INSTITUTE NEWS INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS: AMPHIBIOUS ... · Roslyn BASHIR AC CVO– Dame Marie has been...

United ServiceJournal of the Royal United Services Institute of New South Wales, Incorporated

Informing the defence and security debate since 1947

Volume 65, Number 3, September 2014 – ISSN 1038-1554

CONTENTS

INSTITUTE NEWSPresident’s Column................................................................3

Notices...................................................................................5

OPINIONEditorial: Amphibious Operations – David Leece ..................7

Letters....................................................................................5

INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS:AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS SEMINAR

Amphibious operations: an introduction– David Leece........................................................................9

Its geo-strategic circumstances dictate that Australia adopts amaritime strategy, integral to which are amphibious operations.These involve the projection of a military force from the sea ontoa hostile, or potentially hostile, shore and include assaults,withdrawals, raids and demonstrations. These operations andcontemporary amphibious tactics are described. Australia isbuilding a modern amphibious force modelled on United Statesand British amphibious forces.

Landing ship, landing craft and landing vehiclenomenclature – David Leece.............................................14

The editor clarifies some common amphibious shippingnomenclature and acronyms, briefly describing the vessels andvehicles involved.

Case Study: The utility of amphibious forcesin the 21st century – John Collins .....................................15

This 2011 case-study demonstrates the utility of an integrated21st century amphibious force. The critical enabler was the landingplatform helicopter, HMS Ocean. An intended 7-week exerciseevolved into a 7-month operation first in Libya and then Somaliaspanning all amphibious roles.

Keynote Address: Australiaʼs developing amphibiouscapability – Mark Campbell ..............................................21

The Australian Defence Force is on track to deliver a new jointamphibious capability based on two new Canberra-class landinghelicopter dock (LHD) ships and focused initially on security,stabilisation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief tasks.The first milestone is due towards the end of 2015. The fullcapability is due for delivery in 2017.

Amphibious logistics operations – Jay Bannister ..........25Australia’s amphibious task group will have significant logistic

capacity. Logistics, however, can be an enormous challenge foran amphibious force and the logistics plan must be flexible andresponsive to the landing force scheme of manoeuvre. Sea-basing, embarkation, disembarkation, sustainment at sea,biosecurity, health and other logistic challenges are discussed.

CONTRIBUTED HISTORY NOTE

Seventy years ago: the Desert Air Force in Italy, 1944 –Bryn Evans ..........................................................................29

In May-June 1944, during the Italian campaign of World WarII, the Luftwaffe mounted a desperate effort to counter Allied airsuperiority, but it would prove to be in vain.

BOOK REVIEWS

The backroom boys: Alfred Conlon and ArmyʼsDirectorate of Research and Civil Affairs, 1942-46by Graeme Sligo – reviewed by Marcus Fielding................31

The Backroom Boys is the remarkable story of how a variedgroup of talented intellectuals were drafted into the AustralianArmy in the dark days of 1942 and provided high-level policyadvice to General Blamey and through him to the Government.

Climax at Gallipoli: the failure of the August offensiveby Dr Rhys Crawley – reviewed by Marcus Fielding ...........33

Climax at Gallipoli examines the performance of the Allies’Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in the August Offensive of theGallipoli Campaign rigorously and dispassionately. His messagemay put some objective balance back into the Anzac Centenaryproceedings.

Australia and the Vietnam War by Peter Edwards – reviewedby Marcus Fielding ..............................................................33

This is a one-volume version of the nine-volume OfficialHistory of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts1948–1975 – the equivalent of C. E. W. Bean’s Anzac to Amiens(WWI) and Gavin Long’s The Six Years War (WWII).

The diggerʼs view: WWI in colour by Juan Mahony –reviewed by Marcus Fielding ...............................................35

The Digger's View is a magnificently produced high qualitybook that is crammed with rare colourised photos and diaryentries that provide a very personal perspective of some of theAustralian soldiers who served during World War I

FRONT COVERAn artist’s impression of Australia’s two multi-purpose amphibious assault ships (LHD), HMA Ships Canberraand Adelaide, with their embarked helicopters and landing craft, mechanised (LCM-1E). The proceedings ofthe Institute’s Amphibious Operations Seminar held on 27 May 2014 commence on p. 7. [Photo: Department ofDefence]

United Service 65 (3) September 2014


United ServiceJournal of the Royal United Services Institute

of New South Wales, IncorporatedInforming the defence and security debate since 1947

Editor: Brigadier David Leece, PSM, RFD, ED (Ret’d)Business Manager: Mrs Theodora Fox, BA LibSciEditorial Advisory Committee: Brigadier David Leece, PSM, RFD, ED (Ret’d) – chair Air Vice-Marshal Bob Treloar, AO, RAAFAR Colonel Marcus Fielding Captain Ian Pfennigwerth, RAN (Ret’d)

United Service is published quarterly. It seeks to inform thedefence and security debate in Australia and to bring an Australianperspective to that debate internationally. To this end, the journalpublishes papers presented at meetings and seminars organised bythe Institute. Contributed papers dealing with defence and securityissues or military history also will be published, together withrelevant opinion pieces, letters to the editor, biographies, obituariesand book reviews. Before acceptance, contributions are refereedand edited.

Contributions, which conform to the journal’s style, should beaddressed to the Editor either at [email protected] (preferred)or by post to the Institute’s offices. Papers normally should notexceed 3500 words and may be accompanied by one or two photos,a brief biography and a photo of the author. Opinion pieces,biographies, obituaries and book reviews should not exceed 850words, guest editorials 400 words and letters 200 words.Submission of an article implies that the article has not beenpublished elsewhere and also implies transfer of the copyright fromthe author to the publisher. Notes for contributors are atwww.rusinsw.org.au/journal.

Copyright: This work is copyright. The Copyright Act 1968 permitsfair dealing for study, research, news, reporting, criticism andreview. Selected passages may be reproduced for such purposes,provided acknowledgement of the source is included. Otherwise,articles published in this journal may not be reproduced, stored in aretrieval system, or transmitted in any form by electronic ormechanical means, photocopying or recording, either in whole or inpart, without the written permission of the Editor.

Publishers: United Service is jointly published by the Royal UnitedServices Institute of New South Wales, Incorporated, ABN 80 724654 162, Locked Bag 18, Darlinghurst NSW 2010; and PinnaclePublishing Pty. Ltd., ABN 90 153 935 874, P.O. Box 4192, BayVillage NSW 2261; T: (02) 4334 4711; F: (02) 4334 4433.

Printer: Galloping Press, Unit 29, 398 The Boulevarde, KirraweeNSW 2232, Phone: (02) 9521 3371.

Subscriptions: Members receive the journal at no additionalcharge. The subscription for non-members is: in Australia $50 peryear (post paid); outside Australia AUD$60 (Asia-Pacific) orAUD$70 (elsewhere) per year (air mail); and can be arrangedthrough the Editor at the Institute’s offices. E-copies of articles ande-subscriptions may be obtained through RMIT Informit Collectionsat www.informit.com.au.

Advertising should be arranged through Pinnacle Publishing Pty.Ltd. (see “Publishers” above).

Opinions expressed in United Service are those of the authors andare not necessarily those of the Institute.

Publication of an advertisement does not imply endorsement ofthe products or services by the Institute.

Royal United Services Institute of New South Wales, IncorporatedLevel 20, Defence Plaza, 270 Pitt Street, Sydney NSW 2000

Postal Address: Locked Bag 18, Darlinghurst NSW 2010, AustraliaTelephone: (02) 9393 2325; Facsimile: (02) 9393 3543

Email: [email protected]; Website: http://www.rusinsw.org.auABN: 80 724 654 162

Royal United Services Institute of New South Wales

Promoting defence and national security since 1888

Patron: Her Excellency, Professor The Hon. Dame MarieBashir, AD, CVO, Governor of New South Wales

President: Brigadier David Leece, PSM, RFD, ED (Ret’d)Secretary: Mr Bryn Evans, FCPATreasurer: Mr John Rudd, FCPA, FCSA, FAICD

President’s ColumnOn 27 May, the Institute staged a most successful seminar

on amphibious operations. With Australiaabout to commission two multi-purposeamphibious assault ships, the 100 or soattendees, a third of whom were non-members, were keen to learn whatamphi bious operations involved in the 21st

century and what new options theenhanced capability would offer theGovern ment. An international panel,including British and United States marine officers, explainedthe modern amphibious paradigm and the latest tacticsillustrating them with vivid case studies. Several lessons forthe ADF and the Government emerged during discussion. Aselection of the papers presented is published in this issueand the full proceedings will be published separately as anInstitute monograph.

On 24 June, Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, Com -mander Operation Sovereign Borders, addressed us. Theaddress proved to be very popular, including with the newsmedia, and was reported widely. We are unable to bring youhis paper in this issue, but a paper on which it was based maybe accessed at www.aspi.org.au. In short, he stated thatOperation Sovereign Borders had greatly disrupted maritimepeople smuggling to Australia, but smugglers will keep tryingand long-term perseverance will be essential to stop them.

The Institute was also invited to host a public consultationsession on the 2015 Defence White Paper. It was heldfollowing our regular lunchtime-lecture on 29 July and was ledby Rear Admiral James Goldick, a former National Vice-President of the Institute, supported by two other members ofthe White Paper Expert Panel. Written submissions are nowinvited and the key issues being considered and submissiondetails are listed in Defence News (see p.5 below). TheInstitute will be making a written submission and if you wouldlike to contribute to it, please contact me.

0n 30 September, we will be holding our Australian Naval& Military Expeditionary Force Centenary Seminar com me -mo rating the ANMEF’s seizure and occupation of Germanpossessions in New Guinea, the Solomons and Nauru inSeptember – December 1914. It was an amphibious cam -paign generating lessons that remain relevant to the ADF’snew amphibious force and to the 2015 Defence White Paper.The seminar is not to be missed.

Our 2014 AGM will follow the seminar at 5.00 pm on 30September. If you would like to stand for the Institute’s CouncilI would be pleased to hear from you. We are particularlyseeking a new treasurer.

Finally, in July, we introduced a monthly electronicnewsletter which we will send to members by email andpublish on our website. I thank Doug Roser and Theodora Foxfor this great initiative.

David Leece


INSTITUTE NEWS

Queenʼs Birthday Day Honours 2014The Institute congratulates the following members who were

recognised in the 2014 Queen’s Birthday Day Honours:

Appointed a Dame in the General Division of the Order ofAustralia ~ Her Excellency Professor The Honourable MarieRoslyn BASHIR AC CVO – Dame Marie has been Patron of theInstitute for the past 13 years.

Appointed an Officer in the General Division of the Order ofAustralia ~ Robert Burgess LEECE AM RFD Mosman NSW –for distinguished service to the community of NSW through thedevelopment and guidance of major infrastructure projects.

Appointed an Officer in the Military Division of the Order ofAustralia ~ Rear Admiral Timothy William BARRETT AM CSCRAN NSW – for distinguished service as Commander BorderProtection Command and Commander Australian FleetCommand. Admiral Barrett has been a Vice-Patron of the Institutefor the last two years.

Appointed a Member in the Military Division of the Order ofAustralia ~ Captain Raymond John LEGGATT CSC RAN NSW– for exceptional service to the Royal Australian Navy across thefields of capability management, training, command andoperations.

Awarded a Commendation for Distinguished Service ~ CaptainJay Barton BANNISTER RAN ACT – for distinguished per form -ance of duty in warlike operations as the Chief of Staff, Head -quarters Joint Task Force 633, on Operation Slipper.

Upcoming EventsAustralian Naval and Military Expeditionary ForceCentenary Battlefield Tour9 – 14 September 2014, New Guinea

This tour is being offered by Military History Tours Australia PtyLtd and is tailored to the needs of those wishing to visit the Rabaulbattlefields prior to the Institute’s Centenary Seminar. For furtherdetails, visit www.militaryhistorytours.com.au.

Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary ForceCentenary SeminarTuesday 30 September 2014, 1.00 pm – 5.00 pmSydney Mechanics School of Arts, 280 Pitt Street, Sydney

At the outbreak of World War I, the Australian Naval and MilitaryExpeditionary Force (ANMEF) was raised to seize and occupyGerman colonial possessions in the Pacific. It was formed in August1914 and, supported by the Australian Fleet, it captured Rabaul andbegan occupying German possessions, especially wireless stations,in New Guinea, Nauru, the Solomon Islands and nearby islands inSeptember 1914.

The Institute is holding this seminar to enhance public awarenessand understanding of this important event in Australia’s militaryhistory and the circumstances surrounding it. A panel of five navaland military historians will outline the background to war in 1914,naval operations in the Pacific in 1914, the raising and training of theANMEF and its subsequent operations in New Guinea, and theaftermath.

Attendance fees are: members $30.00; non-members $45.00.Pre-event registration is essential either though the Institute website(www.rusinsw.org.au) or through the office (T: (02) 9393 2325; or E:[email protected]).

Annual General MeetingTuesday 30 September 2014, 5.00 pm – 5.30 pmSydney Mechanics School of Arts, 280 Pitt Street, Sydney

October Lunchtime-LectureTuesday, 28 October 2014, at 1.00 pmWesley Conference Centre, 220 Pitt Street, SydneySpeaker: Major James Nol, Royal Australian Army Medical CorpsSubject: “Understanding Islam and conflict in the Middle East”

November Lunchtime-LectureTuesday, 18 November 2014, at 1.00 pmSydney Mechanics’ School of Arts, 280 Pitt Street, SydneySpeaker: Mr Peter Hartcher

Political and International Editor, The Sydney Morning Herald

Subject: The 2014 Sir Herman Black Lecture: “2014 – The Year in Review”

DEFENCE NEWS

Changes in Senior AppointmentsThe following senior Australian Defence Force appointments

were made recently:• Chief of the Defence Force: Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin, AC• Vice-Chief of the Defence Force: Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, AO,

CSC, RAN• Chief of Navy: Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AM, CSC, RAN• Chief of Joint Operations: Vice Admiral David Johnston, AM, RAN• Commander Australian Fleet: Rear Admiral Stuart Mayer, CSC &

Bar, RAN

Defence White Paper 2015The Defence White Paper 2015 will allow the Government to take

stock of the long-term opportunities and challenges for Australia’sdefence and security. It will align Defence policy with a clear militarystrategy and deliver a costed, affordable plan to achieve Australia’sdefence and national security objectives.

The 2015 Defence White Paper is being informed by a publicconsultation process. The Government is seeking the Australiancommunity’s views on the following key questions:

• What are the main threats to, and opportunities for, Australia’ssecurity?

• Are Defence’s policy settings current and accurate?• What defence capabilities do we need now, and in the future?• How can we enhance international engagement on defence

and security issues?• What should the relationship be between Defence and defence

industry to support Defence’s mission?• How should Defence invest in its people, and how should it

continue to enhance its culture?Detailed submissions can be provided in writing. Submissions

can address any relevant topic and the Defence Issues Paper [atwww.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/] provides guidance on suggestedbroad themes. Written submissions will be accepted until 29 October2014 and can be lodged at the 2015 Defence White Paper internetsite, or by sending your submission in hardcopy to the Department ofDefence.

Department of Defence

LETTER

The Changing Character of WarI enjoyed reading Dr Al Palazzo’s paper on the military revolution

of limits and the changing character of war (United Service 65 (1,March), 9 – 13, 2014). I am pleased that he has identified thecompetition for resources to be a driving factor of future conflict.Indeed, David Kilcullen’s omission of competition for resources as adriver was one of my criticisms of his latest book on the coming ageof the urban guerrilla (United Service 65 (2, June), 35, 2014).

Palazzo’s argument that the natural limit on some resources willplace a limit on the growth and development of some sections ofhumanity is valid – however, I suspect the role of nation-states in theprocess will take second place to private interests. A stratification ofpeople into wealthy and not-so-wealthy categories is a more likelyoutcome – not dissimilar to that depicted recently in the movieElysium.

Australia is relatively rich in resources and has a relatively smallpopulation. If force were to become a factor in the competition forresources, I wonder whether Australia would be able to protect itsresources, interests and sovereignty.

Colonel Marcus FieldingCouncillor, Royal United Services Institute, Victoria

13 May 2014


OPINION

United ServiceInforming the defence and security debate since 1947

Amphibious OperationsGeo-strategic circumstances dictate that Australia

adopts a maritime strategy, integral to which areamphibious operations – the projection of a military forcefrom the sea onto a hostile, or potentially hostile, shorevia assaults, withdrawals, raids or demonstrations.Australia is enhancing its capacity to deploy militarypower amphibiously across a range of contingencies,but is focused initially on security, stabilisation, humani -tarian assistance and disaster relief,1 i.e. para militaryand military assistance operations rather than con ven -tional amphibious operations.

Our Amphibious Operations Seminar on 27 May2014 examined the development of amphibious opera -tions over the last century and Australia’s develop ingcapability. Several lessons emerged relating to landingforce size; amphibious tactics; fighter aircraft support;and amphibious vehicles.

Landing Force Size: The case studies showed thata typical contemporary amphibious task group with abattalion-sized landing force embarked can react quicklyto contingencies, particularly when confronting non-state actors, terrorists, organised criminals or the like. Itis suitable for raiding, non-combatant evacuations, anddelivery of military assistance, but not for amphibiousassaults. The only amphibious assault conducted thiscentury, the 2003 British invasion of Iraq’s Al FawPeninsula, required a reinforced infantry brigade group –3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, reinforced by 15th

Marine Expeditionary Unit, United States Marine Corps.A battalion-sized amphibious ready group lacks the landcombat power needed for amphibious assaults againstthe forces of a nation-state.

Amphibious Tactics: Like its British and Americancounterparts, Australia is training its amphibious forcesto avoid establishing a conventional beachheadwherever practicable and instead to employ direct ship-to-objective manoeuvre and sea-basing i.e. holdingcom mand and control, fire support and logistics facilitiesafloat. This is sensible for many amphibious demonstra -tions, raids, and withdrawals; and for many paramilitaryand military support tasks. In some situations, it alsomay be suitable for seizing points of entry in the initialstages of an amphibious assault. But if the purpose ofthe assault is to establish a firm base for further combatoperations inland or as a site for an advanced naval orair base, frequent reasons for such a mission, then atsome stage, a firm base will need to be establishedashore which can be defended against enemy counter-attack and within which the combat power and logistic

support needed for the subsequent operations can bebuilt up – i.e. a conventional beachhead will need to beestablished. Australia should not neglect to train for thiscontingency.

Fighter Aircraft: During amphibious operations, it isvital that air superiority be maintained both duringpassage to the battle zone and over the amphibiousoperations area. The landing force also needs close airsupport during the assault and once ashore. Both tasksrequire fighter aircraft which can be either land-based orship-based. In the former case, to ensure coverage ofthe amphibious task force, air-to-air refuelling may beneeded – air-to-air re-arming is not possible. The UnitedStates Wasp-class 40,000-tonne amphibious assaultships (LHDs) can serve as ‘lily pads’ for fixed-wingfighter aircraft, enabling them to land, refuel, rearm andtake off. Australia’s two 27,500-tonne Canberra-classLHDs, two-thirds their size, will have correspondinglyless capacity. While short take-off and vertical landing(STOVL) fighter aircraft (e.g. F35 Lightning II B) will beable to land and take off from them, they will have little ifany capacity to refuel and rearm the aircraft; and thedeck will be unable to sustain frequent STOVL landings.

Amphibious Vehicles: Australia’s LHDs will beequipped with a very capable landing craft, the 100-tonne LCM-1E). Where a beach is not protected by coralreefs, it will be suitable for landing main battle tanks andother heavy equipment and for logistic movements toand from ship and shore, although equipment andsupplies will need to be discharged at the waterline, noton the beach or beyond. The LCM-1E, however, is not anamphibious assault vehicle. It provides only limited per -son nel protection; cannot transport assaulting infantryacross the beach; and cannot undertake ship-to-objective manoeuvre. For this, the US Marines use theAAV-7A1, an amphibious, tracked, armoured personnelcarrier that can carry a platoon from shipping over-the-horizon to its objective inland.

White Paper Implications: Australia’s new amphi -bious force as currently configured is eminently suitablefor paramilitary and military support operations, but lessso for warfighting. Should Australia’s 2015 Defencewhite paper conclude that Australia could becomeinvolved in warfighting between nation-states over thenext 30 years, then it should provide for: an amphibiouslanding force of at least brigade size, backed up by atleast one similar-sized reserve force; the conversion ofat least one of the two LHDs to support the frequentlanding, refuelling and rearming of STOVL fighters, andthe equipping of this LHD with amphibious assaultvehicles; the conversion of at least one of the F35Lightning II squadrons on order from the A model to theB (STOVL) model; and the taking up of suitable shipsfrom trade to transport the expanded landing force.

David Leece2

1Department of Defence (2013). Defence White Paper 2013 (Com mon -wealth of Australia: Canberra) paragraphs 8.13 - 8.14, page 77.

2David Leece, Editor of United Service, is President of the Institute. Theseare his personal views.

Before dawn on 12 August 1914, eight days after thedeclaration of war, two Australian destroyers enteredSimpson Harbour at Rabaul, then the capital of GermanNew Guinea. A landing party was put ashore and it raidedthe Rabaul post and telegraph office, destroying thetelegraphic equipment before withdrawing (Meade 2005:1-2). This, Australia’s first military action of World War I,was a successful amphibious raid.

A month later, the Australian Naval and Military Expe -ditionary Force (ANMEF) comprising some 1000 infantryand 500 naval infantry, returned to Rabaul. It wasembarked in the auxiliary cruiser, HMAS Berrima, and wasescorted by a light cruiser, three destroyers, twosubmarines, and a supply ship. Rear Admiral Sir GeorgePatey, commander of the Australian Fleet, was the overallcommander; and Colonel William Holmes commanded thelanding force, the ANMEF.

On 11 September 1914, the ANMEF undertookamphibious landings on the south shore of Blanche Bay atHerbertshohe and Kabakaul before advancing inland andcapturing the German wireless station at Bita Paka after aday of fierce fighting. On 12 September, the Australiansoccupied Rabaul against light resistance (Mead 2005: 37-74). This action was a successful amphibious assault.

On 22 September, Holmes sailed from Rabaul toMadang on mainland New Guinea with a combined forceof army and navy troops in the Berrima, accompanied bythe heavy cruiser, HMAS Australia, the light cruiser, HMASEncounter, and the French armoured cruiser, Montcalm.On arrival, the warships trained their guns on the town.Holmes sent an envoy ashore under a flag of truce anddemanded the unconditional surrender of Madang whichwas imme diate ly forthcoming (Meade 2005: 79-82). Thisaction was a successful employment of the amphibiousdemonstration.

Seven months later, on 25 April 1915, Australian troopsagain took part in an amphibious assault, this time as

participants in an Allied seaborne invasion of the GallipoliPeninsula, Turkey. Led by the 3rd Infantry Brigade, the 1st

Australian Division began landing from rowing boatsbefore first light on the beaches at Ari Burnu on thePeninsula’s west coast with a view to advancing east tosecure the high ground in the centre of the Peninsula andto isolating the main Turkish forces to the south. By dusk,despite determined Turkish opposition and heavy casual -ties, the Division had secured a beachhead and the firsttwo lines of hills which dominated it, but the third ridge,their prime objective, remained beyond their grasp, as itwould for the remainder of the campaign (Firkins 1971: 45-51). For this operation, the Australians were transported byships of the Royal Navy, which also provided them withnaval gunfire and logistic support.

After eight months of futile effort to secure the Gallipolipeninsula, Britain decided to withdraw. The Australian andNew Zealand Army Corps, while still in contact with theenemy, successfully executed an amphibious withdrawalfrom the Ari Burnu beachhead over two nights, 18-19December 1915 (Firkins 1971: 59-60). The Royal Navyagain provided the naval support for the withdrawal.

So before the war was 16-months-old, Australiantroops with either Australian or British naval support hadsuccessfully conducted all recognised forms of amphi -bious operation.

Australiaʼs Defence StrategyAustralia is an island continent situated between the

Indian and the South Pacific Oceans, and with its northernoceanic approaches interdicted by the Indonesian-Melanesian archipelago. Consequently, since Europeansettlement, Australia’s defence has been based on amaritime strategy involving:

• denying any potential enemy use of the sea and airapproaches to the continent;

• denying him forward bases in the archipelago for anattack on the continent; and

• protecting the sea and air lines of communicationbetween Australia and its trading partners.


AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS SEMINAR

Amphibious operations:an introduction

Brigadier David Leece, PSM, RFD, ED (Retʼd) Royal United Services Institute, New South Wales1

Its geo-strategic circumstances dictate that Australia adopts a maritime strategy, integral to which are amphibiousoperations. These involve the projection of a military force from the sea onto a hostile, or potentially hostile, shore;and include assaults, withdrawals, raids and demonstrations. These operations and contemporary amphibioustactics are described. Amphibious forces also can provide logistic support to deployed forces; and military support innon-warlike circumstances. Australia is building an amphibious force modelled on United States and Britishamphibious forces.

Key words: maritime strategy; amphibious operations; amphibious assault; amphibious withdrawal; amphibious raid;amphibious demonstration; amphibious logistics; humanitarian assistance; disaster relief; Australia’s amphibiouscapability.

1David Leece is president of the Institute. These are his personal views.Email: [email protected]

Inevitably, amphibious operations have been an integ -ral component of this strategy, especially in the defence ofthe archipelago.

Amphibious OperationsSo what constitutes an amphibious operation? An

amphibious operation is any operation that involves theprojection of a military force from the sea onto a hostile, orpotentially hostile, shore (Speller and Tuck 2001: 7). Suchoperations are usually conducted without access to portfacilities and frequently employ specialist amphibiousshipping, including landing craft and amphibious vehiclesable to deliver troops and stores over the shore acrossbeaches. Helicopters, too, can be used to speed up therapid build-up of combat power ashore.

While similar in many respects to other maritime activi -ties, including administrative disembarkation of forces on afriendly shore and ferrying activities between ports, thedefining characteristic of an amphibious operation is theneed to land military forces on a hostile shore.

That said, the techniques and equipment designed foramphibious operations frequently also have applicationwhen providing amphibious logistic support to forcesashore – which is sometimes referred to as logistics over-the-shore operations (LOTS); and in non-warlike cir -cumstances, especially where entry to coastal and nearcoastal areas is needed in the absence of port facilities –frequently a requirement following natural disasters andwhen delivering humanitarian assistance. As amphibiousforces tend to be called on in such circumstances, suchso-called ‘military support operations’ are frequentlydiscussed along with amphibious operations.

As already indicated, there are four types of amphi -bious operation – the assault, the withdrawal, the raid andthe demonstration – and each one needs to be under -pinned by sound logistic support. We will now look at eachin turn.

Amphibious AssaultsThe amphibious assault is the principal type of amphi -

bious operation and is conducted in order to establish alanding force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Com -monly, amphibious assaults are conducted for one of threereasons (Speller and Tuck 2001: 12-13):

• to establish a firm base or point of entry for furthercombat operations inland – e.g. the Normandylandings in June 1944 served as a prelude to amajor land campaign in Europe;

• to obtain a site for an advanced naval or air base –e.g. the majority of island landings conducted by theUnited States in the Pacific in World War II were tosecure airfields to cover the next phase of theadvance towards Japan; or

• to deny use of the area or facility to the enemy –e.g. the British assault on Vichy-held Madagascar inWorld War II was to forestall Japanese use of itsnaval base.

Completely unopposed landings are rare and areusually dependent on both excellent intelligence and goodfortune. Even where the beach itself is undefended, as atSan Carlos Water during the 1982 Falklands War, thelanding may be opposed by enemy air and naval forces or

indirect artillery fire (Speller and Tuck 2001: 13-14). Seamines in the approaches and long-range ballistic missilesalso can provide hidden dangers for an apparently benignlanding site.

Conventionally, the assaulting force is assembled onships at sea. It is then transported to the shore by landingcraft, where it secures a beachhead which is defensibleagainst enemy counter-attack and large enough to accom -modate the whole force and its equipment and stores on-shore. Once the force is established securely ashore,command is transferred from the naval com mander to theland commander. Finally, the force attempts to break out ofthe beachhead and then advance to its primary objective.

Today, specialist amphibious forces when conductingassaults prefer not to establish a beachhead. Instead,wherever practicable, they employ direct ship-to-objectivemanoeuvre, in which the landing force treats the sea andland as one continuum. The landing force, whetherdeployed by helicopter or amphibious assault vehicle orboth, thrusts inland straight to its ultimate objective withoutpausing at the shoreline. Requirements of ship-to-objective manoeuvre are that the assault be launched fromover-the-horizon, preferably by night, to achieve tacticalsurprise; and that command and control, logistics and firesupport remain afloat, a technique known as ‘sea-basing’.With sea-basing, supplies are held afloat and are deliveredon a ‘just enough’, ‘just on time’, basis to the forces thatneed them.

In World War II, the amphibious assault was usedextensively in the Pacific Theatre, given its island nature,to gain points of entry both for the capture of airfields andfor the development of further operations inland. UnitedStates Marine Corps amphibious assaults at places likeGuadalcanal, Bougainville and Iwo Jima, have becomelegend (Costello 1981: 338-553; Polmar and Mersky 1988:96-131).

Australian amphibious operations are less wellrecognised. After its successes in the Western Desert in1941-42 at Tobruk and El Alamein, the 9th AustralianDivision returned to Australia and trained with the UnitedStates Navy in amphibious warfare (Mallett 2007). It sub -sequently employed the amphibious assault in NewGuinea in 1943 to gain points of entry at Lae in September(Dexter 1961: 326-346) and Finschhafen in October(Dexter 1961: 444-479). In 1945 in British North Borneo, itagain employed the amphibious assault at Tarakan in May,and Brunei and Labuan in June (Long 1963: 406-471). The7th Division also trained in the technique and then used itsuccessfully in Dutch Borneo at Balikpapan in July 1945(Long 1963: 502-531).

Amphibious WithdrawalsAmphibious withdrawals involve the re-embarkation of

military or civilian personnel and equipment. They may bepre-planned or may involve an emergency embarkationfrom a hostile, or potentially hostile, shore (Speller andTuck 2001: 18-19). A withdrawal may be conducted:

• to disengage in contact with the enemy andwithdraw from a hostile shore back to a safe base –as at Gallipoli in December 1915/January 1916,Dunkirk in 1940, Greece and Crete in 1941, andKorea in 1950;


• in order to conduct further amphibious operationselsewhere (in which case the landing force needs tobe to tactically reloaded and reconfigured, whichcan make the embarkation process complex) – asin Korea in 1950;

• as the final stage of an amphibious raid; or• to help evacuate civilian personnel, i.e. undertake

non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs),such as the final evacuation of United Statescitizens from Saigon in 1975 by helicopter from theembassy to ships off-shore.

Amphibious RaidsThe amphibious raid involves both a pre-planned

assault and a pre-planned withdrawal, including re-embarkation of the landing force, shortly thereafter. Theobjective is occupied only long enough to enable theraiding force to achieve its mission – the ‘hit and run’ con -cept (Speller and Tuck 2001: 15). Raids are conducted(Speller and Tuck 2001: 16-18):

• to inflict loss or damage on the enemy – e.g. theBritish Special Air Service raid on Pebble Island offWest Falkland on 14 May 1982, during which theydestroyed 11 Argentine ground-attack aircraft;

• to secure information say by gathering intelligencefrom prisoners or captured documents, or byundertaking covert reconnaissance, perhaps as aprelude to a full-scale assault – e.g. the regularlanding of special forces reconnaissance teamsfrom submarines to gather intelligence covertlyduring the Korean War;

• to create a diversion – e.g. repeated Allied raids onNorway in World War II forced Germany to station18 divisions there against the possibility of a majorAllied invasion; or

• to capture individuals or equipment – e.g. the raidon Bruneval in February 1942 during which 100commandos were parachuted into France close to aGerman cliff-top radar station, and then over -whelmed the defenders and seized the radar equip -ment, before withdrawing back to Britain by landingcraft from a beach at the base of the cliffs.

Raids also can be conducted for logistical reasons,such as to establish a temporary supply point or com muni -ca tions facility.

In the past century, most amphibious raids have beensmall in scale involving at most a few hundred well-trainedsoldiers or marines, at times put ashore by canoe fromsubmarines, or by helicopter from amphibious assaultships. Wherever practicable today, the raiding forceemploys ship-to-objective manoeuvre. Indeed, it has nowbecome the preferred modus operandi of specialistamphibious forces.

Amphibious DemonstrationsAn amphibious demonstration is designed either to

deceive the enemy or as a show of strength (Speller andTuck 2001: 19-20), with a view to causing the enemy to actin a way that he otherwise would not. To be effective, itmust be credible.

In peacetime, amphibious exercises demonstrate thestrength of national capability and hence can serve to

deter would be aggressors. In wartime, amphibiousdemon strations are employed to induce surrender withoutengaging in fighting – as at Madang in 1914; to tie downenemy forces; or to divert them away from the main areaof operations. To do so, they must appear to pose acredible threat to the enemy force ashore.

In the 1991 Gulf War, the United States deployed 31amphibious ships carrying 17,000 marines, 39 tanks, 12amphibious assault vehicles, 30 light armoured vehiclesand 52 howitzers to the Gulf. The force conductednumerous landing rehearsals to ensure Saddam got themessage. The Iraqis were convinced a major amphibiouslanding would occur on the coast of Kuwait and divertedfive divisions to its defence. Without having to land on themainland, the United States amphibious force effectivelyneutralised an Iraqi force roughly 15 times larger thanitself.

Amphibious LogisticsSound logistic support is indispensable to all military

operations. Logistics involve moving armed forces andkeeping them supplied; the art and science of organi sa -tion, administration and supply. As applied to amphibiousoperations, this includes the tactical embarkation oftroops, equipment and supplies; movement to theobjective area; and the disembarkation of personnel andthe unloading of ships; as well as the sustained provisionof supply, medical, salvage, evacuation, construction,repair and maintenance services. Crucial sub-systems arethe organisation of storage afloat, storage on the beach,and the system of movement between the two (Speller andTuck 2001: 103-117).

The logistic support usually travels, at least initially,with the amphibious task force. It can be provided fromwithin the task force (e.g. by amphibious assault shipsand/or supply ships); or by certain specialist ships in theaccompanying naval escort force (e.g. Britain maintains aRoyal Fleet Auxiliary and the United States its MilitarySealift Command for this purpose); and/or by suitablemerchant ships, including troop transports, that have beentaken up from trade – a practice referred to by the acronym‘STUFT’ and which was used to great effect by Britain inthe 1982 Falklands conflict (Speller and Tuck 2001: 115-117). It was also used by Australia in the Vietnam War andthe 1999 East Timor crisis (Leach et al. 2004).

Forces skilled in providing such services in war arealso usually well-equipped and trained for doing so insome non-warlike situations requiring similar skills andequip ment, such as the provision of humanitarian assist -ance and disaster relief, which can have a heavy demandon emergency supply, engineering, medical, com munica -tions and control services. Accordingly, govern mentsfrequently employ their amphibious forces on such militarysupport tasks, often at short notice.

Planning and Conducting an Amphibious OperationThe ‘seaborne soldiers’ (Parkin 2003) of the landing

force can be naval infantry [i.e. soldiers who are part of thenavy, such as the naval reservists of the ANMEF in 1914,and the Royal Naval Division which served on Gallipoli in1915 (Page 2007)]; marines who specialise in amphibiousoperations (whether they be part of the navy or a separate


marine service); or an infantry-predominant balancedarmy formation, such as an infantry brigade group orinfantry division.

Operations that involve more than one service (Navy,Army or Air Force) are referred to as ‘joint’ operations, andthose involving the armed forces of two or more nations as‘combined’ operations. Amphibious operations are normal -ly joint operations and frequently are also combined ones;and may involve coordination with intelligence teams andpartisans on the hostile shore. Consequently, amphi biousoperations can be among the most complex of all militaryactivities to plan and conduct. The amphibious assault isthe basic amphibious operation. There are five stages inthe planning and conduct of an amphibious assault (Wellerand Tuck 2001: 22-101).

Planning and preparation is a stage which may takemany months. It can involve intelligence collection anddeception activities; establishing command relationships;choosing a landing site; resolving the critical issues ofweather, tides and timing; and training and rehearsal of theforce.

Passage to the battle zone is the stage when the‘amphibious task force’ (ATF) moves from its points ofembarkation or its forward deployed positions by sea to thearea of operations, often referred to as the ‘amphibiousobjective area’. During transit, crowded into transports, theamphibious force can be at its most vulnerable, sosufficient sea control must be achieved to protect the ATFfrom enemy attack. As a consequence, possible threats,choice of route, an escort screen and battlespacedominance become key considerations.

Pre-landing operations, sometimes referred to asfavourably shaping the littoral battlespace, can increasethe chances of success. They can involve supportingoperations to deceive the enemy; and more frequentlyinclude direct preparation of the landing beaches by beachreconnaissance, sea-mine clearing and other obstacleremoval. The need for speed and surprise, however, mayconstrain their scope – as far as possible, they should notcompromise the intended place or time of the mainlanding. Further, a vertical envelopment capability (e.g.helicopters) may render them less important.

Securing the beach can be most difficult anddangerous. The landing force has to be transported to thebeach, get ashore and then secure the beach. Combatpower must be built up rapidly on the beach in sufficientstrength to defeat enemy counter-attacks and create aviable bridgehead into which reinforcements can bedeployed. Air superiority must be achieved over theobjective area and the assaulting force must be providedwith both close air support (from ground-attack aircraft)and naval gunfire support.

Consolidation and exploitation: A period of consoli -dation is necessary to expand the beachhead to an ade -quate size, to secure it against enemy attack, and todevelop the combat power, logistic support, and commandand control needed for the breakout. The efficient organi -sation and management of the beachhead is critical. In its1943-45 amphibious assaults, the Australian Army usedbeach groups consisting of infantry, engineers, pioneers,signallers, medical staff and beach commandos, totalling1800 men to manage beachhead logistics (Crawley 2014).

Finally, with consolidation complete, the force attempts toachieve a breakout and exploit the earlier success.

Australian doctrine. While the above stages in theplan ning of an amphibious assault have universal applica -bility, current Australian amphibious doctrine, with itsprimary focus on the amphibious raid, recognises sevenstages in the planning and conduct of an amphibiousoperation from its inception to its conclusion, namely: Plan,Embark, Rehearse, Move, Shape, Action, and Termi na -tion.

Contemporary Amphibious ForcesAmphibious operations are extraordinarily difficult to

mount at short notice unless well-rehearsed contingencyplans are available and, with little adjustment, can be giveneffect. This has led in recent times to several nationsforming specialist amphibious forces which have anexperienced commander, supported by an efficient staff, incommand of well-trained and properly-equipped forces,and with the capacity to respond to lower-level contin -gencies at short notice. Australia’s amphibious capabilitywas found wanting during the East Timor crisis in 1999and since then Australia has been moving determinedly toredress this deficiency. It has been attracted to twocontemporary models: the United States Marine Expe di -tionary Unit and associated naval Amphibious ReadyGroup; and Britain’s 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines,and the amphibious ships of the Royal Navy.

United States amphibious forcesEach United Sates Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)

trains and deploys as a task-tailored Marine Air-Ground-Task Force (MAGTF) of some 2200 marines and sailorsand consists of a command element, a reinforced infantrybattalion, a composite fixed and rotary wing squadron, anda combat logistic battalion. When required, a Marinespecial operations company embarks in support. Thereare four MEUs in the Pacific and they deploy forwardaboard Amphibious Ready Groups in areas of potentialcrisis to respond rapidly to crises and contingenciesacross the range of military operations (Speller and Tuck2001: 165).

United States Navy Amphibious Ready Groups(ARGs) are amphibious ship formations. Each is builtaround a core of three ships: a multi-purpose (LHD) orgeneral-purpose (LHA) amphibious assault ship; a landingplatform, dock (LPD); and a landing ship, dock (LSD). Asrequired, ARGs and their embarked MEUs are escortedon operations by ships of the United States Navy (Spellerand Tuck 2001: 166).

The three amphibious ships that embark and deploy aMEU are led by a United States Navy captain titled Com -mander Amphibious Task Force (CATF). His Marinecounter part is a colonel, the MEU commander, titled Com -mander, Landing Force (CLF). The CATF and CLF use‘supporting command relations’ to determine leadresponsi bility during the phases of an amphibiousoperation.

Britainʼs amphibious force 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, is an all-arms

formation centred around three battalion-sized commando


units, reinforced with artillery, engineer and logisticsupport elements (Speller and Tuck 2001: 167-8). A RoyalNetherlands Marine Corps battalion is integrated into thebrigade as a fourth manoeuvre unit and a Dutch colonelserves as the brigade’s deputy commander. There isprovision for support as needed from tanks and armouredreconnaissance from the Army’s ready brigade; and fromarmy-operated Apache attack helicopters from theamphibious assault ship.

This landing force is supported by an amphibiousassault ship, helicopter (LPH); two landing platforms, dock(LPD); up to three landing ships, dock (LSD); and, ifneeded, a carrier group, which will include joint strikefighters in the future.

Australiaʼs amphibious forceAustralia’s amphibious force draws on elements of both

the United States and British models and is intended to beinteroperable with them (Leggatt 2013). Current capabilityis the Amphibious Ready Element (ARE) that consists of:a joint Amphibious Task Force command element; alanding force, built upon a rifle company group task-tailored to form an infantry combat team of 150 – 220personnel; a rotary-wing aviation element of 4 – 6helicopters; and a combat support element.

The ARE has so far trained and is ready to respond tocrises and contingencies aboard HMAS Choules, a16,000-tonne landing ship, dock (LSD). In the future, theARE will deploy aboard one of two Canberra-class 27,000-tonne multi-purpose amphibious assault ships (LHD) anduse 100-tonne landing craft, mechanised (LCMs) andhelicopters to rapidly move equipment and soldiersashore. Once the ARE has been certified in 2015, it will bethe ready amphibious force used for regional engagementexercises and to rapidly respond to crises and contin -gencies.

Future amphibious capability will build upon the AREorganisation, with the landing force expanded to a lightinfantry battalion group task-tailored to form a battle groupof up to 2200 personnel; and with the rotary-wing aviationelement expanded to 12 – 24 helicopters. It will requireboth LHDs, the LSD and up to 12 LCMs for embarkationand deployment. Called the Amphibious Ready Group(ARG), it will be the amphibious component of the ADF’scontingency forces. The ADF’s intent is to test anddemonstrate the ARG during Exercise Talisman Sabre2017. It will be escorted on operations by ships of theAustralian Fleet and Air Force assets as needed.

ConclusionGiven its geo-strategic positioning, it is not surprising

that amphibious operations, be they assaults, withdrawals,raids or demonstrations, have played a key role in thedefence of Australia’s national interests over the last 100years, especially during the two world wars. Since WorldWar II, Australia has also employed its amphibious capa -bilities to support peacekeeping, stabilisation, humani -tarian assistance, disaster relief and other militaryassistance operations. The 1999 East Timor crisis, though,demonstrated the weakness of Australia’s then amphi - bious capability. Australia has since been moving slowlybut determinedly to rebuild a modern, highly-professional,

amphibious capability suitable particularly for lower-levelcontingencies and interoperable with that of its principalallies, the United States and Britain.

The Author: Brigadier Leece is President of the RoyalUnited Services Institute, New South Wales, and editor ofthe Institute’s quarterly professional journal, UnitedService. A former citizen-soldier, he served in theAustralian Army for 37 years. Commissioned into theInfantry Corps in 1962, he served on exchange with theUnited States Marine Corps Reserve (1967-69), and latercommanded the 17th Battalion, Royal New South WalesRegiment (1978-81), and the 8th Australian Infantry Brigade(1988-90). In civil life, he was initially an agriculturalresearch scientist who ultimately became ExecutiveDirector and Chief Scientist of the New South WalesEnvironment Protection Authority.

Acknowledgements: I thank Rear Admiral MarkCampbell, RAN, Colonel Jim Hutton, Royal Marines andColonel John Mayer, US Marine Corps, for helpfulcomments on the manuscript.

References Costello, John (1981). The Pacific War 1941-45 (Rawson,

Wade: New York).Crawley, Rhys (2014). Sustaining amphibious operations in

the Asia-Pacific: logistic lessons for Australia, 1914-2014. Australian Defence Force Journal Issue No. 193,28 – 39.

Dexter, David (1961). The New Guinea offensives(Australian War Memorial: Canberra).

Firkins, Peter (1971). The Australians in nine wars: Waikatoto Long Tan (Rigby Limited: Adelaide).

Leach, D. W., Leece, D. R., Dent, P. W., and Macdonald, D.W. (2004). Re-building the Australian merchant navy.United Service 55 (3), 5 – 19.

Leggatt, R. J. (2013). The future of the Amphibious TaskForce. United Service 63 (3), 21 – 24.

Long, Gavin (1963). The final campaigns (Australian WarMemorial: Canberra).

Mallett, Ross (2007). Together again for the first time: theArmy, the RAN and amphibious warfare 1942-45. InDavid Stevens and John Reeve, Eds. Sea power ashoreand in the air (Halstead Press: Sydney), pp. 118 – 132.

Meade, Kevin (2005). Heroes before Gallipoli: Bita Pakaand that one day in September (John Wiley & SonsAustralia Ltd: Milton, Queensland).

Page, Chris (2007). The Royal Naval Division at Gallipoli. InDavid Stevens and John Reeve, Eds. Sea power ashoreand in the air (Halstead Press: Sydney), pp. 68 – 76.

Parkin, Russell (2003). Sailors and seaborne soldiers in thedefence of Australia. In John Reeve and David Stevens,Eds. The face of naval battle: the human experience ofmodern war at sea (Allen & Unwin: Sydney), pp. 92 –112.

Polmar, Norman, and Mersky, Peter B. (1988). Amphibiouswarfare: an illustrated history (Blandford Press:London).

Speller, Ian, and Tuck, Christopher (2001). Amphibiouswarfare: the theory and practice of amphibiousoperations in the 20 th century (Spellmount Limited:Staplehurst, UK).



Landing ShipsA landing ship is a purpose-built troop transport ship

modified to enhance its utility as a platform from which anamphibious operation may be launched and supportedwithout relying on conventional port facilities.

The Landing Ship, Tank (LST) has a shallow draughtto enable it to discharge personnel and vehicles throughbow doors within wading distance of the beach.

Most landing ships, however, stand offshore wherethey are less vulnerable to attack from the shore andemploy landing craft, landing vehicles and/or helicopters totransfer their cargo ashore.

The Landing Ship, Dock (LSD) e.g. HMAS Choules,carries its landing craft in a stern well deck (‘dock’). Tolaunch the landing craft, the well is flooded and the loadedcraft can then sail out and back in through the ship’s sterndoors.

The Landing Platform, Dock (LPD), in addition to adock, has a short flight deck and a hanger to supportlimited helicopter operations.

The Landing Platform, Helicopter (LPH) or‘commando carrier’ (e.g. HMS Ocean) is an aircraft carriermodified to embark and support helicopters, rather thanfixed-wing aircraft. It has a full flight deck but no dock, so itcannot land equipment, such as tanks, which is too heavyfor helicopters.

The Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA/LHD) combinesthe features of an LSD and LPH. It can use LCs to landheavy equipment. It also can serve as a ‘lily pad’ for fixed-wing fighter aircraft, enabling them to land, and refuel andrearm, before taking off again. Most also have excellentcommand, fire control and logistic facilities, includinghospitals, designed to facilitate ‘sea basing’. The 40,000-tonne US Wasp-class LHDs have better dock facilities thanthe older LHAs. They can carry1870 troops, 12 landingcraft and 32 CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters. In theirsecondary role as a sea-control ship, they can operate 20AV-8B Harrier II [vertical/short take-off and vertical landing(V/STOVL)] ground attack aircraft.

Australia is acquiring two 27,500-tonne Canberra-class LHDs to be commissioned as HMA Ships Canberraand Adelaide. Their shallow draft will enable operations inlittoral waters. They will have a range of 9000 nauticalmiles at a cruising speed of 15 knots. They will be able toembark 1050 troops, 110 vehicles, 11 helicopters and fourlanding craft (LCM-1E); and deploy up to 200 troops (acompany group) in one helicopter lift. Their hulls havebeen configured to optimise the helicopter role and whileSTOVL aircraft (e.g. F35 Lightning II B) will be able to landand take off from them, they will have little if any capacityto refuel and rearm the aircraft; and the deck will be unableto sustain frequent STOVL landings.

Landing Craft and VehiclesBy the start of World War II, the landing craft (LC) had

replaced rowing boats for ferrying troops and stores fromship to shore. LCs have a flat bottom, enabling them toreach the beach, and a bow ramp across which troopsdisembark within wading depth or at the waterline.Typical early ones were the Landing Craft, Vehicle andPersonnel (LCVP), capable of carrying 36 men; and theLanding Craft, Mechanised (LCM), of variousdimensions. The more recent 100-tonne LCM Mark 8(LCM-8), still in service, can transport 200 personnel, 50equipped troops, 54.5 tonnes of cargo, or a main battletank.

During the Pacific War, it often proved difficult to findbeaches suitable for amphibious assaults and where theyexisted, the route to them at times was impeded by coralreefs, impassable to landing craft. To overcome this, theLanding Vehicle, Tracked (LVT) was developed whichcould drive over any reefs encountered. Being tracked, itcould also drive across the beach and disembarkassaulting infantry at the back of the beach or beyond.Modifications to enhance troop safety included armourprotection, a stern (rather than bow) ramp, and a heavymachine gun to provide covering fire during dis -embarkation. By the war’s end, the Amphibious Tractor or‘Amtrac’, which embodied the foregoing features, hadbecome the preferred Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV).

The current US Marines LVTP-7A1 (AAV-7A1)Amphibious Assault Vehicle can carry a marine platoonfrom shipping over-the-horizon to its objective inland and,while a compromise between a modern landing craft anda terrestrial armoured personnel carrier, it is preferred toboth for ship-to-objective manoeuvre.

The DUKW or ‘Duck’ is a 2-tonne 6x6-WheeledAmphibious Truck developed in World War II for thetransport of troops and cargo across the beach andbeyond. It has more land mobility than the LVT but,because it lacks armour and is slow and bulky ashore, it isprimarily employed on ship-to-shore transport of logisticsupplies.

Australia is equipping its LHDs with the 100-tonneLCM-1E, especially designed for the Canberra-classLHDs, to deliver troops and equipment, including theAbrams main battle tank, from over-the horizon to theshore. It incorporates a bow ramp and a stern gate,facilitating the loading/unloading of rolling stock within theflood levee and the transfer of vehicles of up to 12 tonnesfrom one barge to another. However, it cannot traversecoral reefs, transport an assaulting force across a beach,or transport commandos to their target in ship-to-objectivemanoeuvre.

David Leece


Landing ship, landing craft and landing vehiclenomenclature

Some common amphibious shipping nomenclature and acronyms are clarified.

The title of this case study paraphrases General RupertSmith’s book, The Utility of Force, in which he argues thatthe entire concept of military engagement has experienceda paradigm-shift from ‘industrial war’ to ‘war amongst thepeople’ (Smith 2005: 3). Recent Middle-East campaigns, the2011 ‘Arab Spring’ and ongoing Asian-Pacific regionaldisputes2 all appear to validate this assertion. Smith’s thesisdoes not mean force cannot be used for positive effect;rather that force/politics ratios must be re-calibrated by agreater admixture of politics alongside military force.

Ninety per cent of the world's population lives within 100nautical miles of the sea (UK Parliament 2012: Ev-w47).Logically, therefore, 90 per cent of potential trouble-spots liein littoral areas. As a timely reminder, David Kilcullen assertsthat, post-Afghanistan, “it’s time for the military to re-engagewith the challenge of irregular warfare in the urban littoral”(Kilcullen 2013: viii). Embarking into an increasinglyuncertain ‘Asian-Century’ means that the Australian DefenceForce’s (ADF) ability to conduct littoral manoeuvre hasexponential relevancy, affording the government a highlycost-effective means of recalibrating inter-agency levers toassist regional partners prevent or resolve potential brush-fires. As Sir Basil Liddell Hart observed: “A self-containedand sea-based amphibious force is the best kind of fireextinguisher because of its flexibility, reliability, logisticsimplicity and relative economy” (Liddell Hart 1960a: 128).

Strategic Context This case study’s theme fuses Smith’s and Kilcullen’s

assertions with the: ‘strategic challenges that will arise’ aspart of the Asian-Century (Australian Government 2012: ii);United States ‘strategic rebalancing’ to the Asia-Pacific; andthe maritime strategy adopted by Australia’s 2013 DefenceWhite Paper (Department of Defence 2013: 29) to underpinits strategic interests: a secure Australia; a secure SouthPacific and Timor-Leste; a stable Indo-Pacific region; and astable, rules-based global order (Department of Defence2013: 24-27).

ʻIndustrial-Era ̓Amphibious RolesADF doctrine describes an amphibious operation as: “A

military operation launched from the sea by a naval andlanding force embarked in ships, landing craft or helicopters,

with the principle purpose of projecting landing forcesashore” (ADDP 2009: 1-2). It envisages four types ofamphibious operations: demonstration, raid, assault andwithdrawal (ADDP 2009: 3-1). History is punctuated byscalable examples of each, from discrete raids in Bordeauxand Singapore Harbours to Gallipoli, Dunkirk, Normandyand Inchon. More recent utility was illustrated in TheFalklands (1982), Kuwait (1991) and East Timor (1999).

Sir Thomas More Molyneux’s 1759 work ConjunctExpeditions was the first to articulate the complexity ofamphibious operations. Molyneux argued that combinedoperations were a necessary component of national defenceand that the fleet and army, acting as consort, seem to bethe natural bulwark (Coetzee and Eysturlid 2013: 123-124).As Liddell Hart observed, overcoming these complexitiesdemands consistent training: “Adequate amphibious meansare not only a matter of ships. Skilled personnel are no lessimportant ... the required skill is the fruit of long training inamphibious techniques and of constant practice incombination of the various elements in such a force (LiddellHart 1960b).

A single Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) can deploy formonths with controllable political overheads and latentcapacity to deliver a spectrum of amphibious effects asillustrated by the case study below involving HMS Ocean, a22,000-tonne amphibious Landing Platform Helicopter(LPH).

Amongst The People – A Glimpse of One PossibleFuture

The imminent delivery of Australia’s two 27,000-tonneLHDs provides a focus to develop a robust ADF littoralcapability. Rightly, the ADF has reached out to long-established practitioners, namely the United Sates MarineCorps and the Royal Marines. As the ADF develops itscapability, however, it must avoid being hypnotised by thetraditional amphibious roles or seduced into replicating theindustrial-scale of earlier campaigns.

Instead, it must focus on more likely regional threats.Contemporary threats ‘amongst the people’ mean that: a‘demonstration’ is more likely to be humanitarian disaster-relief; a ‘raid’ to be a helicopter-borne, Special Forceshostage-rescue mission; an ‘assault’ to be a maritime-launched Apache helicopter strike; and a ‘withdrawal’ to be anon-combatant evacuation. This new paradigm demandsthat inter-agency planners, instead of solely militaryplanners, design a strategic-level regional engagement



Case Study: The utility of amphibiousforces in the 21st century

Major John Collins, Royal Marines1

While this case-study is constrained by secrecy aspects regarding operations in Libya and Somalia, it demonstrates theutility of an integrated 21st century amphibious force. The critical enabler was HMS Ocean. What started as a 7-weekexercise evolved into a 7-month operation, with three payload re-configurations, spanning all amphibious roles, over adistance of 40,000 nautical miles.

Key words: amphibious; Libya; Somalia; HMS Ocean; 2011

1Email: [email protected] South China Sea territorial disputes plus the May 2014 coupdʼétat in Thailand.

campaign to utilise the scalable capabilities that amphibiousforces can exert.

Special Forces have become the tool of choice for manygovernments. This case study reviews two operations toillustrate the utility of 21st century amphibious force.Specifically, it examines the Royal Navy’s HMS Ocean 2011deployment as a glimpse of one possible amphibious future.

A Tale of Two Global ContingenciesHMS Ocean left Britain in April 2011 on a scheduled

Mediterranean amphibious exercise, Exercise Cougar, withan embarked force of Royal Marines, Commando HelicopterForce, and Army Apache helicopters. It returned 229-dayslater, having supported operations in Libya and Somalia.

In May, Ocean was re-tasked to Operation UnifiedProtector off Libya. In addition to air and naval operations, amilitary liaison advisory team had been deployed in April(UK Parliament 2012: 18). As astute journalists noted, “theBritish campaign also had a secret ground aspect, asSpecial Forces blended in with rebel fighters”3 to direct air-strikes and “enable rebel forces to operate more effectively”(UK Parliament 2012: Ev-w1). In complementing operationsashore, “Ocean launched Britain’s first amphibious-basedApache helicopter raid on 3 June, destroying regimearmoured vehicles, installa tions and communications”(Taylor 2011); and continued to do so throughout thecampaign.

Broader amphibious utility was demonstrated by Oceanʼsother embarked capabilities. Sea King helicopters con -ducted area surveillance operations; on-board rigid-hullboats con ducted high-speed interception and boarding-parties; whilst the LPH itself acted as a base to protecthumanitarian shipping and prevent arms deliveries (Taylor2011: Ev-w10).

After 4 months of operations off Libya, Ocean wasordered east of Suez. While the press reported accuratelythat Ocean had reconfigured her personnel and air groupand prepared for further contingency tasking, it purposelyomitted details of what that task entailed.4 Oceanʼs re -deployment had coincided with the kidnap of Judith Tebbutton 11 September 2011. The Tebbutt’s were holidaying in aremote Kenyan resort when husband David was killed andJudith taken to Somalia. By 20 September, the British mediawere reporting that Special Forces were waiting for thegreen-light to deploy. During that period, Ocean had beenrapidly re-rolled and steamed to the Arabian Sea as anamphibious contingency platform to support a potentialSpecial Forces hostage-rescue operation.

ConclusionsDespite omnipresent global instability, analysts failed to

predict the Arab Spring or its after-shocks. Fragmented,social-media inspired revolutions, however, validate Smith’sconcept and re-calibrated utility of force. Whilst this case-study remains constrained by disclosure aspects regardingoperations in Libya and Somalia, the overarching narrative isthe utility of an integrated 21st century amphibious force. The

critical enabler was HMS Ocean. What started as a 7-weekexercise evolved into a 7-month operation, with threepayload re-configurations, spanning all amphibious roles,over a distance of 40,000 nautical miles.

The relevance of this case-study is three-fold. Firstly, ithighlights LPH/LHD similarities and offers a glimpse of howthe ADF could develop a region-specific amphibious capa -bility rather than slavishly adopting United Kingdom/UnitedStates doctrinal and deployment models. Secondly, it fusesMolyneux’s legacy with Liddell Hart’s dictum that amphibiousoperations are an inherently joint, complex and necessarycom ponent of defence strategy, demanding constantpractice. Thirdly, and most significantly, it cautions that ‘waramongst the people’ has fundamentally changed the rules ofthe game. While providing a useful handrail, operationali -zation of the four traditional amphibious roles has beenradic ally altered in terms of time, dimension andsimultaneity.

According to Britain’s First Sea Lord, operations in Libyademonstrated the strategic utility of the Royal Navy andvalue of persistent presence in regions of interest.5 Scalableutility and persistence are integral features of amphibiousforces and will imminently provide the Australian Govern -ment with Liddell Hart’s metaphorical fire-extinguisher todeter, defeat and contribute to the security of its strategicinterests. In an archipelagic region, prone to brush-fires, aquality fire-extinguisher is essential.

The Author: John Collins has served for 32 years in theRoyal Marines, including 27 years in the Special BoatService. He is currently serving on exchange withHeadquarters Special Operations Command, Australia, aslead counter-terrorist planner for the November 2014 G20Summit. Concurrently, prior to a post-military career, he iscompleting a PhD thesis examining the British Army’scredentials as a counter insurgency learning organisation.[Photo of Major Collins: Colonel J. M. Hutcheson, MC]

ReferencesADDP (2009). Amphibious operations. Australian Defence

Doctrine Publication 3.2. Australian Government (2012). Australia in the Asian century:

white paper (Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra).Coetzee, Daniel, and Eysturlid, Lee W., eds. (2013). Philosophers

of war: the evolution of historyʼs greatest military thinkers(Praeger: Santa Barbara, Cal.).

Department of Defence (2013). Defence white paper 2013(Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra).

Kilcullen, David (2013). Out of the mountains: the coming age ofthe urban guerrilla (Scribe: Melbourne).

Liddell Hart, B. H. (1960a). Deterrent or defence: a fresh look atthe Westʼs military position (Stevens: London).

Liddell Hart, B. H. (1960b). The value of amphibious flexibility andforces. RUSI Journal 105 (Nov), 486.

Smith, Rupert (2005). The utility of force: the art of war in themodern world (Penguin: London).

Taylor, Claire (2011). Military operations in Libya. House ofCommons Library Standard Note SN/IA5909, 24 October2011 update (The Stationary Office: London).

UK Parliament (2012). Operations in Libya. House of CommonsDefence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010–12,Volume II, Additional written evidence (The Stationary Office:London).


3Mark Urban (2012), Inside story of UK's secret mission to beat Gaddafi,http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-16573516.

4Navy News (29 Sep 11), https://navynews.co.uk/archive/news/item/1631;Daily Star (20 Sep 11), http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/211871/Rescue-plan-for-Judith-Tebbutt; Daily Express (13 Sep 11),http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/270943/Hunt-for-snatched-British-wife.

5Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, Maritime Conference, Royal United ServicesInstitute, London, July 2011.

The introduction of Australia’s two new Canberra-class Landing-Helicopter-Dock (LHD) multi-purposeamphibious ships will be a significant milestone in thedevelopment of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF)amphibious capacity to deploy and sustain militarypower across a range of contingencies. The ADF’s jointamphibious capability centred on the LHD ships will bea central plank in our ability to conduct security andstabilisation missions in the region. The LHDs will beable to carry substantial quantities of personnel andequipment, and both disembark them at sea via landingcraft and helicopters and provide onshore support.

As stated in the Defence White Paper 20131,Australia’s amphibious capability will focus on security,stabilisation, humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief tasks. This enhanced amphibious capability willalso provide additional options for co-operation andengage ment activities in the Indo-Pacific region,Southern Pacific and Timor-Leste, including bilateraland/or multi-national exercises with regional securityforces such as the United States Navy and MarineCorps. Although likely that Defence will take the lead inoperations or capacity building activities, it will need tobe very closely integrated with Australia’s civilianagencies such as the Department of Foreign Affairs andTrade, Emergency Management Australia, and com -mon wealth, state and territory health and police forces,which provide substantial parts of Australia’s disasterresponse capability.

What is significant about the LHDs?While the size and appearance of the LHDs makes

them seem like a major change in direction, Australia

has had an amphibious capability for many years – theWorld War II landing ships Kanimbla and Manoora, andtheir 1990s and 2000s namesakes, the convertedaircraft carrier Sydney, and the landing ship, heavy,HMAS Tobruk, and its flotilla of landing craft, heavy.This is not a new concept for the ADF.

So Canberra and Adelaide are the most recentmanifestations of our amphibious capability. What Ithink has happened is their breathtaking appearanceand scale has focused people inside and outside ofNavy on what an amphibious capability brings. Andmade people ask why we need that amphibiouscapability. In my view the answer is twofold.

The first is simple – Australia’s strategic geographyis fundamentally maritime. We are, as our nationalanthem says, girt by sea. But our vision, as the Chief ofNavy is wont to quip, is girt by beach.

What does fundamentally maritime mean? And whatdoes that mean for land and air forces? Well, for a start,maritime campaigns are inherently joint – sea, land, air,cyber, space, military, government and private sectorcapabilities are essential to a maritime campaign.

Australia’s maritime environment means that oursecurity and prosperity is dependent on our ability tooperate in the maritime environment. We need tomaintain good order at sea, to maintain our ability totrade, to bring liquid fuels and manufactured goods in,and to get bulk goods and other goods out. Without theability to trade Australia’s economy would quite simplycease to function as we know it.

The maritime environment is not demarcated in thesame way a terrestrial environment is – its borders areporous and there are complex overlapping jurisdictionaland sovereignty issues. Moreover, many parts of it arenot owned by any nation – the high seas, the greatglobal commons, are not owned by any nation, but allnations depend on them – including Australia.



Keynote Address

The LHD in Australia’smaritime strategy

Rear Admiral Mark Campbell, CSC, RAN Head of Navy Capability, Department of Defence, Australia

The Australian Defence Force is on track to deliver a new joint amphibious capability based on two new Canberra-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHDs) ships and focused on security, stabilisation, humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief tasks. The first milestone, a humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and non-combatant evacuationcapability, is due towards the end of 2015. It will be based on one LHD and a rifle company-sized landing force. Thefull capability, with a light infantry battalion-sized landing force, is due for delivery in 2017. It should enable responseacross the spectrum of military contingencies.

Key words: Australia; amphibious assault ship; landing-helicopter-dock; maritime strategy; humanitarian assistance;disaster relief; non-combatant evacuation.

1Department of Defence (2013). Defence White Paper 2013 (Common -wealth of Australia: Canberra) paragraph 8.14, page 77.

So we need maritime capabilities to represent ourinterests in that maritime environment. And ouramphibious capability enables land and air forces to bemore effective in the maritime environment than theyotherwise would be. A small company-sized forceembarked in Canberra or Adelaide will be a strategicweapon in a way no other group of 200 soldiers is everlikely to be – the decision to employ them will obviouslybe one for Government.

The LHDs bring the ability to have a joint forceoperate around Australia and around our region in amore flexible, sustained manner than we havepreviously been able to do. Their effect will be similar towhat we have been able to do previously, but on abigger scale.

The second reason Canberra and Adelaide areattracting attention, is they are capable of much morethan just amphibious operations. Like all warships, theyare defined by their principal war fighting task, but likeall warships, they will be capable of operations acrossmany different warfare disciplines. An LHD withSeahawk Romeo helicopters embarked will be apowerful asset in the anti-submarine warfare or anti-surface warfare disciplines. An LHD with unmannedaerial vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles or un -manned underwater vehicles embarked will contri buteto surveillance and strike functions. Acting as a lily pad(platform for landing and take-off) for allied forces, theycan contribute to the air war.

Importantly from a joint context, the flexibility of theLHD is partly inherent in the capability of the platformand partly inherent in the embarked assets – so a

company group intended principally for a combat taskcan be employed and supported for more constabularyor diplomatic tasks – learning this is partly a culturalissue and partly a question of logistics and training. It isone of the less obvious parts of the journey we, as theADF, need to take to get the most from the LHD.

And we must never forget that an amphibiousoperation is not simply a transport task – it is but onephase of a much bigger maritime campaign.

So as we contemplate these excellent vessels, Ithink we are seeing many people opening their eyes tothe importance of the maritime environment not just toAustralia, but to our neighbours, partners and allies, toour region – and opening their eyes to the possibilitiessuch capable warships open up for Australia as itpursues a maritime defence strategy.

The LHD in DetailEach LHD will be able to embark, transport and

deploy a force of over 1000 personnel by air (with theLHD’s flight deck allowing the operation of a range ofADF rotary-wing aircraft) and sea, along with all theirweapons, ammunition, vehicles and stores. The LHDshave also been designed with the shallowest possibledraft to allow them to operate in secondary ports andharbours as well as manoeuvre tactically in the shallowwaters common to littoral regions2. The LHDs are jointlycrewed with personnel from Navy, Army and Air Forceto form a ship’s company of approximately 400.


Diagrammatic representation in cross-section of a Canberra-class landing helicopter dock (LHD)[Diagram: Department of Defence]

2In a military context, the littoral zone refers to the coastline and adjacentwaters, including estuarine and reef-enclosed waters.

These highly capable ships, the largest everoperated by the ADF, will enable a step change in theway Australia deploys its land forces and their sup -porting systems in amphibious operations, which are bytheir very nature ‘joint’, thereby requiring contri butionsfrom across the ADF. The ADF will develop an amphi -bious capability based around an Amphibious ReadyElement (ARE), enabling growth to an Amphi biousReady Group (ARG) if required in the future. The LandForce element will initially be based on the AustralianArmy’s 2nd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment,with supporting elements. The Amphibious ReadyElement is a task-organised force element consisting oflight infantry, protected mobility, offensive support, avia -tion, logistics, engineers and communications special -ists, plus a command and control element. The AREconsists of approximately 600 people and will becapable of responding across the full spectrum of con -tin gencies. Co-ordination and training will be critical todelivering this robust amphibious capability.

Australiaʼs Amphibious ConceptThe use of coastal, riverine and reef-enclosed

waters for resupply and tactical manoeuvre by anadver sary must be countered by an equally agile mari -time force. ADF expeditionary forces operating in thelittoral environment face threats of varying intensity andsophistication, in circumstances ranging from permis -sive to hostile environments. The nature of our regionadds a layer of complexity to the ADF’s operationalmanoeuvre requirements. The ADF’s operating environ -ment is geographically diverse and complex. It isdominated by ocean with numerous land massesseparated by narrow maritime passages. Its littoralterrain is characterised by the archipelagic, riverine andestuarine, subject to large tidal variations and severeweather. Despite this archipelagic focus, the amphi -bious deployment and sustainment (ADAS) systemmust also be capable of operating in cold weather envi -ron ments such as the Southern Ocean. An amphibiouscapability that is configured to operate from afloat offersincreased flexibility in its ability to concurrently influenceaffairs ashore across multiple islands without neces -sarily a commitment to land.

The ADF amphibious capability aspires to developan Australian approach, leveraging United States andUnited Kingdom conceptual and modernisationdevelop ment initiatives in littoral manoeuvre3, ship-to-objective manoeuvre (STOM)4, distributed manoeuvre

(DM)5 and sea basing6. Amphibious and military supportoperations (MSO) will be the primary capability deter -minant for the ADAS capability. Sea lift will normal ly bea secondary mission. Amphibious opera tions can pro -vide government with a cost-effective option for shapingand influencing the geo-political environment as well asa significant deterrence effect. In addition to traditionalamphibious operations (demonstration, raid, assaultand withdrawal), amphibious forces also offer consider -able advantages where short notice responses andpolitical sensitivities commonly restrict the employmentof other land-based capabilities.

Amphibious operations should be viewed as a singleintegrated operation rather than two or three paralleloperations. The force projection capabilities (utilising airand surface manoeuvre) of available amphibiousplatforms will shape the landing force scheme ofmanoeuvre. The tactical situation will drive the temporequired (of helicopters and landing craft) to launch,insert, recover and sustain those force elementsassigned to an amphibious operation. Importantly,amphi bious operations in the Australian context mustcomprise two essential elements: expeditionaryorientation and littoral manoeuvre. These two essentialelements of Australian amphibious operations can beconsidered the key drivers for ADF amphibiousmoderni sation, and require a fundamental change ofapproach that was not previously envisaged.

Capability RealisationNavy has developed a comprehensive LHD capa -

bility realisation plan to address and synchronise thefundamental inputs to capability required to ensure theLHDs are transitioned into service smoothly. Work forcecontinues to be our major challenge, particularly in thetechnical trades. In parallel, a naval operational test andevaluation programme has been designed to graduallybuild the LHD capability over the next four yearsculminating in final operating capability in mid-2017.The first milestone (initial operating capability)scheduled for mid to late 2015 will deliver the ADF ahumanitarian assistance, disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation operations capability akin to thenow decommissioned landing platform amphibiouscapability previously provided by Kanimbla andManoora. As the LHDs are brought into service and theADF's amphibious capability matures, the LHDs will beincrementally tested to deliver a greater level ofcapability than has previously been resident in the ADF.

Against the backdrop of this strategic planning tointroduce the LHDs into service, 2013 was a verysuccessful year for Navy which saw the crew ofNUSHIP Canberra established in Sydney, including the


3Littoral manoeuvre (also known as operational manoeuvre from the sea)is the delivery by amphibious forces of high-tempo precision effectagainst objectives ashore through simultaneous air and surface assault.It employs ship-to-objective manoeuvre, with forces launched from over-the-horizon to achieve tactical surprise, and sea-basing.

4In ship-to-objective manoeuvre, the landing force treats the sea and landas one continuum. It does not seek to secure a beach. Rather, itthrusts inland straight to its ultimate objective without pausing at theshoreline.

5Distributed manoeuvre utilises multiple entry points and high mobilityfocused directly on the objective, or multiple objectives.

6A requirement of ship-to-objective manoeuvre is that command andcontrol, logistics and fire support remain sea-based (i.e. aboard the LHD.

posting of Navy, Army and Air Force personnel to theship. A specialist team of the ship's engineeringdepartment was co-located at the Williamstownshipyard to develop a deeper understanding of theplatform system, safety issues and development ofengineering operating procedures. Another significantmilestone was the opening of the BAE Systems InterimTraining Facility at Mascot in May 2013 and thecommencement of LHD platform and combat systemtraining for the first crew. This initial training has nowbeen completed and has delivered a very good level oftraining.

The Chief of Army has tasked the 2nd Battalion, theRoyal Australian Regiment (2RAR), to form Army’sAmphibious Battle Group. This battle group isresponsible for raising the core of Army’s amphibiouscapability. In the last 12 months, elements of 2RARhave undergone training in Australia supported byUnited States Marine Corps mobile training teams andUnited Kingdom Royal Marine subject matter experts.The training has focused upon planning amphibiousoperations, expeditionary logistics and expeditionarycommunications. Members of 2RAR have alsobenefited from the opportunity to observe United StatesMarine Corps certification exercises overseas.

Navy has also developed a very positive relationshipwith the Spanish Armada and conducts routinecounter part meetings and undertakes experientialtraining opportunities under a joint memorandum ofunderstanding. In mid-2013, members of the Canberracrew had the opportunity to sea-ride the Spanish LHD,SPS Juan Carlos I, to better understand LHDoperations and assist to develop the numerousoperating procedures required of the LHD.

Similarly, late last year, Navy sent a small team ofsailors to undertake LCM-1E landing craft training toassist in better understanding that component of thecapability and its introduction into service next year.

Another area of work that Navy and Army areworking together on is the complexity of operatinghelicopters from the LHD as part of the embarkedRotary Wing Group. Again procedures and conceptsare being developed and the opportunity to sea-rideSpanish, United States Navy and Royal Navy amphi -bious platforms are being utilised. The challenge ofoperating large, complex aviation platforms should notbe underestimated. The aviation capability will begradually introduced over the coming years com -mencing with the MRH-90 troop lift helicopter, the Tigerarmed reconnaissance helicopter and the CH-47FChinook medium lift helicopter.

Joint Nature of Amphibious CapabilityA key component of the joint force is the role the

Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) istaking in coordinating the ADF’s amphibious capability.Commander DJFHQ is responsible for leading the jointand Army development of the amphibious capability.This headquarters continues to develop joint amphi -

bious doctrineand conceptsfor operationsin support ofthe amphibiousc a p a b i l i t y .Under the leadof Com manderDJFHQ, 2013proved to be avery important year to trial our joint amphibiousprocedures and command and control concepts aheadof next year’s operational sea trials to achieve the initialoperating capability milestone.

In the last 12 months, DJFHQ has designed anAmphibious Pre-deployment Training Programme,similar in concept to the proven United States MarineCorps Pre-deployment Training Programme. TheAmphi bious Pre-deployment Training Programme isaligned with the Army training continuum and will com -mence when the amphibious infantry battalion andenablers have met individual and collective training pro -ficiencies within their respective core trades.

In 2013, DJFHQ validated the Amphibious Pre-deployment Training Programme through the conduct ofa trial certification exercise synchronised with ExerciseTalisman Sabre 2013. Using HMAS Choules and the2RAR landing force, Defence has developed acollective train ing regime that is now tailored to the LHDcapa bility and has begun to address the numerous jointchallenges the ADF will face as the LHD comes intoservice and the joint amphi bious concepts are tested.

ConclusionIn summary, we have made significant progress

towards introducing the first LHD in the years aheadand continue to refine our concepts and plans as we getcloser to realising the LHD capability and broader ADFamphibious capability.

The Author: Rear Admiral Mark Campbell has beenHead of Navy Capability since October 2012. Ahelicopter warfare instructor with substantial aviation,command, acquisition and sustainment experience, hehas about 3500 flying hours mainly as an anti-submarine tactical co-ordinator in Sea King andSeahawk helicopters. He has also flown S2-G Tracker,UH-1B Iroquois, Wessex 31B, Bell 206B-1 and AS350BSquirrel aircraft and served in HMA Ships Tobruk,Sydney, Darwin and Adelaide and HM Ships Illustriousand Invincible. He commanded 816 Squadron in1999–2000 and was head of the Defence MaterialOrganisation’s Helicopter Systems Division in2010–2012. His operational deployments have includedOperation Bursa, Operation Damask includingOperation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91,and in the North Red Sea enforcing United Nationssanctions against Iraq in 1992. [Photo of author: Departmentof Defence]



In this paper, I shall discuss logistic concepts in theamphi bious environment and the many logistic chal -lenges associated with supporting an amphibious force.First, though, I shall provide some context on how theAustralian Defence Force (ADF) intends to employ itsamphibious force.

Australiaʼs Amphibious ForceThe amphibious warfare spectrum is wide ranging

from hard kinetic type operations such as assaults andraids, to military support operations including humani -tarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), non-com -ba tant evacua tion operations (NEO), and defence aid tothe civil community (DACC).

We are about to undertake a step change transition inthe amphibious force, particularly as it relates to ship -ping, and the huge amount of equipment and troopsembarked therein. Over the last 18 months, the ADF hasmade great inroads in the transition from a force basedon a landing platform amphibious (LPA) with an ad hoclanding force, towards a standing joint force that can beincreased/decreased in size (i.e. is scalable) and in thevery near future will be based around the amphibiousassault ship (LHD). That work has principally beenachieved through a number of lines including:

• improved command and control structures andtraining within those structures of the AmphibiousTask Group (ATG) and the 2nd Battalion, RoyalAustralian Regiment (2RAR);

• development of joint mission essential task lists –those fundamental tasks relevant to amphibiousoperations;

• development and testing of collective trainingregimes;

• the integration of 2RAR Landing Force elementswith HMAS Choules, the landing ship dock (LSD);

• the integration of Army’s 5th Aviation Regiment airassets with Choules; and

• continual development of tactics, techniques andprocedures around operating the amphibious taskforce.

The development of the logistic plan is but one ofthose plans that continues to be developed. It includes astandard amphibious support order that includes aspectssuch as finance, mortuary affairs and health support. Ibelieve we continue to make good progress towards afully operational amphibious force by 2017.

The core of the amphibious force consists of anumber of amphibious ships and the embarked force.The embarked force comprises a joint command andcontrol element; an intelligence, surveillance and recon -naissance team; the ground combat element; a logisticcombat element; a rotary wing detachment; and navyelements. Depending on the mission and the environ -ment, the amphibious force may be supported by specialforces, naval escorts and support ships, additionalorganic and land-based aircraft, and other joint enablers.

While the force is scalable and flexible, there are twobaseline amphibious capabilities for planning purposes:

• the Amphibious Ready Element (ARE), basedaround 1 x LHD; and

• the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), basedaround both LHDs and supported by the LSDChoules.

Amphibious Ready GroupThe larger ARG is capable of the full suite of amphi -

bious tasks in a hostile environment. The size andcomplexity of this force dictates that it will be held at alonger readiness notice and is a much more complexlogistic problem for the Amphibious Task Force, the sup -porting maritime force and the joint logistics chain.

The landing force is likely to include: infantry; armour;artillery; engineers; armed reconnaissance, lift andmobility helicopters; intelligence, surveillance and recon -naissance elements; logistic and health support. Thislarge ATF will also require escort and support ships, aswell as land-based aircraft in support. This force will becapable of responding to strategic shaping, crisis andcontingency responses. It will have the capacity to open


Contemporary amphibiouslogistics operations

Captain Jay Bannister, RAN Commander, Australian Amphibious Task Group1

Australia’s developing amphibious task group will have significant logistic capacity. Logistics, however, can be anenormous challenge for an amphibious force and the logistics plan must be flexible and responsive to the landingforce scheme of manoeuvre. Sea-basing, embarkation, disembarkation, sustainment at sea, biosecurity, health andother logistic challenges are discussed.

Key words: amphibious logistics; sea-basing; embarkation; disembarkation; sustainment; biosecurity; healthsupport.

1E-mail: [email protected]

multiple points of entry as a precursor to a wider jointcampaign or conducting independent amphibiousoperations, such as raids, assaults and demonstrationsin support of a wider campaign. Clearly, given thecapacity for maritime manoeuvre, the ARG is the mostcredible land force able to exert influence across thearchipelagic environment in our region.

Amphibious Ready ElementThe smaller ARE amphibious force, while possessing

less combat power, is still capable of the full range ofamphibious tasks. The ARE, however, will be at a muchreduced notice (i.e. must be ready sooner) to provide aready force to conduct strategic shaping, crisis andcontingency response in an uncertain threat environ -ment.

The ARE is based around a single LHD. Still with anintegrated joint command and control structure, it willcomprise a scalable landing force with the commander ofthose forces commanding one or more combined armscombat teams with associated air, ground, intelligence,reconnaissance, surveillance, and logistic enablers.Depending on the mission, escorts and support ships,land-based aircraft and other joint enablers may be insupport. It might also include an enhanced healthcapability.

In 2013, components of the ARE were taken througha newly developed joint mounting, collective training andcertification period in Choules. Whereas previouslyforces had prepared predominantly in isolation with nocertifi ca tion before coming together for joint training, thiscycle will raise the joint amphibious force to a level wherethey are certified to meet government-directed require -ments, or to progress through to mission specific training.The ARE, embarked in HMAS Canberra, will go throughthis training and certification in 2015.

As part of the joint certification conducted in 2013 forthe newly formed ARE, a block training structure wastrialled for the continued development and certification ofthe amphibious force. This training was designed to testdifferent aspects of the ARE and was modelled on the‘crawl, walk, run’ philosophy. It was significant as thistraining had not been conducted to this scale by the ADFpreviously. The trial presented both challenges andoppor tunities for development of the joint force.

Block One, which was further separated into threephases, was the entry level activity and focused on thebasic development of the capability of the ARE. BlockOne Phase One was a specifically designed commandpost exercise to test the planning function of theheadquarters in a simulated environment away from theship. Block One Phase Two was a non-tactical, amphi -bious training activity targeting over ramp and beachdriving training for drivers from units assigned to the ARElanding force. While both activities were deemedsuccess ful, it highlighted a number of aspects forimprovement and provided a much needed starting pointfor the remaining block training. Block One Phase Threewas a pre-landing force concentration period, bringingtogether the landing force reconnaissance and snipers

and the maritime elements, including clearance diversand deployable geospatial teams. This was a skillssharing and task delineation activity, followed by a tacticalphase where intelligence, surveillance and recon nais -sance battlespace management concepts were designedand proven.

Block Two was the first time that the entire ARE jointforce came together for a tactical exercise. Commencingwith combat enhancement training and force integrationtraining, the exercise was also utilised to generate andconfirm standing operating procedures for the ARE.Block Two also saw concepts put to the test that had onlybeen planned previously, including the deployment of thepre-landing force, the execution of a non-combatantevacua tion operation from the sea, security and stabilityopera tions, and raids.

Block Three, the culminating activity for the year, wasa joint exercise led by the Deployable Joint Force Head -quarters and focused on the planning and conduct ofamphibious contingency missions, such as raids, tacticalrecovery of aircraft and personnel, and joint force entryoperations. The exercise was conducted within theExercise Talisman Sabre 13 scenario.

Amphibious Forceʼs Logistic CapacityI now want to touch on the enormity of the logistic

challenge for the amphibious force. The future force willcontain significantly more amphibious shipping than didthe former force based on the Kanimbla-class landingplatforms amphibious and the landing ship heavy, HMASTobruk. It is notable that the future shipping will have 3.5times the linear metres (a unit of measurement for vehiclespace) of the old shipping. The difference between thenew embarked force and the former one is similar inmagnitude.

Let me try to put this amphibious capability intocontext so that you might gain an insight into the enormityof managing the logistics, but also to appreciate what thisamphibious force can provide towards military supportoptions such as humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief. In a single move, Choules alone can transport atotal load of up to 26 M1A1 main battle tanks, about 70light vehicles and over 200 tonnes of ammunition, anamount equivalent to 75 C-17 Globemaster or more than180 C-130 Hercules transport aircraft loads. Similarly, anLHD equates to 156 x C17s and 375 x C130s; and thetotal ARG to 387 x C17s or 930 x C130s.

Perhaps you think I am being a bit disingenuous asclearly air will get there quicker. So let us say thedestination was 12 days steam for our amphibious taskforce, a distance that the C17 might cover in a single leg.The LSD (Choules) would arrive in 12 days withequipment that is combat ready to be employed as soonas it is unloaded. If we could use four C17s to move thiscargo and assuming they could generate the necessaryrate of effort, it would still take them 52 days to deliver thestores. One would also have to assume that the planeshad permission to overfly countries en route and hostnation support in the receiving nation, which would alsoneed an airfield suitable for strategic airlift.


As just mentioned, unique to amphibious operationsis that equipment is delivered in the combat configuredstate, ready to go out the gate, or off the line-of-march.This is not the case with our normal logistic chain. If thoseelements were to be air or sea lifted, they would arrive ina ware housed state and you would then have to add agood period of time for reception, staging and integrationinto a force that you would have had to establish on theground in advance.

Sea-basingIn terms of the entry operation, modern thinking has

moved away from a static lodgement and subsequentbuild-up of combat power and equipment at a beachheadprior to breaking out. Modern thinking in amphibiouswarfare is more centred around distributed manoeuvre,aiming for high mobility and rapid tempo manoeuvrefocused directly on the objective, or multiple objectives.Beaches become littoral penetration points, secured andoperated only as long as necessary to enablemanoeuvre.

This approach will typically aim to maintain a sea-based logistic approach, drawing on the resources withinall shipping and aiming to minimise the footprint ashore.This approach requires a networked fires and robustcom mand and control capability for strong coordination.Clearly, in a permissive environment and when under -taking military support operations, many of these chal -lenges should be easier to manage, but they still requirea high level of coordination.

We have very little experience in such concepts andindeed the landing force will struggle with the limitationsimposed by the reduced sustainment in the ATF and anirregular logistics chain. It will take some time, andperhaps operational experience to truly explore the capa -bilities and limitations of this concept, and understand thetrue benefits of sea-basing.

EmbarkationSo how do we get all the equipment to the area of

operations (AO)? There are essentially two variations toloading ships: tactical stowage, or administrativestowage.

Administrative stowage aims to load and maximisespace with no, or minimal consideration to the order ofhow it would be unloaded. This is essentially a sealifttask, some thing that commercially-contracted shippingcould probably do cheaper than utilising amphibiousships.

Tactical stowage is driven by the off-load require -ments, that is, the land force commander’s scheme ofmanoeuvre ashore in the AO, be it in a hostile environ -ment or a military support operation such as providinghumanitarian assistance or disaster relief. During thetactical unload, or ship-to-shore movement of troops,equipment and supplies by organic air or surface craft, itis vital that cargo is delivered ashore at the prescribedtime, at the correct location and in the sequence requiredto support the land force com mander’s scheme ofmanoeuvre. So in order to ensure that the load

configuration supports this we need to ensure the shipsare loaded in the correct sequence at our point ofdeparture.

This works well in a deliberate and planned deploy -ment though how often would we do this? Not very oftenI would put it to you, particularly during a crisis. Typically,amphibious operations planning continues after theamphi bious task force has sailed and therefore thelanding plan continues to evolve. It might subsequentlybe further adjusted should a rehearsal be conducted. Forthis reason, we aim to only load amphibious shipping to80 per cent capacity to enable a tactical re-stow en route.Our adherence to this doctrine, though, has not beengood traditionally – as history shows, we sail to thegunwales with equipment and subsequently have limitedability to move equipment around at sea.

It often seems that the landing force can never bringenough equipment, which is understandable given thetypical combat power they would seek to generate in aconventional land environment. Hopefully, with the muchlarger capacity in the future the ARG, we can be moredisciplined in this regard, but I fear that stakeholders willseek to challenge this most times.

As an example, a tactical re-stow occurred as recentlyas category 5 tropical cyclone Ita when the landing forcewas already embarked in Choules during an exercise offNorth Queensland in April. The ARE was put on noticeand was poised to support civilian emergency services ifthe need arose. Our load configuration was not ideal butthe team was able to undertake a tactical re-stow at seato ensure we had access to the right equipment to goashore and provide immediate aid to the community. Asit turned out, the cyclone damage was not as severe asanticipated and the Queensland emergency services hadthe capacity to deal with it.

DisembarkationMoving troops and equipment ashore in a tactical

environment is a hugely complex and resource intensivetask. Whilst there are numerous methods to conduct theship-to-objective manoeuvre, the quickest method willalways be over the wharf. However, in environmentswhere that is not possible, such as when port infra -structure is damaged or the hydrographic environment isuncertain or not conducive for berthing alongside, or thesecurity situation simply does not allow, organic air andsurface lift can be utilised. The LHDs with their fourembarked landing craft can move significant amounts ofequipment. Supplemented by embarked air lift, thelogistic offload is very flexible. Choules, with herembarked landing craft and helicopter deck, hasadditional capability with its ‘mexeflote’, a series of self-propelled pontoons capable of shifting very largeamounts of stores, albeit in fairly benign conditions.

Sustainment at SeaWithin a wider campaign, the amphibious operation

may be supported by a joint logistic plan utilising aninteg rated air, sea and land lift plan that reaches backinto the national support base. In such cases, the


operational logistic plan must be heavily influenced bythe require ments to support the ARE.

Sealift of stores equipment will typically beundertaken by non-amphibious shipping be it navalauxiliaries or commercially-contracted vessels. Poten -tially the LSD may be employed in a follow on sealift taskdepending on the logistic flow requirements.

Across the amphibious spectrum of operations in themaritime domain, there is the scope to poise, or indeedsimply to be deployed for extended periods. During aprotracted operation or at a distance from the nationalsupport base, direct support from naval sustainmentshipping will be integral to the operation.

The ability of ships to remain at sea for extensiveperiods is well practised. Indeed, as recently as last April,the Royal Australian Navy task group involved in thesearch for Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 remained atsea for 5-6 weeks with the support of auxiliary sustain -ment shipping.

In 2006, as commanding officer of the landingplatform amphibious, HMAS Kanimbla, and in companywith the frigate Newcastle and the replenishment oilerSuccess, I remained at sea for 6 weeks in internationalwaters prepared to conduct operations in Fiji should ithave been required. This capacity to maintain presence,however, does require supply ships to conduct portlogistics visits to collect food, fuel and consigned cargofor the task group, and not unusually take the taskgroup’s rubbish back to a port, one of the moreunpleasant tasks for them.

BiosecurityThese days, biosecurity is a major challenge for any

operation overseas. It is a major overhead that consumessignificant resources to meet Australian Quarantine andInspection standards. As you can appreciate, anytime weput equipment ashore, be it helicopters into a landingzone or vehicles over the beach and into the hinterland inan overseas location, they are exposed to foreignhazards. The re-embarkation of that equipment and thepersonal stores of the landing force, and the potential forcontami na tion of the amphibious shipping, will requirecareful consideration during the logistics planning phaseto ensure there is a robust plan to deal with those issues.

Specialist Capabilities and EquipmentMost of these logistic principles I have touched on will

apply across the spectrum of amphibious operations. Ifprior planning allows, the load plan will include specialistequipment to support the operation. Examples of thismight include water purification plants or field hospitalsfor a humanitarian aid or disaster relief mission, orspecial forces capabilities for an uncertain or hostile non-com batant evacuation. Irrespective, the logistic principlesare broadly similar in terms of supporting the execution ofthe amphibious operation once in theatre. We must keepin mind, though, that once the amphibious group hassailed, it is too late to remember we left a vital bit ofequip ment behind that is essential for the initialamphibious lodge ment.

Health SupportOne of the unique capabilities of the LHD will be its

health capability, inherent with its own unique logisticchallenges. With two operating theatres, a 6-bedresuscitation unit, both high and low dependency wards,radiography, pathology and pharmacy, this is the mostcapable medical care asset since World War II. However,it is only as good as the people that we man it with, thisalone being a challenge for the ADF.

It is important to note though that the principal role ofthis capability is preservation of our own forces. Further,it is not intended for long-term patients. The moving ofcasualties from the point of wounding to the LHD forstabilisation and potential emergency surgery, beforetheir subsequent tactical aeromedical evacuation to atertiary level care facility or strategic aeromedicalevacuation to Australia, is another tough logisticchallenge for the force. While doctrine development inthis space progresses well, there is some way to go todevelop the capability.

The use of this capability during a humanitarian aid ordisaster relief operation could be quite broad. Forcepreservation would take primacy, however the healthpracti tioners might support those agencies on theground, be they military or civilian. As to whether the LHDfacility would be used for the local population, this wouldneed to be a unique determination for each operation.

ConclusionSo in summary, it is vital that the amphibious logistics

plan is flexible, mobile and responsive, to meet thelanding force scheme of manoeuvre during any amphi -bious opera tion. If part of a wider campaign or enduringopera tion, the joint logistic support plan must enable theamphi bious task force to function effectively.

Amphibious operations are renowned for being one ofthe most complex military processes, if only perhapsbecause of the logistics challenges. The logistics supportplan, though, is fundamental to the very independentnature of amphibious task group operations.

If we are to enjoy success in an amphibiousoperation, bringing the logistics plan together, both at thetactical and operational level, is a significant challenge. Arobust logistic plan will be essential to an effectiveoperation.

The Author: Captain Jay Bannister is Commander of theAustralian Amphibious Task Group and Fleet Battle Staff.In an amphibious operation or exercise, he commandsthe Amphibious Task Force. He attained dual speciali -sations as a Mine Warfare and Clearance Diver, and as aPrincipal Warfare Officer – Surface Warfare. His seaservice included commands of the coastal mine hunter,HMAS Gascoyne, and the landing platform amphibious,HMAS Kanimbla. He recently commanded the trainingestab lishment, HMAS Watson, and was the trainingauthority for maritime warfare. In 2013, he deployed tothe Middle East as the chief-of-staff in the AustralianNational Head quarters. [Photo of Captain Bannister: Colonel J.M. Hutcheson, MC]


Seventy years ago in May-June 1944, during theItalian campaign of World War II, the Luftwaffe mounteda desperate effort to counter Allied air superiority. Thisfollowed the Allies’ break-out from the attritional battlesat Anzio and Cassino, but it would prove to be in vain.

The night of 11 May 1944 was set for the fourthbattle to begin, the hoped for final battle for Cassino andthe Monte Cassino Monastery. With the bulk of EighthArmy now added to Fifth Army, the Allies planned tothrow overwhelming force at the mountain bastion. In aconcentration of numbers, firepower and a massiveartillery bombardment, they intended to smash theirway through the Gustav Line and north onto Highway 6.It was not just a pincer movement of break-throughs outof Anzio and Cassino. The German Army found inretreat that they were under constant attack from Alliedair forces.

In one instance on 14 May, No. 239 Wing Royal AirForce (RAF) of the Desert Air Force (DAF), whichincluded the Kittyhawks of Nos. 3 and 450 SquadronsRoyal Australian Air Force (RAAF), targeted some 200or so vehicles trying to withdraw at Subiaco. By theday’s end, there were an estimated 120 destroyed ordamaged. In the last six days of May, Allied fighters andfighter-bombers claimed 1148 vehicles of all typesdestroyed and 766 damaged. This may have even beenunder-stated. Between Cori and Artena on the AdolfHitler Line, Fifth Army counted 211 vehicles wreckedclearly by air strikes, whereas air force claims had onlyestimated 173.

The fighter-bombers were only able to go about theirdestructive work because of the air superiority assertedand sustained day after day and around the clock byAllied fighters, particularly those of DAF, against theLuftwaffe. Australian airmen were prominent throughoutRAF squadrons, an example being the night-fighters ofNo. 600 Squadron RAF. In the early hours of 15 May at0230, Australian Flying Officer S. F. Rees and FlyingOfficer D. C. Bartlett of 600 Squadron lifted off theirBeaufighter Mk VIF AI (No. V6574) from their base atMarcianise. North of the River Tiber sometime after0400, they made radar contact with a bogey and gavechase. When close enough they identified a Ju88. At0441 Rees shot down the German bomber andreturned to Marcianise at 0520 h.

On 21 May near Anzio, more than twenty of theLuftwaffe’s formidable Focke-Wulf Fw190 fighter-bombers were about to begin their bombing runs onAllied lines. Eight Spitfires of No. 145 Squadron RAF cut

them off. Squadron Leader Neville Duke shot down two,and Flying Officer Joe Ekbury three, in a total of eightFw190s destroyed, plus one probable and onedamaged. Against the strongest air-to-ground opera tionthe Luftwaffe could muster at that time, it was acrushing blow. And so it went on as Allied air powerthwarted the Luftwaffe’s attempts to get back into the airwar. By the beginning of September, those Luftwaffeday fighter units still surviving in northern Italy wereforced to transfer to Germany.

DAF was made up of both air force formations andindividual airmen from nearly every Allied nation. Fromthe early years, Americans, Australians, British,Canadians, New Zealanders and South Africans wereprominent, either in their own national wings orsquadrons, or in RAF formations within DAF. Later, DAFembraced airmen from many other Allied nations andgained its strength and esprit de corps from its verydiversity. A common cause welded them together. ManyAustralian airmen in both RAF and RAAF squadrons,such as No. 3 and No. 450 Squadrons, DAF, wereprominent.

The DAF had first established air superiority over theLuftwaffe during the battles at El Alamein inJuly–November 1942, and then held it as the Desertcampaign continued on through Libya, Tunisia, andSicily. Later, in Italy from August 1943 to the end of thewar, decisive air power was maintained throughcountless battles, such as at Salerno, Termoli, Anzio,Cassino, the Gothic Line, and the final battle for theArgenta Gap and the River Po, as DAF and EighthArmy fought as one entity.

The pioneering tactics developed by DAF for theclose support of ground forces on the battlefieldprovided a template which was copied by air forces inother theatres during the Second World War. Marshal ofthe Royal Air Force Lord Tedder GCB, who was thefounder of the DAF and its commander in its early yearsbefore he became Deputy to Eisenhower, stated thatthe DAF played a lead role, and in his view was ‘… thekey to the ultimate victory in Europe’. Certainly, Alliedair power, particularly the DAF, was a decisive factor inbringing Allied victory in North Africa and Italy.

Bryn Evans1


CONTRIBUTED HISTORY NOTE

Seventy years ago: the Desert Air Forcein Italy, 1944

In May-June 1944, during the Italian campaign of World War II, the Luftwaffe mounted a desperate effort to counterAllied air superiority, but it would prove to be in vain.

1Bryn Evans, secretary of the Institute, is a military historian. This note isbased on: Bryn Evans (2014), The decisive campaigns of the Desert AirForce 1942-1945 (Pen and Sword Books: UK). Signed first editions maybe purchased from the author [Email: [email protected]: 02 9438 1939]. Part of the proceeds will be remitted to the Institute.


BOOK REVIEW

The backroom boys: Alfred Conlon and Army’sDirectorate of Research and Civil Affairs, 1942-46

by Graeme Sligo

Big Sky Publishing: Newport, NSW; 2013; 380 pp.; ISBN 9781921941122 (hardback); RRP $34.99 ~ Ursula Davidson Library call number 355 SLIG 2103

When I was serving in the then United StatesLieutenant General Ray Odierno’s staff in Iraq in 2008, Irecall the influential presence of a British female civilian‘political advisor’, and somewhat bemused that theGeneral’s Iraqi culture advisor was a former New York Citytaxi driver. War has a habit of bringing together strangebedfellows. Graeme Sligo’s The Backroom Boys is thestory of similarly strange bedfellows during World War II.

The Backroom Boys is the remarkable, but little known,story of how a varied group of talented intellectuals weredrafted into the Australian Army in the dark days of 1942and provided high-level policy advice to the Commander-in-Chief of Australia’s military forces, General ThomasBlamey, and through him to the Government. This band ofacademics, lawyers and New Guinea patrol officersformed a unique military unit, the Directorate of Researchand Civil Affairs, under the command of an eccentric andmasterful string-puller, Alf Conlon; who in his civiliancapacity was also Chairman of the Prime Minister’s Com -mittee on National Morale. A controversial figure, Conlonemerged as a skilled advisor to Blamey with an ability torelate to men of power.

Graeme Sligo is a colonel in the Australian Army whohas served overseas in East Timor and Iraq. He is agraduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, theCanadian Forces Command and Staff College, Toronto,the National Defence University of Pakistan, the Universityof New South Wales and the University of Melbourne.Sligo’s own service has exposed him to many strange andexotic bedfellows.

The war brought a huge expansion of the Army infunctional as well as numerical terms, particularly afterJapan's entry. The Army had a host and growing numberof unfamiliar tasks in developing itself for the purpose offighting the war: defending Australia; liberating whatbecame Papua New Guinea (PNG), and other Pacificislands, and subsequent administration of PNG; thereconquest of North Borneo; and plans for the invasion ofJapan and post-invasion military government.

What exactly did the Directorate do? The moresuspicious saw it as “an intelligence group, an undercoveroperation which is shrouded in mystery”. This was mostcertainly not the case. It was, in its essence, ‘a policyadvice bureau’ on a range of politico-military, manpowerand scientific issues.

According to one of the directorate's illustrious staff,the poet James McAuley, “Alf's army directorate was, ofcourse, an extraordinary organisation, and it had in it someof the elements of a Renaissance court, with Alf as aMedici prince.”

The Directorate has been depicted as a haven forunderemployed poets or meddlesome soldier-politicians.

Based on his wide-ranging research, Sligo reveals a fullerand more fascinating picture. The fierce conflicts in thewartime bureaucracy between public servants andsoldiers, in which the Directorate provided critical supportto Blamey, went to the heart of military command,accountability and the profession of arms.

The Directorate was a pioneer in developingapproaches to military government in areas liberated bythe combat troops. The Directorate's central effort was forPNG. Work in the first instance centred on the period ofmilitary government, following the progressive expulsion ofthe Japanese forces. Conlon certainly had a gift for lookingbeyond the situation immediately at hand. Conlon'sendeavours addressed many aspects of the post-wardevelopment of PNG. Improving educational standardsmeant a government school system in a field that hadhitherto been dominated by the missions. Economicdevelopment of the territory required documentation of thegeography and geology of the land, and research on therequirements of agriculture.

Staff training and development was a major innovationbrought about during World War II. Conlon thought it had amajor part to play in preparing for the post-war world, interritories occupied by Australian troops but above all inPNG. The new administration was to have a well-trainedworkforce, centrally and in the field. This was the origin ofwhat eventually became the Australian School of PacificAdministration, eventually located in Sydney.

As the war in the Pacific drew to a close, the Directo -rate was deeply involved in the prospective militarygovernment of the North Borneo territories until the Britishcould fully resume their stewardship of the area.

The Backroom Boys includes a large number ofillustrations and several clear maps. It also has a list ofabbreviations, ranks and notes on a significant number ofthe characters included in the book. There are threeannexes listing the Directorate’s members as well as thestaff and students of each course it ran. Sligo has includeda meticulous set of end notes and a comprehensivebibliography. In all, Sligo has produced a first-class bookon a little known and elusive topic.

The Backroom Boys provides a detailed historicalexample of how post-war occupations can be planned andsuccessfully implemented – an issue of enduringimportance as the recent ‘stability operations’ in Iraq andAfghanistan have demonstrated. While the topic cannot beeasily digested by contemporary military and governmentpractitioners, translating its enduring lessons intocontemporary multi-agency doctrine should be a priorityfor Defence and its Australian Civil-Military Centre.

Marcus Fielding

The story of Australia’s part in the Gallipoli Campaign hasbecome a central part of our national story and identity. Onthe eve of the campaign’s centenary it is a story that runs therisk of becoming more mythical in nature. Thank goodness,then, for Climax at Gallipoli which might put some objectivebalance back into the Anzac Centenary proceedings.

Climax at Gallipoli examines the performance of the Allies’Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) in the AugustOffensive of the Gallipoli Campaign. Crawley’s examination ofthe Campaign is rigorous, dispassionate and timely. His keymessage is that the August Offensive was flawed from theoutset and destined to fail.

Dr Rhys Crawley is a historian with the Strategic andDefence Studies Centre at the Australian National University.He has received several research scholarships and giventalks on aspects of his research on the Gallipoli campaign atthe University of Birmingham, the Imperial War Museum, theAustralian War Memorial and the Istanbul MedeniyetUniversity.

Crawley reminds us that in 1915, the second year of thewar, the Allies were still adapting to a new form of warfare,with static defence replacing the manoeuvre and offensivestrategies of earlier British doctrine. In the attempt, both theMEF at Gallipoli and the British Expeditionary Force on theWestern Front aimed for too much and the result was all tootypical of the Great War – an aggregation of sacrifices as futileas they were heroic. To explain why, he examines in detail theoperational level of war in the campaign, critically scrutinizingplanning, command, mobility, fire support, inter-servicecooperation, and logistics. Crawley links these elements intoa military ‘system’ and his work draws on unprecedentedresearch in the United Kingdom and Australia.

Crawley is critical of the nationalistic rhetoric associatedwith the Gallipoli Campaign in general and the AugustOffensive in particular. “Gallipoli has gone down in history assomething that was on the brink of succeeding,” says Crawley.“Victory was assured, the story goes, ‘if only’ the Allies hadpushed a little harder, or had been the recipients of somesimple good luck. But when we take a step back, and view it

as a case study in the how and why of 1915 warfare, we seea very different picture. It was not unlike what happened onthe Western Front. This was a new kind of war, and all armieswere struggling to figure out how to adapt and defeat theirenemy. It was years before the technology and tacticsadvanced to a stage where victory was possible.”

The Gallipoli Campaign has also been portrayed as one inwhich the British foolishly sent Anzac soldiers to their death,resulting in the loss of about 8700 Australians and 2700 NewZealanders. This is a popular mis con ception that Crawley alsodisputes. “Contrary to what many believe to be the case, theBritish officers in charge of the campaign were not bumblingfools who joyfully sent men to their death in ill-conceivedplans,” he says. “Rather, they were experienced men who hadan intimate knowledge of their profession. The popularnarrative forgets that the British lost many more troops atGallipoli with around 34,000 killed throughout the campaign.”

Crawley also reminds us that Gallipoli is not just a storyabout the Anzacs. “The Anzacs were a relatively smallcomponent of the Allied army of Indian, French, and Britishtroops that landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Their roledeserves to be part of our national narrative, as does theirsacrifice,” he said. “By talking of the Anzacs at the expense ofall others, we have afforded ordinary Australian volunteers, ofall ages and walks of life, superman status. We have blowntheir actions and achievements out of all proportion, and havedeveloped a national history of Gallipoli that is devoid ofhistorical context.”

Climax at Gallipoli is highly recommended for all thoseinterested in the Gallipoli Campaign and in the operations ofthe First World War as a whole. The price may put off casualreaders, but at the same time reflects the high academicstandard of his research and prose. Crawley should becommended for producing an objective account of the AugustOffensive based on primary source material, but sadly I fear itwill become more a reference book for further research thana popular bestseller.

Marcus Fielding


BOOK REVIEWS

Climax at Gallipoli – the failure of the August offensive

by Dr Rhys Crawley

University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, USA; 2014; 364 pp.; ISBN 9780806144269(hardcover); RRP $71.00

Australia and the Vietnam War by Peter Edwards

NewSouth Publishing: Sydney; 2014; 304 pp.; ISBN 9781742232744 (hardback); RRP $49.99;Ursula Davidson Library call number XXX EDWA 2014

This book is a great high-level examination of Australia’sSouth-East Asian wars between 1948 and 1975. Indeed,despite the title’s focus on the Vietnam War this is really asingle volume version of the nine volumes of the OfficialHistory of Australia's Involvement in Southeast AsianConflicts 1948–1975 published between 1992 and 2012. In

this regard, Edwards, the officialhistorian for the series, describesAustralia and the Vietnam War as theequivalent to C. E. W. Bean’s single volume Anzac to Amiensand Gavin Long’s The Six Years War.

(Continued on page 35)

Edwards is a writer, historian and biographer, who haspublished extensively on Australian and international historyand politics. He is currently an Adjunct Professor at DeakinUniversity, Melbourne, and has in recent years held profes -sorial appointments at Flinders University in Adelaide and theUniversity of New South Wales, Canberra.

Australia and the Vietnam War actually examines theMalayan Emergency and the Indonesia-Malaysia Confronta -tion as well as the Vietnam War (aka the second Indo-Chinesewar, or from the Vietnamese perspective the ‘American War’)– each of which occurred in the wider context of the Cold Warand decolonisation.

Australia and the Vietnam War is not an ‘in the weeds’tactical account of the wars, but an examination of why wewent to these places, and what political, diplomatic, social andmilitary factors impacted on the management of thedeployments. Those seeking SAS-like war stories should goelsewhere.

Edwards probes some important questions – WasVietnam a case of Australia fighting ‘other people’s wars’?Were we really ‘all the way’ with the United States? How validwas the ‘domino theory’? Did the Australian forces developnew tactical methods in earlier Southeast Asian conflicts, andjust how successful were they against the unyielding enemyin Vietnam?

With the benefit of decades contemplating the topic,Edwards has done a masterful job of analysing the factorsthat led to high-level decisions. He makes some thoughtfulcomparisons between the ways in which the Malayan Emer -gency, the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation and the VietnamWar were handled by successive Australian govern ments. Healso ‘busts’ a number of myths that have developed over theyears regarding Australia and the Vietnam War. For example,national service was not introduced because of the com mit -ment to the Vietnam War, and there were consistently more

volunteers for national service than men who refused to bedrafted. The result is a com pre hen sive, balanced and easilyunderstood account of a com pli cated and contentious periodin Australian history.

While he does leverage the New Zealand records,Edwards does not draw heavily from United States sources orindeed from North Vietnamese records that might alsoprovide alternate perspectives on decision drivers and events.

The last chapter titled “Lessons, Legacies and Legends” iswhere Edwards’ tremendous analytical skills come to the fore.He makes some very valuable observations and reflectionson strategic and defence policy, foreign policy, operationalmethods, counter-insurgency operations, conscription andthe post-war experiences of Vietnam War veterans.

Australia and the Vietnam War includes some goodimages, but the one colour map of South Vietnam is too smalla scale to be of any real utility. The front and rear inside covershave been used to place two maps of South-East Asia – thefirst from 1945 and the second from 1965-1974 – but thechanges are too subtle. The text includes two black and whitemaps of Phuoc Tuy Province and the Dat Do barrier minefield.Overall, however, the excellent text might have beenburnished by a better series of maps throughout the text.

The book includes a list of abbreviations and a chronologyof events at the start which are useful to readers unfamiliarwith the subject. There are appendices showing the number oftroops deployed to South Vietnam over time; the key politicaland military appointees between 1962 and 1973 (albeit toosmall a font to read); and short biographies on all thosenamed in the book. Edwards also includes a useful sectionrecommending further reading broken down by theme. Acomprehensive index will assist researchers.

Edwards should certainly be congratulated for his com mit -ment, professionalism and dedication to recording Australia’smilitary history by not only completing the nine volumes of theofficial history, but then going the extra mile for this additional‘unofficial’ volume. It is a legacy of which he can be justifiablyproud.

Marcus Fielding


BOOK REVIEWSAustralia and the Vietnam War…(Continued from page 33)

The digger’s view: WWI in colour by Juan Mahony

The Diggerʼs View Pty Ltd: New Lambton, NSW; 2014; 270 pp.; ISBN 9780957969612(hardback); RRP $50.00

On the eve of the Anzac Centenary this book and theproject to create it deserve high praise. The Digger's View isa magnificently produced high quality book that will create aconnection with any reader. The book is crammed with rarecolourised photos and diary entries that provide a verypersonal perspective of some of the Australian soldiers whoserved during World War I.

The Digger's View was five years in the planning andproduction. The collaboration between Juan Mahony and KentRowe Digital Print has resulted in a unique and fresh look atAustralia and World War I. The project sought to betterappreciate what Australian soldiers experienced; and toexplain what they observed and reflected on during the war.

All the images in the book have been painstakinglycolourised to accurately portray what the diggers’ worldlooked like. Each high resolution image takes between oneday to one month to complete, and the attention to detail in

the colouring process achieves results far superior toautomated recolouring techniques. The results are nothingless than spectacular.

The narrative text from the participants further enhancesthe personal perspective. The book includes a comprehensiveglossary, list of abbreviations, and chronology of events aswell as statistics about the First Australian Imperial Force.Group photos have all the individuals identified and there isalso a biographical note for all those that feature in the bookas well as a comprehensive names index.

The Digger's View is available in bookshops and on-line atwww.thediggersview.com.au where sections of the book canbe viewed. At $50.00 RRP this book is terrific value for moneyand would make a handsome gift. If you only buy one book tomark the Anzac Centenary The Digger's View should pro -bably be it.

Marcus Fielding

INSTITUTE NEWS INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS: AMPHIBIOUS ... · Roslyn BASHIR AC CVO– Dame Marie has been...

Documents

Transcript of INSTITUTE NEWS INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS: AMPHIBIOUS ... · Roslyn BASHIR AC CVO– Dame Marie has been...