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    Archaeological Inference and Inductive Confirmation

    Author(s): Bruce D. SmithSource: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Sep., 1977), pp. 598-617Published by: Wileyon behalf of the American Anthropological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/675394.

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    Archaeological

    Inference

    and Inductive

    Confirmation

    BRUCE

    D.

    SMITH

    University

    of

    Georgia

    The

    limitations

    of

    the

    hypothetico-deductive

    (H-D)

    method

    of

    inductive

    confirma-

    tion

    are

    described,

    and an alternate

    method,

    the

    hypothetico-analog

    (H-A)

    method

    is described

    in

    detail.

    The

    H-A

    method

    can

    be characterized as

    a

    modified

    and

    supplemented

    form

    of

    the

    simple

    H-D

    method,

    and is

    proposed

    as

    being

    more

    appropriate for archaeological inference. Aspects of the H-A method that are given

    particular

    attention

    include the

    establishment

    of

    boundary

    conditions

    for reference

    classes,

    plausibility

    considerations,

    multiple

    working

    hypotheses,

    bridging argu-

    ments,

    and

    criteria

    for

    selecting

    alternative

    hypotheses. [scientific

    method,

    archaeological

    nference,hypothetico-analogmethod,

    inductive

    confirmation]

    INTRODUCTION

    PREHISTORIC

    ARCHAEOLOGY

    ver the last fifteen

    years

    has been

    suffering through

    many

    of the

    symptoms

    of

    paradigm

    crisis

    described

    by

    Thomas Kuhn.

    Such

    periods

    of

    theoretical

    retooling

    are characterized

    not

    only by

    the

    borrowing

    of theoretical

    and

    methodological

    models from other fields in the search for a new

    paradigm,

    but also

    by

    a

    recourse

    o

    philosophy

    (Kuhn

    1970:88).

    It

    is

    specifically

    to the

    philosophy

    of

    science

    that a

    growing

    numberof

    archaeologists

    have turned

    in

    an

    attempt

    to make

    their research and

    their results more valid.

    Most

    archaeologists

    would

    now

    acknowledge

    the

    value

    and

    necessity

    of

    employing

    scientific

    methodology

    in their

    reasoning.

    There is

    still

    no

    agreement,

    however,

    as

    to

    which variation

    of

    the

    scientific

    method

    should

    be

    employed

    in

    archaeological easoning.

    There are

    a

    number

    of reasons

    for

    the

    present

    state of confusion

    concerning

    the

    integration

    of scientific

    methodology

    into

    archaeological

    reasoning.

    The

    most

    obvious

    of

    these reasons

    is

    that

    until

    recently

    formal

    training

    n

    either the

    philosophy

    of science or the

    different variationsof the scientificmethod wasnot an integralpartof graduateprogramsn

    anthropology.

    As a

    result,

    most

    archaeologists

    have minimal

    exposure

    to or

    understanding

    f

    scientific

    methodology,

    even

    though they may

    use

    such

    terms as

    hypothesis,

    confirmation,

    etc.,

    in

    their

    working

    vocabularies.

    It

    is not

    surprising,

    therefore,

    that

    relatively

    few

    archaeologists

    have felt

    confident

    enough

    of their own

    understanding

    of

    scientific

    methodology

    to

    attempt

    to alleviate the state of

    ignorance

    of

    their

    colleagues

    by providing

    insight

    into how

    any

    one

    of

    the numerous

    variations

    of

    the scientific method

    could

    be

    employed

    in

    archaeological

    reasoning.

    It

    is

    also not

    surprising

    that of

    the

    attempts

    at

    interpretation

    of scientific

    methodology

    that have been made

    by

    archaeologists,

    many

    have

    tended to confuse

    the

    issue

    further rather than

    providing

    needed clarification

    of

    the role

    of

    scientific

    methodology

    in

    archaeological easoning Morgan1973:259-260).

    Lewis Binford is

    generally

    associatedwith the first attempts at

    making

    archaeological

    reasoning

    more

    scientific,

    although

    one

    could trace the

    beginnings

    of

    this trend back

    through

    Taylor

    (1948)

    to

    the

    late 1800s.

    Binford'sconcern with

    explanation

    n

    archaeology

    s

    clearly

    598

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    Smith

    ]

    INFERENCE AND

    INDUCTIVE

    CONFIRMATION 599

    evident

    in

    many

    of

    his

    articles of the

    1960s

    (see

    the

    collected

    essays

    in Binford

    1972),

    as is

    his selection

    of

    the

    covering

    law

    (CL)

    model of

    explanation proposed by

    Carl

    Hempel:

    After

    surveying

    most

    of

    the

    argumentative

    debate

    in the

    literature

    on the

    philosophy

    of

    science,

    I

    concluded

    that

    from a

    practical-science

    oint

    of

    view,

    the

    arguments

    of Karl

    [sic]

    Hempel (see particularlyHempel, 1965) were the most useful (Binford 1972:18). In a

    number

    of

    his articles Binford

    also

    discusses the need

    for

    implementation

    of a

    logicodeductive

    (1972:70)

    or

    rigorous

    hypotheticodeductive (1972:96)

    method of

    confirmation

    in

    archaeology.Finally,

    Binfordalso

    presents

    a number

    of

    specific examples

    of

    the

    way

    in which

    such

    a

    hypothetico-deductive

    (H-D)

    method of

    confirmation could be

    applied

    to an

    archaeological

    ituation.

    The

    most detailed of the

    specific

    examples

    given

    by

    Binford

    is

    his discussion

    of

    smudge pits

    and hide

    smoking(see

    Binford

    1972:33-58).

    Binford

    has

    recently

    been criticized

    by

    Sabloff,

    Beale,

    and

    Kurland

    or

    (1)

    advocating

    he

    CL

    model

    of

    explanation

    (1973:108); (2)

    organizing

    his

    arguments

    n

    terms

    of

    a

    simple hypothetico-

    deductive

    structure

    while

    paying

    polemical

    ip

    service o

    Hempel's

    CL model

    (1973:110);

    and

    (3)

    presenting

    specific

    archaeologicalexamples

    that do not conform either to the

    CL

    model of

    explanation

    or to the

    hypothetico-deductive

    method of confirmation

    1973:111).

    While these criticisms

    appear

    to be

    justified,

    and

    will be

    discussed

    n

    more detail

    later

    in this

    article,

    I

    would at

    this time like

    to

    pursue

    an

    interesting

    question

    that

    may

    at first seem

    rather

    unimportant:

    Why

    were these

    criticismsso

    long

    (six

    years)

    in

    coming?

    The answer

    o

    this

    question

    in

    large

    measure has

    to do with the fact

    that

    Binford was

    apparently

    not so

    much

    concerned with

    either

    stressing

    the

    importance

    of

    employing

    the CL

    model or

    explaining

    n

    detail

    the

    structure

    of the

    HD

    method as

    he

    was

    with

    analyzing

    he

    structure

    of

    archaeological reasoning:

    However,

    it

    is

    noteworthy

    that Lewis

    R.

    Binford,

    the

    guiding

    light

    of

    the new

    archaeology,

    has

    strongly supported

    a deductive

    approach

    without

    polemically

    belaboring

    the

    role

    of the

    Hempelian

    deductive-nomological

    model

    (Sabloff,

    Beale, and Kurland 1973:108). Binford was primarily interested, then, in presenting a

    rigorous ogical

    method

    of

    confirmation

    hat

    archaeologists

    ould

    employ

    in

    their

    reasoning.

    Labeling

    the method

    he

    outlined

    (see

    especially

    Binford,

    1972:47-48)

    as

    hypothetico-

    deductiveand

    demonstrating

    n detail

    its

    relationship

    o

    Hempel's

    CL

    model were

    apparently

    of

    secondary

    concern, judging

    from the

    very

    limited

    coverage given

    to

    these

    topics

    in

    his

    articles. This has

    interesting

    implications,

    because while

    Binford's

    logical

    method of

    inference,

    as well

    as another

    complementary

    method

    applied

    to

    archaeological

    ituations

    by

    Longacre (1970)

    and

    Hill

    (1968),

    do

    not,

    in

    fact,

    conform to the

    hypothetico-deductive

    framework,

    hey

    are still

    recognized

    by philosophers

    as

    reasonable,

    f

    incomplete,

    methods

    of

    scientific

    inference

    (Morgan

    1973:271-272;

    M.

    Salmon

    1976:379).

    Philosophers

    and other interested

    individuals

    have

    as

    a

    result

    not

    focused their criticism

    so much at the method of scientific inference

    proposed by Binford,

    Longacre,

    Hill,

    and

    others.

    Rather

    they

    have directed their

    comments toward

    the

    numerous

    more

    recent

    attempts

    to

    claim

    that this method of inference

    must

    in

    fact be viewed

    as

    part

    of the CL

    model of

    explanation:

    The new

    archaeologists

    would have their

    colleagues

    believe that the

    new

    trends in

    theory

    and

    methodology,

    which

    they

    have

    helped

    to

    develop

    in

    the

    past

    decade,

    are

    inextricably

    linked

    to

    positivist

    philosophy

    and

    the

    deductive-nomological

    CL)

    model of

    explanation,

    which

    they espouse

    (Sabloff,

    Beale,

    and

    Kurland

    1973:108).

    Two

    publications

    in

    particular (Fritz

    and

    Plog

    1970;

    Watson, LeBlanc,

    and

    Redman

    1971)

    attempted

    both to

    describe

    Hempel's

    CL

    model

    of

    explanation

    and to

    demonstrate he

    need

    for its

    acceptance

    and

    employment by archaeologists.

    The

    response

    by philosophers

    o these

    two publicationswas both rapidand devastating.Levin (1973) respondedto the articleby

    Fritz

    and

    Plog,

    and

    Morgan (1973) replied

    in

    detail

    to the

    discussion of the CL

    model

    presented

    in

    the book of

    Watson,LeBlanc,

    and

    Redman. While

    these detailed criticisms

    by

    Levin

    and

    Morgan

    have

    apparently

    done severe

    damage

    to the

    image

    of the CL model of

    explanation

    within

    archaeology,they

    do not

    appear

    to

    have eliminatedall

    support

    for the

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    600 AMERICAN

    ANTHROPOLOGIST

    [79, 1977

    positivist

    philosophy

    of Carl

    Hempel (see

    Watson

    1974;

    Watson,

    LeBlanc,

    and Redman

    1974).

    This

    debate within

    archaeology

    in

    the

    early

    1970s

    over

    the

    relative merits of the

    CL

    model of

    explanation

    unfortunately

    tended

    to

    divertattention from

    an

    article

    by

    James

    Hill

    (1972) which presenteda comprehensivedescriptionof the hypothetico-deductivemethod

    of

    confirmation

    as well as

    providing

    a

    discussion

    of

    how

    it

    could be

    employed

    in

    archaeological

    reasoning.

    It

    is

    important

    to

    stress

    that

    Hill's

    article,

    rather

    than

    addressing

    the

    issue

    of

    explanation

    in

    archaeology,

    was

    focused on the

    more

    important

    and

    more

    pressing

    problem

    of

    successful

    articulation of the

    H-D

    method

    of

    confirmation to

    archaeological

    situations.

    For

    a few

    years

    after the

    appearance

    of

    Hill's 1972 article it

    appeared

    that even if

    the

    issue

    of the

    identity

    of

    an

    appropriate

    model

    of

    explanation

    in

    archaeology

    remained

    unresolved,

    archaeologists

    could at

    least

    employ

    the

    hypothetico-

    deductive method

    of

    confirmation n

    their

    reasoning.

    This situation

    changed

    abruptly

    with

    the

    publication

    of two

    short

    articles

    in

    1975 and

    1976

    by

    Merrilee

    Salmon,

    a

    philosopher

    with a

    research

    interest

    in

    archaeological

    confirmation.

    Although

    rather

    brief,

    Salmon's

    articles

    contain a number of

    very

    important

    points,

    including

    the

    following:

    (1)

    The

    hypothetico-deductive

    method

    is

    an

    inductiverather han

    a

    deductivemethod

    of

    confirmation

    1976:

    377).

    (2) Archaeologists

    do not

    employ

    the H-D

    method in

    their

    reasoning,

    even if

    they

    believe and

    state

    that

    they

    do

    (1975:464,

    1976:378).

    (3)

    The fact

    that

    archaeologists

    do not

    employ

    the H-D

    method in their

    reasoning,

    even

    if

    they

    think that

    they

    do,

    is

    good,

    not

    bad. This

    is

    because

    the H-D

    method

    is

    an

    oversimplified

    and

    incomplete

    account

    of

    scientific

    reasoning,

    and

    is

    inadequate

    for

    employment

    in

    archaeological

    nference.

    (4)

    The

    inductive method of

    logical

    confirmation

    employed by

    many

    archaeologists

    s

    far more

    sophisticated

    han

    the

    H-D

    method,

    with

    which it

    is

    often

    confused.

    (5)

    The

    method of

    logical

    confirmation

    employed by

    many archaeologists

    s,

    in

    fact,

    roughly

    comparable

    to a

    method of

    inductive

    inference

    described in a

    number of

    publications

    by Wesley

    Salmon

    (1963, 1967).

    Thus

    in

    1976

    many

    archaeologists

    find

    themselves

    in

    a

    situation

    that is

    puzzling,

    surprising,

    and

    at

    the

    same

    time

    encouraging.

    Although

    they

    have

    thought

    of

    themselvesas

    employing

    an

    impressively

    deductive method of

    logical

    confirmation

    (H-D),

    they

    find

    that

    the H-D

    method

    is

    not

    only

    inductive rather

    than

    deductive,

    but

    further that

    they

    were

    never

    actually

    employing

    the

    H-D

    method in their

    reasoning.

    Rather

    they

    were

    employing,

    n

    an

    admittedly

    ncomplete way,

    a more

    sophisticated

    method of inductive nference.

    Merrilee

    Salmon

    begins

    the

    final

    paragraph

    f

    her

    1975

    article

    with

    this statement: It

    is

    my

    hope

    in

    presenting

    some

    of

    these issues and

    suggesting

    alternative

    models,

    that

    fruitful

    discussions

    of

    confirmation and

    explanation

    n

    archaeology

    will

    ensue

    (1975:464).

    She

    has

    indeed

    presented

    a

    number

    of

    pertinent

    observationsand

    suggestions

    concerning

    archaeologi-

    cal

    confirmation

    that

    deserve serious

    consideration

    by

    all

    interested

    archaeologists.

    While t

    is

    understandablethat

    many

    archaeologists

    are

    perhaps

    not

    concerned

    with the

    issue of

    archaeologicalreasoning,

    or

    do

    not

    feel

    knowledgeable

    enough

    on the

    subject

    to offer an

    opinion,

    or

    perhaps

    are not too

    excited

    about

    sticking

    their

    heads

    up

    out of the

    trench,

    I

    strongly

    agree

    with

    Sabloff,

    Beale,

    and

    Kurland

    1973:118)

    that: It

    cannot

    be

    ignored

    by

    a

    thinking member of the profession; the argumentrevolves around the place of scientific

    models in

    archaeological

    research.The

    true issues need a

    clear and

    vigorous

    airing

    n

    print.

    In the

    present

    article,

    which

    is concerned

    specifically

    with

    confirmation

    n

    archaeology,

    a

    number of

    logical points

    raised

    by

    M. Salmon will be

    pursued.

    These

    points

    are

    elaborated

    upon

    in a short initial

    section of

    this article. The

    following

    much

    longer

    section

    will be

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    Smith

    ]

    INFERENCE

    AND INDUCTIVE

    CONFIRMATION

    601

    concerned

    with

    the method

    of inductive confirmation

    presented by

    W. C. Salmon

    and

    suggested

    to

    archaeologistsby

    M. Salmon

    as an

    alternative

    o

    the H-D method.

    To

    facilitate

    discussion

    of

    this

    general

    method as it

    specifically

    applies

    to

    archaeological

    nference,

    t

    will

    be referred

    o

    as the

    Hypothetico-Analog

    H-A)

    method of

    inductive

    confirmation.

    THE

    HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE

    ETHOD

    OF

    INDUCTIVE

    CONFIRMATION

    The

    H-D

    method of

    confirmation will be

    briefly

    described

    prior

    to

    presenting

    a

    more

    detailed

    discussion

    of

    some

    of

    its

    inherent

    limitations.

    A

    more

    comprehensive

    reatmentof

    the

    H-D

    method

    can

    be

    found

    in

    W.

    Salmon

    (1963:76-88)

    and

    Copi

    (1972:422-468).

    The

    hypothetico-deductive

    method

    begins

    with the

    formulation

    of a

    hypothesis,

    which

    can be

    defined

    as

    a

    statement that

    is

    taken as a

    premise,

    n

    order that

    its

    logical

    consequences

    can

    be

    examined and

    compared

    with facts

    that can be

    ascertained

    by

    observation

    W.

    Salmon

    1963:77).

    Once

    the

    hypothesis

    has been

    formulated,

    and

    any

    necessary

    nitial

    conditions

    are

    stated,

    the next

    step

    in

    the

    H-D

    method

    involves

    deducing ogical consequences

    from the

    hypothesis.

    Such

    consequences,

    which are

    often

    termed

    test

    implications

    or

    observational

    predictions,

    when

    combined with

    the

    hypothesis

    and

    any

    stated

    initial

    conditions,

    constitute

    a

    logical

    argument.

    This

    argument,

    consisting

    of

    a

    hypothesis

    and

    initial

    conditions as

    premises

    and

    a

    test

    implication

    as

    conclusion

    must,

    in the

    hypothetico-deductive

    method,

    be

    a

    deductive rather

    than

    an

    inductive

    type

    of

    argument.

    By

    definition,

    a

    deductive

    type

    of

    argument

    s one in

    which

    the

    conclusion must

    logically

    follow from the

    premises:

    If

    all of

    the

    premises

    are

    true,

    the

    conclusion must

    be

    true

    (W.

    Salmon

    1963:14;

    see

    also

    M. Salmon

    1976:377).

    Many

    of

    the

    people

    who believe the

    H-D

    method

    to be

    thoroughly

    deductive

    n

    character

    would be correct f

    the

    method

    consisted

    only

    of

    deducing

    est

    implications

    rom

    a

    hypothesis.

    But

    the

    H-D

    method

    includes

    a

    final

    step

    of

    confirmation.

    This

    involves

    comparing he deduced observationalpredictionswith reality to see if in fact they aretrue.

    If

    the

    observational

    predictions

    are

    true,

    the

    hypothesis

    is

    confirmedto

    some

    extent.

    In

    this

    final

    step

    of

    the

    hypothetico-deductive

    method,

    observational

    predictions

    and

    the

    hypothesis

    once

    again

    comprise

    an

    argument,

    but the

    hypothesis

    is

    now

    the

    conclusion

    and

    the

    observational

    predictions

    are

    the

    premises.

    This

    argument

    of

    confirmation

    can be

    seen to

    be

    inductive rather than

    deductive

    for

    the

    simple

    reason

    that

    even if

    all

    of the

    premises

    (observational

    predictions)

    of

    the

    argument

    are

    demonstratedto

    be

    true,

    the

    conclusion

    (hypothesis)

    might

    still be

    false: To

    argue

    that

    true

    implications

    confirm a

    hypothesis

    is

    to

    argue

    inductively,

    for it

    is

    logically possible

    for

    the

    implications

    to

    be

    true while

    the

    hypothesis

    is false

    (M.

    Salmon

    1976:377;

    see

    also

    W. Salmon

    1967:18-20,

    108-110).

    This

    point will be discussed n greaterdetail later in this article.Thus,althoughthe H-Dmethod

    employs

    deductive

    logic

    in

    one

    step,

    it

    must

    be

    viewed in

    total

    as an

    inductive

    method of

    confirmation,

    because

    it

    also

    includes

    an

    inductive

    argument.

    The

    fact that

    the

    hypothetico-

    deductive

    method

    is

    not

    a

    deductive

    form

    of

    confirmation

    may

    be

    disconcerting

    to

    any

    archaeologists

    who

    hope

    to

    prove

    once

    and for

    all the

    absolute

    truth

    of

    their

    hypotheses.

    At

    the

    same time

    it

    will,

    however,

    make it

    easier for

    many

    archaeologists

    to

    accept

    the

    otherwise

    disturbing

    fact

    that

    they

    have

    not

    been

    employing

    the

    hypothetico-deductive

    method

    of

    confirmation. The

    loss

    will

    not

    seem

    so

    serious

    if the

    hypothetico-deductive

    method

    is

    only

    inductiveafter

    all

    (assuming

    t

    is

    possible

    to

    lose

    somethingyou

    only

    thought

    you

    had).

    The

    type

    of

    inference

    that

    many

    archaeologists,

    as

    well

    as

    most

    of the

    members of the

    larger scientific community, employ resemblesthe H-D method, but differs from it in a

    number

    of

    important

    ways:

    It

    seems

    undeniable that

    science

    uses

    a

    type

    of

    inference at

    least

    loosely

    akin to

    the

    hypothetico-deductive

    method

    (W.

    Salmon

    1967:18).

    The

    most

    obvious,

    but not

    the

    most

    important,

    difference

    between the

    H-D

    method

    and

    the

    method of

    confirmation

    employed

    in

    archaeological

    nference

    has

    to

    do with

    the

    way

    in

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    602 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

    [79,

    1977

    which observational

    predictions

    are shown to follow

    logically

    from

    hypotheses.

    Rarely

    if

    ever are

    such

    arguments

    deductive

    in

    form.

    The

    truth

    of

    an

    observational

    prediction

    (conclusion)

    is often

    argued

    to

    be

    highly probable

    f an

    archaeological ypothesis

    (premise)

    is

    true,

    but

    rarely

    if ever

    could

    it be

    demonstrated that

    such an

    observational

    prediction

    must be true

    if

    the hypothesis is true. This is in large part due to the inherentnatureof

    archaeological

    nference.

    Hypotheses

    formulated

    n

    archaeological

    nference

    invariably

    have

    to

    do with various

    aspects

    of

    prehistoric

    human behavior

    (Hill

    1972:101)

    and

    as

    a

    result

    cannot

    be tested

    directly. They

    can, however,

    be

    tested

    indirectly.

    The

    observational

    predictions

    of

    such

    hypotheses

    about

    human

    behavior

    take the

    form of

    statements

    concerning predicted patterning

    of

    cultural debris

    in

    archaeological

    sites.

    It

    is

    logically

    impossible

    to

    deduce

    such

    observational

    predictions

    because

    of the

    problems

    of

    disturbance,

    poor preservation,

    or

    poor recovery

    of

    cultural

    debris.

    Few

    archaeologists

    would

    argue

    hat

    if

    their

    hypothesis

    concerningprehistoric

    human behavior s

    correct,

    the

    predicted

    pattern

    of

    cultural

    debris

    must be

    observed

    during

    excavation.But

    one

    cannot

    argue

    otherwise

    and

    still

    be

    employing

    the

    hypothetico-deductive

    method

    of

    confirmation. In

    discussing

    an

    archaeologicalhypothesis concerninghumanbehaviorM.Salmonstates:

    ...

    the

    point

    here

    is a

    logical

    one-that

    thereis no deductive

    relation of the

    sort

    required

    by

    the H-D

    method

    between

    the

    hypotheses

    and the

    implication.

    We

    can

    say,

    however,

    that

    if

    the

    hypotheses

    are true then it

    is

    highly probable

    that

    the

    implication

    is

    true....

    The

    implication

    was not

    deduced from

    the

    hypotheses,

    but

    was inferredwith

    high

    probability

    on

    the

    basis

    of a

    correct

    inductive

    argument

    1976:378].

    Similarly:

    While

    they [test implications]

    are

    presumed

    o

    be

    likely

    consequences

    of

    a

    given

    hypothesis,

    they

    do

    not

    follow

    of

    necessity

    from

    it.

    They

    are

    not

    deduced from

    a

    hypothesis

    in

    the

    sense that there is

    a

    strict

    formal

    logical

    connection

    between

    the

    hypothesis

    and

    its

    test

    implication

    (Hill

    1972:83-84).

    This statement

    by

    Hill

    is

    especially

    interesting

    because

    throughout

    his

    paper

    he

    refers

    to the

    method

    being presented

    as

    being deductive,

    and

    more

    specifically being

    the

    hypothetico-deductive

    method of

    confirmation.

    t

    is

    apparent

    hat not

    only

    is the

    H-D

    method

    incorrectly

    characterized

    as

    being

    a

    deductive

    form of

    logical

    inference,

    but

    that the method

    Hill

    presents

    is

    not,

    in

    fact,

    the

    hypothetico-deductive

    method.

    Probably

    the most

    important

    point

    to be

    made

    concerning

    hese

    inconsistencies n

    Hill's

    paper

    is that

    they

    can

    to

    a

    great

    extent be

    remedied

    by changing

    a few

    terms,

    and

    that

    they

    in

    no

    way

    detract from the

    substance

    of

    his

    presentation.

    While he

    method

    presented

    is

    incorrectly

    identified

    as

    the

    H-D

    method,

    it

    is

    none the

    less a solid

    method of

    inductive

    confirmation.

    Having

    demonstrated that

    archaeologists

    are

    not in

    fact

    employing

    the H-D

    method

    because

    their

    observational

    predictions

    are not

    deduced from

    hypotheses,

    we

    can

    now

    consider a numberof other, more importantdifferencesbetween the H-Dmethod and the

    method of

    inductive confirmation

    actually

    employed

    by

    many

    archaeologists.

    These

    differences can

    most

    accurately

    be

    viewed as

    representing

    serious

    limitations

    of

    the H-D

    method.

    The

    first

    serious

    imitation of the H-D

    method

    has

    to

    do with

    the

    relationship

    between

    an

    observational

    prediction

    and the

    variety

    of

    alternative

    hypotheses

    that

    could

    account for

    it.

    W. Salmon

    poses

    this

    problem

    of

    unlimited

    alternative

    hypotheses

    in

    the

    following

    way:

    Whatare

    the

    chances that

    the

    deduced

    prediction

    would

    be

    true

    if

    the

    hypothesis

    we

    are

    testing

    is false

    and

    some other

    hypothesis

    is true? The

    same

    question

    may

    be

    reformulated:

    Are

    there

    other

    hypotheses

    which

    would be

    strongly

    confirmed

    by

    the

    same

    outcome?

    (1963:82).

    When

    this

    question

    is

    rephrased

    n

    termsof

    archaeological

    nference,

    it will be

    recognized

    as

    a

    familiar

    problem

    by many archaeologists:

    What

    are the

    chances that a

    specific

    pattern

    of

    cultural

    debris s the result of the

    specific

    causative

    human

    activity

    I

    have

    hypothesized,

    or is it the

    result of

    any

    one of a

    number

    of other

    human

    activity

    patterns?

    If

    one

    were

    to

    employ

    the H-D

    method

    strictly,

    all of the

    logically

    possible

    hypotheses

    that

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    Smith

    ]

    INFERENCE AND

    INDUCTIVE

    CONFIRMATION

    603

    could have been

    used

    to deduce the observational

    prediction

    would have to be

    considered

    because

    the

    H-D

    method

    provides

    no

    guidelines

    for

    reducing

    the class

    of all

    logical possible

    hypotheses

    to a

    smaller

    group

    of more

    likely hypotheses:

    The

    basic

    trouble

    with the

    hypothetico-deductive

    nference

    in that

    it

    always

    leaves

    us

    with an

    embarrassinguperabundance f hypotheses. All of thesehypothesesareequally

    adequate

    to the available data from the

    standpoint

    of the

    pure

    hypothetico-deductive

    framework.

    Each is confirmed

    in

    precisely

    the same manner

    by

    the same

    evi-

    dence....

    The

    hypothetico-deductive

    method

    is

    therefore, hopelessly

    inconclusive

    for

    determining

    the

    acceptability

    of scientific

    hypotheses

    on

    the basis of

    empirical

    data.

    Something

    must

    be

    done to

    improve

    t

    [W.

    Salmon

    1967:115-116

    ].

    Obviously archaeologists

    do,

    in

    fact,

    initially

    reduce

    the

    number

    of alternative

    hypotheses

    they

    are

    going

    to

    consider,

    and therefore are

    filling

    this

    logical gap

    in the H-D

    method,

    or

    it

    could be said

    that

    they

    are

    extending

    or

    supplementing

    he H-D

    method.

    The

    ways

    in

    which

    archaeologists

    narrow

    the

    range

    of

    hypotheses

    to

    be

    considered

    for

    any

    observational

    prediction

    or set

    of

    observational

    predictions

    will

    be

    discussed

    n the next section of

    this

    article.

    The

    second

    shortcoming

    or limitation

    of the H-D

    method is that it does not

    provideany

    clear set of

    universallyapplicable

    guidelines

    or

    procedures

    or

    choosing

    between alternative

    hypotheses,

    either

    in

    terms

    of

    those

    hypotheses

    considered

    as

    possible

    candidates

    for the

    same

    specific

    observational

    predictions,

    or

    in

    terms

    of

    alternative

    hypothesis

    for

    different

    sets

    of

    observational

    predictions being

    tested at a later

    point

    in

    the confirmation

    process.

    This

    problem

    oo

    will be

    discussed

    n the next

    section

    of

    this article.

    While

    t is clear that those

    archaeologists

    who

    do

    employ

    scientific

    methodology

    n

    their

    reasoning

    do not

    employ

    the

    hypothetico-deductive

    method,

    it is also clear

    that

    the

    method

    that

    they

    do

    employ

    is

    in fact

    logically

    superior

    to the

    H-D

    method,

    and avoids

    many

    of its

    shortcomings.

    THE

    HYPOTHETICO-ANALOG

    ETHOD

    OF

    INDUCTIVECONFIRMATION

    It

    should

    initially

    be

    emphasized

    that

    the

    method

    of

    confirmation

    referred to

    in

    this

    article

    as the

    hypothetico-analog

    (H-A)

    method is best

    characterized

    as a

    variety

    of

    supplemented

    H-D

    method

    that

    is similar

    in

    form

    to

    the

    general

    method

    of

    confirmation

    presented

    by

    W. Salmon

    (1967,

    1973)

    and which has

    recently

    been

    briefly

    describedas

    being

    applicable

    to

    archaeological

    ituations

    by

    M. Salmon

    (1976).

    While the H-A

    method

    can be

    viewed as an

    expansion

    and refinement of the

    more

    general

    model

    described

    by

    W. Salmon

    in an

    attempt

    to make it

    specifically

    applicable

    to

    archaeological

    problems,

    this neither

    entails the endorsementof the

    attempt by

    eitherW. Salmon or M. Salmon nor does it ensure

    by

    association the

    logical

    correctness

    of

    the

    H-A

    model.

    It is

    possible

    that

    this

    attempt

    will

    do

    as

    much

    damage

    to the

    general

    method described

    by

    W. Salmon as other

    archaeologists

    have

    managed

    o

    do to the work

    of Carl

    Hempel,

    although

    t

    is to

    be

    hoped

    that

    this

    will not

    be

    the

    case. The

    term

    hypothetico-analog

    has been

    applied

    to the

    method to be

    discussed

    simply

    to

    facilitate

    reference to

    the

    method

    and

    to

    indicate that it

    is

    inductive n

    form,

    with

    argument

    by analogy

    playing

    an

    important

    role.

    One of

    the

    most

    obvious differences between

    the H-D

    and the

    H-A

    method

    is that

    in

    the

    latter

    method

    observational

    predictions

    do

    not have to be

    deduced

    from

    a

    hypothesis

    and

    initial

    conditions.

    An

    observational

    prediction

    in the H-A

    method is

    inferred

    with

    high

    probability (M. Salmon 1976:378). Salmon further suggests calling such observational

    predictions

    or

    test

    implications

    inductive

    mplications 1976:

    378).

    More

    importantly,

    the H-A

    model addresses the

    problem

    of

    unlimited alternative

    hypotheses.

    The

    whole

    question

    of how it

    might

    be

    logicallypossible

    to limit the number

    of

    possible

    hypotheses

    to be

    considered as

    being responsible

    for a

    specific

    single

    observational

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    604

    AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

    [79,

    1977

    prediction

    or

    set

    of

    observational

    predictions

    has been an

    issue of

    much debate within the

    philosophy

    of

    science

    for a

    number

    of

    years.

    While

    some

    scientists and

    philosophers

    would

    argue

    that

    there

    is no mechanism

    or

    thinking

    up hypotheses-that

    hypothesis

    formulation

    s

    a

    psychological

    rather han a

    logical process-others

    think

    it

    may

    be

    possible

    to

    develop

    such

    methods

    (Simon 1973).

    It

    is

    at the

    same time

    clear, however,

    that

    scientists, including

    archaeologists,

    do not consider all

    logically possible

    hypotheses,

    but

    initially distinguish

    between

    those

    that are

    reasonable

    and

    those that are

    not.

    W. Salmon

    argues

    that

    there

    is

    a

    step

    in

    the

    logical sequence

    of

    confirming

    hypotheses

    that

    comes

    after

    discovery,

    or first

    thinking

    of

    a

    hypothesis,

    and

    prior

    to

    the

    decision of

    whether the

    hypothesis

    should

    be

    seriously

    entertained

    and tested:

    At

    this

    stage

    we are

    trying

    to

    determine whether the

    hypothesis

    deserves o be

    seriously

    entertainedand

    tested

    or

    whether

    r

    should

    be

    cast

    aside

    without further

    ceremony

    (1967:113).

    Salmon describes his

    step

    as

    involving

    plausibility

    considerations

    1967:114).

    Such

    plausibility

    considerationsare: not

    only

    admissable

    nto

    the

    logic

    of

    justification;

    they

    are

    an

    indispensablepart

    of

    it

    (W.

    Salmon

    1967:118).

    This

    step

    of

    plausibility

    consideration

    of

    alternative

    hypotheses

    is, then,

    not

    only

    an

    essential

    part

    of the logic of confirmation,but it is also the most crucialstep involved n the H-Amethod

    of

    archaeological

    nference,

    and

    clearly

    necessitates

    careful consideration.

    Plausibility

    Considerations

    Perhaps

    the first

    point

    that should

    be

    made

    clear

    in

    considering

    he

    process

    by

    which

    scientists

    in

    general

    and

    archaeologists

    in

    particular

    assess the relative

    plausibility

    of

    alternative

    hypotheses

    is that it is

    not an area of

    logically

    solid

    ground.

    Not

    only

    are

    a

    number

    of the theoretical issues

    concerning

    plausibility

    considerations

    being

    actively

    debated,

    there are also

    practical

    difficulties

    that

    must

    be dealt

    with,

    as will be seen

    shortly.

    In light of these inherent theoretical and practicaldifficulties, it is not surprising hat M.

    Salmon does not

    attempt any

    detailed discussion

    of

    plausibility

    considerations

    s

    they apply

    to

    archaeological

    inference.

    In

    discussing

    the now well known case

    study by

    William

    Longacre (1963,

    1968,

    1970) involving

    the

    proposed

    causal

    link

    between

    a

    hypothesized

    pattern

    of

    matrilocal residence and

    an

    inductively

    inferred

    observational

    prediction

    of

    nonrandom

    (aggregated)

    distribution

    of

    ceramic

    style

    elements,

    M.

    Salmon

    states

    the

    following:

    An

    important

    feature of

    Longacre'sexample

    is that his

    hypothesis

    was a

    plausible one,

    that

    is,

    it had

    significant

    prior probability.

    The

    priorprobability

    of

    a

    hypothesis may

    be

    taken as a measureof its

    likelihood, independent

    of

    any testing

    of

    it

    throughchecking

    ts

    deductive

    or

    inductive

    implications.

    Various

    kinds

    of

    background

    nformation, ncluding

    ethnographic analogies, are used to determine the prior probability of an hypothe-

    sis

    .

    ..

    Why

    weren't

    any

    other

    hypotheses

    with

    the

    same

    implications

    considered

    here?...

    The alternative

    hypotheses

    which

    could account for the

    observed

    phenomena

    were

    so

    initially implausible

    hat

    they

    were not

    even

    mentioned.

    [Longacre

    does in

    fact

    mention

    alternative

    hypotheses;

    see

    1970:34]

    No other

    hypothesis

    which fits

    the

    data

    uncovered

    by Longacre

    has

    as

    high

    prior probability

    as his

    hypothesis,

    so no other

    hypothesis

    is so

    strongly

    confirmed

    by

    the

    data

    [1976:378-379; emphasis

    n

    original].

    Although

    M.

    Salmon

    goes

    on to

    say

    that

    plausibility

    considerations re not

    always

    so

    easily

    resolved

    as

    in

    the

    Longacreexample,

    and

    provides

    an

    additional

    example

    to

    make

    her

    point,

    she does

    not

    provide any

    detailed discussion of how

    plausibility

    considerations

    hould

    be

    carried

    out.

    The detailed discussion of plausibility considerations that will be presented below is

    clearly necessary

    for a

    number

    of

    reasons.

    The

    most obvious reason will

    be

    recognized by

    many,

    if not

    all, archaeologists,

    nd has to do with the

    basis

    on

    which

    archaeologists

    valuate

    propositions

    concerning

    prehistoric

    human behaviorthat are

    put

    forth

    by

    other

    membersof

    the

    profession.

    It

    has

    already

    been

    noted that for

    any

    specific

    observational

    prediction

    or set

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    Smith

    ]

    INFERENCE

    AND

    INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

    605

    of

    related observational

    predictions

    there is an abundanceof

    logically possible

    alternative

    hypotheses.

    In terms of

    archaeological

    nference

    this

    could

    be

    rephrased:

    There is an

    abundance of

    logically possible

    (not necessarily probable)

    human

    activity patterns

    that

    would result

    in

    archaeologically

    dentical

    patterns

    of

    cultural debris.

    The

    observational

    predictions, if subsequently shown to be true, would serve to confirm any one of the

    alternative

    hypotheses.

    The decision

    as to which of these

    equally

    confirmable

    alternative

    hypotheses

    concerning

    a causalhuman behavior

    pattern

    will

    actually

    be

    formally

    stated

    (and

    perhaps confirmed)

    is reached

    through

    plausibility

    considerations.

    It has

    already

    been

    established

    that such

    plausibility

    considerations

    are

    an

    integral part

    of the

    confirmation

    process.

    If

    an

    archaeologist

    simply

    states a formal

    hypothesis

    rather

    than

    presenting

    alternative

    hypotheses

    and

    explicitly

    stating

    the

    procedureby

    which

    they

    were

    rejected

    as

    being

    less

    plausible,

    how

    does one

    judge

    the

    relative

    plausibility

    of the

    hypothesis

    that

    was,

    in

    fact,

    selected

    for formal statement

    and

    testing?

    If

    the

    procedure by

    which an

    archaeologist

    determines

    the

    prior probability

    of a

    hypothesis

    is not

    explicitly

    stated,

    how

    can other

    archaeologists

    assess

    the

    reasonableness

    r

    correctness

    of the

    determination?

    How

    could one know if the

    archaeologist,

    either

    by

    design

    or

    through

    ignorance,

    selected a

    hypothesis

    for

    subsequent testing

    that was

    not in

    fact the most

    plausible

    choice? The

    only

    criteria

    that

    could

    be

    employed

    in

    such

    a

    situation would

    be

    those

    of

    competence

    and

    intellectual

    honesty

    of

    the author. Consider

    the

    following

    statement

    by

    Lewis

    Binford:

    ...

    The

    main

    point

    of

    our

    argument

    s that

    independent

    means of

    testing

    propositions

    about the

    past

    must

    be

    developed.

    Such means must

    be

    considerably

    more

    rigorous

    than

    evaluating

    an

    author's

    propositions

    by judging

    his

    professional

    competence

    or

    intellectual

    honesty (1972:90).

    It

    is

    clear,

    I

    think,

    that

    this

    demand for

    explicit

    objectivity

    should be

    extended

    to

    include

    plausibility

    considerations.

    Hypotheses

    must not

    only

    be

    subjected

    to

    testing

    once

    formally

    stated,

    but

    the

    plausibility

    considerations hat

    resulted

    n

    the selection

    of the hypothesis (or hypotheses) to be tested mustbe explicitly stated. Unless his is done,

    archaeological

    nference

    will

    not be

    a

    logically

    complete

    method of

    inductive

    confirmation.

    In

    describing

    he

    plausibility

    consideration

    process

    I

    outline

    the

    general

    method described

    by

    W.

    Salmon

    (1967:113-131),

    and

    at the same time refer to the

    specific

    application

    of

    plausibility

    consideration

    o

    archaeological

    ituations

    by

    several

    archaeologists.

    think it will

    become

    clear

    as

    the

    discussion

    progresses

    hat some

    archaeologists

    employ

    a

    method of

    plausibility

    consideration

    hat is

    very comparable

    o the

    abstract

    descriptionprovidedby

    W.

    Salmon.

    The

    procedure

    outlined and

    described

    in

    detail

    by

    Lewis Binford

    in

    the article

    Smudge

    Pits and Hide

    Smoking:

    The Use of

    Analogy

    in

    Archaeological

    Reasoning

    1967;

    reprinted

    1972:33-51;

    see

    also,

    Binford

    1972:52-58),

    will

    in

    particular

    be

    seen

    to

    be

    in

    very

    close

    agreement

    with

    the

    more

    general

    ogical

    model.

    Although

    Binford

    does

    not

    employ

    the

    same

    terminology

    as W.

    Salmon,

    and

    does

    not

    provide any

    discussion of the inherent

    theoretical

    problems

    involved,

    he

    does,

    in

    fact,

    provide

    a

    logically

    sophisticated

    example

    of

    plausibility

    consideration

    n

    archaeological

    nference.

    Binford's

    method

    would

    riot,

    however,

    be the most

    appropriate

    o

    employ

    in

    all

    archaeological

    ituations,

    and

    different

    variationsof

    plausibility

    considerations

    n

    archaeological

    nference

    will therefore

    also

    be

    discussed.

    Before

    going

    further with a

    discussion

    of

    plausibility considerations,

    a

    number

    of

    points

    need to be

    reiterated.

    First,

    plausibility

    considerationsare

    logically

    separate

    rom and

    prior

    to

    the actual

    testing

    of

    a

    hypothesis:

    Plausibilityarguments

    mbody

    considerations elevant

    to

    the evaluation of

    prior

    probabilities.

    They

    are

    logically prior

    to

    the

    confirmatory

    data

    emerging

    from

    the

    H-D

    schema,

    and

    they

    involve

    direct

    consideration

    of

    whether the

    hypothesis is of a type likely to be successful (W. Salmon 1967:118). Similarly: This

    particular

    situation demonstrates the

    necessity

    of

    examining

    the

    validity

    of

    arguments

    presented

    before

    considering

    them

    seriously

    and

    proceeding

    o the

    testing

    of

    their

    accuracy.

    Invalid

    arguments

    may

    be

    dismissed;

    valid

    arguments

    must be

    tested to

    determine their

    accuracy Binford

    1972:57).

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    606

    AMERICAN

    ANTHROPOLOGIST

    [79,

    1977

    Secondly,

    plausibility

    considerations

    involve

    analysis

    of

    prior

    documented

    situations

    where

    either

    or

    both the observational

    prediction(s) (patterns

    of cultural

    debris)

    and

    alternative causative

    hypotheses

    (patterns

    of human

    behavior) might

    have occurred.

    In

    an

    archaeological

    context

    this

    assessment

    of the

    prior

    probability

    of

    hypothesized

    relationships

    of human activity to cultural debris usually involves consideration of documented

    ethnographic

    and

    ethnohistoric situations where

    the behavior

    pattern

    and/or

    pattern

    of

    cultural

    debris is described.

    Archaeologists

    are

    not, however,

    restricted o

    a

    consideration

    of

    ethnographic

    situations

    in

    determining

    he

    prior

    probability

    of

    hypotheses,

    as will

    be seen

    later

    in

    this article.

    The

    first

    step

    in

    plausibility

    consideration involves

    defining

    the attribute

    class

    to be

    considered.

    This is

    a

    simple

    matter

    (W.

    Salmon

    1967:90-91)

    and in an

    archaeological

    ontext

    consists

    of

    explicitly

    defining

    the alternativebehavior

    patterns

    and

    the

    pattern

    of cultural

    debris

    that are under

    consideration

    Binford

    1972:37-38,

    45).

    The

    second,

    and much

    more

    difficult

    step

    involves

    the

    choice

    of a

    reference

    class.

    In

    an

    archaeological

    ontext

    choosing

    a referenceclass would involve

    deciding

    which

    ethnographic

    situationsare going to be considered n assessingprior probabilityof alternativehypotheses,

    and which

    are

    not

    going

    to be considered.

    Choosing

    a reference class

    is

    referred

    to

    as

    establishing boundary

    conditions

    by

    Ascher:

    In

    effect,

    the

    new

    analogy

    consists of

    boundary

    conditions

    for

    the

    choice

    of

    suitable

    analogs

    (1961:319),

    while M.

    Salmon

    employs

    the term

    domain

    of

    applicability

    (1975:461)

    to refer to a reference class. W.

    Salmon

    clearly

    expresses

    the

    problems

    confronting

    archaeologists

    who are

    attempting

    to

    establish

    an

    appropriate

    eference

    class:

    ...

    In

    order

    to

    ascertain

    the

    probability

    we

    must

    have

    enough

    instances

    to be able to

    make

    an

    inductive

    generalization.

    Thus we

    do not want

    to

    try

    to refer

    single

    cases to

    classes

    that

    are too

    narrow,

    for

    if

    we

    do we will not have

    enough

    evidence

    upon

    which

    to

    base

    our

    inference.

    At the

    same

    time,

    we

    want our reference class

    to contain other

    relevantcases,not irrelevant nes [1967:91].

    In

    attempting

    to

    define

    a

    suitable

    reference

    class, archaeologists

    are

    almost

    invariably

    confronted with the twin

    problems

    of

    insufficient data

    and

    possibly

    biased data.

    This often

    forces

    archaeologists

    to define

    a

    reference class that is

    larger

    than

    appropriate

    n

    that

    it

    contains

    irrelevant ases.

    There

    is, however,

    no clear-cut set

    of

    rules

    for

    defining

    the

    boundaries

    of

    a

    reference

    class:

    The

    choice

    of a

    reference

    class

    is an

    extremely

    practical

    affair,

    in which

    we must

    balance a number

    of

    factors such

    as

    the size

    of

    the

    class,

    the amount

    of

    statisticalevidence

    available,

    the cost involved

    in

    getting

    more

    data,

    the

    difficulty

    in

    effecting

    a

    relevant

    subdivision..

    .

    (W.

    Salmon

    1967:92).

    As a

    general

    rule

    archaeologists

    have

    tended to

    employ the suggested criteria of similarity of environment and similarityof subsistence

    adaptation

    n

    defining

    the

    boundaries

    of a

    referenceclass:

    In

    summary,

    hen,

    the

    canon is:

    seek

    analogies

    in

    cultures which

    manipulate

    similar

    environments

    n

    similar

    ways

    (Ascher

    1961:319).

    While

    this

    is

    certainly good

    advice,

    it

    does

    not

    provide

    an

    answer

    to

    the

    question:

    Should

    all

    ethnographic

    descriptions

    of

    human

    populations

    that have

    a similar

    subsistence

    pattern

    and are located within

    a

    similar

    environmental

    situation as the

    prehistoricpopulation

    n

    question

    be

    included

    n the

    reference

    class,

    or

    only

    some?

    One

    possible

    way

    to

    approach

    this

    problem

    s to include all such

    similar

    ethnographically

    documented

    populations

    within

    the reference

    class,

    and

    then

    partition

    the reference class

    into

    subgroups

    on the

    basis of

    geographical,

    ubsistence, cultural,

    or

    environmentalcriteria

    (see W. Salmon 1967:91-92; M, Salmon 1975:460-461). The way in which the reference

    class is

    partitioned

    would

    vary,

    of

    course,

    depending upon

    the

    type

    of

    human behavior-

    cultural debris

    relationship being

    considered. Once

    partitioning

    of the reference class has

    been

    accomplished,

    the

    subgroup

    hat is most similar o the

    prehistoric

    human

    population

    n

    question

    could

    be

    surveyed

    to

    assess

    the

    prior probability (relative plausibility)

    that

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    Smith

    ]

    INFERENCE

    AND

    INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

    607

    alternative behavior

    patterns

    would

    have

    resulted

    in

    the

    pattern

    of

    cultural

    debris under

    consideration.

    If consideration

    of this

    initial

    highly

    similar

    subgroup

    did

    not

    yield

    sufficient

    data

    to

    ascertain

    he

    prior

    probability

    of

    alternative

    hypotheses,

    then

    subgroups

    with

    a lesser

    degree

    of

    similarity

    could

    be considered.

    The

    number

    of

    subgroups

    hat would

    be

    eventually

    considered would depend both upon the qualityof the ethnographicdescriptionsavailable

    within each

    subgroup,

    and the

    relative

    difficulty

    encountered

    n

    deciding

    between

    alternative

    hypotheses.

    If in

    the

    initial

    subgroup

    there were

    accurate,

    detailed

    descriptions

    of the

    cultural debris and

    the causal behavior

    pattern

    was

    always

    the

    same,

    it

    would

    not

    appear

    o

    be

    necessary

    to consider

    any

    other

    subgroups.

    If,

    on the other

    hand,

    data were

    lacking,

    or

    there

    was more

    than one

    hypothesis

    with

    nonnegligible

    priorprobability,

    urther

    ubgroups

    would have

    to be considered.

    Thus

    Longacre

    was

    able to

    restrict

    his

    plausibility

    consideration

    to

    a small

    subgroup,

    the

    Western

    Pueblos

    (Longacre

    1970:28),

    of the total

    possible

    referenceclass because

    of the excellent

    quality

    of the

    ethnographic

    nformation,

    he

    historical-cultural

    ontinuity

    in the

    area,

    and

    the

    apparent

    ack of

    more than one

    hypothesis

    with

    nonnegligibleprior probability.

    Binford,

    on the other

    hand,

    considereda much

    larger

    percentage of the cases in the total possible reference class, including ethnographic

    descriptions

    from

    the

    Great Lakes

    region,

    the

    Plains,

    and

    the

    southeast United

    States

    (Binford 1972:42-44, 53-55).

    Before

    turning

    to a consideration

    of

    how

    the

    relative

    prior probability

    of

    alternative

    hypotheses

    is

    actually

    determined,

    two

    final

    points

    should

    be

    made

    concerning

    reference

    classes.

    First,

    archaeologists

    hould

    explicitly

    define

    the

    referenceclasses

    hey

    are

    employing

    in

    plausibility

    considerations.

    Secondly, archaeologists

    should

    consider all

    of the

    available

    ethnographic

    cases

    included

    within

    those

    reference

    classes

    ratherthan

    selecting

    only

    some

    cases for

    comparison (requirement

    of

    total

    evidence,

    W. Salmon

    1967:76).

    Thirdly,

    there

    is

    an

    increasing

    effort

    by

    archaeologists

    o

    recognize

    and

    employ

    reference classes other

    than

    ethnographicones. Geographicreference classes(G. Johnson1972, Pearson1976) as well

    as

    reference classes

    concerning

    plant

    and

    animal

    populations

    (Asch,

    Ford,

    and Asch

    1972;

    Smith

    1975)

    are

    being

    successfully

    employed

    in

    determining

    the

    prior

    probability

    of

    alternative

    hypotheses.

    Similar

    guidelines

    to the ones

    just put

    forth for

    ethnographic

    reference

    classes

    also

    apply

    to such

    nonethnographic

    eferenceclasses

    (Smith

    1976a).

    Although

    W.

    Salmon outlines

    an

    all-inclusive

    classification

    of considerations

    that

    can

    serve

    as a basis

    for

    plausibility

    udgments

    1967:125-130),

    such

    plausibility

    considerations

    n

    archaeological

    nference

    invariably

    take the form

    of

    argument

    by analogy (Binford

    1967).

    Since

    arguments

    by

    analogy play

    such

    an

    important

    role in

    plausibility

    judgments,

    it

    is

    obviously

    important

    to

    understand

    their

    general

    structure,

    and

    to know the

    criteria

    established

    for

    determining

    he

    strength

    of such

    arguments.

    Through

    uchan

    understanding,

    archaeologicalarguments by analogy can be improved, and the overall archaeological

    reasoning

    process

    can

    be

    strengthened.

    Argument

    by

    analogy

    is familiar

    to most

    people

    because it

    plays

    an

    important

    role

    in

    most

    everyday

    reasoning.

    It

    can

    be

    briefly

    defined

    as:

    A form of

    inference in

    which

    it

    is

    reasoned

    hat

    if

    two

    or

    more

    things

    agree

    with

    one another

    n

    one

    or more

    respects,

    they

    will

    probably

    agree

    in

    yet

    other

    respects

    (Neilson

    1956:94).

    In

    archaeological plausibility

    considerations the

    situations

    to

    be

    compared

    consist

    of the

    archaeological

    ituation

    on

    the

    one

    hand,

    and on

    the

    other hand

    all

    of

    the

    ethnographic

    ituations

    included

    n the reference

    class.

    The

    archaeological

    observational

    predictions

    (specific

    statements

    concerningpatterns

    of

    cultural

    debris)

    are the shared attributes

    that

    will

    be

    compared

    with

    reference

    class

    situations, and the alternative hypotheses (causal patterns of human behavior) are the

    unknown but

    inferredattribute.

    The

    archaeologist,

    n

    attempting

    o determine

    he

    prior probability

    of alternative

    nferred

    behavior

    patterns

    should

    employ

    the

    seven

    nonquantitative

    criteria isted

    below,

    which are

    described n

    greater

    detail in

    Copi (1972:358-362;

    see also Binford

    1972:34-36).

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    608

    AMERICAN

    ANTHROPOLOGIST

    [79,

    1977

    (1)

    The

    number

    of situations

    shown

    to share

    the attributes

    n

    question.

    (2)

    The

    dissimilarity

    of

    the situations

    shown

    to share the attributes.

    This is what

    M.

    Salmon

    is

    referring

    to

    when

    she

    discusses

    employing

    ethnographic

    cases

    from

    dissimilar

    subgroups

    of the

    reference

    class

    (1975:461).

    (3)

    The

    number

    of shared

    attributes.

    (4)

    The

    number

    of

    inferred

    attributes.

    (5)

    The

    significance

    of the

    shared

    attributes.

    (6)

    The

    specificity

    of inferred

    attributes.

    Binford's

    argument

    concerning

    smudge pits

    and hide

    smoking

    (1967),

    for

    example,

    would be a

    strongerargument

    f it were not

    so

    specific

    as

    to the exact

    function of

    the

    pit

    (Munson

    1969).

    (7)

    The numberof

    points

    of

    difference

    between

    situations.

    The extent

    to which

    these

    criteria have

    to be

    employed

    will,

    of

    course,

    depend

    upon

    the

    relative

    prior

    probabilities

    of various

    alternative

    hypotheses

    that

    emerge

    during

    plausibility

    consideration.

    If

    only

    one of the

    hypothesized

    causalbehavior

    patterns

    s even mentioned

    n

    the reference class

    situations,

    there

    is

    obviously

    no need to

    apply

    all of the seven

    criteria

    listed

    above.

    The

    situation

    becomes

    more

    difficult,

    however,

    if more than

    one

    hypothesis

    is shown

    to

    have

    nonnegligible

    prior

    probability.

    If

    in

    such

    a

    situation

    the

    competing

    hypothesized

    human

    behavior

    patterns

    with

    nonnegligible

    prior

    probability

    are

    similar,

    one solution is

    to

    incorporate

    both into

    a

    single,

    less

    specific

    hypothesis

    prior

    to

    testing:

    ...

    one

    may

    then

    be

    forced,

    as

    I

    previously

    suggested

    (Binford,

    1967

    p. 8),

    to offer

    a

    more

    general

    and inclusive

    proposition.

    In this case the more

    general

    nclusive

    proposition

    would

    be

    that

    the

    observed

    archaeological

    eatures

    were

    smudge

    pits

    as distinct

    from

    lighting

    fires,

    roasting

    pits,

    etc.

    [Binford

    1972:57.]

    If,

    on

    the

    other

    hand,

    alternative

    hypothesized

    causal

    behavior

    patterns

    with

    nonnegligible

    prior probabilityare not similar,they should be formallystated andsubjectedto testing.It

    is

    important

    to

    remember

    hat

    the function

    of

    plausibility

    considerations s

    not

    necessarily

    to

    select

    the

    single hypothesis

    with

    the

    highest

    prior probability

    for formal

    statement

    and

    testing,

    but rather

    to

    reject

    those

    hypotheses

    with

    low

    prior probability.

    If more than

    one

    alternative

    hypothesis

    is

    formally

    stated

    for

    testing,

    it

    is

    important

    to

    attempt

    to

    ascertain,

    through

    consideration

    of

    the

    reference class

    situations,

    if

    there are differences

    among

    the

    patterns

    of cultural

    debris caused

    by

    each

    human

    activity.

    If

    observed,

    such

    differences

    may

    allow

    a

    selection

    of one

    of

    the

    alternative

    hypotheses

    during esting.

    Archaeologists

    would,

    in

    many

    cases,

    be

    pleased

    to

    be confronted

    with

    the

    problem

    of

    more

    than one

    hypothesis

    with

    nonnegligible

    prior probability.

    It

    is

    a

    much more common

    situation

    for an

    ethnographic

    reference

    class

    to

    yield very

    little,

    if

    any,

    information

    concerning

    human behavior-cultural ebris

    relationships.

    Archaeologists

    are

    attempting

    to

    deal with

    this

    problem

    n

    a

    number

    of

    ways.

    The

    patterning

    of

    material

    remains

    in

    archaeological

    contexts

    is

    being

    observed

    and

    analyzed

    with much

    greater

    accuracy

    and in

    much

    greater

    detail

    now

    than

    formerly.

    Improved recovery

    techniques

    such as

    flotation

    (Struever1968)

    have

    greatly

    increased

    the

    amount

    and the

    variety

    of data

    being

    recovered from

    archaeological

    contexts,

    allowing

    longer

    and more detailed

    observational

    prediction

    sets

    to be

    developed

    for

    archaeological

    situations.

    There

    has

    also been a

    corresponding

    ncrease n

    the

    accuracy

    of the

    recording

    and

    describing

    of

    the context

    of material remains. This

    increased

    accuracy

    in

    recovery

    and

    recording,

    combined

    with

    the

    development

    of

    sophisticated

    analytical techniques,

    has

    resulted in a much greater ability on the part of archaeologists o recognizeand describe

    accurately

    the

    existing patterning

    of cultural debris in

    archaeological

    situations.

    This has

    allowed

    longer

    and

    more detailed observational

    prediction

    sets to be

    developed.

    There

    has

    also

    been

    increased

    interest in

    attempting

    to extract more information from the

    material

    remains hemselves

    Semenov

    1964;

    Wilmsen

    1970).

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    Smith

    ]

    INFERENCE

    AND

    INDUCTIVE

    CONFIRMATION

    609

    All

    of

    these efforts have

    been directed

    toward

    providing

    more accurate and

    more

    complete

    detailed

    descriptions

    of

    patterned

    material

    remains

    observed

    in

    archaeological

    contexts. This

    concern

    with

    accuracy

    and detailed

    descriptions

    stems

    from the

    realization

    that the

    ability

    to

    identify

    and to

    differentiate between the

    cultural debris

    patterns

    producedby alternativehypothesized behaviorpatterns dependsto a greatextent upon the

    length

    and

    quality

    of sharedattribute

    ists for

    archaeological

    ituations.

    Archaeologists

    are at the

    same

    time

    working

    on

    strengthening

    the

    other

    side

    of

    plausibility

    considerations,

    the

    analog

    situations.

    Numerous ndividuals

    have oriented

    their

    research

    toward

    detailed

    study

    and

    analysis

    of

    the

    cause and effect

    relationshipsexisting

    between

    human behavior

    and

    patterned

    material

    remains in

    a

    great

    variety

    of

    specific,

    contemporary ethnographic

    analog

    situations

    (Bonnichsen

    1973;

    Cranstone

    1971;

    David

    1971;

    Friedrich

    1970;

    Gould

    1968,

    1971;

    Heider

    1967;

    Longacre

    and

    Ayres

    1968;

    White

    and Thomas

    1972).

    All of

    these efforts

    are

    oriented toward

    providing

    more

    detailed

    and

    more

    accurate attribute lists

    for

    specific

    human

    behavior-cultural

    ebris

    analog

    situations,

    as

    well

    as

    critically analyzing

    the

    numerous

    ways

    in

    which

    archaeologists

    are

    prone

    to

    misinterpretpatternedmaterialremains.

    Cross-cultural

    urveys employing published

    ethnographic

    reports

    are

    also

    being

    carried

    out

    to

    determine

    what kinds

    of

    relationships

    of

    human behavior o

    material

    remainscan

    be

    observed

    in a

    large

    number

    of

    diverse

    ethnographicanalog

    situations

    (Naroll

    1962;

    Ember

    1973).

    A

    recent article

    by

    Murdock

    and

    Provost

    (1973),

    incidentally, gives

    an

    excellent

    example

    of

    partitioning

    of an

    ethnographic

    reference

    class into

    subgroups.

    Investigations

    of

    analog

    situations have

    not,

    however,

    been

    restricted to the

    study

    of

    present

    day

    human

    populations

    or to the

    analysis

    of

    published

    ethnographic reports.

    Archaeologists

    have also been

    literally taking

    things

    into

    their own

    hands and

    carrying

    out

    imitative

    experiments

    with material

    objects

    in a

    manner

    designed

    to

    simulate

    past

    human

    activity patterns Ascher1961; Million1975; North 1975; Spears1975).

    Once

    plausibility

    considerations

    are

    completed,

    and the

    prior

    probability

    of

    alternative

    hypothesized

    causal

    behavior

    patterns

    for

    a

    specific

    observational

    prediction

    or

    set

    of

    observational

    predictions

    has

    been

    determined,

    the next

    step

    in the H-A

    method

    is

    to

    state

    explicitly

    those

    hypotheses

    with

    nonnegligible

    prior

    probability.

    Alternative

    hypotheses

    that

    were

    considered but

    rejected

    due

    to

    low

    prior

    probability

    hould

    also

    be

    listed at

    this

    point.

    Formulation

    of

    Alternative

    Hypotheses

    Once

    hypotheses

    with

    high

    prior

    probability

    are

    explicitly stated,

    the H-A

    method

    follows,

    with

    a

    few

    exceptions,

    the format

    of the

    H-D

    method.

    At this

    point

    in the

    employment

    of the

    hypothetico-analogmethod,

    it is to be

    hoped

    that

    at

    least

    one

    (and

    perhaps more)

    hypothesized

    causal

    human

    activity

    pattern(s)

    has

    been

    found to

    have

    high

    prior

    probability

    of

    causing

    a

    specific

    set of

    observational

    predictions,

    and

    has been

    explicitly

    stated

    prior

    to

    being

    tested.

    If

    the

    archaeologist

    is

    primarily

    interested

    n

    pursuing

    he

    strength

    or

    reliability

    of

    the

    hypothesized

    human

    behavior-cultural

    debris

    relationship(s),

    subsequent

    testing

    of the

    hypothesis

    (hypotheses)

    would

    involve

    either

    considering

    a

    different

    set

    of

    relevant

    attributes

    within the

    original

    reference

    class,

    or

    consulting

    either

    a

    previously

    unconsidered

    subset of the

    original

    reference

    class

    or

    an

    entirely

    new

    reference

    class,

    employing

    the

    original

    attribute class

    (Binford

    1972:46).

    If,

    on

    the other

    hand,

    the

    archaeologist

    s

    considering

    human

    behavior-cultural

    ebris

    relationships within the context of an archaeologicalresearch project, the H-A method

    should be

    carried

    out within a

    larger

    problem

    oriented

    framework.

    The

    familiar

    statement

    that

    archaeology

    must be

    problem

    oriented

    simply

    means that

    any

    research

    project

    should

    be

    oriented

    toward

    providing

    answers

    to a

    numberof

    explicitly

    stated

    general

    problems

    or

    research

    questions.

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