Insight Turkey Volume 13 Number 2 2011 Kemal Kirisci

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urkey’s “Demonstrative Efect” and the ransormation o the Middle East

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A string o uprisings in unisia and

Egypt in the early part o 2011 ol-lowed by those in other countries have rekin-dled the debate over reorm and democratiza-

tion in the Arab world. Te Arab world haslong been treated as an exception to the “thirdwave” o democratization that swept Centraland Eastern Europe, Latin America, and partso Asia and Arica ollowing the end o the ColdWar.1 In 2004 the American administration, topromote a “reedom agenda” and democracy,launched the ambitious Broader Middle East

and North Arica (BMENA) initiative. How-ever, this initiative, aer having shown someinitial signs o hope in 2004 and 2005, very quickly collapsed. Te disasters in Aghanistanand Iraq compelled the United States as well asthe EU to prioritize stability over reorm anddemocratization and the regimes in the Arabworld quickly returned back to old habits o

authoritarian and repressive policies.

Turkey’s “Demonstrative Efect”and the Transormation o the

Middle East

KEMAL KİRİŞCİ*

* Proessor, Boğaziçi University, Department o Political Science

and International Relations, [email protected]

A string o uprisings in unisia

and Egypt ollowed by those in

other countries have rekindled

the issue o urkey constituting

a model or reorm and

democratization in the Arab

world, a point raised by manyWestern and Arab commentators.

Independent o this debate, what

is lacking in the literature is an

analysis o how come there is a

“demand” or the urkish model.

Tis article develops the concept o

a “demonstrative efect” and argues

that it is this “efect” that makes

the urkish model o interest to the Middle East and that this “efect” is

a unction o three developments:

the rise o the “trading state”,

the difusion o urkey’s

democratization experience as a

“work in progress”, and the positive

image o urkey’s “new” oreign

policy. Te concluding part o the

article discusses several challenges

urkey has to meet so that its“demonstrative efect” can have a

positive impact.

ABSTRACT

Insight urkey Vol. 13 / No. 2 / 2011pp. 33-55

Articles



KEMAL KİRİŞCİ

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A leading scholar o democracy anddemocratization in the United States,

Larry Diamond, underlines the impor-tance o a “model” in inspiring reormand transormation among Arab coun-tries. He cites the absence o such a“model” in the Middle East as one o aset o actors complicating the prospects

o democratization in the region.2 Yet recently, prominent personalities rang-ing rom the unisian opposition leader Rashid al-Ganouchi to the grandson o

Hassan al-Banna, the ounder o the Muslim Brotherhood, ariq Ramadan havehighlighted the importance o urkey as a model or example or the transorma-tion o the Arab world.3 Tis, however, is not a new development. As the SovietUnion collapsed and the question o reorm and democratization emerged in itsormer republics, the Economist announced urkey to be the “Star o Islam” and amodel or the Central Asian republics especially.4 Roughly a decade later the ideao urkey as a “model” was raised once again, this time by the American PresidentGeorge Bush when he launched the BMENA initiative. urkey was ocially made

a party to this initiative.5 In both cases urkey’s “model” credentials were basedon urkey being a secular Muslim country and a democracy with a liberal market.Both o these developments triggered a debate on whether urkey could or couldnot be a “model” and produced a rich body o literature.6

Actually, the thoughts o neither al-Ganouchi nor Ramadan are new. Te Arabworld began to take a close interest in urkey roughly around the time the EUdecided to open accession negotiations with urkey in December 2004. Te thenminister o oreign aairs o urkey, Abdullah Gül, likes to reminisce that thenumber o Arab oreign correspondents covering the press conerence o the EUdecision was higher than correspondents rom other countries.7 With this levelo interest it is not surprising that Arab journalists began to raise the view thaturkey constitutes a model o reorm in the Arab world. For example, one such

journalist argued that “it will be possible to learn rom urkey’s experience. Tiswill mean that the reorms will come via rom within a great Islamic country”. Teauthor went on to argue that reorms attained in this manner would become muchmore palatable than would otherwise be the case.8 Another journalist argued that

the contest was between the model urkey was oering in contrast to the oneadvocated by Osama Bin Laden.9

What sets the current debate on urkey’s role as a model apart rom previ-ous occasions is that unlike in the past this time the debate is occurring against a

urkey is being shown as a

model by the very people whoare involved in eorts tobring about reorm andtransormation in the Arabworld




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backdrop o successul uprisings in Egypt and unisia that have raised the genu-ine prospects o actual reorm. Tis time urkey is being shown as a model by the

very people who are involved in eorts to bring about reorm and transormationin the Arab world. Tese developments are again accompanied by a lively debateon why urkey can or cannot be a model or transormation and democratiza-tion in the Arab world.10 However, independent o this debate, what is lackingis an analysis o how come there is a “demand” or the urkish model. In otherwords what explains the growing awareness o the urkish model, independento whether the model is applicable or not? What is it that renders urkey visibleto those seeking or demanding reorm in the Arab world? What are the chan-

nels through which this model is diused or transmitted? Tis paper will developthe concept o “demonstrative eect” and argue that it is this “eect” that makesthe urkish model o interest to the Middle East and that this “eect” is a unc-tion o three developments: the rise o the “trading state”, making urkey visiblethrough commerce, investment and trade; the diusion o urkey’s democratiza-tion experience as a “work in progress”; and the positive image o urkey’s “new”oreign policy, including the introduction o policies encouraging reer movemento people between urkey and the Middle East.

“Demonstrative Efect”

Various terms are used to describe urkey’s role in respect to assisting theprospects o reorm and democratic transormation in the Arab world. Teseterms range rom “model,” “example” to “inspiration”. Even the notion o “com-panion” has been advocated.11 Tis paper acknowledges that those who employ these terms do have certain dierences in mind. Space precludes a discussiono these dierences as well as whether urkey can or or that matter ought tobe a “model”, an “example”, an “inspiration” or a “companion” or not. Instead,the ocus is on how come a range o personalities directly involved in the questor reorm and transormation in the Arab world see urkey as a model. It isundoubtedly possible to develop various arguments to answer such a question.Tis paper advocates the view that one answer stems rom urkey’s demonstra-tive eect.

Samuel Huntington in his seminal work on the “third wave” o democratiza-

tion highlights the importance o the demonstrative eect as a means o showingthat democratic change can happen and how it can happen.12 He reers to theprocess as a snowballing eect o earlier transitions that allow the “stimulatingand providing models o subsequent eorts at democratization”.13 In other words,earlier democratic transitions and experiences set an example or others to ol-



KEMAL KİRİŞCİ

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low. Moreover, Huntington notes that the most powerul demonstrative eectsare regional ones.14 He gives as an example o this process the case o the col-lapse o authoritarian rule in the Philippines as a result o “people power” in 1986inspiring the mass South Korean protests the ollowing year that opened the way to South Korea’s democratization. Te rise o an eective Polish civil society inthe late 1980s, or example, inspired neighboring countries that saw communistparties surrender their monopoly on power within months o Solidarity orm-ing a government in Poland in August 1989.15 Te inuence o the demonstrativeeect is noted especially in the case o the “color revolutions” o the mid-2000s inUkraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.16 A similar process o “spill-over” has clearly

maniested itsel in the case o unisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Libya during the early months o 2011.

Actually, it is possible to argue that urkey’s democratization experience hasalso beneted rom demonstrative eects. For instance, the changes occurringin Eastern and Central Europe aected urkey. Te case o Bulgaria, especially with regard to its treatment o the urkish minority, had a particular inuenceon urkey. One o the dicult and controversial reorms that urkey aced

was the issue o cultural rights or minorities, particularly or Kurds. Te actthat post-communist Bulgaria next door had adopted similar reorms or theurkish minority did indeed attract attention and was hotly debated in urkey.In a similar manner, urkey constitutes an example or the eorts o countrieso the region and especially in the Middle East to reorm. A prominent Syrianacademic has noted how Arabs o all political inclinations, ranging rom Arabsocialists to Islamists, are debating among themselves urkey’s experience andwhat it means or them.17A survey conducted by the urkish Economic and

Social Studies Foundation (ESEV) in seven Arab countries specically askedquestions that seem to capture urkey’s demonstrative eect. Overall 61 percento the respondents considered urkey to be a model or the Arab world. Tisis particularly signicant considering that some have long argued that urkey’ssecular system prevents it rom being a model. Fully 63 percent o the respondentsagreed that “urkey constituted a successul example o coexistence o democracy and Islam.”18

Te “rading State” Dimension

Tere is also an economic dimension to the demonstrative eect. It is not sur-prising that urkish democracy has expanded hand-in-hand with the growth o its economy and per capita income. Scholars have long pointed out the relation-ship between economic development and democracy 19 while research has also




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shown a strong relationship between thelevel o development and the probabil-ity o sustaining democracy.20 Economicdevelopment transorms societies ina number o ways. Most importantly it enlarges the middle class, making itdicult to sustain the concentration o political power in the hands o a narrowelite, and encourages social capital to emerge thereby enriching civil society. 21 Te urkish economy or a long time was a closed and import substitution-ori-

ented economy dominated by a small elite closely allied with the state. It wasaer the liberalization o the urkish market and transormation o the economy in an export-oriented direction that urkey began to see a massive explosionin its middle class. urkey’s per capita income increased rom just about USD1,300 (current) in 1985 to USD 2,773 in 1995 and nally almost USD 11,000 in2008.22 Tis was also the period during which the place o the agricultural sectorin urkey ell rom about 30 percent o GDP employing 77 percent o labor in the1960s to 15 and 35 percent respectively by the early parts o the century.23 Instead

the manuacturing sector grew signicantly together with the services sector,especially in banking, communication, health and tourism. Tese are precisely sectors that require better education and proessionalism, again strengtheningthe ranks o the middle class. It is not surprising that these massive structuralchanges have coincided with growing demands or democratization in urkey especially in the 2000s.

Tese changes also coincided with a period when urkey became a “trading

state”, that is a state whose oreign policy becomes increasingly shaped by eco-nomic consideration and a country in whose GNP oreign trade acquires animportant place.24 urkey’s oreign trade grew rom less than USD 20 billion in1985 to more than USD 330 billion in 2008 and ell to just under USD 300 bil-lion in 2010 due to the world economic recession (able I). Te proportion o manuactured goods in urkey’s exports expanded rom about 1.4 percent in 1950and 18.4 percent in 1970 to 94.2 percent in 2003.25 Much more signicantly, interms o the demonstrative eect, urkey’s trade with its immediate neighbors

increased rom about USD 4 billion in 1991 to USD 82 billion in 2008. Tis is anincrease rom 11.5 to almost 25 percent o urkey’s overall trade (able I). Fur-thermore, urkey’s involvement in its neighborhood has not been solely in trade. urkish enterprises have also been investing in the region, directly contributingto employment and growth.

As the urkish economy is

increasingly engaged in itsneighborhood, there is greaterinteraction between urkish

business elite and the businesspeople o the region



KEMAL KİRİŞCİ

able I: urkish oreign trade and the Middle East

For example, in 2005 the Ramstore supermarket chain, owned by Koç Hold-ings’s subsidiary Migros, operated 54 outlets in neighboring countries and it ranno ewer than 22 supermarkets and three large shopping malls in Russia alone,an investment valued at around a quarter o a billion USD.26 According to theRussian Ria Novosti, as o May 2010, investment in joint Russian-urkish projectsreached USD 25 billion.27 In Georgia, urkish airport construction and manage-

ment company AV operates the airports o Batumi and bilisi. urkish con-struction companies are heavily engaged in the tourism industry in Batumi. Justin this small coastal city o Georgia, there are about 200 urkish investors reportedby the media.28 In Bulgaria, urkey’s EU neighbor, in late March 2008 the urk-ish Prime Minister opened a brand new “glass actory” worth USD 380 millionbelonging to the urkish company rakya Cam. ogether with another urkishglass company Şişe Cam, urkish investments in the glass production sector areexpected to reach USD one billion in the near uture.29 Tere are numerous urk-

ish restaurants and bakeries as well as small- to medium-scale businesses operat-ing practically in all the countries surrounding the Black Sea. Tere is a large andgrowing urkish business presence in the Middle East too. urkish investmentespecially in the construction sector o northern Iraq is ast growing. USAID esti-mated the size o the construction market in the region to be USD 2.8 billion, with

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95 percent o the market controlled by urkish companies.30 urkish investmentsin Egypt, especially in the area o textiles, are growing as some urkish companies

move their actories there. Similarly, urkish companies such as Ülker in the oodsector, GAMA in the construction sector, and Yapı Kredi Bank have importantinvestments in GCC countries.31 urkish companies are also ast expanding theirinvestments in Syria. According to a October 2010 report, “urkey has earmarked180 million euros (247 million USD) in loans or Syria to use or inrastructureprojects.”32 urkish State Minister responsible or Foreign rade Zaer Cağlayanannounced during the Conerence on Investment in the Syrian Coast organized by the urkish-Syrian Business Council that urkish investments in Syria amounted

to USD 700 million.33

Tese developments are signicant or urkey’s neighborhood or at leastthree reasons. Firstly, they set an example o how economic success, in the senseo how a transition rom a primarily agriculture-dominated import-substitutioneconomy to a globally competitive “one” and democratization has gone hand inhand. urkish exports and investments make this relationship visible. Secondly,especially as the urkish economy is increasingly engaged in its neighborhood,

there is greater interaction between urkish business elite and the business peopleo the region. Inevitably, issues o rule o law, accountability and transparency comeup during conversations between business people as well as ocials. Similarly,as urkish companies consider investing in the local economies similar issuesand pressures emerge accompanied by demands or setting up representativeorganizations.

For example, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been keen toattract urkish investment and experience into its region in an eort to learn rom

the experience o urkish companies.34 In a similar ashion Syria has tried to learnrom urkey’s banking experience as an important step in its eorts to liberalizeits economy. A concrete example o the demonstrative eect involves the way inwhich business people rom a number o countries around the Black Sea actually approached urkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (USIAD) toseek assistance in setting up a regional umbrella association to represent businessinterests in the region and learn rom urkey’s business experience. Tis culmi-nated in a process that led to the setting up in November 2006 o the Union o

Black Sea and Caspian Conederation o Enterprises (UBCCE) with its secretariatlocated in USIAD’s headquarters in Istanbul. Te actual process o the setting upo UBCCE and its subsequent activities have constituted occasions where a trans-er o experience and know-how has taken place with regard to doing business inliberal markets and deending business interests in the political arena.35

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KEMAL KİRİŞCİ

urkish Democratization as a “Work in Progress”

Te most potent demonstrative eect may be that urkish democracy is itsel a “work in progress”. Tis closes the otherwise large gap and also hierarchical rela-tionship that inevitably orms between well-established democracies and coun-tries that are receiving democratic assistance. Te act that urkey is still strug-gling with consolidating and deepening its democracy enables the urkish sideto relate to their partners much more easily and also vice versa. urkey, acting asa venue or gathering activists rom the region, becomes critical as they can getboth rsthand experience rom their urkish counterparts and see the “work in

progress” or themselves. A case in point would be the issue o women’s rightsand honor killings. Arab and urkish women activists nd it easier to discussthese problems among themselves than with their Western counterparts who willtreat the issue as a problem o the “other”.36 urkish governmental ocials areconscious o the advantages o “work in progress” and they have noted how thismakes communication with their counterparts much easier.

Tis may also explain why when minister o oreign aairs (at the time)

Abdullah Gül addressed a meeting o the Organization o the Islamic Countries(OIC) in late May 2003 he received a standing ovation. Gül in his speech took a very critical view o the state o democracy in the Muslim world. He stressedthe need or Muslim countries to pay greater attention to human rights andwomen’s rights as well as to greater transparency in governance. However, hisspeech was very much ramed rom the perspective o being part o the mem-bership and “one o them” that needs to improve. Tis was made clear when henoted that “we should rst put our house in order”.37 During his visit to Iran in

February 2011, against the backdrop o uprisings in the Arab world, Gül madereerences to this speech o his in an eort to highlight the need in the Mus-lim world to respond to public demands. Te emphasis on “we” is critical herein relating to an audience that is meant to be a target o democracy diusion.Additionally, when Gül’s speeches are studied closely it is possible to recognizethe preerence or using a discourse that resonates with his audience. He com-ortably employs a detailed language o democracy when addressing Western-ers compared to an audience rom countries lacking a democratic experience.

In the latter case the emphasis is put on concepts such as “good governance”,“improving political participation” and “transparency”. It is this ability to reso-nate with target audiences that is probably the most important aspect o urkey’sdemonstrative eect. A urkish ocial who noted how when Western coun-tries become engaged in democratic assistance with some o urkey’s neighbors

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they “sort o put a project down on thetable like a brick and say here it is and i

you will implement it you will becomedemocratic”. He then added how thisapproach usually leaves the receivingparties staring at the “brick” in an utterstate o puzzlement. In contrast, in the case o urkey, a sense o “we are in ittogether” develops.38

As will be discussed below, urkey’s visa-ree travel policy also allows the pos-

sibility o reinorcing the image o urkey ormed through the media. urkishmedia and especially urkish V series are increasingly recognized as havingan important demonstrative eect in the Arab world. Tey are seen as a bridgebetween the Arab world and a Western way o lie, as depicted in a Muslim butdemocratic, liberal and secular urkey.39 Te act that these series are particularly popular among, or example, Saudi women, must indeed have a demonstrativeeect. A survey o Saudi women above the age o 15 held in March 2009 showedthat more than 71 percent o respondents enjoyed urkish V series. Tese pro-

grams depict urkish women as having a much more liberal and reer way o lie than women do in Saudi Arabia. It is the visa-ree travel that gives the Arabworld the possibility to come and see what is depicted in these movies and Vseries in urkey or themselves. One other way in which travel oers a channel ora demonstrative eect is the use by some Western non-governmental organiza-tions o Istanbul as a venue or meetings that gather activists rom neighboringregions. Tis is partly done or logistical reasons: urkey has a liberal visa policy and Istanbul is easily accessible rom most countries o the region. However, amore important and pertinent actor is that such meetings can be held muchmore reely without ear o government surveillance or repression. Tese meet-ings do also become occasions when visitors rom the region get to experience alively and critical debate among urkish participants over the problems o urkey.Civil society and democracy activists have noted these experiences as examples o demonstrative eects that urkey has to oer.40

urkish business civil society in the orm o organizations ranging, or example,rom the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD),

the urkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), the urkish ExportersAssembly (IM), the urkish Union o Chambers (OBB), USIAD, and theurkish Conederation o Businessmen and Industrialists (USKON) have beeninvolved in activities and projects that constitute examples o how democratiza-tion oers the business world a chance to shape politics and oreign policy. For

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urkey’s visa-ree travel policy

also allows the possibility o reinorcing the image o urkey ormed through the media



KEMAL KİRİŞCİ

example, a couple years ago OBB worked very closely with the government in aneort to promote both peace and business between Israelis and Palestinians withrespect to their “Industry or Peace” (Barış için Sanayi Girişimi) project. Morerecently in December 2010, OBB, together with DEIK, led the initiative or theormation o the “Levant Business Forum”, composed o representatives rom Jor-dan, Lebanon, Syria and urkey, with the aim o encouraging greater economicintegration.41 Another urkish business organization bringing together represen-tatives o especially small- and medium-sized enterprises, USKON, togetherwith the Undersecretariat o the Prime Ministry or Foreign rade (DM), hasorganized yearly trade summits since 2006, bringing Arican leaders and business

people together with their urkish counterparts.42

One last example o a channel through which urkey’s “work in progress”democracy gets transmitted is urkey’s higher education sector that is receivingan increasing number o students rom its neighborhood. Te governmentalso runs a scholarship program that has been incorporated into the urkishInternational Cooperation and Development Agency (IKA). In 2009 therewere more than 7,000 oreign students studying on scholarship programs. A

high-ranking government ocial argued that this was a unique practice inurkey’s neighborhood and added that in time these students begin to want tosee their country to become like urkey.43 Most o the students actually comerom countries that lack democratic traditions such as Central Asian countries.Although the government does not run this program with an overt objective o democracy promotion, it recognizes the program’s demonstrative eect as it givesstudents the possibility to observe urkey as an open society rst hand, with itsstrengths and weaknesses.44 Tis is also recognized by the students themselves.

One such student, who held a high-ranking position in the Azeri bureaucracy,recognized the signicance o this experience and argued that education inurkey is contributing to the long term ormation o Putnam’s “social capital” inAzerbaijan, which is critical to developing and sustaining democracy.45 Tis issignicant considering that at least in the case o aiwan’s transition to democracy it has been noted that the leaders o the democratic movement “adopted Westerndemocratic ideals as well as democratic procedures, institutional design, politicaltechniques and legal rameworks” during their education in the West and applied

it at home.46

urkey’s “New” Foreign Policy

One last actor that supports urkey’s demonstrative eect in the Arab worldis urkey’s “new” oreign policy.47 During the Cold War, urkey’s relations with its

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neighborhood were limited and problematic. Te 1990s saw economic relationsand the movement o people between urkey and the ex-Soviet world expand.Yet, urkish oreign policy during this period remained locked into intense con-ict with a string o neighbors ranging rom Armenia, Cyprus, and Greece toIran, Iraq and Syria. Tis had earned urkey the reputation o a “post Cold Warwarrior”.48 Tis situation began to change by the late 1990s paving the way to arapprochement rst with Greece and then Syria. However, the real breakthroughdid not come until the arrival o Justice and Development Party (AKP) to powerand the “zero problems policy” associated with the current minister o oreignaairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu. Tis policy saw urkey’s relations with its neighborsimprove and expand and was accompanied by a growing interest to seek solutionsto the problems o urkey’s neighborhood rom the Balkans to the Middle East.Te “zero problems policy” has engendered considerable urkish involvement inregional issues ranging rom eorts to mediate between Arabs/Palestinians andIsraelis, between Sunnis and Shi’a in Iraq, between Aghanistan and Pakistan,between Bosnia and Serbia, between Iran and the West, and in resolving bi-lat-eral conicts such as Cyprus and relations with Armenia. Even i these mediationeorts have not always been very successul it has nevertheless helped to changeurkey’s image in the eyes o the Arab world. urkey has come to be known asa country that “speaks much more soly, multilaterally and cooperatively thanever”49 and hence has been much more positively received.

Another important aspect o urkey’s “new” oreign policy has been the closerelations that the government has developed with Hamas and the Muslim Broth-erhood plus the bitter criticism it has directed towards Israel in the last couple o years.50 Tese developments have triggered a major debate on whether urkey has

been shiing away rom the West towards the Middle East. Simultaneously, it hasalso “rufed eathers” with some o the leadership in the Middle East as well asinside urkey.51 In contrast, these developments have made Erdoğan particularly popular among the so-called “Arab street” strengthening urkey’s demonstra-tive eect. Te “street” very much attributes Erdoğan’s policies in this regard to amore democratic urkey in contrast to a urkey where the military once enjoyedgreater inuence.52

Finally, in the context o urkey’s “new” oreign policy Davutoğlu’s energeticeorts to promote a stable and prosperous neighborhood through encourag-ing greater economic integration between urkey and the Arab world need tobe highlighted.53 In July 2010 he led the eort or the establishment o a “CloseNeighbors Economic and rade Association Council” with Jordan, Lebanon

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KEMAL KİRİŞCİ

and Syria. Te council aims to estab-lish a ree-trade area within ve yearsbased on the recognition that “ree tradeagreements contribute to the expansiono world trade, to greater internationalstability, and in particular, to the devel-opment o closer relations among ourpeoples”.54 Actually, such an objective isnot that ar rom the stated objectiveso the European Mediterranean Policy

(EMP) and the European NeighborhoodPolicy (ENP).55 Whether the council will

achieve its objectives time will tell; however, urkey already has ree trade agree-ments with Jordan and Syria and the one with Lebanon nears ratication. urkey has actually signed ree trade agreements with all the EMP countries with theexception o Algeria.56 Tese steps are clearly in line with Davutoğlu’s ambitious

vision o an integration project leading to ree movement o goods and peoplerom the city o Kars to the Atlantic, and rom Sinop to the Gul o Aden.57 Such a

bold project that has already had a tangible element to is that the reer movemento people has resonated well with the Arab public.

A more liberal visa policy has been an especially striking characteristic o ur-key’s neighborhood policy. It has been argued that urkey’s decision to encour-age “ows o people, trade, and ideas” suggests it is abandoning the “realist viewo balance o power, and a zero-sum understanding” o international relationsin avor o a “liberal idea o opening and interdependence”.58 However, this is a

policy that has been extended to parts o the Arab Middle East only recently. Tenumber o the nationals o Arab countries entering the country increased romabout 332,000 in 1991 to almost 1.9 million in 2010 (able II). Tis constitutedonly 6.6 percent o all entries into urkey compared to entries rom the EU andthe ormer Soviet bloc countries, which constituted 56 percent and almost 26 per-cent respectively. Te number o Iranians that entered urkey in 2010 was almostequal to that o those rom the whole o the Arab world combined. More than hal a million Israeli nationals entered urkey in 2008; however, this gure dropped

dramatically to just under 110,000 in 2010 as a result o the deteriorating relationsbetween the two countries. Te big dierence between the entries rom the Arabworld and the rest o urkey’s neighborhood was primarily a unction o the actthat ormer Soviet bloc country nationals, Europeans, Iranians and Israelis enterurkey visa ree or with sticker visas easily obtained at entry points.

urkey’s decision to encourage

“ows o people, trade, andideas” suggests it is abandoningthe “realist view o balanceo power, and a zero-sumunderstanding” o internationalrelations in avor o a“liberal idea o opening and

interdependence”

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able II: Movement o people into urkey rom the Middle East and other regions between 1995 and 2010

Tis situation is ast changing. In a major and dramatic break rom past prac-tice the AKP government began to liberalize visa requirements or most Arabcountries. Visa requirements or Moroccan and unisian nationals were lied in2007 and or Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian nationals late in 2009. It is still di-cult to substantiate the net impact o visa liberalization. However, able II showsthat the increase o entries rom the Arab world average 62 percent between 2008and 2010 and was much higher than the overall increase o 9 percent. Some o

these entries were composed o suitcase traders involved in economic activity in asimilar way to what happened in the early 1990s when urkey opened its bordersto nationals o the ex-Soviet world. In the case o the ormer Soviet space, ollow-ing an initial period o suitcase trade, both the numbers o entries rom and tradewith the ex-Soviet world exploded. Te increase in the number o people enter-ing urkey rom the ex-Soviet world between 1995 and 2008 was just under 400percent while trade or the same period increased by more than 900 percent. Justas a more liberal visa policy played a central role in the expansion o trade with

urkey’s northern neighbors, it would be reasonable to expect a similar expan-sion in trade with Arab Middle Eastern countries ollowing the liberalization o

visas. Lastly, there is also a recognition on the part o government ocials that theadoption o a liberal visa policy allows people to travel to urkey reely and, as oneocial put it, “see urkey or themselves and take back with them whatever they

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KEMAL KİRİŞCİ

wish rom their experience with urk-ish democracy and economy”.59 Interest-

ingly, this point was corroborated by aSyrian journalist and long-time residento urkey during the uprising in unisia.He argued that unisians o all politicalconviction ollow and are inormed o developments in urkey. Tis is the casehe argued because tens o thousands o unemployed unisian university gradu-

ates travel to urkey or suitcase tradeenabling them to become amiliar with political debates in urkey and learn les-sons or unisia.60

Challenges and Conclusion

Tis paper has tried to show the actors that make urkey a potential “model”or “example” or the advocates o the recent uprisings in Egypt and unisia. Itargued that the concept o the demonstrative eect helps to better understand

this process. Te demonstrative eect is mediated through urkey’s economicperormance and its “trading state” policies accompanied by a liberal visa policy permitting a reer movement o people into urkey. Additionally, urkey’s “work in progress” democracy has resonated well with the Arab public and intellectu-als, at least better than the democracy promotion policies o Western democra-cies. Lastly, the role o urkey’s “new” oreign policy needs to be highlighted too.Tis is the case even i urkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy recently has met the harsh realities o international politics, especially with respect to theArab-Israeli conict and the controversy over the Iranian nuclear program, notto mention the complexities acing the improvement o urkey’s relations withArmenia and Cyprus. “Getting to zero” problems have required more than justgood intentions.61 Yet, by and large, urkey’s oreign policy has been welcomein the Middle East. As Lesser notes, “Prime Minister Erdoğan has enjoyed con-siderable popularity with the Egyptian public since he has emerged as a visiblechampion o the Palestinian cause and a sharp critic o Israel. Tis constituency isprecisely the same constituency that had been drawn to ahrir Square and ormedthe backbone o the struggle against the regime”. Lesser on the other hand adds

that Erdoğan’s popularity and urkey’s approach was not welcome by the eliteleadership that was toppled by the uprisings.62 It would be dicult to account orurkey’s demonstrative eect without appreciating the impact o urkey’s “new”oreign policy. In many ways urkey’s demonstrative eect can also be seen to be aunction o what is popularly called urkey’s “so power” in the Middle East.63

Te demonstrative eect is

mediated through urkey’seconomic perormance and its“trading state” policiesaccompanied by a liberal visapolicy permitting a reermovement o people intourkey

46




uran best summarizes the source and impact o the demonstrative eectwhen he notes that “…the urkish experience sets an example o what is pos-sible. As Arab populations get exposed to urkish society through increasingtravel, urkish lms and V serials, businesses and products, and elections thatchange governments, they see a modern, open and prosperous society.” Tis,argues uran, “may lead them to demand that their governments take them inthe same direction as urkey”.64 In the meantime the urkish government, whichhas traditionally shied away rom democracy promotion policies, might need tostart thinking about such policies.65 I reorm and transition are indeed going tooccur in the Arab world there will be a need or much more systematic and well

thought-out assistance than just what the demonstrative eect can oer. urkey ought to be able to help on issues ranging rom the organization o ree and airelections, especially in cooperation with the Council o Europe and the OSCE, tothe development o administrative and legal structures supportive o a ree civilsociety. IKA would be particularly well placed to provide such assistance as wellas interested non-governmental organizations. However, there are a couple o challenges that will need attention.

First and oremost urkey’s own reorm process will need to continue. Aer anenergetic period o political reorm urkey’s reorm process has slowed down andconcerns have been expressed by an ever growing range o domestic and externalactors about setbacks with respect to consolidating a liberal and pluralist democ-racy. Keyman rightly points to the importance o the continuation and consoli-dation o reorm and democratization in urkey i positive and constructive or-eign policy is to be sustained.66 Secondly, a grand debate and careul thinkingabout the dicult exercise o nding a balance between the ethics o supporting

reorms in the Arab world and interests associated with stability is needed. Tisdiculty became particularly conspicuous in relation to the uprisings in Egyptand Libya. In the case o Egypt, the government came out in support o the upris-ings and demands or reorm at a critical moment and in an unequivocal man-ner when Prime Minister Erdoğan called unequivocally on Mubarak to heed tothe demands o the public and go. Te same decisiveness was not maniested inthe case o Libya. Many commentators in urkey and elsewhere have pointed outthat Erdoğan’s beriending o such leaders as Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Omar

al-Bashir and his acceptance o a human rights award rom Muammer Gaddaare dicult to reconcile with an image o a urkey that supports reorm, humanrights and democratization. I urkey wants to sustain its demonstrative eectthere will be hard choices to make between upholding universal values and allow-ing or business, economic and ideational interests.

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KEMAL KİRİŞCİ

Encouraging economic integrationthrough ree trade agreements and reermovement o people in the region is mostcommendable. However, at the same timein urkey there needs to be the recogni-tion that the size o the urkish economy and the comparative advantage that ur-key enjoys in relations to the Arab econ-

omies could open urkey to accusations o becoming hegemonic. It was not thatlong ago that in urkey it was possible to hear cries that the customs union with

the EU would create an unbalanced relationship in which the Europeans would bethe “partners” and urkey would simply be a “market” that would be ooded by European goods. In 2008 the total GDP o Arab countries with which urkey hassigned ree trade agreements and is aspiring to achieve deeper economic integra-tion with was only less than 55 percent o urkey’s GDP.67 Tese countries in 2008and 2010 ran a oreign trade decit amounting to USD 2.9 and 4.8 billion. In thelong run it may not be possible to sustain such decits unless urkey can indeeddevelop arguments and the evidence that the relationship between the Arab world

and urkey is benecial to both sides and is o a win-win nature.68

A most important issue is relations with the EU. Davutoğlu’s aspiration oran integrated Middle East where people and goods can move reely rom “Karsto Atlantic” is most welcome and is actually completely in line with the visiono the ounding athers o the EU. However, this integration project should nottake place at the expense o the EU or at least two good reasons. Firstly, Önişrightly notes that independent o the problems that the EU is creating or urkish

accession, “there is a need to adopt a long-term perspective on this issue andmaintain commitment to the EU membership process”.69 Te importance o anEU anchor or urkey is also stressed by Keyman as well as Aydın and Açıkmeşe.70 Secondly, the EU will be important or urkey or purely economic reasons too.Te transition to democracy and rule o law in the Arab world will be a painul one.Tere will be ups and downs accompanied with considerable instability. urkishbusiness and economic interests will be aected. During at least the transitionperiod urkish companies will need access to the European market to make up or

the losses incurred as a result o the uprisings and the accompanying instability.Furthermore, as Straubhaar notes, a much greater compatibility between the EUeconomies and the urkish one in terms o oreign trade, unless the economieso urkey’s neighborhood are signicantly transormed, will always create aproblematic imbalance in oreign trade between urkey and its neighborhood.71

64 percent o the Arab public

surveyed supported the view that it is urkey’s EUmembership prospects thatmakes urkey an attractivepartner or the Arab world

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Hence, independent o what happens with urkey’s accession process it will beimportant to nurture and reorm the customs union.

Te need or urkey’s EU anchor is important also because the Arab worldwants to see strong EU-urkish relations. A number o public opinion surveys andstatements by leaders o countries in urkey’s neighborhood have underlined thaturkey’s added value to the region’s stability and economic and political develop-ment is intimately tied to the health o urkey’s EU relationship. Maintaining ornurturing stronger relations with the EU would also be especially important interms o Davutoğlu’s vision or urkey’s neighborhood. Davutoğlu, as well as other

ministers in the AKP cabinet, have also argued that urkey is in a way trying todo what the European integration project has achieved in Europe by encouraginggreater economic integration and interdependence in urkey’s neighborhood.72 However, Davutoğlu’s ideas are likely to carry much more credibility i urkey isable and willing to strengthen its relations with the EU. Yes, the EU is mistreatingurkey and some EU member countries are invoking cultural issues against ur-key’s membership application that is beyond standard accession criteria. However,urkey should not allow discourses and policies based on emotions and resent-

ment get in the way o cold rational interests and strategic considerations. Te actthat 64 percent o the Arab public surveyed supported the view that it is urkey’sEU membership prospects that makes urkey an attractive partner or the Arabworld speaks or itsel.73 Te centrality o the EU to urkey’s relations with theMiddle East is also corroborated by how “Middle Eastern elites worry about any sign o Ankara turning its back on its EU accession process.”74

Just as urkey needs the EU, the reverse is also the case. Te EU will need to

open its eyes to the act that the world is changing, urkey has changed and theArab world is about to change and change dramatically. Against this backgroundthe EU cannot continue with its Fortress Europe policies. Te EU has or too longgiven too much priority to security concerns over opportunities with respect toits neighborhood. Tis process o securitizing EU’s relations, especially with itsMediterranean neighborhood, culminated in the Schengen visa regime that hascreated an almost impenetrable “paper wall” around the EU. Tis regime vastly complicates access to the EU or civil society activists, business people, students,

as well as ocials and not to mention tourists. Between 2003 and 2009 Schengen visas issued or the nationals o the European neighbors o the EU increased by 188 percent while or the Arab countries by only 7 percent.75 How can one expectthe EU to promote democracy in the Arab world or have a demonstrative eectunder such circumstances? A prominent American academic and observer o

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KEMAL KİRİŞCİ

European integration, Stanley Homan,when discussing the “exclusionary”nature o the EU’s identity constructionprocess, observed that the ace the EU“presents to the outside world is oenunpleasant”.76 Te EU will have to startto revitalize the EMP and the Union orthe Mediterranean by starting to ease

visa restrictions. Undoubtedly, this willalso call or revisiting the ailed 1995 commitment to achieve a “ree trade area

in the Mediterranean by 2010”. rade and movement o people is an area wherethe EU could benet rom the lessons o urkey’s much more “open door” policy towards the Arab world. Surely, transmitting the values and norms o the EU isgoing to be considerably easier i people rom the region can travel more easily to the EU.

Te craving or reorm in the Arab world and urkey’s emerging demonstra-tive eect in the region may also give trans-Atlantic partners an opportunity to

revive relations with urkey. Gordon and aspinar highlighted the importance o “winning back” urkey in terms o the aermath o the deterioration that took place in US-urkish relations over Iraq.77 Tis call in 2008 also coincided witha period when US democracy promotion policies, especially in the Middle East,came under growing criticism. But, at the same time there was a parallel debateon the need or reorming American democracy promotion policies. In this con-text, urkey’s experience emanating rom its demonstrative eect ought to pro-

vide opportunities or cooperation. Lesser recognizes this when he notes that “the

winds o change” triggered by “the revolutions in urkey’s near abroad” could provide an opportunity or “transatlantic partners to reinvent their troubled security and development strategies” relations and develop a common strategy.78 However,both the EU and the US, in contrast to the BMENA initiative, on this occasion willneed to recognize that urkey may well have a value-added role and can contrib-ute democracy promotion. Tis will call or dealing with urkey more as an equalpartner instead o a junior contractor. In return, on the urkish side there will bea need to make a choice in support o universal values and norms over identity

driven preerences. I, as Kardaş notes, Erdoğan’s virulent opposition to sanctionsor intervention against Gadda’s regime, which is accused o using indiscriminate

violence against protesters in Libya, indeed “reects not only policy dierencesbut also ideological dissonance with the international community”,79 trans-Atlan-tic cooperation will be dicult to achieve. Tis may well not only undermine

Te craving or reorm in

the Arab world and urkey’semerging demonstrative eectin the region may also givetrans-Atlantic partners anopportunity to revive relationswith urkey

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urkey’s demonstrative eect but also undermine urkey’s quest or a stable, pros-perous and better integrated Middle East and or its own democracy too.

Lastly, there is the issue o Israel. It goes without saying that Israel’s blockadeo the Gaza Strip and its treatment o civilians during the military interventionthere in 2008 was simply unacceptable. Many Israelis also accept that what hap-pened on board o the Mavi Marmara in June 2010 was wrong. Actually, mediareports suggest that the Israeli prime minister was indeed close to issuing the apol-ogy that was demanded by urkey i it were not or his minister o oreign aairssabotaging the eort. However, it is also dicult to see how some o the rhetoric

adopted by urkey over Israel can serve urkey’s grander objective o promotinga stable and prosperous Middle East. It is doubtul that regional integration in theMiddle East would be easible and meaningul without Israel and without peacebetween the Israelis and the Palestinians. Aer all, what made Jean Monnet andRobert Schuman such visionaries is that they envisaged an integration programthat engaged France’s arch enemy, Germany, as a partner. Tere is no way thatEuropean integration would have reached the deepening and widening it has hadi Germany had been excluded. Instead o isolating and conronting Israel, urkey

should rise above the current bilateral problems and regain the ground that couldhelp urkey to play its traditional role in Israeli-Arab relations o condence build-ing and mediation. Te Middle East is in dire need o a country that can enjoy the condence o both sides and contribute to luring both sides out o the viciouscircle they have been caught in or so long. Tis was best put by the President o Syria, Bashir Assad, when during an interview he noted the importance o urkey maintaining good relations with Israel i urkey wishes to have a role in the peaceprocess.80 Just as urkey has a role to play in assisting reorm and transormation

among Arab countries it can also play a role, as modest as it may be, to push Israelto reorm its outlook and strategy towards the Arab world and Palestinians. urkey ought to nurture its demonstrative eect on the Arab world while seeking waysto develop a similar “eect” in its relations with Israel. It is only then perhaps thaturkey’s demonstrative eect might have genuine and long-lasting results in termso democracy, stability, peace and prosperity in the Middle East.

Endnotes

* Te author would like to acknowledge the assistance o Ee okdemir and Ekin Kurtic withresearch or this article.

1. Daniel Brumberg, “Democratization in the Arab World? Te rap o Liberalized Autocracy,” Journal o Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2002), pp. 56-68; Alred Stephan and Graeme B. Robertson,“An ‘Arab’ More Tan a ‘Muslim’ Democracy Gap,” Journal o Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2003), pp.30-44.

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2. Larry Diamond, “Why are Tere No Arab Democracies?,” Journal o Democracy, Vol. 21, No.1 (2010), p. 102.

3. “unuslu lider Gannuşi Zaman’a Konuştu,” Zaman, February 23, 2011; arik Ramadan,“Democratic urkey is the emplate or Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Hungtonpost, February 8,2011.

4. “Star o Islam: A Survey o urkey”, Te Economist , December 14, 1991.

5. For a discussion o urkey as a model in BMENA, see Hüseyin Bağcı and Bayram Sarıkaya,“Te Greater Middle East Initiative and urkey: Te AKP’s Perspective,” in Goren Nimrod andNachmani Amikam (eds.) Te Importance o Being European: urkey, the EU and the Middle East (Jerusalem: Te European Forum at the Hebrew University, 2007), pp. 165-77; Meliha Altunışık-Benli, “Te urkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.27, No.1&2 (2005), pp. 45-63.

6. For the discussion on urkey as a “model” just beore and aer the BMENA initiative, seeSteven Everts, “An Asset but not a Model: urkey, the EU and the Wider Middle East,” Centre or

European Reorm: Essays (2004); Graham Fuller, “urkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities,”Te Washington Quarterly, 2004; Meliha Altunisik-Benli, (2005); Ömer aşpınar, An Uneven Fit?

Te ‘urkish Model’ and the Arab World (Washington DC: Te Saban Center or Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, August 2003).

7. Bülent Aras, “urkey and the GCC: An Emerging Relationship,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 12,No. 4 (2005), pp. 89-97.

8. Haşim Salih, “ürkiye Başardı, ya Biz,” Şark-ül Evsat, December 25, 2005 (reproduced in

urkish in Radikal, January 4, 2005).9. Yaser Ebu Hilal, “Bin Laden ile Erdoğan artışıyor,” Urdu El Ghad , October 4, 2005 (repro-

duced in Radikal , November 1, 2005).

10. Saban Kardas, “Revolutions” in Egypt and unisia Highlight Dilemmas o urkey’s Democ-racy Promotion Agenda,” Eurasia Daily Monitor , Vol.8, No.24 (February 3, 2011); Gönül ol, “ur-key as an Alternative Model or Democratization in the Middle East,” oday’s Zaman, February 13,2011; Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz, “Whose Model? Which urkey?,” Foreign Policy Middle

East Channel , February 8, 2011; Mehmet Yeğin, “urkey as a ‘Companion’ not a ‘Model’ to theMiddle East,” urkish Weekly, February 25, 2011; Sinan Ülgen, “Te Future o Democracy in theArab World: How Relevant is the urkish Experience?,” ISSOpinion, February, 2011; Norman Stone,

“Tis Spring won’t breed any more urkeys”, Te imes (UK) April 5, 2011.

11. Mehmet Yeğin, “urkey as a ‘Companion’ not a ‘Model’ to the Middle East,” urkish Weekly,February 25, 2011.

12. Samuel Huntington, Te Tird Wave: Democratization in the Late wentieth Century ( Nor-man: University o Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 101.

13. Huntington, “Democracy’s Tird Wave,” Journal o Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1991), p. 2.

14. Huntington, Te Tird Wave, p. 105.

15. Laurence Whitehead, “Democracy and Decolonization: East-Central Europe,” in LaurenceWhitehead (ed.) Te International Dimensions o Democratization: Europe and the Americas ( Oxord:Oxord University Press, 1996) p. 361.

16. Larry Diamond, Te Spirit o Democracy: Te Struggle to Build Free Societies Troughout the

World ( New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008), p.109.

17. Sadik Al-Azm, “Islam and Secular Humanism” in Islam and Secularism, Te Dialogue SeriesNo. 2 (Antwerpen: Universitair Centrum Saint-Ignatius, 2005), p. 48.

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18. Mensur Akgün et al. Te Perception o urkey in the Middle East ( Istanbul: ESEV Yayınları,2009), pp. 21-22. Tese results were up by a ew points in a re-run o the survey in 2010, see Mensur

Akgün, Ortadoğu’da ürkiye Algısı 2010 ( Istanbul: ESEV Yayınları, 2010).19. Seymour Lipset, “Some Social Requisites o Democracy: Economic Development and Politi-

cal Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 53 (March, 1959), pp. 69-105; DankwartRustow, “ransitions to Democracy: oward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3(1970), pp. 337-63.

20. Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in

the World, 1950-1990 ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

21. Larry Diamond, Te Spirit o Democracy, p. 98 and pp. 102-3.

22. Figures calculated rom the urkish Statistical Institute, see www.tuik.gov.tr.

23. Yakup Kepenek and Nur Yentürk, ürkiye Ekonomisi (Istanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 2009), p.377.

24. Kemal Kirişci, “Te ransormation o urkish Foreign Policy: Te Rise o the rading State,”New Perspectives on urkey, No. 40 (2009), pp. 29-57.

25. Yakup Kepenek and Nur Yentürk, ürkiye Ekonomisi, p. 334.

26. “54. Ramstore Üsküp’e,” Radikal , October 3, 2005.

27. “Investment in Joint Russian-urkish Projects to op 25 Billion USD,” Ria Novosti, May 12,2010.

28. “Şantiyeye dönen Batum’da ürkler Başrolde.” Radikal, September 28, 2010.

29. Reported by Radikal , 28 March 2008. “Şişecam Komşu’da milyar dolara gidiyor.”

30. Kurdistan Region Economic Development Assessment (USAID Report, December 2008), p.26.

31. Aras, “urkey and the GCC,” p. 96.

32. “Inverview: Syria’s Investment Drive Gathers Steam,” Reuters Arica, October 4, 2010.

33. “Conerence on Investment in Syrian Coast Kicks o / 60 urkish Firms Participating,” Syr-

ian Arab News Agency (SANA), October 3, 2010.

34. Interview with businessman in Istanbul representing the Süzer Holding in northern Iraq and

a ormer president o the Diyarbakır Chamber o Commerce (DO), October 2009.35. Interview held with the current secretary general o UBBCE, August 2009.

36. Interview with a leading member o Women or Women’s Human Rights (WWHR) August2009, Istanbul, and a Syrian women activist, October 2009, Damascus.

37. Abdullah Gül, Horizons o urkish Foreign Policy in the New Century (Ankara, C DışişleriBakanlığı Yayını, 2007) p. 528.

38. Interview with a diplomat at the urkish embassy in Washington DC, September 2009. Simi-lar observation were also made by an AKP member o parliament amiliar with issues o democraticassistance, August 2009 and a high ranking ocial rom the Oce o the Prime Minister, October2009. Both remarks were made during interviews held in Ankara.

39. Youse Al Shari and Samir Saha, “urkey’s European Membership: Te Arab Perspective,Notes rom the Arab Media,” in Reections o EU-urkey Relations in the Muslim World ( Istanbul: Open Society Foundation, 2009), p. 25.

40. Interviews with representatives o European Stability Initiative, Hollings Center and theHenrich Böll Foundation. For similar observations, see also İbrahim Kalın, “Debating urkey in the

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Middle East: Te Dawn o a New Geopolitical Imagination,” Insight urkey, Vol. 11. No. 1 (2009),pp. 83-96.

41. “ürkiye Ortadoğu’da 1.5 trilyonluk Levant Birliği Kurdu,” Euractiv, December 4, 2010,available at euroactive.com.tr.

42. Mehmet Özkan and Birol Akgün, “urkey’s Opening to Arica,” Journal o Modern AricanStudies, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2010), pp. 539-540.

43. Interview with high ranking ocial rom the Prime Minister’s Oce, October 2009.

44. Interview with a high ranking ocial at the Prime Minister’s Oce, October 2009.

45. Interview in Baku, October 2009.

46. Cheng un-jen, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in aiwan,” World Politics, Vol.41, No. 4 (1989), pp. 471-499.

47. For recent literature examining urkey’s “new” oreign policy, see special issues o urkishStudies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2009); New Perspectives on urkey, No. 40 (2009); Insight urkey, Vol. 13, No.1 (2011).

48. Dietrich Jung, “urkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Reali-ties,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol.10, No.1 (2004), p.12.

49. arık Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization o urkey’s Foreign Policy,” urkish Studies, Vol. 9, No.1 (2008), p. 16.

50. arık Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization o urkey’s Foreign Policy”; Şaban Kardaş, “urkey:Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2010),

pp. 115-136.51. International Crisis Group, “urkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints,” Europe

Report No. 203, April 7, 2010, p. 11&21; Şaban Kardaş, “ürk Dış Politikasında Eksen Kayması mı?,” Akademik Orta Doğu, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 19-42.

52. For a discussion o how AKP is received in the Arab world, see Mounir Shaq, “urkey’sJustice and Development Party through Arab Eyes,” Insight urkey, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2009), pp. 33-41.

53. Ahmet Davutoğlu, “urkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy” Foreign Policy, May 20, 2010.

54. Joint Declaration on Establishing “Close Neighbors Economic and rade Association Coun-cil” or a Free rade Area between Jordan , Lebanon, Syria and urkey, July 31, 2010.

55. Kemal Kirişci, “Comparing the Neighborhood Policies o urkey and the EU in the Medi-terranean,” in Meliha Benli-Altunışık, Kemal Kirişci and Nathalie occi (eds.), urkey: Reluctant

Mediterranean Power, (GMF, Mediterranean Paper Series, February 2011). See also Nathalie occiand Jean-Pierre Cassarino, “Rethinking the EU’s Mediterranean Policies Post 1/11,” IAI Working Papers 11/06 , March 2011.

56. Serah Kekeç, “ürkiye’nin Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortakları ile Serbest icaret Anlaşmaları,”Ortadoğu Analiz , Vol. 2, No. 24 (2011), pp. 85-93 and p. 91.

57. “Yeni Bir Ortadoğu Doğuyor,” Milliyet , June 10, 2010.

58. Juliette olay, “Coming and Going: Changes in urkish Foreign Policy and Migration” inRonald H. Linden (ed.) urkey and Its Neighbors (orthcoming). For a similar perspective, see also

İhsan Dağı, “Te Liberal urn in urkish Foreign Policy,” oday’s Zaman, February 23, 2009.59. Interview with a high ranking ocial at the Prime Minister’s Oce, October 2009.

60. Hüsnü Mahalli, “Gerçek Devrim,” HaberVakti, January 18, 2011.

61. For the notion o “getting to zero”, see Ahmet Evin et. al. Getting to Zero: urkey, Its Neighbor-

hood and the West (Washington DC: ransatlantic Academy, 2010).

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62. Ian O. Lesser, “Te Revolutions in urkey’s Near Abroad,” GMF Analysis on urkey, February 16, 2011, pp. 1-3.

63. For a discussion o “so power” aspect o urkish oreign policy, see arık Oğuzlu, “SoPower in urkish Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal o International Afairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2007),pp. 81-97; Meliha Benli-Altunışık, “Te Possibilities and Limits o urkey’s So Power in the MiddleEast,” Insight urkey, Vol. 10, No.2 (2008), pp. 41-54.

64. İlter uran, “urkey and Egypt: A Partisan or Democracy or an Unwanted Intruder?,” GMF Analysis on urkey, February 16, 2011, p. 3.

65. Kadri Kaan Renda, “urkey’s Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdepen-dence,” Insight urkey, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2011), p. 106; Kemal Kirişci, “Democracy Diusion: Te urk-ish Experience” in Ronald H. Linden (ed.), urkey and Its Neighbors.

66. Fuat Keyman, “Globalization, Modernity and Democracy: In Search o a Viable Domes-tic Polity or a Sustainable urkish Foreign Policy,” New Perspectives on urkey, No. 40 (2009), pp.7-27.

67. Te total GDP or Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, unisia and Syria amounted to justunder 400 billion USD compared to urkey’s more than 730 billion USD. Calculated rom the WorldBank Quick Query Database.

68. For a discussion o urkey as a “hegemon” in the Arab world, see Malik Mui, “A LittleAmerica: the Emergence o urkish Hegemony,” Middle East Brie (Crown Center, Brandeis Uni- versity, orthcoming).

69. Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces o the ‘New’ urkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a

Critique,” Insight urkey, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2011), p. 59.70. Fuat Keyman, “Globalization, modernity and democracy”; Mustaa Aydın and Sinem A.

Açıkmeşe, “Europeanization through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era in urkishForeign Policy,” Journal o Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2007), pp. 263-74.

71. Tomas Straubhaar, “urkey as an Economic Neighbor” in Ronald H. Linden (ed.), urkeyand Its Neighbors.

72. Te desire to emulate the experience o the EU in regional integration has been noted by İbrahim Kalın, the chie advisor o the prime minister as well as by some EU ocials, see Interna-tional Crisis Group, “urkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints,” p. 11.

73. Mensur Akgün et al. Orta Doğu’da ürkiye Algısı.74. International Crisis Group, “urkey and the Middle East”, p. ii.

75. Kemal Kirişci, “Comparing the Neighborhood Policies o urkey and the EU in the Mediter-ranean,” p. 40.

76. Stanley Homan, “Europe’s identity Crisis revisited,” Daedalus, Vol. 123, No. 2 (1994), p.20.

77. Philip H. Gordon and Omer aspınar, Winning urkey: How America, Europe and urkey

can revive a ading partnership ( Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).

78. Lesser, “Te Revolutions in urkey’s Near Abroad”, p. 4.

79. Saban Kardas, “urkey Diverges rom Western Position on Libya,” Eurasia Daily Monitor ,Vol. 8, No. 44 (March 4, 2011).

80. Interview with Ertuğrul Özkök in Hürriyet , November 8, 2009.

Insight Turkey Volume 13 Number 2 2011 Kemal Kirisci

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