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INSTITUTIONAL REFORM ASSESSMENT OF

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

FOR

IMPLEMENTATION OF TEN YEARS STRATEGIC VISION

Silsila Consultancy Services

November 2013

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Table of Contents

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS....................................................................3

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .........................................................................................6

SITUATION ANALYSIS..........................................................................................10

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................................12

ASSESSMENT ...........................................................................................................13

A. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND REPORTING..................................................15

B. BUDGETING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT..........................................18

C. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ...........................................................25

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................30

A. STRENGTHING COORDINATION AND COOPERATION.........................30

B. STRENGTHING LEADERSHIP, GOVERNENCE AND OVERSIGHT........31

C. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND REPORTING..................................................35

D. BUDGETING AND FINANCE MANAGEMENT .............................................36

E. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT...................37

F. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCIPLINARY MEASURES..38

CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................39

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ABP Afghan Border Police AFMIS Afghanistan Financial Management Information System ANSF Afghan National Security Forces AGO Attorney Generals Office AHR Administration & Human Resource Department AHRIMS Afghanistan Human Resource Information Management System ALP Afghan Local Police ANA Afghan National Army ANAP Afghan National Auxiliary Police ANDS Afghan National Development Strategy ANP Afghanistan National Police ANPC Afghan National Police College ANPRTC’s Afghan National Police Regional Training Centers ANPS Afghan National Policing Strategy ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police ANPA Afghan National Police Academy APPF Afghan Public Protection Force ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund AUP Afghan Uniform Police CAAT Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team, ISAF COIN Counter Insurgency CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan DMS&P Deputy Ministry for Strategy and Policy DoD: Department of Defense EUPOL European Police Mission to Afghanistan GPPT German Police Project Team GIRoA Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan HDI Human Development Index HOO High Office of Oversight HR Human Resources HRM&D Human Resource Management & Development HQ Ministry of Interior Headquarters IARCSC Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission IC International Community IPCB International Police Coordination Board KII Key Informant Interview LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan MoI Ministry of Interior NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPP National Policy Program NSC National Security Council NTMA NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan PAM Police Allocation Manual PGI Police General Inspectorate PSD Professional Standards Department RIMU Reform Implementation Management Unit SSMI Strategic Support to Ministry of Interior Project TMAF Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework UNDP United Nations Development Program

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INTRODUCTION

Going through transition is not a new experience in Afghanistan. The Afghan people have already gone through the same process after the Soviet Union’s sudden withdrawal started without any transition strategy in place. This, resulted in bloody civil war, the collapse of the administration and the migration of millions of Afghans to neighboring countries. It resulted in Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for international terrorist groups.

The regime - mainly the Army and Police - managed to fight insurgents for another two years thanks to the financial support for their salaries and operational expenses. However, the regime could not survive after the financial support was discontinued. The main reason was that the domestic revenue was not at the level to match the budget expenditure of the government, which resulted in slow and gradual collapse of the whole administration.

This time the International Community (IC), having learnt from the past experience, decided to have a process for withdrawal, to ensure not only transition of responsibility to the Afghan Government in a smooth manner but also to provide continuous technical and financial support for strengthening and sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

After a decade of engagement in Afghanistan to counter insurgency and terrorism and also to help the Afghan people in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, the IC decided to shift its engagement in Afghanistan by withdrawing its military forces from battlefields and maintaining a much smaller military presence to provide technical assistance to Afghan ANSF. The IC has committed to provide continuous financial assistance to the Afghan government for strengthening and sustaining the state institutions in both the security and non-security sectors. The Chicago Summit (May 2012) agreed the IC’s support to the security sector in Afghanistan for the coming ten years; this was followed by the Tokyo Conference which set out the development support for Afghanistan, based on certain targets and conditions to be delivered and achieved.

The Ministry of Interior (MoI), in order to prepare itself for this tough job and to begin leading the transition process, developed the ‘Afghan National Police (ANP) 2024 Vision’, which articulates the sort of police and ministry which it aims to develop in the next ten years. The Vision reflects that the MoI not only has to complete the security transition successfully; it also needs to create the conditions for a transformation of the ANP from a largely security focused force, to a police service with the capability to cover the spectrum of policing from security to crime solving, detection and community based work.

This ANP Ten Years Vision has been endorsed by the ex-minister and current minister of MoI. After the approval of the Strategic Vision, all departments were instructed to develop their part of the ‘Two Years Implementation Plan’, for moving the Vision towards implementation. While the line departments, with support of their technical advisors, are working on their two years implementation plan, the support side of the MoI, mainly Strategic Planning, Finance, Procurement and Human Resource (HR) departments required a more holistic approach in order to outline systems inside the Ministry that can deliver unity of effort in support of the Vision

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and the operational work of the Ministry. Without such systems, MoI will be unable to sustain operations and make full and effective use of the resources committed by the international community. In the worst case therefore, lack of institutional development could lead donors to question the utility of support to the MoI/ANP. This would seriously damage both the MoI/ANP, and the ability of the Government to continue improvements in the security of the population at large. Much is at stake.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A team of Afghan and international consultants carried out an evaluation of the Strategic Planning, Finance, Procurement and Human Resource (HR) departments to understand and assess their current institutional capacity with a view to making recommendations for the development of the two years implementation plan for their departments.

The assessment was conducted through deep literature review of all policies and strategies related to MoI institutional capacity in the target areas. Interviews were conducted with relevant senior and medium level management of the MoI. At the same time several rounds of consultation meetings were organized with relevant staff of MoI from central departments, as well as, from eight zones/provinces of the country.

It is also worth mentioning that although the assessment was mainly conducted based on the direction provided by the previous leadership of the MoI, however, during the assessment, the consulting team had meetings with the new leadership of MoI

This report focuses and highlights main challenges that MoI is facing, capacity gaps in the target areas and presents specific recommendations for implementation. It is worth mentioning that this report presents the recommendations in short term phased approaches as instructed by H.E. Minister Daudzai.

The key findings and recommendations of the consultancy team are set out later in this report. This summary will not repeat them all. Rather it will draw attention to the main challenges and possible ways of addressing them.

Unity Of Effort

MoI/ANP will only be able to operate effectively if there is unity of effort across the Ministry and the processes in place amount to a system. This is currently absent, with competition rather than cooperation being the default setting. One reason for this is that timetables for processes such as planning, tashkeel review and budget setting do not reflect the need for resources to be directly linked to objectives. This can easily be fixed, and new timetables should be developed without delay. A further reason is that there has been a lack of direction from the leadership to require cooperation towards the achievement of common goals. International support has also been focused on individuals or separate processes rather than the promotion of a system across the Ministry.

Many of the specific recommendations in this report aim to enable effective cross Ministry working. However, this will only be successful if it is underpinned by clear direction from the Minister that he expects and requires his Deputies and their staff to work as a team. The Minister should require full cooperation between teams and transparency in their dealings with each other. Cross team working to develop plans, and then to ensure that plans are reflected in budgets and the tashkeel should be the norm.

It is for the Minister to decide how responsibilities should be split. However, the consultants suggest that the Minister needs to designate someone in addition to himself to be responsible for coordination within the Ministry. This could be the DM

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for Strategy and Planning. But whoever it is, they must be clearly empowered by the Minister to fulfill this key function. And they should be provided with staff to support the coordination role.

Information Technology

Any Ministry with the complexity of function of the MoI requires good information management. This is not yet present in MoI, although work is underway on a number of systems.

In the opinion of the consultants, it is not proven that current efforts will produce the right result for MoI in terms of IT systems that give the Ministry easy access to necessary information and IT that is sustainable or manageable by a Ministry with limited human capacity.

A review of IT projects should be undertaken to determine the state of play. IT systems need to be:

- basic (off the shelf software is probably the most appropriate for the stage of development of MoI)

- compatible so that HR and finance etc systems can talk to each other and provide adequate management information

- sustainable in terms of cost and human capacity

The systems should also be capable of expanding to the provinces in a planned manner.

The Right People with the Right Skills

A consistent theme across the Ministry is a lack of skilled and qualified staff to meet the complex challenges of sustaining operations and transforming ANP/MoI. It is clear that without adequate human capital MoI will be unable to function sustainably and effectively.

This is a long-term process that needs to be addressed by training. However, training is not the only answer. There is an immediate need for recruitment of skilled personnel, both as short-term advisors and permanent staff. This will result in transitional staffing and structures, and the body of the report makes some suggestions on where and how this could be done. In the view of the consultants, such transitional arrangements are neither ideal nor desirable. However, they are unavoidable if the MoI is to be able to make the necessary fundamental changes in the short and even medium term.

In parallel with transitional structures, the MoI should review the tashkeel with a view to facilitating unity of effort, and to bringing in civilians instead of police officers in accordance with the requirements of specific posts. This will free up police officers to focus on vital police work, and enhance the administrative capability of the MoI. The Ministry should also engage with Ministry of Finance and the Civil Service Commission to agree use of a salary scale such as the National Technical Assistance scale (NTA) that will attract high quality civilians to the MoI.

There is an urgent need to improve HR policies and practices to ensure that the right people are put in the right jobs across ANP/MoI. There is evidence that training is not

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reflected in subsequent appointments, and that there is a lack of criteria for specific jobs and for performance management. An effective program of retirements would help ensure better use of talent. The consultants also question the need for separate HR departments for police and civilian staff. This separation mitigates against unity of effort.

The recruitment and appointment of women to suitable posts requires further work. The Minister is already addressing the need for female leaders in the organization. Much further work is needed. However, the consultants note that women can only flourish in a functional MoI/ANP, and over ambitious targets may be counterproductive.

International Support

The guiding principle for international support should be that it supports the MoI strategy and plans. In the absence of clear MoI plans, the IC has tended to offer well intentioned support that has certainly increased the capability of MoI/ANP but has not produced joined up and sustainable systems.

The IC should be asked to respond to specific requests for tailored support in line with plans. This should include expert and technical support in the form of people to enhance the human capacity of the MoI during transition. Those “advisors” should be tasked both to assist with the delivery of key projects and to transfer skills to Afghan staff in order to ensure sustainability.

MoI should work with the IC to agree how requests for support will be developed and coordinated. The aim should be to reduce the transaction cost for MoI (particularly in terms of Ministerial time) that is currently devoted to managing uncoordinated IC support. The consultants suggest that a unit might be established in MoI to work in close partnership with IPCB on the international side.

Centre/Province relations

MoI/ANP recognize a weakness in the ability of policies from the centre being followed in the provinces. This is not such an issue for operations, but is for endemic administration and management.

PCoPs lack the resources (particularly skilled people) to support the implementation of policies in their areas. This has a detrimental impact in many areas, including HR and logistics.

Increased contact between PCoPs and the centre is improving relations and consistent implementation of policies. However, much more is needed to ensure unity of effort.

Transparency and Accountability

Many of the proposed reforms such as a move to program budgeting will lead to improved transparency and accountability. This can also be enhanced through controls on the funding channels, and the work of the Oversight and Coordination Board. However, there are also some specific and urgent requirements such as the creation of performance management systems and implementation of a merit based appointment system. These should be urgently addressed. Underpinning all of this should be a strengthened and impartial Inspectorate General that enforces policies and

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practices appropriately. This will support professionalization, and could also support initiatives such as increasing the number of women police.

There is also a need for a mechanism for public complaints to be received and investigated. Setting up a Police Independent Complaints Board (PICB) would enhance the trust and confidence of the Afghan public in its police service.

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SITUATION ANALYSIS

The period from 2015-2024 has been coined as ‘the Transformation Decade’1, distinguishing it from the period of ‘transition’ in the run up to the departure of ISAF’s combat troops, which finalizes on 31st December 2014. For obvious reasons, security planning in the run up to 2014 has been focused on supporting the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and on ensuring the completion of the ISAF mission2. The support required initiating and completing this significant increase in numbers has been the main focus of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), which has been responsible for supporting the MoI to recruit, train, equip and deploy ANP throughout Afghanistan. As far as support to the MoI and ANP is concerned, there are two major shifts in international support, which will impact on them:

i. At provincial and district level there will be a significant reduction of (military) police mentoring teams, a reduction in civilian police mentors, and a reduction of direct spending on police capacity building by Coalition Commanders and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

ii. In Kabul, there will be a significant reduction of Ministerial Advisors and a reorganization of their working approach.

In anticipation of the withdrawal deadline of 31st December 2014, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and NTM-A, are going through a staged draw-down process. These changes are happening now. ISAF has recently created the ‘Ministerial Advisory Group’ (MAG) to manage support to the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoI and changed the chain of command so that the MAG reports to ISAF HQ (this will soon be followed by physical migration to ISAF HQ); the remaining training elements of NTM-A will either then be transitioned to the IJC or direct to the Afghans. The number of ministerial advisors in the MoI is reducing from over 300 to 106 by January 2014. If all goes according to plan, this means that the ISAF mission will look radically different by the middle of 2014. Post-2014 that support will reduce even more. There will be a significant reduction in personnel, estimated between 8,000-12,000 in total3, split between headquarters in Kabul and five Regional Commands. Advisor teams will be based in regional commands, but will have restricted engagement with both Provincial and District level Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The role of police advisory teams for regional commands and the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), which commences on the 1 January 2015, has yet to be determined and police advisors are concerned that with no civilian policing support, gains made in local police professionalization will be lost.

                                                                                                               1  At  the  Bonn  Conference  2011,  http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/conference-­‐conclusions-­‐international-­‐conference-­‐afghanistan-­‐december-­‐2011/p26689  2  A  mission  which,  in  2009  required  a  surge  of  both  international  and  national  forces.  After  a  small  increase  to  facilitate  security  of  the  2009  Presidential  election,  the  total  number  of  ANP  was  increased  from  94,958  in  December  2009  to  a  target  number  of  157,000  by  2014.  There  was  a  corresponding  surge  in  ANA  from  100,131  in  December  2009  to  a  target  of  195,000  by  2014.    3  Compared  to  the  current  level  of  100,000  in  ISAF.  The  Figure  of  8-­‐12,000  also  assumes  force  protection  is  adequately  provided  by  ANSF,  which  is  an  optimistic  assumption.  

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The shape of RSM is still being debated within North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the police role,is one of many still being discussed. What can be said is that the ‘Train, Advise, Assist’ model will be severely stretched – nothing like current operational assistance can be envisaged for ANSF as a whole, let alone the ANP.

It is envisaged that RSM will have a ‘MoI-MAG’; but the shape and structure of that organization is yet to be determined, as is the skill sets required for advisors. One of the consistent criticisms of support to the MoI has been that there have been too many military advisors with little or no experience of policing, let alone ministry development. The planning for RSM is an opportunity to change this.

European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) is the largest organization offering civilian policing support to the MoI and the ANP. Funded by the European Union, it is small in comparison to ISAF support, but offers civilian policing expertise to the ANP. EUPOL has deployed officers in regions, often embedded in PRTs. As it is reliant on PRTs and ISAF for force protection in more dangerous areas, EUPOL has reduced its provincial footprint. EUPOL has made valuable contributions to police training and professionalization, though the mission has never been able to fill its mandated positions and its efforts have often been directed at operational and tactical policing. The current EUPOL mission ends on 31st December 2014, and discussions on what shape and size of mission EU Member States may support thereafter have been postponed. At time of writing, there is only a marginal prospect of RSM or of EUPOL being able to provide significant civilian police expertise to the police outside Kabul post 2014. Even in the capital, numbers are likely to be small. There is therefore a risk that the only civilian expertise would be provided by bilateral contributions which would be limited, uncoordinated and would likely have little strategic effect. However, should EUPOL continue to offer policing advice to the ANP and support missions, police officers may still not have the necessary skill sets to support ministerial and bureaucratic development as distinct from their undoubted expertise in operational policing. It is of deep concern that there appears to be political uncertainty over the future support to policing and ministerial development at all levels, from Kabul to the provinces. Such a drastic reduction in regional reach by both ISAF and potentially, EUPOL, means that the focus of international support will inevitably shift to top-down implementation. The impact will be felt most severely in the provinces The MoI is having limited success in framing and projecting its needs for the support it thinks it should receive post 2014. The MoI therefore needs to improve the quality and frequency of its engagement with the National Security Council (NSC) and with the IC on strategic, mid-term and budgetary planning issues. The MoI is currently participating in some planning discussions with international partners4, but are highly reliant on international advice and are generally unable to formulate a complete cross-ministry position without international support. There is a tendency by international advisors to replace rather than build the capacity of the MoI to intervene in these critical planning exercises (this tendency arises for a number of reasons, including positive ones, such as a desire to see the MoI’s perceived interests being protected).                                                                                                                4  For  example,  the  MOIMOI,  through  the  DMS&P  was  engaged  in  the  US  Afghan  Program  of  Record  (APOR)  planning  in  2012/13  which  was  being  undertaken  by  USFOR-­‐A.    

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SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The aim of this assessment is to identify key major gaps in areas of budgeting and financial management, planning and reporting and HR management and present recommendations for addressing them. To make the report more holistic, the assessment used different methods for data collection trying to

i. Present an overview of ten years vision and identify major gaps to be immediately addressed for moving towards realization of the vision;

ii. Assess budgeting and financial management, strategic planning and reporting and human resource management capacity of the ministry highlighting key challenges and present recommendations for addressing them;

iii. Present list of recommendations in the form of two years implementation plan for implementation for not only building institutional capacity of the ministry but also to enable these areas to provide adequate support for implementation of the ten years vision.

The assessment mainly used literature review, individual and group meetings and consultations for collecting information and analyzing capacity of the ministry. The report also drew on secondary data, including reports and policy papers by both MoI and donors. The assessment team conducted an annotated bibliography (an account of the research that has been done on a given topic) to analyze the current situation in these areas. The bibliography provided an initial overview for the team that enabled them to become familiar with the current discourse and evidence related to these themes. Individual meetings with high level and middle level leadership of MoI, MoF officials, MoI advisors and donors were conducted to find all stakeholders’ views about the Strategic Vision of the MoI; and what kind of institutional support the MoI requires to move forward for aggressive reform and development. These meetings provided the consultancy team with the required information to understand concerns of all stakeholders and to explore possible solutions. While the high level leadership of MoI is important at providing vision and direction, it is actually mainly the middle level leadership who are required to take full responsibility for implementation of the plans. The team therefore conducted consultative meetings with middle level officials of MoI from the finance, procurement, strategic planning and HR departments, discussing the major challenges in their departments and exploring possible and actionable solutions.

In order to have the assessment more inclusive and present more holistic solutions, the consultancy team also arranged two days of consultative workshops with finance, procurement and logistic officers of departments of the ministry from eight provinces (Helmand, Bamyan, Badghis, Takhar, Paktya, Kandahar, Balkh and Badakhshan). During the workshops the officers shared the major challenges they are facing with central department and what steps the new leadership should take to address some of their challenges.

The main idea behind all these individual meetings and consultative discussions were to ensure inclusion of all major stakeholders in the process and ensure inclusion of their recommendations in the report which the team believe will encourage their support once the MoI decides to begin implementation of activities presented in this report

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ASSESSMENT

While all the donors committed in the Chicago Summit to supporting ANSF, channeling money in an accountable way, is an issue which both donors and governments are deeply concerned about. Many donors will look to consolidate funding through trust funds for the reasons described above.

The government would like to see ‘on budget’ support while the donors have doubts and concerns on the capacity of the government to manage this requirement efficiently. It is noted that the cost of any activity carried out by government is much lower than contractors especially international contractors. It is, therefore, agreed between the government and donors to channel funding through government mechanism based on institutional reform of government institutions and their performance of service delivery. On the civilian support which was decided in Tokyo Conference both the government and donors came up with sets of indicators for evaluating each other’s performance and holding each other mutually accountable. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) sets activities with timelines for Afghan government to deliver upon, which the donors will provide on budget support to Afghan government.

In case of the Chicago Summit, there is no such framework that provides a set of indicators for Afghan government to achieve, based on which donors will increase or decrease on budget support to security sector.

TMAF has governance and oversight mechanisms built in to enable IC and GIRoA representatives to monitor progress against the TMAF indicators. This is the challenge being addressed by the IC now, who are considering how similar oversight mechanisms might apply to the Chicago commitments, and are developing a concept of an ‘Organization and Co-ordination Board’ or (OCB) has just been set up. This could provide a much needed oversight body, but if the OCB is not supported by a substantive accountability framework, it could quickly become a rubber stamping exercise. This ‘macro-accountability’ framework is also a pre-requisite for actually formulating accountability at the delivery level – getting people out and about to assess security sector performance.

The question is how can we realize the Chicago commitments. In case of TMAF, the Afghan government has developed a National Priority Program for each sector, which clearly articulates vision, mission, objectives, major activities with proper costing and linking all activities with TMAF indicators. Furthermore, MoF is now trying to push the relevant ministries to submit their annual budgets based on their individual NPP’s in the form of Program Budgeting. MoI for its part of the resources from the Chicago commitments has taken the initial step of developing and approving the ANP Ten Year Vision, but consequently needs to develop a comprehensive Implementation Plan for the Strategic Vision and use it as a strong point of reference between the MoI and donors in terms of deliverables and resource mobilization. The ANP Ten Year Vision’s part one articulates what exactly the MoI has to achieve in the areas of Civilian and Community Policing focusing on police in relation with

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public, human rights, fighting corruption, transparency and accountability, the mission of ANP, relationship with the Justice and Security Sector and revision of police related laws. Part of the Vision explains division of responsibilities between the Minister, Deputy Ministers, Office of Minister and major departments of the MoI. The Strategic Vision is a good foundation for MoI to begin planning and executing more strategic and long term activities, however, it has a lot of missing links, which has to be addressed in order to move ahead for proper planning and implementation process. The best way to move ahead towards realization of the Vision is to develop Implementation Plan for each department of the MoI, cost the Implementation Plans and link them with both ordinary and development budgets of MoI in the form of Program Budgeting. However, there are three departments, which play very important role in development and execution of the Implementation Plans:

1. Planning Department is responsible to assist and guide all other departments in development of their Implementation Plans compatible to objectives of Strategic Vision, create a coordination, monitoring and reporting mechanism to coordinate Implementation Plans execution not only within MoI but also with donors and Policy Deputy Ministry of MoF.

2. Finance Department should assist and guide all other departments in costing of their Implementation Plans, linking all the Implementation Plans with both ordinary and development budgets of MoI and submitting MoI’s annual budget to MoF based on the Strategic Vision priorities in the form of Program Budgeting. This department is also responsible for creating mechanism and adopting information system to ensure allocation of fair resources to all departments and provinces, monitor budget execution and report on regular basis on the expenditure occurred and results achieved.

3. Human Resource Department is responsible to review overall structure of MoI and assist all Deputy Ministries and departments to revise their structures and ToRs based on needs of MoI and priorities of Strategic Vision. This department is also responsible to assist all departments in reviewing performance of all their staff and appoint them in the new structure’s positions relevant to their field on merit base.

The question is whether these departments have the capacity to carry the activities mentioned above or not, and if they don’t, what major steps should be taken to help them assume their responsibilities. The following part of the report assesses the capacity of each of these departments, identifying major gaps and presenting recommendations for implementation:

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A. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND REPORTING The DMS&P is a relatively new organization within MoI. The MoI has developed a system for strategic planning, but rapidly evolving circumstances (ministerial changes, security conditions, and international community demands) mean that the system has not run for a complete cycle (as envisaged in the 5 year National Police Strategy). This strategy exists but is not obviously informed by the Strategic Vision or the changes implicit in the end of the ISAF mission. Constant change undermines the credibility of the DMS&P within the Ministry; with strategy, policy and plans being perceived by some as a paper exercise that will never survive contact with reality. The inclusion of program budgeting, procurement, and finance in the Strategic Vision indicates that the Ministry’s leadership recognizes the need to strengthen capacity of this department. The Ministry intends to implement the Vision through a series of Two Year Implementation Plans and development of strategic monitoring and reporting mechanism to assure that the individual plans contribute to achieving the Vision.

The DMS&P recognizes the need for Technical Advisors (TAs) to improve and support the functionality of Planning and Reporting, HR Management and Development (HRM&D), Budgeting, Procurement and Logistics, which are of course, fundamental building blocks for successful implementation of Strategic Vision and the Two Year Implementation Plans. Following are key findings in the area of planning and reporting capacity of MoI: The ANP Ten Year Vision Shortcoming: The ANP Ten Year Vision is a considered good and important document. However, it was intended to provide strong guidance to the MoI and donors on how to start the implementation process. The Vision is not linked with relevant departments or with the budget of the ministry and it is difficult for departments to link their daily activities with it. If the MoI does not take serious steps towards operationalization of the ANP Ten Year Vision, it is going to become an aspirational document, that remains on the shelf, without an implementation element. A focused effort is required to finalize, coordinate implementation and monitoring of the progress of the Two Year Plans. Lack Coordination Between Plans and Budget Timelines: Ministry of Finance is the sole state institution for National Budget has budgeting, execution and reporting calendar that all ministries should follow. For line ministries in order to plan and mobilize their allocated resources properly and efficiently, it is very important to align their planning timing with National Budget timing. MoI’s plans so far are not aligned with timing of National Budget Lack of United Effort: While the MoI has been provided with continuous support by both GoIRA and IC and there has never been shortage of funding for MoI however lack of united effort within MoI being lead by the minister and executed by deputies and directors for reform and development of MoI has not only hampered the reform process but also wasted lots of assistance provided to MoI in the form of TAs, Training and Capacity Building

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Lack of Authority to Deputy Ministry for Strategic Planning: The DMS&P is quite a new division and is assigned with many responsibilities to lead and coordinate implementation of Strategic Vision, however, the division is not provided with enough delegation of authority to exercise its role and have the cooperation and collaboration of other deputy ministries and departments. Furthermore, preparation and implementation of a long term plan for reform and development within the MoI is a process which should be managed by the DMS&P, however, it can never be successful if it is not led directly and specifically by the Minister, which has been the missing requirement so far. Lack of Capacity: This should be divided into three parts.

i. Lack of leadership since, as pointed above this is a process, which should be lead by the minister and carried out by DMS&P as a unified effort. Right now the DMS&P is busy in development of different plans and strategies but lacks the leadership capacity to bring the rest of MoI around and mobilize them not only for development but also execution of policies and strategies.

ii. A lack capable and competent staff is the second part of this challenge.

During the assessment the team observed that most staff of this division needs long term mentoring and coaching and on job training to assume their responsibilities of strategic planning, monitoring and reporting.

iii. Inappropriate advisors for the Deputy Ministry. Unfortunately, most of the

advisors working in this division have a strong police and military background, however, when it comes to strategic planning, monitoring and reporting and developing mechanism and processes for execution of these functions, they do not all have the capacity and expertise. Since there is also lack of clear direction from leadership, the advisors have been helping the MoI based on what they think is right, or on individual requirements of persons they are supporting, rather than aligned to the needs and priorities of the MoI.

Existence of Too Many Strategic Documents: it is not that Deputy Ministry is not doing anything. They are seriously busy with the development of different policies, strategies and plans. However, there is lack of linkages as well as overlaps between these documents, and existence of so many documents itself have created confusion amongst both the ministry and donors. Once the two year plans are finalized by all departments including support department, then the DMS&P should focus on coordinating the implementation of the plans; and on monitoring and reporting implementation of the plans for realization towards the Strategic Vision. Once the first two years plans commence implementation, a renewed process will need to commence in relation to the development of the subsequent two year implementation planning process. The series of two years plans should become the new National Police Plans as soon as the timetables can be reconciled Lack of Coordination and Cooperation: This once again could be divided into three components.

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i. Internally - within the ministry since almost all deputy ministries and departments are competing rather than coordinating and cooperating and,

ii. Externally - there is no systematic coordination and cooperation between MoI and donors, which should be established and managed by DMS&P.

iii. Lack of Communication Strategy - This is for both internal and external stakeholders to market the Vision of the MoI – and their deep desire to professionalize and become a civilian police service responsible to the needs of the Afghan people

Lack of Guidance to Provinces: When the consultancy team invited invited staff of MoI from provinces for consultation, it was revealed that the MoI do not have a single officer or office responsible for planning, reporting and monitoring in the provinces. While all other function of the MoI like budgeting, finance and procurement are highly centralized, the strategic planning and reporting is absolutely centralized and provinces do not see any role for themselves to play in planning and reporting area. Lack of MoI Needs Awareness for Transition: During consultation especially with provinces, it was observed that MoI staff really do not know what are their priority needs for taking more responsibility beyond 2014 after transition. While two year plans are developed by central departments, the provinces are not consulted on their basic needs in terms of training, capacity building, advisors, logistics, equipment and ICT.

Governance Oversight: MoI needs to develop a new “rule of law‟ culture. Accountability mechanisms have an important role to play in helping to demonstrate that all individuals and institutions are subject equally to the rule of law. Furthermore, the development of the sector requires attention to policy making, budgeting and setting up systems for policy monitoring. Such systems may involve the need to map joint outcomes across a number of units that produce individual contributory outputs through operations.

Political v. Operational Structures: One of the issues that will need to be resolved is the balance between “political‟ oversight by the MoI and the desirability of retaining “operational independence‟ of the police under the appointed Deputy Minister of Security (DMS). Whilst that relationship is encapsulated in the Police Law5, the MoI role should be conducted by clear strategic direction, priority setting and performance management. Whilst there have been a number of strategies and plans published by the MoI, it is the consultants’ views that they lack clear priority setting, and more importantly, measurable and achievable targets. Without these, strategies and plans are meaningless and do not allow the community and other stakeholders to see real progress in policing.

                                                                                                               5  Police  Law,  published  in  the  OFFICIAL  GAZETTE  No:  862,  Kabul,  September  22,  2005  

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B. BUDGETING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT While $5.5bn is a significant amount of money for security sector, this is much less than the security expenditure in 2010/11, which the World Bank estimated at $8.594bn6.

The US Department of Defense (DOD) justifications for funding for the Afghan Security Force Fund (ASFF) have declined by a similar rate7, and a large amount of the remaining funds are committed to current training and support personnel and contractors8 to deliver current basic and specialist training programs. As these are delivered by ongoing contracts, there is limited flexibility to introduce new training or mentoring programs to meet the changing needs of the ANP.

The US Government Audit Office (GAO) believes that the real costs of ANSF sustainment will exceed DOD estimates. In their 2013 report they noted that a “shortfall currently exists in Afghan domestic revenue and international commitments to cover the anticipated costs of Afghan security forces, and despite past recommendations and a congressional mandate, the DOD has not routinely provided long-term cost estimates for sustaining those forces.”9 It is not clear whether financial forecasts, or the Chicago total includes, for example, any costs associated with the Afghan Local Police (ALP), Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), or a fully functioning prison system.

The GAO report goes on to predict there will be funding shortages unless increased contributions are found, and that even then, that sustainability of forces by the GIRoA from its own budget is impossible by 2017. Finally, the Chicago summit assumes the international community will meet pledged contributions; an assumption which, in light of the on-going economic crisis, must be viewed with some caution. Without solid financial data from the MoI, the MoF and the international community, meaningful planning for affordable change will not be possible.

Just as the organizations which support the MoI will downsize and change, the current funding sources available to the MoI will not necessarily continue; and if they do, they will likely decline after 2015. It is important to note that Afghan security ministries (MoD, MoI, NDS) have used GIRoA budget processes to process security

                                                                                                               6  World  Bank,  Afghanistan  in  Transition:  Looking  Beyond  2014  Volume  2:  Main  Report,  May  2012  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Images/305983-­‐1334954629964/AFTransition2014Vol2.pdf  7  It  is  important  to  note  that  that  these  figures  are  not  necessarily  the  final  figures  approved  by  Congress;  that  the  funds  can  be  spent  over  multiple  years,  and  the  ASFF  is  not  the  only  fund  available  to  support  ANSF  activity,  as  noted  above.  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Department  of  Defense  Budget  Fiscal  Year  (FY)  2012,  Justification  for  FY  2012  Overseas  Contingency  Operations,  Afghan  Security  Forces  Fund  (ASFF)  and  same  documents  for  2013-­‐2014.    8  $445,000,000  is  has  been  estimated  in  FY2014  for  training  and  mentors  to  carry  out  basic  and  advanced  police  training,  and  MOI  advisory  support  services.  See  Justification  for  FY  2014  Overseas  Contingency  Operations,  Afghan  Security  Forces  Fund  (ASFF)  p.63.  In  2012,  US  troop  contributions  numbered  approximately  68,000;  in  addition  the  DoD,  through  US  companies,  employed  the  109,564  contractors.  This  will  include  a  large  number  of  support  functions  to  US  forces,  but  also  to  the  ANA  and  ANP.  Brookings  Institution,  Afghanistan  Index,  19  March  2013,  p.9.      9  GAO,  ‘Afghanistan:  Key  Oversight  Issues’,  GAO-­‐13-­‐218SP,  11  February  2013.p.20  http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-­‐13-­‐218SP  

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sector salaries, but for almost everything else, their main sources of funding are external to GIRoA.

It is hard to put a precise figure on the amount, which has been spent on the MoI for various reasons; some funds are mixed (for example, the ASFF funds both Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP. In addition, most funds are controlled by donors; most support is off budget; and there is a lot of direct support (e.g. infrastructure) provided at local level by non-policing specific funds such as the Commanders’ Emergency Response Fund. Finally, there are also ad hoc bilateral aid packages that may pay for custom built services or projects in areas of interest to donors.

A large proportion of donor monies are currently disbursed through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)-administered Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). The total expenses for LOTFA in 2012 were $493,403,70310 and the US, Japan and the European Union (EU) are the largest contributors. After the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), LOTFA is the second largest provider of on-budget police and related security sector salaries (excluding military) through the MoF11. LOTFA was created to pool donor monies to support the payment of police salaries and some infrastructure requirements. This is still the main function of the fund, but it now also includes additional outputs relating to MoI reform, gender and community policing.

LOTFA is divided into three ‘pillars’: Pillar 1 provides support to police remuneration and police infrastructure; Pillar 2 provides consolidated capacity development and institutional reform; and Pillar 3 supports Community Policing through the police-e-mardumi project. Donors can earmark funds for each pillar. LOTFA is one of the few security sector funds, which puts money ‘on-budget’ and therefore supports GIRoA’s financial management mechanisms – this in itself can raise risk and the chances of abuses in financial mismanagement. Some have expressed concerns that increasing on-budget support may foster and not challenge corruption12 but development organizations are clear that without putting money on-budget, there will be little or no development of the capacity to manage monies properly, and very little building of the normal checks and balances that government systems require. There are, potentially, other trust funds available to fund the police post-2014. The ANA Trust Fund, which is funded by NATO contributors, provides funding for ANA salaries and other items. It is not clear whether the ANA Trust Fund will be able to fund any ANP functions; though it may be able to fund non-ODA eligible items (such as ammunition and air support maintenance). Weakness in all aspects of public budgeting and financial management is systemic across the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan GIRoA. In 2010, the

                                                                                                               10  LOTFA  Annual  Progress  Report  2012  11  LOTFA  Management  Review  15  December  2012  12  See  for  example,  http://thehill.com/blogs/global-­‐affairs/foreign-­‐aid/292969-­‐state-­‐departments-­‐direct-­‐aid-­‐push-­‐slammed-­‐in-­‐wake-­‐of-­‐afghan-­‐corruption  

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MoF’s Public Financial Management (PFM) Roadmap,13 laid out specific reform objectives intended to improve the government’s ability to link resources with results, improve budget execution, and increase transparency and accountability in public expenditures. This document was the baseline for capacity building investments not only in MoF, but also other line ministries, and informed the technical interventions of non-security ministry (NSM) international partners. This was not the case for the MoI, whose international partners NTM-A, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and EUPOL focused more upon developing the operational capacity of ANP. While this policy decision has expedited the provisioning of field units, the result has been capacity substitution, rather than development of the capacity of MoI budgeting, finance and procurement. The inclusion of program budgeting, procurement, and finance in the Ten-Year Vision indicates that Afghan leadership recognizes the need to strengthen those enabling institutional functions. Although ministerial assessments14 have described the ministry’s current low level of capacity in those areas, its international partners have not followed through with funding for comprehensive institutional reform or other technical interventions. MoI and its international partners must recognize the need to reduce the burden or constraint of limited government capacity, while promoting capacity building over time.

The proposed recommendations can provide overarching guidance in sequencing reform and capacity development projects. This structured approach will focus the two-year implementing plans on specific activities to develop an effective and enabling institutional framework, supported by efficient functional capacity. Targeted capacity building can improve key processes (such as budget formulation and execution). This will make better use of resources and help to focus them for the achievement of strategic objectives in plans, and ultimately policy outcomes for the population.

MoI’s participation in GIRoA’s fiscal reforms lags behind that of the non-security ministries. It was among the last to adopt program budgeting; furthermore, it will not implement the State Budget Preparation System (SPBS) until the ministry starts preparing its 1394 (2014) budget submission. It has not started the certification process to have the authority to manage its own procurements. These weaknesses stem from the ministry’s dependence upon NTM-A and CSTC-A, which have assumed significant responsibility for MoI’s operational support. Given the high level of resources available from NTM-A and CSTC-A, the Security directorate has developed poor fiscal discipline, with unrealistic expectations of resource availability and administrative lead times between planning and expenditure.

Linking policy and planning to resources will establish the foundation for an effective and efficient fiscal system in the Ministry. Currently, planning, programming, implementation, and monitoring are discrete and not effectively coordinated activities, inhibiting the ministry’s ability to link policy with results.

                                                                                                               13  Ministry  of  Finance,  “Public  Financial  Management  Roadmap”,  Kabul  Conference,  2010,  www.mof.gov.af.  14  UNDP  assessment  

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In a functioning budgeting system, the outputs of a specific period of time serve as the input of a succeeding stage. This simple approach aligns policy, planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and monitoring into a smoothly functioning system. Applying resources to Two Years Implementation Plans (effectively creating a medium term budget framework for the ministry) would facilitate preparation of the ministry’s annual budget requests to the MoF. At the time of this mission, donors had not provided direction concerning their thoughts on how they intend to structure the funding modalities for future support, or the level of budget support. Based on the reaction from participants at the procurement / finance workshop, there remains a significant lack of awareness in the Ministry that it will experience significant decrease in support, with increased control and reporting requirements.

Within the Support Directorate, the key processes assuring the availability of financial resources to support operations are: allotment releases (B27), procurement, payment processing (M16), and financial reporting. The authoritative guidance for processing these transactions lies with MoF, as supplemented by MoI policy. Detailed instructions, to include roles and responsibilities, are published in the Accounting Manual (available on the MoF website, www.gov.af). Financial reporting is available through the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS), the government’s enterprise integrated general ledger reporting system. The MoF’s Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) guidance is available on their website (www.ppu.gov.af) and they arrange training in procurement. In addition, the PPU is responsible for certifying ministries in Afghan procurement requirements. Although MoF has made great advances in strengthening its ability to manage the nation’s fiscal resources overall, the government has not been as effective in rolling out these reforms to line ministries.

The assessment team during assessment of budgeting and financial management capacity of the MoI had the following key findings:

Lack of Linkage of Budget with Plan: Effective and efficient fiscal management requires close coordination between line departments and finance and procurement to ensure results based budgeting and execution. Right now there are no linkages between plans and budget, furthermore, the ordinary and development budgets are developed by two separate departments (Admin and Planning) through quite exclusive processes.

Two Separate Departments Responsible for Budget Preparation and Execution: This is quite typical in every ministry that the ordinary budget is prepared and executed by the support department and development budget by the planning department. This creates major challenges such as leadership never knowing overall budget ceiling and execution of the ministry, burdening the planning department with extra responsibilities, wasted resources ,challenging coordination between the two budgets and linking both of them with policies and strategies of the ministry.

Lack of Consultative and Inclusive Process for Preparation and Execution of Budget: While the budget department should be responsible for preparation and monitoring execution and reporting of the budget based on targets set for each department, the line departments in the center and provinces are responsible for actual

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expenditure of budget and assisting the ministry in achieving its objectives. While the line departments are assigned with targets and goals to achieve, they are not consulted on what kind of financial resources they require to perform their duties and achieve their target.

Lack of Capacity: This once again should be divided into three parts. i. Lack of leadership capacity and the best example is two separate departments

responsible for preparation of ordinary and development budgets. The DM Support and budget department lack the leadership capacity to bring rest of MoI around and prepare and execute both ordinary and development budgets in consultation with them based on their needs and priorities,

ii. Very few capable and competent staff is the second part of this challenge.

During the assessment the team observed that most staff of these deputy ministries need long term mentoring and coaching and on job training to assume their responsibilities of preparing both ordinary and development budgets linking both with Implementation Plans of MoI and line departments and guide and assist the line departments in execution of both budgets accordingly,

iii. Inappropriate advisors for the deputy ministry. Unfortunately, most of the

advisors working in the areas of budgeting and financial management have strong police and military background, however, when it comes to program budgeting, financial management and reporting and developing mechanism and processes for execution of these functions, they do not have the capacity and expertise.

Internal Coordination in Budget Preparation: The short timeline for line ministries to submit their initial budget requests to MoF is insufficient for coordination with the procurement and finance departments in MoI. This does not provide the budget department with information on the realism of the ministry’s budget submission, and contributes to lowered budget execution once the ministry receives it allocation from the national budget. Budgets are less credible and less of a predictable resource than they should be. Unrealistic Budgets: Using past expenditures improves the cost realism of future budget estimates. The Ministry does not use historical data in preparing its budget requests, depending instead upon the amount allocated for the previous year.

Lack of Coordination between MoI and Donors: It was noted on a regular basis in workshops with MoI staff that there are problems in coordination between the ministry and donors. The finance department is not involved in funding discussions early on, and this causes delays in processing payment requests. There is a view that sometimes funds are not allocated based on the needs and priorities of the ministry, but reflect the preferences of the donor. One example mentioned in the workshop is where MoI have identified a need to purchase 100 cars and 20 laptops, but the donor has decided to fund 200 cars and 10 laptops. Purchasing only the number of cars needed reduces the ministry’s budget execution rate, although the need was met; purchasing half the number of laptop computers needed expending the total budget for that expenditure, but failed to meet the need. Another challenge is the failure to

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match the procurement and finance requirements of the laws and regulations of the Afghan government and those of donors. Although the Financial Regulations and the Procurement Law recognize that there are cases where donor laws conflict with corresponding Afghan law and regulations, the differing requirements have not been matched adequately and reflected in MoI procurement and finance policy and procedures.

Centre-to-Province Fiscal Relationship: The fiscal relationship between the centre and provinces is even more problematic. The problems identified in the provincial workshop were similar to those reported in other ministries: lack of training, lack of guidance and Standing Operating Procedures (SOP), shortage of qualified staff, and lack of appropriate tools (e.g., accounting software, computers). The role of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Council in control and oversight of the ministry’s provincial budgeting, procurement and expenditures remains undefined. While the provincial officers are expected to execute their budget in the most transparent manner, they have no support when they are under pressure by governors, police chief commanders and provincial council members.

Allotment Releases: Allotments provide the authority to incur an obligation. The process of releasing allotments (and sub-allotments) is a cause of confusion across ministries and provinces. The intent of the allotments is to assure that ministries do not exceed their allocation in the budget and that there is sufficient cash in the relevant government accounts to make the necessary payments. The timing of requests for allotments is a function of whether the allocation is budgeted through the ordinary or development side of the national budget. For the ordinary budget, e.g. salaries, allotments tend to be released quarterly in equal amounts; for the development budget, allotments are released as-needed and as defined by the procurement. MoI’s complaints about the allotment release reflect those of other ministries: delays and problems in seasonality.

Procurement: Currently, CSTC-A is responsible for performing most of the Ministry’s procurements. Over the next year, this responsibility (and some level of funding) will transfer from CSTC-A to MoI. The department is not prepared. The Minister shared with the consultants that when he asked the (then) DM Support how many procurements that were processed by the department followed the GIRoA law and regulation, the response was ‘none.’ The department is not certified to perform its own procurements. This means that procurements are prepared by Ministry of Economy’s Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Service (ARDS), which delays contract award and implementation.

The MoI Is Not Ready for More On Budget Support: While the transition process is moving quite rapidly and there will be more on budget support to MoI, whereas with the current budgeting financial management capacity, MoI is not ready to manage more on budget. It is therefore very important that MoI begin an aggressive reform process to prepare itself for more responsibility and on budget support.

Financial Reporting: Timely financial reporting is critical in allowing management to identify obstacles to budget execution in time to make adjustments. The reporting capabilities of the Free Balance ™ application that underpins Afghan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) have not been fully exploited in Afghanistan. Although the software has standard reports, it has the capability of

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producing non-standard, and ad-hoc reports. Related to improved reporting is the requirement to improve the quality of analytics to inform management decisions about allocation and execution of fiscal resources. Examples of skills necessary to support analytics include variance analysis and regression analysis.

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A. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT The ANP has grown exponentially in the last five years with international advice and financial support. Bilateral support from many international stakeholders has played and continues to play a significant role in police and associated institutional development.

ANP has made significant progress since 2009, attaining an actual total strength of over 151,76615 trained and employed staff (police and civilian), policing all of Afghanistan and has taken on an increasing number of key roles.

Inclusion of merit recruitment, gender affirmation, professionalism, capacity development and productivity and efficiency within a community ethos in the 10 Year Vision indicates that Afghan leadership recognizes the need to strengthen these enabling institutional functions. MoI and its international partners must recognize the need to reduce the constraint of limited government capacity, while promoting capacity building over time.

The ability of the administration and human resource departments to support operations is a function of their integration with policy and operational planning. Resourced plans, built upon realistic staffing estimates, with justified staffing requests, result in availability of human resources to support operations. The Tashkeel process involves a broad spectrum of stakeholders not only within the MoI, but also the MoF, the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), the Presidential Tashkeel Budget Committee, and Parliament. Understanding their roles and responsibilities is critical to identifying gaps in capacity, and in designing appropriate technical interventions.

Within the MoI, the DM Security is responsible for identifying staffing requirements needed to support operations and prioritizing funding across those programs and supporting projects. The DM Administration is responsible for preparing the ministry’s Tashkeel submission as part of the annual budget preparation process. The Minister approves the Tashkeel request prior to its submission to the President’s Budget Committee.

The key findings of the consultancy team in the area of human resource are highlighted below:

Existence of Two HR Departments in MoI: During assessment it was observed the Tashkeel of ANP and Civilian employees of MoI are managed by two separate departments which has hindered the appointment of the right staff to the right place.

Lack of Qualified Staff: Inexperience of personnel in the ministry and its provincial branches in understanding HR process and procedures has become a serious obstacle in their answering the current needs of the MoI. Furthermore, most of these staff has background in military operations (e.g., intelligence, criminal investigation) rather than human resources. Their lack of familiarity in basic interviewing, workforce planning, performance management and training systems skills has resulted in problems with unqualified recruitment, poorly targeted training, little differentiation

                                                                                                               15  Pg. 77: Department of Defense – Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013  

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for high/low performers and a heavy reliance on international advisors for planning of service delivery.

Lack of Training Curriculum Matching Need of MoI: While the ANP is planning to gradually shift from counter insurgency to community policing and rule of law, no work has been done to plan an emended basic training curriculum.

Low Number of Women: As in other similar developing police organizations, the number of female officers is generally at a low level, tapering significantly towards higher rank levels. The ANP has no female Generals and few women, in proportion to men, in the ranks from Major to Colonel. Whilst promotion should remain on ability, greater emphasis should be put through career and management development on ensuring that female officers occupy higher posts. Furthermore, MoI should also ensure protection for women and effective remedies for those who experience problems.

Overlap between Civil Service and Police: Consultants noted that HR departments still have police officers performing roles that are civilian and not requiring police powers. They should consequently urge a drive towards increasing civilianization, releasing police officers to duties requiring police powers.

Lack of Linkage Between MoI Priorities and Structure: Since Police has so far been focusing on providing security and countering insurgency, numbers of police in different departments have been based on that. Now that MoI is preparing for a move towards community policing based on its Strategic Vision, MoI has to review its organization structure based on its needs and priorities and align its structure to its priorities and needs. Furthermore the Tashkeel has so far focused more on the central departments and MoI HQs in provinces.

Lack of Clarity on Roles of MOI and ANP: Consultants are of the view that there is still a learning process underway within the MoI and ANP to identify and separate “political supervision‟ and “operational management‟. The first is clearly the role of the MoI, and the second that of the ANP.

“Political supervision‟ includes:

• Public security policy (e.g. balance between the different products or operational outputs and the main objectives – or policy outcomes for citizens),

• Establishment of a credible, predictable budget framework, • Political coordination with other ministries and selection of senior police leaders

(DM’s and Director Generals, Deputy Director General’s), following transparent rules and process.

Operational management includes:

• Best use of staff, equipment and finances available to reach the agreed priorities and objectives,

• Development of a written and deployed mission statement and implementation of a long term strategy, concentrating on products, processes, people and finances, and systematically controlling delivery and measurement of the attained results.

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Lack of Performance Management: There is a noticeable lack of a “Performance Management Mechanism, both at ministerial level and throughout the ANP, with no clear measurable performance targets. It should be noted that this does not refer to or imply a lack of performance in either the Ministry or the ANP. There is clear evidence of staff and officers performing to the highest level. What is lacking is a mechanism, and structures that both recognize high performance and seek to spread it throughout the organization as model. Governmental and Ministerial regulation control should be through performance setting and measurement, with management responsibility reflecting this. The primary function of the MoI is to ensure that the police are fulfilling their obligations. The role of the MoI is to act as a regulator, an independent expert, an opinion former and a mediator, steering the police to ensure that they are compliant with the regulatory regime and are implementing legislation properly. This involves a need to establish clear targets (quantitative and qualitative) against these priorities to ensure that strategies and policies are being met. Within the genre of performance appraisal systems in AHR the systems used are overtly skewed towards a fully competent rating so as to afford promotion and salary increases for supervised staff. It is suggested that the performance appraisal system should be subject to oversight and routinely amended by a “ranking” system that will realign the scores to provide a more realistic representation of the actual performance scores and departmental performance of the AHR and MoI.

Spans of Command: The consultants looked at the number and span of command levels and ranks. This currently reflects a traditional hierarchical structure with 19 command levels. Modern best practice would advocate a ‘flattening’ of the organization and limiting the number of command/management layers. In business this could be as low as 5 with a broad span of command at each level/layer. The structure of a police organization should be appropriate to the style of policing needed to meet the new challenges. In other words, the form of the organization should follow its function. Western police are following private sector models in flattening their organizations and reducing the number of police officer ranks. The Australian Federal Police, for example, reduced its rank structure to five. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which currently has 10 ranks is studying how some can be eliminated. The effect of flattening the hierarchical structure is to devolve decision-making authority and responsibility to the working level. This allows the principle of ‘empowerment’ to operate. Empowerment is the organizational principle of allowing those at the operational level of an organization, who know local conditions and needs, to make their own decisions about how their work should be done to best effect. It is the consultant’s view that the current rank structure needs flattening. Consultants noted the high number of Senior / High Ranking Officers at MHQ (57% of Colonels and 58% of Lt Colonels) – some with limited spans of command. This is not only evidence of an over-centralization of command but could be seen to evidence a lack of commitment to a front line focus.

Lack of Work Force Management: The number and location of regional zones is in the consultants’ view appropriate. A number of senior officers reinforced the need to carry out a detailed and accurate ‘workforce needs analysis’ at regional and district level. This is currently being conducted by the Force management with advice from the COIN model within NTM-A. consultants are totally supportive of this work being carried out employing statistical and analytical support as appropriate, and considering demographic, geographical and crime data. Police Commanders at all

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levels should be required to justify existing and any additional resource requirements. This is a challenging and potentially difficult task, but with strong leadership and clear direction there could, according to some interviewees, be evidenced support for a redistribution of between 1500 to 3000 officers. A similar review is also required of support functions. Consultants were unable owing to time constraints to look closely at policing at Regional level. The current classification is based on ranks and staff levels – category determines staffing levels. Better criteria for classification would be: numbers of population, crimes, and incidents per officer per area (sq kms). Consultants propose that existing policing workforce planning modalities should be used for urban environments and a % per 100 capita for rural areas at a level of 3.5-3.8 officers per 1000 population.

Lack of Training & Development Strategy: As the ANP reaches its current targeted end strength of 157,000 personnel, the MoI is shifting its focus from building the force to professionalizing and assessing the force. A total of 41,824 ANP personnel attended training in 2012 and 39,723 graduated. During the period from January 2013 through early April 2013 a total of 14,029 ANP attended training and 13,721 graduated. In late June 2012, NTM-A and the MoI signed a Training Centre transition plan, which will consolidate or close 31 training sites, leaving 13 enduring Training Centers by late 2014. Afghan National Police General Training Command Training Centre (ANP GTC) capacity utilization (training seats available vs. training seats assigned) averaged 63% monthly during 2012, but, to date in 2013, this has decreased to 52% monthly. The consultants have determined that the level of graduation has decreased by 28% in the first year of handover from ISAF/NTM-A to the HR department. This reduction needs to be halted and to address this it is suggested that a Business Plan be developed for the Afghan National Police Academy (ANPA), Afghan National Police College (ANPC) and Regional Training Centers RTCs to ensure budgetary and professional capacity development sustainability in the medium term.

Trainings Not Matching Needs of the Ministry: There are many partners who are providing training to staff of the ministry, however, very little improvement is made in operation of MoI especially on support side of the ministry. It is therefore, important that training curriculum and manuals should be reviewed in comparison with needs of the ministry and should be revised based on needs of the ministry.

Lack of Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS): While there is information system for police, however, MoI still does not have a fully functioning information system for civilian employees of MoI which is very important for tracking their information, employment history, promotion, transfers and pay and grading.

Low Compensation for Civil Servant Positions: While the MoI has its own pay and grading scheme for police but for civilian employees, MoI like other ministries have to follow policies and procedures and salary scale of IARCSC which will be very difficult to recruit and retain qualified staff for important civilian positions. As a result slowly and gradually almost all important civilian positions are being filled by police. Given the important role of MoI for security and transition, MoI should come up with a scheme to pay better salary to its civilian staff. Ministry of Education came up with a scheme for public teachers and got it approved by the cabinet in 2006. The

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National Technical Assistance scale (NTA) (endorsed by MoF) may also provide a way forwad.

Lack of Clarity on Roles and Responsibility: Within the ministry there is no distinction between audit, inspection, and investigation. There are three bodies responsible for ‘audit’: personal standards units, document inspection units, and the inspector general. Personal standards units focus on inspections of offices and units. Should they find an infraction, they go into investigation mode. Although the unit uses a checklist, they do not share their standards. This leads to a perception of capriciousness and promotes a hostile environment. The document inspection department is also referred to as the internal audit department. This department reviews documents for completeness and accuracy. If they reveal minor failings, the department may recommend further training. The department also performs investigations. The 10-Year Vision calls for consolidating transparency and accountability functions under a centralized body, the Inspector General.

General Inspectorate & Professional Standards Unit: The MoI has an increasingly ineffective Police General Inspectorate (PGI) that has produced few quality specific and/or thematic reports on police issues to date. This role should be extended to monitoring priorities and targets set by the Minister. Their reports in general should carry more weight in respect of non-compliance by the police. The PGI in the view of the consultants is proposed to be an independent mechanism for monitoring police and it has two main functions: “Inspection of the manner in which the tasks are accomplished by ANP; in a defined range of management functions in the context of appropriateness, effectiveness and application of the applicable laws, as well as to conduct review of all the complaints for misconduct of the ANP police officers regardless of their ranks.

Lack of Reform of Implementation Management Unit (RIMU): MoI’s non-participation in GIRoA’s/IARCSC civil service reforms, results in the ministry significantly lagging behind the non-security ministries. It has not adopted a RIMU program for reorganization of human capital development. It has not introduced HR systems that are now commonplace in ministries that have adopted more contemporary practices, such as, restructuring of the ministry, linking ministry’s priority with Tashkeel/structure/ training and capacity building strategy, providing technical support to line departments, implementation of new Pay and Grading Scheme for ministry and providing scholarship opportunities for employees as well as long-term and short-term trainings in and out side the country. These weaknesses stem from the ministry’s dependence upon NTM-A and CSTC-A, which have assumed significant responsibility for MoI’s AHR support and have been guided by a military set of protocols and not a civil service ethos that would be more appropriate to the police on a forward-looking basis.

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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

This year and the coming year are quite politically charged years for Afghanistan. The Afghan government, in this case MoI is under immense pressure to demonstrate some immediate achievements as expressed by the new Minister, however, he also encouraged that sight should not be lost of long term planning and implementation should not be lost. The team therefore is presenting the recommendations sequencing them in priority order. Along with this report a two years Implementation Plan will is also attached which not only provides detail on implementation of each of the recommendations but also costing them and linking them with budget of MoI.

Furthermore, while the assessment focused on three areas and tried to identify key issues in each of these areas separately, however, there are some issues, which are common in all these departments and have to be addressed across the ministry. These cross-ministry recommendations are divided in six categories. 1) Strengthening Coordination, 2) Strengthening Leadership, Governance and Oversight, 3) Strategic Planning and Reporting, 4) Budgeting and Financial Management, 5) Human Resource Management and 6) Transparency and Accountability and Disciplinary Measures.

A. STRENGTHING COORDINATION AND COOPERATION • Coordination and Cooperation within MoI (INTERNAL): Though the 10

Years Strategic Vision has clearly explained the division of roles and responsibilities between deputy ministries and general departments, still there seems to be absence of coordination and cooperation between the deputy ministries and general departments. They seem to be competing with each other rather than cooperating with each other, which is not helping the ministry at all. This gets worse at the departmental level, which hampers ministry’s overall performance. This could be addressed through clear instructions issued by the minister explaining importance of 10 Years Strategic Vision and Implementation Plans and articulating roles and responsibilities of all departments including planning, finance and HR for implementation of the plans and vision.

• Coordination Between MoI and Donors: This is a serious issue at the level of all departments. There is no coordination mechanism in place to ensure matching of priorities and strategies between MoI and donors which results in wastage of alot of resources, duplication of efforts and creation of many gaps and loose ends. In short, the interventions do not amount to the building of a coherent system. This once again can be addressed by inserting the leadership capacity at the ministry, mainly somewhere between Office of the Minister and DMS&P to begin coordinating MoI and donors efforts. The MoI once assured of existence of coordination capacity within MoI can send a letter to all donors and seek their commitments to align their support with MoI priorities based on 10 Years Vision and Activities of Implementation Plan.

• Coordination and Communication Between Centre and Provinces: Provinces seem lost when it comes to institutional reform of police and lack clear guidance from the centre. There are lots of issues that provinces are

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facing on daily basis and require guidance and supervision from the centre but on the other hand communicating with the relevant departments and getting timely responses seems really challenging. There is no one single unit/department responsible for communication and coordination with the 34 provinces or that feels itself responsible to follow up provincial issues with relevant departments in the centre and get back to provinces. This could be addressed by creation of a provincial coordination unit/department. Usually in ministries this function is seen quite as low level and not of any urgent priority to be addressed. In the view of the authors of this report this is one of the most important issues to be addressed.

• Communication Strategy: MoI’s internal and external stakeholders and many other people need to know MoI’s vision and priorities as well as MoI’s strategy for achieving them and the kind of support MoI needs from its staff, donors, other ministries and general public. It is therefore essential that MoI develop and implement a comprehensive Communication Strategy for communicating MOI/ANP of the vision, requirement for police professionalization, recruitment of women, gradual move from COIN to traditional community policing function of protecting and serving the Afghan people.

• Leadership for Reform and Implementation of Strategic Vision: While the ministry does have the Vision and has also begun development of Implementation Plans, so far the political will and commitment is missing to practically demonstrate practically to MoI staff at all levels that the leadership is serious about implementation of these plans, and requires all the staff to play their part. This leadership exercise is seriously needed to give the feeling of immediate action to all staff and motivate them to get into action. Past experiences have always shown that reforms and developments have been successful only when they are lead by leadership of institutions. Though the Minister has already assumed this role, in order to strengthen the process, it is also recommended that once the Two Years Implementation Plans are finalized, the Minister should consider presenting them and obtaining approval of the National Security Council for 10 Years Strategic Vision and the 2 Years Implementation Plan.

• Unity of Efforts: Right now all other DMs are thinking that not only development but also implementation of Strategic Vision and Implementation Plans is sole responsibility of DMP&S. In order to create unity of efforts not only for implementation of Implementations but also for other reform efforts, Minister should consider the establishment of a steering committee under his leadership comprised of all DMs and with the planning department as the secretariat to meet quarterly and review implementation of Implementation Plans discuss challenges and solutions. This will create unity of effort and make all DMs to take their piece of responsibilities for implementation of plans.

B. STRENGTHING LEADERSHIP, GOVERNENCE AND OVERSIGHT • Development of A Trust Fund in Coordination with Donors: As mentioned

above there are too many sources channeling funding to MoI through different mechanisms. MOI should have discussion with all donors with support of

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IPCB to develop a Trust Fund with the oversight and governance acceptable to all and encourage all donors to channel their funding to MoI through that Trust Fund. UNDP is already considering one but MoI needs to get involved and make sure that the proposed Trust Fund would serve the purpose and needs of MoI. This is particularly the case if Rule of Law Trust Fund that is proposed as a replacement for LOTFA would have a focus beyond MoI that could detract quality of service possibly divert resources. UNDP would in any case be unable to channel funds for non-ODA eligible activity and equipment, and there are already observations on LOTFA with regards to performance and accountability. MoI might therefore eventually develop a mechanism itself with strong governance and oversight in consultation with donors and support of MoF to Afghanize the whole process but it should be done strategically and carefully so that donors have confidence in the mechanism and channel their funding through that.

• Grants Management and Implementation Unit (GMIU): Right now except the minister’s office, donors do not know where to go to in MoI and who to visit if they have a new project, if they face any problem with any of their ongoing projects or if they need guidance from MoI for allocation of their funding based on MoI priorities. This itself has given donors too much freedom to choose which departments to work with and what kind of support to provide for them. Sometimes they even quickly cut off the support if they are not satisfied or happy with the performance of the department. At the same time if you ask any department to provide you with full updated picture of donors support to MoI, no department will be able to provide the information. The MoI needs to establish Grants and Implementation Management Unit (GMIU) as a one-stop shop for donors supporting MoI. This unit should act as a bridge between all departments of the MoI and donors. The primary job of this unit is resource mobilization, coordination and provision of technical support to planning, finance and procurement departments. This unit will work under direct leadership of the Minister, however, will be responsible to work parallel with Policy and Strategy and Support Deputy Ministries to provide them with technical support to assume their responsibilities in leading the Strategic Vision and further planning and implementation and coordinating all donors support to MoI. It is also important that all donors recognize GMIU and coordinate all their support to MoI through this unit by providing information, involving GMIU in project discussions and share concerns with GMIU whenever they face problems with implementation of their projects. It is worth mentioning that all ministries who have gone through reform process have established such units for addressing immediately their capacity gap. IPCB might be asked to work in partnership with the unit as set out in its mandate.

• Capacity Gap: All the targeted departments lack technical capacity to assume the lead role in their areas for development and execution of Implementation Plans, not only for their own departments but also to provide assistance to other departments and to use them as the main tool for not only coordinating the budget support but also off budget support to MoI. These departments definitely need experience and expertise, which does not exist presently in MoI. In order to immediately move ahead with finalization of 2 Years

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Implementation Plan linking it with MoI budget and using it as a tool for coordinating efforts within and outside the ministry. The MoI has to immediately insert that capacity in these departments through national and international advisors, with specific and identified skill sets appropriate to the roles they are advising or mentoring.

• Appointment of Professionals with Relevant Expertise Based on Merit: The three departments, which are extremely key in providing efficient support to line departments for implementation of the Strategic Vision have two main challenges:

i. They all lack the leadership capacity to exercise their leadership roles and responsibilities and guide the line departments in proper planning, budgeting and execution and human resource management.

ii. They are also not provided with enough authority and support by the minister to exercise these roles and be taken seriously by other departments. It is recommended that HE Minister appoints the right individuals with right experience and expertise for these deputy ministries and departments and sign an instructive letter delegating some level of authority to them for assuming their roles effectively and which should be announced to all staff of MoI in the center and provinces. Furthermore, for reform and development of MoI, Minister himself should lead the process which in itself will bring unity of efforts and actions.

• Guidance and Supervision to Provinces: All three departments have a key role in providing guidance and supervision not only to line departments in the center but also to all 34 provinces. The assessment team found out that none of these departments are working with provinces on regular basis to bring them in Kabul regularly for briefings and sharing information, as well as training and also visit provinces themselves, monitor performance of provinces and provide them with feedback for improvement. It is therefore recommended that MoI establishes a Provincial Relation Unit/Department with specific ToR to play the bridging role between all departments in the center and provinces and ensure follow up of all provincial issues in the center and immediate response to provinces.

• IC Advisory and Mentors: There are too many advisors provided to deputy ministries and departments of MoI whose experience and expertise are not matching needs of the departments. It is therefore recommended that MoI quickly map all technical advisors provided by different donors, review their ToRs in comparison with requirements of the departments and also their experience and expertise. The MoI also needs to hold consultations with all departments to find out about their actual needs for technical support and ask all donors to align their technical support according to the requirements of the ministry.

• Strategic Long Term Staged Technical Support: There is no doubt that these departments need technical support, however, so far they are not provided with right kind of support to understand the process and procedures

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themselves and be able to not only guide other line departments to implement them but also ensure their proper implementation. This is mainly because of two reasons:

o Too many different short term trainings and capacity building opportunities are provided for these departments by different consultants. It is not reasonable to expect them to understand and implement them all – especially given that there is no coherence between all the approaches, and

o They are provided with advisors who do not have the right and relevant experience and expertise themselves, mostly with police or military background.

These departments need long term advisors with proper and relevant expertise and experience to not only train them but also coach and mentor them to implement proper process and procedures themselves and help other departments as well. The concept of phasing and sequencing – and the need for this – applies not only to a high level ‘Roadmap’ to a longer term vision. It should also inform the process of capacity building so that capacity is not simply ‘injected’ or substituted by international advisors. Skills must be transferred over time to increase levels of ownership and internal accountability and reduce dependency on external advisers, and the extent and effectiveness of the strategy for doing this must be measurable and subject to evaluation.

• Increasing Policewomen: Presently numbers of policewomen are quite few which is a big concern but that seems to be mainly because women do not see career for themselves in MoI and also think MoI has no protection for women. In order to demonstrate MoI’s commitment for increasing policewomen, it is highly recommended that MoI has at least one or two very competent and professional women in leadership roles of MoI who can become a role model for female staff of MoI and motivate women to join MoI. The MoI should develop a comprehensive Gender Strategy, that will assist the MoI realize the Minister’s requirement to increase the number of female police officers. This must include protection for women and effective remedies when problems occur. Education for male officers in how to work alongside women should be an elemen of the Gender Strategy.

• Civilianization: In all the targeted departments most of the positions especially the leadership and middle management are filled by staff with police background rather than strategic planning, finance and HR. Reform and development of these departments is going to be very challenging if these positions are not filled with right staff with relevant experience and expertise. It is therefore highly recommended that MoI make a policy decision that all positions in these departments should be filled by civilians with the right experience and expertise recruited through an open merit process.

• New Pay and Grading Scheme for Civilian Position: Right now most of the important civilian positions of MoI are filled by Policemen since salary scale for police is higher than civil service. In order to move ahead with successful

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civilianization, MoI needs to come up with a policy to pay better salary to its civilian staff in order to recruit and retain good and qualified personnel in technical areas. Perhaps MoI can come up with a policy to pay them some extra allowance since they are working in MoI, which has high security threats or use NTA or develop its own model as done by the other Ministries.

C. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND REPORTING • Implementation of the 10 Years Strategic Vision: While the MoI has

developed the 10 Years Strategic Vision, still there seems to be a lack of ownership feeling since all other departments and deputy ministries think that its implementation is the primary job of deputy ministry for planning. If this process and feeling continues as it is, then the Strategic Vision will become another nice paper/document for the shelf with no implementation follow up. The Minister needs to send clear instructions to deputy ministries of plan and finance to immediately begin finalization of Two Years Implementation Plans for all departments and budgeting them; and instruct all other departments to support them in these processes by following the lead of DMS&P. Furthermore. the DMS&P needs to take immediate action for implementation of the vision by:

• Empowering and Building capacity of DMS&P and Planning Department to lead and coordinate the whole process

• Building capacity of DMS&P with IC or National subject matter experts (SMEs) specific to Strategic Planning, Review, Monitoring, Policy Development, Implementation planning, Reporting, Coordination, Risk Management, Action Plan development, review and reporting of strategic performance

• Align MoI’s planning and reporting timing with National Budget submission and reporting timeline

• Assisting and guiding all line departments in development of Implementation Plans for their part of the Strategic Vision.

• Issuing clear and comprehensive guidance on: planning, policy making, procedure making (explanations, roles within the MoI, authority to approve, standard templates which have practical use).

• Creating an effective and workable mechanism for monitoring and reporting of at least quarterly performance of all deputy ministries and departments.

• Conducting Quarterly Strategic Vision Implementation Review Conference. This may seem symbolic, however, by bringing leadership of MoI together from center and provinces to review and report on implementation of the plan, will give quite strong aspiration to all the staff of MoI and will motivate them to align their activities with priorities of the plan. Moreover, stakeholders such as Ministry of Finance and donors will begin to take the Strategic Vision and Implementation Plans seriously and align their resources in accordance with priorities of the MoI.

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Provincial and District Needs Assessment – While the 10 Years Vision is developed and approved and two years implementation plans are under development, only 12 months is left for completion of transition process and MoI still doesn’t know its basic needs in the center and mainly in provinces. It is therefore highly recommended that MoI immediately conduct an assessment of all 34 provinces to find their urgent basic needs for transition, which should be costed as per part of the review of the 2015 requirements document currently under discussion.

D. BUDGETING AND FINANCE MANAGEMENT As mentioned above, currently there is no linkage between MoI’s policies, plans and budgets. All are developed and implemented in isolation from one another. The budget department needs to take the following steps:

• First of all the DM for admin and finance department should be empowered by Minister to lead and coordinate united budgeting and financial management process in MoI

• Capacity of DM for admin and finance department should built to understand results based budgeting and execution themselves and then assist others

• Lead, guide and coordinate all departments in costing their Two Years Implementation Plans and coming up with a clear financial requirement for implementation of their plans for both ordinary and development budgets.

• Begin linking the Implementation Plans not only with development budget but also with ordinary budget. This process will help the Ministry understand human, infrastructure, equipment and all other related costs of Implementation Plans and Strategic Vision.

• Submitting next year’s budget to Ministry of Finance based on Implementation Plans in the form of Program Budgeting.

• Adopt a Budget Tracking and Expenditure Reporting System which should enable MoI to distribute its budget to central departments and provinces and track its expenditures

• Improving budget execution by improving the timeliness and accuracy of budget allotment and payment requests, and improving the procurement process.

• Regular Budget Execution Report to MoI leadership by departments and provinces

Approval for Procurements from Procurement Policy Unit: MoI does not currently have the capacity to process its procurements according to the procurement laws, however, MoI needs to develop this capacity and get approval of PPU to process its own procurement so that rather than avoiding the law, MoI has the capacity to implement the law.

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E. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT • Empowering DM for Personnel and HR Department: As mentioned above

there are two HR departments in MoI. Beside wastage of resources, this also has weakened the HR management activities within MoI. It is therefore recommended that first immediately both departments should be merged into one and second this department should be provided with right authority to lead HR reform process inline with priorities of Strategic Vision

• Establishing Reform Implementation Management Unit (RMIU): The current structure of the ANP has evolved over a period of 12 years under successive MoI Ministers. Some of them during their tenure created an organizational structure chart. A number of different structures were created in 2008-09. Consultants have been shown numerous charts – some have been signed, some remain as drafts. Current Tashkeel draft structures are a basic restatement of existing structure with the addition of additional recently created departments such as the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). There needs to be greater justification for this – in some respects there is simply a growth from Directorates to Departments. It is proposed that a RIMU be formed under the DM for Personnel to lead a reorganization and restructuring process in MoI. This would address the need to rationalize these developments with the aim of reducing the number of separate units and facilitating inter-departmental communication and co-ordination. The RIMU would need to work to clearly set targets such as a reduction in the overall size and staffing of HQ and senior ranks, removal of duplications of functionality, increased civilianization etc. Whilst consultants are supportive of consultation (not least to render processes transparent), change cannot be achieved only through consensus. Above all it requires good leadership and direction. Besides focusing on organizational review, reorganization and structuring of MoI based on its needs, MoI also needs to develop a HR strategy as a best practice vehicle to communicate and explain MoI’s policy in the following areas:

i. Women in the MoI and ANP ii. Health & Welfare for Police and their Families

iii. Recruitment iv. Professional Development and Training based on Needs v. Career Path, Appointment and Promotion

vi. Retirement Policy vii. Development of Strengthening of Information System for both Police and

Civilian employees of MoI viii. Good Governance ix. Performance Management x. Define ratio between centralization and decentralization, follow a clear

client-orientation, and an efficiency and cost logic; xi. Establish the most effective ratio of police officers to administrative

personnel.

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F. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCIPLINARY MEASURES

Police Independent Complaints Board (PICB) Right now people have no place to go if their complaints about police are not well received and responded by MoI. It is very difficult for them to bring their complaints to MoI’s relevant departments. It is thus recommended that consideration should be given to establishing a PICB detached from MoI, and possibly responsible to the President.

i. The PICB would have a supervision or oversight role of ALL serious and criminal complaints against the police;

ii. The PICB should have a target of recruiting qualified, vetted and (possibly ex-police) investigators to carry out the most serious allegations against police officers, and be independent of the MOI.

Combating Corruption, as part of the Inspectorate is responsible to MoI. Public confidence in the police is low but is steered by perception as much as reality. Consultants do not believe that current arrangements overcome a possible perception that complaints against police are effectively investigated by police force working at the Ministry that sets its policies and supervises it. The perception is that this process lacks clear independence, and thus probity for any citizen complaining against the police and is therefore not a good practice. The current unit is the central point for referral of all discipline reports. This is overloading the unit and Professional Standards Department (PSD) in the ANP. Some officers interviewed complained that it had become simply a bureaucratic complaints recording system. It was indicated that there is limited oversight by PGI and limited capacity to investigate serious criminal offences. The Inspectorate has a number of keen staff but limited police investigative capacity and limited professionally trained staff with legal qualifications. Criminal offences committed by police officers are the most serious discipline breaches and are thus likely to bring the police into disrepute. In order to seriously fight corruption and also give the same impression to all staff of MoI:

i. Reinvigorate the PGI as per the 10 Vision by providing all support it needs to begin combating corruption,

ii. Linking PGI with governmental anti-corruption agencies to coordinate its activities with them,

iii. Review the IT system of MoI and ensure it is providing the information needed for fighting corruption.

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CONCLUSION

MoI faces one unique challenge: while ANA and NDS have been carrying out tasks and increasing their ability within their traditional roles and responsibilities, ANP has functioned as a security force rather than a traditional police service. The focus on security will likely be necessary for some time. Even so ANP must start to lay the foundations of return to a rule of law based role. Effective crime fighting and civilian policing will enhance the legitimacy of the Afghan government, and remove one of the Taliban’s arguments against democratic rule. An emphasis on the rule of law will thereby enhance security and help counter insurgency.

Consistency of government policy is vital if ANP/MoI is to achieve the goals set out in the Ten Year Vision. The consultants recommend that Cabinet and/or the NSC endorse the Vision as a national policy before the Presidential election is held in 2014. MoI should also seek to build public support for the Vision.

Finally it is worth mentioning that the time is very short as the coalition draw down is gathering pace. Immediate action is required.