts o knowledge creation represent a dualistic ontology. For instance,the internal mental processes and structures are viewed as infu-enced by, but separate rom, the external world. In this view,the development o knowledge and creative insights represents

“a cognitive activity in which subjectivity applies its orms todata rom a distinct and separate objective world” (Packer & Goicoechea, 2000, p. 234).

Conversely, mini-c creativity takes more o a Vygotskian(or sociocultural) view o knowledge creation. Tis view high-lights the transactional relationship between the individualand social world and dissolves the dualistic barrier between thedevelopment o internal mental processes and engagement in

activities, cultural practices, and interactions o the social world(Arievitch, 2008). Ontologically, the individual and social world




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are not viewed as separate, but rather as “internally related to oneanother, mutually constituting . . . where people shape the social world, and in doing so are themselves trans ormed” (Packer & Goicoechea, 2000, p. 234).

Engagement in the social world trans orms the identity development o the individual creator ( unding his or her mini-cinsights and interpretations). Tese mini-c insights and inter-pretations can develop into little-c or Big-C contributions that,in turn, trans orm the social-historical-cultural context. Forinstance, consider Louis Armstrong’s interpretation o the jazz musician as soloist—an act that began as mini-c, yet eventually resulted in the trans ormation o the identity o the jazz musi-cian and the nature o jazz music itsel .

Tis more transactional account o the creative person andthe social world highlights the developmental nature o creativ-ity (c ., Cohen, 1989) and positions mini-c creativity as the gen-esis o all later orms o creative expression. Indeed, as Moranand John-Steiner (2003) have explained, creative externalization(creative products) emerges rom the creative process o inter-nalization (i.e., interpretation and trans ormation) o culturaltools and social experiences. Tus, whatever the creative product(be it an idea, painting, or per ormance) or the magnitude o thatproduct (be it little-c or Big-C), it all starts with the imaginativeand personal interpretations o mini-c.

Additional examples may help illustrate the potential ormini-c insights to develop into trans ormative innovations.Consider, or instance, the development o the revolutionary, and

now ubiquitous, astening product:Velcro. Tis Big-C contribu-tion emerged rom George de Mestral imagining how he mightmanu acture a astening system based on his novel and person-ally meaning ul (mini-c) interpretation o the natural asteningsystem o thistles that would attach to his clothing as he strolledthrough the Swiss Alps.

Similarly, Freeman Dyson (the theoretical physicist) hada novel and personally meaning ul interpretation o Richard

Feynman’s diagrams o particle physics and Julian Schwinger’smathematical theory o interacting particles. From this personal





interpretation he was able to creatively combine them into atheory o quantum electrodynamics:

Feynman’s pictures and Schwinger’s equations begansorting themselves out in my head with clarity they hadnever had be ore. For the rst time I was able to putthem all together. For an hour or two I arranged andrearranged the pieces. Ten I knew how they all tted . . .Feynman and Schwinger were just looking at the sameset o ideas rom two di erent sides. Putting the methodstogether, you would have a theory o quantum electro-dynamics that combined the mathematical precision o Schwinger with the practical fexibility o Feynman. . . . It was my tremendous luck that I was the only person whohad had the chance to talk at length to both Schwingerand Feynman and really understand what both o them were doing. . . . (Dyson, as cited in Gratzer, 2002, p. 105)

Similar to what we have argued with respect to knowledgedevelopment, interpretation and trans ormation o experiences within an academic domain are, rom a mini-c perspective, cen-tral to the development o little-c and Big-C creativity. Tus, we argue that programs o advanced academics should recognizethe importance o supporting and encouraging students’ mini-cinterpretations with the added goal o helping students developtheir creative identity as they move rom mini-c (unique andmeaning ul interpretations) to the expression o little-c and pos-

sibly even Big-C ideas, insights, and understandings o an aca-demic domain.How can educators in programs o advanced academics sup-

port this movement? One way is described in Beghetto’s (2007)concept o ideational code-switching . Ideational code-switchingdescribes how individuals move between their intrapersonalcreative interpretations (mini-c) and interpersonal expressionso creativity (little-c). Similar to linguistic code-switching (in

which multilingual speakers are able to switch to a more under-standable orm o language when they recognize that what they




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are saying is not being understood), ideational code-switchinghighlights the need or students to receive cues rom their socialenvironment when their mini-c ideas and interpretations are notbeing understood.

Educators in programs o advanced academics can helpencourage this switching between mini-c and little-c by: (a)taking the time to hear and attempt to understand learners’mini-c interpretations; (b) cueing learners when their contri-butions are not making sense given the domain constraints,conventions, and standards o the particular academic task oractivity; and (c) providing multiple opportunities or learnersto practice moving between mini-c and little-c creativity. Insum, ideational code-switching, like other suggestions or sup-porting creativity (Beghetto, 2005; Piirto, 2004; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2004), underscores the importance o educatorsrecognizing the value o mini-c interpretations while at thesame time ensuring that learners become aware o the socially negotiated conventions, standards, and existing knowledge o aparticular academic domain.

Bridging Parallel Paths: ConnectingCreativity and Learning

We have argued that meaning ul student learning and cre-ative expression in a particular academic domain is acilitated in

part by students’ own interpretations o that academic domain. o the extent that our argument has merit, educators in pro-grams o advanced academics can work toward simultaneously supporting academic learning and creativity by nding ways toencourage and support students’ interpretations o a given aca-demic domain. o acilitate this, educators need a new metaphorto describe the nature o such programs o advanced academicsas well as the pedagogical strategies aligned with that metaphor.





Intellectual Estuaries: A New Metaphor for Programs of Advanced Academics

Te traditional “two paths” metaphor that describes one pathleading to accelerated domain learning and one that leads to cre-ativity enhancement is no longer tenable i we recognize thatpersonally meaning ul learning and creativity are linked by stu-dents’ ongoing interpretations and identity development in anacademic domain. Tus, rather than viewing creativity and learn-ing as two unconnected streams, we propose the metaphor o anintellectual estuary. An intellectual estuary describes an area o great and diverse intellectual identities in which separate streamso ideas fow in and meet with the vastness o ideas ound in agiven academic discipline. Viewing programs o advanced aca-demics as intellectual estuaries is more in alignment with theinterpretive and dialogic nature o learning and creativity. In this view, the streams o students’ creative and academic potentialmeet with supports and opportunities that will help cultivateboth capacities.

Tus, students’ own unique and personally meaning ul inter-pretations o academic content are encouraged and juxtaposed with the perspectives o other students and the conventions,norms, and standards o a particular academic domain. Such anapproach should help educators in programs o advanced aca-demics to move away rom what Greenlea and Katz (2004)described as the all-too-typical orm o classroom discourse in which classrooms represent a “singularity o viewpoints, trans-

mission, and recitation rather than meaning making” (p. 174).Allowing students the opportunity to voice their interpre-tations and simultaneously con ront multiple perspectives andinterpretations creates the conditions under which classroomlearning becomes internally persuasive and generative both o creativity and new understandings. Enacting the metaphor o an intellectual estuary requires that educators in programs o advanced academics create multiple opportunities or students

to engage in the kinds o discourse that support internally per-suasive understandings and new insights. Classroom discus-




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sions represent one such opportunity or doing so. However,simply creating more opportunities or classroom discussions isnot enough; it is how those discussions are held that is o greatimportance. Te prototypical classroom discussion ormat o Initiate, Respond, and Evaluate (Cazden, 2001) where the teacherinitiates the discussion by asking her students or an example o a hypothesis, students respond by providing examples, and theteacher evaluate s each response as correct or incorrect is not su -

cient. A di erent type o pedagogical strategy or classroomdiscussions is necessary i educators are serious about support-ing new understandings and creative insights. Fortunately, thereare several promising instructional strategies designed to providestudents (o varying age levels in various subject areas) with anopportunity to encounter multiple perspectives. Tese strategiesinclude “position-driven” science and mathematics (Hatano & Inagaki, 1991; O’Connor, 2001), Socratic seminars (Adler, 1982),and exploratory talk (Barnes & odd, 1978; Mercer, 1995).

Educators interested in developing intellectual estuaries intheir programs o advanced academics can also draw rom a widerange o promising curricular programs that cut across variousacademic content areas and grade levels. Te Center or Gi tedEducation at Te College o William and Mary has developeda variety o problem-based science learning units or learners ingrades K–8. Problem-based learning o ers educators an impor-tant and viable strategy or linking the development o studentcreativity and academic learning across many content areas(Plucker & Beghetto, 2003).

With respect to curriculum design, theParallel Curriculum( omlinson et al., 2002) o ers a model or developing K–12curriculum and instruction; this model has the added goal o helping students “think about how creativity is mani est in the[academic] discipline, when, why, and about what that helpsthem understand their own creativity” (p. 38). Educators andcurriculum developers can also nd key insights rom Piirto’s(2007) ve precepts or designing (and delivering) curriculum

that will engage the academic and creative talent o students inprograms o advanced academics. aken together, these strate-





gies, curricula, and considerations o er educators a wide rangeo resources or cultivating intellectual estuaries across all gradelevels and academic subject areas. o provide a more concreteexample o how such strategies might be used to cultivate intel-lectual estuaries, we describe two examples. Te rst highlightsthe use o exploratory talk (Barnes & odd, 1978; Mercer, 1995);the second illustrates the use o Socratic seminars (Adler, 1982;Polite & Adams, 1997).

Examples of Strategies forSupporting Intellectual Estuaries

Example 1: Exploratory alk.Exploratory talk as a pedagogicalstrategy involves teaching students how to engage in a orm o shared or collaborative inquiry in which students explore andchallenge ideas while at the same time they adhere to a set o social ground rules. Examples o these social ground rules include:(a) Students will be asked to make their reasoning explicit; (b)challenges and alternatives to perspectives and ideas will be pre-sented and negotiated; and (c) general agreement will be strived

or prior to making group decisions or taking action (Wegeri ,2005). Several studies (Mercer, Wegeri , & Dawes, 1999; Rojas-Drummond, Perez, Velez, Gomez, & Mendoza, 2003; Wegeri ,Mercer, & Dawes, 1999) have demonstrated that teaching stu-dents to use exploratory talk has resulted in improved academiclearning and creative reasoning.

According to Wegeri (2005), a key indicator that students

have adopted an exploratory orientation is that students “areable to change their minds in response to good arguments” (p.226). An example o this can be seen in several segments o Kamii’s (2000) video ootage o second graders working ondouble-column subtraction problems. In one particular seg-ment o the ootage, the students are working through a prob-lem in which they are asked to subtract 17 rom 26. Studentso er a variety o answers, which their teacher writes on the

board, including: 18, 11, and 9.




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As students share their answers, other students variously exclaim, “Disagree!” or “Agree!” Te teacher then asks studentsto explain their answers. At one point a student named Gary, who believed the answer to be 9, explains that he arrived at hissolution by rst removing the 6 and 7 rom 26 and 17. He thenexplains to “take o 10” rom 20 and “that would be 10.” Next,he explains, “take o 7 more” and “that would be 3.” He thenconcludes by explaining, “add the 6 back on and that would be9.” A ter the teacher repeats Gary’s method to the class, anotherstudent exclaims, “I disagree with mysel !” Te teacher recognizesthis and asks, “What was your answer?” Te student explains, “Itwas 18.” Several other students provide varying explanations o how they arrived at 9.

Another student, named Steven, explains how he arrived at11: “20 and 10 is 10 and 6 take away 7 is 1 and 10 and 1 is 11.” Yetanother student exclaims, “Disagree.” Te teacher then explainsthat Steven has a di erent answer and repeats his reasoning tothe entire class. Multiple students now exclaim, “Disagree! I canprove it’s 9!” wo students explain why they think it is 9. A terhearing these explanations, Steven, the student who originally thought the answer was 11, seems to recognize his mistaken rea-soning and explains, “I disagree with mysel .” Te teacher thendouble checks with Steven, asking whether he is sure that hedisagrees with his initial understanding o the problem, prior tomoving on to the next problem.

Tis brie excerpt o classroom dialogue illustrates threeimportant aspects o exploratory talk and a classroom environ-

ment representative o an intellectual estuary. First, there aresocial ground rules at play in this second-grade classroom. Indeed,in alignment to what Wegeri (2005) has described, students areexpected to: (a) provide reasons or their claims by explaininghow they arrived at their answers to the subtraction problem;(b) make challenges explicit, negotiate by stating whether they agree with a particular answer and then explain why they agreeor disagree; and (c) as a group, seek to reach agreement on the

answer be ore moving on to the next problem.





Second, this excerpt illustrates what Wegeri (2005) hasdescribed as a key indicator o an exploratory orientation (i.e.,students change their minds in response to good arguments). Tis is evidenced by two separate students stating, “I disagree with mysel !” a ter hearing the explanations o other students.Finally, this excerpt highlights how creating opportunities orstudents to come into contact with multiple perspectives helpsnot only create a new and internally persuasive academic under-standing o double column subtraction but is also supportive o new, creative insights. Indeed, students came up with several cre-ative (i.e., unique and accurate) ways o solving the problem.

Example 2: Socratic Seminars.Socratic seminars, typically used with older students (middle, secondary, postsecondary), repre-sent another promising approach or creating intellectual estu-aries in programs o advanced academics. Socratic seminars, apedagogical strategy attributed to Adler’s (1982)Te PaideiaProposal,teach students how to engage in academic discussionson a wide range o topics, in which multiple perspectives andinterpretations are encouraged and ideas and understandings arecritically scrutinized in light o di ering perspectives and textualevidence (Polite & Adams, 1997; Wortham, 2006). Te JuniorGreat Books program o ers a series o K–12 books and curri-cula in support o Socratic seminars. Piirto (2007) has observedqualitative di erences in the quality and nature o dialogue instudents who have participated in Junior Great Books programs.

Socratic seminars represent a pedagogical strategy that is in

alignment with the idea o intellectual estuaries; multiple per-spectives and personal interpretations are brought together inan e ort to develop new individual insights and deeper under-standing o some curricular topic.

In the ollowing excerpt, adapted rom Wortham (2006, pp.114–115), urban ninth-grade students in a combined history andlanguage arts class that uses Socratic Seminars are discussingPericles’ claim that Athenian soldiers had con dence in battle

even though they were acing a Spartan opponent that had argreater military training. Tis excerpt illustrates how two stu-




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dents, Jasmine and Martha, supported each other in developingtheir understanding o the confict between Athens and Spartaby making connections between their own personally meaning-

ul and unique (i.e., mini-c) interpretations o their experienceand the curricular topic being discussed:

MARTHA : Yeah, wait. You’re comparing, you’re com-paring Sparta to Athens. Now, they telling me, justbecause they get, they have con dence, all this . . .

MAURICE : A lot o work.MARTHA : Yeah, going into a war, they going to ace

people whose experience in war, I mean, think, eat,eel nothing but military training—

TEACHER (Mr. S) : What you’re doing is callingPericles a liar here.

* * * TEACHER (Mr. S) : Okay, we’ve got our hands at once.

I don’t know who’s rst.UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE STUDENT : Jasmine. TEACHER (Mr. S) : Jasmine? Okay. JASMINE : Now, Martha.FEMALE STUDENTS: (Laughter) JASMINE : I you was about to ght William, he’s big-

ger, he’s taller than you, don’t you think he’ll beat youup?

MARTHA : Cause he got the— JASMINE : Wait, wait a minute. Don’t you think he can

beat you? Yes or no?MARTHA : But not [10 unintelligible syllables] JASMINE : I’m sure that he could beat you. He’s got

more training than you.MARTHA : But then I just have to keep ghting, right?UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE STUDENT : Tat’s

what they’re doing.MARTHA : Tey just keep ghting, but they would

never beat Sparta.





As illustrated in this brie excerpt, allowing students to maketheir own personally relevant and unique interpretations o thetopic being discussed, with the added guideline that they needto connect that interpretation to the text, encourages students todevelop personally meaning ul analogies to support more robustunderstanding o the academic content. Importantly, Wortham(2006) illustrated that the use o student-participant examplesin academic discussions can also infuence the development o students’ social identities (in sometimes unexpected, unfatter-ing, and potentially hurt ul ways). For instance, Wortham hasdemonstrated in his book-length analysis o classroom discus-sions how two students, Maurice and yisha, became increas-ingly identi ed through “participant examples” as social outcasts. Tus, as Wortham has argued, educators planning to use suchtechniques need to be aware that “personalization in the class-room o ers both risks and rewards” (p. 288). Tere ore, they havea responsibility to ensure that they actively monitor and inter-rupt any negative identi cations that may result rom personal-izing the curriculum.

Concluding Thoughts

In this article we have argued that supporting academiclearning and creativity are not separate paths, but rather over-lapping goals that can and should be simultaneously pursuedin programs o advanced academics. For this to happen, educa-tors need to recognize and support the interpretative nature o learning and creativity. Tis recognition is acilitated by broaden-ing traditional conceptions o learning and creativity to includeinterpretive perspectives on learning and creativity.

Te metaphor or programs o advanced academics as having“two paths” (one or creativity and one or academic learning)needs to be replaced with a new metaphor and appropriate peda-gogical strategies in support o that metaphor. We proposed themetaphor o an intellectual estuary (in which multiple streams o creative and academic interpretations come together and thrive)




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and then briefy discussed how various instructional strategiesand curricular models might be used to enact that metaphor. Itis our hope that the ideas presented in this paper will gener-ate additional conversations and debate regarding how programso advanced academics might simultaneously support studentlearning and creativity.

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Intellectual Estuaries- Connecting Learning and Creativity in Programs of Advanced Academics

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