Informatics Online Voting Opportunities and Risks STOA Workshop at the European Parliament Brussels,...

Informatics

Online VotingOpportunities and Risks

STOA Workshop at the European ParliamentBrussels, 17 March 2011

Prof. Dr. Rüdiger GrimmIT Risk Management

Universität Koblenz-Landau

Informatics

Grimm 2011: Online Voting 2/20

Agenda

• How it is today• Security concern• Trust challenge• Solution

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Legally Binding Internet Elections in Europe in 2011• Switzerland

– Legally binding internet elections in February 2011 for all cantons

– since 2002, pilots in Zürich, Neuenburg and Geneva

• Norway– legally binding municipal elections in 2011– Internet voting and paper-ballot voting– voter can recast his/her electronic vote multiple times– terminal voting overrides Internet voting – paper votes override electronic votes– open source system (ErgoGroup & Scytl)– cryptographic protocol integrated into high school maths

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Legally Binding Internet Elections in Europe in 2011• Estonia

– legally binding Internet elections since 2005– Internet voting and paper-ballot voting– voter can recast his/her electronic vote multiple times– newer electronic vote overrides older vote– paper vote overrides electronic vote– new for elections in March 2011: mobile authentication

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Estonia

2005Local Elections

2007Parliamentary

Elections

2009European

Parliament Elections

2009Local Elections

Eligible voters

1.059.292 897.243 909.628 1.094.317

Participating voters 502.504 555.463 399.181 662.813

Voter turnouts

47,4% 61,9% 43,9% 60,6%

I-Voters 9.317 30.275 58.669 104.413

I-Voters among eligible voters 0,9% 3,4% 6,5% 9,5%

I-Voters among participating voters

1,9% 5,5% 14,7% 15,8%

[http://www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics, 04.03.2011]

kh

Voter turnout for Parliamentary Elections before I-Voting:200358%

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Online voting out there in the world

• …• France, French citizens abroad, 2003 tests• The Netherlands, citizens abroad• Germany, more than 30 real voting in private

area• UK, tests 2002, 2003, 2007• Portugal, 2004 EU and 2005 Parliament Tests• Austria, since 2003, voting in academic area and

for citizens abroad• … and a lot more in the USA

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Online voting systems in use

• Polyas, Germany– Association of Computer Science (GI) Bodies– Research Funding Association (DFG) Bodies

• Helios, USA/Belgium – Undergraduate Student Government at Princeton in Spring 2011– Student elections at the Université catholique de Louvain in 2010– International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR) in 2010

• voter turnout ~30% (compared to ~20% with paper-based elections)

– Presidential election at the Université catholique de Louvain in 2009

• Many more for research and demonstration– Bingo, ThreeBallot, Prêt à Voter, Punchscan, …

grimm

Ben Adida, Lawrence Lessig (Harvard), Olivier Pereira (Louvain)

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Classical advantage

• Ubiquity and 24-7• Seamless integration in everyday communication,

esp. of Internet generation• Easy-to-use, also for complex applications

Increase of participation

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0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Abgegebene Stimmen

Wahlberechtigte

Participation in GI Board Elections

Casted Votes

Registered Voters

Online

Online

Participation

13,7%

24,1%

16,9%

20,5%17,5%

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Agenda

• How it is today• Security Concern• Trust Challenge• Solution

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Correctness and Anonymity

• Do machines• Does network

• Are our votes• Will our votes remain

• Are there hidden access points for manipulation ??

work as we expect ??

secret ??

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Security can be provided, technically

• Several solutions for anonymity, e.g., blind signatures and separation of duty

• Organizational approach of protection profile and system security evaluation by Common Criteria

• See BSI basic protection profile and Polyas evaluation

Security is manageable

But How do people KNOW that these security features work?

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Security can be provided, technically

• But how do people KNOW that these security features work?

• Cars work safely, if they do not crash• Voting systems work safely, if … they do not

crash??• Public relies on experts certification• Is trust in experts’ statement sufficient?• Are there better procedures to feel (see, touch,

experience…) security… and to check correctness?

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Agenda


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Verifiability

• March 2009, German Constitutional Law has stated as basic requirement:– Verifiability of voting process by everyone– Even without deeper knowledge of technology

• What is verifiability?– Cast as intended (individually)– Stored as cast (individually, universally)– Tallied as stored (universally)

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Verification

encrypt

cast ballot

decrypt

recorded-as-cast

cast-as-intended

counted-as-recorded

Informatics


Verification by Bulletin Board

encrypt

cast ballot

decrypt

publish ballots

publish votes

encrypted-as-intended

recorded-as-cast

cast-as-intended

counted-as-recorded

decrypted-as-recorded

Bräunlich/Grimm, 25.2.2011

grimm

kh04.03.2011- Wenn der Wähler überprüft, ob sein Ballot veröffentlicht wurde, dann kann daraus recorded-as-cast geschlussfolgert werden- aus Zero-Knowledge folgt decrypted-as-recorded- aus vergleich der Ergebnisse folgt counted-as-recorded

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Agenda


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Solution

• Internet Voting can provide better functionality than paper voting

• Ubiquity and 24-7• Seamless integration in everyday communication,

esp. of Internet generation• Easy-to-use, also for complex applications

– Universal and individual verification– Multiple voting (recast)– Multiple media (paper, terminal, Internet)– Integration with eParticipation

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References

Johannes Pichler (Hrsg.): Überlegungen zur Hebung demokratischer Partizipation –Provokationen und Optionen. Schriften zur Rechtspolitik, Band 31, Neuer WissenschaftlicherVerlag, Wien, Graz 2010.

Krimmer, Robert; and Grimm, Rüdiger (Eds.): Electronic Voting 2010, 2008, and 2006.Lecture Notes in Informatics, Bonn 2010, 2008, and 2006, resp.

Volkamer, M., Vogt, R.: Common Criteria Protection Profile For Basic Set of SecurityRequirements for Online Voting Products. BSI-CC-PP-0037, Version 1.0, 18. April 2008.http://www.bsi.bund.de/

Estonia: http://www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics

Helios: http://heliosvoting.org/about-us/

Polyas: http://www.polyas.de/

Informatics Online Voting Opportunities and Risks STOA Workshop at the European Parliament Brussels,...

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