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Economic Commission for Africa

Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms:The Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

Economic Commission for Africa

Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms: The Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

December 2010

iiiThe Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

Table of Contents

List of acronyms v

Foreword viii

Acknowledgements x

Executive Summery xi

CHAPTER I: Introduction 1

1.1 Structure of the Study 31.2 Methodology 31.3 DefinitionofkeyConcepts 41.4 TheNexusBetweentheSixTerms 5

CHAPTER II: Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms 6

2.1 TheInternationalContext 62.2 TheAfricanContext 7

CHAPTER III: The Post-Colonial State in Africa 11

3.1 Reasons Behind State Intervention in Africa 113.2 Three Thematic Areas of the Post-Colonial State 123.3 BuildingStateCapacity 13

CHAPTER IV: The Weberian Bureaucratic Model and the African Civil Service 14

4.1 FeaturesofBureaucraticModel 144.2 PathologiesoftheModel 14

iv Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms:

CHAPTER V: Trends and Processes of Civil Service Reforms in Africa 16

5.1 ReviewoftheGeneralLiteratureonPublicSectorReform(PSR) 165.2 ReviewoftheLiteratureonPublicSectorReformsinAfrica 175.3 TheOutcomeoftheReformPhases 285.4 ReviewoftheLiteratureonCivilServiceReform(CSR) 315.5 Trends,ProcessesandDynamicsofCivilServiceReformsinAfrica 365.6 PhasesofCivilServiceReforms 375.7 TheEvaluationofCSRsinAfricasincethe1980s 385.8 StrategiestoImproveCSRsinAfrica 415.9 Fourmajorsetoffactorsthataffectadministrativereform 42

CHAPTER VI: Experiences, Innovations and Best Practices in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa 47

6.1 ExperiencesinCivilServiceReformsinGhana,Kenya,NigeriaandSouthAfrica 476.6 ModestInnovationsandBestPracticesfromtheExperiences

oftheFourCountries 766.7 InfluenceofsomeExternalForcesonInnovationsandBestPractices 786.8 SummaryofthedriversofCSRs 806.9 PocketsofEffectiveness,ProductivityorSuccess 80

CHAPTER VII: Challenges Facing Civil Service Reforms and Strategies for Addressing them 87

7.1 MajorChallengesPosedtoEffectiveCivilServiceReforms 877.2 CivilServiceReformsandPovertyReductionintheFourCountries 897.3 PointatwhichtheCountriesareAddressingtheChallenges 90

CHAPTER VIII: Conclusions, Findings, Lessons and Policy Recommendations 91

8.1 Conclusion 918.2 Findings:WhatworksandwhatdoesnotinCivilServiceReformsinAfrica 918.4 PolicyRecommendations 95

References 101

vThe Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

List of acronyms

AAPAM African Association of Public Administration and ManagementAD Alliance for Democracy AfDB AfricanDevelopmentBankANC African National CongressAPP AllPeople’sPartyAPRM AfricanPeerReviewMechanismASCON AdministrativeStaffCollegeofNigeriaAU African UnionBPSR Bureau of Public Sector ReformBS BeneficiarySurveyCAFRAD AfricanTrainingCentreforAdministrationandDevelopmentCAPAM CommonwealthAssociationofPublicAdministrationandManagementCDTs CapacityDevelopmentTeamsCMAs Central Management TeamsCODESA ConventionforaDemocraticSouthAfricaCODESRIA CouncilforDevelopmentandScientificResearchinAfricaCPSI Centre for Public Service InnovationCSOs CivilSocietyOrganizationsCSR Civil Service ReformCSRs Civil Service ReformsCSRP Civil Service Reform ProgrammeCSPIP CivilServicePerformanceImprovementProgrammeCSU Client Services UnitDfID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentDP Democratic PartyDPSA DepartmentofPublicServiceandAdministrationEFCC EconomicandFinancialCrimesCommissionFCT FederalCapitalTerritoryGEAR Macro-EconomicStrategyforGrowth&EmploymentGDP Gross Domestic ProductGIDD GovernmentandInstitutionalDevelopmentDivisionGNU Government of National UnityHIPC Highly Indebted Poor CountryHRD HumanResourceDevelopmentHRM Human Resource Management

vi Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms:

ICT Information Communication TechnologyICPC IndependentCorruptionPractices&OtherRelatedOffencesCommissionIFP InkathaFreedomPartyIMF InternationalMonetaryFundIPPDS Integrated Payroll and Personnel Database System IT Information TechnologyKACA KenyaAnti-CorruptionAuthorityKANU Kenya African National UnionMBO ManagementByObjectivesMDAs Ministries,DepartmentsandAgenciesMDGs MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsMDM Mass Democratic MovementMLGRD MinistryofLocalGovernmentandRuralDevelopmentMMDAs Metropolitan,MunicipalandDistrictAssembliesMOF MinistryofFinanceMOFEP MinistryofFinanceandEconomicPlanningMPCCs Multi-PurposeCommunityCentreMSD Management Services DivisionMTEF MediumTermExpenditureFrameworkNARC NationalRainbowCoalitionNDC National Democratic CongressNDPC NationalDevelopmentPlanningCommissionNEPAD NewPartnershipforAfricanDevelopmentNGO Non-governmentalOrganizationNIRP NationalInstitutionalRenewalProgrammeNP National PartyNPM NewPublicManagementNPP NewPatrioticPartyNPS NewPublicServiceOAU OrganizationofAfricanUnityODA OverseasDevelopmentAgencyODM OrangeDemocraticMovementODM-K OrangeDemocraticMovement-KenyaOECD OrganizationofEconomicCooperationandDevelopmentOHCS OfficeoftheHeadoftheCivilServicePAC Presidential Advisory CommitteePDP People’sDemocraticPartyPIPs PerformanceImprovementPlansPNDC Provisional National Defence Council

viiThe Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting SystemPPP PublicPrivatePartnershipPRC Provisional Ruling CouncilPSC Public Services CommissionPSRs Public Sector ReformsPSRP Public Sector Reform ProgrammePSRMS PublicSectorRe-inventionandModernizationStrategyRDP ReconstructionandDevelopmentProgrammeSA SelfAppraisalSAI SelfAppraisalInstrumentSAP StructuralAdjustmentProgrammeSAPs StructuralAdjustmentProgrammesSARS South African Revenue ServiceSDS Service Delivery StandardsSMS Senior Management ServiceSOEs State-ownedEnterprisesSPA SpecialProgrammeofAssistanceTPSM&ES TransversalPublicServiceMonitoring&EvaluationSystemUDF UnitedDemocraticFrontUK United KingdomUNDESA UnitedNationsDepartmentforEconomicandSocialAffairsUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUNECA UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforAfricaUS United StatesVERS VoluntaryEarlyRetirementSchemeWB WorldBank

viii Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms:

Foreword

ThesocioeconomiccriseswhichAfricancountrieshavebeenexperiencingoverthelasttwodecadeshaveinspiredgovernmentstosearchforsolutions,amongotherthings,throughstudiesandpolicyreformsonvariouscriticalissuesofpublicsectormanagementandadministration.Inmoderngov-ernance,thepublicserviceisregardedasthenervecentreofthemachineryofgovernment.Assuch,regularrevisionofpublicservicerulesandproceduresisnecessarytoenabletheserviceconformwithchangingtimesandcircumstancesandtoeffectivelyrepositionitselfforhigherlevelsofefficien-cy and effectiveness and enhance service delivery. This is because of the recognition that an effective statedependsonaneffectivepublicsectorcapableof spearheadingsocioeconomicdevelopmentandreducingpovertyparticularlyindevelopingcountries.

Oneareaof thepublic sectorwhichunderwent reforms inmanyAfricancountries since the late1980sisthecivilservice.Theessenceofthesereformswastoimprovetheeffectivenessandefficiencyofthecivilserviceandtoensureitsperformance,capacityandsustainabilityovertime.Theultimategoalbeingtoraisethequalityofpublicservicesdeliveredtocitizensandtoenhancetheircapacitytocarryoutcoregovernment functions,whichareessential topromote sustainedsocioeconomicdevelopment.

Againstthisbackground,theEconomicCommissionforAfrica(ECA)commissionedthisstudy1aspartofitsbroadermandateatpromotinggoodgovernanceandsustainablesocioeconomicdevelopmentof thecontinent.Theactivity isalso incompliancewith thedevelopment frameworkofTheNewPartnershipforAfrica’sDevelopment(NEPAD)oftheAfricanUnion.Thestudyexaminesinnovationsandbestpractices inpublicsector reforms inAfricasince theearly1980s todatewithparticularemphasisonthecivilservice.Inaddressingtheseissuesthestudyaimstoinspirefurtherdiscussion,researchandaction in this increasingly importantarea.Thepaper recognizes thatcomprehensivecivilservicereformsarenoteasytoundertakeevenwhentheyoffersignificantsocialandeconomicbenefits.Inaddition,thepaperacknowledgesthatsimilartoothersocioeconomicreformapproachesadoptedbymanyAfricancountries, civil service reformshave facedavarietyofoperational andstrategicchallenges,whichpolicymakersneedtoaddresstofullybenefitfromtheexercise.ThestudyconcludesthatsomeprogresshavebeenmadeinAfricaintermsofinnovationsandbestpracticesinCSRs.However,theprogresshasbeenslowinsomecasesbecauseofseveralchallengessuchaslackofpoliticalandbureaucraticcommitment, lackofownershipof the reformprocess,politicizationresultinginbreakdowninthemeritsystem,andpoorconditionsofservice.

1 TheoriginaldraftofthisstudywaspreparedbyJosephR.A.Ayee,PhD,DeputyViceChancellorandHeadofHumanities,UniversityofKwaZuklu-Natal,SouthAfrica.

ixThe Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

ThepublicationwaspreparedbytheGovernanceandPublicAdministrationDivisionofECA,undertheoverallsupervisionofMr.AbdallaHamdok,Director.TheteamwasledbyMr.SaidAdejumobi,Chief,PublicAdministrationSectionandcomprisedof:GuillermoMangué,KalebDemeksa,GuyRanaivomanana,Boris-EphremTchoumavi,RebeccaBenyam,MeazaMollaandECAPublicationservices.Ateamofindependentexpertsdrawnfromgovernment,privatesector,academiaandcivilsocietyreviewedthedraftdocumentatanAdHocExpertsgroupmeetingthattookplaceinAddisAbabafrom7-8November2009.Thecommentsandobservationsmadebytheexpertscontributedsignificantlytoimprovingthepaperandareherebyacknowledged.

Itisexpectedthatthedataandinformationcontainedinthisstudywillprovevaluabletodecision-makers,plannersandresearcherstoshareknowledgeandexperiencesacrossthecontinentinordertoachievesustainabledevelopmentinAfrica.

AbdallaHamdok Director Governance and Public Administration Division.

x Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms:

Acknowledgements

TheGovernanceandPublicAdministrationDivision(GPAD)oftheUnitedNationsEconomicCom-missionforAfrica(UNECA)wouldliketothanktheteamofexpertswhoreviewedthedraftofthispaperat theAdhocExpertMeetingonInnovationsandBestPracticesinCivilServiceReformsinAfrica,7-8December,2009,UNCC,AddisAbaba,Ethiopia.GPADwouldalsoliketothankallindi-viduals,institutionsandstaffmembersoftheUNECAsecretariatwhocontributedtotheproductionofthispublication.

xiThe Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

Executive Summery

Reformofthepublicsectorinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries,whichbeganintheearly1980s,wasmeanttoimprovewaysinwhichgovernmentismanagedandservicesdelivered,withemphasisoneffectiveness,efficiency,economyandvalueformoney.Thisisbecauseoftherecog-nitionthataneffectivestatedependsonaneffectivepublicsectorcapableofspearheadingsocio-economicdevelopmentandreducingpovertyparticularlyindevelopingcountries.OneareaofthepublicsectorwhichunderwentreforminAfricaisthecivilservice,regardedasthenervecentreofthemachineryofgovernment.Sincethelate1980smanyAfricancountriesreformedtheircivilserviceaspartoftheprocessofstateredesign,whichwaslargelyinfluencedbytheadoptionofstructuraladjustmentprogrammes(SAPs),democratizationandthenewpublicmanagement(NPM).

Againstthisbackdrop,thisstudyexaminesinnovationsandbestpracticesinpublicsectorreformsinAfricawithinthelastdecadewithemphasisonthecivilservice.CasesstudiesfromGhana,Kenya,NigeriaandSouthAfricawillbeusedtoillustratetrends,dynamics,issuesandchallengesofreforminitiativesandtheirimplicationsforcivilserviceperformance.Thefourcountrieswereselectedbe-causeoftimeandfunding,theirlinguisticsandpoliticalhomogeneityaswellasthefactthattheyundertookpublicandcivilservicereforms(CSRs)whichshowthesymptomsoftrends,processes,dynamics,majorinnovationsandbestpractices.

Thestudyisdividedintoseven(7)parts.Part1dealswiththemethodology,namely,sourcesofdatacollectionandreasonsforthechoiceofthefourcountriesascasesstudies.Part2definesthefivemajorconceptsortermsusedinthestudy.Itisdesignedtoenablethereadergetaclearerpictureofthetrajectoriesanddynamicsofcivilservicereform(CSR)inAfrica.Part3discussesinnovationsandbestpracticesinpublicsectorreformsinnon-Africancountries.Part4reviewstheliteratureonpublicsectorandcivilservicereformsandthenfocusesonthetrends,processesanddynamicsofcivilservicereforminAfrica.Part5isdevotedtotheexperiencesofcivilservicereforminthefourcountries,namely,Ghana,Kenya,NigeriaandSouthAfrica,highlightingthemajorinnovationsandbestpractices.Part6identifiesandanalyzessomeofthemajorchallengesfacingcivilservicereformsandthestrategiesaimedataddressingthem.Part7summarizesthefindings,highlightsthelessonslearntandprofferspolicyrecommendationsonhowthecapacityandperformanceofthecivilservicecan be enhanced in Africa through meaningful reform of the sector.

ThestudyfoundthatthefourcountrieshadundertakenfarreachingCSRswithGhana,NigeriaandKenyabeginningtheirreformsasfarbackasthelate1980saftertheimplementationofSAPwhileSouthAfricabegunitsownaftertheapartheiderain1994.TheessenceoftheCSRsistoimprovethe

xii Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms:

effectivenessandperformanceof thecivilserviceandtoensureitsaffordabilityandsustainabilityovertime.Theultimategoalistoraisethequalityofpublicservicesdeliveredtocitizensandtoen-hancethecapacitytocarryoutcoregovernmentfunctions,whichisessentialtopromotesustainedsocio-economicdevelopment.ThecoreelementsorstrategiesoftheCSRsusedareorganizationalrestructuring,humanresourcemanagementincludingretrenchmentandpayreform,budgetaryandfinancialreformswhilethenon-coreelementsarestrengtheningthecapacityofpolicy-makinginsti-tutions,improvingtherelationshipsbetweenministersandcivilservantsandotherpublics,increas-ing thepolitical responsivenessof topcivil servantsandbuilding thecapacityof thecivil servicethrough training of staff and retaining them.

Thestudyalsofoundthatsomemodestprogresshasbeenmadeinthefourcountriesintermsofin-novationsandbestpracticesinCSRs.Theyinclude:(i)indigenizingandmainstreamingprogrammeleadershipandmanagement;(ii)buildinganincentiveframeworkunderseverebudgetaryconstraints;(iii)integratingcivilservicereformprocesses;(iv)radicalreorganizationofgovernment;(v)buildingsmartpartnershipswithavarietyofstakeholders;(vi)effectiveandefficientdeliveryofpublicservices;(vii)performancemanagementagreementswithseniorcivilservants;(viii)promotingaccountabilityandtransparency;(ix)e-government;(x)capacitybuilding;(xi)reducingcorruption;(xii)enhancedremunerationforcivilservants;(xiii)institutionalframeworkforinnovation;(xiv)annualcivilservicemonitoringandevaluation.Someofthesourceswhichhaveinfluencedtheseinnovationsandbestpracticesare:(i)InternationalFinancialInstitutions;(ii)CharterforthePublicServiceinAfrica;(iii)theNewPartnershipforAfricanDevelopment(NEPAD)and(iv)CommonwealthAssociationofPublicAdministrationandManagement(CAPAM).

ProgressintheimplementationofCSRshas,however,beenslowinthefourcountriesbecauseofseveralchallengessuchaslackofpoliticalandbureaucraticcommitment,lackofownershipofthereformprocess,politicizationresultinginbreakdowninthemeritsystem,inabilitytohireandretainseniorofficials,weaksystemsofaccountability,poorandwrongdiagnosisandprognosis.Thereisgrowingconcernbygovernmentsandtheircitizensinthefourcountriesovertheslowpaceofre-formsandtheirinabilitytoreducepoverty.Accordingly,thefourgovernmentshavetakensomestepstograpplewiththechallengesofsequencingandthepaceofthereforms.Inaddition,someoftheearliergainsmadebytheCSRsinthecountriessuchasdownsizing,werereversed.

Someofthekeylessonsinclude:(a)reformeffortsshouldbeguidedbyaholisticvisionandsharedbyallkeystakeholders;(b)CSRsmustbelinkedtosuchcomponentsasfinancialmanagement,de-centralizationandsector-wideapproaches; (c)a long term,system-wideapproach tocivil serviceandpublicsectorreformsmustbeadopted;(d)aselectiveintroductionofNPMideasandpracticesshouldbeadapted;(e)reformisacontinuousexerciseandittendstodevelopitsownmomentumthatsuccessivepoliticalandadministrativeleadershipteamswoulddeepen,dependingonprevailingcircumstanceswithinandoutsidethecountry;(f)acommittedworkforceisimportantinnurturing

xiiiThe Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

awell-functioningcivilservicesystem;(g)anefficientandeffectivepublicservicerequiresnotonlycostcontainmentandstaffretrenchmentbutalsoincentivestoattractandretainhighlyskilledadmin-istrativeofficials;(h)theWeberianbureaucraticmodelonwhichcivilservicesystemsandstructuresarebuiltinAfricaprovidesrelevantdataforunderstandingtheconstraintsandchallengesthatfacedCSRs;(i)CSRswereexternally-drivenandthereforelackthe“homegrown”touchtomakethemsuc-cessful;(j) thecentralityofthecharacterofthestateinAfricaisimportantinunderstandingCSRs;(k)theAfricancontinenthasrecordedsomeinnovationsandbestpracticesinreformtypifiedbytheexperiencesofBotswanaandSouthAfricaandsporadicsinglecasesfromotherAfricancountries.

Someof thepolicy recommendations include: (a) focusing reformsnotonlyonmanagementbutalsoonleadership;(b)tailoringreformpoliciestospecificorganizations;(c)reformingtheincentivesystem;(d)undertakingculturalchange;(e)creatingaPan-AfricanAdministrativeSpacesimilartotheEuropeanAdministrativeSpaceof1997,whichwillidentifycommonprinciples,strategyandactionsofpublicadministrationthatmaybecloselylinkedtothegovernanceissuesaddressedintheAfricanPeerReviewMechanism(APRM);and(f)movingtowardstheNewPublicService,whichinvolvesasetofideasabouttheroleofpublicadministrationinthegovernancesystemthatplacescitizensatthe centre.

xiv Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms:

1The Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

CHAPTER I: Introduction

EventhoughtheroleofthestateindevelopmentinAfricahasbeendownplayedfordecades,apara-digmaticshiftandarediscoveryoftheimportanceofthestateinthedevelopmentprocessandtheneedforamorecapablesectoroccurredinthe1990s.Therelevanceofthestateorthepublicsector2 tosocio-economicdevelopmentinAfricacannotbeunderestimated.Thishasbeenre-echoedinthe1997World Development Reportwhicharguedthat“aneffectivestateisvitalfortheprovisionofthegoodsandservices–andtherulesandinstitutions–thatallowmarketstoflourishandthepeopletoleadhealthier,happierlives.Withoutit,sustainabledevelopment,botheconomicandsocial,isimpossible”(WorldBank,1997:1).ThebasicfunctionofthepublicsectorinAfricathereforeistoprovidegoodsandservicestocitizensbasedon“realizationandrepresentationofpublicinterestsanditspossessionofuniquepublicqualitiescomparedtobusinessmanagement”(Haque,2001:65).However,thepublicsectorwasnotabletoperformitsfunctioneffectivelybecauseofits“accumula-tionofexcessivepower,lackofaccountabilityandrepresentation,indifferencetowardspublicneedsanddemands,officialsecrecyandinaccessibility,androleindepoliticizingthepublicsphere”(Gar-nham1990;Haque1994).Thisineffectivenesscoupledwiththeeconomiccrisesofthelate1970sand1980sandtheapparentlessonsfrominternationalexperienceofthesuccessofmarket-friendlyeconomieshavecombinedtoproducewhatsomescholarshavereferredtoasthe“redefinitionoftheroleofthestateorpublicsector”(Fiszbein,2000:163).

Theredefinitionoftheroleofthestateorthepublicsectorinvolvestheneedtooverhauladministra-tivesystemsandrejuvenatepublicorganizationsinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Thisis because:

Though the dawn has been clouded and goals cannot be easily defined, the vital-ity of a country’s development depends on the rejuvenation of public administra-tion even in the darkness of insufficient knowledge and experience (Rizos, 1965: 47).

Public sector reforms in developed countries like theUnited Kingdom (UK),United States (US),Canada andAustralia have shown that changes in political, social, economic and administrativeenvironments(suchaseconomicandfiscalcrisisofthestate,theinfluenceofneo-liberalideaslike

2 Theterms“publicsector”andthe“state”areusedsynonymouslybecausetherecannotbeastrongstatewithoutanef-ficientpublicsector.InmostAfricancountriestheclearanceevidenceoftheweaknessofstatesisprovidedbythepoorperfor-manceofthepublicsector.SeeAfricanDevelopmentBank,AfricanDevelopmentReport2005:AfricaintheWorldEconomy,PublicSectorManagementinAfrica,EconomicandSocialStatisticsofAfrica(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005),p.121.

2 Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms:

publicchoicetheoryandcriticismsoftheoldpublicadministration,changesinpoliticalandideo-logicalcontext liketheNewRight ideas,developmentininformationtechnologyandgrowthandroleofmanagementconsultants)havepromptedanddrivenradicalchangesinpublicadministrationandmanagementsystems.Thecentralobjectiveofchangewasimprovementinthewaysinwhichgovernmentismanagedandservicesdelivered,withemphasisoneffectiveness,efficiency,economyandvalueformoney(Lane,1997;Kettl,1997,MetcalfeandRichards,1990;Ayee2008).

InAfricaandotherdevelopingcountries,however,theneedtoreformpublicsectorinstitutionshasbeenpromptedlargelybyworld-widedeclineinpublicfinancesandtheneed“togetmoreforless”(Caiden,1988:332).Theunjustinternationaleconomicsystemandpersistentpublicpressuresforincreased government intervention to reverse the situation have forced governments in Africa and otherdevelopingcountriestoadopttemporarymeasureswhichhaveresultedinlarge-scaleborrow-ing,unprecedentedpublicindebtedness,highratesofinflation,frequentcurrencydevaluations,andharshpoliciesimposedunderthepressureoftheWorldBank(WB)andInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)(HicksandKubisch,1984).Governmentshavehadtocutbacktoreduceexpenditures,staff,investmentsandservicesandtodemandhigherproductivityandbetterperformancefromtheirslug-gishpublicsectors.

TherenewedsenseofurgencyaboutcreatinganeffectivepublicsectorinAfricacanbeobservedbothatthecontinentalandnationallevelsinmanyAfricancountries.Forinstance,thefourthPan-AfricanConferenceofMinistersofPublicService,heldwithintheframeworkoftheNewPartnershipforAfricanDevelopment(NEPAD)inMarch2003inSouthAfrica,agreedtoaPan-AfricanGovern-mentandPublicAdministrationcapacity-developmentprogrammetostrengthenpublicinstitutionsandsystemsofAfricanstates.Publicsectorreformhasalsobecomeahighpriorityforgovernmentsin Africa.

Inordertoimprovetheircountries’positionsintheemergingworldeconomy,governmentsinAfricaandotherdevelopingcountrieshavebeenforcedtoredefinetheirrolesandstrategies.Indoingso,almostallhaveblamedthe“deadhand”ofbureaucracy: thepoorperformanceofpublicbureau-cracies,thedailyannoyancesofirksomerestrictions,cumbrousredtape,unpleasantofficials,poorserviceandcorruptpractices3.The“deadhand”ofbureaucracyhadtobereplacedbyanewinvigor-atingconceptofpublicmanagementandclearproofthatpublicorganizationswerevalueformoney(WorldBank,1997).

3 Foranextensivediscussionofthe“deadhand”ofbureaucracyseeG.E.Caiden(ed.)“SymposiumonPublicPolicyandAdministrativeReform”,Policy Studies Journal,Vol.4,No.8,SpecialIssue4,1980-81;PeterSelf,“What’sGoneWrongwithPublicAdministration”,Public Administration and Development,Vol.6,No.4,1986:329-338;PeterDrucker,“TheDeadlySinsinPublicAdministration”,Public Administration Review,Vol.40,No.1(March-April),1980:103-106.


Againstthisbackdrop,thisstudyexaminesinnovationsandbestpracticesinpublicsectorreformsinAfricawithinthelastdecadewithemphasisonthecivilservice.CasesstudiesfromGhana,Kenya,NigeriaandSouthAfricawillbeusedtoillustratetrends,dynamics,issuesandchallengesofreforminitiativesandtheirimplicationsforcivilserviceperformance.

1.1 Structure of the Study

Thestudyisdividedintosevenparts.Partonedealswiththemethodology,namely,sourcesofdatacollectionandreasonsforthechoiceofthefourcountriesascasesstudies.Parttwodefinesthefivemajorconceptsortermsusedinthestudy.Itisdesignedtoenablethereadergetaclearerpictureof the trajectoriesanddynamicsofcivil service reform inAfrica.Part threediscusses innovationsandbestpracticesinpublicsectorreformsinnon-Africancountries.Partfourreviewstheliteratureonpublicsectorandcivilservicereformsandthenfocusesonthetrends,processesanddynamicsofcivilservicereforminAfrica.Partfiveisdevotedtotheexperiencesofcivilservicereforminthefourcountries,namely,Ghana,Kenya,NigeriaandSouthAfrica,highlightingthemajorinnovationsandbestpractices.Partsixidentifiesandanalyzessomeofthemajorchallengesfacingcivilservicereformsandthestrategiesaimedataddressingthem.Partsevensummarizesthefindings,highlightsthelessonslearntandprofferspolicyrecommendationsonhowthecapacityandperformanceofthecivil service can be enhanced in Africa through meaningful reform of the sector.

1.2 Methodology

Thisstudyusedprimaryandsecondarysourcesofdata.First,itreviewstheliteratureonpublicandcivil service reforms globally, in Africa and the four countries, namely, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and SouthAfricatoenableusanalyzethetrends,processes,dynamics,majorinnovationsandbestprac-tices.Secondly,thepaperdrawsondocumentarysourcessuchasconstitutionsandgovernmentpub-licationsandreports,whichgiveofficialviewsofreforminitiativesandprocessesinthefourcountriestobeefupandvalidatesomeofthetrends,processes,dynamics,majorinnovations,bestpracticesand issues raised in the literature.

The choice of the four countries is instructive for three reasons. First, there is evidence that thecountriesundertooksubstantialreformeffortssincethe1990sintheregionsthattheybelongtoinsub-SaharanAfrica,namely,GhanaandNigeriainWestAfrica,KenyainEastAfricaandSouthAfricainSouthernAfrica.Secondly,theyshowthesymptomsoftrends,processes,dynamics,majorinnova-tionsandbestpracticesinbothpublicandcivilservicereforms.Thirdly,timeandfundingdidnotal-lowustoexpandthestudytoArabophone,FrancophoneandLusophonecountriesinadditiontothe


problemposedbythemlinguisticallyandpoliticallyastheyhavedifferentsystemsofpublicsector,hencedifferentsetupoftheircivilservicestructures.

1.3DefinitionofkeyConcepts

Inthisstudy,thefollowingdefinitionsareused.

• Innovation:Inthisstudy,innovationreferstotwoprocessesofchangeinanorganizationorsociety.First,itreferstoputtingnewideasintousefulpractice(UNDESA2007).Inthewordsof JohnAdair (2007:5) innovation“combines twomajoroverlappingprocesses:havingnewideasandimplementingthem”.Secondly,innovationisalsoaboutdoingoldthingsinnewandbetterwaysbyanorganizationorsocietytomeetitschallenges(Aldair2007:Olaopa2009a).

• Best Practices: Theconceptofbestpracticeisarelativelynewone.AccordingtoWikipe-dia,thefreeencyclopedia,abestpractice“isthebeliefthatthereisatechnique,method,process,activity,incentiveorrewardthatismoreeffectiveatdeliveringaparticularout-comethananyothertechnique,method,process,etc.Theideaisthatwithproperpro-cesses,checksandtesting,adesiredoutcomecanbedeliveredwithfewerproblemsandunforeseen complications” (http://en.wikipendia.org/wiki/Best_practices 6/24/2009). Inshort,bestpracticesinthisstudyreferstothe“mostefficient(leastamountofeffort)andeffective(bestresults)wayofaccomplishingatask,basedonrepeatableproceduresthathaveproventhemselvesovertimelargenumbersofpeople”(Ibid).

• Public Sector:The termpublic sectoror service indicates awider scope than thecivilservice.Wemaydefine thepublicserviceas themachineryofgovernment, that is, thetotalityof services that areorganizedunderpublic (that is, government) authority. It isthetotalityof theadministrativestructureswithinwhichtheworkofgovernmentiscar-riedout(Lane1993).Amoregovernanceorienteddefinitionseesthepublicsectorasthenatureandmodeofoperationofthestateinpresidingoverthepublicsectorcoversthefollowingcategoriesofinstitutions.Theyarethe(a)thecivilserviceinthestrictsenseofministriesanddepartmentsofthecentralgovernment;(b)thelegislatureandjudiciary;(c)localgovernments;(d)publicorstateenterprises,boards,corporationsgenerallyreferredtoasparastatalswhichoperateandprovideserviceinareassuchaswaterandelectricity;(e)thesecurityforces;(d)theprofessionalregulatorybodieswhicharegiventhepowertoprescribetrainingrequiredformembers;toregulatetheconductofmembersandtopro-hibittheunqualifiedfrompracticing.

• Civil Service:Within theCommonwealthofNationsofwhichseventeenare inSub-Sa-haranAfrica,thetermcivilserviceisoftenusedsynonymouslywithgovernment.Inthispaper,civilserviceisusedtodescribetwosetsofideas,namely,(i)itreferstothebodyof


permanentofficialsappointedtoassistthepoliticalexecutiveinformulatingandimple-mentinggovernmentalpolicies,whoarereferredtoascivilservants;and(ii) it refers toministriesanddepartmentswithinwhichspecificaspectsofgovernmentworkarecarriedout(Adamolekun1999).

• Reform:Inthispaper,administrativereformisseenas:(i)adeliberateplantochangepub-licbureaucracies;(ii)synonymouswithinnovation,whichistheinjectionofnewideasandnewpeopleinanewcombinationoftasksandrelationshipsintothepolicyandadminis-trativeprocess;and(iii)copingwiththeuncertaintiesandrapidchangestakingplaceintheorganizationalenvironment(DeGuzmanandReforma,1992;TurnerandHulme,1997).

• Public Sector Reforms (PSRs): Wemay define public sector reforms as processes andpracticeswhichareconcernedwithimprovingthecapacityofinstitutionstomakepolicyanddeliverservicesinanefficient,effectiveandaccountablemanner.Inaddition,italsoinvolves the strengtheningandmanagementof thepublic sector.Someof the rangeofreformmeasuresinclude(i)civilservicereform;(ii)financialandfiscalreform;(iii)decen-tralization;(iv)legalandjudicialreform;(v)privatizationandderegulation;(vi)enhancingaccountability;and(vii)improvingcorporateregulatoryframeworks(AfricanDevelopmentBank2005).

1.4 The Nexus Between the Six Terms

Thenexusbetweeninnovation,bestpracticesandreformvis-à-visthepublicsector,publicsectorre-formsandcivilserviceisthattheyareallconcernedwithmakingchangesbyintroducingsomethingnewornovelandconjuresupthoughtsofcreativity,bringinnewideas,experimentationandtakingriskstoenableorganizationsandinstitutionsinthepublicsectorandcivilservicemorefunctional,effectiveandefficient.


CHAPTER II: Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms

2.1 The International Context

Public sector reforms inAfricaweredrivenbyeconomic reform,democratizationand the searchforadministrativeefficiencywithaviewimprovingthequalityofgoodandservicedeliveredtothepublic.Inotherwords,reformswereinspiredbyorhaveparallelsinthepublicadministrationreformexperiencesofothercountriesoutsideAfrica(AdamolekunandKiragu1999;CaidenandSundaram2004).Notableexamplesincludethe“bigbang”comprehensivestatereformsinNewZealand(fromthemid-1980sthroughtheearly1990s)(seeBox1),theradicaltransformationofadministrativecul-tureintheUnitedKingdomunderMargaretThatcherandhersuccessors(1979-1998)(seeBox2),theGovernmentPerformanceandResultsAct(1993)intheUnitedStates,thetotalqualitymanagementmovementsinseveralSoutheastAsiancountries,andthedecentralizedmanagementinitiativeinsev-eralLatinAmericancountries(CampbellandFuhr1997;AdamolekunandKiragu1999).

By1997,internationalinnovationsandbestpracticesinpublicsectorreformshadthefollowingfourmain features:

Thisentailsthatthestateonlyperformsfunctionsthatshouldbeatthelevelofthestatewhileleav-ingtheotherfunctionstosub-nationalgovernmentsandtheprivatesector.Themainissuesaretheneedforthestatetonurtureanenvironmentthatisconductivetoprivatesectordevelopment;decen-tralizationoffunctionsandprivatization,commercializationorliquidationofstate-ownedenterprises(SOEs).TheseformthecorefeaturesoftheNewPublicManagement(NPM)(WorldBank1997).AgoodillustrationoftheredefinitionoftheroleofthestateisthereformsinNewZealand.Thetwoele-mentsintheexerciseweretherestructuringofSOEsandthedownsizingofthecorepublicservice.SOEswerecorporatized,privatizedorliquidatedandthecorepublicstaffwasreducedfrom88,000to35,000withinfiveyears(AdamolekunandKiragu1999;BaleandDale1998;Schick1998).TherestructuringoftheSOEswasinspiredinlargepartbytheirsignificantcontributiontotheseriouseco-nomiccrisisofthecountryfacedintheearly1980s.Withregardtotheministriesanddepartmentsofcentralgovernment,thegovernmentdecidedtotransferpolicyimplementation(productionofgoodsand delivery of services) to outside agencies, leaving theministries and departmentswith policyplanning,contractingandmonitoringofperformance.Theredundanciesthatresultedweremanagedthroughseverancepaymentsthatwererecoupedwithineighteenmonths(seeBox1).


Theseareintroducedtoenhancepublicmanagementperformance.Themeasuresinclude,amongothers,improvementinfinancialandpersonnelmanagementsystemswithemphasisonincreasedau-tonomyformanagers(withcorrespondingresponsibility),payreform(partlylinkedtoperformance),andcontinuousskillsdevelopmentandupgrading.Someof the initiatives include thecreationofBritish-styleexecutiveagenciesthatareresponsibleforpolicyformulationandthemanagementofthecontractarrangementswiththeexecutiveagencies.Inhumanresourcemanagement,merit-basedrecruitmentandpromotionproceduresaswellasdueattentiontoincentivestomotivatestaff,notablythroughdecentpaywererecognized.Ingeneralcountrieswithameritsystem(forexample,Japan,KoreaandSingapore)havebetterqualifiedcivilservicesthanthosethatdonot(example,Philippines)(AdamolekunandKiragu1999).

Infinancialmanagement,budgetreformandexpenditurecontrolsthroughmakingbudgetsystemsmoretransparentandlinkingbudgetstodevelopmentplansandtheintroductionofthemediumtermexpenditureframework(MTEF)toensureamorestrategicapproachtoresourceallocationandman-agementaswellascontrolpublicspendingwereimplemented(CaidenandSundaram2004;TurnerandHulme1997).

Improvedpublicmanagementperformancewasmeanttoimproveservicedelivery.Threemeasuresthatsoughttoimprovethequalityofservicedeliveryaresurveysofservicedelivery,qualitycharters,andprogrammeevaluation.Surveysofservicedeliveryseetoestablishbenchmarksagainstwhichprogressinservicedeliveryismeasured.TheuseofqualitycharterswasstartedintheUnitedKing-domin1991whileAustraliastartedtheuseofprogrammeevaluationtoimproveservicedeliveryasakeyfeatureofitspublicmanagementreformprogrammeinthemid-1980s(AdamolekunandKiragu1999;TurnerandHulme1997).

Theemphasisisonmeasuresforenforcingtheaccountabilityofthegovernorstothegovernedthroughincreasestransparency,opennessandcitizenparticipation.Someofthemeasuresincluderespectforelectorallegitimacy,internalcontrolmechanisms(hierarchicalcontrol,internalaudits,codeofethics)andexternalcontrols(thejudiciary,legislature,mediaandombudsmen)(Olowu1999a).

2.2 The African Context

TheliteratureshowsthatthereareinnovationsandbestpracticesinsomeAfricacountries.Thebestknown example is Botswana,which is reputed for its good institutions, prudentmacroeconomicmanagement,politicalstabilityandefficientcivilservice.Thecountryistheembodimentofenviableconstitutionalorder,law-basedstateandrespectfortheruleoflaw,whichhavestrengthenedstatelegitimacy,leadershipsuccessionandpoliticalstability.Oneofthekeyaspectsofpublicpolicyandpublicsectorreforminthecountryisenforcingmarketdisciplineandpromotingefficientallocation


anduseofeconomicresources throughtheencouragementofprivatesectoractivity ineconomicdevelopment(ADB2005).

PublicmanagementreformsfeaturedprominentlyinsuccessivedevelopmentplansofBotswanaandits“Vision2016”.SomeofthereformsincludetheadoptionofthePerformanceManagementSys-tem(PMS),WorkImprovementTeams(WITs),ComputerizedPersonnelManagementSystem(CPMS),OrganizationandMethodsReviews(O&MRs),PerformanceBasedRewardSystem(PBRS)andDe-centralization.Ministriesanddepartmentswererationalizedinordertoimproveefficiencyandef-fectiveness in service delivery. Part of the reform led to the establishment of autonomous authorities whichworkonlargelycommercialprinciples(ADB2005;Olaopa2009a).

Akeythingtonoteisthatthereforms,unlikeinmostAfricancountries,havelargelybeendrivenbyasuccessionofcompetentleadershipanddedicatedworkforcewhoarecommittedtocontinuousadministrative reform.This reinforces theviewofAdamolekun (1999) that thequalityofpoliticalleadershipisnotonlykeytosuccessfulreformbutalsodevelopmentandreducingpovertybyadopt-ingstrategicpoliciesandprogrammes.ThetransformationalleadershipgoodpracticeshavealsobeenrecordedinGhana,LiberiaandRwandawheretheleadershavedesignedpoliciesandprogrammesintheareasofgoodgovernanceandtheeconomytoensuretherealizationoftheMillenniumDevel-opmentGoals(MDGs).

Some of the good innovations and practices in otherAfrican countries include the following: (i)Egypt’sInformationandDecisionSupportCentreanditsrapidandswiftresponseinservingasacata-lystfortheestablishmentofaflourishingcomputerindustry;(ii)theintegratedcoastalmanagementwithlocaldevelopmentplanningmodelinNamibia;(iii)Mali’stwo-pillarinter-tierresourceplanninginitiative166;theintroductionoftheMediumTermExpenditureFramework(MTEF)inpublicfinan-cialmanagementinGhana,ZambiaandTanzania;(iv)Tanzania’ssalarysupplementationscheme;(v)DiasporacapacityleveragingschemesinLiberiaandSierraLeone;(vi)PublicExpenditureTrackingSystems(PETS)inGhana,UgandaandZambiabycivilsocietyorganizations;(vii)Namibia’sNationalPublicPrivatePartnershipschemeforexpandedwastemanagementservicesinpoorcommunities;and(viii)Rwanda’sinvestmentintheICTsectorasadriverofeconomictransformationandaimingtobecomearegionalsupplierofICTrelatedcapacitysupportto,forexample,SouthSudan(KiraguandMutahaba2006;Olaopa2009b).


Box 1: Overview of Public Institution Reform in New Zealand, 1985-1997

(i) Launchedinthemid-1980stoaddressthenationaleconomiccrisisthatemergedintheearly1980s:balanceoftradedeficits,risinginflation,budgetdeficits,growingnationaldebt,un-employment.

ii. Commencedwith the transformation of trade activities of government organizations intostatecorporatestructures,whichweresubsequentlyprivatized.Corporatizationentails theremovalofthenon-coregovernmentactivitiesintocorporatestructureswith:(a)clearrolesandobjectives;(b)minimalcontrols–corporatefreedom;agreedperformancemeasuresandcontrols;andincentives;

iii. Laterinlate1980s,extendedtonon-tradingactivities,includingpublicpersonnelmanage-ment.

iv. InthecorporatizationprogrammeofNewZealand:(a)departmentalheads(chiefexecutives)areappointedoncontract,providedwithresourcesandautonomy,andjudgedbyresults;(b)civilservantscompetewithprivatesectorprofessionalsforappointmenttothestatecorporateagencies.

v. Results:corepublicservicestaffhalvedinfiveyears.

Sources: Bale and Dale, 1998; Schick 1998; Adamolekun and Kiragu 1999.


Box 2: Administrative Reform Experience of the United Kingdom, 1979-1997

1980:CreationofanEfficiencyUnitintheOfficeofthePrimeMinister.

1980-1997:Downsizingofthecivilserviceandprivatizationofnationalizedindustries.Thisledtoareductioninthenumberofpermanentcivilservantsfrom735,000to482,000,a34%reduc-tion.

1982:EstablishmentoftheAuditCommissiontowatchovertheefficiencyoflocalgovernmentsand the national health service.

1983:ImprovedauditingcapacitythroughtheestablishmentofaNationalAuditOffice.

1988:“TheNextStepsInitiative”–creationofthefirstexecutiveagenciestorunthe“executivefunctionsofgovernmentasdistinctfrompolicyadvice”.Bymid-1997,130executiveagencieswereestablished,employing384,000civilservants,about74%ofthetotalstaffstrength.

1991:“Competing forQuality”–promotingcustomer responsivenessbymeansofaCitizen’sCharter(severalotherchartershavefollowed,includingchartersforpatients,taxpayers,parentsandjobseekers.

1994:Establishmentofastandingcommitteeonstandardsinpubliclife.

1995:CreationoftheOfficeofCommissionerofPublicAppointments(toupholdtheprincipleofselectiononmerittopositionsinnon-ministerialadministrativeagencies).

1996:EstablishmentofaSeniorExecutiveService.

1997:Devolution–stepstowardtheestablishmentofregionalassembliesinScotlandandWales,tobefollowedbythetransferoffunctionsandresources.

Sources: Adamolekun and Kiragu 1999; Guy Peters, 1995.


CHAPTER III: The Post-Colonial State in Africa

3.1 Reasons Behind State Intervention in Africa

Eventhoughtheterms“state”andthe“publicsector”havebeenusedsynonymouslybecausetherecan be no strong statewithout an efficient public sector (AfricanDevelopment Bank, 2005), forpurposesofanalysisandtocontextualizereformoftheAfricanpublicsectorandunderstanditspro-cesses,dynamicsandintricacies,itispertinentforustoexaminethestateandstatecapacitybuildinginAfrica.Thissectionisthereforedevotedtothepost-colonialstateinAfricaandeffortsmadetobuilditscapacity.

Severalstudieshaveidentifiedthreemainreasonsforstate interventionintheeconomyinAfrica.Theyareasfollows:(i)statistconceptionsofdevelopment;(ii)economicnationalism;(iii)politicalpatronage(Tangri,1999).

3.1.1 Statist Conceptions of Development

Thepost-independenceperiodinthe1960sinAfricawitnessedanenormousexpansionofgovern-mentinterventioninnationaleconomieswhenthepublicsectorwasseenasamajorcontributortoeconomicgrowthandsocio-politicalstability.Thisstatismorstatecapitalism,thatis,ownershipandinterventionbythestatewasacceptedasthedominantdevelopmentstrategyandparadigm.ThatthestatehadacentralroletoplayindirectingthedevelopmentprocesswasespeciallyacknowledgedintheAfricancontextinthemidstofaweaklydevelopedindigenousprivatesectoraswellassub-stantialforeigneconomicpresence.Thusjustifyingstateinterventionintheeconomywasnotonlyan ideological necessity but also a historical one. Consequently, a variety of forms of state economic interventioninheritedfromthecolonialperiodwereexpandedandgeneralizedintheyearsafterin-dependence,leading,inparticular,tothemarkedexpansionofSOEsundertakingimportantsharesofproductionandinvestmentinAfricancountries(Tangri,1999;Young,1991;Bennell,1997).

3.1.2 Economic Nationalism/Africanization of the Economy

AfterindependencetherewerestrongfeelingsinAfricancountriesof“economicnationalism”,whichstemmedfromtheweaknessandsubordinatestatusofAfricanprivateenterpriseaswellasfromthefactthatAfricaneconomieswerelargelyinthehandsofforeigners.PublicsectorenterprisewasseenasenablingthestatetocarryoutactivitiesthatAfricanprivateentrepreneurscouldnotperformandalsotoreducethedominanceofforeignenterprise.Throughoutthecontinent,politicalleaderssought


to securegreater indigenousownershipof theeconomy,especiallyof theactivitiesacountryde-pendedonforitsforeignexchangeearnings.Greaterownershipandcontroloftheeconomythroughwhatwascalled“capturingthecommandingheightsoftheeconomy”toinfluencethebroaddirec-tionofnationaldevelopmentthroughnationalizationofforeigneconomicconcernswerecarriedoutinZambia,Tanzania,Nigeria,Ghana,Zimbabwe.Inaddition,newSOEswerecreatedinSwazilandandKenyatoacceleratethepolicyofAfricanizationoftheeconomy.InsomesocialistcountrieslikeTanzania,EthiopiaandMozambique,thepolicyofextensiveproliferationofSOEswaspursuedaswayoffulfillingtheideologicalambitionsofthegovernments(Adamolekun,1999).

3.1.3 Political Patronage

State interventionwasseenasmaintainingthe leaders inpower.Becauseof the intensepressuresexertedonAfricanleadersforprovidingemploymentandtheredistributionofpublicresources,thepublicenterprisesectorofferedtheleaderstheresourcesandopportunitiestomeetsomeofthede-mands.Asaresult,stateownedenterprises(SOEs)weretobephysicallyimpressive,spreadalloverthecountry,shouldcreatenewjobs,andshouldbenefittheconsumervialowerprices.Andjustasitwasnecessarytoimpresstheelectorate,itwasalsonecessarytorewardpartyactivists;hencetheen-terpriseswereusedassourcesofpoliticalpatronage.ThispointhasbeenreinforcedbyVandeWalle(1994:155-156)whoarguedthatinCameroon,SOEs“provedtobeanidealinstrumenttodistributestate resources in the formof jobs, rents,powerandprestigewhichenabledPresidentAhmadouAhidjotorewardalliesandco-optopponentsandthussecurehispowerbase”.Inshort,SOEswerebeneficialtostateofficeholdersintermsofconsolidatingtheirpowerandmaintainingtheirpoliticalincumbency(Tangri,1999).

Furthermore,thecreationofSOEsstemmedfromthefactthatthey(SOEs)werevisibleandhighlyos-tentatiousevidenceofthegovernments’effortstodeveloptheeconomyofthecountry.SOEserectedimpressivefacades,andthoughtherewasnotmuchbehindthefaçadeinreal terms, thepoliticalimpactwasconsiderable(Adamolekun1999).

3.2 Three Thematic Areas of the Post-Colonial State

Itisinstructivetonotethatthepost-colonialstateinAfricahasattractedinterestinthreethematicar-eas,namely,(i)stateconsolidation;(ii)statedecline;and(iii)statecapacitybuilding.Stateconsolida-tion,whichcameintovogueintheimmediatepost-independenceera,emanatedfromtheunderlyingassumptionthatthestatewasamajormeanstobringaboutsocietalchangeandfulfillingeconomicandsocialaspirationswithstrongintegrativeanddevelopmentobjectives(Herbst,2000).Theshifttostatedeclinefromthemid1970sfocusesonanalyzingwhatwentwrongwiththestateandtherea-sonsforitsweakness.Thestateprovedincapableofbringingaboutintendedchangesinsocietyand


wasseentobeerectedonratherdoubtfulfoundationsoflegitimacy.Thestatewasvariouslycharac-terizedas“prismatic”(Riggs1964),“soft”(Myrdal1968),“weak”(JacksonandRosberg,1982),“over-developed”(Leys1975),“precapitalistaffectation”(Hyden1983)and“anti-development”(DwivediandNef1982)becauseofitsinabilitytomeettheaspirationsnotonlyofcivilsocietybutalsothosewhooccupiedcentralpoliticalinstitutions(Azarya,1988).ThischaracterizationwasnotonlyamajorcauseofeconomicdeclineexperiencedbymostAfricancountriesduringthe1970sand1980sbutaweakeningofgovernmentalcapacityandeffectiveness,whichinturnhinderedeffortsateconomicrevivalviastructuraladjustment(Jeffries,1993).

3.3 Building State Capacity

StateinterventionintheeconomyAfricancountrieshaslargelybeenseenascounterproductiveanddetrimentaltoeconomicgrowthandprogress.Patronage,neopatrimonialism,corruption,nepotism,inappropriatepolicydesign,poorpolicyimplementationandtransactionalratherthantransforma-tionalleadership,allnotintheinterestofpursuingthepublicinterestbutrathersectionalandpartisaninterests,poorserviceprovisionanddelivery,characterizedtheperiodofstateintervention.WiththeeconomiccriseswhichfacedmostAfricanstatesinthe1970sand1980scoupledwiththelessonsofmarketforcesindevelopedcountries,therewastheneedtoredefinetheroleofthestatethroughthebuildingofitscapacity.

Fourfeaturesunderpinnedstatecapacitybuilding.Theyare:(a)areductionoftheroleofthestateinnationaleconomicmanagement;(b)anenhancedroleforsub-nationalgovernments;(c)public-privatepartnershipinrespecttotheproductionandprovisionofgoodsandservices;and(d)effortssuchasdesigningcorporateplansandsigningofperformancecontractsaimedatachievingimprovedperformanceinpublicmanagement(Adamolekun,1999).

Giventheincapacityofthestatetoimplementstructuraladjustmentprogrammes(SAPs),theWorldBankandotherdonorsinthe1980smovedtowardsaconcernwithimprovingstatecapacitythrough“rollingbackthestate”,thatis,therestrictionoftheroleofthestatewhileprovidinggreateropportu-nityformarketforcestoassertthemselvesonthedevelopmentprocessandliberalizingtheeconomywhichitishopedwillinduceeconomicdevelopment.Theconcernalsoinvolvesbuildingadminis-trativecapacityasaninstrumentalityofthedevelopmentprocessratherthanofaspoilssystemandthedevelopmentofmoreefficientand,insense,moreautonomousstatemachines.Variouspanaceasweresuggested,includingadministrativereformcoveringareassuchasorganizationaldevelopment,manpowerdevelopment,training,andtheintroductionofmanagementtechniquesalongthelinesoftheNewPublicManagementSchool(Schaffer,1969;Levy,2004;Haque,2001).


CHAPTER IV: The Weberian Bureaucratic Model and the African Civil Service

4.1 Features of Bureaucratic Model

ThecivilservicesystemsofAfricancountriesinheritedfromthecolonialrulersinthe1960swereinspiredby theWeberianbureaucraticmodel (Adamolekun2002). Themodel thereforeprovidesrelevantdataforunderstandingthechallengesthatnewideashavetoovercometotrulybecomein-novationsandbestpracticesinAfrica.Inotherwords,onecannotunderstandthefunctions,structure,orientationandorganizationalcultureaswellaschallengesfacingthecivilservicewithoutlookingatthestrengthsandweaknessesoftheWeberianbureaucraticmodel.

DefinedconceptuallybyWeberaslegalrationalauthorityandembodiedincivilservicestructuresandlaws, theprimarygoalof themodelwastoeliminatepatrimonial,amateurandspoilssystemadministration.Thecommoncomponentsofthemodelincludeentrancebyexamination,orotherprofessionallysanctionedqualifications,promotionbymerit,jobtenure,reasonableandpredictablesalaries,andadministrationbasedonwrittenrules.Bytakingpersonneldecisionsoutofthehandsof politicians, the bureaucraticmodelwas expected to reduce patronage and clientelism. Stableemploymentandincomearetodiminishthetemptationsofcorruption,whiledetailedrulesandex-tensivepapertrailsprovidemeansforrootingoutmalfeasance(GerthandMills1946).

4.2 Pathologies of the Model

In spiteof thesevirtues, thebureaucraticmodelhascreatedpathologies suchasover regulation,rigidityandemphasisoncomplyingwithrulesratherthanachievingresults.TherulesofWeberianadministration tend toabsorbmoreofabureaucrat’s time thanactually implementingpoliciesorprovidingservices.Moreover,jobtenureandrigidrulesforpromotion,whichoftendependmoreonsenioritythanmeritandperformance,deprivemanagersoftheabilitytousepromotionsanddismiss-alstomotivatesubordinates(Evans1995).

InAfrica,thecivilservicestructureswhichwerebasedonthebureaucraticmodelledtoinefficientorganizations,excessiveredtapeandstructuralarrangementsthatimpededasmuchormorethanservetheimplementationofpublicpolicy.Itdiscouragedindividualinitiativeandsupportedacul-tureofunreflectivedefenceofthestatusquo.Itlackedflexibility,imaginationandadaptabilitythat


generatethecapacityforself-correction.Inshort,theformalorganizationalstructureswhichwereoriginallydesignedtopromote“neutrality”becamedysfunctionalandinefficient. They had social-izedpublicandcivilservantstofollowrulesandregulationstothepointthattheybecameendsratherthanmeanstoapublicpolicygoal.Themodelmadethemaself-interestedgroupofpeoplewhichplaceditsowninterestsfarabovethoseofthegovernmentandthepeoplethatconstitutethepublicthatitserves(Olaopa2009b).AccordingtoAdamolekun(2002),theabandonmentoftheprinciplesunderlyingWeber’smodelinAfricasawthelossofitsassociatedbenefits.Heidentifiedpoliticizationandpartisanshipasthecommonfeaturesofthesinglepartyorpatronagepoliticalsystemsindifferentcountries,whichwerenotconducivetothepracticeofthebureaucraticmodel.


CHAPTER V: Trends and Processes of Civil Service Reforms in Africa

5.1 Review of the General Literature on Public Sector Reform (PSR)

Thegeneralliteratureonpublicsectorreformindicatesthatchangesinthesocio-economiccondi-tionsinthe1970sand1980shaveprovidedgroundsforadministrativereformsinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries(Caiden,1978;1988;1991;BjurandCaiden,1978;BoudiguelandRou-ban,1988;Ayee2008).Thesereforms,partlypromptedbytheworld-wideeconomicrecessionofthe1970sand1980s,de-emphasizedtheroleofthestate,andratheremphasizedtheroleoftheprivatesectorinthesocio-economiclifeofthecountriesconcerned,aphenomenonthatisreferredtointheliteratureasthe“rollingbackofthestate”orthe“withdrawalofthestate”.Underpinningthesere-formswasthesearchforefficiencyandeffectivenessinthefaceofdwindlingresources(WorldBank,1997).Thiswaselaboratedinmostcasesintoageneralcrusadetoreorganizeandmodernizethepublicsectorincludingthecivilservice(Caiden,1988;1991;Peters,1992;Collins,2000).

ThesechangeshadtheirpoliticalandideologicalunderpinningsintheriseofneoliberaleconomicthinkingandconservatisminboththeUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStatesinthelate1970sand1980s,andwerereflectedintheconcurrentshiftinthestrategiesoftheIMFandtheWorldtowardamoreliberalandmarket-orientedideology(Christensen,1988;Luke,1991;Collins,2000).Theimpli-cations,forthepublicservice,weredemandsforasmallerbutefficientandeffectivepublicservice.Intheprocessofreforms,somemanagementtechniquesfromtheprivatesectorwereimportedintothepublicservicesuchasPlanning,ProgrammingandBudgetingSystems(PPBS),meritpay,Manage-mentByObjectives(MBO)andcontract-basedappointments(Batley1994a;Batley1994b;DenhardtandDenhardt2000).

Theemergenceoftheneoliberalagendaintheformof“rolling-backthestate”inwesterncountriesin the1970sbegan tohaveexpression in IMF-andWorldBank-supportedeconomicreformpro-grammes inAfricancountries in the1980s,withasimilardemand forsmaller,efficientandcost-effectivepublicadministrationinstitutionswhichcouldonlybeachievedthroughreforms(Caiden1991;DenhardtandDenhardt2000).

PSRisalsoseenaspartoftheagendaforimprovinggovernance,whichincludesthreebroadareas:rule-basedoperationofthegovernmentitselftoimprovethesupplyofpublicgoods,voiceandac-countabilityforcitizenstodemandbetterpublicservicesandmoreefficientandeffectiveregulation


oftheprivatesectortoimproveitscompetitiveness(WorldBank2008;Levy2004:UNDESA2005;UNECA2004).AsrightlypointedoutbyDror(2001)publicsectorreformtriestoheadoffcrisesinthecapacitytogovernandthereforecommandsattentioneverywhereespeciallywhenpublicofficialsareexpectedtoprovidesatisfactoryservice,makeimprovements,planaheadtomeetmostcontin-genciesandkeepupwiththestateoftheart.

AccordingtoCaidenandSundaram(2004),publicsectorreformsarehighlycomplicatedandemo-tionalbecausetheyareboundupwithideologyandvalues,notjusttechniquesandprocesses,andincludenotmeredetailbutkeysocietalissues.Someofthekeyquestionsembeddedinpublicsec-torreformsare:(i)Whatshouldbeconsideredpublicandhowfarshouldpublicinterventiongo?(ii)Howshouldpublicgoodsandservicesbeprovidedanddeliveredandtowhom?(iii)Howshouldpublicorganizationsberunandbywhom?(iv)Whatshouldbethesocialstandingofpublicservantsandwhatshouldtheirdutiesandobligationscover?(v)Whatarethekeypublicpersonneltobefoundandhowaretheyeducatedanddeveloped?(vi)Towhomandhowshouldtheybeaccountableandforwhat?(vii)Whatshouldbeconsideredfaircompensationtothem?(viii)Whoshouldbedeniedpublicofficeorremovedfromofficeforwhatoffences;(ix)Howisperformance,capacity,andtalenttobemeasured,bywhomandforwhatpurpose?

5.2 Review of the Literature on Public Sector Reforms in Africa

5.2.1 Literature on Rationale for Public Sector Reforms:

TheliteratureonpublicsectorreformsinAfricacanbedividedintothreeareas,namely,(i)thosethatdealwiththerationaleforpublicsectorreforms;(ii)thosethatdealwiththestrategiesdeployedforpublicsectorreform;and(iii)thosethatlookedatthephasesofthereforms.

Theliteratureidentifiesthedriversforpublicsectorreforms(PSRs).Theyinclude(a)inabilitybymanygovernmentstobalancethebudgets;(b)incapacityofgovernmentstoadequatelyrespondtopublicdemands;(c)theinternationalizationofmanyissuesthatpreviouslyweresolelydomestic;and(d)theoverexpansionofthescaleofgovernmentanditsinterventioninallspheresofsociety,evenwhereithasnocompetenceandtrackrecord,leadingtooverloadproblemsCohen1993;LevyandKpun-deh2004;Mutahaba1989;Mutahaba,BagumaandHalfani1993:VandeWalleandRamachandran2003;UNECA2004:Rugumyamheto2004;AfDB2005).Attention toPSRhas thereforeemergedbecausethequalityofthepublicsector–accountability,efficiencyinservicedelivery,transparency,andsoforth–correlatesstronglywithlong-termgrowthandpovertyreduction(Mukandala2000;VandeWalle2001;MutahabaandKiragu2002;Ayee2008).Indeed,inadequatestatecapacityisseenasthefailureofthepublicsectortoperformitsfunctions(AfDB2005).Accordingly,publicsectorreformaddressesfourproblemsconstrainingdevelopmentalprogressinAfrica,namely,(i)over-centralized


government;(ii)recurrentpersonnelcoststhatconsumelargeamountsofscarcebudgetaryresources;(iii)largebudgetdeficits;and(iv)decliningadministrativecapacity(Cohen1993;LevyandKpundeh2004;Mutahaba1989;Mutahaba,BagumaandHalfani1993:UNECA2004).

Someofthestudieshaveeitherfocusedonpublicsectorreformsunderstructuraladjustmentpro-grammes (SAPs)orspecificallySAP-relatedpublicservice reforms.Studies that focusedonpublicsectorreformsunderSAPincludethecorporateworksoftheAfricanTrainingCentreforAdministra-tionandDevelopment(CAFRAD)(1990),BalogunandMutahaba(1991),andtheindividualworksofMutahaba(1989),Mukandala1992;Adamolekun(1991),Kaul(1996),Nti(1996),Macgregoret.al.(1998);AdamolekunandKiragu1999;Mukandala2000;andOlowu(1999).ThesestudieshighlighttheimpactofSAPsonpublicsectorinstitutionsingeneral.Theycoveravarietyofissuesrangingfromprivatisationandderegulation,todecentralizationandcivilservicereformsandproblemsconfrontingthepublicserviceinAfricasuchasserioushumanresourcemanagementissuesofleadership,meritpayandrelatedgovernancereforms,theappropriatestrategyformobilizingresources.TheypointoutthattheseissuesmustbeadequatelyaddressedbeforeAfricancountriescanmakesignificantprogressthepublicsectorandindevelopment.

CAFRAD’sworkwastheresultofaseminarandwasapioneeringoneontheissueoftheimplicationsandtheimpactofSAPsonpublicadministrationstructuresandmanagement.SomeoftheimportantissuesraisedintheCAFRADworkaresetoutbelow. First,publicsectorreformsinAfricaresultedfromseriouseconomiccrisisandwerethusnotendsinthemselvesbutdirectedatsupportingpoli-ciesforeconomicstabilizationandadjustment;consequentlytheseadministrativereformssometimesfailedtoanswerthespecificneedsofAfricancountries.Secondly,thecentralobjectivesofSAP-relat-edadministrativereformsweretoreducecostandtoincreasetheeffectivenessofthepublicservice.ReductioninthesizeofthepublicserviceincludingthecivilserviceasarequirementofSAPwasbasedonthegoalofreducingbudgetdeficitsandredressingfinancialimbalances.ThiscontrastswiththeextrademandswhichtheimplementationofSAPsimposedontheserviceintermsofproducingvoluminousinformationanddataformonitoringtheimplementationofSAPs.

MostofthecontributionsinthevolumeeditedbyBalogunandMutahaba(1991)dwellmoreontheeffectsoftheeconomiccrisisonpublicsectorinstitutionsratherthantheimpactofSAPsontheseinstitutions.Thereisadistinctionbetweentheeffectsofthecrisis,ontheonehand,andtheeffectsofadjustment,ontheother.OnewouldexpectthatanySAP-relatedadministrativereformswouldseektoredresssomeofthenegativeimpactsofthecrisisonthepublicservicesingeneral,andonthecivilserviceinparticular.

AfewofthecontributionsinBalogunandMutahaba(1991)howevershedsomelightontheimpactofSAPsonthepublicservice.Adamolekun(1999),forinstance,highlightstheWorldBank’sinvolve-mentinpublicsectormanagementimprovementsinAfrica,andnotesthatcivilservicemanagement


improvementunderadjustmentprogrammeshasincluded,interalia,staffreduction,salaryandwagereviews,thestrengtheningandthereorganizationofkeyministriesandcentralagenciesofsomeAf-ricancountriessuchastheGambia,Senegal,andMali.Wamalwa,inthesamevolume,arguesthatSAPshavepromotedcost-consciousnessatalllevelsofthepublicadministrationsystemandhavethepotentialtoensuremerit-basedemploymentandtherationalizationofpublicadministrationin-stitutionssuchasthepublicandcivilservice.However,theconcomitantrestrictionsonemploymentandthemassretrenchmentofpublicpersonnelhaveadverseeffectsonthemotivation,morale,andproductivityofpublicpersonnel(BalogunandMutahaba,1991:109-119).

Writingonadministrativereforms inEastAfrica,Mutahaba (1989)hasnoted thatmuchof there-formeffortsinTanzania,ZambiaandKenyatookplaceamidstcomplementaryreformsinthesocio-economicsystems.Inmostofthecasesadministrativereformmeasuresinthesethreecountriesweretakentofacilitatesocio-economicdevelopmentobjectives.InagreementwiththeCAFRAD(1990)studyandtheNti(1991),Mutahabaforcefullyarguesthateffortsatreformshouldnotbeconcernedmerelywithrehabilitatingthepublicservicesystems,butshouldaimattransformingandbuildingviablesystemsthatarecapableofhandlingtheshocksofindependenceandofeconomiccrisis.

Afewstudieshaveemergedthathavefocusedspecificallyonadjustment-relatedpublicsectorre-forms.Inthiscategory,thereistheworkofDeMerode(1992)fortheUnitedNations(1992),Olowu(1999),Demongeot (1994),Macgregor (1998),Wescott (1999),Kaul (1996),Langseth, (1995).DeMerode(1992)pointsouttwosetsofreasonsthathavebeenusedtojustifythereformofthepublicsectorundertheSAPs.ThefirstisthatmostoftheAfricapublicserviceswereoversizedandthusrep-resentedabudgetaryburdenonthegovernment,especiallyinthecontextofeconomicdeclineandincreasingbudgetdeficits.Oneobviouswayofredressingtheimbalanceistoreducethenumberofpublicservantsandtheircost,whichisaprominentfeatureofSAPs.

ThesecondsetofreasonsforSAP-relatedpublicsectorreformshavetodowithweakgovernmentcapacitiesreflectedinweakpublicsectorcapacities.Theserepresentbottlenecks forboth the im-mediate feasibilityand the long-termsustainabilityofSAPs.The reformof thepublic servicewasthereforerequiredfor theeffectiveimplementationofstructuraladjustment. However, theworksoftheUNDESA(1992),Olowu(1999),Demongeot(1994),Macgregor(1998),Wescott(1999),Kaul(1996),Langseth,(1995)takeasomewhatdifferentpositionfromthatofDeMerode.Whilerecogniz-ingthatpublicsectorreformsareoverdueinAfricancountries,andpointingoutthatsomeAfricanpublicservicesareoversized,ineffectiveandinefficient,theydoubtwhetherSAPsprovideabasisforcomprehensiveadministrativereformsinthepublicservice.Theyparticularlynotethattheemphasisonthereductionofthesizeofthepublicserviceandthecutsincost,privatisationandderegulationwouldnotnecessarilyimprovetheefficiencyandeffectivenessofthepublicserviceunlessattentionisfocusedonotheraspectsofpublicservicemanagementsuchascapacitybuilding,servicedelivery,


aidmechanisms,changemanagementprocesses, leadershipcommitment, sequencing,ministerialrestructuring,decentralization,attitudinalchanges,perceptionchangeandgoodgovernance.

5.2.2 The Influence of the New Public Management (NPM)

ArguablyoneofthemostinfluentialdriversofpublicsectorreforminAfricaistheNewPublicMan-agement(NPM).Itisoftenassociatedwithpositive,action-orientedphraseslike:reinventinggovern-ment,re-engineering,revitalizationofthepublicservice,organizationaltransformation,totalqual-itymanagement,paradigmshift,entrepreneurship,empowerment,resultsoverprocess,downsizing,now rightsizing, lean andmean, contracting out, off-loading or outsourcing, steering rather thanrowing,empoweringratherthanservingandearningratherthanspending(Frederickson,1996).Itemphasizesthecentralityofthecitizenorcustomer,accountabilityforresults,decentralizedauthor-ityandcontrol,marketorientationofcostrecovery,competitionbetweenpublicandprivateagenciesfor the contract to deliver services and the creation of semi-autonomous agencies for service delivery (Hood,1991;1995;Manning,2001;Larbi,1999;Walsh,1995;UNECA2003;CaidenandSundaram2004).Thusthecomponentsorelementsof theNPMreformincludeprivatizationandregulation,civilservicereforms,decentralization,contractingandmarketmechanisms,improvedservicedeliv-ery,humanresourcemanagementanddevelopment, informationandcommunicationtechnology,sustainabledevelopmentandgoodgovernance.Accordingly,theNPMispartofabiggerschemetotransformgovernmentandpromotede-bureaucratization,de-regulation,performanceandoutputori-entation,financialviability,downsizing,clientservice-focus,innovationandentrepreneurship(Larbi1999;Lane2000;Hope2001;Minogue2001;Schacter2001;Taylor2001).

TheNPMcapturesmostofthestructural,organizationalandmanagerialchangesthattookplaceinthepublicservicesinOECDcountriesliketheUK,NewZealandandAustraliainthelate1970s.Itis seen as a body of managerial thought or as an ideological thought system based on ideas gener-atedintheprivatesectorandimportedintothepublicsector(Hood,1991;1995).TheNPMshiftstheemphasisfromtraditionalpublicadministrationtopublicmanagementandpushesthestatetowardsmanagerialism.Thetraditionalmodeloforganizationanddeliveryofpublicservices,basedontheprinciplesofbureaucratichierarchy,planning,centralization,directcontrolandself-sufficiency, isapparently replacedbyamarket-basedpublic servicemanagementor “enterpriseculture” (Larbi,1999;Walsh,1995;Hood,1991;CaidenandSundaram2004;Hood1991;1995).

ThedoctrinalcomponentsofNPMhavebeenexpandeduponandhaveevolvedsincethe1990s.Forexample,thecoreideasoftheUnitedKingdom’sCitizensCharterinitiative,launchedin1991,addedaconsumeristdimensiontopublicmanagement.TheCitizensCharterbroughttheissueofconsumerstoprominenceandhassincebecomeakeyfeatureofmostofNPMdiscussions(Hood,1991;1995).

ThecoremeasuresoftheNPMaresummarizedinTable1.


Table 1: The Core Measures of the NPM

Variable Managerialist Measures Enabling Factors

Professional Management Delegating management authority withinpublicservices

Breakingupexistingbureaucraciesintoseparateagencies

OutputControl Results orientation and funding of outputs,notinputs

Encouraginggreaterawarenessbyadopting“citizenscharters”

OperationalEfficiency Greaterdisciplineandparsimonyinresource use

Greatercompetitioninthepublicsec-tor and fees for services rendered

Terms of Service Flexibilityinhiringandfiringem-ployees

Downsizingandpublicserviceandlimitunioninfluence

Budgeting Makebudgetsmoretransparentinaccounting terms

Encouragegovernmentstobecomemoreenterprisingbyearning,notspending

Sources: James Gow & Caroline Dufour, “Is the New Public Management a Paradigm? Does it Matter?”, International Review

of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 66 (2000): 573-597; P. Dunleavy & C. Hood, “From Old Public Administration to New Man-

agement”, Public Money and Management, Vol. 14, No. 3: p. 10; G.A Larbi, The New Public Management Approach and

Crisis States (Geneva: UNRISD, 1999); Nick Manning, “The Legacy of the New Public Management in Developing Countries”,

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 67 (2001): 297-312.

AccordingtotheAfricanDevelopmentBank(AfDB)Report(2005),theNPMhasledtothecreationofautonomousexecutiveagencies,decentralizedmanagement,subsidiarity,accrualaccountingandcommercialization,Forinstance,Ghana,SouthAfrica,KenyaandNigeria,theinternalrevenuede-partmentswerehivedofffromthecivilservicewhileseparateteachinghospitalswithautonomyfromtheMinistryofHealthwerecreated.

Thisnotwithstanding, theNPMasauniformtemplate for reforminAfrica,hasnotworkedasex-pectedacrossboard.Batley(1997)inhisfive-yearreviewof the“changingroleofgovernmentinadjustingeconomies”hasconcludedthattheeffectoftheNPMonmostAfricancountrieshasbeenmixedatbestwithsomeimprovementsinefficiencyandmixedeffectsonequity.Onthedownside,inrelationtothemovetoautonomizeservicedeliveryagencies,thetransactioncostsofradicalreformstendtooutweightheefficiencygainsofunbundling,andthatthereformsthatpursuetheseparationofpurchasersfromprovidersmayhavedecreasedaccountability–andthat,consequently,inequityhasgrown(Manning,2001;Batley,1997).Similarly,theimplementationoftheNPMhasledtotherealizationthat“market inspiredreformsofgovernment“failures”donotreallyworkverywell inconditionswherethestateremainsweakandsubjecttoformalinfluences(AfDB2005:132).Inaddi-tion,theNPMhasnotsucceededineliminatingthe“clientelistic”tendenciesthattendtopermeateAfricangovernments.Whileinsuchacontextthecreationofindependentagenciesisastepinthe


rightdirection–themannerinwhichNPMhasbeenintroducedasa“technocraticfix”doesnotlenditselftofullutilizationofitsattributes(AfDB2005;UNECA2004).

TheAfDB(2005:131)hasidentifiedsomeofthekeylessonsfromimplementingNPMmeasuresinAfricaasfollows:

(i) WhereasthedownsizingofthepublicsectorinAfricancountrieshasbeensignificant,byupto40%insomeinstanceslikeGhanaandUganda,thecostsavingshavebeenmuchless,inmostcasesbyamere6-7%,largelyduetohighcompensationcostsinacontextofpreviouslowsalaries.Retrenchmentisacostlyexercise,asevidencefromNorthAfricaconfirms(Larbi1995;1998;Bulmer2000);

(ii) ThecreationofindependentexecutiveagencieshasmovedaheadinmanyAfricancoun-triesand,thoserevenueauthoritiesthathavehelpedincreasegovernmentincome,havealsoincurredhighmanagerialcostsstemmingfromtheneedtopaytopexecutivessalariescompetitivewiththoseoftheprivatesector.Inspecificcasesofdecentralizationtosub-nationalunits,seriousproblemshaveariseninmonitoringtheuseoffunds,thusincreasingratherthanloweringtransactioncosts(Ayee2008);

(iii) MorecountriesthaninanyotherregionhaveadopteduserfeesforhealthcareservicesinAfrica.Inthemid-1990sonlythreecountries–Angola,BotswanaandSaoTomeandPrincipe–hadnouserfeesinthegovernmentsector.Theprobleminmostcountriesthathaveadoptedthissystemisthatmanagementandaccountingcapabilitieshavebeeninad-equatetosupportcostrecoveryprogrammes.Thegains,therefore,haveremainedmodest,ifanyatall(Larbi1998;1999);and

(iv) Performance standards have been introduced in many African countries and have in some instancescontributedtoimprovingpublicservices.SuchreformsintheTanzanianpublicsectorareacaseinpoint.Atthesametime,thereisevidencethatmanyemployeesfeelthattheirremunerationisnotcommensuratewithwhattheyareexpectedtodo(UNECA2004).

Twoconclusionscanbemade from the reviewof the literature.First, thatmajor socio-economicreforms, suchas those introducedunderSAPswould requireacapableadministrativemachinerytosupportandsustain them.Though, formostAfricancountries, this impliedcomprehensiveandsystem-widereformsinthepublicservice,theliteratureseemstosuggestthatreformshavebeenlesscomprehensiveandlesssystemicintheirimpacts.Thesecondconclusionisthatthepublicsectorreformsareaby-productofstructuraladjustmentprogrammesandtheNPMandthisimpliesthatthescopeandcontentof thereformshave largely tendedtobedeterminedbyadjustmentconditions(AfDB2005:UNECA2004).


5.2.3 Literature on Strategies for Public Sector Reform

Generally,theliteratureidentifiestheresponsestodealwiththeproblemsthathadledtoPSRs.Themostcommonmeasureshaveincludedthe(a)re-examinationoftheroleofgovernment,thatis,whatthegovernmentshoulddoandshouldnotdo;(b)re-examinationofthecostsofrunninggovernmentbusiness,followedbynecessarycost-cuttingmeasures;(c)decentralizationanddevolutionofauthor-itywithingovernment; (d)considerationofmorecost-effectivewaysof servicedelivery includingprivatizationorcorporatizationofactivities;(e)introductionofmanagementideasfromtheprivatesectorintothepublicsector,including,givingresponsibilitytopublicservicemanagerstomanageandbecomeaccountableforusingtechniquesandtoolsderivedfromtheprivatesector;(f)partner-shipbetweenthegovernmentandtheprivatesectorintheprovisionofservicestothepublic(TurnerandHulme1997;WorldBank1997;Larbi1999;Rugumyamheto2004;CaidenandSundaram2004;AfDB2005;Ayee2008).

Specifically,theliteraturehasidentifiedninestrategiesthathavelargelybeenusedinpublicsectorreforms (WorldBank2008;TurnerandHulme1997;Collins2000;Batley1994;1997;LevyandKpundeh2004;Ayee2008).Theyareasfollows:

(i) CivilServiceandAdministrativeReform:Itinvolvesallaspectsofthemanagementandor-ganizationofpersonnel.Itincludesprogrammestodownsizethecivilserviceandreformstothepersonnelinformationsystem(includingcivilservicecensuses),careerpaths,paygrades(decompression),otheraspectsoftheincentivesystemandtheorganizationoftheministries(Olowu1999;Olowu2003;LevyandKpundeh2004;AfDB2005);

(ii) PublicExpenditureAnalysisandManagementconcernsthemanagementofmoneythroughtheentirebudgetcycle.Thisincludesbudgetplanningandexecution,inparticular,finan-cialmanagementinformationsystemsandmediumtermexpenditureframeworks(MTEFs),procurement,auditingandmonitoringandevaluation.Italsoincludestheimplementationofreformsarisingfromcountryfinancialaccountabilityassessmentsandcountryprocure-mentassessment reviewsand thestrengtheningofkeybudgetaryaccountability institu-tions,suchaspublicaccountscommitteesofthelegislatureandsupremeauditinstitutions(WorldBank2008;AfDB2005;GarnettandPlowden2004;PhilippeandTaliercio2002);

(iii) RevenuePolicyandAdministrationinvolvestaxadministrationreformandincludesthekeyaspectsofrevenueadministration,particularlytheinstitutionalsettinganddevelopmentofoperationalprocesses,includingautomationandinteractionwithtaxpayers(actualandpotential).Someofthetrendsintaxadministrationreformarereorganizationoftaxdepart-mentsalongfunctionallines,establishingacomprehensivesystemoftax-payeridentifica-tionnumbers,computerization,grantingautonomytotaxdepartmentsandestablishmentoflargetaxpayerunits.Theirobjectivesaretoensureproperplanningandbudgetingofpublicexpenditures,effectiveandefficientadministrationofgovernmentrevenues,proper


useofbudgetresources,effectivecontrolofpublicexpenditure,accountingandreportingonpublicfinanceandfullaccountabilityforallpublicspending(WorldBank2008;Kiragu1999;RaknerandGloppen2003;DorotinskyandFloyd2004;Taliercio2003;2004);

(iv) Anti-corruptionandTransparencytocombatcorruptionandimprovetransparencyacrossthepublicsector.Someoftheinitiativesincludemainstreaminganti-corruptionincountryanalysis,helpingcountriestocurbcorruptioninsuchkeyareassuchasextractiveindus-tries,preventingfraudandcorruptionsuchasfiduciarycontrolsandcontributingtoeffortstofightcorruption(Kpundeh2004;HopeSnrandChikulo2000);

(v) Decentralizationhasbeenconsideredbymanyasoneofthemostimportantstrategiesinpublicsectorreform.ThisisbecausedonorsandgovernmentsinAfricahaveconsidereddecentralizationasastrategythatwillbringservicedeliveryclosertoconsumers,improvetheresponsivenessofthecentralgovernmenttopublicdemands,improvetheefficiencyand quality of public services and empower lower units to feelmore involved and incontrol.Itisalsomeanttoreduceoverloadandcongestionatthecentreandspeedupop-erationaldecision-makingandimplementationbyminimizingthebottlenecksassociatedwithover-centralizationofpowersandfunctionsatjustoneortwopointsinthehierarchyofapublicserviceorganizationorministry.Consequently,decentralizationseeks to in-creasetheoperationalautonomyoflinemanagersandagencies,leavingonlybroadpolicyguidelines tobeworkedoutat thecentre (Smith1985;Rondinelli1989;Olowu1992;1997;NdegwaandLevy2004;OlowuandWunsch2004;AfDB2005);

(vi) LegalandJudicialReforminvolvesthecomputerizationofthejudiciary,continuinglegaleducationandprovidingaconducivelegalenvironmenttofacilitatethedevelopmentoftheprivatesector.Oneoftheoutcomesisthesettingupofspecialcourtssuchascommer-cialcourtsand“fasttrackcourts”todispensejusticeexpeditiously.Theemphasishasbeenonalaw-basedstate,respectfortheruleoflawandtheindependenceofthejudiciaryandthecreationoftheenablingenvironmentforprivatesectordevelopmentbyreducingthecostsofdoingbusiness(Adamolekun1999;Ayee2008);

(vii) Sectoral InstitutionalBuilding involves thebuildingandmaintaining thecapacityof in-stitutionsinallsectorsandskillsareastoprovidevalueformoneyservices.Thisentailstheabilityandcapacitytoattractstaffandretainthem.Accordingly,emphasisisplacedonHumanResourceManagement(HRM)andHumanResourceDevelopment(HRD)is-sues.HRMfocusesonselection,recruitment,appraisal,rewardandcareeropportunitieswithininstitutionswhileHRDreferstotheorganizationalactivitiesdirectedatimproving


theskillsandcapacitiesoftheworkforcethroughtraining,developmentofinter-personalskills,mentoring,participativemanagement stylesandprovidingperformance feedback(Peters1992;Dror1976;AfDB2005;EDIandISAS1992;TurnerandHulme1997;Ayee2008);(viii)PublicEnterpriseReformentailsacombinationofobjectivessuchasensuringprofitabilitybyavoidingtradinglosses,avoidingliquiditycrisesandrisingdebts,remov-ingthedominanceofunproductiveinvestments,creatingafavourableinvestmentclimateforbothlocalandforeigninvestors,providinginstitutionalarrangementsandoperationalguidelinesthatwouldensurethatthegainsofthereformprogrammearesustainedinthefutureandensuringwidershareownership,especiallyamonglowerincomegroups.Thetwo common types of state enterprise reform are privatization and commercialization.Privatizationinvolvesthepartialortotaltransferofownershipofastateownedenterprise(SOE)totheprivatesectorwhilecommercializationinvolvesmakingSOEsmoreefficientwiththecapacitytomakecontributionstothetreasury.Insomecasescommercializationcould involve thechangeof the relationshipbetween themanagementof theSOEandthegovernment throughperformancecontractormanagementcontracts.Whileononehand,performancecontractsareusedtodefinenewrelationshipsbetweenmanagersofSOEsandthegovernmentwithaviewtomakingtheachievementofthedesiredresultspossible,managementcontracts,ontheotherhand,involvesaprivateenterprisetakingupthemanagementofanSOE(Ramanadham1989;1995;Adamolekun1999;Laleye1999;Islam1993;WorldBank1995;Tangri1999:AfDB2005);(ix)Public-PrivateSectorPartner-ships(PPPs)emphasizethesynergybetweenthepublicandprivatesectorsintheprovisionofsocialwelfare,publicgoodsandservices.Suchpartnershipsorcooperationaremeanttopresentgovernmentswiththeopportunitiestoimprovecitizenaccesstoservices.Inad-dition,thecompetitioninsuchserviceprovisionarrangementsisexpectedtoencouragequalityinstitutions(Batley1994;1997;Collins2000).

5.2.4 Literature on the Phases of Public Sector Reforms

ReformingthepublicsectorinAfricaisdividedintothreephases4,namely,(1)thereformsfromthe1980stoearly1990s,whichfocusedmainlyonmacro-economicstabilityandweremainly“quan-titative”;(2)thereformsofthemid-1990sto2000,whichfocusedonperformanceandcivilservicemanagement;and(3)reformsfrom2000,whichfocusedonservicedeliveryasaresultofthepub-

4 The threephasesare sometimes referred toas“First-GenerationReforms”,“Second-GenerationReforms”and“Third-GenerationReforms”.SeeRichardCrook,“TheStateoftheStateinAfrica:WhatistobeDone?”,InauguralLecturedeliveredattheInstituteofCommonwealthStudies,UniversityofLondon,October27,2004;DeleOlowu,“AfricanGovernanceandCivilServiceReforms”, inN.vandeWalle,NicoleBall&VijayaRamachandran (Eds.)Beyond Structural Adjustment: The Institutional Context of African Development(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan),Chapter4.Beforethesethreephasestherewasanearlierphaseinlate1950stothe1960swhichwasdevotedtoimplementationofstatistpolicies,Africanizationandprofes-sionalizingthesystemofpublicadministrationthathasbeeninherited.Themainstrategyusedistechnicalassistance


lication of the World Development Report1997.SeeTable2foranoverviewoftheaims,features,achievementsandchallengesofthephases.

5.2.4.1 Phase One Reforms: 1980s to Early 1990s:

Largescale,donor-fundedcivilserviceorpublicsectorreformprogrammesreallybeganinAfricawiththestructuraladjustmentprogrammes(SAPs)ofthe1980s.Betweenindependenceandthelate1970s,themainfocushadbeenAfricanizationofthesmallinheritedcolonialcivilservicescombinedwithrapidexpansion(particularlyofeducationservices),aprocessaidedbytheformercolonialpow-ers mainly through training and technical assistance.

TheSAPloansofthe1980swereprimarilyaimedatstabilizingmacro-economiccrisesofbalanceofpaymentsandfiscaldeficits,runawayinflationandcurrencyovervaluations.Forthisreason,thecivilservicereformpackageswhichfrequentlyaccompaniedSAPloansweremainlyconcernedtoreducethecostofpublicsectoremployment,whichwasregardedasself-evidentlyexcessiveorbloated.ThemainproblemsoftheAfricancivilserviceswhichhademergedduringtheeconomiccrisesleadinguptotheSAPareidentifiedinTable2.

ItisestimatedthatinAnglophoneAfrica,publicsectorwagesdeclined80%inrealtermsbetweentheearly1970sand1980s(parallelingthegeneraldeclineinGDPpercapita)(VandeWalle,2001:134).Forinstance,inGhanain1984,atopPrincipalSecretaryearnedonly2.5timesthesalaryofabasicclerk,although,ofcourse,thereweresubstantialnonpaybenefits(Nunberg,1996:146).

Duringthisperiodthereforethenowfamiliarproblemsofmoonlightingandabsenteeism,lowmo-rale,corruptionandpoliticisationofrecruitmentemerged.Thereislittledoubtthatinmanycountriesthecapacityofministriesincludingfinanceministriestofulfilevenbasictasksvirtuallycollapsed.

Solutionsofferedbythe1980scivilservicereformprogrammes(CRPSs)wererelativelycrude.Inlinewithneo-liberaleconomicpoliciesaimingtodrasticallyreducetheroleofthestateintheeconomy,theyfocusedon:(i)downsizing-retrenchments,mergersandrecruitmentfreezes,eliminatingghostworkers;and(ii)decompressingwagescales,tryingtousesavingsonrecruitmenttopayhighersala-riestohigherlevelmanagerswithscarceskills.

Largeamountsofaidmoneywereallocatedforthispurpose.From1981to1991,theWorldBankincludedcivilservicereformprogrammesin91loan/creditfacilitiesworldwide,55ofwhichweretoAfricancountries,eitherSAPorTechnicalAssistanceloans.Theytotalled$2131million(Nunberg,1996:122).


5.2.4.2 Phase Two Reforms: Mid-1990s to 2000

Thephase2reformsofthemid1990sfocusedonperformanceandcivilservicemanagement.They,tosomeextent,emergedfromalimitedrecognitionthatdownsizingandpayrestructuringalonewerenotproducingthedesiredresults.Netreductionsinnumberswerenotgreat,exceptperhapsintheformerSOEsector,overallsalaryexpenditureswereactuallyrisingandyetasoneauthoritativeWorldBankstudyfound,theideathatretrenchmentsanddecompressionswouldproducesavingswhichwouldfundrealimprovementsinsalaryratesforskilledstaffhadnotworked(McCourt,1998;Dia,1996).Thisphaseretainedtheassumptionthatthecivilserviceneededtobereducedinsize,butaccompaniedthiswithmuchmoreambitiousattemptsattotalrestructuringofcivilservices,focusingonmanagementsystems,performancemanagementandbudget/financialmanagement,andmarketi-zationofservicedelivery.

AsRichardBatley(1996)hasshowninhisworkonthechangingroleofgovernment,thisperiodofreformwasnothinglessthananattempttotransfertoAfricanandotherdevelopingcountriesallthetechniquesofpublicsectorreformwhichinthedeveloped,particularlyEnglishspeakingcountries,havecometobeknownastheNewPublicManagement(NPM).

ThemainproblemsofAfricanPublicServicesbeforeSAPhavebeensummarizedasfollows:

• Normsabouthiringandfiringarerarelyenforced;• Resourcestiedforspecificpurposesareoftendivertedtomeeturgentneedsinothersec-

tors;• Attitudestowardsbothplanningandschedulingareflexibleanditisgenerallyassumed

thatnothingoccursquiteasarranged;• Organizationstendtolackcapacityfororganizationalintelligence,abilitytolearnfrom

pastmistakesislimited,decision-makingtechniquesremainpersonaltothemanagers;• Large-scaleorganizationstendtobedividedintomicro-organizationscontrolledbyindi-

vidualtopmanagers;• Managersshowamarkedambivalenceabouttechnicalmatters;• Therewasanexcessiveexpansioninthenumbersoflowlevelandpoorlyqualifiedem-

ployees, particularly inunproductive stateownedenterprises and ‘parastatal’ agencies;and

• Therewasanerosionofrealwagelevelscausedbymassiveinflationandtheeffectsofimportcontrols(Hyden1983:145-147;Olowu1999:1-4;UNECA2004).

ThetypicalmechanismsfordesigningandimplementingthesereformswerethecreationofhighlevelreformagenciesusuallylocatedinthePresidentialorPrimeMinisterialoffices,deliberatelyintendedtobypassthemainstreamministriesandbackedupbyteamsofforeignconsultantsandtechnicalassistancepersonnel.Atthesametime,foreignaidflowstoAfricancountriescontinuedtoincrease


massively,increasingthedirectroleofdonorsandtheiragentsingovernmentprogrammesespeciallypublicsectorreform.

5.2.4.3 Phase Three Reforms: 2000 to Present

Phase3of reformshasonlyemergedsince theendof the1990s, followingon theWorldBank’srecognition in its 1997 World Development Report: The State in Changing World that having an effective, responsive and legitimate statewas crucial for sustaining an effectivemarket economy(WorldBank1997).Inasectionentitled“GoodGovernmentIsNotaLuxury–ItIsaVitalNecessityforDevelopment”,theReporturgesreforminalarmistterms:“Peoplelivingwithineffectivestateshavelongsufferedtheconsequencesintermsofpostponedgrowthandsocialdevelopment.Butanevenbiggercostmaynowthreatenstatesthatpostponereforms:politicalandsocialunrestand,insomecases,disintegrationexactingatremendoustollonstability,productivecapacity,andhumanlife”(WorldBank1997:15).

Newgenerationprogrammessincethemillennium,althoughstillverymuchwithintheNPMpara-digm,havetendedtofocusonhowtoimproveservicedeliverytocitizens,makingitmoreresponsiveandeffective.TheyarenormallyspecificallylinkedwiththenewPovertyReductionStrategyPlans(PRSPs)whichhavebecomeanewconditionalityforloanstoHighlyIndebtedPoorCountries(HIPC),themajorityofwhicharelocatedinAfrica.Thusforpublicservantsthishasmeantprogrammeswhichattempttoinvolveofficersintakingonboardtheopinionsanddemandsoftheirclients-thepublicorusers - anddesigning theirownPerformance ImprovementPlans (PIPs)which involve servicedeliverystandardsmonitoredbybothresponsiblemanagersandcitizenusergroups.TheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DfID)fundedsuchprogrammesin,forexample,Tanzania,UgandaandGhana.Infact,theGhanaianCivilServicePerformanceImprovementProgramme(CSPIP)wasstartedin1996.TheGhanaprogrammeinvolvedstaffintargetedagenciesengagingin‘selfappraisal’exercisesinwhichtheyweresupposedtoconfrontanddiscusswhattheirpublicclientsfeltaboutthequalityoftheirservice,andthencomeupwithPIPswhichcouldformthebasisofaPerformanceAgreementwiththeirChiefDirectorandthegovernment.PIPshavetoincludemeasurabletargets.

5.3 The Outcome of the Reform Phases

Aftertwentyfourormoreyearsthegeneralconsensustobefoundinbothconsultantsreportsandintheacademicliteratureisthattheresultsorachievementsofpublicsectorreformshavebeenex-tremelylimited.Insomeinstances,theyhaveevenbeennegative.(Tangri,1999;OlowuandWun-sch,2004;OlowuandWunsch,1995;Rondinellietal.,1989;1996;Smith,1985;Mawhood,1993;OlowuandSmoke,1992;Wunsch,2000;2001;Adamolekun,1999;Collin,2000;Olowu,1997;Englebert,2000;Dia,1996;LevyandKpundeh,2004;Ayee,1994;2001;AyeeandCrook,2003;CrookandManor,1998;Devas,DelayandHubbard,2001:UNECA2004;AfDB2005;Ayee2008).


InthewordsofCaidenandSundaram(2004:374)“despiteallthehooplathataccompaniesthem,publicservicereformsrarelysucceed,asevidencedbynumerousfailurestocomeevenclosetotheirinitialintentions”.

Thepolicyinitiativesaimedatmakingthepublicsectormoreequippedtoplayitspost-SAPsregulatoryhavelargelyremainedunsuccessfulbecausetheyemphasizetraining,incentives,downsizingandinsti-tutionalinnovationswhichEnglebert(2000)describedas“somewhatmisguided”.Inhiswordswhichseem fatalistic:

It is doubtful whether African bureaucrats need additional training and more im-ported institutions. They are neither less competent nor less moral than civil serv-ants elsewhere. Patterns of bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, delinquent rule of law, and the like answer to a political logic and are the consequences of the dichotomization between statehood and power in African non-legitimate states. It is hard to see how public sector management programmes address these deep-er issues. They may provide temporary Band-Aids, but they are unlikely to bring about lasting improvements(Englebert,2000:180-181).

Inspiteofthereforms,manypublicorganizationshaveremainedinefficient.Theircontinuedpoorperformancehasbeenblamedonanumberoffactors,whicharesetoutasfollows:

(i) Reformsweremainlyseenintechnicalandmanagerialtermsratherthaninpoliticalandin-stitutionaltermsbecause“publicadministrationsareembeddedinacomplex,interdepend-entsystem.Thissystemincorporatesnotonlythebureaucraticapparatusasawhole,butalsopoliticalinstitutionsandsocial,economic,andpoliticalinterestsmorebroadly(Levy,2004:11).

(ii) Mostofthereformsarenestedinpolitics.Forinstance,whereasmanygovernmentsagreedto reduce the number ofministries as part of the retrenchment exercise they have oftenresorted to the temptationof increasing thenumberofministries again.The introductionofmulti-partypoliticshasreinforcedthepressuretorewardfollowersaspartofcoalition-buildingingovernment.Theresultisthatdemocraticreformshaveoftenworkedagainstthenecessaryconsistency inreforming thepublicsector.The“one-size-fits-all”approachthatignorescountry-specificorganizationalaspectsofpublicorganizations(LienertandModi,1997;Nunberg,1996);

(iii) Reformshavefailedtorespondtothelivelihoodconcernsofemployees(poorworkingcon-ditionsandinadequatesalariesforpublicsectoremployeeshavecontinuedduetotheneedtoreducegovernmentexpenditure)andrequirementthatrecruitmentbefrozenwithitsat-tendantadmonitiontounderpaidandpoorlymotivatedworkerstoassumeadditionalrespon-


sibilityandtoleadeffortsatimprovingefficiency(Goldsmith,2000:Olowu,2003,Lienert,1998;Schiavo-Campo,1998).

(iv) Africanbureaucraciessufferfromweakorganizationalcultureasaresultofmoreemphasisbeingputonmotivationratherthanonpublicserviceethosofcommitment,professionalismandpromotingpublicserviceandinterest(Crook,2004).

(v) Thereislowdemandforqualityserviceandgoodperformancefromcitizens,clients,us-ersandcivilsocietyorganization,whichhasmadeoperationsofpublicorganizationsnotonlyunresponsiveandunaccountablebutalsofraughtwithneo-patrimoniallogics(Crook,2004).

ThetrendsinreformingthepublicsectorinAfricashowthattheywereinfluencedbybotheconomicliberalizationanddemocratization.Theyareperceivedtohavebeendrivenbymainlydonorsratherthan“homegrown”.Ineachofthetrendsemphasiswasplacedonaccountability,improvedservicedelivery.Onesignificantoutcomeofthetrendsisthattheyshowmixedresultsmainlybecausepub-licexpectationsofthestateinAfricaarefundamentallydifferentwhilethenotionsofpublicserviceethosorcivilserviceculturehavenotchangedasenvisaged.Perhapsthelegacyofthetrendsistoconstrainthepublicofficialstoensurethatpublicexpectationsprovidemotive,andbuildingbasicpublicsectordisciplinestoprovidecapability.EventhoughthedirectapplicationofthereformshasbeenlimitedandhasachievedlittleinAfricanstates,theyhavesignificantlyalteredthepublicman-agementdebatebothforgovernmentsandfordevelopmentagencies(Manning,2001).

Takentogether,thetrendswereaimedatretoolingpublicinstitutionstoperformtheregulatoryfunc-tionswhichthepost-SAPsstatewastoperform.

Table 2: Phases of Public Sector Reforms in Africa

Indicators Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3

Period 1980s-early1990s Mid-1990s-2000 2000-date

Objectives Achievement of macro-eco-nomic stability and quantita-tive

Performance and civil service management

Effectiveandefficientservicedelivery

Assumptions Problemsofserviceprovi-sionweretheresultofpricedistortion emanating from widespreadgovernmentsubsidies.

Shiftedemphasisfromthequantityofemployeestotheirquality.Tomakepublicsectoremploymentmoreat-tractiveanddecreasethesizeof the government.

Improveservicedeliverytocitizens,makingitmoreresponsiveandeffective;ii.Effective,responsiveandlegitimate state is crucial for sustainingmarkereconomy


Indicators Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3

Features/strategies Reducingsizeofstate,cost-cutting, retrenchment, cost-recovery,privatization.

FeaturesoftheNPM:remu-nerationandpromotionpoli-ciestorewardperformance;incentives,skills,motivation,contractingout,public-pri-vatepartnerships,agencifica-tionsuchastheexecutiveauthority model.

Provision of basic services throughprocessesdrivingpluralization,decentraliza-tionandparticipation;ben-eficiarysurveys,self-appraisalexercises,performanceimprovementplansbypublicservants;customer-friend-linessandresponsiveness;Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans;

Achievements Marginalreductioninsizeofpublicsector,eventhoughitisdebatable;cutbackonequipment,servicesanddevelopmentexpenditure.

Marginalimprovementinconditions of service

Improvedparticipationof civil society and other stakeholdersinsomepublicpoliciesintheformulationofsomepublicpoliciessuchasPoverty Reduction Strategy Plans;improvedconsultativeprocess;marginalimprove-ment in quality of service.

Challenges/problems (i)Ignoredthehistoricalevidence about the origin of thepublicsectorprobleminAfrica.Lowproductivityandinefficiencyoriginatedfrom the economic crisis of the1970s;(ii)Reformsignoredabasicfactaboutpeopleandor-ganizations:peoplemakeor-ganizationswork,therefore,motivatedworkersareasinequanonfororganizationalef-ficiency.Itthereforefailedtoaddress livelihood concerns ofpublicsectoremployees.(iii)Lackofownershipofreform;(iv)realdownsizingnot achieved

(i)One-size-fits-allapproachthatignorescountry-specificorganizationalaspectsofpublicorganizations;(ii)Cre-atedaquagmireforemploy-ees, for instance, reduction in government requires that salariesandno-wagebenefitsremainlow;duehiringfreez-es,theunderpaidandpoorlymotivatedworkerswerebeing admonished to assume additionalresponsibilityandtoleadeffortsatimprov-ingefficiency.(iii)issueofrelativitiesnotaddressed;(iv)braindraincontinued;(v)lackofownership

Performanceimprovementplansandbeneficiarysurveyshavenotbeenproperlyorganized;provisionofser-vicesforthepoorstillafarcry;inspiteofparticipation,Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans have not achieved their objectives;qualityofservicenotimproved

Sources: Olowu 1999; Wescott 1999; Olowu 2003; Crook 2004; Levy and Kpundeh 2004; Ayee 2008.


5.4 Review of the Literature on Civil Service Reform (CSR)

5.4.1 Literature on the Definition of the Civil Service and its Developmental Role in Africa

Theliteraturereviewcanbedividedintotwo,namely,(i)definitionofthecivilserviceanditsroleindevelopmentinAfrica;and(ii)therationaleforcivilservicereforminAfrica.AttentionhasbeenfocusedbytheliteratureonthedefinitionofthecivilserviceanditsimportancetodevelopmentinAfrica.Threemainapproacheshavebeenusedtodefinethecivilservice(Lienert1998;Olowu1999;Olowu2003).Thefirstapproachconceivesofthecivilserviceasasystemofemployment,focusingonthesizeofcivilservices,andrulesofthecivilserviceemploymentastheserelatetosuchissuesasrecruitment,jobevaluation,traininganddevelopment,performanceappraisal,andtheroleandcompositionofhighercivilserviceasagainsttherestoftheservice.Second,civilservicescanalsobeconceivedasinstrumentsofgovernance-institutionsthatserveasthebridgebetweenthestateandspecificadministrativeorgans.Third,civilservicescanbedefinedintermsoftheirroleinthepolicyprocessas“policyauthorizers, implementers,fixers,payers,producers,arrangers,andclientsandconsumers”(McGregor,1991:33).

Theimportanceofthecivilservicetodevelopmentcannotbeover-emphasized.AsOlowu(1999:2)rightlypointedout“centraltothenotionofaneffectivestateisaneffectivecivilservice”.Thecivilserviceisregardedastheprincipalinstrumentofthestateaswellasanorganofemployment,govern-anceandpolicymaking.Itisseenasbothacauseandaconsequenceofeconomicgrowth,andasanessentialconditionfortheemergenceofthemodernstate(Jacoby1976;Migdal1988:Kiggundu1998;Lienert1998).Africancivilservices,originallymodeledontheirmetropolitanprecursors,arethusexpectedtoassistthedevelopmentoftherestofthepublicsectorandnon-stateactors,thatis,theprivatesectorandothercivilsocietyorgans.Accordingly,criticaltothecivilserviceisthehighercivilservice.Thosewhooperateattheselevelsmustnotonlybeproficient,butmustsetthemoraltoneforthecivilandotherpublicservicesaswellasothersocialinstitutions.Thestrongattachmenttomerit(hencemeritocracy)ensuresthatthemostcompetentpeoplearenotonlyrecruitedbutrisetoleadershiplevelsinthecivilservice.Thisgroupprovidesprofessionalleadershipandtakesrespon-sibilityforaccountableperformanceofthecivilserviceandqualityadvice,inthepublicinterest,tothepoliticalleadership(Adu1964;Caiden1969;Mutahaba1995;Quah1995;Olowu1999;2003;Bentil2004).AccordingtoSmith(1984)countriesthatdonotsubscribetothecareersystemoperatesystemsthatguaranteethecompetence,confidenceandcredibilityoftheirseniorcivilservants.TheroleplayedbytheseniorcivilservicehasbeenemphasizedintheJapanesedevelopmentexperiencebyKim(1996:5):

Top civil servants have to bridge the world of administration and the world of poli-tics, and to monitor the traffic back and forth, ensuring that the people reporting to them understand that they have to meet political goals and needs. At the same


time, they also have to protect the administrative bureaucracy from day-to-day interventions by politicians who want to, for example, make sure that the new bridge is built in their district or constructed by their relatives’ companies.

However,itisinstructivetonotethatitisatthehighercivilservice,themostcriticallevelinwhichAfricancivilservicesareweakest.SeveralstudieshavedemonstratedthetendencyofAfricancivilservicestobe“understaffedatthetopbutoverstaffedatthebottom”(UNDESA1992:16).IthasbeenpointedoutthatthecombinationofeconomicandpoliticalfactorshasledtotheseverehemorrhageofthebestandbrightestbrainsfromthecivilservicesinAfrica.Pooreconomicperformancesetsse-verelimitstohowmuchthestatecanpayitsofficials–afactorthatledtoseverewageerosion.Butitispoorpoliticsthataggravatesmattersastheseintroduceotherperniciousproblemsconfrontedbythecivilservices–severewagecompression,politicizationofthemostseniorpositionsinthecivilservicetherebyloweringmoralandunderminingperformanceofthosewhoworkinthecivilserviceand poor accountability regimes at the very top (Hyden 1999;Adamolekun 1999; Lindauer andNumberg1994:Kiggundu1998;Bentil2004;Mhone2003).

5.4.2 Literature on Rationale for Civil Service Reform in Africa:

Thepurposeofcivilservicereform(CSR)istoimprovetheeffectivenessandperformanceofthecivilservice and to ensure its affordability and sustainability over time. The ultimate goal is to raise the qualityofpublicservicesdeliveredtothepopulationandtoenhancethecapacitytocarryoutcoregovernmentfunctions.Thisisessentialtopromotesustainedsocialandeconomicdevelopment.CSRprogrammesgenerallyseek to improvecore functions (forexample, revenuegeneration,financialmanagement,personnelmanagement,policyformulation,etc.)aswellassector-specificpolicy,man-agementandorganization(Glentworth1989;Wescott1999:Kaul1996;Mhone2003).

The literaturehas identified three reasons forCSR inAfrica.First,CSR is seenaspartof thepro-grammeof“rollingbackthestate”.Inthewakeoftheeconomicandfiscalcrisesofthelate1970s,specialattentionwasfocusedonrevitalizingAfricancivilservices,originallyasapartofprogrammesofstructuraladjustmentandstatecutback.Africancivilserviceswereperceivedasbloated,plaguedwithcorruption,andothermisallocationof resources, ineffectiveservicedelivery, sum-minimum-wagecompensation, therecruitmentandpromotionofunqualifiedstaffandadrainonthestate’sscarceresources.Eventhestatewasseenasanobstacletodevelopment.Itwasaninstitutionthatconstrained theprivatesector fromunleashing itsproductivepotentials (Kaul1996;Olowu1999;2003;Kiggundu1996;Wescott1999).Table3showscommonlycitedcausesofcivilserviceineffec-tiveness in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa.

Second, effective CSR is part of good or sound governance,which also includes accountability,transparencyandtheruleoflaw.Goodgovernancebecametheagendafordonorfundingfromthe


late1980s.Inthisconnection,CSRaspartofthegoodgovernanceagendarequiresacommitmenttoestablishamoreprofessionalcivilservicewithastrongeremphasisonperformanceandlessin-fluencedbypatrimonialismandethnicloyalties.Soundorgoodgovernanceisthemostimportantdistinguishing success inpromoting sustainablehumandevelopment from failure (Wescott 1999;Adamolekun1999;Olowu1999;2003;Bentil2004).Thirdisthechangingroleofthestate.Theroleassignedtothestateintheplanningandmanagementofnationaleconomicandsocialactivitieshadundergone fundamental changes and reassessment. Hence in its famous World Development Report 1997,theWorldBankconcededthateconomicreforms–structuraladjustment–werenotenoughtobringaboutsustainabledevelopment.Thestate’scapacityforpromotingdevelopmentneededtobeenhancedespeciallyinthefaceoftherelentlesspressurestowardsdemocratizationandglobaliza-tion.Thecivilservice,recognizedasthe“core”publicservicewasaninstrumentofthestatewhosecapacitymustbesubstantiallyincreased.Thehistoricalexperiencesofwesternindustrializedcoun-triesandthenewlyindustrializingcountriesofEastAsiawereusedtohighlightthetypeofstrategiesneededtoboost theperformanceandcapacityofcivilservice(deMerode1991;Kiggundu1996;Kaul1996;Langseth1995;Macgregoret.al.1998;Mhone2003).

Theliteratureoncivilservicereformhasfocusedonthematicareaswhichincludemainlysevencom-ponents.Theyare:(i)measurestotracktheexistingstaff,forinstance,payrollandhumanresourcedatabasessincepayandemploymentdataareessentialtodiagnosingcivilserviceissuesanddesign-ingreforms;(ii)measurestocontainandreducethenumberofstaff–viaretrenchmentandlayoffs,earlyretirement,andhiringfreezes,whichhavebeenthemostcontroversialcomponentsofCSR;(iii)compensationreformsdealwithpaystructuresandpensions;(iv)humanresourcemanagementdealswithmanagementofcadresgenerallyandtheseniorcivilserviceparticularlywithspecialemphasisonmerit-basedrecruitment,promotionanddiscipline,performancemanagementandappraisalsys-tems;(v)organizationalcomponentdealswithissuessuchascontracting,creatingdeliveryagencies,andprocessengineeringandorganizationalrestructuring.Theseareusuallybasedonfunctionalandprogrammereviewsandaimtoimproveoperationalefficiency;(vi)demandsidereformsfocusontheusersofservices,throughservicestandards,e-government;(vii)trainingandcapacitybuilding(Kaul1997;WorldBank2008).

Table 3: Commonly Cited Causes of Civil Service Ineffectiveness in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa


Ghana Kenya Nigeria South Africa

i. Poor morale i. Poor management of financialresources

i. Highly regimented and militarized

i.Wastefulderivedfromtheestablishmentofseparatebureaucraticandpara-statalstructures,separateuniversitiesandseparatetechnical education for the differentracialgroups

ii.Poorpay,benefits&incentives

ii.Lackofaccountabilityframeworkandenforce-ment

ii.Slowinrespondingtotechnological changes and modernorganizationalmethods

ii.Corruptionwithand“ghost”names

iii. High levels of absentee-ism

iii.Lackofgoodrecords,data&management

iii.Sycophanticbecausecivil servants feel that it is safer to conform than initiate

iii.Patternsofconspicuousconsumptionamongblackcivil servants

iv.Inadequatesupervision&accountability

iv.Laxityatwork iv.Poorworkarrange-ment, highly hierarchical operationalstructure,un-streamlinedorganizationalstructures

iv.Inadequatecapacityespeciallyintheimplemen-tationofaffirmativeactionwhichhasledtotheshort-ageofskilledpeople

v.Ineffectivepromotion&careerdevelopmentpoli-cies&procedures

v.Lackofclearper-formance targets and standards

v.Lackinginfinancialandmaterial resources

v.DifficultytoretainexperiencedblackSouthAfricanprofessionalsinseniorpositioninthecivilservice because of better conditions of service in the privatesector

vi.Poorperformanceap-praisalpractices

vi.Jobdissatisfaction vi.Corruptinvirtuallyallaffairs because of insecurity oftenure,poorremunera-tionandglorificationofmaterialism by society

vi.Affirmativeactionhasbecomea“numbersgame”

vii.Poorlydesignedjobs vii.Poorpay,briberyandfavoritism

vii.Grosslyindisciplineandnegativepoorethics

vii.Duplicationandun-necessaryoverlappingoffunctions

viii. Poor human resources management

viii. Poor management of budgetaryflows

viii.Decliningefficiency,effectivenessandproduc-tivity

viii.Evidenceofweakac-countabilityandtranspar-ency,notablythepersis-tenceoftheproblemofcorruption



ix.Hostileenvironment ix.Poormanagementofbudgetaryflows

ix.Disregardanddisrespectby some members of the politicalclass,thebusinesscommunityandotherpub-lic servants

ix.TheAfricanizationofthecivil service led to the in-creased role of contractors in the delivery of services andlessensthedepend-ence of the government on the civil service in the eventofastrike

Sources: UNDESA, Size and Cost (1992); Etuk, The Nigerian Public Service: In Search of Creative Excellence, (1992); Ayee,

“Civil Service Reform in Ghana: A Case Study of Contemporary Reform Problems in Africa” (2001); Cohen, “Importance of

Public Service Reform: The Case of Kenya” (1993); Catlett and Schuftan, “Lessons from Institution Building in Kenya” (1994);

Picard, “South Africa” (1999).

5.5 Trends, Processes and Dynamics of Civil Service Reforms in Africa

TheliteratureemphasizesthateventhoughtheelementsofCSRvaryfromoneAfricancountrytoan-other,therearekeycomponentsthathaveremainedprominentandconsistent.Theycanbeclassifiedintotwobroadtypes,namely,“core” and “non-core” elements.

a) The Core Elements of CSR:

TherearethreeelementsofCSRinAfrica.Theyare(i)OrganizationalRestructuring;(ii)PersonnelManagement;and(iii)BudgetaryandFinancial.Theseelementshavesub-elements.

• Organizational Restructuring: Even thoughorganizational reviewsand restructuringarepopularinmostAfricancountries,theirimpactisseentobemarginal(Ingraham1996).Re-structuringtakesthreemainforms.Theyare(a)ministerialrestructuringwhichinvolvesthereductioninthenumberofministries,departmentsandagencies;(b)creatingorstrength-eningofcentralcoordinatingorganssuchastheOfficeoftheHeadoftheCivilService(OHCS)anditsfunctionaldirectorates;and(c)simplificationandflexibilitysuchastheeliminationofnon-essentialfunctions,unnecessarypaperworkandregulationsandcut-tingexcessiveredtape(Olowu1999;2003;Wescott1999;Kaul1996;AfDB2005;Ayee2008).

• Personnel Management: Itentails fourmajorcomponents.Theyare (a) improvementofmanagementofpersonnel,which isnecessary to identifyghostworkers,ministerial re-views,hiring,freezeandintegrationofthepayrollandpersonnelrecords;(b)retrenchmentsometimes referred toas“downsizing”or“rightsizing”,which involves thedismissalofredundantcivilservantstomakethecivilserviceaffordable.Downsizingistoreducefis-caldeficitsandthusfreeupdomesticresourcesfortheprivatesector;toreducetheeffect


of thesuperfluousstaffonmanagement timeandoverhead functions; to reducepublicsectorproductivitybytyingpersonnellevelstoadequateandsustainableoperationsandmaintenance;andtolimittheroleofthestatetothosetasksthatcannotbeadequately,willinglyorprofitablyperformedbytheprivatesector(Macgregoret.al1998);(c)ministe-rialreviewswhichformthebasisforretrenchmentandincludeanassessmentofsystemicandstructuralconstraints,organizationofstructures,establishmentofstaffinglevelsandmanagementsystems;(d)payreforms,oftenregardedasthemostdifficultofCSRsbecauseofthedeplorablesalarysituationinmostAfricancountries,withemphasisonthemoneti-zationofbenefitsandwagecompression(Olowu1999;2003;Wescott1999;Kaul1996;AfDB2005;Ayee2008).

• Budgetary and Financial Reforms:Theyhavethreecomponents,namely,(a)enhancementofrevenuethroughidentificationofadditionalrevenuesourcesandmethodsofincreas-ing revenuecollections frompresent sources,broadening taxbasesbydevelopingusercharges,consumptiontaxes,andtaxesonbusinessmenandthoseoutsidethepublicsectortosupplement theirmeagerdirect revenuesourcesand thecreationof revenueadmin-istration agencieswith substantial autonomy; (b) improvementon the expenditure sidetoreducetheratioofthewagebilltogovernmentexpenditure,sothatresourcescanbereleasedforgrowthandoperationsandmaintenanceactivities; (c)reformingsystemsoffinancialmanagementandaccountingbymovingfromtraditionalaccountingmethodstoZero-basedBudgetingandPlanning,ProgrammingandBudgetingSystemsandMediumTermExpenditureFramework(Olowu1999;2003;Wescott1999;Kaul1996:AfDB2005;Ayee2008).

b) The Non-Core Elements of CSR

Therearethreeelements.Theyare(a)strengtheningthecapacityofpolicy-makinginstitutionssuchas theCabinetas theprincipal institution forpolicymaking, improving therelationshipsbetweenministersandcivilservants,thepublic,stakeholders,thelegislatureandtheofficeofheadofstateandheadofgovernment;(b)increasingpoliticalresponsivenessoftopcivilservants.Forinstance,in1988,therewasatransformationofpermanentsecretariesinNigeriaintheWhitehalltraditionintodirector-generals,politicalappointeeswhoservedasdeputyministersandwererequiredtovacateof-ficewhentheadministrationthatappointedthemleft;(c)capacitybuildingthatis,trainingofhumanresources(Olowu1999;2003;Wescott1999;Kaul1996:AfDB2005;Ayee2008).

5.6 Phases of Civil Service Reforms

TherearethreephasesofCSRsinAfrica.Phaseonesometimescalled“FirstGenerationReforms”consistsofreformswhichwereundertakenintheimmediatepost-independenceperiod.Theywere


premisedonthegrowth,expansion,Africanizationanddominanceofthepublicsectorwithinthenationaleconomy.Thisphaseischaracterizedbycentralizationanddegenerationintopatrimonialrule(AAPAM1984;Mutahabaet.al.1993;UNECA1996;WunschandOlowu1990;Hyden2000;Crook2004).

Phasetwoor“SecondGeneration”Reforms,whichtookplacefromthelate1970suptothemid-1980s as part of the first set of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) include the eliminationof“ghost”workers,downsizing,privatizationandcontractorization,departmentalrestructuring,im-provedbudgetexpenditurecontrolsandreformofpayandgrading–essentiallytheconsolidationofdiverseremuneration(Olowu1999;2003;Wescott1999;Crook2004).

Phasethreeor“ThirdGeneration”Reformsweredesignedandimplementedfromthelaterpartsofthe1980stodate(2009).Theyinvolveimprovedservicedelivery,marketizationofservicedelivery,electronicgovernanceorelectronicgovernment,accountabilityandtransparency,customersatisfac-tionandotherfeaturesoftheNewPublicManagement(Olowu1999;2003;Wescott1999;Crook2004).

5.7 The Evaluation of CSRs in Africa since the 1980s

CSRs have had successes and challenges. These are:

a) Successes

First,CSRssucceededinthequantitativeaspectsofthereforms,namely,thereductionofnumberofpeoplewhoworkedinthecivilandpublicservices.Between1986and1996,countriesreducedtheircivilservicesbymorethan10%,makingSub-SaharanAfricahavingtheleastnumberofcivilservantsperpopulationintheworld.Comparedtootherdevelopingcountriesthathaveacivilservicesizeperpopulationofthreepercent,Africa’sdeclinedtoonepercentby1996(Lienert1998).Mostofthereductionswereachievedthroughacombinationofearlyretirements,voluntaryretrenchmentwithgenerous severance payments, audits and organizational restructurings,wage freeze and attrition(Olowu2003;AfDB2005).

Secondly,CSRshaveloweredthenominalandrealwagesintheregion.Forinstance,averagewagebillfor32Africancountriesfellfrom7%ofGDPto6%ofGDPbetween1986and1996.Thedevalu-ationoftheCFAfrancledtofurtherdeclineofthewagebillintheFrancophonecountriesbysome3%oftheGDP(Lienert1998;Schiavo-Campo1999).


Thirdly,CSRshavehelpedsanitizedthesystemofhumanresourceandfiscalmanagementinstateswherethesystemofaccountabilityhadallbutcollapsed.Theyplacedconstraintsonthestatesthatperceivedtheirsovereignauthorityastotalandcompletelyunchallengeableirrespectiveoftheirper-formanceingovernance(Olowu1999;2003;Adamolekun1999).

Fourthly,CSRsputinplacesystemsofperformancemonitoringforthecivilservice.Theyhaveledtotheconductofauditsofcivilandpublicservicepersonnelincountrieswherethenumberofthoseworkinginthecivilserviceswerenotknownandwherethesenumbershavebeendeliberatelyinfil-tratedwithlargenumbersof“ghostworkers(Lienert1998;AfDB2005).

Fifthly, staff andorganizational audits led tomajor reorganizations and theprivatizationof someservicesthatwerebeingpoorlyperformedbygovernmentagencies.Sixth,someofthereformsspear-headedgovernanceimprovementprogrammes,forexample,helpingtodecongestthecentrethroughsupportfordevolutionarydecentralizationprogrammestolocalgovernmentunitsandtoexecutiveagenciesinGhana,UgandaandTanzania(Goldsmith2000;Olowu1999;2003).

Seventh,CSRsbroughtanendtopractices thatwerenolongersustainable.Theseinclude, for in-stance, theuseof thecivilserviceasanemployerof thelastresortandthepracticeofautomaticemploymentinthecivilserviceforgraduatesofthesecondaryandhighereducationalinstitutions.Eighth,thereformsreleasedsubstantialinputs–especiallymanpowerandequipment-fortacklingsubstantiveproblems(Kiggundu1998).

Ninth, the successes of CSRs have led scholars (Adamolekun 1999; CODESRIA 2002; Levy andKpundeh2004),drawingonexistingassessmentsofCSRsin2004toclassify29Sub-SaharanAfricancountriesbylevelsofCSRseffortsintothefollowingfourgroups(seeTable4):

Group A (advanced reformers)consistsoffourcountries,namely,SouthAfrica,Botswana,MauritiusandNamibiathatdidnotexperiencesignificantpublicadministrationdeclinebecausetheinheritedtraditionofmerit-basedandpoliticallyneutral civil service systemwasmaintainedandnurtured.Theymadereasonableprogressinsocio-economicdevelopmentandwere,therefore,abletofinancethecostofnurturingtheircivilservicesystems–providingdecentpaylevelsforofficials;fundingedu-cationalinstitutionsatfairlyadequatelevelstoassuresupplyoftrainedmanpower;andprogressivelyconsolidatingdemocraticpoliticalculture,includingrespectfortheruleoflaw.Thesedevelopmentsareconsidereda“virtuouscycle”.InbothSouthAfricaandBotswana,forexample,thenurturingofacareercivilserviceremainsapriorityofthegovernmentsdespitetheintroductionofNPM-styleap-pointmentsinthelate1990s.Thegovernmentreactedtoanewrealityinwhichthefairlydecentpayforqualifiedprofessionalstaffinthecivilservicewaslaggingbehindpaylevelsforcomparablestaffinthepublicsector(Adamolekun2005;AfDB2005).


Group B (committed reformers)comprised12countriesthatexperiencedadeclineintheirpublicadministrationsystembutwereseriouslycommittedtorehabilitatingtheircivilservicesystems.Theyalsoembracedthedemocratizationwaveofthe1990sbutwithsignificantlyvaryingspeedstowardsestablishmentofdemocraticinstitutionsandrespectfortheruleoflaw.Becauseofthestrongcommit-menttoreforminthe12countries,bothbilateralandmultilateraldonoragenciesacceptedtoprovideassistance.Suchexternalsupport,tiedtotheimplementationofSAPs,waslargelyaimedatreducingthecivilservicewagebillthroughstaffreduction,freezingofnewrecruitmentsandremovalof“ghostnames”.Inaddition,thecountrieshaveimplementedkeyreformsthatresultedinvaryingdegreesofimprovingefficiencyandeffectivenessofthecivilservice.Someofthereformsincludeenclavingoftaxadministrationthroughthecreationofsemi-autonomousrevenueagencies,creationofexecutiveagenciesoutofgovernmentministriesordepartmentsandsalaryenhancementsforsomegroupsofcivilservants(Adamolekun2005;AfDB2005).

Group C (hesitant reformers)consistsof sixcountrieswhichhave introducedsomeof the reforminitiativesundertakenby“committedreformers”butwithoutanysignificantsuccess(AfDB2005).

Group D (vicious cycle)consistsofsevencountrieswhichmightbereferred toas“beginners”ofreforms.Theyhavebeencaughtupin“viciouscycle”ofheightenedconflictsandweakeconomieswithdecayingpublicadministration(Adamolekun2005).

b) Challenges:

Inspiteofthesuccesses,outcomesofCSRshavelargelybeenseenasrelativelyunsuccessful(WorldBank2008;SeealsoTable5).First,downsizingorreductionofthesizeofthecivilserviceisseenasachievingmodestresultsassomeoftheretrenchedworkersreturnedthroughrevolvingdoors,somenewappointmentshadtobemadeinthesocialsectors,andthelargestnumbersofretrenchedstaffcamefromthelowerlevelcadres(AfDB2005).

Secondly, the reduction affectedprofessionals in skilled categories andnot lower cadre officials,whotooktheopportunityforalternativeemploymentthattheycouldcompeteforoutsidethepublicsectorandoutsidetheircountries.Thismadethecivilservicespoorerintermsofhumanresourcesasstaffreductionandemploymentfreezescreatedshortagesofskilledprofessionalsandtechniciansthroughoutthecivil,andoffront-lineworkersneededtosustain,improvequalityandexpandpublicservicesinkeyareassuchaseducation,healthandagriculturalextension(AfDB2005).

Thirdly,ithasbeenpointedoutthatthereisnoidealsizeforacountry’scivilservice;theactualoroptimalsizeislikelytobedictatedbyacountry’smacro-economicrealities,suchastheneedforfis-caladjustments,theamountoftaxrevenueavailabletopaycivilservants,andthebalancebetweengovernments’wageandnon-wagespending.Withouttakingthesefactorsintoaccount,downsizing


policyhasweakenedthecivilservice.TheexperienceofmanyAfricancountriessuggeststhatsuchapolicywasmissing,andthisledtoreformreversalseveninsuccessfulcountriessuchasGhanaandUgandawherethesizeofthecivilserviceroseagain(MutahabaandKiragu2002).

Fourthly,thereiseitherlackofpoliticalcommitmenttoreformoradiscontinuityovertheimplemen-tationperiod.InsomecountriessuchasGhana,thegovernmentadoptedthereformstrategiesandpassednewlegislation.Butthenasimplementationstarted,momentumslowedanddelaysoccurredandtheprogrammecompletelystalled(WorldBank2008).

Fifthly,changesinpoliticalleadershipalsoresultedindecisionstoterminate,reverseordilutemorecontroversial reforms suchasdownsizing. Inanumberofcountries, thepersistenceofpatronagesystems and politicization of the bureaucracy undermined implementation in the review period,particularlythosereformsthataffectpay,recruitment,promotionanddownsizing.Inaddition,thestrengthoftradeunionsinthepublicsectorcansubvertdownsizing,payandmerit-basedreformsinotherwisesupportivepoliticalregimes(WorldBank2008;Klitgaard1997).

Accordingly,eventhoughsomeprogresswasmadeinthequantitativeaspectsofCSR,itwasmade“often to the detriment of civil service quality” (Lienert 1998).This pointwas also re-echoed byHaqueandAziz(1999:101)whentheypointedoutthat“civilservicereformshaveprimarilybeenconcernedwithcostcuttingandcontainment.Theissueofproductivityandtheneedforappropriatehumancapitalforithaslargelybeensecondary”.

AnumberofchallengeshavebeenidentifiedascontributingtotheslowprogressateffectiveAfricanCSRs.TheyarecontainedinBox3.Thekeyonesaretheinabilityofthereformstoaddresstheserioushumanresourceproblemsconfrontingcivilservices,thefaultynatureoftheirdiagnosis,prognosis,inadequateinstitutionalenvironmentsuchasingrainedsystemsofpatronagepoliticalappointments,unrealisticexpectationsbythedonorcommunity,ineffectivedonorcoordination,lackoftangiblein-dicatorsofsuccesssinceunliketaxreformswhereleadersseeobviousbenefit,thepoliticalleadershipcannoteasilyidentifytangiblebenefitsofCSRsandinadequatestrategiesofreformimplementationsuchasthelackofparticipationofstakeholders(Olowu1999;2003;Bentil2004;AfDB2005;Ayee2008;WorldBank2008).

5.8 Strategies to Improve CSRs in Africa

ThereisnodoubtthatconcernexistsaboutthenatureofCSRsinAfricabutexperiencesshowthatthereisnouniquesolutionorapproach(Kaul1996).ThisnotwithstandingasetofkeystrategieshasemergedasmajorinstrumentsfortheimplementationoftheCSRsprocess.Theyinclude:


(i) securing leadership forchange, that is, thecommitmentandsupportofpoliticiansandbureaucratsatthehighestlevelsincemostsuccessfulreformsarepoliticallydriven;

(ii) enhancing policy development capacity and strategic planningwithin the governmentbystrengtheningofficesofthepresidentorprimeministerandsettingupinter-ministerialcommitteesandtaskforcesforspecialpolicyissuesandnationalforumsinvolvingprivateandprivatesectors;

(iii) improvedhumanresourcesystemsthroughtailoredtraining,rewardingachievement,es-tablishinga fast track,monitoringresults throughperformancecontractsandpromotingaccountability and transparency and anti-corruption measures, personal contracts andpublicreportingandredundancymanagementfoundedonacultureofrealism;

(iv) reviewandre-examinestructuresofgovernmentincludingstructuringforefficiency,estab-lishingefficientprogrammeandintroducingmarkettesting;

(v) introductionofqualitymanagementandcustomer-orientedprogrammesbydevelopingapublicsectorethosbycreatingaworkingculturebasedonquality,performance,opennessandtransparency;

(vi) improvingpartnershipwithNGOsandtheprivatesectorbyopeningupareasofpublicservicetoprivateorNGOsuppliers,whilestandardsinareaswhereconsumerchoicewillhaveinsufficientimpact;

(vii) theuseofinformationtechnology(IT)andthedevelopmentanduseofinternalandex-ternaladvisingskillsthroughtheuseofITforrevenuecollection,financialmanagementandaccounting,interdepartmentalcommunicationsystems,automationofprogrammes,e-governanceandtheuseofITtoprovidebetterinterfacewithcustomersbydeveloping“onestop/non-stop”servicecentresandpublicinformationsystems;and

(viii) improvingfinancialmanagementtomakeitmoreperformanceoroutputoriented.Devel-opmentsintheareaincludetheprovisionofefficiencydividendstothedepartments,theintroductionofdepartmentalcharges,paymentsbydepartment for internalgovernmentservices,shiftingfromcashtoaccrualaccounting,improvingestatemanagementthroughvaluationofland,buildings,equipmentandinfrastructureownedbythegovernmentandpublic reporting through thestrengthenedroles forgovernmentauditors, the increasinguseofvalueformoneyreviews,annualauditedfinancialsummarystatementandconsoli-datedbalancesheets;(ix)evolvenewarrangementsforgoverning,attractingandretain-ingscarcecategoryofskillsinAfricancivilservicesaspartoftheeffortofqualitativeandquantitativeorientationof thecivil serviceswhichdemands the selective reformof thecontinent’shighereducationsystemandthemobilizationandincreaseintheinputsofcivilsocietyandnon-stateactorsinthepolicyandreformprocesses(Kaul1996;Olowu2003;Bentil2004;AfDB2005).


5.9 Four major set of factors that affect administrative reform

Theliteratureseemstobeclearonthefoursetoffactorsthathaveaffectedtheprocessofadministra-tivereform.First,someauthorsprivilegeapoliticalperspective.Forexample,Haggard(1997)out-linesaconceptualandanalyticalschemethatemphasizesthecentralityofpoliticalandinstitutionalfactorsinshapingstatereform.Heconceivesofadministrativereformasa“processofre-writingthecontractbetweenelectedpoliticiansandbureaucraticofficials”(Haggard1995:12),whoseoutcomeisstronglyshapedbymainvariables:thebalanceofpowerbetweentheexecutiveandthelegislatureandthenatureofthepartysystem,particularlyitsdegreeofpartyfragmentationandthelevelofpartydiscipline.Atahigherlevelofabstraction,thereformofthestatecanthusbeseenasapoliticalpro-cessofstrikingabalancebetweentheefficiencygainstobeachievedbydelegation,theinterestsofexecutivesandlegislatorsincontrollingthebureaucraticagentsforpoliticalends,andtheneedforpoliticiansandbureaucratstoremainresponsivetoorganizedinterestgroups.

Second,otherscholarsconcentrateonasetofeconomicpressuresfororagainstreform.Fiscalcrisesand constraints pressure governments directly to reform government bureaucracies, though thesepressuresdonotnecessarilytranslateintoreformeffortsdesignedtoincreasestatecapacity.Moregenerally,historicallyandtheoreticallysinceMaxWeber,capitalismandmodernbureaucracyhaveflourishedtogether.Inthecurrentcontextofincreasedinternationalcompetitionandvolatilecapitalflows,capitalistshavestrong incentives topush foradministrative reforms that reduce transactioncosts (ports,courtsandcustoms); level thecompetitiveplayingfield (monopolyand trade regula-tions);andenhanceinvestorconfidencethroughgreater transparencyinbudgets, internationalre-servesandmonetarypolicy(Maxfield1997;Mahon1996).

Third,thestrategicchoicesofstatereformers,suchaspolicydesignandcoalitionbuilding,shapedthepoliticalcostsofdifferenttypesofreforms.Thepreferencesandstrategiesofstatereformersor“changeteams”hasfiguredprominently,atleastinitially,inexplanationsofreformbecausethedis-tributionalimplicationsof“technical”reformsinthepublicsectorareoftennotapparentimmediatelytootherpoliticalactors(SchneiderandHeredia2003).

Fourth,InternationalFinancialInstitutions(IFIs)haveinfluenceddomesticreforminitiativesthroughconditionalityinemergencylendingandongoingprogrammelending.Therapidcirculationofideasonadministrativereformconstitutesanotherinternationalfactor.Apredominantinternationalthink-ingonadministrativereform–calledmanagerialismorNPM–influencedthedesignofsomereformprogrammes.Thesefoursetsofinfluencesincludemanyofthefactorsthoughttoaffectthepoliticsofreformsofallsorts.Aswehaveseenintheliteratureandlateroninthefourcountrycasestudy,thecombinationofthesefactorshadtheexpectedintensityordirectionofinfluencesonpublicandcivilservice reform in Africa.


Beyondtheseinfluences,therearetwohypotheseswhichhavealsoimpactedreforminAfrica.First,theprospectsforadministrativereformaredimmerincountrieswherethebureaucraticandpoliticalelitesare fused.Conversely,whenpoliticaloutsiderscome topower, theyaremore likely toem-barkonadministrativereform.Second,theprogrammaticcommitmentsofpoliticaloutsidersmatter.Where these commitments require complementary administrative changes, then governments aremorelikelytosustaininvestmentsinadministrativereforms(SchneiderandHeredia2003).


Table4:Classificationof29Sub-SaharanCountriesbyLevelsofCivilService Reforms Efforts

A. Advanced Reforms (‘vir-tuous cycle)

B. Committed Reformers C. Hesitant Reformers D. Beginners and Non-starters (‘vicious cycle”)

Botswana Benin Coted’Ivoire DemocraticRepublicofCongo

Mauritius BurkinaFaso Gabon Burundi

Namibia Ethiopia Guinea CentralAfricaRepublic

South Africa Ghana Nigeria Liberia

Kenya Togo SierraLeone

Mali Zimbabwe Somalia

Mauritania Sudan

Rwanda

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Source: Adamolekun, “Reorienting Public Management in Africa: Selected Issues and Some Country Experiences”, (2005).


Table 5: Civil Service and Administrative Reform: Type and Challenges

Component Political Risk Financial Cost Demanding of Capacity

Successfully Im-plemented Re-forms

Little or no Pro-gress

Pay&employ-ment data

Minimal Modest Yes–butcapac-ity building ispartoftheproject

Yemen,Guyana Honduras, Uganda

Downsizing High Significantonetime costs for retrenchment

Yes Russia,Tanzania,India

Bulgaria, Guy-ana, Uganda, Ethipia,Yemen,Cambodia,Sri Lanka

Compensationreforms

Yes,inegalitar-ian cultures, wherelowerranksarepoliti-cizedorwhereunions are strong

Yes Yes Bulgaria, Albania Guyana, Indo-nesia,Yemen,Pakistan

Human resource management reforms

Yes,especiallyinpatronage-basedsystems

Moderate Yes Bulgaria, Bolivia and Albania

Ghana

Organizationalreforms

Moderate Modest Yes Russia, India, Tanzania

Ghana

Demand-side reforms

Moderate Modest Yes Tanzania,Uganda, India

-

Training No Modest Yes Ethiopia,Russia,Yemen

Bolivia

Source: World Bank: Public Sector Reforms: What Works and Why? (2008): 53


Box 3: Challenges facing CSRs in Africa

i) CSRsarebasedonthewrongpremises–ontheideaof“affordable”civilservicesratherthan“requiredcivilservices”dictatedbythelogicofademocratic,developmentalstate

ii) CSRsarebasedonpoordiagnosis–thatAfricancivilservicesareover-bloated–afactthatcannotbeempiricallyestablishedfor the totalityof theAfricancivilserviceprofile.Thesecivil servicesarepoorlystructuredandconcentrated.Theyhavesurplusesat thebasebutsubstantialshortagesattheprofessionallevels.Skilledpersonnelarealsonotwelldistributedinspace,asthereisatendencytoover-concentrationatthecentre;

iii)CSRsconstituteawrongprognosis;theyrepresenttheapplicationofawrongprescriptiontotheproblemconfrontingAfricancountries;

iv) CSRshavetendedtobegenerallyminimallyparticipatory,oftenexcludingthekeystakehold-ers,thecivilservants.Itwasfearedthatinvolvementofthestakeholdersmightslowdowntheimplementationofretrenchmentprogrammesinthecivilservice

v) CSRshavetendedtofocusontheshorttermgainsratherthanthelongterm,becausedonors,whohaveprovidedtheimpetusformostreformefforts,mustcomeupwithimmediateresultstoappeasetheirdomesticconstituents;

vi)CSRsarelargelydisconnectedfromotherpoliticalandeconomicreformstakingplaceinthecountries.WiththeexceptionofafewcountrieslikeUgandaandGhana,theydonotincludecriticalpublicsectorreformissuessuchasdecentralization,strengtheningaccountabilityandimprovingtransparency,whichareallcornerstonesofreforminthepoliticalandeconomicrealms;

vii)CSRsinvolvechangesnotonlyinstructuresbutalsoinorganizationalbehavior.Changingbehaviortakestimetobearfruit,forwhichsomeobservershavesuggestedaperiodof10to15years.Butthedonorswhoprovidefundsforreformneedtoshowquickresultstoconvincetheirdomesticconstituencies.HenceeventhoughAfricanownershipisstressed,therealityofmostreforminitiativesisthedominanceofexternaltimetablesandimmediateresults.

Sources: Olowu 1999; 2003; Wescott 1999; AfDB 2005; Ayee 2008


CHAPTER VI: Experiences, Innovations and Best Practices in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

6.1 Experiences in Civil Service Reforms in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa:

ExperiencesofCSRsinGhana,Kenya,NigeriaandSouthAfricahavebeeninfluencedbytheNewPublicManagement (NPM)approachandwith theexceptionofSouthAfrica, the implementationof structural adjustment programmes (SAPs).TheCSR efforts in the four countrieswere aimed ataccruingsavings,efficiency,andeffectivenessandwerecodedaspartofthegrowinginternationalNPMenterprise(Minogue1998;HoodandPeters2001;McCourtandMinogue2001).TheNPM,asearlieronindicated,ischaracterizedbyitsemphasisonreductionandderegulationofbureaucracy,employingmarketmechanismsorsemi-marketentitiestoconductgovernmentaction,devolutionofresponsibilitydownwardandoutwardinorganizations,andenergizingtheworkforcetothinkinen-trepreneurialterms.Importantly,theNPMreformerssoughttosplitpolicyoversightofpublicserviceprovidingbureaus into smallermanageableunits. Scholars regarded theNPMasan internationalparadigmshiftanddebatedoveritsefficacy.Still,academicskepticsdismissedtheNPMasnotde-liveringonitsfullpromises,especiallyindevelopingcountries(Polidano1999;PolidanoandHulme1999;CaidenandSundaram2004;Larbi1999;McCourtandMinogue2001).

TheNPMwasattractivebecauseitwasframedasastrategyforempoweringcitizensandprovidingroomforadministratorstobeentrepreneurs.Moreover,deregulation,especiallyinrollingbackthe“swollenorbloatedstates”seemedtoprovidegreaterchoicesforconsumersofpublicgoodsandservices.TheNPMbecamealargepartofthereformagendaembracedbygovernmentsinGhana,Kenya,NigeriaandSouthAfrica.Asanagenda,itwasjuxtaposedonon-goingSAPswhichentailedimprovingtheperformanceofthepublicsectors(Ayee2008;Olowu2003;AfDB2005).

CSRswereexternallydriveninitiativesbut implementedinphasesbeginningfrom1987.SAPsaf-fectedpublic administration in variousways.The initiators directly linkedCSRs to the successfulimplementationofotherdevelopmentgoals,especially,poverty reduction.Toa largeextent,howsuccessfulthereformswerecarriedoutwasseenasapredictorforoveralleconomicdevelopmentinthethreecountriesandtoalesserextent,SouthAfrica.


Another significant occurrence is that public administration in the four countrieswas confrontedwith other ecological forces that included orientingmanagerial capacity to engage globalizationandembracee-governmentsystems,albeitinalimitedform.Briefly,therehasbeenadrivetowardscomputerizationof civil service systems,especially in theareas suchaspayroll,human resourcecomplimentcontrol(IntegratedPayrollandPersonnelDatabaseSystem(IPPDS)),taxmanagement,datamanagementanddisseminationofinformation(Olowu2003;Adamolekun1999).

Consequently,theCSRswereclearlyaimedatreducingtheroleofthestateinpublicadministrationinthefourcountries.Thediminishedroleofthestatetranslatedintogreaterrhetoricsupportforpri-vatesectorprovisionofservicesthatwerepreviouslyonlyavailablethroughgovernmentinstitutions.Nolongerwasthegovernmenttheguarantorofsecurity,publichealth,publiceducationandevenjobs.Thestate’sroleasmonopoly-leviathanwasthreatenedbytheoverridingSAPregimethatcalledforcostsharingandathinnerandleanergovernment(AfDB2005;Olowu2003;Otenyon.d).

6.2.1: The Ghanaian Experience

6.2.1.1The Political and Constitutional Context

TheWestAfricanstateofGhanaachievedindependencefromBritainonMarch6,1957.Sincethen,ithadexperiencedperiodsofcivilianandmilitaryrule.GhanareturnedtoconstitutionalruleinJanu-ary1993afteralmosttwodecadesofmilitaryrulewiththebirthoftheFourthRepublic.Fiveelectionswereheldin1992,1996,2000,2004and2008.Theelectionsof2000and2008weresignificantbecausepoweralternatedbetweentheincumbentgovernmentandtheminorityparty.TheNationalDemocraticCongress(NDC)astheincumbentgovernmentlosttheelectionsin2000whiletheNewPatrioticParty(NPP)alsolostpowerin2008.

The1992Constitution,whichembodiestheguidingprinciplesofthegovernmentalsystem,isbasedonaquasi-executivepresidentsystemofgovernment.However,unliketheUSpresidentialsystem,whichmaintains a separation of powers, theGhanaian Constitution stipulates that amajority ofministersofstatebeappointedfromamongmembersofParliament.AnothersalientfeatureoftheConstitutionistheguaranteeofanindependentjudiciarydistinctfromboththeexecutiveandleg-islativearmsofgovernment.Thehybridsystemofgovernment,has,however,underminedtheeffec-tiveaccountabilitybyParliament(Saffu2007).InthewordsofNinsin(2008:76-77)the“executivedominanceofthelegislaturedoesnotenableparliamenttoexerciseitsoversightfunctionseffectivelyinordertoprotectandenhancetheinterestofthepeople.Atbestitadumbratesthepowerthatparlia-mentismandatedtoexerciseinrelationtotheexecutive”.

Theeconomiccrisisofthe1970sand1980sledtotheintroductionoftheSAPin1983bythemilitarygovernmentoftheProvisionalNationalDefenceCouncil.TheimplementationofSAPalsoledtotheintroductionofCSRin1987.


Chapter 14 of the 1992Constitution identifies the civil service as part of the 14 public serviceswhichwerecreatedbeforethecomingintoforceofthe1992Constitution.Thoughitsfunctionshaveevolvedovertheyears,thecivilserviceinGhanastillhasresponsibilityin:(i)helpingtogetthebestvalueformoneyspentandthehighestprofessionalstandardsindeliveryofservicestothepublic;(ii)helpingtoplan,prioritizeandharmonizetheactivitiesofGovernmentwithinandbetweenagencies;(iii)promotingandfacilitatingeffortsoftheprivatesectortocreatewealth;(iv)assistinginmobiliz-ingGhana’smanpower and financial resources so as to accelerate national development and toreducepoverty;(v)contributingtotheconsolidationofgoodgovernanceanddemocracy(RepublicofGhana,2003:30).

6.2.1.2 The Ghanaian Civil Service in Historical Context

TheGhanaiancivilservicewasonceregardedasthe“finest,mostrelevantandperformance-orientedinstitutionsinAfrica”(Nti,1978:1).Atthetime,itwaswelltrained,adequatelyremuneratedandresourcedwhileitssizewasmanageableandsecurityoftenureaswellasanonymityandneutralityofthecivilservantswereguaranteed.Allthesefactorscombinedtoproduceanenvironmentwhichwascongenialandthuselicitedinmostcivilservantsthehighestdegreeofperformanceandproduc-tivity.However,thesegooddaysturnedintobadtimesunderwhichthecivilservicewasdescribedasa“moribund,paper-pushinginstitution”(Nti,1978:2).WhenthePNDCtookoverpoweronDe-cember31,1981,thecivilservicewasseentobeincapableofimplementinggovernmentpoliciesandprogrammes.ThiswasmisconstruedbythePNDCasacalculatedeffortbythecivilservicetosabotageitspoliciesandprogrammes.Itthereforeregardedthetopechelonsas“alliesofimperialismandneo-colonialismwhichshouldbesubjectedtorevolutionaryoverthrowandnotmerereforms”(Ghana,1982:5-6).IntheopinionofthePNDC,thecivilserviceshouldbereorganizedandpoliti-cizedtoensurethatits‘orientationtallieswiththeobjectivesoftheRevolution”(Ghana,1982:5).Thisledtosomeofthestructuralchanges,includingthere-designationofthepositionofprincipalsecretary to thatofChiefDirector,whomustbeappointedbasedonbothmeritandpartisanship.Consequently,thepositionofChiefDirector,theadministrativeheadofaministry,wasnolongerthepreserveofcivilservantsbutnowopentoattractapplicationsfromthepublicservice(Ayee1991;1993;1994;Woode1984).

ThereformbythePNDCofthetoppersonnelofthecivilservicehasledtothepoliticizationofthecivilservice.Oneoftheresultsisthatsomecivilservantseithercampaignontheplatformsofpoliticalparties,orstandforpartiesintheirprimariesorparliamentaryelections,ortotakeuptoppostswith-outresigningtheirpositions.Thenegativeeffectofthistrendonthesupposedneutralityofthecivilserviceanditsworkcannotbeoverestimated.IthascreatedpossibleavenuesforconflictofinterestsespeciallywhentheCivilServiceCodeofConductenjoinscivilservantstoexhibitasenseoffairness,selflessnessandjusticeandtakedecisionssolelyintheinterestofthepublic(Ayee2009).


AnumberoffeaturesofGhana’scivilservicehavebeenidentifiedasdebilitatingtoitsperformance.They include: (i) substantialoverstaffing,especiallyat junior levels– lackofmanpowerplanning;(ii)deteriorationofrealsalaries/wagesplusahighdegreeofwagecompression;(iii)lackofmorale/motivation–incentivesproblems;(iv)inabilityofmajorinstitutionsinvolvedincivilservicemanage-menttoprovidepolicyguidance,direction,andsupervisiontosectoral/departmentalunits–defectivemanagerialcompetence;(v)over-centralizationandover-concentrationofpowersandfunctionsatthenationallevel;(vi)poorphysicalworkenvironmentandpoorfacilities–logisticalproblems;(vii)excessivebureaucratizationandredtape(e.g.,ofpromotionsandappointmentstokeyposts);(viii)lackofpoliticaldirectionandcommitment,leadingtoapathyandinertia;(ix)seriousdeficienciesintraininginstitutionsandprogrammes;(x)obsoleteandrigidrulesandregulationsresultingfromanoutdatedCivilServiceAct(Ayee1992;1993;1994;1999;2001;Woode1984;Nkrumah1992).

6.2.1.3 Ghanaian Civil Service Reforms

SuccessivereformeffortshavebeenmadetotackletheseproblemsoftheGhanaiancivilservice.Forvariousreasons,previousattemptstoeffectivelyreformthecivilservicewerecosmetic,andmostoftherecommendationsbyvariouscommissionsandcommitteeswereeithershelvedoronlypartiallyimplemented.TheresultofthedebilitatingfeaturesofthecivilservicewasthatthePNDC’sSAPwasintroducedinanadministrativeenvironmentofsevereconstraintsandhandicapsthatneededtobeaddressediftheSAPwastobesuccessfullyimplemented.Thissituation,however,appearednottohavecaughttheattentionofthedesignersandfinanciersofGhana’sSAPuntilthelate1986(Ayee1999).

Hencein1987thegovernmentincorporatedtheCivilServiceReformProgramme(CSRP)asakeycomponentofSAP.ItwasfundedbytheOverseasDevelopmentAgency(ODA),nowcalledDepart-mentforInternationalDevelopment(DfID).TheCSRPwasdesignedtocontributetotheimprovementofhuman resourcemanagement in thecivil service, reduceoverstaffingand trim redundantcivilservantsaspartof theeffort toreducegovernmentexpenditureandhelpachievemacroeconomicstability.Itscomponentsincludedthereviewofpersonnelpolicyandmanagement,incomespolicyandsalaryadministration, labourrationalization,revampingof theManagementServicesDivision(MSD)andreviewofrecordsmanagement(Ayee1999;Quartey2007).

TheCSRPintroducedsomeimportantreformssuchasthelaunchingofanewstaffperformanceap-praisalsystem,down-sizingofthecivilservice,andresourcingandequippingofMSD,aswellasthetrainingofitsstaffinvariousaspectsofhumanresourcemanagement.AreviewoftheCSRPin1993,however,foundthatthereformwasnotsufficientlycomprehensiveanddidnotcoverallMinistries,DepartmentsandAgencies(MDAs).Besides,itwasfaultedfromnotbeingparticipative,afactwhichtendedtounderminethenewchanges(Adofo1991;Dodoo1996;1997).


In1994,thegovernmentchangedthefocusofthereformswiththecreationoftheNationalInsti-tutional Renewal Programme (NIRP),whichwas a programme for capacity building under goodgovernance.Itsmajoraimwastoencourageinstitutionsundertheexecutive,legislativeandjudicialarmsofgovernmentaswellasautonomousinstitutionslistedintheConstitutiontodischargetheirfunctionsinatransparent,competent,accountable,andcosteffectivemanner.Thiswassupposedtocreateanenablingenvironmentforacceleratedgrowthandequitablesocialdevelopment(Ayee1999;2001).

To achieve some of the objectives of theNIRP, theCivil Service Performance Improvement Pro-gramme(CSPIP)fundedbyDfIDwaslaunchedinMarch1995toreplacetheCSRP.DfIDspent£5millionbetween1995 and2000on the programme (Quartey 2007).TheCSPIPwas designed toaddress theshortcomingof theCSRP,especially inensuringtheparticipationofkeystakeholders.Itsmainobjectiveswere to improveperformanceof service in termsof its cost-effectiveness andcustomerfocusandresponse,enhanceefficiencyandfacilitatethedevelopmentofaproactiveandmotivatedpublicsector.Inotherwords,itwastodevelopthecapacityoftheGhanacivilservicetodelivereffective,efficientandcustomer-orientedservice.Thekeyobjectives,amongothers,wereto(i)ensurethatministries,departmentsandagencies(MDAs)developperformanceimprovementplans (PIPs),whichspecify theiroutputandservicedeliverytargets,againstwhichperformanceismonitored; (ii)motivatecivil servants towards results-orientedpracticeandperformance linked toappropriaterewardschemes;(iii)improveresponsivenesstotheneedsofthepublicandprivatesec-torsandcontribute towardssupportingnationaldevelopmentagenda; (iv)encourageallMDAs todischargetheirfunctionsefficientlyandinatransparent,competent,accountableandcosteffectivefashion(Antwiet.al.2008).

DesignedandexecutedbytheOfficeoftheHeadoftheCivilService(OHCS),theCSPIPwasper-ceivedas“homegrown”andstrengthenedtheinstitutionalcapacityofMDAsandMetropolitan,Mu-nicipalandDistrictAssemblies (MMDAs). InOctober1997,Rawlings’NDCgovernmentput intooperationthePublicSectorRe-inventionandModernizationStrategy(PSRMS)tohelptransformstateinstitutions,theiraccountabilityandperformanceframeworkandtheirrelationshipwiththeprivatesectorandcivilsociety(Owusu2006).

WhenKufuor’sNPPgovernment assumedoffice in2001 it showed little interest inpublic sectorreformsuntilthebeginningofitssecondterminearly2005.ItcreatedaMinistryofPublicSectorRe-form(MPSR)inMay2005toprovideaninstitutionalhomeforallpublicsectorreformsandproducedaworkingdocumenton“TowardsaNewPublicServiceforGhana”and“ReferenceDocumentonWorkProgrammetoCoordinatetheImplementationofPublicSectorReforms”in2005andJanuary2006respectively.


ThemethodologyoftheCSPIPwasconsultativeandparticipatoryaimedatencouragingownershipand sustainability right from thedesign to implementation.To address someof the shortcomingsleveledagainsttheearlierCSRPof1988-1992,aseriesofconsultativemeetingsorworkshopswithstakeholders(thatis,civilservants,parliament,industry,civilsocietyorganizationsandpoliticians)wereorganizedtosolicitviewsonwhatkindofcivilservicetheydesired.Amulti-sectoraltechnicalgroupwasconstitutedtoformulatetheideastogetherwithtechnicalandfinancialassistancefromtheDfIDand theWorldBank.Thepreliminaryblueprintandoutcomewaspiloted for twoyears:1994-1996,beforethefulloperationalphasecommencedinfrom1996-2001(Antwiet.al.2008).TheprocessapproachwasadoptedforthedesignandimplementationoftheprogrammeasfeaturedinthehandbookpublishedbytheOfficeoftheHeadoftheCivil(OHCS)(GhanaRepublicof2001).

AmongthestrategiesadoptedaspartoftheimplementationprocessoftheCSPIPwere:(i)develop-mentandimplementationofperformanceimprovementplans(PIPs)throughselfappraisal(SA),thatis,internalreview;beneficiarysurveys(BS)–thiswasintheformofconsultationwithclientsandindependentconsultantstointerviewservicebeneficiariesofMDAs;diagnosticworkshops;andim-plementation,monitoringandfeedback;(ii)communicationstrategyinvolvinganewsletterandpressconferences;(iii)settingandpublishingofServiceDeliveryStandards(SDS)usingasimilarpartici-patoryapproachinvolvingthestaffoftheconcernedMDAs,centralmanagementagencies(CMAs),keystakeholdersandclients;(iv)establishmentofClientServicesUnits(CSUs)andtheinstallationofacomplaintssystemforthecivilservice;(v)establishmentofothercomponentsofreformrelatedtoincomes,matchingofsocialdevelopmentissuessuchasgenderinpolicyformulationandpublicfinancialmanagementsystem;(vi)establishmentofacentraltechnicalback-stoppingandmonitoringbodyattheOHCS,whileeachMDAhadaninternalreformgroupcalledtheCapacityDevelopmentTeam(CDT)–amixtureofstafffrombottom-up;(vii)regularmonitoringvisitsofMDAsandquarterlyreviewmeetingsconsistingofthetechnicalteam,stakeholders,DfIDUKandWorldBankwerecon-ductedtore-strategizeandchartthewayforward;and(viii)anannualreviewwithmajorstakehold-ers,pressreviewandreporttotheofficeofthePresident.

6.2.4.1 Some Progress Made by Ghana

Ghana’scivilservicereformeffortshaveproduceddisappointingresults(WorldBank2008;Owusu2006).EvidencesuggeststhatmostMDAswentthroughthemundaneactivitiesofformingCapac-ityDevelopmentTeams(CDTs),conductingBSs,developingPIPsandevenimplementingitaspartoftheirschedule“job/taskprocess(seeTable6).TheCSPIP‘News’and‘Handbook’werepublishedinadditiontoanew“codeofconduct”with60,000copiescirculated.Servicedeliverystandardsweresetandmechanically implemented.Atbothnationalandregional levels identifiableofficerswerelabeledtoindicatetheestablishmentoftheCDTsreformCo-ordinator/Member.Performanceagreementsweresignedandevaluated,butnotnecessarilyactedupon.Despitebeingacorecentralmanagementagency,andthereforefullyawareoftheCSPIPunderthereformagenda,theMinistryof


FinanceandEconomicPlanning(MOFEP)failedtomakebudgetaryprovisionforreformprogrammesofMDAsandhencenoincentivesfortherelativelygood-performingMDAs(Antwiet.al.2008).

Inaddition,beneficiarysurveyswereconductedandreported,butthemethodologybecametoome-chanicalandthefacilitatorsorresourcepersonshadlessflexibility.Forinstance,thecrucialsystem-wideissuesofremuneration,decentralizationandfinancialmanagementreformswerenotproperlydealtwith, and this appears tohaveundermined theCSPIPprocess.Additionally, thechanges inpersonnel,bothpolitically and technocratically,occasionally led to lossof interestor viceversa.Consequently,whiletheresultsonthemechanicalroutineaspectsoftheCSPIPwereimpressive,theactualleveloftransformationorchangethatenduresandshouldbereflectedinmanagementandstaff’sattitudeandbehaviorandintheorganizationalcultureisleastunacceptable(Ghana,Republicof2001;2002).

AsrightlypointedbyQuartey(2007:38),theoutcomeoftheCSPIPis“deceptive,withvirtuallynorealimprovementinservicedeliveryandefficiencyinothertasksperformedbytheCivilService”.TheNPPgovernmentitselfacknowledgedthefailureoftheCSPIP.Itpointedoutthateventhoughthecivilserviceisresponsiblefor implementinggovernmentpolicy, it is“demonstrablyweakandineffective.…Successivegovernmentshavebeendissatisfiedwithitslevelofperformance…andthefollowingkeyissuesaccountforthislowleveldischargeofitsresponsibilities:(i)inadequatepolicyplanningandanalysis; (ii) lowcapacity forpolicyanddecisionimplementation; (iii) lowcapacityforprogrammeandprojectplanning; (iv) insufficientuseof researchfindingsand information; (v)weakdataretrievalandundevelopedICTskills;and(vi)limitedmonitoringandevaluationtechniqueamongcivilservants”(Ghana,Republicof2006:2,30).

6.2.5.1 The Main Innovations and Best Practices

Someoftheinnovationsandbestpracticesinclude(i)thedesignofaCivilServiceCodeofConduct;(ii)thedevelopmentofstandardsforservicedeliveryandprintedbrochuresbydeliveryservicedeliv-eryinstitutionssuchasthePassportsOffice,LandTitleRegistryandRegistrar-General’sDepartmentwhichexplaintheirservicestothepublic.Thebrochurescontaininformationaboutservicesprovidedbytheinstitutions,proceduresformakinguseoftheservices,standardsofservicetobeexpectedbythepublicandproceduresformakingcomplaints;(iii)theintroductionofahighflyerschemein1996whichenablesyoungofficerswhoaredeemedtohavethepotentialtobegivenspecializedtrainingtoenablethemtomaximizetheirpotentialandstrengthenthecapacityoftheCivilServicethroughacceleratedpromotioniftheywereabletodemonstratetheirworth;(iv)introductionofcustomer/cli-entorientationthroughbeneficiarysurveys;(v)theintroductionofperformanceimprovementplansandthesigningofperformanceagreements;(vi)computerizationofpersonnelrecords;(vii)theintro-ductionoftheMediumTermExpenditureFramework(MTEF)andthelinkageoffunctionalreviewstotheimplementationoftheMTEF;and(viii)separationofpolicyformulationfromimplementation


throughthecreationexecutiveagenciesliketheGhanaHealthServiceandInternalRevenueService,whichisreputedtobethefirstautonomousrevenueauthoritycreatedinAfrica.

Table 6: Summary of CSPIP Achievements in Ghana (1997-2001)

I n s t i t u -tion

Tar-get

CDTs formed

SAIs com-pleted

BS Start-

ed

BS com-pleted

Diagnostic workshop completed

PIP pro-duced

PIP dis-cussed & validated

PIP imple-mentation

started

Ministries 21 21 21 17 16 17 15 10 10

Depts&Agencies

41 41 33 25 14 12 6 5 4

RCCs 10 10 10 10 7 6 4 3 3

MMDAs 110 82 65 18 7 5 4 4 3

TOTAL 182 154 129 70 44 40 29 22 20

Source: Ghana, Republic of (2000; 2002)

Key: CDTs, Capacity Development Teams; SAIs, Self Appraisal Teams; BS, Beneficiary Survey; PIP, Performance Improvement

Plan; RCC, Regional Coordinating Councils; MMDAs, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies).

6.3.2: The Kenyan Experience

6.3.2.1The Political and Constitutional Context

Kenyaachieved independence fromBritain in1963.TheKenyaAfricanNationalUnion (KANU),whichdominatedKenyanpoliticsfordecadesandwasformanyyearsinthepost-independencepe-riod(until1992)theonlylegalpoliticalparty,developedahighlycentralizedsystem.Kenyaintheimmediatepost-independenceperiodadoptedafederalconstitutionthatofferedlegislativepowers,financialcapacityandexecutiveauthoritytolocalandprovincialgovernmentsinanattempttoundothe legacyofcolonialpaternalismandcentralization (Leys1975).At thenational level, the1963IndependenceConstitutioncreatedabicamerallegislature(SenateandHouseofRepresentatives),anexecutive,headedbytheprimeminister,andacivilservice.Atthesubnationallevel,theconstitu-tioncreatedeightsemi-autonomousregions,eachwitharegionalassembly,anexecutiveledbytheregionalpresident,andaregionalcivilservice(KhadiagalaandMitullah2004).However,the1968RepublicanConstitutionunderJomoKenyattadismantledandeliminatedprovincialautonomyandfederalism.Thecountrybecameaunitarystate.AtthecentrethetwochambersoflegislatureweremergedtoformtheNationalAssemblywhilethepositionsofheadofstateandprimeministerwerecombinedtocreateastrongpresidencywithunhamperedpowers.

TheKANUwastheonlypartybetweenNovember1964tomid1966wheninthelatteryear, theformerVicePresident,OgingaOdingabrokeawayfromKANUandformedtheKenyaPeople’sUnion


(KPU),whichremainedinplaceuntilDecember1969whenitwasproscribed.Thereafter,theKANUonceagainremainedastheonlydefactopartyuntil1982whenthroughlegislation,itbecamelegallytheonlypartyuptolate1991whenmultipartyismwasresurrected.TheclamourthatengulfedmostofAfrica forpluralism,democracyanddecentralizationcompelledMoi to repeal the single-partylegislation in1991 setting inmotionconstitutionalchanges fromanauthoritarianunitary state toademocratic society.Theconstitutionalchangesof1992 led thedemocratizationprocess,whichfocusedmostlyon reform the structure, institutionsandpoliticalprocessesof thecentral govern-ment–thepresidency,parliament,electoralrulesandthecivilservice.Italsoresultedinthetransferof responsibility formanaging thepresidential andparliamentaryelections from thecivil service,notablytheprovincialadministrationtotheElectoralCommissionofKenya.Giventhehistoryoftheprovincialadministration’spartialitytotherulingparty,thischangepromisedtocreateconditionsforfreeandfairelections.Furthermore,thepresidentiselectedforafiveyeartermandthewinnerofthepresidentialelectionsmustsecurethelargestnumberofvotesamongallcontestantsnation-wide,winatleast,25%ofthevotesamongfiveofKenya’seightprovincesandbeelectedMemberofParliamentinaconstituency(Smoke2004;KhadiagalaandMitullah2004).

Kenyaheldmulti-partyelectionsin1992,1997,2002and2007.The1992and1997electionsthatelectedMoitopowerwereregardedasflawedgiventhelevelofcorruption,despondency,centrali-zationandauthoritarianismthathadengulfedthecountry.However,theDecember2002electionswerejudgedas“freeandfair”bybothlocalandinternationalobservers.Moi’sdefeatbyMwaiKibakioftheNationalRainbowCoalition(NARC)wasseenasanencouragementforelectoralcompetitionwithinthebodypolitic.However,the2007electionswerekeenlycontestedas8othercandidateschallenged the incumbent Kibaki, including RailaOdinga of theOrangeDemocraticMovement(ODM)andKalonsoMusyokaoftheOrangeDemocraticMovement–Kenya(ODM-K).TheoutcomewasdisputedbyOdingabecausetherewasvote-riggingandhecalledforare-runofthepresidentialpollsbyanindependentbodyotherthantheelectoralcommission.Theimpasseledtoviolenceandsomeliveswerelost.ACoalitionGovernmentisinplaceunderapowersharingagreementunderwhichKibakiremainspresidentwithOdingaservingasprimeminister.Thispoliticalsituationpor-tendsfragmentation,politicizationandpatronageforthestructureandbehavioroftheKenyancivilservice.Reformshavethepotentialofstallingbecauseofdividedattentionfromthepoliticalleader-ship.ThereforecommittedpoliticalleadershipwhichisrequiredinCSRswillbemissing.

6.3.3.1 The Kenyan Civil Service in Historical Context

FromthepointofviewofpublicadministrationinKenya,theprevalenceofhierarchyandcontrol-basedpublicadministrativesystemsunderminedthepossibilityofembracingdemocraticadministra-tion.Duringthecolonialperiod,publicadministrationwasessentiallytomaintainlawandorder.TheKenyancivilservicetodaymayberegardedasaproductofthecolonialexperience.ThecivilserviceinKenyalikeinanyotherCommonwealthcountrywasnotdesignedtograpplewithdevelopmentneedsofpost-independenceperiod.Itisfromthisexperiencethatitsstrongfeatures,especiallycen-


tralismofgovernmentalfunctionsemanate(Oyugi1995).Asthecountryevolvedovertime,itwasabletoshedmostofthecentralisttendenciesbydeconcentratinggovernmentalfunctionsuptothedistrictlevel.Thepreoccupationoftheadministrationthroughoutthecolonialperiodhadbeensys-temmaintenance.Thecivilserviceproperwasweakasaninstitutionfordevelopmentmanagement.Itwashighlycentralizedandcompartmentalized.Thesituationwascompoundedbythestructureofstaffingontheeveofindependencein1963.AfterindependenceAfricanizationasapersonnelde-velopmentpolicywaspursuedwithgreatzealespeciallyduringthefirstfiveyearsofindependence,sothatby“1968,theCivilServicehadbeenAfricanizedto98percent”(Nyamu,1974:3).Itbroughtintotheservicepeoplewithlittleornoexperiencetocountoninhandlingthechallengingdecisionstheywouldhavetomake(Leys1970).

Atindependence,thegovernmentofJomoKenyattaandKANUchangedtheparadigmofthecivilser-vicefrommaintenanceoflawandordertoincorporatedevelopmentadministration.Thecivilservicebecametoatoolforcementingnationalism.Thiswasactualizedthroughdifferentstrategiesforemostofwhichwastopostmembersofdifferentethnicgroupstoserveindifferentlocalities.Besidesna-tionbuilding,itwasthoughtstabilityanddevelopmentwouldbeachievedthroughcentralizationofthecivilservice.Becauseoftheurgencyingivingmeaningtoindependence,thegrowthofthecivilservicewasremarkable(Leys1975).

Bythelate1960s,thecivilservicebecameabureaucraticoligarchywithstrongconnectionstopowercentres.Someofthewell-connectedtopcivilservantssuchasPermanentSecretariesandDirectorsrantheirministriesanddepartmentsinamannercontrarytoestablishednormsandpractices.Promo-tionswerenotbasedonmeritwhichresultedinindisciplineandlossofmorale(Oyugi2006).Thissituationalsoledthecivilservicetotakesidesinpoliticalissuestherebycompromisingadministrativeefficiencyandprofessionalism.Therewasnoconceptualdifferentiationbetweenwhatwaspoliticalandadministrative.Promotioninthecivilservicewasbasedonone’sloyaltytoKANU.Bythe1990s,itwasobviousthatthecivilservicewasnotprofessionalinanysenseoftheword.Publicadministra-tionlostitslinkagestonationaldevelopmentasministrieswerereducedtoappendagesofpoliticalpowerelites.Theministrieswerepoliticizedtothecoreandpoliticalpatronageunderminedethicalandprofessionalprinciples(Mutahaba1989).

Thepost-independenceerasawKenyaundertakingaverycomplexreformprogrammeoftransitingthecivilservicefromacolonialtoanindependentadministration.Themainvehicleusedforimple-mentingthereformsistheappointmentofsevencommissionsandcommitteesbythegovernment(seeTable7).TheTermsofReferenceofthesecommitteesorcommissionsinvariablyincludedtheidentificationofreformmeasuresthatwouldbetakentoimprovetheefficiencyandproductivityofthecivilservice.Inadditiontothesecommittees,thegovernmentalsoappointedamyriadoftaskforces,workingpartiesandgroupstoreviewcertainspecificaspectsofgovernmentoperations.Forinstance,thedevelopmentoftheeducationsystemwasguidedthroughtheworkofsuchgroupsas


theKenyaEducationCommissionof1964,theNdegwaCommissionof1971,theWamalwaReportonTrainingof1972and theWorkingPartyonEducationandManpowerTrainingof1988 (Avedi1995).

Table 7: Commissions/Committees on Civil Service Reforms in Kenya

• ThePrattCommission,1963• TheMiller-GraigCommission,1966• TheNdegwaCommission,1971• TheWaruhiuCommittee,1979• TheRamtuCommittee,1985• TheMbithiCommittee,1990• TheMuneneCommittee,1996

Source: Kenya, Republic of, An Overview of Kenya’s Civil Service Reform Programme, 1997, p. 2

6.3.4.1 The Kenyan Civil Service Reform:

ThereisnodoubtthatCSRsinKenyawereinfluencedbythechangingphilosophywhichinvolvesaprocessofmatchinggovernment’sroletoitscapabilitiesandresourcesandmovingtoimprovethegovernment’scapacityandeffectivenesstoperformitsdefinedtasks.Thisphilosophywasreflectedinthegovernment’sdevelopmentpoliciesnotablythroughtwomajorSessionalPapersinthe1980sand1990s.The1986SessionalPaperwhosethemewas“EconomicManagementforRenewedGrowth”introducedSAP thatwasmeant to reducecentralcontrol, liberalize theeconomy, reduceandra-tionalizegovernment functions,organizationandexpenditureand recognize theprivatesectorasanengineofgrowth.Althoughgrowthacceleratedinthe1980s,by1994slowgrowthcroppedbackalongwithhighinflation,fallinginvestmentsandraisingdeficits.Todealwiththisnewproblem,thegovernmentissuedtheSessionalPaperNo.1of1994onEconomicRecoveryandSustainableDevel-opment from1994to2010. Inadditiontomaintaininganenablingenvironment, thegovernmentwentontostatethatitwouldconcentrateitsactivitiesonprovisionofsocialservicesandphysicalinfrastructure,ensureefficientadministrationofgovernmentservicesandprotectionoftheenviron-ment(Kenya,Republic1994).

TheperceptionofaswollenstatewhichneedstoberolledbackbytheNPMwasmanifest inthenumbersofcivilservants inKenya.Forexample, in1963, thenumberofemployeesintheKenyacivilservice(excludingteachers)stoodatabout60,000withacorrespondingnationalpopulationof8millionhencetheratioof133:1.Between1963and1991,employmentintheCivilServicegrewannuallyat5.5%reaching274,000employeesin1991(Grindle1996;Kenya,Republic1994).Thisgrowthsurpassedtheaveragepopulationgrowththusleadingtoapopulationtoemployeeratioof85:1in1991.


WhileimplementingtheSAP,thegovernmentrealizedthattherewasprogressivedeclineinefficiencyandeffectivenessofthecivilserviceandthatthequalityandscopeofservicesrenderedbygovern-mentministrieshadrapidlydeteriorated(Odhiambo2005).SAPnecessitatedstrictbudgetarycontrolsandreductionsinpublicexpenditure.Tomeetthisobjective,thegovernmentterminatedthousandsofpublicserviceemployeesinphasesbeginning1997-8.ThesecondphaseoftheVoluntaryEarlyRetirementScheme (VERS),whichwas introduced in2004, retrenched20,000civil servants.ThegovernmentoftheNationalRainbowCoalition(NARC)borrowedover15billionshillingsfromtheInternationalMonetaryFundtoimplementthesecondscheme.Initially,thepoliticalcostofdoingsowashighbecausetheadministrationwantedtofulfillitspromiseofcreatingratherthancuttingjobs.Buttherealitywasthattheearlierretrenchmentsdidnotprovideresourcesforpublicservicedelivery(Otenyon.d.).

Againstthisbackdrop,theCSRstartedinAugust1993withthelaunchingoftheCivilServiceReformProgrammeandActionPlan.Itsprincipalgoalistorealizeenhanceddeliveryofservicesandgoodstothepublicandproductivity.Specifically,theCSRisto(i)reductionbudgetdeficit;(ii)increaseef-ficiencyandproductivity;(iii)rationalizegovernmentministries;(iv)downsizeortrimthelowerlevelsJobGroupsA-Gtomaketheservicemoreresponsivetotheneedsofthepublicinthefaceofbudget-aryconstraints.Theideaisthatatrimmercivilservice,betterremuneratedandmotivatedwillbeasurebetinofferinghighqualityservice;(v)enhancesupervisorycapacity;(vi)promotemanagementinformationsystems;(vii)reducestaffcostbyputtinginplacebettermethodsofpayrollmanagement;(viii)developaclearworkethicsbyrevisingexistingcodeofregulationsanddesigningaCodeofConduct(Oyugi2006).

TheCSRwasdesignedtobeimplementedinthreephases:

• PhaseI(1993-1998)focusedoncost-containment;• PhaseII(1998-2001)focusedonperformanceimprovement;and• PhaseIII(2003-todate),whichfocusesonrefinement,consolidationandsustenanceof

reform gains.

PhaseIusheredinPhaseIIreformstowardsmid-1998.However,PhaseIIreformsonlygainedmo-mentumfollowingtheNationalAllianceRainbowCoalition(NARC)governmentin2003.PhaseIIwasredesignedandreformulatedonthebasisofexperiencegainedunderPhaseI.Consequently,theCivilServiceReformMediumTermStrategy1998-2001waspublishedin1998andoutlinedthestrat-egiesforCSRPII.Someofthespecificobjectivesincludeimprovingthequalityandtimelinessofthedeliveryofpublicservices,throughimprovementsinthecompetenceandmanagementofcivilserv-ants,reduceoverlapsandduplicationswithinandbetweenministriesandimprovepayandbenefitsofcivilservantswithaviewtoenhanceperformance,productivityandefficientdeliveryofservices.It


hasfourcomponents,namely,(i)redefinitionandrationalizationofgovernmentfunctions;(ii)staffingandmanagementofthewagebill;(iii)payandbenefitreform;and(iv)trainingandcapacitybuilding(Kenya,Republicof1994).

Phase II reformwitnessed a series ofministerial and sectoral initiatives. In addition, governancereformswerealso launched.They include justice, lawandorder sector reforms; judicial reforms;capacity building and training; e-governance; results basedmanagement; participation in qualityawardsandreintroductionofperformancecontracts(MarwaandZairi2009).

6.3.5.1 Some Progress Made by Kenya

LiketheGhanaiancase,theCSRsinKenyahavethefollowingachievements:(i)First,itledtoare-ductioninthesizeofthecivilservicewiththeintroductionoftheVoluntaryEarlyRetirementScheme(VERS).Over45,000peopleretiredwhileacostcontainmentmeasureabolishedover30,000vacantpositions.Theadditional45,000poststhatwerevacantasaresultoftheVERSwerefrozenandnoministrywasauthorizedtofillthem;(ii)Uniquepersonalnumbersforcivilservantsweredesignedandintroducedinordertoassistintheimprovementofestablishmentcontrolandmaintenanceofpayroll integrityincludingtheeliminatingghostworkers; (iii)computerizationofall thepersonnelrecordsthroughthedevelopmentofanintegratedpayrollandpersonneldatabasesystem(IPPD);(iv)tosensitizeandpsychologicallyprepareretireesundertheVERS,aresourcehandbookonEntrepre-neurshipandSmallScaleEnterpriseswaspreparedanddistributedtoretireestoencourageandguidethemonstartingandmanagingsmallscaleandincomegeneratingprojects;(v)rationalizationoffivetargetministriesinservicedelivery(agriculture,health,financeandplanning,waterdevelopment,roadsandpublicworks);(vi)theestablishmentofa“ChangeTeam”alsoreferredtoas“DreamTeam”inJuly1999.ItcomprisedsixtoprateKenyanprofessionalsdrawnfromtheparastatalsandprivatesectorsinsideKenyaandfrominternationalorganizations.Itwasspecificallymandatedtocleanthecivilserviceofitsinefficiencyandcorruptionandtodevelopandbegintoimplementaneconomicrecoveryprogramme.

ByDecember2000, the teamhadproducedan InterimPovertyReductionStrategyPaper (PRSP),adoptedandprogressivelyimplementedtransparentandcompetitiveprocurementreformmeasures,removepoorperformersfromsomekeycivilserviceandparastatalpositionsandreplacedthemwithcompetentandhonestprofessionalsandstronglysupportedtheseriousanti-corruptionmeasuresoftheKenyanAnti-CorruptionAuthority (KACA)that includedtheprosecutionofcorruptpublicoffi-cials.TheworkoftheChangeTeamcametoabruptendinMarch2001.Thisisbecausethe“DreamTeam”wasmadeupofpeopleunderstandthepoliticsofthebureaucracyaswellastheoperationsoftheservice.Ittookthemtimetosettle,astheyencounteredresistancefromthecareercivilserv-antswhowereby-passedontheinsistenceofthedevelopmentpartners(Kenya,Republicof1997;Adamolekun2005;Kpundeh2004;Kenya,Republicof2005).


Inspiteoftheachievements,thereforminitiativeshavenotproducedremarkablechangesinservicedelivery.This isbecauseKenyanscontinue tograpplewithproblemsof inefficiencies,corruption,andlargelydysfunctionalcivilservice;povertyandinequality,environmentaldegradation,stagna-tionandunemployment;anddevelopmentprogrammeshavenotbeentakenseriously.Inaddition,someoftheachievementswerereversedsuchasthedownsizingofthecivilserviceaswellasthetruncationoftheworkofthe“DreamTeam”.Specifically,theconstraintsinclude(i)theimplementa-tionoftheVERSwasdonebeforeundertakingastaffanalysistodeterminestaffinglevelsofallcadresinjobgroupsA-G.ThisanalysiswouldhaveassistedMDAstosetuptheirretrenchmenttargets;(ii)lackofsounddeploymentandredeploymentproceduresandpracticescontributed to theunevendistributionoflowercadrestaff,jobgroupsA-Gintheservice;(iii)duetolackofreliablepersonnelinformationsystem,deletionsofstaffwhoseparatedwiththeservicewereattimesnotpromptlydonebyMDAs;(iv)thereductionofstaffthroughnaturalattritionwithoutreplacementandvoluntaryearlyretirementschemeimplythattheremainingcivilservantsshouldputextratimeandefforttomaintaintheworkload.Theremainingcivilservantswerenotappropriatelycompensatedandthisconstrainedtheimprovementofefficiencyandproductivity;(v)MDAsdonothaveinternalcapacitytocarryoutministerialrationalization;(vi)vestedinterestsandinternalconflictsintheexistingorganizationset-up,andreluctancebysomeministrystaff toviewtheexercise fromapurelyobjectivestandpointhaveresultedinresistancetochange;(vii)theexpectationsofcivilservantsarethatareformingcivilserviceimpliesimprovedtermsandconditionsofserviceandamovetowardspayingalivingwage.However,therehasnotbeensubstantialimprovementinpayandbenefitsandthisimpingednega-tivelyonattempts tosustainreformgains (Kenya,Republicof1997;Adamolekun2005;Kpundeh2004;Kenya,Republicof2005).

6.3.6.1 The Main Innovations and Best Practices:

Someoftheinnovationsandbestpracticesinclude:(i)computerizationofpersonnelrecords;(ii)theestablishmentofa“ChangeTeam”alsoreferredtoas“DreamTeam”inJuly1999tocleanthecivilserviceofitsinefficiencyandcorruptionandtodevelopandbegintoimplementaneconomicre-coveryprogramme;(iii)thepublicationofaresourcehandbookonEntrepreneurshipandSmallScaleEnterprisestoprepareretireestoencourageandguidethemonstartingandmanagingsmallscaleandincomegeneratingprojects;and(iv)thedesignofacodeofconduct.

6.4.3 The Nigerian Experience

6.4.3.1 The Political and Constitutional Context

NigeriagainedindependencefromBritishruleinOctober1960.Sincethenithashadbriefspellsofdemocraticcivilrule(1960-1966and1979-1983)aswellasarelativelylongspellofdemocraticrulefrom1999todate.Despitebeingundermilitaryruleforalmost30yearsofits49yearsofinde-pendence,Nigeriahasahistoryofconstitution-making(1960,1963,1979,1989,1995and1999),avibrant and active civil society and a culture of democracy.


After16yearsofmilitaryrule,theProvisionalRulingCouncil(PRC)headedbyGeneralAbdulsalamiAbubakar held presidential elections on February 27, 1999.The electionswerewon byGeneralOlusegunObasanjo’sPeople’sDemocraticParty(PDP)whichdefeatedtheothertwoparties,theAllPeople’sParty(APP)andtheAllianceforDemocracy(AD).Theoutcomeoftheelectionswascon-testedincourtbutwasdismissedbytheFederalAppealCourt.Thispavedthewayforthehandingoverofpowerfrommilitaryruletothewinneroftheelections,GeneralObasanjoandhisparty,thePDPonMay29,1999.Twoelectionswereheldsince1999buttheirresultsespeciallythatof2007,whichbroughtPresidentYar-Aduatopower,weredisputedandledtothelossofsomelives.

AuthoritarianismhasmanifesteditselfinNigeriathroughyearsofmilitaryrulemarkedbyabsenceofdebate,intimidation,disregardofcivilrights,andnonchalanceaboutdueprocessandtheruleoflaw.Thishasleftanintolerantenvironment,inwhichthelanguageofpoliticiansisstillmilitaristicandpeoplestilluseviolencetosettleissues.Itisinmarkedcontrasttoademocraticculturewherethepeoplefreelydebateissuesandhelptobuildtheirownfuture,freefromunwarrantedinterferencebythestateandotherindividuals(InternationalIDEA2001).

The1999Constitutionstipulatesthatthestatestructureshouldbeafederalrepublic,withthree-tiersof government, namely, the federal government, states and local governments units. The federal struc-turewasadoptedin1954,whenNigeriawasstillundercolonialrule.Thefederalstructureevolvedfromthreeregionstofourin1963,andthento12statesin1967,19in1976,21in1987,30in1991and36in1996.TheFederalCapitalTerritory(FCT)andtheseatofgovernment,Abujadesignatedassuchin1976,haveanautonomousstatus(Otobo1999).

Theformofgovernmentisafederalpresidentialsystemofgovernment.Thepresidentexercisestheexecutivepowers,combing the rolesofHeadofState,HeadofGovernmentandCommander-in-chiefoftheArmedForces.Theappropriatedistributionofpowersbetweenfederalandstatelevelsofgovernmentisanissuethathasbeenatthecentreofdebateovertheconstitutionalframework.Thereisalsotheproblemofseparationofpowersbetweenthethreetiersofgovernment.Onecriticalareaisthedivisionorallocationoffiscalpowersbetweenthethreelevelsofgovernment(InternationalIDEA2001).

TheConstitutionstipulatesa“federalcharacter”principlewithaviewtoensuringthatappointmentstopublic service institutions fairly reflect the linguistic, ethnic, religiousandgeographicdiversityofthecountry.Thepracticehasresultedinaconfusedbalancingofthemeritprincipleandaquotasystemwithaheavydoseofarbitrariness.Thishashadadverseconsequencesforbothmoraleandperformanceinthecivilservice.

TheFederalCivilServiceCommissionisaconstitutionalbody,establishedunderSection153(1d)ofthe1999Constitution.Itisempoweredto(i)appointqualifiedcandidatestomanthedifferentMinis-


tries/ExtraMinisterialDepartmentsinthefederalcivilservice,makerecommendationstogovernmentonpersonnelpoliciesaimedat improving theefficiencyandeffectivenessof thecivil serviceandensurethatpersonneldecisionsreflectthestatedpoliciesandinterestsofthegovernment(Nigeria,FederalRepublicof1999).Moreover, thepowers,objectivesandcompositionof theCommissionareinformedbythedesiretoacquireandretainthehighlycapablehumanresourcethatwillpropelthecountrytowardsattainingitsnationalobjectives,namely,tofirmlyestablishNigeriaasa“united,strongandself-reliantnation,agreatanddynamiceconomy,ajustandegalitariansociety,alandofbrightandfullofopportunityforallcitizensandafreeanddemocraticsociety”(Nigeria,FederalRe-publicof1995:10)throughnon-partisanship,adherencetorulesandregulationsandbestpractices.

OnemajorstipulationintheConstitutionistheseparationoftheOfficeofHeadoftheCivilServiceoftheFederationfromthatoftheSecretarytotheGovernmentoftheFederationostensiblytoreducepoliticizationoftheservice.

6.4.4.1 The Nigerian Civil Service in Historical Context

TheNigeriancivilserviceevolvedfromthecolonialservicewhichwasestablishedbytheBritishau-thoritiesastheadministrativemachineryofthecountry.Thecivilservicehasbeensubjectedtothreepolitical influences: thecolonial, civilianandmilitary.These three influences retaincertaincom-moncommitments,albeitinvaryingdegrees–forexample,careerorientationforcivilservantsandtheuseoftheFederalCivilServiceCommissionforpromotion,disciplineandruleenforcementforthecivilservice.Buteachoftheseinfluencesbequeatheddifferentlegacies.Animportantinheritedlegacyfromcolonialrulewastheattributesofpoliticalneutrality,anonymityandimpartiality.Post-independencecivilregimessoughttoreinforcetheroleofthecivilservant,especiallyhighercivilservantsasconfidentialadviserstoministers–thepoliticalheadsofministries(Otobo1999).

Someoftheinheritedlegacieswerenotsustainedundermilitaryregimes.Forexample,duringthefirstphaseofmilitaryintervention,1966-1979,twopatternsemergedinregardtotheroleofhighercivilservants.Between1967and1975thehighercivilservantsdominatedthepolicyprocess,lead-ingtothevirtuallossoftheirattributesofpoliticalneutrality,anonymityandimpartiality.Bycontrast,between1975and1979, theroleofcivilservants in thepolicyprocessbecamelesspronounced(Adebayo1981;Adamolekun1986).Thistrend,whichhassincecontinued,isattributabletothreefactors.First,themassdismissalsor“purges”ofcivilservantsin1975/76and1984/85madehighercivilservantsmorecircumspectandlesslikelytotakeahighprofileroleinpublicpolicymaking.Sec-ond,theappointmentofadviserstogovernmentwithstrongtechnicalskillsinvariousdisciplineshadreducedgovernments’ relianceoncivilservants.Third,economicreforms,especiallyprivatizationandcommercializationofpublicenterprises,havealsoreducedtheopportunities for theappoint-mentofhighercivilservantstotheboardsofstateenterprises,thuscurbingtheirinfluence(Otobo1999;Agagu2008).


Thesizeofthecivilservicehasgrownandcontractedinresponsetopoliticalaswellaseconomicfactors.Thetransitionfromcolonialruletosovereignindependenceledtothefirstwaveofexpansioninthecivilservice.Whereasascolonialrulehadfocusedonthelimitedobjectivesofmaintaininglawandorderandreliedpartlyontraditionalrulersforgovernanceinthe“indirectrule”system,theattainmentofindependencecompelledthegovernmenttopursuebroadsocio-economicdevelop-mentobjectives–requiringexpansioninthenumbersandmixofcivilservicepersonnel.Asecondcontributoryfactorintheexpansionofthecivilservicewastheincreasedrevenuefromoil,especiallyinthe1970s,whichenablethegovernmenttofundvariousprogrammesandprojects,mostofwhichwereinitiallylinkedtopost-civilwareffortsofreconstruction,rehabilitationandreconciliation.Theseprojectswereadministeredmainlybycivilservants(GboyegaandAdamolekunandAbubakar1989;Otobo1999;Briggs2007).

Thesizeof the federalcivil service thusgrew from less than30,000at independence in1960 to45,154in1970,leapingto98,877in1974andto213,802in1988,peakingto273,392in1990andinthemid-1998thecivilservicewasabout200,000strong.Thecontractionofthecivilservicesincethemid-1980sistraceabletothe“purges”in1984/85andtheretrenchmentexerciseundertakeninthecontextoftheeconomicreformsinitiatedbythefederalgovernmentsince1986(Otobo1999;1998;Philips1988;1989;1990).

6.4.5.1 The Nigerian Civil Service Reforms

CSRshavebeenconductedinNigeriadatingbacktothepre-independenceeratodate(seeTable8).Thereformsbefore1972contributedmainlytoimprovementsinsalariesandwages,gradingstruc-tureandstrengtheningmanagementresponsibility.TheyincludetheGorsuchCommissionReformof1956thatcreatedtheexistingstructureoftheNigerianCivilServiceandtheNewnsCommitteeof1959whichintegratedtheexecutiveagency-typedepartmentalstructureswiththeministerialonestherebygivingPermanentSecretariesthestatusofManagingDirectorsofcompaniesintheprivatesector(Olaopa2009c).

ThreereformswhichhaveshapedCSRsinNigeriaforalongtimewillbeexamined.Theyarethe:(i)ThePublicServiceReviewCommission(theUdojiCommission,1972-1974);(ii)1988CivilServiceReforms;(iii)1994ReviewPanelonCivilServiceReformcalledtheAlisonAyidaPanel.BeforethesereformswereimplementedthecivilserviceinNigeriawasconsideredtradition-bound,some-whatponderousandshowedsignsofdeteriorationandseveralundesirablecharacteristicsofwhich thefollowingwerethemostprominent:over-centralization,incessantconflictsbetweenthecadres,lit-tleemphasisonresultsandconcreteperformance,counterproductiveseparationofauthorityfromresponsibilityatthetopmosthierarchy,dangerouslylowstaffmoraleandproductivityandinappropri-atestaffdevelopmentpractices(Adegoroye2006;Babura2003).


6.4.5.1.1 Udoji Reforms, 1972-1974:

TheCommissionintroducedanumberofkeyinnovationsinthecivilservice,notablytheopeningofthepostofPermanentSecretarytobothadministrativeandprofessional/specialiststaff;theharmoni-zationandunificationofjobgradingandsalarysystemsthroughtheservice;theintroductionofthemeritsystemasabasisforreward;thereplacementoftheconfidentialreportingsystembytheopensystemofreporting;andtheintroductionofanewcodeofconductforallpublicofficers.EventhoughtheCommissionwasknownforthesalaryincreasesitgavepublicservants,itsgoalofintroducingmodernmanagementstyle, techniquesandculture to theNigeriancivil servicewasnotachieved(Otobo1999;Babura2003;Adegoroye2006).

6.4.5.1.2 The 1988 Reforms:

The1988CSRswerelargelyinspiredbytheeconomicreformslaunchedin1986.Theobjectiveswereto:(i)enhanceprofessionalism,decentralizationanddelegationoffunctions;(ii)institutechecksandbalances;(iii)promotegeneralmodernization;(iv)enhancethecombinationofresponsibilitywithauthority;(v)alignthecivilservicewiththespiritofexecutivepresidentialism;and(vi)enhanceef-ficiency,effectivenessandspeedofoperations(Phillips1990;1989;1988).

Someof thehighlightsof theReformswere: (i) themergingofministerial responsibilitiesandad-ministrativecontrolsandtheirinvestmentintheMinisteraschiefexecutiveandaccountingofficers;(ii)replacementofthedesignationofPermanentSecretarywithDirector-General,whosetenurewillterminatewiththeGovernmentthatappointedhim/herandwhowillserveasDeputyMinister;(iii)greaterresponsibility in theappointment,promotionandtraininganddisciplineofstaff; (iv)verti-calandhorizontal restructuringofministries toensureoverallmanagementandeffectiveness; (v)permanencyofappointmentaseveryofficeristomake/hercareerentirelyinoneMinistry;and(vi)abolitionofthepoolsystem,whichallowsprofessionalsandadministrationofficerstomovearoundvariousministriesinsteadeachprofessionalbeingexpectedtospendhisorhercareerinoneministry(Nigeria,FederalRepublicof1988a;1988b;Igbuzor1998;PAC1999).

Inreality,howeverthe1988CSRsledtothe(i)consciousanddeliberatepoliticizationofthecivilservice;(ii)misuseandabuseofpowerbyministersandDirectors-Generalwhosawtheirministriesasaseparateentityandrunthemaspersonalproperties;(iii)increaseinthecostofrunningthecivilserviceduetotheimpositionofuniformstructuresonministries,theproliferationofparastatalsandincreaseinpersonnelwithoutacorrespondingincreaseinproductivity;(iv)absenceofacoherentandsystematic trainingpolicythroughout thecivilservice; (v)glaringshortageofskillmanpower,especiallyinthetechnicalandprofessionalcadresinvirtuallyalltheministries;(vi)prevalenceandvirtualinstitutionalizationofcorruption;(vii)disregardoftherules,regulationsandproceduresresult-inginarbitrarydecisionsandgenerallossofdirection;and(viii)completeemasculationoftheFederalCivilServiceCommissionregulatoryrole in theappointment,promotionanddisciplineof federalcivilservants(Nigeria,FederalRepublicof1995;1997;PAC1999).


Thus,the1988CSRdespiteitsloftyidealsofefficiency,professionalism,accountabilityandchecksandbalances,didnotachieveitsdesiredobjectives.Infact,“theharmdoneduringthereformswassomuchandsodeepthatitwouldtaketime,patienceanddeterminationtorestorethelostgloryoftheService”(Ayida,1998:115).

6.4.5.1.2.5 Alison Ayida Panel Reforms, 1994:

TheAyidaReviewPanelontheCSRswasinauguratedonNovember10,1994to,amongstothers,re-examinethe1988reforms.Thereportof thePanelwashighlyandconstructivelycriticalof the1988.Itreversedmostofthereformsof1988asthegovernmentbegantoimplementincrementallyin1997.Specifically,thereformsrecommendedthatthe:(i)civilserviceshouldreverttothesystemthatisguidedbytherelevantprovisionsoftheConstitution,theCivilServiceRulesandtheFinancialRegulationsandCirculars;(ii)theministersshouldcontinuetobetheheadoftheministryandshouldberesponsibleforitsgeneraldirectionbuthe/sheshouldnotbetheAccountingOfficer.Instead,thePermanentSecretary shouldbe theAccountingOfficerof theMinistry; (iii) the titleofPermanentSecretaryshouldberestored.She/heshouldbeacareerofficerandshouldnotbeaskedtoretirewiththeregimethatappointedhim/her;(iv)thepostofOfficeoftheHeadoftheCivilServiceshouldbere-establishedasaseparateofficeunderthePresidentandacareercivilservantshouldbeappointedtoheadtheoffice;(v)thepoolsystemberestoredforthoseprofessionalandsub-professionalcad-res thatcommonlyexist inministries/extraministerialdepartments; (vi)ministries/extra-ministerialdepartmentsshouldbestructuredaccordingtheirobjectives,functionsandsizesandnotaccordingtoauniformpatternasprescribedbythe1988reforms.Eachcouldhavebeenbetweentwotosixdepartments;(vii)personnelfunctionsinthecivilserviceshouldbelefttotheFederalCivilServiceCommissionwithdelegatedpowers toministries; (viii)financialaccountability in thecivilserviceshouldbeenhancedthroughstrictobservationoffinancialrulesandregulations;(ix)recruitmentintotheFederalCivilServiceattheentrypointshouldbebasedonacombinationofmeritandFederalcharacter,butfurtherprogressionshouldbebasedonmerit;(ix)Decree17of1984whichempowersgovernmenttoretirecivilservantsarbitrarilyshouldbeabrogated;(x)theretirementageintheCivilServiceshouldbe60yearsirrespectiveofthelengthofservice;(xi)governmentshouldharmonizethepensionratesofthosewhoretiredbefore1991andthosewhoretireafter1991;andsalaries,allow-ancesandwelfarepackagesofcivilservantsshouldbesubstantiallyreviewedupwardsandshouldbeadjustedannuallytoamelioratetheeffectsofinflationanddiscouragecorruption(Nigeria,FederalRepublicof1995).

6.4.5.1.2.6: The Obasanjo Civil Service Renewal Programme, 1999-2007

WhentheObasanjoadministrationassumedofficeonMay29,1999afteryearsofmilitaryrule,itidentifiedacivilserviceincrisisoccasionedbyinefficiencyinservicedelivery,insensitivitytogeneralwelfare, indifference to thenormsguiding theconductofpublicofficialsandrampantcorruption(Olaopa2009c).Facedwiththechallengesoftransformingatotalitarianstatetoademocraticoneandaglobalcontextofadministrativereform, thegovernment launcheditsCivilServiceRenewal


Programme(CSRP)in2003,whoseaimsarecontainedinTable8.TheprogrammewasarticulatedinanewframeworkfortheFederalGovernmentReformAgendacalledtheNationalEconomicEmpow-ermentandDevelopmentStrategy(NEEDS).

Theactivitiesof thereformweredesigned to focuson thecore functionsofgovernment,namely,policymaking,servicedelivery,valueorientationandaccountability.Theseculminatedinnineareasof reform,namely, civil service,pay, integratedpayroll andpersonnel information system,publicexpendituremanagement,SERVICOM-servicedelivery,monetizationoffringebenefits,pensionandanti-corruption(Olaopa2009c).

TheYar’AduaadministrationwhichtookoverfromtheObasanjoregimein2007isbuildingonthefoundationlaidbyitspredecessor.Inthisconnectionsincetakingover,PresidentYar’Aduahasprom-isedacommitmenttotheruleoflaw,nationalrestorationandtoleadershipbyexample.Accordingly,oneofthewaysofachievingthiscommitmentistodevelopalong-termNationalStrategyforPub-licServiceReforms(NSPSR),whichhasfourpillars,namely,creatinganenablinggovernmentandinstitutionalenvironment;anenablingsocio-economicenvironment;publicfinancialmanagementreform;andcivilserviceadministrationreform(Olaopa2009).

6.4.5.3 Some Progress Made by Nigeria:

Someaccomplishmentsincludethefollowing:(i)wastecurtailmentthroughmonetizationoffringebenefitsashappenedinGhanaandKenya,theintroductionofanationalhealthinsuranceschemeandpublicexpendituremanagementthroughMTEF,thealignmentofexpenditurepatternwithkeysectorsfortheachievementoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs),procurementreformandthepassageofaFiscalResponsibilityActtoensureprudentmanagementofresources;(ii)promot-ingtheeffectivenessofthecivilservicethroughorganizationalrestructuringoftheFederalCapitalTerritoryAdministration,FederalMinistryofFinance,NationalPlanningCommissionandtheStateHouse;rightsizingor“servicecleansing”throughtheretrenchmentofGradeLevels01-06consistingofcleaners,gardeners,drivers,messengersandclericalassistantswhoform70%of thecorecivilservicemadeupof161,000officers; (iii) reviewof rulesandregulations;service-widecapacitybuilding,forinstance,therepositioningofexistingtraininginstitutionssuchastheAdministrativeStaffCollegeofNigeria(ASCON),Badagryandtheestablishmentof theCivilServiceCollegeinAbujatofocusonbothmiddlelevelmanagementandexecutivemanagementtraininganddevelopment;trackingcorruptionthroughsettingupanti-corruptionunitsinallMDAsdirectlylinkedtotheAnti-CorruptionAgenciessuchastheIndependentCorruptPracticesandOtherRelatedOffencesCom-mission (ICPC)andEconomicandFinancialCrimesCommission (EFCC);establishmentof servicechartersand institutionalizationofcomplianceenforcement;and the settingupof theBureauofPublicSectorReforms(BPSR)astheinstitutionalframeworkforsustainingthereform;andtheintro-ductionoftenuresystemforthepositionsofPermanentSecretariesandDirectors(Adegoroye2006;Babura2003;Agagu2008).


Inspiteoftheseaccomplishments,therearechallenges.Theyinclude(i)buildingconsensusonre-formastherearedifferencesofopinionbetweenthepoliticalactordriversofreformandthebureau-cracyregardingthescope,strategyandimplementationmodalitiesofthereformprocess;(ii)passiveresistancefromcentralagenciessuchastheOfficeoftheHeadoftheCivilService,theFederalCivilService Commission, theNationalAssembly and the Judicial Service Commission to reform andreassurethemthatreform,ratherthanerodetheirstatutory,constitutionalandconcessionarypow-ers,caninfactstrengthenthemtoeffectivelydischargetheirregulatoryandoversightfunctions;(iii)prevalenceof“ghost”workerssymptomaticofpoorpersonnelrecordsandpayrollcontrolsystems;;(iv)ahighlycentralized,hierarchicalandrule-drivensystemwhichstifles individual initiativeandmuffles corporate accountability; (v) erosion of professionalism and esprit de corps; (vi) capacitygapsatalllevelsduetoabsenceofsystematictraining,needsidentificationandseriouscommitmenttowardsupdatingskills;(vii)thepreponderanceofunskilledstaffintheservice–70%oftheentireworkforceisconstitutedbyofficersofGradeLevels01-06whileonly1.7%ismadeofofficersinthestrategicthinkingdirectoratecadre(GLs15-17);(viii)eventhoughthefederalcivilserviceempha-sizesuniformity, standardizationand transparency in recruitingcompetentapplicants, the recruit-mentprocesslacksequityandtransparency,makingitdifficult,ifnotimpossible,torecruitthebestqualifiedapplicantsforavailablejobsintheservice.Thisrelatesmoretothelevelofprofessionalismandpatronage-inspiredcorruption;(ix)lowqualityserviceasmanifestedinlonglagperiodsinob-tainingresponsestoinquiriesinMDAs;delaysinattendingtothepublic;and(x)alackofcustomerorientationinpublicservicedelivery,whichisexacerbatedbythefailuretoundertakeclientsurveystomeasurecitizens’(customer/client)satisfactionortopublishguidelinestoelicitcitizens’commentsonproposedchangesinservicedelivery(Briggs2007;Adegoroye2006;Babura2003;Agagu2008).


Themaininnovationsandbestpracticesincludethefollowing:

(i) trackingcorruptionthroughthesettingupanti-corruptionunitsinallMDAsdirectlylinkedto theAnti-CorruptionAgencies such as the Independent Corrupt Practices andOtherRelatedOffencesCommission (ICPC)andEconomicandFinancialCrimesCommission(EFCC);

(ii) thesettingupoftheBureauofPublicSectorReforms(BPSR)astheinstitutionalframeworkforsustainingthereform;and(iii)introductionofMTEF.


Table 8: CSRs in Nigeria from 1945-1994

Commission/Review/Reform Recommendations

i.TudorDavisCommission,1945 Reviewedwagesandgeneralconditionsofservice

ii.HarraginSalaryReviewCommission,1946

Reviewedwagesandgeneralconditionsofservice;dividedthecivilserviceinto“SeniorService”and“JuniorService”

iii.GorsuchCommission,1956 Reviewedremunerationandstructureoftheserviceandnotedabsenceofviablemiddlecategoryandcreated5maingrades

iv.NewnCommittee,1959 Proposedintegrationofministriesanddepartments

v.MbanefoSalariesandWagesCommis-sion,1961

Reviewedsalariesandwages

vi.MorganCommission,1963 Reviewedsalaries/wagesofjuniorstaffofFederalGovernmentandprivateestablishment;introducedforthefirsttimetheminimumwageongeo-graphicalbasis

vii.ElwoodGradingTeam,1969 Examinedanomaliesinthegradingofpostsandproposeduniformsala-riesforofficersperforminginidenticalduties

viii.AdeboSalaries/WagesCommission,1971

ProposedtheestablishmentofaPublicServiceReviewCommissiontoexaminetheroleofthePublicServiceCommission;structureofthecivilservice;conditionsofserviceandtrainingarrangements

ix.UdojiCommission,1972 Focusedontheissueofincreasingefficiencyandeffectivenesswithinthecontextofmeetingthechallengesofadevelopment-orientedsociety;improvestructureandsystemofthecivilservice;openreportingsystemforperformanceevaluation;unifiedgradingandsalarystructurecoveringallpostsinthecivilservice;createdaunifiedSeniorManagementGroupforAdministrativeandProfessionals/Specialistsforcentralmanagementofcareer;harmonizationandunificationofjobgradingandsalarysystems;andintroductionofmeritprincipleandcodeofconductforallpublicservants

x.DotunPhillipsReform,1986 Enhancedprofessionalism,alignmentwithpresidentialsystemofgovern-ment,decentralizationanddelegation,combinationofauthoritywithresponsibility,enhancedaccountability,enhancedchecksandbalances,generalmodernizationandenhancedeffectiveness,efficiencyandspeedofoperation


Commission/Review/Reform Recommendations

1988Reforms To ensure a virile, dynamic and resulted-oriented civil service. Recog-nizedthepoliticizationoftheupperechelonofthecivilservice;OfficeofHeadoftheCivilServiceabolished;theMinisterinadditiontobeingtheChiefExecutivealsobecametheAccountingOfficerinplaceofthePer-manentSecretary;thepostofPermanentSecretaryabolishedandanewpoliticalpostofDirector-General,whoholdsofficeatthepleasureofthePresidentwasthencreatedinitsplaceandwouldvacateofficewiththeGovernmentwhichappointedhimunlessreappointedbytheincomingadministration;civilservicetobeprofessionalizedtostimulatespecializa-tionandexpertiseandanofficetomakeacareerinaparticularministryordepartment;eachMinistrytobedividedintodepartment,division,branchandsection;abolitionofthepoolsystem

ReviewPanelonCivilServiceReform,1994(AlisonAyidaPanel)

Re-examinethe1988reforms;highlyandconstructivelycriticalofthe1988reformsandthereforereversedmostthereforms.RecommendedthePersonnel Management Board in each ministry and devolution of author-itytoincurexpendituretocertaincategoriesofseniormanagementstaff,specificallytothelevelofassistantdirectorandabove;upwardreviewofpayandotherincentivesforcivilservantstoreducecorruption;recruit-mentintothecivilservice,especiallyattheentrygradesoftheprofes-sionalcadres,shouldasmuchaspossible,bebasedonacombinationofmerit and federal character such that the best candidates from each state areselectedonacompetitivebasis;strictsanctionstobeappliedtocivilservantsfoundtohaveengagedincorruptpractices

TheObasanjoCivilServiceRenewalPro-gramme,1999-2007

(i)ToreprofessionalizetheCivilServicetocreateanewgenerationofof-ficersandtechnocratswithsufficientskills;(ii)Tomonetizefringebenefitsandreducewasterandinefficiencywithinanincentivestructurethatsupportscompetitiveprivatesectordevelopment;(iii)Operateafiscalruleandbudgetaryreformsinthecontextofamovertowardsamediumtermexpenditureframework;(iv)Setclearlytheorganizationalandpersonnelobjectiveswithaconcernwithresultsratherthanprocessandexpenditure;(v)Conductrigorousandsystematicevaluationandreport-ingofprogrammeperformancetomakepolicymakersaccountableforresourcesusedandforresults;(vi)Re-engineerexistingprocessestomakethemfaster,modernizeandmoreefficientusingICT;(vii)Strikethebal-ancebetweendirection,controlandtheautonomyenergyofdepartmentandpublicmanagersthroughreformsofcentralagencies;(viii)Createaprocessinpolicyworktoencouragedecisionmakerstoperiodicallylookatthelongerandwiderissues;(ix)Changethemindsetsofofficerssothattheyareconditionedbystrongprofessionalethics

Source: Compiled by the author.


6.5.4 The South African Experience

6.5.4.1 The Political and Constitutional Context:

Afterseveralyearsofapartheidruleand45yearsofoperatingadefactoone-partystatewithaparty-dominatedbureaucracy,theNationalParty(NP)wasdefeatedbyNelsonMandela’sAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)tobecomethenon-racialpresidentandgovernmentrespectivelyintheMay1994electionsandtheinaugurationoftheGovernmentofNationalUnity(GNU).Thereturntonon-racialrulewasinfluencedbyacombinationofnormativeandstructuralfactors.TheyincluderesolutionsbyboththeUnitedNationsandthenOrganizationofAfricanUnity(OAU),thenationalconsensusbybothwhitesandblacksforanegotiatedsettlementwithinapower-sharingframeworkasresultoftherisingviolence,killingsandloomingeconomicdownturn,theendoftheColdWarandthe“de-ideologization”offoreignpolicythataccompaniedthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,thematerialandideologicalpainsofpatron-bereavementsufferedbytheANC5,theglobalwaveofdemocratizationintheearly1990sfavouringpoliticalsystemsfeaturingmulti-partydemocracy,respectforhumanrights,andmarket-oriented,openeconomiesandtheachievementofNamibiaofitslong-delayedindepend-encein1990(Furlong2001;Evans1996).

Thenegotiationsthatledtotheabandonmentofapartheid,theintroductionofanewconstitutionin1993andtheSouthAfrica’snationaldemocraticelectioninApril1994weretheresultofacom-promisebetweentheNationalParty(NP)andtheANC.Bythelate1980s,powerfulelementswithintheNPgovernment’ssupportbaserecognizedthatwhitedominationandapartheidwerenolongertenable(FriedmanandAtkinson1994).TheNPgovernmentwasstrongenoughtoremaininpowerandwasneverinanydangerofbeingoverthrownbyrevolutionariesbutwasnotstrongenoughtorestructureapartheidtofacilitateasustainablepoliticaleconomy.TheoppositionrepresentedbytheANCinexileandtheUnitedDemocraticFront (UDF)/MassDemocraticMovement(MDM)insideSouthAfrica,wasnotstrongenoughtooverthrowtheNPgovernment.Theensuingstalematewasfinallybrokenbytheforcedretirementduetoill-healthofP.W.BothaandhisreplacementbyF.W.deKlerk(SkweyiyaandVil-Nkomo1995).InFebruary1990thedeKlerkgovernmentreleasedjailedleaders of theANC, includingNelsonMandela, unbannedopposition political parties, includingtheANC,andbeganthelongprocessofnegotiationthatwouldeventuallyleadtothenewconstitu-tion.ThesenegotiationsbeganinDecember1991attheConventionforaDemocraticSouthAfrica(CODESA)andwerecontinuedby theNegotiatingCouncil,whichwasconvened inMarch1993(Ottaway1993;Pycroft1996).

5 TheANCwascompelledafterseveralmonthsofhesitationtorenouncedarmedstruggleandagreedtoworktowardsnegotiationsbecausecommunistregimeswerecollapsinginEasternEuropeandtheSovietUnionhadtoomanyproblemstocontinueunderwritingtheexpensiveANCcampaign,whiletheharshrealitiesofpoliticssuggestedthattheWestwasfarmoreinterestedinhelpingEasternEuropethaninassistingblackliberation.Inaddition,manyoldfriendsoftheANCsuchasZam-bia’sKennethKaunda,facedangrycitizenstiredofeconomicdevastationandcorruptionanddemandedanendtoone-partyrule.SeeP.J.Furlong,“SouthAfrica”,2001.


Non-racial rule resulted in the formation of four parties, namely, theAfrican National Congress(ANC),theNationalParty(NP),theInkathaFreedomParty(IFP)andtheDemocraticParty(DP).Elec-tionswereheldin1998,2002,2006and2009,whichwereallwonbytheANC.

SouthAfricaisaparliamentarydemocracywithaquasi-federalsystemofgovernmentalsystemwithacentralgovernmentandsubnationalgovernmentsattheprovincial,municipalandlocallevels.ThePresidentiselectedfromtheNationalAssemblyandceasestobeamemberoftheAssemblywhenelected.ThePresidentisstipulatedtoselecttheDeputyPresidentandanynumberofministersfromamongthemembersoftheNationalAssemblywhilehemayselectnomorethantwoministersfromoutsideit(SouthAfrica,Republicof1996).

Chapter10of the1996Constitutionisdevotedtothebasicvaluesandprinciplesgoverningpub-lic administration.According to theConstitution, public administrationmust be governedby thedemocraticvaluesandprinciples,including(a)ahighstandardofprofessionalethics;(b)efficient,economicandeffectiveuseofresources;(c)bedevelopment-oriented;(d)servicesprovidedimpar-tially, fairly,equitablyandwithoutbias; (e)people’sneedsmustbe responded to,and thepublictrustbeencouragedtoparticipateinpolicy-making;(f)accountable;(g)transparentbyprovidingthepublicwithtimely,accessibleandaccurateinformation;(h)goodhumanresourcemanagementandcareer-developmentpracticestomaximizehumanpotential;(i)bebroadlyrepresentativeoftheSouthAfricanpeople,withemploymentandpersonnelmanagementpracticesbasedonability,objectivity,fairnessandtheneedtoredresstheimbalancesofthepasttoachievebroadrepresentation(SouthAfrica,Republicof1996).

6.5.5.1 The South Africa Civil Service in Historical Context:

Theideologyofapartheidwhichformedthefoundationofthepre-democracygovernmenthadbeendescribedasacrimeagainsthumanitybytheUN,OAUandmanydemocraticforcesintheworld.WiththedemocratizationofSouthAfricain1994,thenewgovernmenthadnochoicebuttoreformthesystemitinherited.Itsoughttonotonlytransformthecountry,butalsothestatemachinery(civilservice)itinheritedandneededverybadlytoimplementitselectionpromisesofabetterlife,whichwasencapsulatedintheReconstructionandDevelopmentPlan.

Priorto1994thepublicandcivilserviceswerehighlycentralized.TheCommissionforAdministra-tion(thepredecessorofthePublicServicesCommission(PSC)hadextensivepowers.Thisincludedthesettingofsalaries,responsibilityfordisciplinaryauthority,pensions,leave,promotionsandevalu-atedstaffqualificationsandrequirements.Itwasalsoresponsibleforthegradingofposts,thesettingofwagesandsalariesandregulationsofconditionsofwork(Cameron2009). Thiscentralizationresultedinbloatingoftheentirepublicsector,whichconsistedofabout2millionpeopleoutofwhich800,000belongedtothecivilserviceby1994(Picard1999;Fraser-MoloketiandRobertson2003).


Duringtheapartheidera,theSouthAfricanpublicandcivilserviceswereisolatedandoutoftouchwith internationaldevelopmentsand in theprocess thecivil servicegotbloated inanattemptbythe racist regime toprove that separatedevelopmentworked.The attempt toprove that separatedevelopmentworkedwasalameresponsetoimmensepressurefromwithinandoutsidethecountry(Thornhill2008;Horwitz1994).Duringthetransitionintheearly1990sverylittleworkwasdonebytheANConthenatureofpost-apartheidadministrationchange.AsFraser-Moleketi,aformerMinisterofDepartmentofPublicServiceandAdministration(DPSA)stated“PublicServiceReformwasnotseenasasexytopic”(Cameron2009:5).Itwasclearwhatneededtobedone.Thereneededtobeafundamentaltransformationfromanapartheid-drivenbureaucracytowardsamoredemocraticpublicservicewhichputscitizensfirst(Fraser-MoleketiandSalojee2008).

Bardill(2000:103)arguesthatcivilservicereforminSouthAfricawasinfluencedbygrowingglobalcompetition, the failureof thecentralized state-dominateddevelopment strategies, theworseningeconomiccrisisinthedevelopingworldandtheimpactofIMF/WorldBankSAPs.Thisinvolvedareappraisaloftheroleofthestate.TheReconstructionandDevelopmentProgramme(RDP)wasthemajorpolicyinitiativeoftheANCgovernmentafterthe1994elections.Itwasanintegratedcoherentsocio-economic programme. It attempted to integrate development, reconstruction, redistributionand reconciliation into aunifiedprogramme. Itwas intended tobe a vision for the fundamentaltransformationofSouthAfricansociety(RepublicofSouthAfrica1994:7).TheRDPwasintendedtobeasocialdemocraticvisionforthecountrywithemphasisonwelfarerightsandthepoor.Theadoptionofthegovernment’sMacro-EconomicStrategyforGrowthandEmployment(GEAR)in1996committedthegovernmenttomoreorthodoxfiscalpolicies(SeekingsandNattrass2006:347-349).TheGEARwasamacroeconomicstrategyprimarilyaimedatreducingthegovernmentbudgetdeficit,albeitwithinabroadergrowthanddevelopmentstrategy.ThegovernmentdidnotabandontheRDPbutpublicsectorinvestmentremainedlowduringaperiodoffinancialconsolidation(Hirsch,2005:257-258).

ItwasarguedthatadoptionoftheGEARin1996ledtotheimplementationofpublicsectorreforminamorebudget-drivenparadigmwithanemphasisongoalssuchascost-cutting,rightsizingandprivatization(Bardill2000:106-107).TheWhitePaperontheTransformationofthePublicServicein1995laiddownthenationalpolicyframeworkforthetransformationofthepublicservice.Manyofitsrecommendationswereinlinewith“internationalbestpractice”althoughtheWhitePaperwarnedagainsttheuncriticaladoptionofNPMframework(Bardill,2000:105).

6.5.6.1 The South African Civil Service Reforms

Between1994and1998,threeissuesdominateddebateoverthepublicsector:(i)affirmativeaction;(ii)theroleofgovernment;and(iii)thesizeofthecivilservice.Allthreefeaturedprominentlyinthepublicservicereformeffortsembarkeduponbythegovernmentsincethetransitionfromapartheidtononracialrulein1994.UnlikeGhana,KenyaandNigeriawhoseCSRswereinfluencedbySAPs,


thoseofSouthAfricawereshapedbyexperiencesofbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountriesandtheNPM.Theyweredrawnonpublicdebatesonthedesirablefeaturesofanewpublicservicethatbeganinthetransitionperiodandcontinuedafterthe1994elections.TheMinisterofPublicServiceassumedtheroleofcabinet-levelchampionofpublicservicereform.Topreparethegroundforgov-ernmentdecisionsonthesubject,membersofthereformcommitteewentonstudytourstoselectedcountries inbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries. Furthermore, twoworkshopswereorgan-izedin1995and1996:theformerwasfocusedonlearninglessonsfromtheexperiencesofotherCommonwealthcountries.Participantsintheworkshopsweredrawnfromthecentralgovernment,provincialgovernment,parliament,academiaandselectedcivilsocietyorganizations.Theministerattendedsessionsofbothworkshops.Ateachworkshop,theSouthAfricanparticipantsmadeitcleartotheotherparticipantsthattheywereinterestedinlearningaboutgoodpracticestoadaptforuseandbadpracticestoavoid(Adamolekun2005).Thisisunderstandablygiventhatduringtheapartheidera,theSouthAfricanpublicservicewasisolatedandoutoftouchwithinternationaldevelopmentsinpublicandcivilservicereforms(Thornhill2008;Maphunge2003).

ThefundamentalprinciplesofCSRsafter1994areenshrinedinthe1996Constitution,whichwasfurther elaborated in the1997Public ServiceAct. In addition to theConstitution and thePublicServiceAct, the legal framework for running the civil service include theWhitePaperonPublicServiceEducationandTraining(1997),SkillsDevelopmentAct(1997),CodeofConductforPublicServants(1997),WhitePaperonAffirmativeAction(1998)andEmploymentEquityAct(1998).ThislegalframeworkforrunningthecivilserviceisseenasarguablythemostcomprehensiveinAfrica(Adamolekun2005;Picard2004).

AccordingtotheConstitution,publicadministrationmustbebroadlyrepresentativeoftheSouthAfri-canpeople,mustbedevelopment-oriented,andmustbeaccountable.Theoverallobjective,asstatedinthePublicServiceAct,is“thecreationofapeople-centredpublicservicewhichischaracterizedbyequity,quality,timeousnessandastrongcodeofethics”(SouthAfrica,Republicof).Thefollow-ingareamongthespecificissuestobeaddressedassetoutintheWhitePaperonthetransformationofthepublicservice:(i)restructuringandrationalizingthepublicservice;(ii) transformingservicedelivery;(iii)enhancingaccountability;(iv)humanresourcedevelopmentandtraining;(v)improvingemploymentconditionsandlabourrelations;and(vi)thepromotionofaprofessionalserviceethos(SouthAfrica,Republic1995).Theseobjectivesaresomeofthetenetsof theNPM.RichardLevin(2004:12-13)arguesthatpublicsectorreforminSouthAfricahasbeenshapedbythetenetsofNPM,includingastrongfocusondecentralizedmanagementofhumanresourcesandfinance.However,Fraser-Moleketi,aformerDirector-GeneraloftheDepartmentofPublicServiceandAdministration(DSPA)statedthatthereformswerenotinfluencedbytheNPMbutratherthegovernmentwantedtoborrowNPMskillsandtechniquestomodernizethepublicservicewithoutbuyingintotheideo-logical framework.Therewas,however, theacknowledgement that someNPMreformshadbeenintroduced(Cameron2009).


Aspartofthereform,thePersonnelExpenditureReviewwasundertakenin1999,whichledtothefollowing: (i) reviewofdeterminationofconditionsofserviceforSeniorManagementStaff (SMS),promotionsystemandpayprogressionwithaviewtointroducingaperformance-basedsystem;(i)reviewofmacrobenefitsinthepublicservicewithspecialfocusonmedicalaid,housingandpen-sionwithaviewtoensuringefficiency,adequacy,equityandadministrativejustice;(iii)reviewofcollectivebargainingstructuresinthepublicservicetodefinerolesandresponsibilitiesandissuestobenegotiatedatnationalandsectoralordepartmentallevels;(iv)amendmentsandadoptionofcer-tainlawstofacilitatecivilservicereform;(v)movetowardsthedevelopmentalstateandpromotionofeconomicgrowthandsocialobjectives;(vi)movetowardsthesinglepublicservice;(vii)introductionofaffirmativeaction:race,genderanddisability;(viii)focusonimprovedservicedeliveryandtakinggovernmenttothepeople(Kuye2006).

6.5.7.1 Some Progress Made by South Africa:

Anumberofachievementshavebeenrecorded.Theyincludethefollowing: (i) themovetowardsthedevelopmentalstatetosimultaneouslypromoteeconomicgrowthandsocialobjectivessuchaspovertyreductionwhichfacilitatestateinterventioninthemarket.Thisentailsastrongerpublicsec-tortoimproveservicedeliveryandpovertyreduction.Thishasledtocentralizedmovesuchastheprovisionforasinglepublicserviceencompassinglocalgovernmenttoensureverticalcoordinationbetweenvariousspheresofgovernmentandpointingtothedangersofexcessivedecentralization.Thisissupportedbytheinternationalliterature.Forinstance,theUNDESA(2005:52)pointsoutthatasgovernmentshavebeguntoquestionthevalueoftheNPMmodel,therehasbeentheacknowl-edgementoftoorapiddecentralizationofHRMfunctionswhichmayleadtoadeclineintheprofes-sionalismofthecorecivilservice;(ii)LikeinGhana,NigeriaandKenya,downsizingorrightsizingwasundertakenthroughtheintroductionofvoluntaryseveranceprogrammein1996toencourageexistingstafftovoluntarilyretire.Therewasadeclineinthenumberofpersonnel,althoughnottotheanticipatedlevels.Totalemploymentinthepublicservicedeclinedfrom1,267,766inSeptem-ber1995to1,031,594inDecember2000(CameronandMilne2000;HohlsandPeroff2000);(iii)ThecreationofSeniorManagementServices (SMS)ontherecommendationof theDepartmentofPublicServiceandAdministration(DPSA)incorporatingmanagersbetweentheranksofDirectorandDirector-General,withaflexibleremunerationsystemandacompetencybasedmanagementframe-workin2001onmostlythree-yearcontracts.Sinceitsinceptionin2001therewere4,623employeesin the top 4 levels, namely,Director-General,Deputy-Director, ChiefDirector and upwards andrisento8592in2008(CameronandMilne2008);(iv)Contractappointmentsweremadeinvolvinghiringpeopleoncontractoftenoutsidethepublicsectorandentailingterminatingthecontractsofthosewhodonotperform.Itbroughtinnewpeopleandideasaswellasfacilitatingthedepartureofweakheadsofdepartment.Itreducedcomplacency,ledtochangeandinnovationandfacilitatedthedisplacementofpoorperformers(PSC2008); (v)anopenemploymentsystemwasintroducedwherebyallpostswouldbefilledbycompetition.ThemovetowardsanopenemploymentsystemwaspartiallyinfluencedbytheNPMideologybutitalsoderivedfromthepoliticalsituationinSouth


Africa.Itwasakeyaimofthenewgovernmenttocreatearepresentativepublicservice.TheANCgovernmentintroducedapolicyofaffirmativeactionforblacks,womenandgender.Thereis,how-ever, someevidence that suggests thatpatronageappointments in thepublic servicehavegrownsubstantiallysince1994.ThereistheinfluenceofthecontroversialdeploymentpolicyoftheANC,whichdeployspartymemberstoseniormanagementpositionsinthepublicsector,manyofwhomlackexperience(Picard2005;CameronandMilne2008);(vi)ThePublicServiceLawAmendmentActof1997andthePublicServiceRegulationsof1999introducedperformancemanagementunderwhichseniormanagerswhowerenotheadofdepartmentswouldenterintoperformancemanage-mentcontractwithhis/herimmediatesupervisor,whileinthecaseoftheDirector-Generalitwouldbewithhis/herminister.Theobjectivesaretoprovideareliableandbalancedmeasuretoassessthemanager’sperformance,todeterminewhethertheyareperformingtheirfunctionseffectivelyandtoimprove the political-administrative interface betweenpoliticians and seniormanagement (Miller2005);(vii)TheWhitePaperonTransformingPublicServiceDeliverycommonlycalledthe“BathoPele”(People’sFirst)aimedatmakingservicedeliveryapriorityinthepublicservice(SouthAfrica,Republicof1997).Itentailedashiftawayfrombureaucraticsystems,processestowardsanewwayofworkingwhichwasfasterandmoreresponsiveandwhichputtheneedsofthepublicfirst(Ncholo2000).“BathoPele”comprises8principles,namely,consultationwithcitizensonthelevelandqual-ityofservices;thesettingofservicestandards;equalaccess;courtesyandconsideration;provisionofinformationoneligibility;opennessandtransparencyregardingcostsandresponsibilities,pridingredressandvalueformoney(SouthAfrica,Republicof1997).Consequently,Multi-purposeCom-munityCentres(MPCCs)nowcalled“ThusongCentres”werecreatedin1999todeliverservicesofallspheresofgovernmentfromasinglelocation.Asof2007,96centreswereinoperationwhilethenumberroseto125in2008(Cameron2009).

Inspiteoftheachievements,thereareproblems.Theyare:(i)thelargenumberoflower-levelperson-nelwhocouldnotberedeployedanddidnotapplyforvoluntaryserviceprogrammes(VSPs)becauseoflimitedmarketability.RightsizingtargetswereonlypreparedtoofferalimitednumberofpostsforabolitionandtheVSPsledtothedepartureofskilledandexperiencedpersonnelandtheretentionofnonproductiveemployees.Inaddition,eventhoughtherewasareductioninpersonnelbill,thewagebillcontinuedtoincrease(HohlsandPeroff2001;Ncholo2000:98);(ii)TheSMSispoliticizedsincethePresidentistheappointingauthoritywhiletheprocedureforappointmentoftheDirector-Generalensuresthattheyareappointedlargelyonthebasisofpoliticalaffiliation(DPSA2008).Consequently,theBritishsystemofprofessionalcareerheadofdepartmenthaslargelybeenreplacedbyacombina-tionofpoliticalandcontractbasedappointments(PSC2008);(iii)thecontractappointmentsledtohighturnoverofDirector-Generalsasresultofthepolitics-administrationinterfacegiventhatrelation-shipratherthancompetencethatdeterminestheirtenure.Italsoledtotheprematureterminationofcontractsbecausethebestpersonisnotnecessarilyappointed.Thisalsoaffectedinstitutionalmemoryandorganizationalknowledgeanddiscouragedsuitablecandidatesfromapplying(Cameron2009);(iv)attemptstocreateamoreflexibleemploymentsystemhavecontributedtoslowerappointment


procedures.Oneoftheunintendedconsequencesofadvertingpostsnationallyhasbeentocreatearecruitmentsystemwhichhasbeenjustasslowifnotslowerthantheoldpublicadministrationsystem.Inaddition,contrarytotheNPMfeaturethatnon-performingstaffcanbedismissed,inthecaseofSouthAfricatheinflexiblelabourlegislationmakesitdifficulttodismissnon-performingstaff(Cameron2009);(v)thereislowlevelofcompliancewithguidelinesonperformancemanagementbeing erratic and inconsistentwhileperformanceappraisals fail to showanadequate correlationbetweentheperformanceoftheheadofdepartmentasanindividualandtheoverallperformanceofthedepartmentforwhichtheyareresponsible.Furthermore,performancemanagementhasnotimprovedanysignificantlytheperformanceofseniormanagers;(vi)unevenperformanceofservicedeliveryormixedresultsofservicedelivery(DSPA2006;Cameron2009;SouthAfrica1998).


Someoftheinnovationsandbestpracticesinclude:(i)theintroductionofMTEF;(ii)thecreationofexecutiveagenciessuchastheSouthAfricanRevenueService(SARS);(iii)theimplementationofmer-it-basedrecruitmentandpromotiontakingintoaccounttheneedforgenderrepresentation;(iv)thecreationofSeniorManagementServices(SMS)alongthelinesoftheUSandUK;(v)theassumptionoftheMinisterofPublicServiceascabinet-levelchampionofpublicservicereform;(vi)stakeholderparticipationinreformthroughnation-wideconsultativeprocessintheformofworkshopsandlearn-ingfromtheexperiencesofothercountries;(vii)comprehensivelegalframeworkforrunningpublicservice;(viii)contractappointments;(ix)moresystematicapplicationofNPMelementsthananyofthefourcountries;(x)settingupofCPSItopromoteinnovations.

6.6 Modest Innovations and Best Practices from the Experiences of the Four Countries:

ItisclearfromtheexperiencesofthefourcountriesthattheyallimplementedCSRswithNPMfea-tures.Eventhoughthecountrieshavewitnessedreversals insomeof theprogressmade,onecanseeevidenceofsomemodestinnovationsandbestpracticesgleanedoutoftheexperiencesofthefourcountries (seeTable10).Theyare: (i) indigenizingandmainstreamingprogrammeleadershipandmanagement;(ii)buildinganincentiveframeworkunderseverebudgetaryconstraints;(iii) in-tegratingcivilservicereformprocesses;(iv)radicalreorganizationofgovernment;(v)buildingsmartpartnershipswith a variety of stakeholders; (vi) effective and efficient delivery of public services;(vii)performancemanagementagreementswithseniorcivilservants;(viii)promotingaccountabilityandtransparency;(ix)e-government;(x)capacitybuilding;(xi)reducingcorruption;(xii)enhancedremunerationforcivilservants;(xiii)institutionalframeworkforinnovation;(xiv)annualcivilservicemonitoringandevaluation(AfDB2005;Antwiet.al.2008;Rugumyamheto2004;CaidenandSunda-ram2004).


It should be noted that of the four countries, South Africa is ahead of the other countries in terms ofmajorinnovationsandbestpractices(seeTable9).Amajorinnovationinthefourcountriesise-government,whichreferstotheuseofinformationtechnologyapplicationtoperformgovernmentfunctionswithmaximumefficiencyandatminimumcost.Itenablesgovernmentstodeliverinforma-tionandinsomecases,servicestocitizens,businessandothergovernmentagencies.Thegoalsofe-governmentare:betterservicedeliverytocitizens,improvedservicesforbusiness,transparencyandempowermentofthecitizensthroughinformationandefficientgovernmentpurchasing(AfDB2005).ThefourcountrieshavegovernmentwebsitesfromwhichonecandownloadinformationonactivitiesofMDAs.Inaddition,thesiteshavecreateda“onestopshopping”pointswherecitizenscancarryoutavarietyoftasks,especiallythosethatinvolvemultipleagencieswithoutrequiringthecitizentoinitiatecontactswitheachagencyindividually.Thee-governmentofSouthAfricaismoredevelopedthan the others because of its Centre for Public Service Innovation.

SouthAfricahasmademuchprogressthanthethreeothercountriesinthetableofinnovationandbestpracticesinmainlytwoareas.FirstisthecreationinJune2001ofaCentreforPublicServiceInnovation(CPSI)withamotto“UnlockingInnovation”.Itsmandateistofacilitate,advocateforandchampioninnovationinthepublicsectoraswellaspartneringwithpublicsectororganizationsinidentifyinginnovativesolutionsanddevelopinganenvironmentthatsupportsimplementationandsustainabilityofinnovations.InlinewithitsmandatetheCPSIdevelopedapocketguideforusebypublicservantsatalllevelsandotherstakeholdersworkingtowardsachievingidealsofabetterlifeforSouthAfricans(CPSI2003;n.d).

ThesecondinnovationistheinitiationoftheSouthAfricanPublicServiceCommission(PSC)withthemotto“CustodianofGoodGovernance”in2000oftheTransversalPublicServiceMonitoringandEvaluationSystem(TPSM&ES).TheTPSM&ESlooksattheextenttowhichDepartmentscomplywiththenineprinciplesforpublicadministrationprescribedinSection195(1),Chapter10ofthe1996Constitution. It involves analyzingdepartmental performance against a performance indicator foreachprinciple.Table10showstheperformanceindicator(s)usedforeachconstitutionalprincipleaswellastheapplicablepoliciesandregulations.SincetheinceptionoftheTPSM&ESin2000to2007,thePSChasassessed53departments,16nationaland37provincialdepartments.

TheevaluationsthroughtheTPSM&ES,whichtake18weeksinvolvingdocumentanalysis,interviewsanddesktopresearch,areanimportantlevelusedbythePSCtocontributetogoodgovernanceandservicedeliveryimprovement.TheTPSM&ESinessenceattemptstoachievethefollowing:(i)identifyandaddressproblemareasthatneedthedepartment’sattention;(ii)encouragelearningbyidentifyingandpromotinggoodpractice;(iii)communicatecriticalareasinpublicadministrationtodepartmentssothattheyaligntheirpriorities,resourcesandenergyaccordingly;and(iv)helddepartmentstore-flectontheirownperformanceandachievements(PSC2007).


6.7InfluenceofsomeExternalForcesonInnovationsandBestPractices:

Foursourceshavealsoinfluencedinnovationandbestpracticeseitherdirectlyorindirectlyinthefourcountries.Theyarethe:(i)InternationalFinancialInstitutions;(ii)CharterforthePublicServiceinAfrica;(iii)theNewPartnershipforAfricanDevelopment(NEPAD)and(iv)CommonwealthAssocia-tionofPublicAdministrationandManagement(CAPAM).

6.7.1 The Influence of International Financial Institutions:

Thesignificantimpactofexternalactors,especiallytheinternationalfinancialinstitutionsonpublicsec-torreformsinAfricainthe1990scannotbeglossedover.Theseexternalinfluencesbeganinthe1980sinafewcountrieslikeGhana,NigeriaandKenyabutbecamemorewidespreadandcontinuousinthe1990s,allinthecontextofexternalfundingofeconomicreformprogrammes,especiallythestructuraladjustmentprogrammes(SAPs).Fromapreoccupationwiththecutbackmanagementordownsizing(reductionofstaffnumbersandwagebill)dictatedbytheneedtoreducebudgetdeficitsfromthemid-1980stotheearly1990s,thedevelopmentpartnersmovedtosupportabroaderapproachthatincludesattentiontostrengtheningpublicadministrationcapacityandimprovingthequalityofservicedeliverythrough theadoptionof theNewPublicManagement (NPM) initiatives.Box4summarizes thekeyelementsincivilservicereformagreeduponbySpecialProgrammeofAssistance(SPA)inNovember1995,whichhasbecometheguidingprinciplesofcivilservicereformprogramme(CSRP)inAfrica.TheSPAwasagroupofaidagenciesthatmettocoordinatebalance-of-paymentsandothersupporttoAfricancountriesundergoingeconomicreformprogrammes(Wescott1999).

6.7.2 The Charter for the Public Service in Africa:

TheCharterforthePublicServiceinAfricawasadoptedatthethirdPan-AfricanConferenceofPublicServiceMinistersinWindhoek,NamibiainFebruary2001.Itcontains29articlesenunciatingasetofprinciplestoachievethefundamentalprinciplesofthePublicService.TheCharteraffirmstheimpera-tiveofprofessionalvaluesofthePublicServiceinAfricaandredefinestheobjectivesandmissionsandspecifiesthefundamentalconditionsrequiredforstrengtheningPublicServicerole,competence,ethicalvaluesandimage;andprescribesacodeofconductforAfricanPublicServiceemployees.TheCharterdefinestheframeworktoguideAfricancountriesintakingsuchlegislative,regulatory,technicalandpracticalmeasuresasmayberequiredtostrengthenandensuretheproperfunctioningoftheirpublicservicesaswellastoimprovethequalityofservicedelivery.

FormostAfricancountries, theCharterhassincebecomeareferencepoint formeasuringthead-equacyandperformanceoftheirpublicservice.TheCommonwealthSecretariat,undertheauspicesofitsGovernanceandInstitutionalDevelopmentDivision(GIDD),isassistingAfricancountriestoachievetheobjectivesoftheCharterontheplatformoftheCommonwealthForumforAfricanHeadsofPublicServicewhichmeetseveryJuly(Adegoroye2006).


6.7.3 The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD):

NEPADwasadoptedinJuly2001attheAfricanUnionSummitinLusaka,Zambiaandisahome-grownoranAfrican-ledinitiativewithanAfricanagendatoaddressAfricanproblems(Asante2006).Itsbroadgoals includeeradicatewidespreadand severepoverty,promoteandaccelerategrowthand sustainable development and adopt and adhere to best practices in political and economicgovernance.UnderNEPAD,thereforminstrumentistheAfricanPeerReviewMechanism(APRM),a self-monitoring instrument voluntarily acceded to by member states of the African Union to meas-ureprogressintheattainmentoftheobjectivesofNEPADinfourthematicareas:(i)democraticandpoliticalgovernance;(ii)economicgovernance;(iii)corporategovernance;and(iv)socio-economicgovernance(HopeSnr.2002).

TheAPRMhasbecomethereformtoolkitdrivingsomeoftheCSRinitiativesinthefourcountries.Accordingly, anAll-AfricaPublicSector InnovationAwardshavebeen institutedand the targetedbeneficiariesarepublicservants,policymakers,politicians,CSOs,andcitizensinAfrica.Therearethreecategoriesofawards,namely,(i)innovativeservicedeliveryimprovements,(ii)innovativepart-nershipbetweengovernment,privatesectorandCSOsand(iii)innovationsinsystemsandprocessesofgovernance.Theselectioncriteriarequirethatallprojectsnominatedforawardssatisfythecondi-tionsofaninnovativeideaorconcept,theideaorconceptmusthavebeensuccessfullyimplementedwithinthepublicsectorinAfricaandshouldbenewforthecountryorcommunity(Ghana,Republicof2006).Inaddition,AfricancountriesarealsoexpectedtocelebrateintheirindividualcountriesanAll-AfricanPublicServicesDayatwhichawardswillbegiventoMDAswhichhaveexcelledininnovationandbestpractices.

6.7.4 The Commonwealth Association of Public Administration and Management (CAPAM):

TheCAPAMisaninternationalnot-for-profitmembershiporganizationwhichiscommittedtopro-motingandadvancinggoodgovernanceandpublicadministrationamongthe53Commonwealthcountries.Theorganizationwasestablished in1994bypublic servicepractitioners forpractition-ers and is headquartered inToronto, Canada. Some of its objectives include: (i) interactingwithpoliticiansandadministratorsonadministrativeissuesandalsocreatingapoliticalinterfaceamongmemberstopromoteeffectivegovernance;(ii)identifiesimportantnewtrendsinpublicsectordevel-opmentandappropriateCAPAMresponses;(iii)organizeswithmembercountriesconferences,semi-nars,workshopsandanyotherplatformtopromotesharingofgoodpracticesinpublicadministrationandmanagement;(iv)consultsseniorpublicservantsaspractitionersresponsibleforadministrativeandmanagerialfunctions,aswellasdonoragenciesandinstitutesandschoolsofPublicAdministra-tionandManagementtodeviseanddevelophighlevelprogrammestoenhancethecapabilitiesofpoliticalofficeholdersandseniorpublicmanagerstoperformtheirrespectivefunctionseffectively;and(v)promotesclosecollaborationbetweenacademicsandpractitionersinpublicadministration.


Inthisconnection,itorganizesconferencesonceineverytwoyearsatwhichmembercountriesshareexperiencesonbestpracticesandinnovations(CAPAM2007).CAPAMhasalsoabulletin,Common-wealth Innovations,whichispublishedfourtimesayearandisdedicatedtobuildingnetworksforbettergovernanceandpublicadministrationamongmembercountries.Inaddition,CAPAMhasalsoinstitutedInternationalInnovationsAwards,whicharedesignedtohighlightandrecognizeexamplesofpositivechangeinthepublicservice.TheAwardsattractalargenumberofapplicationsbiennially.For instance, in2004and2006, therewere250entries fromacross theCommonwealthandap-plicantssubmittedoutstandingprojectsintheareasofICT,housing,conservationandenvironment,transportation,taxationandhealthcare(CAPAM2007).

6.8 Summary of the drivers of CSRs:

Theexperiencesofthefourcountriesshowthatreformsbecameamajorconcernbecauseofacom-binationoftwoormoreofthefollowingreasons:(i)economicreformandtheneedtoreducebudgetdeficitsthroughimprovedeconomicperformance;(ii)theneedtorespondtoglobalchallenges(com-munication and information revolution, international trade and finance); (iii) social pressures forbetterqualityservices;(iv)goodgovernancethroughdemocratization,politicalliberalizationandthenurturingofcompetent,accountableandhonestadministration;and(v)externalpressures(donorsandsupranationalobligations)(AdamolekunandKiragu1999).

6.9 Pockets of Effectiveness, Productivity or Success:

AccordingtoRobertDaland(1981),‘pocketsofproductivity’referstopublicorganizationsthatarereasonablyeffectiveincarryingouttheirfunctionsandinservingsomeconceptionofthepublicgooddespiteoperatinginanenvironmentinwhichmostpublicorganizationsareineffectiveandsubjecttoseriouspredationbycorruption,patronage,etc.

Reformofacountry’scivilserviceasawholeasisextremelydifficultandrare.Thebroadcivilserviceandstatedownsizingreformsseektoalterthenegativeinstitutionalcontextswithinwhichmanypub-licsectororganizationswork.YetthroughoutAfrica,thereareorganizationsthatperformrelativelywell, despitedauntingunfavourable contexts anddespiteoverall poorpublic sectorperformance(Grindle1997).Consequently,insteadofcondemningthewholeCSRsasfailures,thecurrenttrendinthefourcountriesandotherAfricancountriesistostudyministries,departmentsandagenciesthathavebeensuccessful intheiroperations.Theobjectiveis tostudywhysomepublicorganizationshaveperformedandareperformingmuchbetterwithrespecttodeliveringpublicservicestocitizensthanmostothers.Threekeyquestionsareaddressedinastudyonpocketsofsuccess.Theyare(i)Howandwhydidtheselectedpublicorganizationsbecome“PocketsofEffectiveness”;(ii)Howdid


theseorganizationsmanagetopersistinacontextofweakstatehoodandpoorgovernance;and(iii)Dotheseorganizationshavethepotentialtotriggerorinspirepositivetransformationsofotherpublicorganizationsoreventheenvironmentinthenearfuture?

Box 4: Guiding Principles for Civil Service Reform Programming

Purposes:

• Improveefficiencyandeffectivenessofthecivilservice;• Ensureitsaffordabilityandsustainabilityovertime;• Raisequalityofpublicservicesdeliveredtothepopulation;• Enhancethecapacitytocarryoutcorefunctionsandsector-specificmanagementandorganization;• Promotesustainedeconomicandsocialdevelopment;• Altertheruleandfunctionsofthecivilservice;• Promotemacroeconomicstabilization;• Promoteprofessionaldevelopment:integrityandaccountability.

Prerequisites:

• Leadershipandcommitment;• Developmentofenablingenvironment;• Good governance.

Programme Design:

• Diagnosisandpreparation;• VisionandStrategy;• Sequencingandtiming;• ProcessApproach;• Strengtheningcorefunctions;• Ministerialstructuringanddecentralization;• Downsizing;• Payincentives;• Capacitydevelopment.

ImplementationMonitoringandEvaluation:

• Managementofreform;• Servicedeliverysurveys,tracerstudies;• Aidmanagement;• PolicyDialogue;• SelectiveConditionality;• Flexibility.

Sources: “Guiding Principles on Civil Service Reform” by Special Programme of Assistance for Africa (SPA) Working Group

on Civil Service Reform. Based on Case Studies from Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, Central African Republic, Benin and Burkina

Faso, November 1995. See also Wescott 1999.


Table 9: Innovative and Best Practices of the CSRs in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa

Innovation and Best Practices


i.Indigenizingandmainstreamingpro-grammeleadershipand management:

CSPIPhomegrown,participatoryandconsultativewithmeetingsandwork-shopswithstake-holders(i.e.civilservants,parliamen-tary,industry,CSOs,politicians).Technicalassistants from outside.Reformlackspoliticalleadershipand commitment.

Nothomegrown,participatoryandconsultative;largelyimposedbydonors.

Homegrown,partici-patoryandconsul-tative.Largelytheresult of commissions orenquiryreports.

Careful design of the reformprogrammeincluding learning from the lessons of reformexperiencesinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Emergenceofreformchampions,especiallyatthecabinet level and at theleadershiplevelof the civil service andinparliament.

ii. Building an incen-tiveframeworkundersevere budgetary constraints:

Pay reforms to attract skilledstaffbutlong-ertermpaypolicytoachievelivingwageproblematic.



Pay reforms to attract skilledstaffbutlong-ertermpaypolicytoachievelivingwageproblematic.Com-petitionfromprivatesector.

iii. Integrating civil servicereformpro-cesses:

Reform interventions wererunningasdis-parateprogrammesandprojectswithminimallinksandvirtually no coordi-nation.




iv. Radical reorgani-zationofgovern-ment:

Rationalizationof government institutions, roles and functions, decentrali-zation,institutionalpluralisminservicedelivery,agencifica-tion.




v. Building smart partnershipswithavarietyofstakehold-ers:

Vigorouspublicprivatepartnerships,civil society, cabinet, politicians,industry,etc.

LessPublicprivatepartnerships,civilsociety,cabinet,poli-ticians, industry, etc.

Lesspublicprivatepartnerships,civilsociety,cabinet,poli-ticians, industry, etc.

Vigorouspublicprivatepartnerships,civil society, cabinet, politicians,industry,etc.




vi.Effectiveandefficientdeliveryofpublicservices:

Ineffective and inefficientdeliveryofpublicservices.




vii. Performance management agree-mentswithseniorcivil servants:

Progress made but more room for im-provement.




viii. Promoting accountability and transparency:

Self-appraisals,ben-eficiarysurveysinthe form of consulta-tionwithclients,diagnosticworkshop,establishment of cli-ent services units and thecomplaintssys-tem;communicationstrategy involving newsletterandpressconferences.

Littleconsultationwithclientsandcus-tomersofMDAs;lackof communication strategy involving newsletterandpressconferences;littleinformation sharing betweenMDAsandpublic.

Littleconsultationwithclientsandcus-tomersofMDAs;lackof communication strategy involving newsletterandpressconferences;littleinformation sharing betweenMDAsandpublic.

Centre for Public Service Innovation influencesbehaviorandchangeworkpractices.Itengageswithstakeholders,determine areas of potentialaction.

ix.E-government: Someprogressmade to establish e-government through creationofwebsitesgovernment institu-tions.

Someprogressmade to establish e-government through creationofwebsitesgovernment institu-tions.

Someprogressmade to establish e-government through creationofwebsitesgovernment institu-tions.

Rapidprogressmade to establish e-government through creationofwebsitesgovernment institu-tions. Integrating servicedeliverywithaspecialfocusone-government.

x.Capacitybuildinginitiatives:

Littleprogressmade. Littleprogressmade. Littleprogressmade. Littleprogressmade.

xi.Reducingcorrup-tion:

Someprogressmadetoreducecorruption.




xii.Enhancedre-muneration for civil servants:

Poor remuneration packageofcivilserv-ants.







xiii.Institutionalframeworkforin-novation:

Ministry of Public Sector Reforms estab-lished to coordinate publicsectorreformin2005toprovideaninstitutional home. No institution for innovation.

National Steering Committee assisted by the Civil Service Reform Secretariat wasestablishedin1999tobetheover-all coordinating body for reform initiative in the civil service.

Bureau of Public Sector Reforms es-tablished in 2003 to initiate and coordina-tionactionplanonreform at all levels. No institution for innovation.

Centre for Public Service Innovation establishedinJune2001 to actively identify innovative solutions to service delivery challenges andsupportinnova-tors.Itproducedapocketguidetoinnovation in the South African Public Sector.

xiv.Annualcivilservice monitoring and evaluation:

Not done. Not done. Not done. Since 2000 the Public Service Com-mission initiated the Transversal Public Service Monitor-ingandEvaluationSystem(TPSM&ES)toseehowDepart-mentscomplywiththe9principlesofthe Constitution.

Source: Complied by the author


Table 10: South African Public Service Commission TPSM&ES Performance Indicator and Applicable Policies/Regulations Per Principles

Constitutional Principle Performance Indicator Applicable Policies and Regulations

1.Ahighstandardofprofessionalethicsmustbepromotedandmain-tained.

Casesofmisconductwhereadisci-plinaryhearinghasbeenconducted,complywiththeprovisionsoftheDisciplinaryCodeandProceduresforthe Public Service.

(i)DisciplinaryCodesandProceduresforthePublicService;(ii)PublicSer-vice Coordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC)Resolution2of1999asamended by PSCBC Resolution 1 of 2003;(iii)CodeofConductforthePublic Service.

2.Efficient,economicandeffectiveuse of resources.

(i)Expenditureisaccordingtothebudget;(ii)Programmeoutputsareclearlydefinedandthereiscredibleevidence.

(i)PublicFinanceManagementAct,Act1of1999,Sections38to40;(ii)TreasuryRegulationsPart3;PublicServiceRegulations,PartIII/3.Strate-gicPlanning;(iii)TreasuryGuidelinesonpreparingbudgetsubmissionsfortheyearunderreview;(iv)TreasuryGuideforthePreparationofAn-nualReportsofdepartmentsforthefinancialyearendedMarch31;(v)NationalPlanningFramework.

3. Public Administration must be development-oriented.

Thedepartmentiseffectivelyinvolvedinprogrammes/projectsthataimtopromotedevelopmentandreducepoverty.

Section195(c)ofthe1996Constitu-tion.

4.Servicesmustbeprovidedimpar-tially,fairly,equitablyandwithoutbias.

ThereisevidencethattheDepartmentfollowstheprescribedproceduresof the Promotion of Administrative JusticeAct(PAJA)whenmakingad-ministrative decisions.

(i)PromotionofAdministrativeJusticeAct,ActNo.3of2000;(ii)RegulationsonFairAdministrativeProcedures,2002;(iii)Departmentaldelegations of authority.

5.Peoples’needsmustberespondedtoandthepublicmustbeencouragedtoparticipateinpolicymaking.

TheDepartmentfacilitatespublicparticipationinpolicymaking.

WhitePaperforTransformingPublicServiceDelivery(BathoPele).


Constitutional Principle Performance Indicator Applicable Policies and Regulations

6.PublicAdministrationmustbeac-countable.

(i)Adequateinternalfinancialcontrolandperformancemanagementisexertedoveralldepartmentalpro-grammes;(ii)Fraudpreventionplans,basedonthoroughriskassessmentsareinplaceandareimplemented.

(i)PublicFinanceManagementAct,/Act1of1999;(ii)TreasuryRegula-tions,Part3:PlanningandBudgeting;(iii)WhitePaperforTransformingPublicServiceDelivery(BathoPele);(iv)PublicServiceRegulations.PartIII/B.StrategicPlanning.;(v)Treas-uryGuidelinesonpreparingbudgetsubmissions,2002;TreasuryGuideforthePreparationofAnnualReportsofdepartmentsfortheNationalPlanningFramework.

7.Transparencymustbefosteredbyprovidingthepublicwithtimely,ac-cessible and accurate information.

(i)DepartmentalAnnualReportcomplieswithNationalTreasury’sguidelineonannualreporting;and(ii)Accesstoinformation:theDepart-mentcomplieswiththeprovisionsofthe Promotion of Access to Informa-tionAct(PAIA).

(i)PublicFinanceManagementAct,/Act1of1999;(ii)NationalTreas-ury’sguidelineforthepreparationofAnnualReports;(iii)theDepart-ment of Public Administration guide foranOversightReportonHumanResource;(iv)PublicServiceCom-mission,EvaluationofDepartments’AnnualReportsasanAccountabilityMechanism,October1999;(v)WhitePaperforTransformingPublicServiceDelivery(BathoPele);(vi)Promotionof Access to Information Act, 2000, Act2of2000;(vii)Departmentaldelegations of authority.

8.Goodhumanresourcemanage-mentandcareer-developmentprac-tices,tomaximizehumanpotential,must be cultivated.

(i)Recruitment:Vacantpostsarefilledinatimelyandeffectivemanner;(ii)SkillsDevelopment:TheDepartmentcomplieswiththeprovisionsoftheSkillsDevelopmentAct.

(i)PublicServiceRegulations,2001asamended;(ii)PublicServiceAct.

9.PublicadministrationmustbebroadlyrepresentativeoftheSouthAfricanpeople,withemploymentandpersonnelpracticesbasedonability,objectivity,fairness,andtheneedtoredresstheimbalancesofthepasttoachievebroadrepresentation.

TheDepartmentisrepresentativeoftheSouthAfricanpeopleandisimplementingdiversitymanagementmeasures.

(i)PartVIPublicServiceRegulations,2001asamended;(ii)EmploymentEquityAct,Act55of1998;(iii)WhitePaperontheTransformationofthePublicService–15/11/1995;(iv)WhitePaperonAffirmativeActioninthe Public Service, 2001.

Source: Public Services Commission, Fourth Consolidated Public Service Monitoring and Evaluation Report, October 2007:

3-4.


CHAPTER VII: Challenges Facing Civil Service Reforms and Strategies for Addressing them

7.1 Major Challenges Posed to Effective Civil Service Reforms:

Anumberofcountry-specificchallengesareidentifiedbelow.Itisalsoinstructivetonotethateventhoughthechallengesarecountry-specific,theyresonateinCSRsinthefourcountries.

7.1.1 The Ghanaian Experience:

TheoutcomeoftheCSPIPhasbeeninfluencedbytheweaknessesinherentinthedesignandimple-mentationprocess.Theyincludethefollowing:(i)Toomanyreformactivitiesgoingonconcurrently,withinadequatesequencingthatseemedtohaveoverburdenedthesamepeopleanddidnotexploitthe synergiesof thevarious reformdimensions suchaspublicfinancialmanagement reformpro-gramme,legalreformanddecentralization.Asisusuallyassociatedwithchange,turfbattlesensued,butwerenotproperlydealtwithbytheNationalInstitutionalRenewalProgramme(NIRP)andtheOHCS,whichweresupposedtoprovidecoordinationandoverseetheprocessinordertoenhancethereformsuccess;(ii)keyservice-wideconstraintsrelatingtobudgetreform,payandrewardreformswere not undertaken, thereby serving as amajor disincentive to employeemorale. For example,peoplekeptasking“whatisinitforme?”;(iii)ittargetedtoomanyorganizations,180MDAsinall(seeTable6)andhencesupportwasthinlyspread,whichreduceditsintendedimpact;(iv)ServiceDelivery Standards andClient ServicesUnits thatwere establisheddidnot receive thenecessaryfinancialbackingandlogisticalsupporttofunctionasanticipated;(v)supportforthereformsatthehighest level (bothpoliticalandbureaucratic)wascosmetic; (vi) thereformmethodologybecametoomechanistic.Forexample,theMinistriesofAgricultureandHealth,thatwererelativelyadvancedbyvirtueoftheirpastsectoralreformexercisecouldhaveby-passedcertainstagesoftheprocess;(vii) theexpectedskills transferdidnot takeplacebecausetheprogrammewasaimedatmeetingtargets,asituationthatissupportedbytheliterature.Donorstendtotreatpublicsectorreformasan“engineeringproblem”,aphenomenontobeaddressedthroughtextbooksolutionsandhencefavourmechanisticinterventionsfeaturingquantitativetargets(Antwiet.al.2008;Schacter2000).

7.1.2 The Kenyan Experience

Someofthereasonsthatledtothedisappointingoutcomesinclude:(i)lackofadequateplanningbeforetheimplementationoftheCSRs.Thereformagendawasnotsetcarefullyandprioritizedwhile


inadequatetimeandresourceswerenotallocated;(ii)reformprocessandrationalizationwerenotfullyinternalized,ownedandhomegrownforeventualimplementationandsustainabilitybecausereformingMDAsdidnotfullycomprehendthewayforwardandthereforefullyinvolvedinthede-velopmentoftheactionplanforimplementation;(iii)noacceptanceofreformwasbuiltamongtopmanagersintheservice;(iv)lackofadequatefundstomountdemand-driventrainingprogrammesforallcadresinserviceledtocapacityproblems(Kenya,Republicof1997;Adamolekun2005;Kpundeh2004;Kenya,Republicof2005).

7.1.3 The Nigerian Experience

Someofthefactorsare:(i) increasingpressuresforemployment,utilizationofinformalsourcesofrecruitment,longmilitaryera,federalcharacterprinciple,lackofindependenceoftheFederalCivilService Commission and delegation of recruitment function have affected recruitment in the civil service;(ii)jobdescriptionandstandardpersonnelrequirementsarenotadequatelyusedinthere-cruitmentprocess,especiallyatthelowestcategoryofgradelevels;(iii)thekeycontributoryfactortoweakservicedeliveryincludepoorincentivestructuresforstaff,capacitydepletionandaverylim-itedapplicationofmanagementinformationsystemtechnology;(iv)institutionalizedcorruptionasaresultoftheinabilityofanti-corruptionagenciestoperformtheirfunctions;(v)longyearsofmilitaryruleanditseffectsonthedevelopmentofademocraticcultureorethos;(vi)inadequatepublicser-vicecultureortraditionwhichisvalue-based,whichcannotdrawfromuniversalpublicserviceval-uessuchaspublictrust,impartiality,equity,transparency,ethicalstandardsandselflessness(Otobo1999;Agagu2008).

7.1.4 The South African Experience

Someofthereasonsare:(i)PerformancemanagementcontracthasbeenunderminedbythelackofasubstantiveperformancecultureintheSouthAfricanpublicservice;(ii)thereisthequestionofor-ganizationculture.Theworkingenvironmentofcivilservantsandotherpublicservantshasimpactednegativelyon“BathoPele’s”effectiveness.Management’sfailuretoactdecisivelyonethicaltrans-gressionsandallegedcorruptioncoupledwithageneralwaveofmaterialisticgreedunderminethepromotionandapplicationofprofessionalethicsandconstitutionalvalues(DPSA2007:13,47);(iii)McLennan(2007)arguedthat“BathoPele”hascreatedaframeworkfortreatingcitizensascustomerswhichhasarguablycreatedaself-interestedratherthanprofessionalculturewithinthepublicservice;(iv)theachievementofthedevelopmentalstategoalsbecameunrealisticbecauseeventhoughthepublicserviceishighlyeducatedintermsoftertiaryqualifications,thereisstillaproblemofpoorskillslevelwithintheservice.AccordingtoButler(2008:2-3),SouthAfricadoesnothavetheskillsbasethattheEastAsiandevelopmentalstatesenjoyed.Southall(2006)statesthatameritocraticpub-licserviceformsthebasisofthesedevelopmentalstates;(v)giventhehistoricalinjusticesofthepast,oneofthemajorprioritiesoftheANCgovernmentistopromoteamorerepresentativeworkforce.


TheANCthereforeintroducedapolicyofaffirmativeactionforblacks,womenandgender(Ncholo2000).Thereisevidencetosuggestthatpatronageappointmentsinthepublicservicehavegrownsubstantiallysince1994.ThereistheinfluenceofthecontroversialdeploymentpolicyoftheANC,whichdeployspartymemberstoseniormanagementpositionsinthepublicsector,manyofwhomlackexperience (UNDP2004;Picard1999;2005); (vi) therearestill staff shortages in thepublicserviceleadingtotheintroductionofOccupationalSpecificDispensations(OSDs)forspecificpro-fessionssuchashealthandeducationinordertoretainskilledstaff;(vii)thereisbraindrainfromthecivilservicetothemorelucrativeprivatesector(CameronandMilne2008).APSCReportof2005statedthattherewasnotenoughskilledmanagerialstaff.HeadsofDepartmentshaveindicatedthefailure to retain skills in the government as themajor reason government departments outsourceprojects insteadof implementing themwith their internalstaff.Thissuggests thatoutsourcingwasundertakenforpragmaticratherthanideologicalreasons(PSC2005).

7.1.5 Evidence of Reversal of Elements of Civil Service Reforms in Some African Countries

Eventhoughcivilservicereformshavesomesuccesses,thereisevidenceofreversalofsomeofitselementsinsomeareasandcountries.Akeyareathathassufferedreversesisdownsizing.Downsiz-ingwasdonewithoutputtinginplaceapolicyofensuringthatasufficient,motivatedandcompetentworkforceremainsinthecivilservice.TheexperienceofmanyAfricancountriesisthatsuchpolicywasmissing,andthisledtoreformreversalseveninsuccessfulcountriessuchasGhanaandUgandawherethesizeofthecivilserviceroseagain(AfDB2005).

ExcessiveorinappropriatedownsizinginseveralAfricancountrieshasconstrainedthecapacityofthestate toperformanddeliver serviceseffectively.Staff reductionandemployment freezeshavecreatedshortagesofskilledprofessionalsandtechniciansthroughouttheservices,andoffront-lineworkersneededtosustain,improvequalityandexpandpublicservicesinkeyareassuchaseduca-tion,healthandagriculturalextension.Often,retrenchmenthasconcentratedonlabourinthelowerechelons–drivers,messengersanddailypaidworkers.Wagessavedfromsuchretrenchmentsaresubstantiallyinsufficienttoachievethedesiredtargets.Freezingofemploymentalsocontributedtotheageingof thecivilservice,with implications forpensionspaymentsas theoldercivilservantsretire(AfDB2005).

7.2 Civil Service Reforms and Poverty Reduction in the Four Countries

Poverty and inequality continue to be pressing problems facingAfrican countries. Reformswerethereforemeanttobuildthecapacityofthecivilservicetoenableitperformitsfunctions.Fundamen-tally,theabilityofgovernmenttolegitimatelytaxandgovernpeopleispremisedonitscapacitytodeliverawiderangeofservicesrequiredbyitspopulationwhichnootherplayerwillprovide.Even


thoughcivilservicereformsinAfricawerenotspecificallytargetedtopovertyreduction,theunstatedunderlyingassumptionwas thatonce thecivil servicewascapableofprovidingvalue formoneypublicservices,thiswillcascadedowntootherstateinstitutionsatthelocalleveltobuildtheneces-sarycapacitytobeabletoprovideservicesforthepoor.Unfortunately,civilservicereformsinthefourcountrieswerenotabletoreducepovertythroughtheprovisionanddeliveryofpublicservicestothepoor.Furthermore,muchpovertyinruralareasinAfricagoesunperceivedaspublicandcivilservantsconcernedwithbringingdevelopmentperpetuatebiaseswhichoverlookandmisunderstandthenatureandextentofpoverty.

Asaresultoftheinabilityofreformstodealwithpoverty,thedonorcommunityespeciallytheWorldBankandIMFaskedcountriestodesignpovertyreductionstrategyprogrammes(PRSPs).Inaddition,the fourcountriesare far frommeeting theMillenniumDevelopmentGoals (MDGs),whichhavebecomeapriority.

7.3 Point at which the Countries are Addressing the Challenges

Thereisgrowingconcernbygovernmentsandtheircitizensinthefourcountriesovertheslowpaceofreforms.Accordingly,thefourgovernmentshavetakensomestepstograpplewiththechallengesofsequencingandthepaceof thereforms.Someof themeasurestakenincludethefollowing: (i)more political and bureaucratic commitment and support to reforms through treating them as apriorityintheallocationofservicebudgetaryresourcesbothbythegovernmentanddevelopmentpartners;(ii)situatingorplacingthereformeffortsmorecloselyinthecontextofcountryspecific-itybyacknowledgingthatsuccessfulandsustainableeconomicreformcannottakeplacewithoutacompetentpublicadministration;(iii)therecognitionthatthereformsareacontinuousexercisethathavetendedtodeveloptheirownmomentumthatsuccessivepoliticalleadershipteamsaswellassuccessiveadministrativeleadershipteamswilldeepen,invaryingdegrees,dependingonprevailingcircumstanceswithinandoutsidethecountries;and(iv)thedecisionofthegovernmentstoinvolvemorestakeholdersinthereformprocessthroughtheappointmentofsomerepresentativesoftheleg-islatureandselectedstakeholdersfromtheprivateandcivilsocietysectorsatthereformdesignstagetoenhanceitscredibilityandthechancesofsuccessfulimplementation.


CHAPTER VIII: Conclusions, Findings, Lessons and Policy Recommendations

8.1 Conclusion

Thestrategiesadoptedbythefourcountriesareon-going.ThefourcountrieshaverealizedthatCSRsaredifficulttoimplementandtakealongtimetoachieveandthereforepatienceisneededgiventheirspecificcountrypolitical,economic,andsocialaswellasculturalenvironments.Theyhavealsoun-derstoodthereformexperiencesmustbeviewedaslearningopportunitiesandcorrectionsmadeasonemovesalong.Againstthisbackdrop,anumberofstrategieshavebeendesignedtodealwiththechallenges.Theyinclude(i)Linkingcivilservicereformstootherpublicsectorreformsandensuringthatthereiscoordinationandharmonizationofefforts;(ii)capacitybuildingeffortsthroughtrainingneedsassessmentandholistictrainingofstafftailoredmeasuredtoberelevanttotheoperationsoftheMDAs;(iii)improvingconditionsofservicethroughcompensatoryreformstoretainandattractskilledstaff;(iv)improvedcommitmentandsupportonCSRsfrompoliticiansandseniorbureaucratseventhoughthereismoreroomforimprovement;(v)designingandenforcingcodeofconductforpublicservantstoensurethedevelopmentofapublicserviceethosorculture;(vi)passinglegislationtostreamlineprocurement,accounting,auditingprocedures,encouragewhistle-blowingandrighttoinformationandtherebypromoteaccountabilityandtransparency;(vii)inter-countrysharingofCSRsexperiencesmarkedbyvisitsoftheHeadsofCivilServiceandMinisterforPublicService;(viii)adoptionandadaptingtherequirementsoftheCharteronAfricanPublicService,NEPADandAPRMandensuringthatasmuchaspossible,therequirementsaremet;(ix)continuingredefinitionoftheroleofthestatethroughinitiativesofnotonlyencouraginggreatercompetitionandserviceprovisionbutalsoprovidingthefacilitativeandregulatoryframework;(x)increasingrecognitionofthevalueofneutralityofcivilservants,andoftheneedtosecureadegreeofautonomyofpublicpersonnelmanagementfromextraneouspressuresinordertosafeguardhighqualityperformance(Olowu199;2003;AfDB2005;Ayee2008).

8.2 Findings: What works and what does not in Civil Service Reforms in Africa:

ThepaperhasshownthatthereisanactiveongoingsearchinGhana,Kenya,NigeriaSouthAfricaandotherAfricancountriesforwaysofcreatinganeffective,efficientandsustainablepublicsectorreformstrategy.Thesearchhasbeenledbythedonorcommunity.Indeed,inthefourcountries,withthesupportofthedonoragencies–especiallytheWorldBank–haveexperimentedwithvariousre-


formstrategiessincethe1980s.Althoughtherehavebeenmarginalsuccessinreducingthesizeofthepublicsector,inmanycasesthishasleftademoralizedandunmotivatedpersonnellargelyincapableofperformingbasicfunctions(MutahabaandKiragu2002).Severalreasonshavebeenadvancedfortheapparentfailureofthesepolicies(Nunberg1999).Moreimportantly,however,themixedrecordofthereformeffortshascompelledAfricangovernmentsandtheinternationalcommunitytore-eval-uatethepolicies.Theresulthasbeenasoberrealizationthatimprovingtheperformanceofpublicorganizationsisdifficultandmulti-facetedtaskthatmustincludestrategiestochangethe“rulesofthegame”fundamentally.Italsorequireslong-term,high-levelcommitmentandextensivesupportbycivilservants,nationalleadersandtheinternationalcommunity(StevensandTeggemann2004).

Thefailureofreformeffortshasledtoanumberofstudiesarguingthatengagementwithpublicsec-tor reforms in isolation fromthebroadercivil serviceculturewouldhaveonly limitedeffect,andstressingtheneedforunderstandingthecontextasitaffectsthe“enablingenvironment”forcapacitydevelopment.Boothet.al(2005),forinstance,usesa“drivers-of-change”approachtoanalyzehowchangeoccurs,thepowerrelationshipsatstakeandthestructuralandinstitutionalfactorsunderlyingtheoften-observed“lackofpoliticalwill”behindthereformprocess.Thesestudiesareimportantinexplainingwhyreformsinsomecountriessucceed,whiletheyfailinothers(StevensandTeggemann2004).However, they ignore thequestionofwhydifferentorganizationswithin thesamecontextsometimesresponddifferentlytoreforms.

Given the foregoing, theon-going search for effective strategies to transform thepublic sector inAfricashouldconcentrateon thedifferentialperformanceoforganizationswithinacountry.Eventhoughpublicsectorreformpolicieshavebeenbasedonthepremisethatallpublicorganizationsare ineffective, there isevidence that it isnotallpublicsectororganizations thathaveperformedpoorlysinceonecanidentifysomethathaveperformedrelativelywell(Grindle1997).Consequently,ananalysisofthecausesofdifferencesinperformanceinthepublicsectorcouldhaveasignificantimpactonpolicy. Inaddition, theconceptoforganizationalcultureneeds tobeflaggedaseveryorganizationhasacultureandthereforeanystrategyforreformshouldincludeeffortstochangetheculture(Owusu2006).

CivilServiceReforms(CSRs)inthefourcountriestendtocompelrecipientcountriestoproducetargetbound“socalled”bestpracticecases.Whatwouldappeartobetherealitywithregardstoreformsinthecountriessuggeststheneedtorecognizethat:

The central focus of public service reform rightly remains the transformation of the conditions of employment of career public officials, who occupy key positions in government organization so as to enable public authorities to attract, retain and reward talented professionals and make them more responsive to citizen needs and expectations. Once the citizen see the evidence of administrative reform in


the form of improvements in service delivery and administration, the virtuous cycle of political acceptance and effective implementation will gain momentum (Caiden and Sundaram, 2004: 383).

Basedontheexperiencesofthefourcountries,aframeworkforre-thinkingcivilservicereformsug-geststhreebroadareasofconcernsthathavetoberecognizedinfuturecivilservicereform(seeFig-ure1).Thecentralargumentoftheframeworkisthatfirst,therearecriticalsuccessfactorsthatneedtobeconsideredandconsciouslyincorporatedintoanyreformprocess.Sevensuchfactorshavebeenidentified.Theyare(i)wholeheartedpoliticalleadershipcommitment;(ii)wholeheartedbureaucraticleadershipcommitment;(iii)thoughtfulsynergisticplanning/preparation;(iv)patienceforimplemen-tationandevaluation;(v)capacitytoconvince,neutralizeand/oraccommodatereform-phobiasandcritics;(vi)sustainablefinancialandtechnicalresourceavailability;and(vii)consciousnurturingofgeneralpublicsupport (Antwiet.al.2007;CaidenandSundaram2004;Olowu1999;2003;Ayee2008).

Secondly, one should look at the challenges confronting institutions and their operatives, that is,publicandcivil servantsand technocratsgiven thegrowingpublicskepticismofgovernmentanditsagents.There is theperception that individuals insideoroutsidegovernmenthavebecome in-capableofaltruism,thatis,peopleseektheirselfinterestandnotthepublicinterest.ThishasbeenbuttressedbythestudyofKeenet.al(2005)whicharguesthatrigidinstitutionalstructurescandis-engageorganizationsfrombecomingco-learnerswithexternalplayersoractors.Inthepublicsectororganizationsthissituationleadsthemintofour-institutionaltraps,namely,(a)theadministrative-trap whereinstitutionalarrangementsbecomeinflexibleanddrivenbynarrowlydefinedmanagementorefficiencyconsiderationsthatareunabletotakeintoaccountnewinformation,differentinterestordiversevalues;(b)thecompetency-trapunderwhichbureaucraciesbecomeverygoodatwhattheydo,butareunabletoinnovateandrespondtonewchallengesrequiringdifferentapproaches;(c)thebureaucratic-trapwhereplanningprocessesbecomecapturedbybureaucratichierarchiesandareunabletointegrateinternalinputsintothedecision-makingframeworks;and(d)thelegitimacy-trap underwhich bureaucratic processes become focused onmaintaining legitimacy by servicing theinterestsofanarrowrangeofinterestgroups((Keenet.al.2005;ReschenthalerandThompson1988;Gruening2001).Thuscitizensseepublicsectorinstitutionsastoobig,costly,wasteful,unproductive,inefficient,ineffectiveandunnecessarilybureaucratic,coupledwiththecomplaintthatpublicsectoroperatives,thatis,civilandpublicservantsareequallytoo:parasiticrentseeking,incompetent,rude,officious,mean,abusiveandcorruptasindicatedintheinstitutionandoperatorschallengesdimen-sion(seeFigure1).Itisthuscrucialforreformersnotonlytofocusonthecriticalsuccessfactorsbutalsotounderstandcivilsocietyconcernsandaddressthemaccordingly(Antwiet.al.2008;CaidenandSundaram2004;Olowu2003;Adamolekun2005;AfDB2005).


Thirdly, reform in the 21stcenturywillhardlysucceedwithoutcontextualizingreformeffortswithincountry specific realities including its history, culture,politics, economy, sociology, ideologyandvalues.InthewordsofBrianLevy(2004:11)“…aprincipalreasonforthelimitedsuccessofreformswastheimplicitpresumptionthattheweaknessofpublicadministrationasmanagerialandcouldberemediedinastraightforwardmannerthroughacombinationoforganizationaloverhaulandfinan-cialsupporttoprocuretherequisitespecialisttechnicaladvice,trainingandhardware.Bycontrast,acentrallessonofexperience….isthatpublicadministrationsareembeddedinacomplex,inter-dependentsystem.Thissystemincorporatesnotonlythebureaucraticapparatusasawhole,butalsopoliticalinstitutionsandsocial,economic,andpoliticalinterestsmorebroadly”.

Fourthly,civilservicereformsinthefourcountrieshavebeenlargelyexternally-driven,whichhascontributedtosomeofthechallengesfacingthereforms.Accordingly,premiumneedstobeplacedoninternally-drivenreformswhichstandabetterchanceofsuccess.

8.3.1 Lessons

ThefollowinglessonscanthereforebelearnedfrompublicandcivilservicereformsinAfrica:

• Reformeffortsshouldbeguidedbyaholisticvision,sharedbyallkeystakeholders,aspub-licandcivilservicereformsrequirechampionsandpoliticalcommitmentfromthehighestlevelsofgovernmentandsociety;

• Institutionbuilding,development-orientedleadershipandcommittedworkforceplayanimportantroleinnurturingawell-functioningcivilservicesystem;

• Reformisacontinuousexerciseandittendstodevelopitsownmomentumthatsucces-sivepoliticalandadministrativeleadershipteamswoulddeepen,dependingonprevailingcircumstanceswithinandoutsidethecountry;

• Soundeconomicpoliciesandavibrantpublicservicearekeyingredientsforkeepingacountryina“virtuous”cyclezoneofgovernanceandpublicadministrationcontinuum;

• Civilservicereforms(CSRs)mustbelinkedtosuchcomponentsasfinancialmanagement,decentralizationandsector-wideapproaches.Alongterm,system-wideapproachtocivilserviceandpublicsectorreformsmustbeadopted.AselectiveintroductionofNPMideasandpracticesshouldbeadapted;

• Africangovernmentsneedtobuildavibrantpublicservicecapableofunderstandingthechallengesofdevelopment,analyzingdevelopmentpolicyproposalanddesigningandim-plementingeffectivepoliciesinachangingdomesticandglobalenvironment.Anefficientandeffectivepublicservicerequiresnotonlycostcontainmentandstaffretrenchmentbutalsoincentivestoattractandretainhighlyskilledadministrativeofficials.Whentheincen-tivestructuresinthepublicandcivilservicesremainpoor,itsefficiencyaswellasabilitytoeffectpolicieswillremainverylow(AfDB2005).


Figure 1: A Framework for Re-thinking Public Service Reform

RECOGNIZE CORE CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS:• WholeheartedPolitical

LeadershipCommitment;• Wholehearted

BureaucraticLeadershipCommitment;

• Thoughtful Synergistic Planning/Preparation;

• Patience for ImplementationandEvaluation;

• CapacitytoConvince,NeutralizeandAccommodate Reform-phobiasandCritics;

• SustainableFinancialand Technical Resource Availability;and

• Conscious Nurturing of GeneralPublicSupport

OPERATORS ARE TOO

• Parasitic• Rentseeking• Incompetent• Rude• Officious• Mean• Abusive• Corrupt

INSTITUTIONS ARE TOO

• Big• Costly• Wasteful• Unproductive• Inefficient• Ineffective• Bureaucratic

INSTITUTIONAL & OPERATORS CHALLENGES

CONSIDER COUNTRY SPECIFIC CONTEXT• History• Culture• Politics• Economy• Sociology• Ideology• Values

Source: Antwi et.al. “Public Sector Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa” (2008): 262.

8.4 Policy Recommendations

ThereisnodoubtthatCSRswillcontinuetobeamajorpreoccupationofgovernmentsinAfricagiventhecrucialroletheCivilServiceisexpectedtoplayinthedevelopmentprocess.Accordingly, forfuturereformeffortstobesuccessfulthefollowingpolicyrecommendationsarebeingmade:

8.4.1 Reforms Should Focus not only on Management but also on Leadership:

LeadershipiscentraltosuccessfulimplementationofCSRs.Publicandcivilservicereformsasim-plementedhavefocusedonimprovingthemanagementoforganizations.Buttheproblemofmanypublicsectororganizationsisthelackofeffectiveleadershiptoinstitutethechangesnecessaryfor


creatingeffectiveorganizations.Kotter’s(1996)distinctionbetweenmanagementandleadershipisapthere.Accordingtohim,managementinvolvesasetofprocessestohelpkeepthecomplicatedsystemofpeopleandtechnologyrunningsmoothly,includingplanning,budgeting,organizing,staff-ing,controllingandproblem-solving.Conversely,leadershipinvolvesasetofprocessesthatcreateorganizations in thefirstplaceoradapt them tosignificantlychangingcircumstances.Leadershipdefineswhatthefuturelookslike,alignspeoplewiththatvision,andinspiresthemtomakeithap-pen,despiteobstacles.

Lackofvisionaryleadershipisaseriousproblem,particularlymostAfricancountrieswhereapoorincentivesystem,lackofresources,andexcessivelybureaucraticrulesandregulationsmakeitex-tremelydifficulttoattractandretainsuchpeople.TheoftenconstrainingcivilserviceenvironmentinmanyAfricancountriescan,anddoes,frustratemanyreform-mindedandvisionaryleaders.How-ever,thereareexamplesofeffectiveleaderswhohavesucceededintransformingsomepublicinstitu-tions,whatonemightcalled“pocketsofsuccessorproductivity”.Althoughthereisoftentheneedtoimprovethemanagementofpublicorganizations,itisequallycriticalforallpublicorganizationstohavea“collectivelycreated”commonframeofreferencewhichcanbeeffectivelycreatedonlybyaleaderormanager(Mahler1997).

Arevolutionarybreedofleadershipthatconsistentlypromotesefficiency,honesty,productivityandpublic offeringswhile fiercely standing against illegitimatepolitical forces is critical.Meritocracyratherthanethnicityortribalismorindeedpoliticalpartypatronagemustcontinuetoreignsupremeincivilserviceappointments.Acceptanceofreformsshouldbebuiltamongsttop-levelmanagerssothatreformscansucceed(MarwaandZairi2009).

8.4.2 Tailor Reform Policies to Specific Organizations

Moreattention shouldbepaid to country-to-country studies toprovideamore sophisticatedun-derstandingofpoliticalandsocial systems, incentivestructures,andsourcesof leadershipand toincorporatethisunderstandingintothedesignofreformpolicy(DACNetworkonGovernance2006).Takingtheargumentforward,oneshouldavoid“one-size-fits-all”reformstrategiesandtailorreformpoliciestospecificorganizations.Sincedifferentorganizations–eventhoseinthesamecountryorinthesamesector–couldhavedifferentcultures,itiscriticalthatonetakeseachorganization’scultureorculturesintoconsiderationindesigningreformstrategies.Indeed,theWorldBank(2002:17)hasconcededthatoneshould“startwitha thoroughunderstandingofwhatexistsonthegroundandemphasize‘goodfit’ratherthananyone-size-fits-allnotofbestpractice”.Understandingwhatexistonthegroundrequiresanunderstandingofthecultureofeachorganization.Organizationalchangetherefore entails a good understanding of the nature of the culture, an assessment of the culture – in-cludingthemultiplesubcultures–understandingthedifferentculturalforms,andusingthoseformstofacilitatechange,wherenecessary(Owusu2006;Grindle1997).


8.4.3 Cultural Change

Culturalchange isa long-termprocess,as such, itmustbe temperedwith ‘quickwins.’ Initiatingsustainablereformrequiresthefullcommitmentofnationalpoliticalandbureaucraticleadersandtheinternationalcommunity,andthesupportofemployees(WorldBank2005).Changingorganiza-tionalculturesasawayofimprovingtheperformanceofpublicorganizationsisnoexception.Lackofcommitmentbypoliticiansandbureaucratsoftenresultsinlapsesinpolicyimplementation.Theshort-termdemandsofthedonorcommunityalso“havesometimescompromisedlongertermgoalsofinstitutionalbuilding,withnegativelongtermimpacts(WorldBank2000:xiii).Thecommitmentofpublicsectoremployeestothereformeffortisalsonecessarytocreateasenseofownershipandtodiffuseso-called“reformfatigue”.Abetterunderstandingoftheenablingenvironmentforcapacitybuildinganddevelopmentandusingtheknowledgeofdesigningreformpoliciesiscriticalinallcas-es.Inaddition,instituting‘quickwins’canbehelpfulinmakingsuchalong-termapproachtopublicsectorreformacceptabletopoliticalandadministrativeleaders.‘Quickwins’areawayofprovidingapositivefacetopublicsectorreformbydemonstratingthatreformisnotjustaboutsacrificesandpain;italsoinvolvessignificantimprovementsinservicedelivery.Moreover,insituationswheretheenablingenvironmentmakescomprehensivereformunfeasible,itmaybeexpedienttoprofessional-izethepublicserviceoneagencyatatime,respondingtothemosturgentneedsforcapacity(WorldBank2005;Grindle1997;AfDB2005).

8.4.4 Reforming the Incentive System is a Prerequisite for Cultural Change

Theimportanceofadequatesalariesandatransparentincentivesysteminpromotingefficientpublicsectororganizationscannotbeover-emphasized.Increasingemployeeremunerationwouldnotonlystemtheoutflowofworkersfromthepublicsectorbutalsoreducecorruption.Discussionsonsalaryreformmustbeopenandhonest;however,theymustbebasedondialoguebetweenthegovernmentandtheotherstakeholders,especiallytheunions.Suchadialoguewouldhelpeducatethestakehold-ersaboutthebudgetaryconstraintsfacedbythegovernmentaswellasprovidinganopportunityforthegovernmenttoimposeuponthestakeholderstheneedforincreasedeffectivenessaswayofjusti-fyinghigherwages(Owusu2006;Olowu2003;AfDB2005;Adamolekun2005).

8.4.5 The Creation of a Pan-African Administrative Space

SimilartotheEuropeanAdministrativeSpaceof1997isimperativetoidentifycommonprinciples,strategyandactionsofpublicadministrationthatmaybecloselylinkedtothegovernanceissuesad-dressedintheAPRM:democracyandpoliticalgovernance,economicgovernanceandmanagement,corporategovernanceandsocio-economicdevelopment.Astartingpointcouldbetheprinciplesun-derpinningthe“CharterforthePublicServiceinAfrica”adoptedattheThirdPan-AfricanConferenceon the Ministers of the Public Service held in Namibia in 2001.


Theprinciplesare:(i)principleofequalityoftreatment;(ii)principleofneutrality;(iii)principleoflegality;and(iv)principleofcontinuity.Theprinciplesandcriteriatobeadoptedwould,however,need to have a broader orientation, including issues of economic management, accountability and transparencyandadministrativecompetence(Adamolekun2005).

8.4.6 The Move towards the New Public Service:

Africancountriesshouldmove towardswhat iscalled the“NewPublicService” (NPS),which in-volvesasetof ideasabout theroleofpublicadministrationin thegovernancesystemthatplacescitizensatthecentre(DenhardtandDenhardt2000).Itisonewhichwill“serveratherthansteer”andenablespublicandcivilservantstohelpcitizensarticulateandmeettheirsharedinterestsratherthanattempttocontrolorsteersociety.Itisbuiltonworkindemocraticcitizenship,communityandcivilsociety,organizationalhumanismanddiscoursetheory(DenhardtandDenhardt2000).Accord-ingly,publicandcivilservantsshouldfocusontheirresponsibilitytoserveandempowercitizensastheymanagepublicorganizationsandimplementpublicpolicy.Inotherwords,withcitizensattheforefront,theemphasisshouldnotbeplacedoneithersteeringorrowingthegovernmentalboat,butratheronbuildingpublicinstitutionsmarkedbyintegrityandresponsiveness.ThefeaturesoftheNewPublicServicearecontrastedwiththeoldpublicadministrationandnewpublicmanagement(NPM)(seeTable11),whichhavebeenpracticedinAfricawithlimitedsuccess.Indeed,theNPSistoreplaceboththeoldpublicadministrationandtheNPM(DenhardtandDenhardt2000).

8.4.7 Developing African Benchmarks for Civil Service Reforms

DevelopingAfricanbenchmarksforinnovationsandbestpracticesinCivilServiceReformsitisanuphilltasktodevelopuniformbenchmarksforinnovationandbestpracticesincivilservicereformsgiventhediversityoftheAfricancountries.Benchmarkinginvolvesthesettingofminimumstandards“floors”whoseperformanceshouldnotbepermittedtofallbelowandthenbenchmarkperformancewithin/withoutwithbestpracticewhoseperformanceexceedssuchfloors.Thecivilserviceshouldbenchmarkperformanceagainstthebestinclasstoprovidechoiceinbothsourcesofserviceanddeliverymeans.Inthisway,benchmarkingwillfostercompetition,attractpotentialprivateinvestorsandraisethecostofharbouringpoorperformancetothedelightandbenefitofallcitizens.

BenchmarkinginnovationsandbestpracticesinAfricashouldtakeintoaccountthefollowingthreeareas:(i)Public Service Management and Accountability: The Public Service is the largest organi-zationintermsofemployment,budgetandimpactonsociety.EffectiveadministrationofthislargeandcomplexenterpriseisanessentialelementinthedevelopmentandgrowthofAfricancountries.Withthediversityofcircumstancesandsocio-economicsituations,fundamentalprinciplesofgoodmanagement,leadershipandtransparentaccountabilityrequireinnovativeadaptationsforeffectiveimplementation;(ii)Government Services and Programmes: The fundamental role of the civil service


istoenhancethewelfareofitscitizens.Servicesandprogrammesrangefromstrategiestocontroldisease,extendinghealthcareandeducationalservices,tofacilitatingroutinetransactionswithgov-ernmentorganizations.Withlimitedhumanandfinancialresources,optimizinggovernmentinvest-mentsforthegreatestpublicgoodwillrequireinnovativepolicies,pioneeringstrategiesandinventiveimplementation;citizendialoguetofostermutualunderstandingandtomediatedecisions.Withthepluralityofcitizeninterestsbasedongeographical,societalandeconomicdifferences,maintaininganopendialogwithcitizensandsustainingeffectivedemocraticprocessesrequireinnovativestrate-giesandprocesses;(iii)Use of Technology in the Public Service: Despitedecadesofadvancementsininformationandcommunicationstechnology(ICT),theirrategrowthisstillaccelerating.WhiletherehavebeenmanysuccessesinadaptingthesetechnologiestoservethePublicService,therehavebeenmanyspectacularfailures.Innovationsareneededtomanagethesetechnologiestoharnesstheirpo-tentialforeffectivepublicserviceoperations.

BenchmarkinginnovationandbestpracticesincivilservicereformsinAfricashouldincludethefivecriteria:(i)The Innovation:Theelement(s)oftheideathatmakesitnew,uniqueandinnovative;howtheideahaschangedthinkingandperceptionaboutaproblemanditssolution;howthisnewunder-standingtranslateintousefulpracticesthatareofbenefittothepublicserviceanditscitizens;(ii)Ap-propriateness to Context:howappropriateistheinitiativetolocalornationalsocio-economiccondi-tions;strategiesthatareadoptedtoadapttheinnovationtolocalcircumstances;thelessonslearnedandapproachesusedtoovercomedifficultiesintheimplementationprocess;(iii)Effectiveness: Not allinnovationsandbestpracticeshaveenduringbenefits.Oneshouldthereforelookatwhethersuf-ficienttimehaspassedtodemonstrateresults.Inthisregard,itisimportanttodealwithindependentassessmentsontheresultsachievedfromtheinnovationandthecostsofimplementationandquanti-fiablebenefitsachieved;(iv)Long Term Significance:doestheinnovationchangehowspecificchal-lengesandopportunitiesareperceived?;Arethereopportunitiestoadaptorexpandtheinnovationtootherdomains;Hastheinnovationchangedtheunderstandingandanalysisofsimilarchallenges;andthepotentialbenefitoftheinnovationforthecountry;(v)Transferable Lessons Learned:Whatlessonsarelearnedintheidentification,formulationandimplementationofinnovations.Aretherevaluableinsightsintotheinnovationprocessintheprocessandwhatstrategiesweredesignedtomaximizerisksintheimplementationofnewideasandchangeinthepublicservice(CAPAM2010).


Table 11: Comparing Perspectives: Old Public Administration New Public Management and New Public Service

Criteria Old Public Administration New Public Management New Public Service

Primarytheoreticalandepis-temological foundations:

Political theory, social andpoliticalcommentaryaugmented by naïve social science.

Economictheory,moresophisticateddialoguebasedonpositivistsocialscience.

Democratic theory, varied approachestoknowledgeincludingpositive,interpre-tative,criticalandpost-modern.

Prevailing rationality and associated models of human behavior:

Synopticrationality,“admin-istrativeman”.

Technical and economic rationality,“economicman”or the self-interested decision maker.

Strategicrationality,multipletestsofrationality(political,economic,organizational).

Conceptionofthepublicinterest:

Politicallydefinedandex-pressedinlaw.

Representstheaggregationofindividual interests.

Result of a dialogue about shared values.

Towhomarepublicservantsresponsive?

Clients and constituents. Customers. Citizens.

Role of government: Rowing(designingandimplementingpoliciesfocus-ingonasingle,politicallydefinedobjective).

Steering(actingasacatalysttounleashmarketforces).

Serving(negotiatingandbro-keringinterestsamongciti-zensandcommunitygroups,creatingsharedvalues).

Mechanisms for achieving policyobjectives:

Administeringprogrammesthroughexistinggovernmentagencies.

Creating mechanisms and in-centive structures to achieve policyobjectivethroughpri-vateandnon-profitagencies.

Buildingcoalitionsofpublic,non-profitandprivateagen-cies to meet mutually agreed uponneeds.

Approachtoaccountability: Hierarchical – administrators areresponsibletodemo-craticallyelectedpoliticalleaders.

Market-driven–theaccu-mulationofself-interestswillresult in outcomes desired by broadgroupsofcitizens(orcustomers).

Multifaceted–publicserv-antsmustattendtolaw,communityvalues,politicalnorms,professionalstandardsandcitizeninterests.

Administrative discretion: Limiteddiscretionallowedadministrativeofficials.

Widelatitudetomeetentre-preneurialgoals.

Discretion needed but con-strained and accountable.

Assumedorganizationalstructure:

Bureaucraticorganizationsmarkedbytop-downauthor-itywithinagenciesandcon-trol or regulation of clients.

Decentralizedpublicorgani-zationswithprimarycontrolremainingwithintheagency.

Collaborativestructureswithleadershipsharedinternallyandexternally.

Assumed motivational basis ofpublicservantsandad-ministrators:

Payandbenefits,civilserviceprotections.

Entrepreneurialspirit,ideo-logical desire to reduce the sizeofgovernment.

Public service, desire to contribute to society.

Source: Denhardt and Denhardt, “The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering”, Public Administration Review, Vol.

60, No. 6: 554.


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