Insurgencies Effect Global Economy Sjubril

7/30/2019 Insurgencies Effect Global Economy Sjubril

1/18

INSURGENCIES AND THEIR EFFECT ON

GLOBAL ECONOMY

SHITTU JUBRIL .A. **

2012


2/18

INTRODUCTION

The need for a state to exercise complete sovereignty over its territory and people therein

amidst globalization, internal political crises and compromises among the various arms of

government is quite a struggle as evidenced by the challenges faced across the globe by states

on a daily basis. As of today, various states worldwide are fighting one form of insurgency or

the other, be it Islamist, militant, rebel or even ethnic. These insurgencies become projected

onto a global scale by means of organized criminal networks dealing in narcotics, arms transfer

and training, and terrorists cells, thus making the issue of insurgency a global concern. But

this idea would imply amongst other things, the ceding of sovereignty to the global community

to interfere in the internal affairs of a state, an idea which is impossible in this present era of

post-Westphalia state sovereignty.

This article is to be part of a larger independent project by the author that examines the issue

of insurgency and tries to calculate its impact on global policy. However, this article will focus

more the economic effects of insurgency. The article will argue that insurgencies are causing

more harm than good economically to nations affected by it, particularly the developing ones,

and by extension the global economy.

This would be done by looking at the concept of insurgency (PART 1) before moving

on to case studies of insurgencies around the globe (PART 2) while measuring the effects of

such insurgencies on economy in the area mentioned above (PART 3). The concluding aspect

will talk about the effects and implications of the analysis on global developmental strategy and

what must be done to either correct or compliment the status quo while pointing at areas which

further research can be made.


3/18

1.1 LOOKING AT THE CONCEPT OF INSURGENCY

Insurgency can be defined as activity usually political cum military in a nation by a group

aimed at taking over the role of government in a particular area.1 Such activities include but are

not limited to propaganda, guerilla warfare2, acts of terrorism directed against either civilian or

military targets, kidnapping, etc.3The cause of insurgency4 may be linked to different reasons

ranging from political dissatisfaction, ethnicity, ideology, religious beliefs, oppression etc.

Insurgencies make use of the population who in most cases are sympathetic to their cause and

would help protect the identity of such insurgents from security agencies. In doing this, most

insurgencies try to subvert the authority of the constituted government by taking over the role

of government in the provision of basic services to the people.5

People who make up insurgencies include some members of the local population, refugees from

neighbouring countries, especially when they enjoy some form of protection from such group,

** Graduate of International Law and Diplomacy from Babcock University, Nigeria. Any questions, comments,

feedback and suggestions should be sent [email protected]

1See U.S. Counter Insurgency guide, (2009), UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY COUNTERINSURGENCY

INITIATIVE available at www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt. see also Thomas Mockaitis(2011), cited below

2Guerrilla tactics are intended not only to wear down the governments conventional forces, but to provoke them

into conducting reprisals against the general population, which they rightly or wrongly perceive as aiding the

insurgents. See Thomas Mockaitis, cited below, p. 9 See also, Scott Stewart (2011), Insurgency and the Protracted

War: - For insurgents, the operational concept is that if the enemy attacks in force, they retreat; if the enemy

stays in place, they conduct harassing attacks; if the enemy tires, the insurgents press the attack; and if the enemy

retreats, the insurgents pursue. The idea is to apply prolonged pressure, both physical and psychological, and to

create a mounting number of casualties over time. At the same time, the insurgent organization works to

strengthen its own organizational support base and military capability. Article available athttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/insurgency-and-protracted-war3Ibid pg. 6

4For instance Russian insurgence in the Northern Caucasus is caused by years of misrule, alongside increasing

Salafism. See Stephen J. Bank, (2012) Russias homegrown insurgency: Jihad in Nothern Caucasus, Strategic

Studies Institute, the Tuareg insurgence was caused by neglect for the nomadic population, the FLN insurgence

was islamist5see also Thomas Mockaitis(2011), Resolving Insurgencies, Strategic Studies Institute

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppthttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/insurgency-and-protracted-warhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/insurgency-and-protracted-warhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/insurgency-and-protracted-warhttp://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmpptmailto:[email protected]


4/18

government officials who defect to the side of the insurgents, and also supporters in Diaspora

who provide financial support.6

According to the insurgencies guide7, most insurgencies have same intermediate objectives

designed to help them achieve eventual domination of a country. They include: -

Limit the ability of government and enhance capability of insurgents to provide publicservices

Obtain support or neutrality of critical segments of the population Isolate the government from international diplomatic and material support and increase

international support for the insurgents.

Increase domestic and international legitimacy of the insurgent organization at theexpense of the government

Destroy the self confidence of government leaders and cadres, causing their abdicatrionor withdrawal

Reduce and if possible neutralize government coercive power while strengtheninginsurgent coercive capabilities.

Insurgencies are usually funded by illegal activities in most cases: dealing in narcotics8, ransom

demands from kidnap of expatriates9. In some cases, nationals in Diaspora may fund insurgent

6See C. CHRISTINE FAIR, (2005), DIASPORA INVOLVEMENT IN INSURGENCIES: INSIGHTS FROM THE KHALISTAN

AND TAMIL EELAM MOVEMENTS, Taylor & Francis Inc. Routledge Publishers7

Seehttp://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf8For instance in the case of Columbia the government has had to deal with large fields where coca is being

cultivated and this has been done often with the assistance of other countries. Also, the Taliban -led Islamist

insurgency was routinely and fully identified with () terrorism and (b) illicit drugs. See Ekaterina Stepanova,
http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf


5/18

groups or even States10 may provide financial assistance to such insurgent groups, usually in

promotion of their political interests, for example the contras in Nicaragua were funded by the

U.S. government.11Funds are needed for the purchase of munitions and arms, hiring of

professionals, daily administration of insurgent activities, hiring of mercenaries, bribing

government officials, and provisions of basic services to the population.

We shall now take a look at examples of countries currently facing one form of insurgency or

the other. The sample used in this study is derived from the countries that have made the news

in the past three months.

2.0 CASE STUDIES OF INSURGENCIES.

In carrying out these studies, a brief description will be given about the type of insurgency in

the country being studied, the time when the insurgency started and government efforts in

tackling the insurgency. Also the sources of funding for the insurgent groups, the tactics

employed by the insurgents in undermining the efforts of the government to effectively

administer its territory will be examined. More importantly, the countrys budgetary allocation

to defense spending will be used as a benchmark to describe the effect the insurgency has the

economy. At this point, it must be noted that precise figures cannot be given as to breakdown

of budgetary allocation on defense in order to calculate the effect that the insurgency has on the

(2012), Illicit Drugs and Insurgency in Afghanistan, available at

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/stepanova-illicit-drugs/html9

See www.asiglobalresponse.com for list of countries where foreigners run the risk of being targeted in kidnapping

or extortion Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq By Dr. Phil Williams (2009) Strategic

Studies Institute10

See Contra affair, Nicaragua v. U.S.A.11

Such assistance was not in violation of international law principle of non interference. See I.C.J. Rep
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/stepanova-illicit-drugs/htmlhttp://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/stepanova-illicit-drugs/htmlhttp://www.asiglobalresponse.com/http://www.asiglobalresponse.com/http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/stepanova-illicit-drugs/html


6/18

economy12 so the method employed by the author is to look at whether there has been an

increase in defense spending since the start of the insurgency in the country being studied.

2.1. ALGERIA

The Algerian insurgency can be described in two phases: the 1954 - 1962 phase and that which

started in 1992. The first phase could be described as the rebellion which led to the collapse of

the French Fourth Republic and the loss of one of the integral parts of France.13The FLN

which spearheaded the insurgency used different tactics such as guerilla warfare, attack on

specific targets and appeal to the civilian population to achieve their goals.

One of the tactics used to win over the hearts of the population was an attack which triggered a

regressive military response which claimed lots of lives. France also sent a 400.000 strong force

to quell the insurgents and though the insurgency was stopped, their activities triggered a

revolutionary response on the part of the citizens who agitated for independence.

The cause of the second phase of insurgency in Algeria is deeply rooted in long-standing

revulsion against authoritarian rule, extensive official corruption and crippling unemployment.

Government response has been the application of brute force, and it is only of recent that the

authorities are sponsoring the fight against the terrorism through the promotion of Sufism.

The dissatisfaction with military rule and the first round of general elections which saw an

Islamist party who won the elections and likely to take over the countrys leadership triggered

12See Mariya Gorbanova, Leah Wawro, (2011) The Transparency of National Defence Budgets, Transparency

International UK13

See http://themeliandialogue.wordpress.com/Case Study The Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) The Melian

Dialogue.htm for case study on subject matter.


7/18

a series of events that led to the second phase of insurgency in the history of Algeria.14 In 1992,

the Islamist party won the elections and the military dissatisfied with the outcome annulled the

elections and went further to ban the party. The military organized another round of elections

in which a lot of parties boycotted, and saw the most unlikely candidate to win the elections

coming into power. This resulted in widespread revulsions and civil unrest which lasted for up

to 5 years. This time around, various insurgent groups were involved in the insurgency such as

the SGPC, ISF, and GIA. Since 1992, these armed insurgent groups have staged various forms

of attacks all over the country. The group is funded mainly by kidnapping and ransom

demands. However, almost all these groups whose activities were almost brought to a halt have

changed in terms of their original ideologies and to become terrorist groups. They developed

external links with foreign terrorist groups who have provided them with training and financial

assistance.

Looking at data with regards to the countrys military expenditure during the period while the

insurgency lasted, it can be said that military spending between 1992 and 1999 increased on a

yearly basis15, but which is the date the government granted amnesty to most of the insurgents,

but since then it has been on a decline.

2.2. NIGERIA

In Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency became internationally known in 2009. Boko Haram is

said to not only oppose Western education, but Western culture as well. The group consists of

radical Islamists, ex-servicemen as well as neighbouring countries such as Chad and Niger.

14http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_Civil_War,http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria-

90s.htm15

http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4 As percentage of gross domestic product, the budget allocation to

military spending increased to 4% in 1998, 3.8% in 1999 but reduced sharply to 3.4% in 2000. Since then budget

figures have been fluctuating between an average of 3.3% to 3.7%
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_Civil_Warhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_Civil_Warhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_Civil_Warhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria-90s.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria-90s.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria-90s.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria-90s.htmhttp://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria-90s.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria-90s.htmhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_Civil_War


8/18

The group seeks to establish Islamic rule in the North and has carried out major campaigns

against the government and the security apparatus in various places in the Northern part of the

country.16In achieving their objectives, they make use of the population who are either

sympathetic to their cause, or are afraid or unwilling to cooperate with security agencies for

fear of being attacked. According to Salisu Mohammed, a conflict management specialist: -

"Many people have known of the existence of this group, silently and within the community,

especially in the last year," he said. "They are becoming more extreme because in the past there

wasn't a major push in place to check their proliferation. "They are taking advantage of a

broken-down structural condition in Nigeria that people can take the law into their hands

without getting reprimanded."17

The government response has been largely military18 and strengthening of the security

apparatus of the country19. The security forces have been accused of extrajudicial killings and

attack of communities accused of covering up the identity of the Boko Haram members.20

Most of the funding comes from political sources, although the group has also engaged in the

kidnapping of expatriates. The groups activities have resulted in policy changes in government

as well as foreign countries such as US, Australia, Iran, who have offered technical support, and

16Of recent was the attack on Jaji Military base, and also the kidnapping of a French expatriate in Kano by another

insurgent faction named Ansaru.

17Salisu Mohammed, a conflict management specialist, told Al Jazeera

newshttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/20121974241393331.html 18

Other responses of the government have been an attempt at negotiation, building of model schools but suchgestures have not been able to really address the problem of insurgency.19

President Jonathans statement: we were not prepared for this kind of emergency this he said during the

media chat broadcasted live on television in the last quarter of the year 2012. See ibid below20

According to Salil Shetty, Secretary General of Amnesty International:"People are living in a climate of fear and

insecurity, vulnerable to attack from Boko Haram and facing human rights violations at the hands of the very state

security forces which should be protecting them," see

http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/latest/46934-amnesty-international-says-nigerian-

forces-making-insurgency-worse
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/20121974241393331.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/20121974241393331.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/20121974241393331.htmlhttp://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/latest/46934-amnesty-international-says-nigerian-forces-making-insurgency-worsehttp://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/latest/46934-amnesty-international-says-nigerian-forces-making-insurgency-worsehttp://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/latest/46934-amnesty-international-says-nigerian-forces-making-insurgency-worsehttp://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/latest/46934-amnesty-international-says-nigerian-forces-making-insurgency-worsehttp://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/latest/46934-amnesty-international-says-nigerian-forces-making-insurgency-worsehttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/20121974241393331.html


9/18

military training to counter the growing insurgency. The budget structure has also witnessed

changes in terms of budgetary allocation to various sectors of the economy.21 For instance,

Defense spending in 1988 and 1989 was about N1.3 billion and N1.7 billion22, Military

expenditures(% of GDP)1.5% of GDP (2006) but in 2010, the value for Military expenditure

(current LCU) in Nigeria was 291,719,000,000 which was about 16 percent of the budget.23 In

2011, a whooping sum of 978 billion naira was approved for security.

The groups activities are starting to take its toll on the economy. According to a Reuters

report; "If the Nigerian government gets distracted by Boko Haram rather than economic growth, then

it could start to witness weakening economic fundamentals," Nigeria's security bill has risen to

20 percent of spending in the 2012 budget from 16 percent in 2010, leaving less money for much-needed

infrastructure projects and for work on reforms to the power and other social and industrial sectors. It

has become President Goodluck Jonathan's biggest headache and is threatening to divert the

government's attention from the pressing but thorny issue of weaning the economy away from its reliance

on crude oil exports.It is diverting money away from needed infrastructure spending and could be

costing as much as 2 percent of the country's economic output.24

21See Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai (2011 ) What Nigerians Pay The Federal Government available at

http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/what-nigerians-pay-fg/94277/where he said though Nigerians have never

felt so insecure in recent history, the NSA, Police and Defence will spend a combined 865 billion naira more than

2 billion naira a day, weekends included! This does not include the 36 states so-called security votes.22

http://www.mongabay.com/history/.html/nigeria-demographic_factors_and_the_defense_budget.html23

http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/nigeria/military_expenditure24

Chijioke Ohuocha, (2012), Nigeria insurgency is beginning to take toll on economy, available at

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/us-economy-nigeria-security-idustre8190kd20120210
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/what-nigerians-pay-fg/94277/http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/what-nigerians-pay-fg/94277/http://www.mongabay.com/history/.html/nigeria-demographic_factors_and_the_defense_budget.htmlhttp://www.mongabay.com/history/.html/nigeria-demographic_factors_and_the_defense_budget.htmlhttp://www.mongabay.com/history/.html/nigeria-demographic_factors_and_the_defense_budget.htmlhttp://www.indexmundi.com/facts/nigeria/military_expenditurehttp://www.indexmundi.com/facts/nigeria/military_expenditurehttp://www.indexmundi.com/facts/nigeria/military_expenditurehttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/us-economy-nigeria-security-idUSTRE8190KD20120210http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/us-economy-nigeria-security-idUSTRE8190KD20120210http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/us-economy-nigeria-security-idUSTRE8190KD20120210http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/nigeria/military_expenditurehttp://www.mongabay.com/history/.html/nigeria-demographic_factors_and_the_defense_budget.htmlhttp://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/what-nigerians-pay-fg/94277/


10/18

3.0. INSURGENCY AND ITS DOMINEERING EFFECT ON THE GLOBAL

ECONOMY

The effect of insurgency is such that its impact is not readily seen in the policy decisions but in

terms of its outcomes.25 Most insurgencies at their early stages pose no real threat to

government at their early stages and consequently left unattended by governments till their

activities become a literal thorn in the flesh to the government. We shall first look at theories

that can be used to define the effect that insurgency has on the global economy before going on

to determine the effect that insurgency has on the global economy based on results derived

from our case studies.

3.1. THEORIES THAT CAN BE USED TO DESCRIBE THE EFFECT OF

INSURGENCY ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

There are various theories and approaches that can be used to describe the effect of insurgent

operations on the global economy. First of all the substitution theory which is based on the

premise that an increase in government spending in one sector of the economy will lead to a

reduction in another sector of the economy thus creating a balance or cushion effect. This is

made humorous by the words of President Goodluck Jonathan26 who stated that we do not

take money from the moon to increase salaries of workers by 54 %( when describing the effect

of the increase of salaries on capital expenditure in relation to recurrent expenditure of budget.

In other words an increase in defence spending will definitely lead to an adverse effect in terms

of reduction from a sector or group of sectors the funds which are allocated, leading to an

25Or the effect that insurgencies have in terms of destruction of property, disruption of social and economic

activities, the general fear created and the loss of lives, and not in terms of the cause effect analysis it has on the

economy.26

Media chat televised nationwide on 18th

December 2012,


11/18

adverse effect on the economy. Such effect may be significantly pronounced or minimal

depending on the country, population, resources, level of development amongst other factors.

Also using the substitution theory, an increase in security spending will lead to a frustration of

the economic environment making it unattractable to foreign investors who would not want to

risk capital and expatriates who are sometimes victims of kidnaps because of the uncertainties.

On the other hand a secure economic environment will attract investors thus boosting the

economy.

The substitution theory might explain why the economy is affected by insurgency within a

country but provides no explanation for the impact that such insurgency may have on the

global economy. This is why the systems approach27 using a dominoeffect theory has been

propounded to provide a better understanding of how insurgency affects the global economy.

First using the substitution effect, the increase in military spending, while at the same time

leading though a reduction in spending in other areas of the economy leads to a domino effect

whereby other actors become interested in benefitting from such activities happening in a

country.

The increase in defence spending and reduction in other sectors will lead to a reduction in the

GDP because spending which is meant for infrastructure is now diverted to security as first

response, and which in most cases have no long term value when compared to other sectors of

the economy like education, food and infrastructure. Thus the more funds diverted to defense,

starting from the countries where the insurgents originate, to the countries seeking to protect

either their nationals and investments alike from the scourge of insurgency to those having a

27Oliver Wils et al, (2006), The Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation Concept and Fields of Application,

Berghof Foundation for Peace Support document available at http://www.berghof-

peacesupport.org/systemic_approach.htmpp 13 - 16
http://www.berghof-peacesupport.org/systemic_approach.htmhttp://www.berghof-peacesupport.org/systemic_approach.htmhttp://www.berghof-peacesupport.org/systemic_approach.htmhttp://www.berghof-peacesupport.org/systemic_approach.htmhttp://www.berghof-peacesupport.org/systemic_approach.htm


12/18

moral obligation in terms of ensuring the peace and stability of the international system to the

international organizations, such funds no matter how minimal would contribute a significant

sum capable of reversing the tide on volume of international trade( take for instance, Libya

when the insurgency lasted the price of crude oil went up).

3.2. GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECT OF INSURGENCY

Looking at the case studies28, once the government is not directly threatened by the activities

of the insurgents, the government turns a blind eye and leaves the military to deal with the

security situation.29 For instance in Nigeria, according to a BBC report30, the Nigerian

economy is not being directly threatened by the Boko Haram insurgence in the north especially

when the mainstay of the economy is located down south. This was the same mistake made by

the Colombian government in leaving the part of their territory to the FARCs31. The meaning

of such actions by any government is or could be interpreted as a waiving of the nations

sovereign ability to maintain its control over a portion of its defined territory. However, those

discussions are for another day.

28Other countries studied by the author but not included in the article include Colombia, Afghanistan, Nepal and

Sri Lanka.29

Governments, faced with violence directed at the system, initially go after that which they can see, insurgents

with weapons, leaving the infrastructure virtually alone to grow and become ever more deadly. The forces of the

state thus normally seek to .close with and destroy the enemy, while the insurgents continue the process ofsuccessively dominating areas. See, Thomas Marks,(2002), Colombian adaptation to FARC insurgency, Strategic

Studies Institute (SSI), ISBN 1-58487-078-830

Op. cit.31

Thomas Marks op. cit. said the lack of concern by the ruling elite played a key roleFor there were and are two

Colombias. More than 95 percent of the populace lives in the first area. The other 5 percent-minus and key

insurgent formations are in the second zone. As long as the guerrillas were revolutionary homesteaders in areas no

one else wanted, the government bothered with them only when their actions forced a response. It was the job of

the police and the military, to keep an eye on them.


13/18

In essence, insurgence does not only affect the functioning of governments but have an

overbearing influence on policy making and implementing strategies. Looking at our case

studies, it is evident that a lot of governments in their response to growing insurgencies first

raise the level of funding going to defence and security, thus projecting the idea that massive

funds are needed to effectively tackle insurgencies. These funds when approved are hurriedly

spent on logistics and training of defence, intelligence and security forces.32

These strategies are usually anticipated by these insurgent groups who use the government

response to their advantage in creating confusion and bitterness among the populace before

winning their sympathy by undermining the ability of the government to effectively administer

the territory. The insurgents know that the government will send the military and the only

language most military understand is brute force and crackdown on communities accused of

supporting insurgent groups.33 The funds that are usually diverted to strengthening the

security apparatus is usually at the expense of infrastructure and basic support services needed

by the population.34 Also, foreign investors would not want to invest either directly or

indirectly in states where insurgents operate, because of the security of their investments or

32Most of the time when these funds are disbursed, there is usually no strategy in place before the funds are

disbursed thus leading to mismanagement of resources with little or no progress made with regards to tackling the

insurgency. See Omitoogun Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa The Processes and Mechanisms of Control,

OUP33

The May 1945 Stif massacre was a catalyst to the rebellion and a sign of things to come. A V-E Day march by

the Muslim population of Stif resulted in a riot where 103 Europeans [were], plus another hundred wounded*and+ a number of women *were+ brutally raped (Horne 2006, 26). Frances response was swift and brutal; the

French Navy and Air Force bombed targets within Algeria while the police and army conduct*ed+ a prolong and

systematic ratissage(literally, raking over) of suspected centers of dissidence in which the French claimed 1,500

Muslims died *while+ other estimates vary from 6,000 to as high as 45,000 killed (Library of Congress 1993).

(Cited in themeliandialogue)34

For instance in U.S. the budget saw a reduction of social security by a certain percentage while the defence

budget remained uncut. It is also important to note that once the stakes are upped in respect of any sector of the

economy, itll take a while before such increase can be counter balanced or eventually reduced.


14/18

even the stability of the government.35 Expatriates are not spared by insurgencies as they

become victims of violence, kidnappings36, and instruments of compromise.

The activities of insurgents and the government response in general have an effect on the

economy in terms of development; foreign countries divert developmental funds to assisting the

government in stopping the insurgents, and also in protection of such countries national

interest. Insurgents try to stop foreign interference by carrying out attacks on the nationals

and officials of the intervening country located abroad37, and if possible such attacks would be

projected to the home soil of such intervening country38. Such countries try to response by

retaliating by direct attacks or by troops on the home soil of the insurgent groups or by

training of security operatives and also by strengthening the home soil security apparatus, thus

diverting funds of the intervening state towards areas away from infrastructure and social

comfort. Thus the states where the insurgents originate divert funds, the states indirectly

affected divert their funds, the states in which the insurgents operate also divert funds and

attention away from infrastructure and the resultant effect is that the global economy is

affected not only by diversion of funds but by inability to trade.39

35One inevitable fact is that foreign investors make huge investments in sectors of the economy that are also

potential targets by these insurgents because they provide strategic advantage and project the strength of the

insurgency. For instance, seizing oil installations, or hijacking telecommunications will have a serious effect on the

foreign investment. Also, see the Home Missionary SocietyCase in which a government is not held responsible for

acts of rioters when it is not liable of negligence in quelling such disturbances.36

See the various articles where it is on authority that kidnappings and ransom demands are used by theseinsurgents to fund their activities. See also the incident in Northern Nigeria where a British and Italian expatriate

were captured and killed before a rescue attempt cold be initiated37

See the recent attack on the American consulate in Libya38

The September 11, 2001 attack is one which will remain reminiscent in the minds of the global population for a

long time.39

See Libya, it is argued that the strategic interests of countries in bonny light crude also with the threats by

Qadaffi to commit wide scale violations of human rights led to the intervention by NATO. See also Saudi Arabia in

which China in protecting her strategic interests helped in the quelling of the insurgents.


15/18

The question that may be asked is whether the insurgents should be left alone because their

activities affect the economy, for such notion would seem like the school of thought that is

being proposed by the author. But more importantly, what is being said is that the present

strategy being used by most states in tackling insurgency is quite ineffective because rather

than witnessing improvement, the resultant effect of such strategy is we might be winning the

war against terrorism but losing the battle of saving our global economy and increasing the

quality of life.

The United States government has perhaps followed this same line of thought in her

withdrawal of troops from these States where the insurgents are based while training the

troops of the insurgence infected states to effectively tackle the insurgents.40

Another strategy which would effectively hamper and reduce the effectiveness of insurgent

groups is by using the main instruments of the insurgents against them: the population41.

Insurgent groups rely on the population for their success and to also carry out their activities.42

The population matters to the insurgents who will do whatever they can to gain the sympathy

of the population. Therefore the government in response to insurgence should be careful to

avoid repression of the local population, while providing infrastructure that would improve the

lives of the populace.

40These strategies include training in counter insurgency tactics, cyber warfare and orientation about basic rules

of humanitarian law.41

The hearts and minds theory, commonly called HAM, argues that the impact of development and modernity on

traditional societies causes the fragmentation of old institutions before new institutions are in place. This

institutional gap creates problems, which can give rise to insurgency. The prescription for success is therefore towin the publics support (their hearts and minds) for the government by ameliorating some of the negative

effects of development while speeding up the provision of modernitys benefits. RAND analysts felt that even if the

actual provision of benefits lagged, the key was providing security to the population and convincing it that

government was operating for its benefit. (Long, 2006) cited in the 3D approach and Counterinsurgency.42

The central characteristic of an insurgency is the reliance on population for active support or at least its passive

acquiescence. This support, whether from affinity with or coercion from the insurgents (often a mix of both)

provides the insurgents with personnel, supplies, and, critically, an information advantage over the counter

insurgent force (Long, 2006; Ahmend, 2008; Kilcullen, 2006a) cited in approach and Counterinsurgency. ibid


16/18

A lot of theories have been proposed in this regard. For example, in Afghanistan, there is the

CERP43 program which has gulped over 700 million dollars the idea is to provide those hired as

insurgents with a reason not to continue in that path. In other words, a production of

alternative incomes without psychological negative feelings/ satisfaction would make those

who are casually insurgents to abandon insurgency for other areas in which they can contribute

positively to the development of their society as well as well as atone for their past wrongs.44

This would cause a reduction in the number of casual insurgents leaving the professionals to be

dealt with by the security forces. This has side effects as studies45 have also shown that while

such strategies effectively reduce insurgencies attacks on soft targets, the majority of the people

are radicals who prefer focusing on hard targets.

One may doubt the overall effectiveness of such techniques but using the elimination

technique46, the positive outcomes would outnumber the negatives in a progressive fashion.

This is more supported by the proposition47 that an isolation of insurgent support in a given

population would force the insurgents back to the wall and in retaliation, the insurgents may be

pushed towards making huge statements by coordination and quality of strikes that would

43Radha Iyengar et al (2011)BUILDING PEACE: THE IMPACT OF AID ON THE LABOR MARKET FOR INSURGENTS

available athttp://www.nber.org/papers/w17297NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH44

The 2007 U.S. counterinsurgency field manual cites strengthening the local economy and generating

employment as an important part of an effective counterinsurgency campaign: Unemployed males of military age

may join the insurgency to provide for their families. Hiring these people for public works projectscan remove the

economic incentive to join the insurgency. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual(FM No. 3-

24), p. 173 cited also in Radha Iyengar et al (2011), ibid45

P.23 ibid46

According to David Kilcullen, Insurgencies are nonequilibrium systems that exist on the edge of chaos. That is,

they depend on inputs of energy and matter from the external environment. Deny these inputs, and the feedbackloops driving the insurgency lose energy, until the overall insurgency breaks down. Insurgencies are dissipative

structures that depend for stability on a throughput of energy. The more energy (violence, grievances, insurgent

action) circulating in the system, the more stable it becomes, and the less effective countermeasures become.

Once energy is drained from the system it becomes chaotic, its structure begins to collapse, inroads can be made

into disrupting it, and the underlying drivers can be addressed. See David Kilcullen, (2006) Countering Global

Insurgency pg 22 36 available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf

47See ISAFs counterinsurgency guidance
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17297http://www.nber.org/papers/w17297http://www.nber.org/papers/w17297http://www.nber.org/papers/w17297


17/18

send chilling messages to the general population. The need for the coordination could be used

by COIN operatives to counter insurgent operations through the use of technologies such as

the use of cyber warfare48 equipment to tackle these groups.

CONCLUSION

Having looked at the concept of insurgency, we have been able to understand the effect that it

has on development in the global economy. The case studies have also shown that insurgencies

prevail when there is a development gap in some areas of the country, and when such areas are

continuously neglected by the government, there is the tendency for sovereignty to be eroded

by groups who take advantage of the situation in subverting the authority of government as

has been seen in the cases of Mali, Colombia, and even Nigeria. Thus, the focus should not be

on eliminating the group, because based on the systems approach, one can see that insurgents

adapt to the environment and therefore, government agencies should strive to ensure that the

main weapon insurgents use against the government, which is the people, are catered for thus

isolating the support base of the insurgents.

With regards to the military expenditure, it is seen that an increase in military spending does

not automatically mean that insurgency will collapse as such funds have the capability of being

misused. The effective approach in this regard is to focus on the factors that led to the

insurgency in the first place while winning the hearts and mind of the population, rather than

engage in crackdowns which have the ability of turning the tide in favor of the insurgents.

Therefore spending in this area should be checked in order to ensure that it contributes

48See article by Mark Clayton available at

http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Syria_12_07_25_Syria_s_cyberwars.pdf See also

http://www.phantomreport.com/syrias-digital-proxy-war
http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Syria_12_07_25_Syria_s_cyberwars.pdfhttp://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Syria_12_07_25_Syria_s_cyberwars.pdfhttp://www.phantomreport.com/syrias-digital-proxy-warhttp://www.phantomreport.com/syrias-digital-proxy-warhttp://www.phantomreport.com/syrias-digital-proxy-warhttp://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Syria_12_07_25_Syria_s_cyberwars.pdf


18/18

positively to peace and development of the nation affected by such insurgency, and also to

ensure that funds meant for development arent diverted to other sectors thus turning back the

hands of time for attaining a comfortable level of development for the nation and adding to the

number of issues to be tackled by institutions and organizations tasked with maintaining the

peace.

Insurgencies Effect Global Economy Sjubril

Documents

Transcript of Insurgencies Effect Global Economy Sjubril