SEPTEMBER 2007

Dovelyn Rannveig AguniasMigration Policy Institute

Neil G. Ruiz The Brookings Institution

I. Introduction

International labor mobility is increasing, as a matter ofpolicy and a matter of fact. Yet, countries of origin anddestination have reached little consensus on how best tomitigate the social costs of a more integrated global labormarket. As proposals for temporary worker programs indeveloped countries spark political debates on immigrationreform, national governments and international organiza-tions have been grappling with questions about the welfareand protection of migrants. Reports of maltreatment andexploitation of foreign workers come from all migrant-receiving countries, from the Middle East and Singapore tomore traditional migrant-receiving countries like the UnitedStates. How can governments ensure migrants are pro-tected while working abroad?

This Insight examines one method of tackling this ever-increasing problem from the perspective of the Philippines,a traditional migrant-sending country.1 It gives an overview

Protecting OverseasWorkers:Lessons and Cautions from the Philippines

P R O G R A M O N M I G R A N T S , M I G R AT I O N , A N D D E V E L O P M E N T

Insight

Countries of origin can play a major role inprotecting their migrant workers abroad. Agovernment-operated welfare fund thatmigrants and/or their employers finance offersa potentially efficient and feasible solution tosharing the cost of protection. An analysis ofthe world’s largest migrant welfare fund, thePhilippines’ Overseas Workers WelfareAdministration (OWWA), shows that protec-tion of migrant workers can be institutional-ized through three elements: (1) a mechanismfor repatriation, (2) provision of insuranceand loans, and (3) education and training.

However, countries of origin must overcomeseveral limitations if they want to realizethese benefits. The Philippine case highlightsthe importance of tailoring services to theimmediate or core needs of overseas work-ers without overextending the government’scapacity, as well as of creating meaningfulpartnerships with members of the civil soci-ety and the private sector. Also critical tosuccessful operation is a strong state capacitythat allows for the representation and mean-ingful participation of migrant workers; politi-cal, administrative, and financial transparencyand accountability; and the effective use ofgovernment employees. Further, since pro-tection of migrant workers is a transnationalissue that requires transnational solutions,partnerships across borders are also neces-sary. Destination countries should be activepartners and should complement the offer-ings of welfare funds.

Protecting overseas workers will gain moreattention as temporary migration continuesto grow worldwide. A membership-drivenwelfare fund like OWWA can benefitmigrants in a number of ways. Once its limi-tations are addressed, this Insight shows thatOWWA can be a useful template for manydeveloping countries as they face the mount-ing challenges of protecting workers abroad.

S U M M A R Y

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of the welfare services that the Philippinegovernment provides to its citizens who aretemporary overseas workers rather than per-manent emigrants. It is based on interviewswith several high-level government officialsand migrants’ organizations, as well as on ananalysis of several data sources on the wel-fare and protection services available tooverseas workers. Although not a detailedperformance evaluation of Philippine pro-grams, the paper provides an understandingof the policies, functions, and challengesthat the Philippine government addressesthrough a unique government institution, theOverseas Workers Welfare Administration(OWWA), to protect its overseas workersabroad.

Countries of origin can play a major role inprotecting their migrant workers abroadthrough an institutionalized welfare fund,

but policymakers need toexercise caution given thelimitations governments inorigin countries face. ThePhilippine experience high-lights the importance ofdeveloping state capacity toeffectively deliver services,ensuring accountability toand representation of

migrant workers, and creating meaningfulpartnerships within as well as beyond astate’s borders.

II. Emigration from the Philippines

For more than three decades, the Philippinegovernment has adopted a deliberate policy

of labor export. High unemployment rates,especially among the highly educated, andpolitical instability are the main push fac-tors.2 With increasing pull factors from majorindustrial countries that are suffering fromlabor shortages, the Philippine government’slabor-export system allows and encouragesFilipinos to benefit from these opportunities.

As of December 2006, Philippine governmentestimates placed the stock of all overseasFilipinos, including temporary workers, per-manent emigrants, and irregular migrants, at8.2 million, which amounts to almost 25 per-cent of the total labor force and 9 percent ofthe country’s total population.3 Today, thePhilippines is the largest organized labor-exporting country in the world. Although asubstantial proportion of the Filipinos abroadare permanent emigrants (most of whom settlein the Americas), the majority of overseasFilipinos are contract or temporary workers,officially called overseas Filipino workers orOFWs.4 Figure 1 provides an overview of theastonishing growth of land-based and sea-based OFWs from 1974, when the govern-ment initiated its labor-export policy, to 2006.Almost two-thirds of these OFWs originatedfrom the countryside5 and almost half havecollege degrees.6

The number of OFWs has increased almost25-fold over the past 20 years, with nearly1.2 million registered deployments to over190 countries in 2006 alone.7 Most OFWs goto the Middle East and East Asia, as high-lighted in Figure 2, but the numbers haverecently been increasing in Europe as well.Seafarers make up a significant proportion of

Countries of origincan play a majorrole in protecting

their migrant work-ers abroad throughan institutionalized

welfare fund.

OFWs with almost a quarter of a milliondeployed annually, and they compose 30percent of all seafarers in the world.

Celebrated nationally as “modern-dayheroes,” the remittances from this hugeDiaspora have emerged as a major source ofthe country’s foreign exchange inflows, aver-aging 8.9 percent of gross national product(GNP) over the last five years and over 23percent of export earnings.8 According to theCentral Bank of the Philippines, remittancesin 2006 reached US$12.8 billion and are

projected to approach the US$15 billionmark in 2007.9

Although government policy initially focusedon exporting professionals, OFW occupa-tions abroad have diversified over time toinclude factory workers, construction work-ers, and service workers, such as care giversand domestic helpers (see Figure 3 andAppendix 1). Professionals are still thethird-largest group of OFWs; that categoryincludes nurses and engineers.

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Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbooks, 1984 to 2006.

Figure 1. Deployed Overseas Filipino Workers, 1975 to 2006 (in thousands)

4

Figure 2. Deployed Overseas Filipino Workers by Destination, Annual Average, 2002 to 2006

See insetbelow.

See insetbelow.

Map by Chuncui Velma Fan of theMigration Policy InstituteSource: Philippine OverseasEmployment Administration(POEA), 2002 to 2006.

Note:To see theMaps moreclearly, pleasezoom in onthe screen byclicking theZoom In (+)button in thetoolbar.

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A shift in the international demand forPhilippine labor took place in the 1980s,indicated by a decline in the relative share ofworkers in production processes and relatedoccupations, and an increase in the interna-tional demand for service workers. In thePhilippines, this led to more women goingabroad, mainly to work as domestic helpers

in Hong Kong, Singapore, and the MiddleEast, and as entertainers in Japan.

Studies from the early 1980s showed thatmen originally composed an overwhelmingmajority of OFWs. By 1987, 47 percent of alldeployed land-based workers were women.This proportion rose to almost 50 percent in

Figure 3. Overseas Filipino Workers by Occupational Type Abroad

Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbooks, various years as cited in Neil G. Ruiz, "Made for Export: LaborMigration, State Power, and Higher Education in a Developing Society," Ph.D. dissertation, MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, 2007.

Note: Type 1 includes professional, technical, and related workers (as well as entertainers). Type 2 includes managerial, executive, and administrative workers; sales workers; and agricul-

tural, husbandry, and forestry workers, and fishermen.Type 3 includes clerical workers.Type 4 includes service workers.Type 5 includes production process workers, transport equipment operators, and laborers.Please see Appendix I for more detailed information.

1994, a trend that continues well into thecurrent decade. As of 2006, 60 percent ofnew hires were women.10

The Institutionalization of Labor ExportIn 1974, President Ferdinand Marcos issueda presidential decree creating three govern-ment institutions within the Ministry of Laborto facilitate the export of workers: theOverseas Employment Development Board(OEDB), the Bureau of Employment Services(BES), and the National Seamen Board(NSB). As overseas employment becamemore significant, the Philippine governmentwas not able to meet the increasing demandsfor processing and recruiting workers. Thegrowing need for more private-sector partici-pation led the government to merge thesethree agencies into the Philippine OverseasEmployment Administration (POEA) in 1982.POEA’s sole purpose is to manage therecruitment and deployment of Filipinos foroverseas contract work abroad.

Through POEA, the government encouragesthe “responsible” participation of the privatesector. POEA licenses all private recruitment

agencies and plays a majorrole as “regulator” byinforming potential over-seas workers of agenciesthat have issued false con-tracts or have not compliedwith rules during thedeployment process. Inother words, POEA ensuresthat private recruitmentagencies and employers in

destination countries do not cheat potentialand current overseas workers.

The other reason for restructuring govern-ment institutions in 1982 was to mitigate therisks involved in migration, such asexploitation and abuse. A 1977 White Paperby the Ministry of Labor and Employmentrecommended that the government focus onprotecting and promoting the welfare andrights of OFWs rather than focus solely onrecruiting and placing them.11

In response, the government created theWelfare Fund Administration (WFA) in 1980,which later became the Overseas WorkersWelfare Administration (OWWA), an inde-pendent financial agency that manages thewelfare fund of overseas workers and pro-vides services to its contributing memberslike insurance and loans.

OWWA is essentially a single trust fundpooled from the mandatory US$25 member-ship contributions of foreign employers, land-based and sea-based workers, investment andinterest income on these funds, and incomefrom other sources. Categorized as a quasi-governmental entity, it is entirely self-fundedand receives no budget allocation from thenational government.

The Need for a Welfare Fund As a result of state involvement and anincrease in Filipino emigration, major politi-cal issues arose around reports of the mal-treatment, illegal recruitment, and even

6

POEA ensures thatprivate recruitment

agencies andemployers in

destination countriesdo not cheat

potential and currentoverseas workers.

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deaths of OFWs. Between 1987 and 1991, atotal of 23 Senate bills and 32 House billswere filed in the Philippine Congress in anattempt to investigate several mysteriousOFW deaths.

In addition, the government has needed toconduct large-scale repatriations from theMiddle East due to political events in theregion. During the 1991 Gulf War, the gov-ernment brought home about 30,000Filipinos from Iraq and Kuwait. The repatria-tion highlighted problems in coordination,lack of reliable data on the Filipinos in theregion, and the inadequate number of gov-ernment personnel abroad. The repatriationalso strained relations between governmentofficials and the workers they were trying torepatriate.12

These developments reached a definingmoment in 1995. Flor Contemplacion, aFilipina domestic worker in Singapore, wascharged with murdering another domesticworker, Delia Maga, and the child of Maga’semployer. After being drugged and adminis-tered electric shocks, Contemplacion, whospoke little English, was reportedly coercedinto a confession without a lawyer present.She was later put to death despite thePhilippine president’s direct appeal to thegovernment of Singapore.13

This incident sparked protests in thePhilippines that challenged the state’slabor-export policy. A grenade exploded out-side of the Singapore Airlines office inMetro Manila following the news ofContemplacion’s death,14 and mass demon-

strations also took place at the Embassy ofSingapore in Manila and at the departmentsof Foreign Affairs (DFA) and Labor andEmployment (DOLE). The Philippinesdowngraded its diplomatic relations withSingapore, the secretaries of DFA andDOLE resigned, and the deployment ofdomestic helpers to Singapore was tem-porarily halted.15

The perceived injustice surroundingContemplacion’s death heightened the senti-ments of an increasingly uneasy societyafter more than two decades of large-scaletemporary emigration. A 42-year-old motherof four and sole provider for her family,Contemplacion came to symbolize the sacri-fices of Filipino migrants — the “modern-day heroes” willing to risk even death toprovide for their families back home. AsJoaquin Gonzales, anexpert on Philippinestudies, noted in hisbook, PhilippineLabour Migration:Critical Dimensionsof Public Policy,Contemplacion’sdeath “heightenedlong-standingdebates in the Philippines and exposed thelack of adequate government attention to theplight of Filipino overseas contract workers[OCWs], not just in Singapore but in all thelabor-receiving countries.”16

Indeed, Contemplacion’s case was not anexception. According to DOLE, between1996 and 2001, the bodies of about 1,224

Contemplacion came tosymbolize the sacrificesof Filipino migrants —the “modern-day heroes”willing to risk evendeath to provide for theirfamilies back home.

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OFWs were repatriated.17 All of these OFWswere said to have died of “unknown or myste-rious circumstances.” Congressional hear-ings on this issue, held in 2001, revealed thatmany of the bodies, particularly those ofdomestic workers employed in Taiwan andHong Kong, “bore bruises and deep cuts.” Insome cases, autopsy examinations discoveredthat internal organs were missing, possiblysold for transplants to unknownbeneficiaries.18

Other negative reports about treatment ofOFWs also spread throughout the Philippinemedia. Illegal recruitment for positions asprostitutes or “comfort women” becameanother politicized issue. Another highlypublicized case was that of Maricris Sioson,a performing artist who died in Japan in

1991 under suspicious circumstances.19 InHong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore,many Filipina women were and are stillbrought to work as “hostesses” at bars.Philippine government statistics from 1994show that women are more likely to be vic-tims due to the nature of their work (seeTable 1).

The 1995 “Magna Carta” These events in the early 1990s resulted inthe most significant reorganization to date ofthe Philippines’ labor-export policy, namelythe Migrant Workers and Overseas FilipinoAct of 1995. The so-called Magna Cartaresponded directly to the Contemplacion case.The law called for government to promote thewelfare of migrant workers and place theirprotection above all else. It states:

Table 1. Number of Welfare Cases, January to September 1994

Nature Total Male Female Female/male ratio

Overall (number) 9,368 3,021 6,347 2.1

Overall (percent) 100 32 68

Maltreatment 1,419 546 873 1.6

Delayed or nonpayment of salaries 1,272 565 707 1.2

Contract violations 1,373 691 682 0.9

Physical abuse 187 6 181 30.0

Rape and sexual abuse 15 0 15 N/A

Sexual harassment 330 0 330 N/A

Health problems 42 13 29 2.2

Mental illness 6 0 6 N/A

Other 3,769 694 3,075 4.4

Source: Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, as cited in “Filipino Women Migrants: A StatisticalFactbook,” National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women and the Asian Development Bank.

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While recognizing the significant contri-bution of Filipino migrant workers to thenational economy through their foreignexchange remittances, the State does notpromote overseas employment as a meansto sustain economic growth and achievenational development. The existence ofthe overseas employment program restssolely20 on the assurance that the dignityand fundamental human rights and free-doms of the Filipino citizen shall not, atany time, be compromised or violated.

The Philippine government put in placemany programs to protect and representFilipino migrants. The Magna Carta createdan Office of the Legal Assistant for MigrantWorkers Affairs (OLAMWA) within theDepartment of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to takeresponsibility “for the provision and coordi-nation of all legal assistance services to beprovided to Filipino migrant workers as wellas overseas Filipinos in distress.”21

Nevertheless, OWWA remains the mainagency for protecting Filipinos while abroaddue to its much larger scope of responsibili-ties, which extend beyond the provision oflegal assistance.22

III. How OWWA Is Organized

OWWA is an international operation organ-ized by a migrant-sending government. Thisentails a complex organizational structure thatincludes a board of trustees, a secretariat, andregional and international offices.

The Board of Trustees OWWA’s board of trustees is a tripartitebody with the DOLE secretary as chair and12 members representing government, man-agement, and OFWs. The president of thePhilippines appoints all board members.The board is broadly representative of across-section of government agencies,including the Departments of ForeignAffairs, Finance, and Budget. OFWs areallotted sea-based, land-based, and women’ssector representatives (see Figure 4). Anoverwhelming majority of board membersare not OWWA members, a major source ofcivil society and OFW criticism.

The board plans and implements policies andprograms, crafts the rules and regulations,oversees fund sources, and creates yearlyappropriations for the Secretariat, OWWA’sadministrative arm.23 Unlike other Philippinegovernment agencies that administer trustfunds, OWWA has no charter. This setupallows for more flexibility but may also allowthe board to exercise blanket and unregulatedauthority. As a permanent government agency,changes to OWWA’s operations can only bemade through legislation.

The OWWA Secretariat The Secretariat, headed by an administrator,manages day-to-day operations in thePhilippines and abroad. Of its staff of 580,only about 100 employees are stationed at itsmain office in Manila. The rest are stationedat regional offices within the Philippines(about 300 employees) or based in countries

with particularly large numbers of temporaryworkers (about 180 employees).24 In 2006,28 welfare officers were assigned to 16 coun-tries, with more than half of them placed inthe Middle East, including nine in SaudiArabia alone (see Figure 5). The OWWAadministrator recommends welfare officers,whom the DOLE secretary nominates andwhom the president of the Philippinesappoints. The welfare officers abroad worktogether with the labor attachés and theambassadors or consuls-general to assistFilipino migrant workers (see Figure 6). Theyare usually attached to Philippine embassiesand consulates. Indeed, the government con-siders OWWA staff abroad to be part of itsunified team in that country, with the ambas-sador as the leader.25

Membership Membership in OWWA, which is mandatoryfor migrants going abroad through officialchannels, may be obtained in two ways: byenrollment upon processing of a contract atPOEA or by voluntary registration of awould-be member at a job site overseas.Membership is valid until the OFW’semployment contract expires. For voluntarymembers who register at a job site, member-ship does not exceed two years.26

Ideally, the employer and/or agency pays the$US25 membership fee, a practice that somecritics say rarely happens in reality. A 2004independent field study by the ScalabriniMigration Center, a Manila-based researchinstitute, confirmed that the membership fee

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Figure 4. OWWA Board of Trustees

Source: Overseas Workers Welfare Administration.

DOLE secretaryand chairman

POEAadministrator

OWWAadministrator and

vice chairman

DOLEundersecretary

DFAundersecretary

DBM assistantsecretary

DOFundersecretary

Labor sectorrepresentative

Managementsector

representative

OFW sea-basedrepresentative

OFW land-basedrepresentative

OFW women’ssector

representative

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Figure 5. OWWA Welfare Officers by Destination, 2006

See insetbelow.

See insetbelow.

Map by Chuncui Velma Fan of theMigration Policy InstituteSource: Overseas Workers WelfareAdministration (OWWA), 2006.

Note:To see theMaps moreclearly, pleasezoom in onthe screen byclicking theZoom In (+)button in thetoolbar.

is “routinely passed onto migrant workers.”27

Although the mandatory nature of member-ship has been instrumental in shoring up thefund’s assets, some migrant organizations arequestioning the authority of OWWA torequire such payment.

The number of OWWA members hasincreased through the years, reflecting thegeneral upward trend in OFW emigration. Itis important to note that, despite the manda-tory membership requirements, a large pro-portion of temporary workers are not OWWA

members. As of May 2007, OWWA had over1 million members, which represents just 28percent of the 3.8 million legal temporaryworkers abroad in 2006, as estimated by theCommission on Overseas Filipinos, anothergovernment body. This difference, accordingto current OWWA Administrator MarianitoRoque, is a result of the many OFWs whoextended their contracts while overseas butdid not renew their OWWA membership.28

The reasons for nonrenewal are not clear andwarrant a careful study. Some may find mem-

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Figure 6. Organizational Chart of OWWA within the Philippine Government

Sources: Overseas Workers Welfare Administration and Department of Labor and Employment.

Department of Foreign Affairs(DFA)

Department ofFinance (DOF)

Department of Budget and

Management (DBM)

Embassiesand/or

consulates

Overseas Workers Welfare

Administration(OWWA)

PhilippineOverseas

EmploymentAgency (POEA)

Migrant workers andother overseas Filipinos

resource centers

Philippine OverseasLabor Offices (POLOs)

Foreign servicepersonnel

Labor attachés Welfare officers

OWWA Board

Secretariat

Internationaloffices

Head-quarters

Regionaloffices

Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)

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bership unnecessary since they know the gov-ernment repatriates OFWs regardless ofmembership status. Others may be unsatisfiedwith the services OWWA provides, and somemay simply find renewal a difficult or time-consuming process.

IV. Juggling Two Tasks: Achieving Fund Stability while Providing Services

The right balance between achieving fundstability and providing much-needed servicesto its beneficiaries is central to operating anywelfare fund successfully. Looking at OWWAdata reveals that the balance has tilted more toward achieving fund stability.

In 2005, OWWA spent only 3 percent of thefund balance on services. This ratio may beinterpreted positively or negatively. OWWAmay be spending less on services now somore is available for future services to futuremembers. At the same time, however, it mayalso mean OWWA is simply underinvestingin services.

Amassing funds serves two purposesalthough these purposes are not explicitlypart of OWWA’s policy framework.Interviews with current and former OWWAofficials confirmed that one goal is toachieve enough of a surplus that the interestincome alone will support OWWA’s annualoperating budget. A second purpose, accord-ing to administrator Roque, is to reach 10billion pesos (US$200 million),29 the amountOWWA would need to repatriate all or most

OFWS from the Middle East in a worst-casescenario; OWWA expects to have the 10 bil-lion pesos by October 2007. Once OWWAsurpasses that level, it will be able to spendmore on services.30

While both goals may make sense, they havecompromised OWWA’s past and present abil-ity to fund welfare services. Yet, this save-first-spend-later strategy has been critical toachieving financial stability — a crucial com-ponent of OWWA’s survival and legitimacy.As will be discussed later in the paper, thisstrategy is compatiblewith OWWA’s role as acontingency fund forlarge-scale repatria-tion should the needarise. Moreover, theaccumulation of assetsnow also appears to bea cautious and perhapsan easier strategygiven the difficulties in extending services,such as loans and education grants, in an effi-cient and effective manner.

Protecting Overseas Workers on a BudgetIn the last five years, OWWA’s income aver-aged 1.9 billion pesos (US$38 million) peryear. Membership fees comprise the greatmajority of this income (73 percent) while therest is from investments and other income.

According to its most recent audited financialstatement, as of December 2005, OWWA hada total investment portfolio of 6.7 billion

The right balance betweenachieving fund stabilityand providing much-needed services to itsbeneficiaries is central tooperating any welfarefund successfully.

pesos (US$134 million), 90 percent of whichhad been entered into an InvestmentManagement Agreement with the Land Bankof the Philippines (LBP) and theDevelopment Bank of the Philippines(DBP).31 As investment managers, LBP andDBP are authorized to invest/reinvest fundsin government securities, such as treasurybills and bonds, the servicing and repaymentof which the government fully guarantees fora maximum term of five years.

OWWA spent an average of 865 millionpesos (US$17 million) per year from 2002-2006. Administrative and operating costscomprised 55 percent of expenditures, whilethe rest was spent on programs and projects.

OWWA officially recognized this problemwhen its board introduced a cap on opera-tional costs at 50 percent of total expendi-tures. Operating costs declined, dippingbelow the 50 percent threshold in 2003 and2004. However, operational costs increasedin the next two years. In 2006, the proportionwas 57 percent.

Since 1999, OWWA has brought in moremoney than it has spent. This surplus isadded to OWWA’s equity. As a result,OWWA’s yearly financial statements showthat the fund grew nearly fourfold in 11years, from 2.2 billion pesos (US$44 million)in 1995 to 8.6 billion pesos (US$172 mil-lion) in 2005. To place the magnitude of thisamount in the Philippine context, OWWA’stotal assets are more than twice the 2006

annual budget of its mother agency, DOLE,and 14 times more than the 2006 budget ofits sister agency, POEA.

V. OWWA Services and Benefits

OWWA members can access a wide range ofbenefits, including life and disability insur-ance, loans, education subsidies, training,and other forms of social services and familywelfare assistance. Judging from OWWA’sbudget appropriations in 2006, OWWApoured more resources into some benefits— such as repatriation, other forms of onsiteassistance, and insurance — while spendingless on others, such as loans, education, andtraining (see Table 2).

Repatriation Program and Workers ProtectionThe repatriation program, which the currentOWWA administrator calls the backbone ofthe agency, facilitates the immediate repatria-tion of distressed and physically ill contractworkers, as well as the remains of those whodie while working abroad. In both plannedand forced return, OWWA negotiates withemployers/brokers and other host-countryauthorities; facilitates documentary require-ments for issuance of exit visas, clearances,monetary claims, and medical or policereports; and coordinates with Philippineembassies and DFA for other necessaryadministrative actions and airport assistance.Recently, for instance, the government negoti-ated the release of 700 OFWs jailed in SaudiArabia, mostly for cultural offenses like car-rying a Bible or drinking alcohol.

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OWWA is instructed by law to maintain,among other programs, an EmergencyRepatriation Fund to evacuate OFWs in caseof wars, disasters, or epidemics. The 1995 actallotted a seed amount of 100 million pesos(US$2 million) to comply with this law.32

During the war in Lebanon in July 2006, forexample, OWWA reserved US$10 million forthe evacuation of Filipino workers.33 About6,300 workers were repatriated between Julyand October 2006, with OWWA eventuallyspending $1,200 per returnee.34 It is not clearhow many of the repatriated were OWWAmembers. In 2006, OWWA assisted in therepatriation of 10,834 workers from Lebanonand other countries, spending almost 170million pesos (US$3.4 million) on airfare.This represented about 13 percent of revenuein 2006 (see Table 2).

Apart from repatriation, OWWA offers otherforms of assistance, services, and programs inits offices abroad, including counseling fordistressed workers, paralegal services, andlow-key diplomatic initiatives (e.g., negotia-tions for imprisoned OFWs, mobile welfareservices, hospital and prison visits, sportsdevelopment projects like sport leagues, cul-tural and recreational activities, and contin-gency operations during crisis situations).About 600,000 members, or 62 percent of allmembers in 2006 (both within the Philippinesand overseas), received various kinds of assis-tance or services.35

Embassies and consulates abroad providelegal assistance for overseas Filipinos in dis-

tress. OLAMWA coordinates all legal assis-tance services for Filipino migrant workers.The Philippine Congress created a legalassistance fund of 100 million pesos (US$2million), partly sourced from OWWA, to payfor foreign lawyers, bail bonds, court fees,and other litigation expenses.36

InsuranceAnother expensive item in OWWA’s servicesbudget is insurance claims. OWWA providesmembers with life and personal accidentinsurance while abroad. The coverageincludes 100,000 pesos (US$2,000) for natu-ral death and 200,000 pesos (US$4,000) foraccidental death; a burial benefit of 20,000pesos (US$400) is also provided. OWWAcharges an additional 900 pesos (US$18) peryear for health insurance.

As a rider to the life insurance, OWWA alsooffers monetary assistance to workers who suf-fer work-related injuries, illness, and disabili-ties during employment abroad. The benefitranges from 2,000 pesos (US$40) to 50,000pesos (US$1,000) and up to 100,000 pesos(US$2,000) in case of permanent disability.

In the past five years, a growing number ofOFWs have used the death and disabilitybenefits, from fewer than 600 in 2002 to morethan 1,500 in 2006.37 Despite this increase,the most current figure is still noticeablysmall relative to the total membership, andmuch less relative to the total stock of OFWs.

According to Roque, many OFWs have pri-vate insurance, which may partly explain the

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Table 2. Expenditures in Services in Pesos, 2006

Services Number of beneficiaries/claims/loans/grants

Cost Cost as apercentage

of revenue**

Number of beneficiaries/claims/loans/grants as a percentage of total member-ship*** (except when noted)

Repatriation Repatriated 10,834 OFWs 169,628,508 13.48% 1.09%

Workersassistance*

Assisted 614,697 (local andoverseas) workers at 24/7operations center

Data notavailable

Data notavailable

61.83%

Assisted 11,759 OFWs at theManila airport

Data notavailable

Data notavailable

1.18%

Insurance Paid 1,122 OFWs’ claims forinsurance and burial benefits

154,600,000 12.29% 0.11%

Paid 395 OFWs’ claims for disability and dismemberment

9,053,500 0.72% 0.04%

Loans Made 137 PredepartureLoans (PDLs) to OWFs

4,934,768 0.39% 0.01%

Made 543 Family AssistanceLoans (FALs) to OFWs

25,383,000 2.02% 0.05%

Made 261 Grocerias loans 10,500,000 0.83% 0.03%

Made 198 loans throughOWWA-National LivelihoodSupport Fund LivelihoodDevelopment Program

34,102,000 2.71% 0.02%

Education and training

Maintained 269 Education forDevelopment ScholarshipProgram (EDSP) grants

16,140,000 1.28% 0.03%

Made 1,981 Skills-for-Employment ScholarshipProgram (SESP) grants

3,040,183 0.24% 0.20%

Made 2,177 SeafarersUpgrading Program (SUP)grants

19,071,630 1.52% 0.95%****

*OWWA’s Financial Management System (FMS) does not allow for itemizing the specific services spent on workersassistance.

**Revenue in 2006 was 1,258,010,854 pesos.***Total membership as of December 2006 was 994,191.****This figure was arrived at by dividing the number of beneficiaries by the total number of deployed seafarers

(230,022) in 2006.Source: Overseas Workers Welfare Administration.

low number of claims. Former DOLESecretary Patricia Santo-Tomas also notes thatcontract workers are relatively healthier thanthe general population because of the rigor-ous medical examinations required beforeleaving.38 Further, the insurance benefits are“one size fits all,” and the lump-sum bene-fits are low relative to OFW earnings.

Loan Products To prevent illegal recruiters and loan sharksfrom preying on overseas workers and theirfamilies, OWWA, in coordination with gov-ernment financial institutions, is mandatedby law to extend loans to overseas workers.OWWA offers three kinds of loans: 1. Predeparture loans (PDL) are offered to

help defray the cost of predeparturerequirements, including medical examina-tions, subsistence allowance, clothing, andpocket money.

2. Family assistance loans (FAL) are foremergency purposes or family needs. Themaximum loan amount is set at 40,000pesos (US$800), payable in six months toa year and with a 9 percent annual inter-est deducted in advance. This benefit islimited to members who have at least sixmonths remaining in their employmentcontract.

3. Livelihood loans are offered to improveaccess to entrepreneurial developmentopportunities upon return. In a jointundertaking with the National LivelihoodSupport Fund (NLSF), the OWWA-NLSFLivelihood Development Program offerscollateral-based loans of up to 200,000pesos (US$4,000) per qualified borrower

at a 9 percent annual interest rate.Partnerships with five or fewer membersare entitled to a maximum loan of 1 mil-lion pesos (US$20,000) with 200,000pesos (US$4,000) for each member.Borrowers with no collateral can obtainloans of up to 50,000 pesos (US$1,000).In 2004, OWWA started the GroceriaProject, an interest-free, loan-assistancepackage extended in the form of goodsworth 50,000 pesos (US$1,000) per quali-fied groups of OFWs and their families.

One recurring problem with all these loanprograms has been lowrepayment rates. PDLand FAL loans have arepayment rate of 29percent. Indeed, only137 PDLs and 543 FALswere approved in 2006before OWWA suspended lending pendingfurther evaluation.39

Similarly, as early as the late 1980s, OWWAintroduced livelihood lending programs with-out much success. For instance, although thefirst livelihood program introduced in 1987generated employment for about 3,600 work-ers, it suffered from very low repayment ratesand was suspended by 1995. A year later, thesame program was repackaged, this time witha higher loan ceiling and entrepreneurshiptraining. Like its predecessor, this program,which funded over 430 enterprises in eightyears, was plagued by repayment problemsand was eventually replaced in 2004 by theOWWA-NLSF Livelihood Development

17

Insight

One recurring problemwith all these loanprograms has been lowrepayment rates.

Program mentioned above.40 In 2006,OWWA-NLSF funded 198 projects costing34 million pesos (US$680,000).

Reasons behind the low repayment rates arenot clear since the government has not eval-uated many of these programs. AdministratorRoque, some nongovernmental organization(NGO) leaders, and the media have sur-mised that overseas workers sometimes per-ceive the loan programs as dole-outs ratherthan subsidized loans, resulting in lowrepayment rates.41

Scholarships and Trainings OWWA also provides four kinds of scholar-ship grants and training opportunities formembers and, in some cases, their depend-ents. The Education for DevelopmentScholarship Program (EDSP) provides grantsof 60,000 pesos (US$1,200) per year todeserving and qualified dependents attend-ing college-degree courses with curriculumsof five years or less. The Skills-for-Employment Scholarship Program (SESP)pays for one-year technical and six-monthvocational courses reflecting the technicalskill requirements of overseas jobs.

A separate program caters to seafarers. TheSeafarer’s Upgrading Program (SUP) aims todevelop the expertise of Filipino seafarers inaccordance with technological advancementsand international maritime standards.Financial assistance ranges from 1,200 pesos(US$24) to 7,500 pesos (US$150) per course.

In partnership with Microsoft Philippines, theTulay (Bridge) Education Program offers

training and access to computer technologyso that families can communicate through theInternet. Tulay takes part in Microsoft’sUnlimited Potential (UP), a global initiativeaimed at providing technology and skills forunderserved individuals. Aside from Internetand e-mail use, OWWA members and theirfamilies living near Community TechnologyLearning Centers (CTLC) can also takecourses in basic computer applications, suchas Word, PowerPoint, and Excel.

Mandatory predeparture orientation seminars(PDOS) help build skill sets and familiarizewould-be migrants with the culture and prac-tices of their host countries. Specific modulesare customized for household workers, per-forming artists and entertainers, nurses, andseafarers, as well as for workers migrating tocertain countries/regions, such as HongKong, Libya, the Middle East, South Korea,and Taiwan. In conducting these seminars,OWWA partners with members of the privatesector (e.g., recruitment agencies and associ-ations) and civil society (e.g., workers’ groupsand NGOs). The partners conduct the orien-tations while OWWA prepares the materials,sets standard qualifications, and conductstraining for trainers.42 A 2005 survey con-ducted by the Scalabrini Migration Centerfound that 84 percent of respondents consid-ered PDOS “useful” or “very useful,” partic-ularly for first timers. However, the surveyrevealed the need for more country-specificinformation and smaller group discussions.43

Apart from PDOS, few OFWs benefit fromscholarships and training-related programs.For instance, only 0.95 percent of seafarers

18

deployed in 2006 availed themselves ofSUP while the 1,981 SESP scholars repre-sented about 0.2 percent of total member-ship (see Table 2 on page 16). Unlike theother programs, EDSP is competitive andhighly selective. In 2005, about 2,500dependents applied for 100 spots. An addi-tional 45 spots are made available to stu-dents pursuing courses in priority fields inscience and technology, such as engineeringand science teaching.

VI. Protecting TemporaryWorkers: Lessons and Cautionsfrom the Philippines

In cash-strapped developing countries, oper-ating a welfare fund that migrants or theiremployers finance offers a potentially effi-cient and feasible solution to sharing the costof protection. However, the Philippine expe-rience shows the challenges involved in mak-ing a welfare fund work. A welfare fund hasto (1) find the right balance of services, (2)create meaningful partnerships, (3) buildstrong state capacity, and (4) actively involvedestination countries.

1. Balance Core and Secondary Services A welfare fund’s services can be groupedinto two broad categories. Core services,those that protect migrant workers from therisks they face while abroad, include repa-triation in case of breakdowns in publicorder, such as war, or in case of other formsof maltreatment; health and life insurance;and legal assistance for settling work-related

disputes and frauds. Secondary serviceshelp migrant workers, before and afterdeparture, and the families left behind.These include education and training, rein-tegration programs (e.g., livelihood loans),and predeparture loans.

A fund’s resources may be adequate to pro-vide core services, since a relatively smallproportion of migrant workers actually expe-rience the most severe problems while work-ing abroad. However, a fund cannot delivercostly secondary services on its own basedon a small membership fee, as OWWA’sexperience demonstrates. Ding Bagasao, aprominent Filipino NGO leader and aca-demic, has asked, “Why is OWWA not ask-ing for more than US$25?”44

It is not surprising that, despite the rhetoric,OWWA has actually extended secondaryservices to relatively few OFWs and theirfamilies — in most cases meeting only theminimum requirements mandated by law.Offering secondary services to few benefici-aries only creates undue expectations anddissatisfaction among fund members as wellas the general public. Welfare funds shouldfocus not only on critical services, but alsothose that can bedelivered in an effec-tive manner andmeaningful scale.OWWA illustrates thatcountries need to findthe right balance ofwhat aspects of wel-fare the government

19

Insight

OWWA illustrates thatcountries need to find theright balance of whataspects of welfare thegovernment can trulydeliver, and they need tosearch for partners indelivering services.

can truly deliver, and they need to search forpartners in delivering services.

2. Create Meaningful Partnerships Since private and public institutions can alsoprovide secondary services, welfare fundsshould delegate these services to such insti-tutions. Partnerships can range from sharingresponsibilities to full outsourcing in order tosupplement direct capacity.

OWWA has started to take such steps. It out-sourced medical insurance to the PhilippineHealth Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH)in 2003 and partnered with NLSF in givingout livelihood loans. It has also outsourcedthe majority of PDOS to NGOs and membersof the private sector. In 2006, OWWA pro-vided a very small portion of PDOS with con-sultants responsible for the large majority(see Table 2).

Even in core services, such as repatriationand insurance, partnerships have been andwill be critical to more efficient delivery. Forinstance, OWWA partnered with theInternational Organization for Migration(IOM) in the repatriation of OFWs from therecent war in Lebanon. IOM repatriatedalmost 67 percent of Filipino returnees.45 Ontop of that, OWWA was able to decrease itsown repatriation costs by using IOM’s dis-count on airfares.46

Civil-society organizations, when welfarefunds properly engage them, can also playmany roles, such as providing services withgovernment help, giving inputs in the policy-

making process, and assuming critical over-sight functions to address accountability andcorruption issues. A welfare fund shouldexplore new mechanisms to build partner-ships with civil society. In the Philippines,for instance, organizations like UnladKabayan and the Economic Resource Centerfor Overseas Filipinos (ERCOF) promotesocial entrepreneurship among returningOFWs and provide services for enterprisedevelopment in the Philippines.Organizations like these can offer criticalhuman resources that can effectively providethe secondary services of a welfare fund.

Apart from partnerships with civil societyand the private sector, coordination withother government agencies and local govern-ments can be critical. For example, OWWArecently signed a memorandum of agreementwith the governor of Nueva Vizcaya to estab-lish a migrants’ desk in the province. OWWAwill train local government personnel in pro-grams and projects relevant to migrant work-ers and their families.47

However, partnerships also come with risks,such as poor coordination on resource issuesand misunderstandings about expectations.Therefore, welfare funds should enter part-nerships with caution. Public-private part-nerships must be based on solid understand-ings of the respective responsibilities, agreedindicators of success, and complete trans-parency. Otherwise, partnerships may failand even deplete a fund’s balance, which iscritical to its continued financial stability.

20

Although they can potentially augment thestate’s capacity to deliver services, effectivepartnerships also require a certain degree ofpreexisting capacity. In working with part-ners, governments must have the flexibility toaddress different needs and expectations ofprivate and nongovernmental organizations,which tend to work on different timetablesand have different notions of accountability.The inflexibility of government bureaucracycan present a major challenge in creatingeffective partnerships. Despite the risks,exploring new partnerships is worthwhile,particularly because it provides reformchoices and allows more room for innovativeand unconventional thinking.

3. Build State Capacity Questions about what a welfare fund can andcannot do naturally lead to the critical issueof state capacity. The role of the state, inboth the developed and developing world,has changed in many ways, in part as aresponse to greater economic integration. Inmany countries, however, particularly in thedeveloping world, the state has yet to developthe capacity to respond to these changes ade-quately. The OWWA experience has shownthat strong state capacity allows the countryto make use of opportunities that labormigration provides and to protect and pro-mote the interests of temporary workers.

Therefore, developing countries need toadopt frameworks and tools that permit (1)representation and meaningful participationof migrant workers; (2) political, administra-

tive, and financial transparency and account-ability; and (3) the effective use of govern-ment employees.

Migrant Workers’ Representation and ParticipationIn any welfare fund, it is especially impor-tant to strengthen capacities for policy for-mulation and coordination. A fund shouldinclude a wide array of stakeholders, partic-ularly the members themselves. One of theunique aspects of the Philippine case is thedispersal of its estimated 3.8 million tempo-rary workers. Representing their interestsand directing the OWWA welfare fundremain major challenges. Although migrantsare represented on the OWWA board, theyconstitute a very small minority.

Further, OWWAdoes not have amechanism for vot-ing on major issuesor even electing itsboard members. Asalready noted, thePhilippine presi-dent appoints allboard members.Although this may be the most feasiblesetup, given the logistical difficulty of con-sulting a membership dispersed in over 190countries, this still raises questions of towhom OWWA should be accountable. ThePhilippine Congress is considering a bill thatwould change OFW representation on theOWWA board. However, since similar billsfiled in the previous Congress lacked sup-

21

Insight

The OWWA experience hasshown that strong statecapacity allows the countryto make use of opportuni-ties that labor migrationprovides and to protect andpromote the interests oftemporary workers.

port, this bill’s prospect of turning into lawremains dim.48

Welfare funds need to consult extensivelywith different stakeholders, especially themigrants, to find solutions for addressing thistype of problem. Possible solutions can rangefrom the simple, such as requiring appointeesto be former or current migrants, to the morecomplex, such as having fund members peri-odically elect migrant representatives.

Apart from increasing the number of migrantboard representatives, it is also important forwelfare funds to create clear avenues ormechanisms that allow for regular consulta-tion with all fund members. Without suchavenues, the extent to which these migrantboard members can truly represent allmigrants will always be limited. A method ofcanvassing the needs of migrants and anevaluation system of program performanceneed to be developed to ensure that welfarefunds are effectively used. For instance,OWWA’s plan to facilitate and support thecreation of an umbrella of OFW organizationsoverseas is a step in this direction.49

Transparency and AccountabilityRepresentation of migrants’ interests raisesquestions of transparency in the managementand accounting of the welfare fund, a qualitycritical to a fund’s successful operation. Thegovernment running a welfare fund shouldcreate mechanisms for periodically informingfund members about the fund’s financialstanding and the services offered in a givenperiod, and it should provide a way for mem-

bers to effectively communicate with thefund’s board.

Operational transparency is even more criti-cal in instances where a fund is accused ofcorruption and mismanagement of funds.From 1999 to 2005, the PhilippineCommission on Audit’s reports on OWWAhighlighted millions of pesos in unrecover-able or “doubtful accounts,” and nonliqui-dated cash advances. The largest of theseunredeemable investments was the SmokeyMountain Project, a housing developmentprogram for the urban poor. In 2005, govern-ment auditors noted that the recovery of the479 million peso (US$9.6 million) invest-ment in the project is “uncertain.”50

Without operational transparency, specula-tion about the welfare fund’s financial stand-ing can surface and damage the credibility offund managers. For instance, during the 2006war in Lebanon, the Philippine mediareported allegations that OWWA did nothave the resources available to fund repatria-tion efforts although the agency’s auditedaccounts clearly indicated otherwise.

At the same time, the board’s process formaking policy decisions also should betransparent. For example, OWWA membersand the general public cannot access boardmeeting minutes. This practice has resultedin a veil of suspicion. In 2003, OWWA’sdecision to outsource medical insurance tothe Philippine Health Insurance Corporation(PHILHEALTH), the national government’sinsurance company, caused a scandal

22

because some members of migrant and civil-society groups interpreted the transfer as a“bail out” of the ailing corporation. A reso-lution filed in the Philippine Congress notedthe “dissatisfaction of OFWs” and chargedthat the “majority of the OWWA boardmembers and officials shunned the loneOFW representative who has consistentlyobjected to the transfer.”51 The outsourcingto PHILHEALTH was also reportedly linkedto the 2004 presidential campaign. Somemigrant groups alleged that the diversion ofOWWA funds enabled President GloriaArroyo to give away PHILHEALTH insur-ance cards during the campaign period.52

Whether there is substance to these allega-tions is difficult to ascertain due to the lackof transparency in the board’s decision-making process.

Effective Use of Government EmployeesAnother central component of state capacityis the effective use of government employees.Welfare funds should explore approaches thattackle civil-service pay, management struc-tures, career structures, and training.

OWWA has allocated more than half of itsannual budget to operational expenses, withabout 40 percent going to salaries and otherpersonnel benefits. Some members of civilsociety have criticized the high operationalcosts. The international nature of OWWA’soperations partly explains its expenses.Although this pattern of spending can be jus-tifiable, welfare funds should still assesswhether such spending contributes to humanresources that benefit migrants.

4. Involve Destination CountriesLegal protection of migrants is challenging,especially in destination societies with valuesystems and worldviews that differ from thosein the origin country. For instance, the major-ity of the Philippines’ welfare officers arelocated in the Middle East, partly due to thehigh number of welfare cases in this region.53

However, protection of overseas workersshould also concern destination countries.

Toward this end, countries of destinationshould consider providing technical andfinancial assistance in capacity-building proj-ects. They also should consider developingmechanisms to protect the welfare of tempo-rary workers by signing bilateral agreementsor memorandums of understanding (MOUs)with countries of origin that explicitly addressworkers’ protection. Although the Philippineshas signed 12 bilateral agreements with des-tination countries, these MOUs and agree-ments are merely generalities and guidelineson migrant workers; they do not give basesfor enforcing compliance on wages and otherterms of employment.54

Given that migrant workers provide servicescritical to the economies of receiving coun-tries, it may be logical and useful for destina-tion countries to give them necessary protec-tion in employment-related matters, such aswages, working hours, contract compliance,and occupational safety. Destination coun-tries can conduct studies or audits of theirown national laws to identify and perhapscodify legislation, legal precedents, andpractices that may already exist. Bilateral or

23

Insight

regional agreements could go a step furtherand make it mandatory for a given destina-tion country to provide such legal protection.No major country of destination has ratifiedthe UN Treaty on the Protection of MigrantWorkers and their Families. Consequently,destination countries’ national laws remainthe best way to enforce and internalizemigrant-worker protection.55

Since this type of protection is a transna-tional issue that requires transnational solu-tions, partnerships across borders are criti-cal. Institutions like OWWA have limitedpowers because they cannot interfere directlywith domestic issues in destination countries.Governments of the destination countries can

complement theofferings of welfarefunds. For example,the EuropeanCommission devel-oped a policy docu-ment arguing themerits of “global

mobility partnerships” with third-countrynationals. One of the suggested commitmentsthat EU Member States and/or the EC couldgive is the provision of “predeparture lin-guistic or technical training for persons witha concrete employment prospectiveabroad.”56

VII. Conclusion

Protecting overseas workers will gain moreattention as temporary migration continues togrow worldwide. Since 1997, temporarymigration to countries that belong to theOrganization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD) has grown annually by9 percent. The number of temporary migrantsin East and West Asia, including SaudiArabia and the United Arab Emirates, hasconsistently grown by 2.5 percent per yearsince 1985. In the United States, growth intemporary migration averaged 10.4 percentper year, from 208,100 entries in 1997 to396,700 in 2004.57

Temporary migration presents countries oforigin with the dilemma of ensuring the pro-tection of their workers abroad. This Insightprovides an overview of the Philippine gov-ernment’s approach to protection and thebenefits and limitations of its main protectionvehicle, OWWA. The Philippine experienceshows that the protection of overseas workerscan be institutionalized through three ele-ments: (1) a mechanism for repatriation, (2)provision of insurance and loans, and (3)education and training.

This strategy provides key lessons for originand destination countries that are thinkingmore seriously about protecting temporaryoverseas workers. A membership-driven wel-fare fund like OWWA can benefit migrantsin a number of ways. First, it allows the gov-ernment to raise sufficient revenue to finance

24

Since this type ofprotection is a

transnational issue thatrequires transnationalsolutions, partnerships

across borders are critical.

inherently expensive needs of migrants indestination countries. Without private fund-ing from overseas workers, cash-strappedgovernments like the Philippines would behard pressed to allocate sufficient resourcesfrom the national budget. Second, a welfarefund also enables a government to providecritical on-site services, especially repatria-tion, in emergency situations. Finally, a wel-fare fund, if managed effectively, has thepotential to financially support activitiesthat can leverage migrant resources fordevelopment, such as business entrepre-neurship and career development amongreturning migrants.

However, countries of origin must overcomeseveral limitations if they want to realizethese benefits. The Philippine case showsthe importance of tailoring services to theimmediate or core needs of overseas work-ers without overextending the government’scapacity. Given that many OFWs work inconflict-prone regions, it makes sense thatthe Philippines’ top priority has been build-ing up the contingency fund for repatriation.Other sending countries may and shouldhave different priorities. For instance,Mexico and Morocco might focus less onlarge-scale repatriation and more on wages,labor conditions, and secondary services.

Governments should evaluate where thecapacity to deliver services lies. Some countries of origin face limited state capac-ity, which can be addressed through well-managed partnerships between govern-ments and with private and nongovernmen-

tal organizations. These countries can enlistprivate organizations to deliver programs tooverseas workers.

Welfare funds require effective institutionsthat allow for transparency as well as a wayto represent the views of the dues-payingmembers themselves. This guarantees thatservices remain relevant to the needs ofbeneficiaries. It is a challenge to design auseful way to consult the beneficiaries,given that migrants are typically dispersedto many countries.

In addition, countries of origin should not bethe only ones expected to protect migrantworkers. Destination countries also need todo their part in protecting migrant workerswithin their boundaries.

In the Philippines, where one in 12 peopleis a migrant and where everyone has a relationship to migration in one way oranother, managing institutions like OWWAcan be inherently difficult.58 OWWA servesa population of 3.8 million, highly mobiletemporary workers scattered in over 190countries, as well as the families left behind— an enormous task that few governmentshave even attempted systematically. Itsexperience provides a rich set of lessonsand cautions about what is involved in pro-tecting overseas workers. Once its limita-tions are addressed, OWWA can be a usefultemplate for many developing countries asthey face the mounting challenges of pro-tecting workers abroad.

25

Insight

ENDNOTES1. Migrant-sending refers to a country that has a large-scale government program for facilitating the export of its laborforce.2. Neil G. Ruiz, “Emigration and Higher Education in the Philippines,” Paper presented at the Labor andEmployment Association Conference, Chicago, IL, January 7, 2007.3. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, “Global Presences: A Compendium of Overseas EmploymentStatistics 2006” (Mandaluyong City: POEA, 1996), 51-52.4. Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) is the official term used by the Philippine government to refer to Filipinosabroad working on finite or temporary contracts. 5. Asian Development Bank, Enhancing the Efficiency of Overseas Filipino Workers’ Remittances (Manila: AsianDevelopment Bank, 2004), 61.6. Florian A. Alburo and Danila I. Abella, “Skilled Labour Migration from Developing Countries: Study on thePhilippines,” International Migration Papers, Paper 51 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2002), 16.7. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Global Presences, 52.8. Ruth C. Gonzaga, “Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) Remittances: Compilation Practices And FutureChallenges,” Paper presented at the Conference of the International Association for Official Statistics (IAOS), 2006. 9. Michelle V. Remo, “Cost of Sending Remittances to RP Going Down, Says BSP,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 7,2007.10. See note 7 above.11. Jorge Villamor Tigno, “Governance and Public Policy in the Philippines: RA 8042 and the Deregulation of theOverseas Employment Sector” (PhD dissertation, University of the Philippines-Diliman, 2003), 114-115.12. Graziano Battistella, “Return Migration in the Philippines: Issues and Policies,” in International Migration:Prospects and Policies in a Global Market, ed, Douglas Massey and Edward Taylor (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2004), 232.13. Anne-Marie Hilsdon, “The Contemplacion Fiasco: The Hanging of a Filipino Domestic Worker in Singapore,” inHuman Rights and Gender Politics, ed. Anne-Marie Hilsdon, Martha Macintyre, Vera Mackie and Maila Stivens (NewYork: Routledge, 2000), 172-173.14. US Department of State, “1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism,” Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_95/terasi.htm.15. Joaquin Gonzales III, Philippine Labour Migration: Critical Dimensions of Public Policy (Singapore: Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies, 1998), 6-7.16. See note 15 above.

26

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the thoughtful comments of MPI’s Kathleen Newland; theeditorial contributions of Kirin Kalia; the technical support of April Siruno, Aaron Terrazas, andVelma Fan; the research assistance of Laiden Pedrina of the University of the Philippines; andthe support of the Brookings Institution, Global Economy and Development Program. They givespecial thanks to OWWA Administrator Marianito Roque and his staff for providing access toOWWA’s resources and data, and to Patricia Santo-Tomas, Ildefonso Bagasao, Arturo Brion,Gregorio Oca, Florenda Herrera, Francis Oca, Jeremiah Opiniano, and Frencel Tingga forsharing their time and expertise. This Insight is made possible by the generous support of theJohn D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by a grant from the Multilateral InvestmentFund of the Inter-American Development Bank.

17. Michael A. Bengwayan, “When Filipino maids return home in coffins,” New Straits Times, March 7, 2001.18. See note 17 above.19. Robyn Rodriguez, “Domestic Insecurities: Female Migration from the Philippines, Development and NationalSubject-Status,” in UCSD Center for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper Series (La Jolla: UCSD Centerfor Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper 115, 2005), 7.20. Author emphasis.21. Philippine House of Representatives, Republic Act 8042, Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. 22. Edgar Rodriguez and Susan Horton, “International Return Migration and Remittances in the Philippines,” inUniversity of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper Series (Toronto: University of Toronto Department ofEconomics, 1995), 18.23. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Board of Trustees, http://www.owwa.gov.ph/page/board_of_trustees/.24. The staff numbers are estimates; actual numbers are unknown according to OWWA. 25. Section 23 of the Rights and Enforcement Mechanism Under International and Regional Human Rights Systemof the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, as cited by Arnel F. de Guzman, “A Critical Assessment of theMigrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042),” unpublished paper, 9-10.26. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Omnibus Policies, Board Resolution No. 138, 2003,http://www.owwa.gov.ph/filemanager/download/.27. Maruja Asis, Preparing to Work Abroad: Filipino Migrants’ Experience Prior to Deployment (Manila: PhilippineMigrants Rights Watch and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005), 52.28. Marianito Roque, interview by authors, June 1, 2007.29. Exchange rate used: 50 Philippine pesos to 1 US dollar.30. See note 28 above.31. Philippine Commission on Audit, 2005 Annual Audited Report of OWWA.32. See note 21 above.33. “Few Pinoys in Lebanon Want to Go,” Manila Standard, August 24, 2006.34. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Annual Report 2006, 27.35. Note that members who used the workers assistance program might also be accounted for in other services, suchas repatriation. Given the limitations of OWWA data, it is difficult to verify this assumption.36. Renee E. Ofreneo and Isabelo A. Samonte, “Empowering Filipino Migrant Workers: Policy Issues andChallenges,” in International Migration Papers (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2005), 8-12.37. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Insurance and Health Care Availment Report, 2002-2006. 38. Patricia Santo-Tomas, interview by authors, May 24, 2007.39. See note 28 above.40. Masami Ochi, “Return Migration of Filipina Overseas Workers: Some Implications for ReintegrationProgrammes,” Typescript 2005.41. Marianito Roque, see note 28; Candice Y. Cerezo, “Failures Bared in Government Lending Project for OFWGroups,” Manila Times, January 3, 2007.42. A.K. Masud Ali, “Predeparture Orientation Programme, Study of Good Practices in Asia, A Comparative Study ofBangladesh, the Philippines and Sri Lanka,” in Labour Migration in Asia: Protection of Migrant Workers, SupportServices and Enhancing Development Benefits, ed. Caroline Mackenzie (Geneva: IOM, 2004), 109.43. Maruja Asis, Preparing to Work Abroad: Filipino Migrants’ Experience Prior to Deployment, 7-10.44. Ding Bagasao, interview by authors, June 5, 2007.45. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Annual Report 2006, 28.46. See note 38 above.47. Philippine Information Agency, “OWWA to Establish Migrants’ Desk in Nueva Vizcaya,” October 16, 2006.48. Philippine House of Representatives, House Bill No. 00699 An Act Providing for the Selection of AdditionalMemberships in the Boards of the POEA and the OWWA, Amending for Such Purpose Republic Act 8042, OtherwiseKnown as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Introduced by Congressman Rexlon Gatchalian;Philippine House of Representatives, House Bill No. 1357 An Act to Provide for an OWWA Charter to Govern the

27

Insight

Operation and Administration of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Prescribe for Public Accountabilityon the OWWA Administrators and Officials Thereof and for Other Purposes Introduced by Rep. Roseller L. Barinaga. 49. See note 28 above.50. Philippine Commission on Audit, Annual Audited Report of OWWA, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and2005. Available at: http://www.coa.gov.ph/Financial_Reports.htm.51. Philippine House of Representatives, House Resolution No. 03 Resolution on Her Excellency President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo to Immediately Recall Executive Order (EO) No. 182 dated 14 February, 2003 Which Allowed theTransfer of the OFW Medicare Fund Under the Charge and Care of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration(OWWA) to the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH). Introduced by Rep. Roseller Barinaga. 52. Alecks P. Pabico, “The Truth About OWWA Funds,” Inside PCIJ: The Stories Behind Our Stories, August 1,2006, http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=1091.53. See note 38 above.54. Stella P. Go, “Recent Trends in International Movements and Policies: The Philippines,” Paper prepared for theWorkshop on International Migration and Labour Markets in Asia, February 17, 2006, Japan Institute for LabourPolicy and Training (JILPT), Tokyo, Japan, 5-6.55. See note 44 above.56. European Commission, “Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and ThirdCountries,” Communication 2007, 6.57. Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, “Linking Temporary Worker Schemes with Development,” Migration InformationSource, February 2007, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=576.58. Marianito Roque, interview by authors, October 13, 2006.

28

Bureau of Employment Services (BES) Commission on Audit (COA) Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Department of Labor and Employment

(DOLE)Economic Resource Center for Overseas

Filipinos (ERCOF)Education for Development Scholarship

Program (EDSP)Family Assistance Loans (FAL)International Organization for Migration

(IOM)Mandatory Predeparture Orientation Seminars

(PDOS)National Livelihood Support Fund (NLSF)National Seamen Board (NSB)Office of the Legal Assistant for Migrant

Workers Affairs (OLAMWA)

OFW Family Circle (OFC)Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD)Overseas Employment Development Board

(OEDB)Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs)Overseas Workers Welfare Administration

(OWWA)Philippine Health Insurance Corporation

(PHILHEALTH)Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration (POEA)Predeparture Loans (PDLs)Seafarer’s Upgrading Program (SUP)Skills-for-Employment Scholarship Program

(SESP) Welfare Fund Administration (WFA)

List of Acronyms

29

Insight

Appendix 1. Detailed Descriptions of Occupation Types Abroad

Type Broad Category Specific Occupations

Type 1 Professional, technical,and related workers(includes entertainers)

• Medical, dental, veterinary, and related workers• Aircraft and ship officers• Architects, engineers and related technicians• Composers and performing artists• Sculptors, painters, photographers, and related

creative artists• Teachers (including supervisors and principals)• Mathematicians, statisticians, system analysts, and

related workers• Other

Type 2 Managerial, executive, andadministrative workers

Sales workers

Agricultural, animal husbandry, and forestryworkers, and fisherman

• same as broad category

• Salesmen, shop assistants, and related workers• Sales supervisors and buyers• Others

• Agricultural and animal husbandry workers, fishermen, hunters, and related workers

• Others

Type 3 Clerical workers • Clerical and related workers• Bookkeepers, cashiers, and related workers• Computing machine operators• Telephone and telegraph operators• Secretaries, stenographers, typists, and card/tape-

punching machine operators• Other

Type 4 Service workers • Helpers and related housekeeping service workers • Cooks, waiters, bartenders, and related workers• Building caretakers, cleaners, and related workers• Service workers• Hairdressers, barbers, beauticians, and related

workers• Protective service workers• Others

30

Appendix 1. Detailed Descriptions of Occupation Types Abroad (Continued)

Type Broad Category Specific Occupations

Type 5 Production processworkers, transportequipment operators, and laborers

• Transport equipment operators• Bricklayers, carpenters, and other construction

workers• Electrical fitters and related electrical and electron-

ics workers• Plumbers, welders, sheet-metal, and structural metal

preparers and erectors• Machinery fitters, machine assemblers, and preci-

sion-instrument makers• Laborers• Tailors, dressmakers, sewers, upholsterers, and

related workers• Material-handling and related equipment operators• Painters• Production and related workers• Production supervisors and general foremen• Blacksmiths, toolmakers, and machine-tool opera-

tors• Food and beverages processors• Furniture makers and related workers• Stationary engine and related equipment operators

31

Dovelyn Rannveig AguniasDovelyn Rannveig Agunias is an Associate Policy Analyst forthe Migration Policy Institute’s Migrants, Migration, andDevelopment Program. Ms. Agunias focuses on remittances,Diasporas worldwide, and the migration-development nexus.She recently co-authored an MPI Policy Brief, “CircularMigration and Development: Trends, Policy Routes, and WaysForward,” and authored two MPI reports: “Remittances andDevelopment: Trends, Impacts and Policy Options — AReview of the Literature” and “From Zero-Sum to a Win-Win

Scenario: A Literature Review of Circular Migration.” Before joining MPI, Ms. Aguniaswas an Edward Weintal Scholar at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. She holds aMS in foreign service, with honors, from Georgetown University and a BA in politicalscience from the University of the Philippines.

Neil G. RuizNeil G. Ruiz is a Research Fellow for the BrookingsInstitution’s Global Economy and Development Program anda PhD candidate in political science at the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology. He specializes in comparative andinternational political economy, global labor markets, migra-tion policy, the relationship between international migrationand economic development, and Southeast Asian politics. Mr.Ruiz has several years of experience in policy analysis anddevelopment work as a consultant for the AsianDevelopment Bank and the Migration Policy Institute. His dis-

sertation, titled “Made for Export: Labor Migration, State Power, and HigherEducation in a Developing Society,” proposes a theory for why developing countriescreate policies for exporting labor. Mr. Ruiz earned his MSc in economic history fromOxford University and graduated Phi Beta Kappa and High Honors from theUniversity of California, Berkeley with a BA in political science.

About the Authors

Insight

The Migration Policy Institute(MPI) is an independent,nonpartisan, nonprofit thinktank dedicated to the study ofthe movement of peopleworldwide. The instituteprovides analysis, development,and evaluation of migrationand refugee policies at thelocal, national, and internationallevels. It aims to meet therising demand for pragmaticresponses to the challengesand opportunities thatmigration presents in an evermore integrated world. MPIproduces the MigrationInformation Source atwww.migrationinformation.org.

M O R E F R O M M P I :

1400 16th Street NWSuite 300Washington, DC 20036

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www.migrationpolicy.orgwww.migrationinformation.org

This Insight is part of a series from MPI’s Program on Migrants, Migration, andDevelopment. Previous program publications include:

• “Leveraging Remittances for Development” by Dilip Ratha, June 2007.

• “The Phenomenal Rise in Remittances to India: A Closer Look” by Muzaffar A. Chishti,May 2007.

• “Circular Migration and Development:Trends, Policy Routes, and Ways Forward” byDovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland, April 2007.

• “Remittances and Development:Trends, Impacts, and Policy Options—A Review ofthe Literature” by Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, September 2006.

• “From Zero-Sum to a Win-Win Scenario: A Literature Review on Circular Migration”by Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, September 2006.

The Migration Information Source, MPI’s award-winning online journal, featured a SpecialIssue on Migration and Development in February 2007. It is available athttp://www.migrationinformation.org/development.cfm.

MPI’s work on Migrants, Migration, and Development is made possible by the generoussupport of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by a grant from theMultilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank.

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