Infantry - Fort Benning · Infantry • INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin...

Infantry

••••• INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S.Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for theinfantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authorsand not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry andinfantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerningeditorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; [email protected]. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. •POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. •USPS Publication No. 370630.

MARCH-APRIL 2007 Volume 96, Number 2

PB 7-07-2

MG WALTER WOJDAKOWSKICommandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENOEditor

MICHELLE J. ROWANDeputy Editor

BETTY J. BYRDEditorial Assistant

At top left, a Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 27th InfantryRegiment, 25th Infantry Division, provides security during amission in Iraq. (Photo by TechSergeant Maria J. Bare, USAF).At middle right, Soldiers withthe 1st Infantry Division marchto the front during World War I.(U.S. Army photo) Below, agroup of Soldiers completetraining on Fort Benning,Georgia, in May 1960. (U.S.Army photo)

This medium is approved for officialdissemination of material designed to keepindividuals within the Army knowledgeable ofcurrent and emerging developments withintheir areas of expertise for the purpose ofenhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Distribution: Special

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 0705701

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FRONT COVER:

BACK COVER:A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion,27th Infantry Regiment, 25thInfantry Division, providessecurity at a checkpoint in Iraq. (Photo by Master SergeantAndy Dunaway, USAF)

FEATURES23 THE HARD CHOICE: DECISIVE POINTS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Captain Brandon Anderson26 A CENTURY OF EXCELLENCE: THE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL —

THEN AND NOWDavid S. Stieghan

31 A HISTORY OF THE INFANTRY SCHOOL: HOW FORT BENNING BECAME‘HOME OF THE INFANTRY’

DEPARTMENTS1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE2 INFANTRY NEWS6 PROFESSIONAL FORUM

6 MANAGING COMBAT STRESS — THE ROLE OF THE BATTALIONCOMMANDERLieutenant Colonel Gary Brito

8 A CYCLE OF VICTORY — MANNING SYSTEM CONTRIBUTES TO‘SPARTAN’ SUCCESS IN AFGHANISTANCommand Sergeant Major James Redmore

12 ETHICS AND MOTIVATION — HOW A SOLDIER FEELS DURING COMBATCaptain Massimo Scotti, Italian Army

16 A COMMANDER’S GUIDE TO THE FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANYCaptain Trenton J. Conner

38 TRAINING NOTES38 IMPROVING STRYKER GUNNERY TRAINING

Captain Joshua Dailey42 PRINCIPLES FOR THE SMALL UNIT LEADER

Captain Scott Shirk45 BOOKS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHT INTO BIN LADEN’S PAST

Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN50 WEAPONS CORNER

51 BOOK REVIEWS52 SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

MAJOR GENERAL WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI

Commandant’s Note

In April 2007, 100 years ago, the Army established the Schoolof Musketry at the Presidio of Monterey, California. This was beginning of the Infantry School. In this Commandant’s

Note I want to discuss how the Infantry applied lessons learned incombat to improve the training of our Soldiers even as the InfantrySchool itself evolved over the course of a century.

Friedrich von Steuben began the U.S. Infantry’s firstsystematic training when he drilled George Washington’sContinental Army at Valley Forge in 1778. Following theMexican War the Army’s peacetime training continuedintermittently until the Civil War, which represented the firstconfrontation between eighteenth century tactics and nineteenthcentury technology. Union and Confederate forces sustainedcasualties far greater than those of any earlier conflict. The massedfrontal infantry attacks favored by Union and Confederate forcesearly in the war fell apart in the face of field artillery firing canisterand grape shot and the massed fires of rifles accurate to rangestwo or three times those of the smoothbore muskets still in use.These Civil War lessons spawned Major General Emory Upton’sU.S. Army Infantry Tactics, published in 1874, which remainedin use until after the Spanish-American War of 1898.

Following the Spanish-American War, Lieutenant GeneralArthur MacArthur, Commander of the Pacific Division, establishedthe School of Musketry at Monterey in 1907 to addressshortcomings identified in the war with Spain. The post atMonterey was too small for training large numbers of troops,however, and the school moved to Fort Sill, Oklahoma as theInfantry School of Arms in 1913 where field artillery, infantry,and cavalry officers and noncommissioned officers learned thefundamentals of their profession.

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and initial reportsfrom the field showed that our own Army needed to train formodern war, and on a far larger scale than ever before. Fort Sillwas not big enough to accommodate the levels of training neededand the Army selected a site near Columbus, Georgia, and namedit Camp Benning. The machine gun school left Fort Sill andmoved to Camp Hancock, Georgia, in the summer of 1917.Soldiers trained there on contemporary machine guns used by thewarring powers. At the same time, the Small Arms Firing Schoolopened at Camp Perry, Ohio. The Army officially establishedCamp Benning on October 19, 1918, less than a month before theend of World War I. By now, after-action reports flooded the WarDepartment from Europe and after close scrutiny our trainingfurther evolved.

Camp Benning escaped the closure of military posts during

A CENTURY OF TRAINING

March-April 2007 INFANTRY 1

the post-war demobilization whenColonel Paul B. Malone —himself a decorated WWIbrigade commander andstaff officer — presentedthe case for preserving thecamp before Congress. Hestressed the urgent need fora single infantry school where theArmy’s Soldiers and leaders could learn their profession, and onFebruary 20, 1920, Congress voted to resume the constructionand growth at Camp Benning.

As war clouds again spread over Europe in World War II,Fort Benning trained over 600,000 Soldiers and commissioned52,000 lieutenants by the end of 1945. The Infantry Boardreceived and applied the lessons learned during WWII for thenext generation of Soldiers. Ranger units in Burma, the Pacific,North Africa, and Europe necessitated Ranger training at FortBenning. The first Ranger class for individual candidatesgraduated on March 1, 1952. Barely five years after WorldWar II, the Korean War presented new challenges as the Armyfaced an enemy whose massed infantry assaults and tenacityagain gave rise to changes in tactics, techniques, and proceduresto deal with this new threat.

In Vietnam the limited road network and elusive nature ofthe enemy demanded better mobility. Under Major GeneralHarry W.O. Kinnard’s leadership the 11th Air Assault Divisiontested and refined the air mobility concept at Fort Benning in1963, and in 1965 deployed to Vietnam as the 1st Cavalry Division(Airmobile). Throughout the Cold War, during the Vietnam War,in Operation DESERT STORM and smaller conflicts, and nowduring the global war on terrorism we still gather and apply thelessons learned in combat. Our ability to capture and rapidlydisseminate information on the enemy’s intent, his weapons, andhis tactics, techniques, and procedures enables us to shareintelligence with our allies, and to train our own Soldiers to destroyhim.

The Infantry saves lives and wins battles because we collectand share relevant information on the enemy. As we welcome theArmor School to Fort Benning and become the Maneuver Centerof Excellence, we look back with pride on those early days after1913 when infantrymen, field artillerymen, and cavalrymen trainedtogether at Fort Sill and we look forward to this superb trainingopportunity in the future.

Follow me!

APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED

COMMON CORE COURSE TO BE REQUIREMENTFOR CAPTAINS’ CAREER COURSES

The following publications have beenpublished by the U.S. Army in the last threemonths:

* FM 3-21.20, The Infantry Battalion,* FM 3-05.202, Special Forces Foreign

Internal Defense Operations,* FM-I 4-93.41, Army Field Support Brigade

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,* FM 4-20.64, Mortuary Affairs Operations,* FM 3-90.61, The Brigade Special Troops

Battalion,* FM-I 2-22.9, Open Source Intelligence,* FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency,* FM 4-20.153, Airdrop of Supplies &

Equipment: Rigging Ammo,* FM 3-23.30 (Chg 1), Grenades and

Pyrotechnic Signals,* FM 4-02.43, Force Health Protection

Support for Army Special Operations Forces, and* FM 4-20.167, Airdrop of Supplies &

Equipment: Rigging Tracked Personnel - CargoCarrier.

2 INFANTRY March-April 2007

DDDDDOCTRINEOCTRINEOCTRINEOCTRINEOCTRINE C C C C CORNERORNERORNERORNERORNER

The Captains’ Career Common Core Course (C5) willbecome required for graduation from all branchcaptains’ career courses (CCCs) beginning June 1.

The C5 provides a series of critical skills grounded inleadership, communication, composite risk management, criticalreasoning/thinking and developing a positive command climate.The skills are intended to better prepare officers for their next 10years of service, and the change is in keeping with the Army Chiefof Staff’s vision to continue transformation of the Army OfficerEducation System.

The instruction is in a Web-based interactive multimediaformat that facilitates self-paced study. Although completionof the C5 is not a requirement to attend a captains’ career course,Soldiers may complete the training before beginning the careercourse.

“This gives students a good basis for the beginning of the CCC

and relieves them of the requirement while they are at the residentphase,” said Lieutenant Colonel Shawn M. Maxwell, C5coordinator at the Center for Army Leadership, ProfessionalMilitary Education Division.

The curriculum supports preparation of company-grade officersfor company command, as well as battalion- and brigade-levelstaff positions in combined, joint and multinational environments.It provides first lieutenants and captains with a common foundationof operational and leadership instruction tied to the officer’sspecific career field, branch, and functional area needs, Maxwellsaid.

First lieutenants and captains may enroll in the C5 via ATRRS.Eligible officers should contact their career manager to determinespecific branch requirements. More information is available atthe Center for Army Leadership’s Army Knowledge Online Website at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/376783.

ARMY NEWS SERVICE

ARMY LAUNCHES WOUNDED SOLDIER,FAMILY HOTLINE

At the direction of the Acting Secretary of the Army and Army Chief ofStaff, the Army has opened a Wounded Soldier and Family Hotline (1-800-984-8523). The purpose of the hotline’s call center is twofold: to offer woundedand injured Soldiers and family members a way to seek help to resolve medicalissues and to provide an information channel of Soldier medically relatedissues directly to senior Army leadership so they can improve how the Armyserves the medical needs of our Soldiers and their families.

Many wounded and injured Soldiers who have supported the global war onterrorism, as well as their families, are enduring hardships in navigating themedical care system. The Army is committed to providing outstanding medicalcare for the men and women who have volunteered to serve this great nation.Recent events made it clear the Army needs to revise how it meets the needs ofour wounded and injured Soldiers and their families. In certain cases, theSoldiers’ chain of command could have done a better job in helping to resolvemedically related issues.

Leaders in Soldiers’ chains of command also need to be aware that this callcenter exists and that it has not been created to circumvent the chain ofcommand. The hotline is open from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m., Monday through Friday,but it will eventually expand to 24 hours a day, 7 days a week as additionalpersonnel are trained and added to its staff.

PEO SOLDIER TESTS IMPROVEDPARACHUTE SYSTEMS

DEBI DAWSON

Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier is testing a newparachute system that the Army plans to use to replacethe system in use since the 1950s. The new parachutes

address increased weight requirements and provide additionalsafety benefits.

Beginning in 2008, all T-10 parachutes, which have been inthe Army inventory for more than 50 years, will be replaced withthe Advanced Tactical Parachute System (ATPS) T-11. Althoughthe T-10 is a proven system, today’s paratroopers face increasedrequirements beyond the T-10’s design.

Paratroopers are required to jump in more equipment than inthe 1950s, when the total weight of Soldier, parachute systemand combat load averaged 300 pounds. The T-11 is designed tocarry a paratrooper with a total jump weight of as much as 400pounds safely to the ground.

A key safety benefit of the T-11 is a significantly slower rate ofdescent averaging 18 feet per second, resulting in a 25-percentreduction in impact force over the T-10. The T-11 achieves theslower descent by having a canopy with a 28 percent larger surfacearea than the T-10, while weighing only seven pounds more.Additionally, the main canopy design results in minimal oscillationafter inflation and after lowering the combat load.

Operational testing of the T-11 began in January under thesupervision of the Airborne and Special Operations TestDirectorate and PEO Soldier. It is being tested by XVIII AirborneCorps paratroopers, riggers, and jumpmasters who will make morethan 3,200 test jumps from January to October to ensure itssuitability for use in mass-tactical, static-line operations.

Lieutenant Colonel John Lemondes, PEO Soldier’s ProductManager for Clothing and Individual Equipment, explained thatthe T-11’s reserve parachute is more reliable and much safer thanthe T-10’s. “The T-11 harness improves paratrooper comfort andintegration with the parachute and mission equipment. The T-11main canopy design results in a much smoother deploymentsequence, minimizes oscillation and significantly reduces the rateof descent, which will result in many fewer jumper-related injuries.It will ultimately result in more Soldiers available for duty becauseof fewer injuries.”

Under the current fielding plan, the 75th Ranger Regiment,the Rigger School and the Airborne School will receive the T-11in 2008-2009. The 82nd Airborne Division will receive the newparachute in 2009-2011, and T-10s will be replaced Army-wideby 2014.

Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, PEO Soldier designs,develops, procures, fields, and sustains virtually everything theSoldier wears or carries. By employing innovative concepts and

technologies, PEO Soldier has made great strides in quickly gettingimproved equipment into the hands of Soldiers, especially thosein Iraq and Afghanistan. PEO Soldier headquarters is supportedby three Project Managers (PMs). PM Soldier Warrior isresponsible for Land Warrior, Air Warrior, and Mounted Warrior.PM Soldier Weapons manages both individual and crew-servedweapons. PM Soldier Equipment has purview over Sensors andLasers, Soldier Survivability and Clothing and IndividualEquipment. PM Soldier Equipment is the material developer andprogram manager for all of the U.S. Army’s parachutes andauxiliary parachute equipment.

For more information on PEO Soldier, visit the organization’sWeb site at http://www.peosoldier. army.mil.

(Debi Dawson is a public affairs officer with PEO Soldier’sStrategic Communications Office.)

Courtesy photo

The T-11 parachute is being tested by XVIII Airborne Corpsparatroopers, riggers and jumpmasters who will make more than 3,200test jumps from January to October 2007.


INFANTRY NEWS

The Army continues toupgrade body armor toincrease protection from

bullets and fragments, and soonwill field the Improved OuterTactical Vest (IOTV) toSoldiers deploying to Iraq andAfghanistan.

The IOTV meets ProgramExecutive Office (PEO)Soldier’s goals of providingSoldiers with the most advancedprotective gear available while alsoimproving comfort and missioneffectiveness.

“The IOTV is more than three poundslighter than the current OTV, but providesan equal level of protection over anincreased area,” said Brigadier General R.Mark Brown, Program Executive OfficerSoldier. “This vest epitomizes ourcontinuous efforts to seek the nextimprovement and to provide our Soldiersthe best body armor available, bar none. Itis live-fire tested — we know it will proveitself in combat.”

“The weight of the IOTV was reducedby eliminating overlap,” said Major CarlFulmore, assistant product manager forSoldier Survivability. “With the IOTV, wewere able to streamline previousimprovements.”

For example, the vest now has a highercut in the underarm area, which willeliminate the need to attach the axillary orunderarm protector to the current deltoidaxillary protector set. The deltoid protectorcan still be attached at the commander’sdiscretion. The vest’s integrated throatprotector provides the same protection asthe current attachable version, but it’sdesigned to be more comfortable. The nowintegrated side plate carriers decrease thevest’s profile, and a lower back protectorextends the vest’s coverage by 52 squareinches.

The IOTV’s numerous improvements gobeyond increased protection. A single-stagequick release added to the front of the vestallows a Soldier to doff the IOTV and itsattachments with one pull. The vest then


ARMY TO FIELD IMPROVED ARMORDEBI DAWSON

falls to the ground in twopieces and can be put backtogether in minutes.

“This feature would onlybe used by Soldiers in

emergency situations,such as being trapped inan overturned orsubmerged vehicle. It’snot meant to simply be aquick way to get out of

the IOTV at the end of theday or mission,” Fulmore said.

Medics could use the quick release totreat wounded Soldiers, or they could usean opening on the left shoulder, whichallows easy access while still providingprotection to the patient.

Comfort and utility features are alsopart of the improved design. The mostnotable may be the IOTV’s overheadopening. An internal waistband providesa snug fit and moves much of the weightfrom the shoulders to the waist.

“This design significantly decreasedthe vest’s profile and should increasemobility. We believe mobility equalssurvivability.” Fulmore said.

Other features include:• The addition of a long variant to sizes

medium through extra large. This extendsthe size range from eight to 11 and shouldresult in a near-custom fit for Soldiers.

• Additional modular lightweight load-carrying equipment attachments as aresult of moving the opening from thefront of the vest. These attachments arenow in the universal camouflage pattern.

• Enhanced small arms ballistic insertpockets with four inches of verticaladjustability, which will allow for betterplacement of the plates based onindividual body proportions.

• Additional storage pockets.• A mesh lining to aid ventilation.Soldiers will continue to use the

enhanced small arms protective insertsand the enhanced side ballistic inserts.

(Debi Dawson is a public affairs officerwith PEO Soldier’s StrategicCommunications Office.)

U.S. Army photoA Picatinny Objective Gunner Protection Kitinstalled on a HMMWV.

The Armament Research,Development and Engineering Center atPicatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, hasdesigned a new armor shield thatprovides much needed protection forHMMWV (high-mobility multipurposewheeled vehicle) gunners in combatsituations.

The Picatinny Objective GunnerProtection Kit (O-GPK) was a jointdevelopment by Picatinny engineers andSoldiers recently returned from activeduty in Iraq. With more than 2,500 ofthe systems already being used intheater, the O-GPK is currently in massproduction at Army depots, and field-ready kits are arriving in Iraq andAfghanistan on a weekly basis.

“The O-GPK provides significantforce protection and situational awarenessfor the (HMMWV) gunner,” said ThomasKiel, lead designer of the O-GPK. “Thesystem includes a combination of steel andtransparent armor that (is) configured toprotect our Soldiers against enemy riflefire and IED blasts.”

The O-GPK includes transparentarmor windows and rearview mirrorsthat allow Soldiers to maintain aprotected posture while performingmission objectives with full visibilitythrough the windows. The kit is modularand utilizes the existing features ofHMMWV design for quick installationonto the overhead turret with no specialtools required.

PICATINNY DESIGNSNEW GUNNER ARMOR

PICATINNY ARSENALPUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

In November 2006, the U.S. Army Infantry Center began atransition of its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Systems Managers (TSMs) to TRADOC

Capability Managers (TCMs) in coordination with the ArmyCapabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). The TSMs weresystems-focused and by TRADOC regulation had built-indisestablishment criteria after fielding of a specific system.However, we have learned that the TSMs provided intensiveoversight of key Army systems across the Army imperatives ofdoctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader developmentand education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) at verylow cost in terms of personnel resources. The TSM systemprovided a direct user representative link to the materieldeveloper community, specifically, product managers (PMs) andprogram executive officers (PEOs). In short, the TSM concepthas worked well for key Infantry assigned systems, i.e. Soldier,Bradley, Stryker, Tube Launched Optically Tracked WireGuided (TOW)/Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS),and Javelin.

As the Army nears the completion of modularity andimplements base realignment and closure (BRAC) federal law, itbecame apparent to both the Infantry and Armor Centers andARCIC that a different paradigm needed to be established tomanage our BCTs across the domains of DOTMLPF and stillmaintain a direct user link to PMs and PEOs. Conceptually, itwas determined that TCMs would not be disestablished andcontinue to provide intensive DOTMLPF oversight of assignedsystems as well modular BCTs. Therefore, in coordination withefforts to establish the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE)at Fort Benning, TCM-Heavy Brigade Combat Team, TCM-Stryker, TCM-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)/CloseCombat Missile Systems (CCMS), TCM-Soldier, and TCM-Combat Identification were established from the existing TSMstructures at the Infantry and Armor Centers.

The new paradigm is to intensely manage our BCTformations as well as assigned systems. A major change willespecially occur for the IBCT. Whereas TSM-CCMS onlyprovided DOTMLPF oversight of the TOW/ITAS and Javelinsystems, TCM-IBCT/CCMS will now provide that oversightas well as DOTMLPF integration for the IBCT. While it is notenvisioned that TCM-IBCT/CCMS will be the proponent forall IBCT issues, TCM-IBCT will provide a single point ofcontact to help resolve key IBCT issues as they arise.

TCM-IBCT/CCMS MissionThe TCM-IBCT/CCMS serves as the MCOE single point of

contact to oversee the IBCT as it is properly organized, trainedand equipped for success on the battlefield. Performs duties as theArmy’s centralized manager for all combat developments user

activities associatedwith the Javelin,ITAS, TOWmissile system,and kineticenergy (KE) closecombat missilesystems.

T C M - I B C T /CCMS is in theprocess ofconducting an initial DOTMLPF assessment of the IBCT and willbrief the Chief of Infantry in third quarter FY 07. We willincorporate input from our active and reserve component IBCTsin this assessment. By the end of March 2007, TCM-IBCT/CCMSwill have accomplished the following tasks:

• Write TCM-IBCT campaign plan.• Finalize charter with ARCIC.• Educate USAIC, TRADOC and DA agencies and the filed

Army concerning TCM-IBCT role.Throughout the remainder of the year TCM-IBCT/CCMS will: April-June 2007 —• Review Directorate of Combat Developments post combat

survey and CALL data … Determine initial IBCT DOTMLPFassessment.

• Conduct DOTMLPF Assessment of IBCT and brief CG in3QFY07.

• Visit IBCTs to confirm/adjust assessment.• Develop/Open IBCT Web Portal.July-December 2007 —• Establish Integrated Concept Team.• Coordinate within USAIC and TRADOC to address issues.• Continue visits to IBCTs.• Refine DOTMLPF Assessment of IBCT.IBCTs will comprise 54 percent of the Army (active and reserve

components). That equates to 38 of 70 BCTs. It is time that thisversatile formation gets the staff oversight that it deserves andrequires.


TSMs Transition to TRADOCCapability Managers

TCM-IBCT/CCMS Points of Contact:Colonel Jeff Terhune, TCM-IBCT/CCMS —

[email protected], DSN: 835-3911, COM:(706)545-3911

John Bastone, Deputy TCM-IBCT/CCMS — [email protected], DSN: 835-6245, COM: (706) 545-6245

Major Chad Calvaresi, Assistant TCM-IBCT/CCMS —[email protected], DSN: 835-4317, COM: (706)545-4317


Author’s Note: The intent of this article is not to prescribethe approved method for managing combat stress, but rather offersome thoughts and generate discussion on how a battalioncommander can manage this very important issue.

As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, more than3,000 service members have been killed and over 21,000 wounded.Given the conditions of combat, multiple deployments and otherrelated issues, units are showing more and more signs of combatstress, a stress that can slowly erode the war-fighting abilities of anyunit. A few of the rather obvious causes are back-to-back deployments,separation from home and loved ones, and the loss of fellow Soldiers.A few of the not so obvious causes are marital problems, financial

problems, anxiety, and fear. Identifyingthe not so obvious causes andtaking actions to mitigate themis a tough task. All of these

causes, and more, can quicklylead to declining unit

readiness, Post TraumaticStress Disorder (PTSD),and health problems, aswell as a variety of other

related problems.

MMMMMANAGINGANAGINGANAGINGANAGINGANAGING C C C C COMBATOMBATOMBATOMBATOMBAT S S S S STRESSTRESSTRESSTRESSTRESSTHE ROLE OF THE BATTALION COMMANDER

What Help Is Out There?Few if any clinical experts exist in the maneuver battalion to

help in dealing with casualties and combat stress. Nor does thecommander receive a lot of institutional training in dealing withthis subject. Closing this gap is a challenge.

In addition to personal leadership (of the commander), the battalionchaplain can assist in identifying indicators of combat stress. Keepin mind that Soldiers often see the chaplain in confidence. It isimportant to empower the chaplain to fix problems without the directinvolvement of the battalion commander. However, the commander/chaplain relationship should allow for the two to share informationwithout violating the trust of the Soldier. Of course, another veryvaluable asset is the battalion command sergeant major as he oftenmaintains a thumb on the pulse of the battalion.

The brigade psychiatrist or combat stress doctor is a trainedprofessional who can help to identify combat stress and, in manyways, prevent it. He can help identify the Soldiers most at risk ofdeveloping PTSD or other behavioral disorders. Some of thesedisorders include flashbacks, nightmares, irritability, troubleconcentrating, sleeplessness and decreased alertness, all of whichwill eventually affect unit and individual Soldier readiness.

The assistance of the combat stress doctor doesn’t always haveto be reactive. Scheduling counseling sessions with a platoonthroughout a deployment is a great way to be proactive and getahead of the problem. One technique is to conduct initial sensingsessions between the doctor and the Soldiers, followed by morein-depth sessions with Soldiers identified as “high risk” for stress-

related disorders. Additionally, there are othermedical teams outside of the brigade that

specialize in preventing and treatingcombat stress. The expertise that these

teams bring to the battlefield istremendous. It is highlyrecommended to deploy the same

combat stress team to the battalion on eachoccasion. A feeling of trust will develop overtime, creating an environment whereSoldiers feel comfortable discussing issueswith familiar personnel. The combat stressteam should visit the battalion for a few

days early in the deployment, prior to any

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GARY BRITO

incidents, to begin building a rapport thatwill pay dividends later. The battalioncommander (and his subordinates) shouldfoster an environment that allows forSoldiers to feel that they can seek helpwithout being labeled as weak.

More than 15 percent of service membersreturning from Iraq and 11 percent of servicemembers returning from Afghanistan havemet the screening criteria for majordepression, generalized anxiety, or PTSD,according to a study published in the July 1,2004, issue of the New England Journal ofMedicine titled “Combat Duty in Iraq andAfghanistan, Mental Health Problems, andBarriers to Care.”

“The most important thing we can dofor service members who have been incombat is to help them understand that theearlier that they get help when they needit, the better off they’ll be,” said Colonel (Dr.)Charles W. Hoge in the June 30, 2004,Associated Press article “One in EightReturning Soldiers Suffers from PTSD.”Hoge, a medical doctor with the Departmentof Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences atWalter Reed Army Institute of Research,was one of the authors of the study.

These same assets can be of great valueduring a unit’s regeneration program uponredeployment for both the Soldier and his/her family.

Seeing the SignsThis is tough for several reasons: age,

maturity, experience in the Army, andtraining levels all can affect how troops (andleaders) deal with combat stress. However,the commander must be able to see the signs,and in some cases, take deliberate actions. Itis important to train subordinate leaders toaddress combat stress with their Soldiers anddeal with it themselves. The hardened platoonsergeant may enforce the “suck it up”approach. This approach is more commonthan not and is also understandable given theconditions of combat. However, it mayeventually lead to poor leader decisions,impact on Soldier performance, and possiblycontribute to unwarranted escalation of forceincidents. None are good for a unit. Granted,in combat, times can be tough for everyone;however, a few techniques can help lowerand manage the stress level.

Some of the approaches that thecommander can influence include:

Adjust the combat patrol schedule, Morale phone calls, Physical Training, Mandatory “stand-down” day, Shuffle duty positions — give a

guy a break, Bible studies, Sensing sessions, In-theater passes, Visit the troops, go on a mission

with Soldiers, Special meals (Big motivator!), Train junior leaders to identify

symptoms early, Group counseling, Ask your NCOs, Effective FRG and newsletters, and Leader-to-leader discussions with

battalion commander and the leaders atall levels.

Another outlet available to all Soldiersis environmental leave, commonly referredto as R&R leave. Ironically, this may causestress and coping issues for many of ourSoldiers. A few techniques to mitigate are:

1. Leverage the rear detachment (phonetrees, rear detachment chaplain, etc),

2. Transition “from and to” the patrolschedule both before and after a Soldierdeparts for leave and lastly,

3. Closely manage the leave windowsfor the leadership of the unit. Of course, amandatory deployment briefing thataddresses leave/travel process, finances andexpectation management when joining thefamily, in addition to other areas can be ofgreat value to our Soldiers. Uponredeployment, recommend no more than a48-hour pass for all Soldiers, regardless ofrank. This is a great opportunity to slowlybut efficiently integrate back into the CONUSenvironment, meet newly assigned battlebuddies and get reacquainted in the barracksor back at home. Additionally, recommend areverse SRP (Soldier readiness process)focused on finance settlements, medicalscreening, family reunion briefings, and tooffer the opportunity for Soldiers to seekassistance from a chaplain or a medicalprofessional if needed.

What to Look ForSome Soldiers experiencing combat

stress may show no symptoms while othersshow many. Physical signs may includeexcessive talking or joking, out of character

quietness, vomiting, tight stomach(contractions), sweating, constantheadaches, hyperventilation andexhaustion, just to name a few.

Emotional signs of stress may includeanxious or agitated behavior, anger towardsall Arabs (or local nationals, depending onwhere the unit is operating), anger towardspeers and the Army, depression, callousedor numb behavior, resentment, loss ofconfidence, and a general disbelief in orsupport of the mission.

Seeing the signs while engaged insteady-state operations is hard. Who bestdoes this? The squad leader, a battle buddyor the first sergeant? Everyone shares theresponsibility, but the final responsibilitylies with the commander. Seeing the signsis complicated by the fact that leaders canalso experience combat stress but are stillexpected to perform leadership dutiesinherent to their rank and position. Whowatches the commander? Great question,as he is often without peers on the FOB(forward operating base) or within the unit.Great obvious sources, of course, are thebattalion command sergeant major,chaplain, or in some cases, even thecompany commanders.

ConclusionManaging stress before, during, and

after a deployment is critical to maintainingthe war-fighting readiness of our force.With prolonged operations in Iraq,Afghanistan and potential conflicts in otherareas of the world, we must continue to carefor our most valuable asset — the Soldier.

The long-term effects on the Army areobvious. Our junior leaders and youngSoldiers will be the senior NCOs andleaders of tomorrow. While there may beno textbook solution to manage combatstress, working hard to reintegrate ourSoldiers back to their homes, families andsociety, as well as utilizing the assetsavailable in the field, coupled with goodold-fashioned leadership, may help ussustain the long fight.

Lieutenant Colonel Gary Brito is currentlyserving as a senior trainer (Scorpions) at theNational Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.He previously served as the commander of the 1stBattalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rdInfantry Division, Fort Benning, Georgia.



Victory proverbially has a thousand fathers, and thesuccess of our brigade in Operation Enduring FreedomVII has well over 3,000. But a share of the credit also

belongs to the system that brought the team together.The 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division

developed from an ideal into a battlefield reality within a yearand a half. The “Spartan” experience demonstrates the utility ofthe three-year lifecycle manning system and validates, in largemeasure, the concept of the modular brigade combat team.

The brigade began with little more than a commander and adream. Fortunately, that commander was the ideal man for thejob. Colonel John Nicholson’s office at the Pentagon wasincinerated during the terror attacks on September 11, 2001. Thecolonel escaped with his life only because the arrival of householdgoods that morning kept him away from his office. Hiscommitment to the mission and the team could not have beenmore powerful.

I had served with Colonel Nicholson during a previousassignment and knew I was getting not only a motivatedcommander but one of the finest leaders and tacticians available.Conscious of the possibilities and potential of the new organizationas well as the challenges we faced, the commander and I soughtto seize the unique opportunity to build a very special team fromthe ground up.

The colonel had already struck upon the “Spartans” theme bythe time we discussed our unit identity in late July of 2004. As we

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talked, I grew more and more enthusiastic about the concept. TheSpartan ideal embodied everything we hoped to achieve. Theancient Spartan warriors formed an elite class set apart by theirtraining, professionalism, and service. They idealized discipline,loyalty, self-sacrifice, valor, strength, and skill.

When the colonel asked my advice for a motto, I conducted alittle research before responding. As I learned about the ancientcity-state and its unique warrior class, I came across a Spartanexpression that perfectly distilled our ideal: “With Your Shield orOn It.” The phrase meant for Spartans that a warrior should returnfrom battle with shield in hand or perish in the fight. Since awarrior’s shield protected the comrades who stood beside him infighting formation, the motto suggested ideals of sacrifice,solidarity, courage, and teamwork. Once the theme coalesced, theSpartan ethic informed every aspect of our brigade.

We had a commander and a command sergeant major so wehad a brigade — at least on paper, and we had one hell of a motto.But that was about it.

The commander and I assembled the Spartan team from avariety of 10th Mountain “legacy” units, preexisting elementspressed into service in new capacities and entirely neworganizations. We brought the 1st Battalion, 32nd InfantryRegiment over from 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain and 2nd Battalion,87th Infantry Regiment from the division’s 2nd Brigade. Wesignificantly enhanced the capabilities of a resident main supportbattalion to form the 710th Brigade Support Battalion. The 4th

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR JAMES REDMORE

MANNING SYSTEMCONTRIBUTES TO ‘SPARTAN’SUCCESS IN AFGHANISTAN

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regimentformed from the remnants of divisionartillery (DIVARTY). As the DIVARTYcommand sergeant major, I watched myorganization steadily disintegrate until itvanished entirely into the fledgling BCTs,and then I took my place in the SpartanBrigade.

A new battalion-sized element featuredunique reconnaissance, mechanizedmovement, and targeting capabilities. The3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regimentrelied largely on new troopers to fill itsranks, leaning heavily on brother Spartanbattalions for leaders. We established the3rd Brigade Special Troops Battalion fromsix separate battalions within the division.

Bringing these capabilities togetherwithin the same brigade paid rich commandand control dividends. Since thecommander and I controlled all assetswithin the 3rd BCT, we could movepersonnel among battalions as necessary.They could coordinate activities among allthe brigade’s organizations, de-conflictingschedules and resolving issues whennecessary. Brigade leaders could passguidance and directions throughorganization channels rather thancoordinate with separate headquarters forsupport. Instead of negotiating with distinctorganizations, they simply passed orders tosubordinate units. The modularorganization also encouraged cross-talkamong leaders and Soldiers from differentspecialties, enhancing cohesion andunderstanding across the brigade.

We confronted a number of significantchallenges as the brigade stood up.Equipping the new force on a condensedtimeline posed enormous logisticaldifficulties for our supply chain. The mostdaunting challenges revolved aroundmanning. The establishment of the newbrigade brought enormous numbers of newSoldiers to Fort Drum. Our brigade alonereceived around 2,000 new Soldiers duringthe run-up to Operation Enduring Freedom(OEF) VII. This posed significant receptionand housing as well as integration, trainingand equipping problems.

The new arrivals stretched theinfrastructure around Fort Drum to thebreaking point. Base housing facilities formarried and single Soldiers alike were soonexhausted. Virtually every property in

nearby towns was rented, sold or leased inshort order. While post leaders initiatedconstruction projects designed to increasethe housing capacity at Drum, leaders andSoldiers resorted to increasingly remotelocations in the near term. Significantnumbers of brigade Soldiers commuted 45minutes to an hour each way every day fromregional towns. Some lived as far out asSyracuse, a commute that typically beganat 3 a.m., including privately owned vehicle(POV) and shuttle bus legs.

Fortunately, the brigade’s senior NCOsacted energetically and decisively tomitigate the problems. Spartan sergeantsmajor and first sergeants met personallywith incoming Soldiers as they completedin-processing Friday afternoons. Theydiscussed the post, the area, the division,expectations and standards. They alsodiscussed Soldiers’ experiences andbackgrounds, and any personal or familyissues that could impact the team. Thepersonal interaction allowed our leaders tomake informed decisions about who toplace where rather than randomly assignincoming Soldiers to units and housingareas. If two out of six guys had to live inSyracuse, who among them were bestprepared to handle the situationresponsibly? Who needed a strong, directive

leader to impose discipline? Who wasprepared to accept greater responsibilities,perhaps move into a leadership position?

The relative youth and inexperience ofour incoming Soldiers pushed enlistedbrigade leaders to their limits. Many newSoldiers required close supervision,vigorous mentorship and remedial training.Platoon sergeants and squad leadersdevoted enormous energy to developingjunior leaders, identifying young Soldierswith leadership potential and providing thementorship necessary to create tacticallyand technically proficient team and sectionleaders.

We sought from the earliest stages of thebrigade’s existence to inculcate a commonWarrior Ethos. One aspect of the WarriorEthos was conceptual. It revolved aroundesprit de corps, discipline, and mentaltoughness. Another aspect of the WarriorEthos revolved around combat training,instilling skills that complemented theWarrior spirit and produced Soldierscapable of taking the fight to the enemy.

The combat training also ensured ourSoldiers saw themselves as — and theywere in fact — Warriors first andtechnicians second. The training instilledtactical, weapons, and self-defense skills.

A brigade-wide combatives programinstilled self-defense skills whileencouraging physical fitness and discipline.The program contributed enormously to theeffectiveness of our Soldiers in close-quarters combat with the enemy. It helpedus inculcate not only the proficiency butthe aggressiveness, confidence and fightingspirit necessary to confront and defeat theenemy on the battlefield.

We strongly emphasized marksmanshipthroughout the train-up for our rotation.The emphasis on marksmanship reflectedour commitment to fundamental Soldierskills, our philosophy of conductingtraining “across the board” and ourdetermination to inculcate the WarriorEthos throughout the brigade. On apractical level, it also reflected situationalawareness. Our analysis proved correct.Many of our Soldiers — and not justinfantrymen — fought during small armsengagements against the enemy inAfghanistan during OEF VII.

We adopted a small arms master gunnermodel. Much of the marksmanship training


Photos by Sergeant First Class Michael Pintagro

A fueler with F Company, 710th BrigadeSupport Battalion serving as sergeant of theguard in a force protection detail, monitorstraffic at a vehicle entry point in Afghanistan.

broke down conveniently into modules. This allowed us to conducttraining in self-contained blocks, maximizing flexibility andensuring everyone reached an acceptable level of warfightingproficiency. Short-range marksmanship training prepared Soldiersto confront the enemy with confidence, skill and deadly accuracyon the battlefield. We maximized participation in squad designatedmarksmanship and advanced rifle marksmanship trainingprograms. The training typically culminated in react-to-contactlive-fire drills, convoy live fires and combined arms live fires.

The universal marksmanship effort complemented, but did notreplace, service-wide schools and programs. It provided a baselineof competence on widely employed weapons systems, ensuring alarge proportion of our Soldiers could apply lethal force on thebattlefield. Whereas previous efforts focused on honing the skillsof select “trigger-pullers,” usually infantrymen, artillerymen andcavalrymen, we made mechanics, cooks and medics “trigger-pullers” in their own right.

We also took advantage of formal marksmanship coursesdesigned to refine the skills of our finest shooters. We sent selectSpartans to Sniper School and brought in mobile training teams(MTTs) to reach others.

We implemented perhaps the most comprehensive and dynamicuniversal observer program conducted within a maneuverorganization. Our philosophy was simple: we provided basictraining on fire procedures to anyone who might go “outside thewire” on patrol or mission. We weren’t the first organization toimplement universal observer training, but we conducted thetraining on an unprecedented scale. Soldiers from other artilleryjob specialties, infantrymen or armored cavalrymen might practicecalling for fire, but how many logisticians, staffers or personnelfrom outside the organization typically receive universal observertraining? We trained mechanics, cooks, members of othergovernmental agencies and even Afghan National Army allies inbasic fire procedures.

We established the Spartan Responder program to ensuremaximum proficiency in buddy aid. This went far beyond theconventional combat lifesaver model. Rather than train a coupleguys at a time as slots opened up, we turned our subject matterexperts into trainers. Medics trained each other and then turnedto the rest of the force. By the time we deployed, 100 percent ofour companies had received basic emergency medical training.

Meanwhile, a quiet revolution in battalion support unfolded inthe frozen woods of northern New York. The modular configurationof the brigade afforded a unique opportunity to disperse supportassets. We attached a forward support company (FSC) to eachmaneuver organization. Support Soldiers integrated almostimmediately into their battalions and squadron. This not onlyestablished unprecedented cohesion and camaraderie but ensuredwe would truly train as we fought. Training alongside infantrymen,artillerymen, and cavalry troopers also afforded 710th personnelunique opportunities to learn from the men they supported. Soldiersserving in FSCs trained to the same standards as the combat armstroops they supported, developing in the process into some of theArmy’s most lethal mechanics, logisticians and medics. Combatarms Soldiers, in turn, benefited enormously from their exposureto subject matter experts in a wide array of support specialties.

Training progressed through individual and small group phasesto squad, platoon and company exercises. Company training gaveway to battalion-level exercises conducted at home station.Elements from all of our battalions participated in capstone livefire and fire support training events, setting the stage for ourmission rehearsal exercise (MRE), which was conducted in Juneat the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana.Our mission identified early on, capstone training events and theMRE focused specifically on escalation of force (EOF) scenarios.

As the deployment approached, we conducted final trainingmissions and participated in team-building activities. Senior NCOsconducted a staff ride to Fort Ticonderoga, New York. The staff

ride allowed me and battalion commandsergeants major a final opportunity to interactwith and mentor senior brigade NCOs. Analready tight senior NCO corps emerged fromthe staff ride even stronger and more cohesive.

Practicalities dominated our final weeks athome station. We packed outbound equipmentand received theater-specific gear. We sentSoldiers to the numerous mandatory theaterbriefings and conducted cultural familiarizationtraining. Soldiers completed final administrativeand medical screenings and spent valuable timewith their families.

As the torch party departed in January andadvanced parties and main bodies prepared todeploy, the commander and I could reflect onenormous achievements. Had we merelyconstructed and deployed a brigade within 18months, the achievement would have beenremarkable. Yet we had accomplished muchmore. We had assembled one of the most highlytrained and cohesive maneuver brigades to serve

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment peers across the Pakistani borderwith the aid of an Improved Targeting Acquisition System from an observation point inPaktika Province, Afghanistan.

in the war on terror. Few brigade-sized elements featured suchversatility or such comprehensive capabilities. Seldom if ever hada higher proportion of Soldiers within a brigade possessed such awide range of capabilities. Prior to transformation, how manybrigades contained mechanics and clerks trained to infantrystandards of marksmanship? How many truck drivers and radiotechnicians in other organizations could call in fire missions withdeadly accuracy?

The lifecycle system aided our efforts in a number of criticalways. First, it brought the team together relatively early on. Keyleaders came to know their Soldiers early in the cycle, allowingthem to identify and mentor potential leaders in the earliest stagesand train to the strengths and weaknesses of every troop. Thishelped leaders turn Soldiers into combat multipliers. A strongshooter might develop into a mentor for weaker ones; a skilledfire supporter might teach less proficient Soldiers to call for fire.Playing to Soldiers’ strengths created valuable subject matterexperts, enhanced confidence and developed leaders.

Colleagues, in turn, helped Soldiers remedy deficiencies andturn weaknesses into strengths. A skilled fire support team member,for instance, might learn buddy aid from a medic he taught to callfor fire. A gifted marksman might be a mentor on the range and astudent in the motorpool.

Second, the lifecycle ensured maximum predictabilitythroughout the planning, training and execution phases of ourmission. This allowed for highly effective medium and long rangeas well as near-term planning. Key leaders arranged cumulativetraining events that built on previous instruction. One level oftraining built on another, beginning with individual, team andsquad events and culminating in integrated large scale exercises.The predictability of the lifecycle also allowed us to integrateindividual schools, temporary duty missions and advanced trainingopportunities into our battle rhythm. Rather than send Soldiers toschools haphazardly as opportunities arose, we consciously selecteddates that dovetailed with unit calendars and the broader brigadetraining plan.

Predictability worked to the benefit of the individual Soldieras well as the team. A Soldier who knows with a reasonable degreeof certainty when he can attend BNCOC, pursue educationalopportunities or take leave stands a much better chance ofaccomplishing personal and family as well as unit goals. Leadersand Soldiers planned for major training events and missions andscheduled personal activities accordingly. Family members knewwhen brigade and unit activities permitted free weekends and leaveopportunities with their Soldiers and when they did not.

The continuity provided by the lifecycle also yielded importantadvantages to our brigade. Under the individual manning system,Soldiers and even key leaders arrived and departed sporadically— often at the worst possible times. Transitions frequently occurredduring the run-up to important activities or missions, leavingSoldiers without proven leaders and trusted colleagues when theyneeded them most. The lifecycle helped in two significant ways.First, it kept most of the team intact throughout the cycle. Second,it allowed us to prepare for the transitions that did occur andmitigate their impact.

By encouraging cohesion, stability and continuity, the lifecycle


contributed to morale and esprit de corps. Soldiers developed tightbonds with their leaders and with each other. Despite an intensemission and a high operational tempo, our brigade has enjoyedrobust retention rates, particularly among those opting to remainwith their organizations. While a number of factors influenceretention, the cohesion encouraged by lifecycle manning clearlyplayed a role. Indeed, the cohesion of one infantry squad was sostrong that its members reenlisted on the same day for similarterms in order to keep the squad together.

Critics of the lifecycle often fault the system’s inflexibility. Sincethe lifecycle deliberately aims to lock a team into place throughouta major mission, it is certainly less flexible than the individualmanning system. But it bears reiterating that the advantages ofcontinuity generally outweigh the disadvantages incurred bylimiting flexibility. The inflexibility of the lifecycle, moreover, isoften exaggerated. When leaders find it absolutely necessary to“bust the cycle,” they can. I’ve done it myself in order to place theright man in the right position to accomplish the mission. Withsufficient coordination and support from brigade and higherechelon leaders, a lifecycle unit can indeed move Soldiers intoand out of its organization. The threshold of justification for sucha move and the effort required to complete it are simply greater.

The lifecycle, some critics warn, has the potential to lock NCOsinto positions that hinder career development. This critique is notentirely without merit. Battalion command sergeants major notassigned a brigade could find themselves trapped at the same levelfor consecutive lifecycles. Other senior NCOs, particularly thosepromoted during the lifecycle, might well serve part or all of acycle in positions below their grade. These problems are, in somecases, mitigated by career developing opportunities within thebrigade or, more rarely, by busting the cycle, but they cannot bedenied.

The replacement system for lifecycle units requires furtherdevelopment. Originally, the system’s architects expected apackage of personnel configured according to brigade needs andlikely attrition patterns to fill vacancies over the course of thelifecycle. This package never materialized for us. Instead, weultimately obtained backfills from other 10th Mountainorganizations on an individual basis, an imperfect solution at oddswith the entire concept of the lifecycle.

On balance, however, the lifecycle system represents a vastimprovement over the individual manning method. The continuity,predictability and stability inherent in the lifecycle definitely helpedus create a winning team. The lifecycle system significantly anddirectly improved our cohesion, our technical and tacticalproficiency, and our warfighting capabilities. Our pride, esprit decorps and cohesion — our drive for excellence in everything wedo — was significantly enhanced by the unity built during ourlifecycle. The lifecycle contributed heavily to Spartan successduring OEF VII. I’m convinced it will play a similarly constructiverole in the development of other brigades.

Command Sergeant Major James Redmore is currently serving asthe command sergeant major of the 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. Hepreviously served as the command sergeant major for the Division Artillery,10th Mountain Division.


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

The soldier engaged in combat is pervaded by atumult of feelings, often in contrast with each other,conflicting feelings where passion tends to overcomereason, motivation and sense of ethics. An alternationof rational and irrational predominance, which involvesalso the commanders compelled to live through evenmore explosive and stressing situations.

THE SOLDIERThe figure of the soldier has been socially recognized since the

dawn of civilization. He distinguished himself by his strengthand aggressiveness. He stood out from the rest of the group becausehe was able to defend territory and food supplies and take foodaway from other groups. He was the “prince of survival” and, forthis reason, the community praised him but at the same time stoodin awe of him. As Plutarch wrote in Life of Lycurgus, in the 8thcentury BC Lycurgus aimed to create a new Spartan society whosemembers were invincible warriors. They had to be untouched by“the superfluity and vanity; this basic general rule operated inEgypt where soldiers were kept quite separate from civil society.For many centuries, Spartan society held great fascination for allGreece and inspired Plato when he idealized “his State” in therepublic. According to him, society was divided into three groups

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depending on the nature of each individual: philosophers, warriors,and citizens (farmers and craftsmen).

Philosophers and warriors have to lead the utopian State ofPlato. Philosophers are seen as the source of all wisdom; theyknow what is good for the city (they know the truths of life morethan anyone else in the world).Warriors have the virtue of bravery.(The military must ensure that people obey the philosophers’ will,and they have to defend their territory against enemies.) Thesetwo classes rule the lower ones which consist of craftsmen andfarmers who produce goods for the community. The ruling classeshave to worry not only about their own well-being but also aboutthat of the entire community. All these groups have to have twoimportant virtues: justice, which means performing one’s particularfunctions, and moderation.

Contemporary society, technology and new ways of looking atthe military world enable us to draw an analogy between thesetwo Platonic virtues and those virtues that lead the soldiers duringpeace and through war. The military draws on its strength infighting and aims to win. However, strength can act as a powerfuland effective deterrent when it proves to be potentially destructiveand winning.

Fighting means being able to use violence in a sensible andeffective way, killing only if necessary and allowing for the fact

that one can be killed. Winningmeans being the ideal instrument forneutralizing attacks against thecommunity/state.

Neutralizing attacks impliesaggressiveness of military spirit andmoderation in order to achieve one’sgoals without going beyondhumanitarian limits. Soldiers areexperts in the use of force and haveto use it avoiding any excesses.

It is widely believed that inwartime everything is allowed (interarma silent leges). Actually, thereis nothing more dangerous thanholding an opinion like that, notonly from a civil point of view butalso in military terms. As GeneralCarl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)said, war is famously “thecontinuation of policy by othermeans.” By nature all human beingssurrender themselves to pathos(passion) rather than to logos

CAPTAIN MASSIMO SCOTTI, ITALIAN ARMY

How a Soldier Feels During Combat

Courtesy photos

Italian Army Soldiers patrol an Iraqi street.

(rationality) and ethos (ethics andmorals). In particular, during war humanbeings reveal their real nature and cancause irreparable damage. For thisreason, the civilized society calls forethical behavior and principles which aretransformed into regulations thatguarantee humanity and justice. Thisprocess provides an effective safeguardagainst unjust wars. In fact, we canquestion the legitimacy of a war if theway it is fought violates basic humanrights (the rules of ius in bello), theprinciple of proportionality (it concernsthe damage inflicted), and the principleof discrimination (between fighters andnon-fighters). “However just a war is, itwill turn out to be unjustified if to win itthe two important principles of ius in belloare violated (it does not matter how muchand how often).”

THE SOLDIER, FROMINSTRUMENT TO ACTOR

We have to confront the dilemma aboutwhether soldiers are just pawns in thegovernment’s plans or rational agentswithin that military continuation of policy.

If we regarded soldiers as mereinstruments for attaining politicalobjectives, lifting the burden of makingimportant decisions from their shoulders,this would make their tasks much easier.Choosing this option means transforminga fighter into a mere war machine, whichis built to win and is based on training,discipline, and leadership.

If we saw them as real protagonists ofthe war and able to solve knotty problemsand make key decisions affecting nationalobjectives and policies, they would be in avery delicate situation. In this case, in fact,they are no longer free to operate inaccordance with international rulesgoverning military operations (ius in bello),which are fundamental parts of theirdoctrine. In addition, they are at the mercyof public opinion and, consequently, theyare burdened with responsibilities theywould prefer not to have.

Considering the soldier as a “thinking”being means recognizing a change of hisrole: from pawn to actor, “from simplecause to intelligent cause;” he can be seenas “a cause able to produce good and badthings” and not “something produced by

another cause without order andobjectives.”

This changes the meaning of the term“soldier.”

In peacetime, the soldier is onlypotentially engaged in military operationsand fighting. Consequently, he is able toplan his work according to his primaryobjectives and take into account the effectsthat have been produced by his own actions(effect-based operations).

However, we have to consider carefullydifferent theaters of operations in which asoldier can operate. In fact, he could showa very rational or aggressive dispositionaccording to the context. It is clear that ouranalysis is much simpler if we take intoconsideration the theater of operations inwhich the thinking and instinctive parts ofthe soldier come out.

WHO THE FIGHTERS ARETraining and discipline pull soldiers in

a particular direction on the battlefield(combat motivation). In the sudden quietthat follows the fighting, they stop to thinkabout the results that have been achievedand the major objectives that must bepursued as they assess the whole situation.In this phase reason prevails (militaryethics), and soldiers are able to makeimportant decisions taking intoconsideration their humanity and, at thesame time, the need to win.

All soldiers go through alternate periodsof rationality and irrationality. The figureabove shows the extreme levels of these twomental conditions: military ethics andcombat motivation.

It should also be realized that thecommander of large units is able to operatewithout getting physically involved in thefighting. The responsibility of the missionand his own troops and the respect of lawrequire a great deal of energy. In addition,he feels a surge of pure adrenaline duringthe battle because he would like to be onthe front line with his soldiers; to fulfil thisonerous task he has to get the maximumbenefit out of “his inner resources” —combat motivation and military ethics. Thecommander, whose soul often surrendersto the combat motivation, becomes veryclose to his soldiers through this emotionalinvolvement (pathos), and extremes meet.This makes the structure of the Army solid,and all these elements make it an organicwhole.

The third and last figure we can see inthe virtual battlefield shows the staff. Theywork for the commander in order totransform every single decision into actionin accordance with the tasks and law (iusin bello, military ethics). They work in acontext where there is little physical andemotional involvement and where they areable to act reasonably and responsiblyfollowing “the rational path” of his heart.

Prevalent Emotions in a Combat Situation


PROFESSIONAL FORUM


WHAT LEADS THE SOLDIERSoldiers are driven by an instinct which pushes them to act to

pursue specific aims. This is referred to as military ethics andcombat motivation. Military ethics is a set of rules governing thepublic and private conduct of the military. It consists offundamental values such as country, discipline and honor.

In short, military ethics remind soldiers of “what they have todo and for whom.” Circumstances affect our choices, but a soldiercannot let this happen during his work. He gets around this byfollowing the rules governing the army, trying to predict theconsequences of his actions during the mission, treating hiscomrades with great respect, and taking into consideration thecurrent situation. This means adopting a morally correct attitude.

Combat motivation can be explained by offering a precisedefinition of both terms. Motivation is derived from the Latinword motivus which means “able to make something move,” thatis to say a conscious or unconscious stimulus to the action. If thisstimulus refers to the individual, it can be described as “a dynamicfactor of human behavior which leads an organism towards a goal.”As far as the adjective “combat” is concerned, it refers to theindividual aggressive behavior. It is a phenomenon emergingfrom the state of war and is not a feature of people whojustify it. Soldiers, who have received adequate trainingand are under good leadership in an ideal environment,are driven by this instinctual impulse which enables them tooverwhelm the enemy with determination. Combatmotivation regards the individual and the group at the sametime. As far as the soldier is concerned, it appears to be awillingness to win and survive. Instead, in a group it showsitself as cohesion, which is something that relates members ofan organization to each other so that all members displaywillingness and honor, their own commitment to themselves,unity and objective.

CONCLUSIVE ANALYSISWhat I have described by referring to the roles as soldier-

fighter, soldier of staff and commander is just abstract theory,whereas the reality is much more complex than it seems. A soldierdoes not have to see himself as a war machine; a commandershould not expect him to take decisions or make choices aboutsimple and ideal situations.

During the battle he fights bitterly and hard against the enemyand he moderates his aggressiveness adhering to simple andessential ethical principles. These principles must be easy toremember and comprehensible. For example, in the U.S. Army’sSoldier’s Creed, the so-called “Warrior Ethos” is outlined: “I willalways place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I willnever quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade.”

Soldiers driven by their instinct and principles of honor andcomradeship are able to persist in their actions even in badconditions, trying to win the battle no matter how difficult it is. Inthis case, persisting in doing something is not a mere courageousaction. It is moral courage; it is not only an energy that pushesthem to take risky and definitive decisions, but it is an inner energywhich enables them to summon the willpower to fight.

The U.S Army’s Soldier’s Creed stresses that modern armies

tend to make the motivational aspect prevail over the ethical partof the soldier although they recognize the need to morally respectthe enemy and the rules of war. Referring to the graph on page 13,in fact, we could move the parabola of combat motivation to thetop of the graph (or to the bottom) depending on whether thearmy aims to have (especially in the front line) soldiers driven bypathos rather than by ethos.

A useful comparison will show an important point: the U.S.Army demands a lot of its troops in terms of results. The policyadopted by the Italian armed forces is quite different. As aconsequence, American Soldiers put a greater emphasis on theobjective that must be obtained whereas Italian soldiers layparticular emphasis on how to achieve it. This allows us to noticethe different degree of trust placed in the single individual.Outlining just a few principles in the detailed checklists issymptomatic of an organization that does not exert a strict controlover its members and allows them to operate free within limits.This makes them feel much more involved in the pursuit of theirgoals and urges them to devote themselves to the operation, even

taking the initiative if necessary. On the contrary, enunciatinglots of principles without classifying standard operatingprocedures according to their features could make the single

individual feel confused and bound to comply withinstructions that are given by people who have the power

to decide.Until today, this attitude towards operational

problems has turned out to be able to achieve goodresults and it has been considered to be a good qualityof Italian armed forces in the peacekeeping missions

because it has allowed them to fulfil essential andstrategic aims, earning universal praise. In the future,this quality could transform into a serious handicap. The

Italian Minister of Defence said, “A peacekeepingoperation does not have to impose limits to the military

functions since the combat features of an army must bedistinctive.” These words warn the military against anymisinterpretation of what the battlefield is — a place of violentclashes with the enemy.

Once again, our attention is drawn to the concept of the warriordefined by Plato in the “Republic.” This concept is valid even inthe contemporary society because it clears up any doubts aboutwhat view the armed forces have to hold on the figure of the soldierin order to avoid any possible misunderstanding about somefundamental concepts that have meanings which are often twisted.

Peace considered as absence of military conflict cannot beguaranteed forever. This resource must be safeguarded constantlyby adopting an adequate policy of security, which says anappropriate use of force should be used only if necessary.

The equation security-inability to communicate violencerepresents the cornerstone of being a warrior. In order to avoidany possible misunderstanding, when the military operates inpeacekeeping missions it should face the situation with its usualmilitary mind supported by adequate professional training andmoral creed.

Former American Secretary of Defense Les Aspen said, “Wehave to carry out a mission, we have to fight and win the wars of

our Nation. For whom do we do it? For the American population.This “twofold ethics” justifies the American armed forces ... Sincewe are able to fight and win all the wars of our Nation, we aremuch more capable than others of facing different kinds of missionsuch as peacekeeping and relief operations ...”

Soldiers must be regarded as “combat ready” instruments; theyare trained and equipped to further strategic aims. However “wecannot give a weapon to anyone. Consequently, a well-chosenselection and a rigorous moral and disciplinary training of peoplewho pursue a military career are needed.” Adequate moral“training” must be considered an unequivocal point of referencein all situations, when they are on garrison duty or during a militaryoperation, when they undertake a combat or a peacekeepingmission.

To meet this objective it is necessary to explain simple andbasic principles to the soldier concerning the figure of the fighter.They must be regarded as consistent and clear principles, to giveexamples:

* “I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trainedand proficient in my warrior tasks and drills” (U.S. Army, WarriorEthos);

* “I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of theUnited States of America in close combat” (U.S. Army, Warrior Ethos);

* “...the ethos of the Army is sustained by all soldiers doingtheir duty with an implacable will to succeed; accepting their graveresponsibility and legal right to fight and kill according to theirorders and their unlimited liability to give their lives for others;confident that in return the nation will look after them and theirfamilies” (British Army);

* In combat: you will act without relish of your tasks, or hatred;you will respect the vanquished enemy and will never abandoneither your wounded or your dead, nor will you under anycircumstances surrender your arms (The French Legionnaire’sCode of Honour);

Captain Massimo Scotti, Italian Army, is currently serving as a companycommander of a cadet company at the Italian Army Military Academy in Modena.This article first appeared in the 2/2006 May-June July-August English editionof Rivista Militare and is reprinted with permission of the editors.

*A mission once given to you becomessacred to you; you will accomplish it to theend and at all costs (The FrenchLegionnaire’s Code of Honour).

This is important to face the difficultsituations of combat in Iraq andAfghanistan. At strategic level, thecommander has to face delicate andcontroversial questions. This requires ahigher standard of competence.

The shift of organizational leadershiptowards real strategic leadership involvesthe development of new abilities and habits.At an organizational level, tasks andobjectives are really clear and this requiresspecific competence. Consequently, tasksand standard of performance must be clearand easy to understand.

The commander finds himself in adifficult situation because he has to managethe most delicate resource, which is thematter of ethics. He cannot adopt an

immoral attitude towards the enemy, because he is a human beingand has power to think logically. In other words, he has the abilityto think in an intelligent way because reason is peculiar to man.He realizes that everyone is born equal.

His behavior will be ethically correct if he considers the enemyexactly like him. His behavior will be immoral if he views him asan instrument to serve military interests. The principle must beindependent of specific goals everyone strives for. In this way, itis universal and ethically valid.

The commander always finds himself in a delicate situationswhich could affect his soldiers and civilians’ life as well as successand failure of strategic and political objectives of the nation. Inaddition, these situations are surrounded by an aura of uncertaintyand ambiguity.

Commanders do not play a key role only in saving others’ livesbut also in guaranteeing deterrence. They have to be ready toconduct military operations involving the killing of people anddestruction of property. Since soldiers have to face difficultsituations in many cases, the commander is not allowed to be in astate of inertia and paralyzed with fear. A commander could makemistakes when he makes decisions, which are often subjected torevision. However, this possibility does not have to inhibit him.On the contrary, he has to give much more vigor to his conductand adopt an attitude that seems to be wise and correct in thatparticular situation.

In any case, taking an ethically wrong decision meansincreasing the number of choices that they will have to face, aswell as the future impact of those choices. A bad ethical decisioncould catch the commander in a trap showing him the wrong way.


Italian Army Special Forces Soldiers prepare for a mission in Iraq.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Background

The Army is making great progressin its transformation as it movesto a brigade-centric organization.

Part of this transformation is the creationof forward support companies that providelogistics support to battalions and operateas a subordinate of the battalion. Theintegration of these companies has createdsome challenges for their supported units.Many of these challenges stem from thecreation of new doctrine and deviate fromthe accepted norms of Army of Excellence(AOE) doctrine. Battalion commandersand executive officers struggle with thedifferences between the AOE doctrine theylearned early in their careers and theemerging doctrine of the transformationalArmy. Many commanders across the Armydo not use the forward support company(FSC) and the expertise within it to its fullpotential. This appears to be due to a lackof understanding of forward supportcompanies’ capabilities and subject matterexpertise and because these leaders havenot yet been trained on the new logisticsdoctrine by the institutional Army.

For many years, brigade-levellogisticians created forward logisticselements (FLE) “out of hide” to augment

A Commander’s Guide to theForward Support Company

existing capabilities like the supportplatoon or battalion maintenance sectionto weight the battlefield logistically asneeded with assets and C2 (command andcontrol). This ensured that critical supplyand maintenance capabili t ies wereforward with supported battalions. TheFSC was created to provide all of theassets a battalion needed to be self-sufficient and the necessary C4I(command, control, communications,computers and intelligence) to plan,synchronize, and control logisticsoperations. The forward support companyis a multifunctional unit that includes adistribution platoon and a maintenanceplatoon organized to provide support to amaneuver battalion (FM 4-90.1).

PurposeThe purpose of this article is to provide

information on the doctrinal composition,capabilities, and operations of the forwardsupport company and will provide bothdoctrinal and non-doctrinal tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to bothcurrent and future combined arms battalion

CAPTAIN TRENTON J. CONNER

(CAB) commanders and staff officers. Thisarticle will also address methods ofapplying the capabilities of the forwardsupport company to sustain currentcounterinsurgency operations.

ScopeThis article focuses on the CAB FSC and

will not address the unique requirementsof FSCs supporting RSTA (reconnaissancesurveillance and target acquisition)squadrons and fires battalions; however, thefundamental principles are the same for allFSCs. Also, for the sake of discussion, theheavy brigade combat team (HBCT),combined arms battalion, forward supportcompany’s modified table of equipment willbe used throughout the article.

The Forward Support CompanyThe forward support company is a 233-

Soldier, multifunctional unit that includesa distribution platoon and a maintenanceplatoon organized to provide support to amaneuver battalion (FM 4-90.1). This is

Courtesy photos

Forward support company Soldiers conducta tactical refueling at the National Training

Center at Fort Irwin, California.


intentionally a very broad missionstatement. The FSC provides eachbattalion a robust and flexible logisticscapability that can perform both doctrinaland non-doctrinal missions for thebattalion in support of full spectrumoperations. Although the FSC is organicto the brigade support battalion due to TitleIX considerations, it operates under thecommand and control of the CABcommander through attachment oroperational control. The sectionshighlighted below provide the doctrinalmissions and capabilities of the subordinateelements of the FSC. These elements arethe company HQ section, the food servicesection, the distribution platoon, and themaintenance platoon. Each section’scritical equipment, military occupationalspecialties, and potential shortfalls arehighlighted.

The Company HeadquartersThe FSC headquarters is similar to every

other company headquarters in the Army.The headquarters section is responsible forthe command, control, supply, andadministration of the company. It alsoperforms the following logistics tasks:

1) Coordinates and provides technicalsupport to the combined arms battalion.

2) Advises the combined arms battalioncommander on sustainment requirementsversus available assets.

3) Determines the unit’s sustainmentrequirements in coordination with the BSB(brigade support battalion) operationssection, combined arms battalion S4, andlogistics representatives from attachedunits.

4) Provides input to the combined armsbattalion logistics estimate and servicesupport paragraph of the operations order(OPORD).

5) Plans and monitors supportoperations and makes necessaryadjustments to ensure support requirementsare met.

6) Plans and coordinates allocation ofavailable CSS resources.

7) Tracks available assets throughsubordinate company teams, BSB supportoperations section, combined armsbattalion S4, and other units.

8) Requests backup support whenneeded.

9) Recommends support priorities and

enforces priorities received from higherheadquarters.

10) Coordinates with the S3, S4 andHHC commander on CAB support area(CABSA) locations.

11) Plans and executes contingencyoperations as required.

12) Coordinates with the S3 and S4 onprimary and alternate routes into thecombined arms battalion support area.

13) Establishes and monitors brigadeand battalion logistics situation report(LOGSITREP), logistics status(LOGSTAT), and logistics spot reports inaccordance with an SOP.

14) Plans future logistics operations incoordination with the S4.

15) Develops and maintains tactical andCSS overlays.

16) Develops the CSS synchronizationmatrix.

17) Keeps the BSB abreast of thelogistics situation and future supportrequirements. (Field Manual-Interim 3-90.5, Heavy Brigade Combat TeamCombined Arms Battalion)

(Many of these tasks were previouslyperformed by the battalion S4, but now thebattalion has trained and dedicatedlogisticians to coordinate and providecontinuous support.)

The headquarters section also has acouple unique items of communicationequipment which allow for theater-widecommunications:

Battle Command SustainmentSupport System (BCS3) — BCS3 is theArmy’s maneuver sustainment commandand control system. It aligns sustainment,in-transit, and force data to aidcommanders in making critical decisions.This system capability provides operatorsthe complete logistics picture in the formof the “running estimate.” BCS3 provides:

* A map-centric display on a commerciallaptop — a thorough technical and visualpicture of the battlefield,

* The ability to plan, rehearse, train andexecute on one system, and

* System software that can operate onunclassified or classified networks.

Very Small Aperture Terminal(VSAT) — The VSAT is the satellitecommunications system that allows theBCS3 and the Standard Army MaintenanceSystem-Enhanced in the maintenanceplatoon to transmit and receive data.

CSS Automated Information SystemsInterface (CAISI) — CAISI is a secure,wireless local area network (LAN) whichprovides the “last mile” connectivitybetween logistics automation systems andVSAT type networks.

Movement Tracking System (MTS)Controller Station — This is a satellite-based, messaging and mapping system thatprovides asset visibility of andcommunication with transportation assets.This system is designed to be integratedwith command post operations.

Forward SupportCompany (HBCT)

CO HQ

HQ Section

Field FeedingSection

DistributionPlatoon

Platoon HQSection

Class III & WaterSection

General SuppliesSection

MaintenancePlatoon

Platoon HQSection

MaintenanceControl Section

MaintenanceSection

FieldMaintenance

Teams (1 x CO)

Service andRecoverySection

Figure 1


PROFESSIONAL FORUM


Movement Tracking System Vehicle Mounted — The vehiclemounted system provides the FSC commander the same capabilityas the controller station while on the move.

All of these systems combine to provide the FSC and thecombined arms battalion with a logistics common operatingpicture. They also provide the FSC a “reach back” logisticscapability. When combined with the combined arms battalion’sABCS (Army Battlefield Command System) suite, these systemscreate a complete picture of the battlefield for the battalioncommander.

Field Feeding SectionThe FSC food service section provides Class I food service and

food preparation. The food service section can prepare and deliverhot meals to the maneuver company teams. It distributesprepackaged food, prepared food, or both. It can provide oneheat-and-serve meal and one cook-prepared (A or B ration) mealper day. Central to the food service section’s mission is its abilityto task organize and deploy with company teams and operateremote feeding sites. The field feeding section has two criticalpieces of food service equipment. They are:

* Containerized Kitchen (CK) — The CK is a mobile fieldkitchen that can support 800 Soldiers with up to three hot, cook-prepared or heat-and-serve meals per day. One CK replaces twomobile kitchen trailers and provides more food preparationcapability. The CK is mounted on a tactical trailer and towed.Major features of the CK include electrical power from an on-board tactical quiet generator (TQG), an environmental controlfor heating and cooling, and refrigerated storage of 60 cubic feet.Cooks in the CK can roast, grill, boil, fry and bake. The CK hasrunning water, a protected serving line, and ventilation of exhaustand cooking by-products.

* Kitchen, Company Level, Field Feeding-Enhanced(KCLFF-E) — The KCLFF-E is used for field feeding ofcompany-sized units. It is designed to heat, deliver and serve oneheat-and-serve ration per day for up to 200 Soldiers. It also has alimited capability to provide perishable and shelf-stable mealsprepared by cooks. In order to operate, the KCLFF-E requires twofood service specialists along with assistance from the unit beingsupported. The KCLFF-E is moved using a HMMWV or largervehicle.

Distribution PlatoonThe mission of the distribution platoon is to provide supply

and transportation support to the combined arms battalion. Itconsists of a platoon headquarters section, Class III transportationsection, general supply section, and Class V transportation section.The distribution platoon receives, transloads, and distributes allclasses of supply minus Class VIII; although the platoon maydistribute Class VIII based on battalion SOPs. The platoon maydistribute supplies via unit distribution (combat logistics patrols[CLPs]), supply point distribution (FOB-centric), or both. It alsohas the ability to conduct simultaneous Class III and V support toline companies, HHC, and the FSC itself. The platoon can provideits own security while conducting CLPs or it can be augmented bymaneuver forces based on METT-TC.

Key Equipment: 1 x FBCB2 1 x Forward Area Water Point Supply System 12 x M978 HEMTT Fueler 1 x M977 HEMTT Cargo 5 x M1120 HEMTT Load Handling System 5 x M1075 Palletized Loading System 5 x M1083 MTV w/Ring Mount 5 x M2 .50 CAL MG 1 x Container Handling Unit (CHU)

Personnel: Platoon leader: Quartermaster Corps Platoon sergeant: 92A40 automated logistics specialist 13 x petroleum specialists 1 x water treatment specialist 28 x motor transport operators 1 x automated logistics specialist

The real shortfall of the distribution platoon is the lack ofammunition specialists (89B) within the platoon. The Class Vsection is composed of only motor transport specialists. Thebattalion relies on these specialists to get on the job training inthe management of ammunition.

Maintenance PlatoonThe maintenance platoon provides field maintenance to the

CAB. With more than 140 Soldiers, the maintenance platoon islarger than most companies. The platoon consists of nine sections:platoon headquarters, maintenance control, maintenance, serviceand recovery, and five company-level field maintenance teams(FMTs). The platoon has a wide variety of military occupationalspecialties giving it a robust maintenance capability. Themaintenance platoon provides maintenance support for thefollowing types of systems: M1 series tanks, M2/M3 series fighting vehicles, Construction equipment, Tracked vehicles, Wheeled vehicles, Weapons systems, Fire control systems, Power generation equipment, Communications equipment,

Sergeant First Class Kap Kim

A cook with a forward support company takes water into a containerizedkitchen before dinner at Forward Operating Base Hope in Iraq.

Specialty electronicdevices, Utility equipment, and Quartermaster and

chemical equipment (pumps,hoses, water/fuel systems, etc.).

The platoon maintains alimited quantity of combatspares (prescribed load list [PLL]and shop/bench stock) in themaintenance control section. Themaintenance platoon operates theunit maintenance collectionpoint. When a company isdetached from the battalion, theFSC commander detaches asupporting maintenance packagethat includes the personnel, tools,test equipment, and PLL stocksnecessary to support the company,usually the habitual FMT plus any additionalcapabilities required by the mission.

The maintenance platoon headquarterssection provides command, control, andsupervision for all administrative functionsof the platoon. With guidance from the FSCcommander, the headquarters sectionmonitors established maintenance priorities,provides recommendations for reinforcingsupport, as well as plans and conducts allnecessary platoon training activities.

The maintenance control section is theprimary manager for all field maintenancein the HBCT combined arms battalion andserves as the “nerve center” for thebattalion’s maintenance activities. Themaintenance control section performs allof the Army Maintenance ManagementSystem (TAMMS) and dispatchingoperations and tracks scheduled services forthe combined arms battalion using theStandard Army Maintenance System-Enhanced (SAMS-E). All company teamSAMS-E boxes and PLL clerks arecollocated with the maintenance controlsection. The maintenance control officer(MCO) manages all the SAMS-E operators.The SAMS-E clerks operating eachcompany box process each DA Form 5988-E (Equipment Inspection MaintenanceWorksheet) completed by the operator orcrew and verified by the FMT. FieldManual-Interim (FMI) 4–90.1, HeavyBrigade Combat Team Logistics, definesthe responsibilities of the maintenancecontrol officer, as follows: “The

maintenance control officer (MCO) is theprincipal assistant to the commander, bothbattalion and FSC, on all matters pertainingto the field maintenance mission. The MCOserves as maintenance officer for themaneuver battalion and FSC … He isresponsible to the commander for themanagement of the combined efforts of themaintenance control section, maintenancesection and service and recovery section,and the maintenance system teams...”

This eliminates the need for maneuvercommanders to pull a battalion motorofficer (BMO) “out of hide.” Battalioncommanders now have a school-trainedmaintenance officer with supervision (theFSC commander) to manage their fleets!The MCO is also aided by a maintenanceofficer, usually a chief warrant officer 1 or2, plus a sergeant first class who serves asthe maintenance sergeant. According to thearticle “Maintenance Management in theHeavy BCT” which appeared in theSeptember-October 2006 issue of ArmyLogistician, author Captain Eric A. McCoypointed out that the maintenance controlsection must accomplish the followingtasks:

1) Coordinate recovery of the battalion’sequipment,

2) Evaluate and ensure the quality of allmaintenance completed by the maintenanceplatoon,

3) Monitor the status of equipmentundergoing repairs, and determine thestatus of the repair parts required to

complete those repairs, and4) Perform maintenance

according to the prioritiesestablished by the maneuverbattalion commander.

The service/recoverysection provides recoverysupport to elements of thecombined arms battalion.This section also provideslimited reinforcing recoverysupport to field maintenanceteams. When reinforcingrecovery support is required,FMTs request support fromthe maintenance controlsection.

The maintenance sectionprovides field maintenance forthe HBCT combined arms

battalion. This section primarily focuses onthe HHC and the FSC. It also providesmaintenance support to elements attached tothe combined arms battalion and providesreinforcing maintenance to the FMTs.

Each field maintenance team is tailoredto support infantry, armor, and engineercompanies. As the FSC commander taskorganizes his company, all or part of anFMT goes with the company teams tomaintain habitual support doctrinally. Thecompany commander sets the FMT’spriorities for his company, and the FMToperates under the control of the companyfirst sergeant while supervised by the FMTmaintenance NCOIC. FMTs carry limitedonboard combat spares to help facilitaterepairs forward. If inoperable equipment isnot repairable by the FMT due either toMETT-TC or a lack of repair parts, theFMT uses recovery assets to recover theequipment to the unit maintenancecollection point (UMCP) or designatedlink-up point. FMTs are fully integratedinto the combined arms units’ operationalplans.

Key equipment includes the FBCB2,M88A1, M88A2, M984 HEMTT wrecker,M1089 MTV wrecker, M1075 PLS,Forward Repair System, FMTV Series, andM2 .50 cal. machine gun.

The Role of the FSC in COINThe forward support company fulfills its

primary mission of supporting its battalionalmost without fail at combat training centers

A Soldier with an FSC’s Maintenance Platoon replaces an engine on anM88 recovery vehicle.


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

and in theater. This is done through traditional methods ofcommand and control, distribution operations, and maintenanceactivities. However, the FSC has many other capabilities andpossesses areas of expertise not currently being used. The followingsections may assist battalion commanders in exercising thecapabilities of the FSC as it conducts both doctrinal and non-doctrinal missions. The FSC can perform valuable shapingoperations such as combat logistics patrols, assessment of essentialservices, and limited support and training for host-nation securityforces logistics.

Combat Logistics PatrolsThe enemy wants the most visible and “easiest” targets to exploit

in the media. The enemy thinks the most vulnerable targets arelightly armored, logistics convoys. So if the enemy wants to attacklogistics targets why not operate them at night when we are at ourbest? Combat logistics patrols should not be used as “bait” assome may suggest, but supplies must be moved across thebattlefield, so why not force the bugs to come out of hiding whenwe are at our best? Why not position our assets at those criticalpoints on the battlefield so that the bugs can be crushed?

The most common mission for the FSC is combat logisticspatrols (CLPs). Much has been written on the subject of convoysecurity in the last few years. It is not the intent of this article todiscuss convoy battle drills and things of that nature. The thingsthat will be covered are decisions that must be made by battalioncommanders such as security, air/ground integration, and settingthe conditions for success.

Security. The question of security for combat logistics patrolsand who provides it is a question that every unit that rotates throughthe National Training Center asks itself. Each unit struggles withconvoy SOPs and the allocation of combat forces to the FSC.Additionally, the question of, “Who’s the convoy commander?”becomes a heated topic of discussion; the answer to which is notclear and must be settled by the unit through standard operatingprocedures. There are basically three methods of security for aCLP:

1) Self: The FSC uses organic assets to provide its own security.2) Allocation of external assets: Roughly a platoon-sized

element is temporarily attached to the FSC for the conduct of themission.

3) Combination of both: Platoon-sized elements secure thepatrol through more dangerous terrain, and the FSC secures itselfthrough less dangerous terrain. This usually involves link upoperations with multiple companies within the battalion AO.

All three of these methods can be successful. The decisioncomes down to METT-TC, and the level of training of the Soldiersinvolved.

Air/Ground Integration. The use of Army aviation is almostautomatic when plans for ground combat operations begin.Immediately, battalion S3s contact higher to find out what airassets are available for the next cordon and search, but whatabout combat logistics patrols, especially if the CLP is “selfsecuring?” Is the use of an air weapons team for convoy securitya good economy of force mission? Aviation support providesvaluable firepower and “eyes forward” for combat logisticspatrols. They can detect IEDs and other potential threats, and

they can provide accurate fires for the convoy commander as heactions through the kill zone.

Critical to the integration of aviation is training for the leadersof the forward support company. Planning and using close airsupport is not taught at the logistics schoolhouse yet. These tasksneed to be incorporated into training at home station for at leastsquad leaders and above. Then the use of air support can be refinedat a combat training center by all elements within the battalion.Finally, upon deployment, battalion S3s should include CLPs intohabitual aviation requests to brigade.

Setting the Conditions. Much is written on setting conditionsfor offensive operations. Terms like tactical patience andmomentum are often used, but do we apply the same level ofthought and analysis for tactical logistics operations? No. Moreoften than not, the battle captain does not even know when theFSC is on the road because some other operation has his attention.Below is an example of a conditions checklist that could be helpfulfor battalion S3s and battle captains in planning, coordinating,and tracking combat logistics patrols.

1) What is the mission, route, and frequency/call sign of theCLP?

2) Is aviation support on-station? Frequency/call sign?3) Has the security force linked up with the FSC and completed

rehearsals?4) When was the last route clearance conducted?5) What friendly operations are in progress or planned during

the CLP? Is there a conflict?6) Is the QRF postured to support the CLP?7) Do the units know that a CLP is moving through their AO?8) What is the latest intelligence for the route?9) Is the CLP traveling through Tier I IED sites at prime hours?10) Convoy commander turns in final manifest and receives

latest intelligence update.Assessment of Essential Service RequirementsThe FSC has a wide variety of military occupational specialties

that can be readily applied in the civilian world on commercialequipment. The reason many Soldiers enlist in the Army is toobtain job skills for use upon completion of their enlistment. Whynot use these same skills to assist in helping local populationsduring counterinsurgency operations? Chapter 8 of the new FM3-24, Counterinsurgency, states:

“In general, according to existing U.S. military logistic doctrine,there is no provision for U.S. forces to become decisively orexclusively engaged in providing essential services to the HN (hostnation) population during COIN operations. However, thisdoctrinal position does not prohibit units from using applicableskills and expertise resident in their military organizations to helpassess essential HN service needs. In conjunction with theseassessments, logistics and other units can also be used to meetimmediate needs where possible and in the commander’s interest,and to assist in the handoff of essential service functions toappropriate U.S. government agencies, HN agencies, and othercivil support organizations.”

In other words, if you have the ability, do what you can withwhat you have until it can be turned over to the appropriate parties.By having an FSC within the battalion, commanders now have


the ability to do more. The ability to assist the local populace canlend credibility to commanders. The FSC commander along withthe Civil Affairs team leader/S-5 can work together to build areaassessments for the battalion commander. Below is a list ofcapabilities available to commanders within the FSC using theSWEAT framework:

Sanitation: Water treatment specialist and field sanitationexpertise in food service section (along with HHC medical platoon)

Water: Water treatment specialistElectricity: Power generation specialistsAcademic: All can aid in training and education for critical

job skillsTransportation: Assessment of rail/bus/ferry/port capacities

and facilities and assessment of mechanical maintenance of rail/bus/truck/ferry operating equipment

Food Supply: Food service section can inspect packaging andfacilities, with veterinary assistance food quality and vector control

Fuel: Petroleum specialists can inspect and test fuel facilitiesand storage

A potential SWEAT team could be:Security TeamCivil Affairs TeamSanitation/Water/Fuel/Food:

1 x 92W, water treatment specialist2 x 92F, petroleum supply specialist1 x 63J, quartermaster/NBC equipment repairer1 x 92G, food service specialist1 x 68W (HHC), combat medic

Electricity: 1 x 52D, power generation equipment repairer and1 x 52C, utilities equipment repairer

Academic: CA teamTransportation: Distribution platoon leaderHost-Nation Security Forces LogisticsSince the advent of military transition teams, deployed units

are not as involved in the logistics of the Iraq/Afghanistan SecurityForces; however, units may still be called upon to assist theseforces with training and/or logistics support. The most significantlogistics challenge in training HN security forces is enforcingaccountability and curtailing corruption.

FM 3-24 states: “Logisticians conducting such training shouldexpect to find themselves repeatedly emphasizing the long termbenefits of supply discipline and materiel accountability and theimportance of those practices to the security and development ofthe host nation. For this reason, emphasis should be placed oninventory procedures. Simultaneously the black market should bemonitored for the presence of pilfered military equipment as ameans of determining the effectiveness of logistic procedures andaccountability training.”

Other areas of logistics training may include warehousing andtransporting supplies, combat logistics patrols, maintenance, andrecovery operations.

Units may also be called upon to provide emergency resupplyto HN security forces. If so, then contingency stocks of Halal MREs,bottled water, and ammunition should be kept on hand. Ammunitioncan be obtained through captured stocks. Overall, support to HNsecurity forces should have a minimal impact; however, units will

increasingly find themselves conducting joint patrols with HN forcesand are better postured to react quickly to urgent needs.

Maintenance Support to the Combined Arms BattalionCurrent doctrine relating to maintenance support to the

combined arms battalion is written in the context of supportinghigh-intensity conflict (HIC). FMI 3-90.5 discusses the allocationof field maintenance teams to the companies of the combined armsbattalions. In a HIC fight, this makes perfect sense, but whatabout in the current FOB-centric counterinsurgency?

When a preponderance of the maintenance personnel is slicedout to the companies, decentralized maintenance activities occurand in a HIC fight they should; but in units operating on battalionor larger FOBs, maintenance should be centralized at the battalionlevel. This ensures a number of things. First, the maintenancecontrol section has better visibility of the battalion’s non-missioncapable vehicles’ and parts’ statuses. The maintenance controlofficer can better enforce maintenance priorities and surgemechanics for high priority efforts. Second, maintenance personnelcan better sustain 24-hour operations. It is important to rememberthat mechanics will not only be performing their primary dutiesbut will also have force protection requirements and other details.Historically, 30 percent of personnel from support units provideforce protection at FOBs; having all of the mechanics underneaththe umbrella of the maintenance platoon ensures both the forceprotection and maintenance missions. Thirdly, the consolidationof maintenance personnel in a FOB environment provides for boththe specialization and cross-training of mechanics leading to betterefficiencies in the production capabilities of the platoon.

A final recommendation for the employment of the FSCmaintenance platoon is to establish a “service station” for patrolswhen they return to the FOB. This ensures combat vehicles arebeing taken care of and returned to the fight in peak condition.The service station is a one-stop shop for the line companiesreturning from missions. See Figure 2.

The changing role of the Army CookCurrent field feeding is primarily performed by logistics

contractors. These contractors provide quality meals for over 90percent of coalition facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. These serviceshave limited the role of the Army cook in providing prepared mealsto Soldiers to only working in remote locations. So what are all the

Battalion Service Station

Tasks:

1. Conduct After PMCS

2. Report deficiencies to mechanic

3. Mechanic verifies fault and orders/installs parts

4. Refuel

5. Draw Class I, IV, V, and VIII

6. Repack vehicle for combat

Fuel Pt

CL IV

CLI H20

MAINT

PLT

DistroPLT

CL V

MED

PLT

Staging Area

Figure 2


cooks doing now? Cooks are now performing security functions farfrom their MOS. The field feeding section in the FSC has 23 Soldiers.This number of Soldiers provides the commander a pool of personnelto accomplish many tasks. Here are a few recommendations for theemployment of the field feeding section: Convoy/area security — Alleviates the security burden

from the line companies and ensures every combat logistics patrolhas a maneuverable security element. This element can alsoperform security for area assessment teams or MEDCAPs. Personal Security Detachment — Train approximately 16

Soldiers in personal security for the battalion commander andother battalion leaders. Force Protection — Entry control points and other guard

duties. Dislocated field feeding — The FSC should maintain a

reserve of four cooks to operate two KCLFF-Es in case ofunforeseen, out of sector missions.

The field feeding section should be resourced with four M1114swith M2 .50 caliber machine guns and MBITR radios fordismounted operations. The key to success for these securityoperations is home station training, followed by utilization at aCTC prior to deployment.

Other Nontraditional Logistics MissionsBelow is a list of four other nontraditional missions the FSC

can perform:Nonstandard casualty evacuation: The FSC has 28 FMTV

vehicles that can mobilize to support casualty evacuation. Split-based operations: The FSC has enough com-

munications equipment to support logistics command and controlin two nodes. Female search teams: Since the FSC is the only unit that

has females at the battalion task force-level, having all of themtrained in personnel search techniques allows units to searchindigenous female personnel without violating cultural differences. Captured ammunition/arms holding area (CAHA): The

FSC should operate the initial storage point for capturedammunition, arms, and equipment. This will also provide forcontingency stocks of ammunition, weapons, and armament repair

parts for HN security forces.What battalion commanders must ensure…Some battalion commanders place more emphasis on logistics

than others. What follows is a discussion of the things battalioncommanders can do to ensure their FSC provides all it is capableof and is a full member of the battalion.

Integration of the FSC as a unit — This starts with therelationship the maneuver battalion commander has with theFSC commander. If the battalion commander treats him orher like a lesser Soldier/officer because of their branch ofservice, then that is how the rest of the battalion will treat theFSC. The FSC commander is the senior logistician in thebattalion and should be held fully responsible for the materialreadiness and supply status of the battalion. Additionally, FSCofficers and Soldiers should be held to the same standards asthe rest of the battalion.

Integration of the Combat Trains Command Post and FSCCommand Post — Units are finding much success consolidatingCSS command and control in one centralized command post.Many times the S1 and S4 operate independently of the FSCcommander and this creates a disjointed concept of support.Creation of a “fusion cell” combines the S1, S4, and FSC andprovides a “one-stop” point for all administration and logistics.An example of this integration is shown in Figure 3.

Battle Tracking in the TOC — FSC operations, includingrecovery missions and combat logistics patrols, should be planned,coordinated, and tracked just as other battalion operations.

Medical Support — Commanders should task the medicalplatoon to provide at least one medic to support FSC missions.The FSC has no organic medical capability and although the FSCwill have first responders and combat lifesavers, having a truemedic will save lives.

Training the FSC — FSC operations should be fully integratedin all battalion training. The FSC should not be allowed to justsimply feed, fix, and supply the battalion while the line companiestrain. The FSC should conduct convoy operations, tactical refueland recovery missions, establish tactical feeding sites, and conductcrew-served and individual weapons training.

SummaryThe FSC provides each supported battalion a robust logistics

capability. The FSC can provide critical shaping and sustainingoperations to be integrated with the other lines of operations. TheFSC commander gives battalion commanders an executive agentfor all logistics matters and ensures integration with higher levelsof support. After fully integrating the FSC into the maneuverbattalion, commanders will see just how effective their logisticssystems are and how well they are integrated with other combatoperations.

FSC/CTCP INTEGRATION

FUSION!FUSION!

Consider:Consider:•• OneOne--stop SA for FSC stop SA for FSC CDR & S4 CDR & S4 •• Functional ALT TOC Functional ALT TOC •• COPCOP•• SynchronizationSynchronization•• Centralized OPSCentralized OPS•• Ability to best support Ability to best support the TFthe TF•• Optimizes Optimizes CommsComms•• InterInter--OperabilityOperability

S4S4

S1S1

FSCFSCCDRCDR

S1S1REPREP

S4S4REPREP

FBCB2/BFT/MTS/BCS3 REMOTEFBCB2/BFT/MTS/BCS3 REMOTE

ROLLING BUBROLLING BUB

RTORTORTORTO

FSCFSCXOXO

MTSMTSOperatorOperator

OPS OPS SGTSGT

BCS3 BCS3 OperatorOperator

Captain Trenton J. Conner is the Forward Support Company Trainer forthe Light Infantry Task Force (Airborne) at the National Training Center, FortIrwin, California. He commanded Company A, 25th Brigade Support Battalion,1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT) during Operation Iraqi FreedomIII. He has a bachelor’s degree in Business Administration from North GeorgiaCollege and is a graduate of the Combined Logistics Captain’s Career Course.

Figure 3


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

A decisive point is the tipping point in a military operationwhen one side begins to win. It lends focus and clarity to an operation. Commanders focus their efforts on

achieving the decisive point and continue through to the desiredendstate. In a boxing match, a decisive point could be when onefighter lands a devastating blow, allowing him to follow up andknock his opponent out. In a football game, it could be when ateam recovers a fumble and runs it back for a touchdown. Decisivepoints are measures of effectiveness and initiative.

FM 3-0, Operations, defines a decisive point as “a geographicplace, specific key event, or enabling system that allowscommanders to gain marked advantage over an enemy and greatlyinfluence the outcome of an attack.”

Current doctrine for company level leaders and below focusesdecisive points on either controlling terrain or destroying theenemy. According to Sir Robert Thompson, the architect for Britishcounterinsurgency success in the Malayan Emergency, neithertactic alone is sufficient. In his book Defeating CommunistInsurgency, Thompson said, “The government must give priorityto defeating the political subversion, not the guerillas.” Thompsonfocused his efforts foremost on attacking the cause of theinsurgency, not just its symptoms. Unfortunately, focusing solelyor primarily on killing the enemy or controlling terrain oftencreates a search and destroy mentality which addresses thesymptoms and not the cause. According to Thompson, “most

search-and-clear operations, by creating more communists thanthey kill, become in effect communist (or now insurgent) recruitingdrives.” A search and destroy focus reduces an Army to cuttinggrass without pulling out the roots. In Iraq and Afghanistan,successful leaders across the Army are focusing their Soldiers ondefeating the cause of an insurgency instead of just killing orcapturing the insurgents.

Because winning looks different in defeating an insurgency,the model for decisive points should be changed. Commandersknow they have more in their toolbox than “kill or capture,” andthat success cannot me measured solely in body counts or hilltops.Decisive points can and should reflect that. Decisive points incounterinsurgency at the company level should include quantifiablemeasures of influence and success in building the government’slegitimacy with its people and successfully transitioning authorityto its own security forces, as well as traditional measures of success.

Conventional WarConventional doctrine for high intensity conflict was created

and refined through Western warfare. By the 18th century, Westernand Central European countries accepted unwritten rules of warin order to keep it from being more terrible and maintain somelevel of social order. The disagreements of nations were ultimatelydecided by massing military forces against their counterparts andfighting pitched battles to gain a decisive victory, according toWarfare in the Western World: Military Operations from 1600 to1871 by Robert A. Doughty and Ira D. Gruber. Underlying theseideas are the assumptions that the enemy army would agree topitched battles and that these engagements would be decisive;meaning that the people would accept defeat and its implicationsto their way of life. A major difference between conventionalconflict and insurgency lies with this crucial aspect, the peopleand their consent.

The underlying principles in American doctrine, tactics, andstrategy are found in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz andAntoine-Henri Jomini as they were interpreted through the 19thand 20th centuries, according to the book Learning to Eat SoupWith a Knife by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl. The book alsodiscusses how both authors were writing in response to theunprecedented success of Napoleon fighting conventionally againstconventional forces in Europe. According to Nagl, Clausewitzdefined war as a function of the people, the government and thearmy, while Jomini focused his writings on the army, specificallyon massing friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses at adecisive point in order to destroy the enemy’s army, and with it hisability to “properly” resist. Because of the culture and assumptionsof Europe, Clausewitz’s broad interpretation of conflict was focusednarrowly into the most dynamic and decisive factor in Western

TTTTTHEHEHEHEHE H H H H HARDARDARDARDARD C C C C CHOICEHOICEHOICEHOICEHOICE:::::CAPTAIN BRANDON ANDERSON

DECISIVE POINTS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

“This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient inits origin-war by guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins,war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead ofaggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting theenemy instead of engaging him... When there is a visible enemyto fight in open combat, the answer is not so difficult. Manyserve, all applaud, and the tide of patriotism runs high. Butwhen there is a long, slow struggle, with no immediately visiblefoe, your choice will seem hard indeed.”

— President John F. KennedyRemarks to the graduating class of the

U.S. Military Academy, West Point, June 6, 1962

“If the only tool that you have is a hammer, you tend to seeevery problem as a nail.”

— Abraham Maslow

Editor’s Note: The author has supported this article withextensive source documentation which has not been included inthe text, due to space considerations. All footnotes and otherdocumentation will, however, be provided by Infantry on request.



and Central Europe — the army. Throughthe Prussian and later German interpretationsof Clausewitz’s and Jomini’s ideas, themodern focus of “find, fix, and finish” wasborn.

The context that caused the decisivefactor of war to be the army must beconsidered to fully appreciate what otherdynamics exist. Within similar societiesof continental Europe, the assumptions ofpurely military wars were relatively safe.Therefore, Napoleon was able to takeAustria and Prussia after defeating theirarmies in pitched, decisive battles withminimal resistance, according to Doughtyand Gruber. However, where there was afundamental cultural or religiousdisagreement with Napoleon and what hisrule represented, as with Spain or Russia,something different happened. The war of“the fist and the axe” was born.

InsurgencyIn On Guerilla Warfare, Mao Tse-Tung

uses the example of Napoleon in Russia in1812 to show the contrast betweenconventional and unconventional warfare.Mao read Clausewitz and Western militaryhistory, and this greatly influenced histhinking. From Napoleon’s 1812 example,Mao learned how a great army can winbattles but lose the war. Napoleon invadedRussia, seized Moscow, and waited for thesurrender of the Czar. He had seizeddecisive terrain and any army that would

dare to meet him would be defeated; byconventional standards he had won.However, something different was at work.As Napoleon waited in Russia, the winterrolled in. His supplies ran short. TheCossack cavalry conducted limited attacksagainst his logistics and army. Napoleoncould not sustain his soldiers nor imposehis will on the people of Russia. The resultwas that Napoleon, who had left Francewith 600,000 soldiers, returned to Francewith only 100,000, although he never losta battle. The Russians’ victory was wonthrough exhaustion, not decisive combat.

Mao saw this kind of conflict as theAchilles’ heel to the powerful conventionalforce he faced in China in 1930s. Heconsidered the three variables of war fromClausewitz for his situation: the people, thegovernment, and the army. He knew he couldnot field a superior army to the Japanese.However, he found that by exploiting thecrucial variable of the people he could changethe conditions on which war was fought. Hecould shape the battlefield to the point thathe gained the initiative. The focus andimportance of winning the support of thepeople in guerilla warfare cannot beoverstated because this is where the initiativeis won or lost. It can clearly be seen inMao’s “Three Rules and the EightRemarks,” all of which focus oninfluencing the population:Rules:1. All actions are subject to command.

2. Do not steal from the people.3. Be neither selfish, nor unjust.Remarks:1. Replace the door when you leave the

house. (In summer, doors were frequentlylifted off and used as beds.)

2. Roll up the bedding on which youhave slept.

3. Be courteous.4. Be honest in your transactions.5. Return what you borrow.6. Replace what you break.7. Do not bathe in the presence of

women.8. Do not without authority search the

pocketbooks of those you arrest.

Tech Sergeant Molly Dzitko, USAF

An interpreter and a Soldier from the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82ndAirborne Division, talk with a motorist while on patrol near Samarra, Iraq.

Mao Tse-Tung also said that the nature ofthe guerilla is to conduct limited attacks at atime and place of his choosing and escape toa safe area or anonymity amongst the people.Guerillas know where the forces they attackare, but the same is not true of their opponents.Guerillas need intelligence superiority for thisand it gives them the initiative. A guerilla’sintelligence superiority comes from the activeor passive support of the people. Therefore,with the support or submission of the people,a guerilla force can continue to attack if andwhen it chooses. With the support of thepeople, the guerilla force is unable to befound, much less fixed or finished, unlessit wants to be.

FM 3-0 says that a decisive point,“allows commanders to gain markedadvantage over an enemy and greatlyinfluence the outcome of an attack.” Fewthings are more powerful and decisive inan insurgency than the intelligencesuperiority that a successful guerilla forceenjoys. In the words of Sir RobertThompson, “The population is not onlyproviding the guerilla with his food andintelligence, but providing him perfectcover and concealment.”

Decisive Points in DefeatingInsurgency — When Do I Start toWin?

“The key strategic thrust is to providemeaningful security for the Vietnamesepeople in expanding areas of increasingly

“Because he is a foreigner and abarbarian, guerillas can gain theconfidence of millions of theircountrymen.”

— Mao Tse-TsungOn Guerilla Warfare

effective civil authority ... In order to provide security for thepopulation our operations must succeed in neutralizing the VCIand separating the enemy from the population. The enemy MainForces and NVA are blind without the VCI. They cannot obtainintelligence, cannot obtain food, cannot prepare the battlefield,and cannot move “unseen.”

— General Creighton AbramsAs quoted in Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife by

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl

In conventional conflict the outcome is decided purely bymilitary action, and decisive points are limited to the destructionof enemy forces or the control of terrain. However,counterinsurgency has the aspect of simultaneous military andpolitical action with the focus on the support of the people inorder to isolate the guerilla. Because of this feature,decisive points within the population becomecrucial. The population provides intelligence,logistics, recruits, and legitimacy to either theguerillas or the government. Therefore, the battleis won or lost at the popular level.

“Necessary measures were taken to achievetheir three objects: of protection, of uniting andinvolving the people, and of development, with theultimate aim of isolating the guerilla units fromthe population.”

— Sir Robert ThompsonDefeating Communist Insurgency

The focus here is on protecting and influencingcommunity leaders, building indigenous military orpolice forces through joint actions, and transitioningto host nation control in order to establish thegovernment and the rule of law. Success and thetipping point in this kind of conflict is not measuredin body counts or control of a hill, but in the level ofsupport from the people. Local people provideintelligence, logistical support, recruits, and

Captain Brandon Anderson graduated from the U.S. Military Academyin 2003. He is currently serving on a military transition team in Afghanistan.His previous assignments include serving as weapons platoon leader forD Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division,and as a rifle platoon leader with the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, 2nd InfantryDivision.

The author would like to thank Major Joshua Wright, Major Desmond Baileyand Australian Army Major Gregory Rowlands for their help with this article.

legitimacy to one side or the other. For intelligence,support can be quantified by the amount and qualityof intelligence on guerilla activities that coalitionforces receive. Logistical support can be measuredby the number of workers willing to work with andfor the government and amount of food or materialsold to coalition forces. Success in recruiting canbe measured in the number and quality of localpeople willing to serve in indigenous security forces.Legitimacy can be measured by overall support ofthe government and its programs.

ConclusionThe influence and support of the people is

crucial to success in counterinsurgency. Whatthis means for tactical leaders at the companylevel and below is that decisive points are not onlybased on the terrain or enemy, but may also be basedon the people and local forces. With the active orpassive support of the people, the guerilla can fight

at a time and place of his choosing. However, with the support of thepeople coalition forces can isolate the guerilla from his intelligenceand logistical support and reduce him to criminal status. Decisivepoints in counterinsurgency at the company level should includequantifiable measures of influence and success in building thegovernment’s legitimacy with its people and successfully transitioningauthority to its own security forces.

Communist Insurgent cells and supporters in the population (source of intel/logistics/recruits/ legitimacy)

District Committee (Leadership)

Local Armed communist Insurgent units at platoon and company strength

Regular communist Insurgent units at company and battalion strength

Figure 1 — This diagram, which was adapted from Sir Robert Thompson’s DefeatingCommunist Insurgency, shows the importance of isolating insurgents from the people.Note that the word “communist” has been replaced by “insurgent.”

Tech Sergeant Molly Dzitko, USAF

Success and the tipping point in this kind of conflict is not measured in body counts orcontrol of a hill, but in the level of support from the people. Local citizens provideintelligence, logistical support, recruits, and legitimacy to one side or the other.


A CEThe

Throughout will celebraestablished

Musketry moved to settling into its permThrough numerous the Maneuver CenteSchool colocates froSchool at Fort Benn

To mark this prouWalter WojdakowskSchool Centennial.”across Fort BenningSeptember 2007 at


David DismukesA drill sergeant and other recruits offer words of encouragement to a trainee negotiating an obstacle course on FortBenning in October 2006.

Officer candidates practice throwing grenades from the standing position on a range on Fort Benning in October 1965.U.S. Army photo

An instrduring w

ENTURY OF EXCELLENCEU.S. Army Infantry School — Then and Now

DAVID S. STIEGHAN

2007, Fort Benning and the Infantry communityate the centennial of the Infantry School. Firstd in 1907 at Monterey, California, the School ofFort Sill, Oklahoma, from 1913 to 1918, before

manent home at Camp Benning in 1918.expansions, Fort Benning is poised to becomeer of Excellence by 2011 when the Armorom Fort Knox, Kentucky, to join the Infantryning.d milestone in Infantry history, Major General

ki has declared 2007 the “Year of the Infantry” In addition to media articles and displaysg, a suitable outdoor celebration is planned forthe site of the new National Infantry Museum.

March-April 2007 INFANTRY 27ructor with the U.S. Army Infantry School assists a studentweapons training on Fort Benning in May 1976.

U.S. Army photo

Ranger School cadre demonstrate fighting techniquesduring an orientation for students in May 1958.

U.S. Army photo

Above, Soldierscomplete machinegun training on FortBenning in June1942.

Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Division


The 100th anniversary of the Infantry School isApril 1, 2007. On that date in 1907, the Schoolof Musketry opened for courses in rifle and

machine gun marksmanship at Monterey, California. In 1913, the School of Musketry moved to Fort Sill

and then on to Camp Benning as the U.S. Army InfantrySchool in 1918. Within three years, Camp Benning wasrechristened Fort Benning, and the Model 1905 Bayonet onthe school’s shoulder patch rotated from point downward topoint upward.

A search of The Bayonet, Fort Benning’s post newspaper, showsthat celebrations in the past commemorated the anniversaries ofthe founding of the Infantry School using 1907 as the foundingdate. In addition, the Infantry Library, now known as the DonovanResearch Library, began in 1907 when General Arthur MacArthurdonated around 50 books to start the collection.

The United States Army Infantry School at Fort Benning tracesits creation to the beginnings of the Continental Army during theWar for Independence. George Washington appointed Captain“Baron” von Steuben as Drillmaster of the Continental Army in1778. The Prussian veteran instituted a single manner of infantrydrill for the Continental Army by consolidating all junior officersinto platoons and companies, and drilling them together to createa body of instructors for the entire Army. Later, von Steubenconvinced Washington to create a model company of infantry to

demonstrate drill and maneuvers to the rest ofthe army. These were the origins of an

American School of Infantry. After the Warfor Independence, Congress undid most

of the fine instrument created byWashington and von Steuben byreducing the Army to an

85-mancompany for

a year and allowingcommanders of the

Regular Army and the militiato use whatever drill suitedthem.

In 1813, the Army adopteda form of Duane’s Tacticsduring the War of 1812 toreduce the infantry drill to one

standard drill. On March 4,1826, Major GeneralEdmund P. Gaines

established the first infantry training post at Jefferson Barracksnear St. Louis, Missouri. The Infantry School of Instruction begantraining enlisted men and small units and quickly expanded totraining infantry officers in their duties. By November 24, 1828,the post closed as all the troops and infantry units were neededacross the nation. Though what became known as the InfantrySchool of Practice lasted only two years, the overall efficiency ofthe United States Infantry improved immensely, and the idea ofrecreating a similar school was not lost on those in attendance.

In 1881, the Army created a military postgraduate program forofficers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, known as the School of

Application for Infantry and Cavalry. This same programis now the Command and Staff School. In 1892, the

School of Application divided into a School for Cavalryat Fort Riley, Kansas, and a School for Artillery at FortSill, Oklahoma, leaving the infantry without a formalschool.

After the Spanish-American War, Lieutenant GeneralArthur MacArthur ordered the establishment of new

target ranges and a course of fire for every unit and postin the Department of California and the Columbia. To

provide formal instruction for the marksmanship instructors,General MacArthur ordered that a school be established in the

department. The first commandant, Captain Frank L. Winn, latercommented, “From this idea the plan developed into a school ofexperiment and theory in the use of the rifle in battle and ofimprovement, by testing, in the rifle itself.” As a result, the WarDepartment approved the establishment of the School of Musketry,Pacific Division, at the Presidio of Monterey, California. Thoughthe original intent was the development of small arms use in theinfantry, the scope of development and instruction soon grew toinclude, “all subjects connected with small arms, ammunition andtactics.” The latter directive allowed the instructors to pursueresearch and training methods to prepare infantrymen for modernwarfare.

Initially, the school staff consisted of Captain Winn as theofficer-in-charge, an assistant instructor, one company from eachof the two divisions in the department and a machine-gun platoon.Each quarter, the rotating student body consisted of two officersfrom each of the infantry, cavalry and artillery regiments in thedivision, one enlisted man from each company, troop, and battery,and additional officers and enlisted men as selected by the divisioncommander. The school cadre arrived on March 25, 1907, andreplaced the 2nd Squadron, 14th Cavalry in garrison. The newschool opened for business on April 1, 1907.

Outgrowing the limited ranges at the Presidio in Monterey,California, the School of Musketry colocated with the School ofFire at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 1913. Both schools languishedwithin a few years as both instructors and students were needed tosecure the border with Mexico and for the Punitive Expedition of1916. Upon the Declaration of War with the Central Powers onApril 6, 1917, it became apparent that the Infantry, Field Artillery,and the 35th Division could not continue to train on the sameranges at Fort Sill. The War Department needed dozens of newfacilities to muster and train the millions of Doughboys requiredin Europe as soon as possible. By the summer of 1918, the Infantrycast about for a new home.

In an attempt to lure an Army training camp to the Columbus

General Orders, Headquarters, Pacific Division, No. 5,San Francisco, California, March 6, 1907

“….they will carry into effect the requirements of theorder with a view to opening the (Musketry) school onApril 1, 1907….” By Command of Lieutenant General(Arthur) MacArthur.

(This order appears in a brief history of “The Musketry School at Monterey,California” written by Brigadier General (Retired) G.W. McIver in November1929. Then-Major McIver, 20th Infantry, served as the second commandantfrom October 31, 1907 to July 1, 1911. The original monograph is preservedin the Infantry Archives in the Donovan Research Library at Fort Benning.)

area, the Encampment Committee of theChamber of Commerce of Columbus,Georgia, presented a “Proposal for theLease of Land to the United StatesGovernment for Establishment of Schoolof Musketry,” on January 17, 1918, torepresentatives of the United States Army.Included in the original proposal areendorsements from the Muscogee CountyCommissioners to build access roads andthe Columbus Power Company to buildelectrical transmission lines if thegovernment accepted the property for atraining camp. With options secured on7,400 of the 9,000 acres proposed at $2 peracre, total estimated construction costs forthe cantonment came to $706,000. Aformal plan dated January 23 lists a totalof 2,008 students, instructors, andpermanent party planned housed andheadquartered in 67 buildings. While theoriginal proposal for the camp envisioneda lease on the land, the Army decided laterto convert the cantonment to a permanentfacility and continue training there afterWorld War I.

On August 17, 1918, a telegram arrivedin Columbus, confirming the selection ofthe area for the new site of the Army’sInfantry School of Arms. By October 6,troops transferring from Fort Sill steppedoff the train and stood in formation onOctober 19 christening the new post“Camp Benning” in honor of a localConfederate General, Henry LewisBenning. Unlike most temporarytraining facilities created in haste duringthe Great War, Camp Benning survivedpostwar budget cuts to become apermanent infantry school in 1920. In

1921, the Army formally designated thepost as the Infantry School and changedthe name to Fort Benning in 1923.

During the 1920-1921 school year, thenew school graduated hundreds oflieutenants and captains from the Active,Reserve, and National Guard components.In addition to instructors, Camp Benningincluded demonstration units to supporttraining, an Army Air Corps detachmentand the 32nd Balloon ObservationCompany at Lawson Field, and the InfantryTank School. While the Tank Schoolmoved to Camp Meade, Maryland, withina year, the infantry tanks moved back toFort Benning in 1932. In addition totraining leaders, Fort Benning became animportant center for testing weapons andtactics, publishing professional journalsand manuals, and developing maneuverdoctrine- roles it continues into the 21stcentury. As the home of the largest branchof the Army, Fort Benning continued togrow in facilities and troops assignedthrough the lean years of the GreatDepression.

From 1927 to 1932, LieutenantColonel George Marshall served as theAssistant Commandant of the InfantrySchool. In this role, Marshall instituteda rigorous training program known as the“Benning Revolution” preparingthousands of officers for higher commandin World War II. The infantry tank unitsgrew through the 1930s until ColonelGeorge S. Patton, Jr., and others formedand trained the 2nd Armored Division atFort Benning, before deploying overseasfor combat in World War II. Numerousdivisions and smaller units were either

federalized or created at Fort Benningduring peacetime draft buildup in 1940 andthroughout World War II.

In 1940, the Airborne “Test Platoon”initiated the Airborne School that stillgraduates thousands of parachutists for theUnited States military each year. TheOfficer Candidate School began graduatinginfantry lieutenants in 1941 and stilloperates as the only federal OCS programin the Army. Over 100,000 Soldiers enteredthe Army as privates or lieutenants at FortBenning during World War II, and the postearned the nickname: “The Benning Schoolfor Boys.” At the end of the Second WorldWar, Fort Benning remained a vibrantfacility as Ranger training began, theinfantry developed a mechanizedcomponent and prepared troops and leadersfor the Korean War, Vietnam, and otherCold War commitments. At this writing,the U.S. Army Infantry School and FortBenning have more troops assigned ascadre or in training than any other facilityin the United States military.

From 1945 to 1965, Fort Benningtransformed to its standard role as aneducation, testing, and doctrinedevelopment center. While recruit andofficer training increased during theKorean War, 1950-1953, the next majorexpansion took place during the VietnamWar. The concept of helicopter-borne airassault was tested at Fort Benning for twoyears before the 11th Airborne (Test)Division became the 1st (Air Assault)Cavalry Division prior to deployment toVietnam in 1965. In addition to greatly-expanded OCS, the NoncommissionedOfficer Candidate Course trained thousands

Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Division


A photograph taken in 1941 shows a view of the main post of Fort Benning. Many of the buildings are still being used today.

Col. Henry E. Eames, October 1918 to April 1919Maj. Gen. Charles S. Farnsworth, April 1919 to July 1920

Maj. Gen. Walter H. Gordon, September 1920 to November 1923Brig. Gen. Briant H. Wells, November 1923 to March 1926

Brig. Gen. Edgar T. Collins, March 1926 to May 1929Maj. Gen. Campbell King, May 1929 to May 1933

Brig. Gen. George H. Estes, September 1933 to September 1936Brig. Gen. Asa L. Singleton, October 1936 to August 1940

Brig. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, October 1940 to March 1941Brig. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, March 1941 to February 1942

Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, February 1942 to September 1943Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, September 1943 to June 1944

Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker, July 1944 to July 1945Maj. Gen. John W. O’Daniel, July 1945 to June 1948

Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress, July 1948 to January 1951Maj. Gen. John H. Church, March 1951 to May 1952

Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, June 1952 to January 1953Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy Jr., January 1953 to June 1954

Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Harper, June 1954 to May 1956Maj. Gen. George E. Lynch, May 1956 to August 1956Maj. Gen. Herbert B. Powell, August 1956 to April 1958

Maj. Gen. Paul L. Freeman, May 1958 to April 1960Maj. Gen. Hugh P. Harris, April 1960 to July 1961

Maj. Gen. Ben Harrell, August 1961 to February 1963Maj. Gen. C.W.G. Rich, February 1963 to August 1964

Maj. Gen. Heintges, August 1964 to July 1965Maj. Gen. Robert H. York, July 1965 to July 1967

Maj. Gen. John M. Wright Jr., July 1967 to May 1969Maj. Gen. George I. Forsythe, June 1969 to August 1969

Maj. Gen. Orwin C. Talbott, September 1969 to February 1973Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Tarpley, February 1973 to August 1975

Maj. Gen. Willard Latham, August 1975 to July 1977Maj. Gen. William J. Livsey Jr., July 1977 to April 1979

Maj. Gen. David E. Grange Jr., June 1979 to August 1981Maj. Gen. Robert L. Wetzel, August 1981 to July 1983Maj. Gen. James 1. Lindsay, July 1983 to March 1984Maj. Gen. John W. Foss, March 1984 to January 1986Maj. Gen. Edwin H. Burba, January 1986 to June 1987

Maj. Gen. Kenneth C. Leuer, June 1987 to September 1988Maj. Gen. Michael F. Spigelmire, September 1988 to June 1990

Maj. Gen. Carmen J. Cavezza, June 1990 to October 1991Maj. Gen. Jerry A. White, October 1991 to September 1994Maj. Gen. John W. Hendrix, September 1994 to July 1996

Maj. Gen. Carl F. Ernst, July 1996 to September 1999Maj. Gen. John M. LeMoyne, September 1999 to October 2001

Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, October 2001 to June 2003Maj. Gen. Benjamin C. Freakley, July 2003 to August 2006

Maj. Gen. Walter Wojdakowski, August 2006 to present

PAST USAIS COMMANDANTSof infantry sergeants from 1967 to 1972,forming the basis for the currentNoncommissioned Officer EducationSystem. On several occasions since 1965,brigades and smaller units were formed andtrained at Fort Benning to deploy aroundthe world to serve as part of NATO, DesertStorm, Operation Enduring Freedom,Operation Iraqi Freedom, and othermissions.

In 2005, the U.S. Congress approved aBase Realignment and Closure (BRAC)recommendation to move the Armor Schoolfrom Fort Knox to join the Infantry Schoolat Fort Benning. The resulting ManeuverCenter of Excellence will combine bothmounted and dismounted combat trainingand doctrine development at one locationfor the entire U.S. Army by 2011. Togetherwith the Airborne School, Ranger School,OCS, Sniper School, the ArmyMarksmanship Unit, the WesternHemisphere Institute for SecurityCooperation (WHINSEC), and manydeployable units, the Armor and Infantrycolocation will create one of the mostimportant, and certainly the busiest, U.S.Army posts.

During 2007, the School of Infantrycelebrates its centennial — 100 years ofcontinuous service to the United States.While Fort Benning transforms into theManeuver Center of Excellence over thenext few years, it will still serve as the“Home of the Infantry” while alsofunctioning as the “Home of the Armor.”While operating at three locations withthree different names, the Infantry Schoolhas increased dramatically in size and inscope, but has not materially changed itsmission. While infantry training anddoctrine development took place at anumber of locations at different timesthroughout our nation’s history, the currentUnited States Army Infantry Center beganas the School of Musketry at Monterey onApril 1, 1907.

Dave Stieghan is the Infantry Branch Historianand Command Historian of U.S. Army InfantryCenter. He is currently researching the InfantrySchool Centennial, the Echo Teams/Companiesthat served in Vietnam, and the U.S. Army NCOCC“Shake and Bake” course conducted from 1967through 1972 at Harmony Church and four otherposts.

A list of references for this article is on file andavailable through Infantry Magazine.


Editor’s Note: The following wasadapted from an excerpt of an article that wasfirst published in Volume XXIII of The MailingList, which was printed in February 1942. TheMailing List was a predecessor of InfantryMagazine.

This chapter is an extracted portion(Chapter III: Sections 1 and 2) of amanuscript entitled “A History of The

Infantry School.” The history was written in 1931 byFirst Lieutenant Leroy W. Yarborough in collaborationwith Major Truman Smith and with the assistance ofMajor Charles A. Willoughby and Major Leven C.Allen. The history covers a full and complete accountof the development of the Infantry School idea for thetraining of officers. It includes the details of theestablishment of the Infantry School of Practice atJefferson Barracks, 1826-1828; The School ofMusketry, Presidio of Monterey, 1907-1912; TheSchool of Musketry and The Infantry School of Armsat Fort Sill, 1912-1918; and The Infantry School atFort Benning, 1919-present.

Chapter I of this history appeared in Volume XX ofThe Mailing List in July 1940 and Chapter II in VolumeXXXII, August 1941. (The volumes containing thiscomplete history are available through the DonovanResearch Library on Fort Benning.)

Military Events Concerned with the Infantry Schoolof Arms at Fort Sill and Camp Benning, 1918-1921

The period of three and a half years following the removal ofthe Infantry School of Arms to its new site near Columbus, Georgia,has no parallel in the school’s history.

In the kaleidoscopic whirl of events which revolved about theschool during that time there was a dramatic intensity whichassumed an increasingly high pitch until its abrupt terminationin an anticlimax of neglect. It began, figuratively, as thebanishment of an overgrown stepchild from its home, when itstoo rapid wartime expansion led to its eviction from Fort Sill andits partial dismemberment and distribution, between three widelyseparated camps. There followed the brief epoch of urgent hasteto reunite its fragments and to resume its mass production oftrained manpower; then the intervention of the armistice markeda new crisis in the school’s career and opened a third epoch throughwhich the school ran a long gauntlet of hazards of uncommonvariety.

Efforts to establish the school near Columbus had carried onfor more than a year before it was finally moved to Camp Benning.Two classes of people were engaged in this endeavor, local citizensand Army officers. Although the motives of each group differed

slightly, their main efforts coincided sufficiently to accomplishthe common end. After the armistice, the status of Camp Benning,and likewise of the school, became uncertain. To some it appeared

to be a wartime installation that would disappear with thepassing of the conditions which created it. Soon after thetermination of the war, there developed a strong oppositionto the maintenance of the school at Camp Benning.Forthwith began a lengthy and heated contest which

divided the community and drew into the strugglegroups of Army officers and members of Congress.

The camp’s citizen proponents lauded it as aneconomic asset to the community. Itslocal opponents denounced it as a

menace to religion, home, andwomanhood. To the Army officers, the

infantrymen particularly, it appeared tobe an almost ideal location for an infantryschool and, as it was already established,they desired to retain it. If the camp wasabandoned, the school might not be

reopened for years, if at all. It was a bird in thehand, so to speak. The interest of members ofCongress, reflecting, no doubt, the views of theirconstituents, varied from downright indifference or

hostility to intense favoritism. The fate of thecamp and the school, as well, several timeslay on the lap of the gods, and the gods werenot inclined to be friendly. Its survival throughthis long period of attack, revilement, and

neglect is a miracle of accomplishment, a monument to theindomitable spirit of those who fought in its cause. In none of themajor groups, which participated in the contest over CampBenning was there complete harmony. The aggregations of citizensand congressmen were divided into opposing factions, betweenwhich there was rank dissension, even hostility. Even in the Armygroup there was not complete accord, and the loose statements ofsome officers were quoted by foes of the camp in the congressionalhearings which later enhanced the importance, if not the dignity,of the contest. But of all who engaged in the struggle to continuethe infantry’s school at Camp Benning, none was more diligentnor zealous than the Army group, yet the range of activities ofnone was more circumscribed than that of this group. Their sharein the fray had to be conducted with circumspection, and theirinitiative of action could rarely extend beyond the limits or serviceroutine.

As the characters of the respective groups differed, there waslikewise a diversity of interests and a medley of motives inspiringtheir works. Most of their efforts progressed concurrently and insome cases, especially those of individuals were overlapping. Anattempt to recount their activities and the ensuing results in theexact order in which they took place would produce only a maze

A HISTORY OF THE INFANTRY SCHOOLHOW FORT BENNING BECAME ‘HOME OF INFANTRY’


of words. For the sake of clarity of this mostcritical period in the history of the InfantrySchool, the roles of the principals and thedelineation of the physical progress andconditions of that period are presentedseparately. Even this method offers animperfect solution to the problem ofclarifying the muddle of events, and thereunavoidably occurs some repetition.

The Decision to Move the InfantrySchool From Fort Sill

The War Department’s order directingthe removal of the Infantry School of Armsfrom Fort Sill to the new Columbus sitewas the climax of a long series ofcircumstances and events which ultimatelyled to the selection of this locality as theone available site which was nearest to theideal for infantry training purposes. Officialcognizance of the probable necessity ofrelocating the infantry’s school was firstindicated in July 1917, and arose fromconditions created by the rapid expansionof both it and the Artillery School of Fire,which taxed the limited facilities of FortSill beyond their capacity and led to pettyfriction between the two schools. In thissame year, too, at least four favorablereports had been made on the Columbusregion by Army inspectors or boards in thesearch for desirable training sites. Althoughnone of these had to do with the InfantrySchool of Arms, it is not improbable thatthe succession of favorable reports directedofficial attention toward Columbus. InJanuary 1918, General R. M. Blatchfordexamined the Columbus locality amongothers in a search for a site for a small-arms firing school, an associate activity ofthe Infantry School. In July the board, ofwhich Colonel Henry E. Eames waspresident, designated it as second choicein case the site near Fayetteville, NorthCarolina, could not be secured for theinfantry’s school. An inspection of landadjacent to that selected by Colonel Eames’board near Fayetteville had been made inthe preceding month by Colonel E. P. King,Jr., of the field artillery in a search for atraining ground for that arm. ColonelKing’s selection of that locality wassubsequently confirmed by the Secretary ofWar. This left the Columbus region as thebest one available for the infantry, and as aresult of a study made by the general staffduring July and August, it was designatedas the locality in which would be situated

the Infantry School of Arms upon itsremoval from Fort Sill. The plan at thattime contemplated the acquisition of250,000 acres of land for a school with acapacity of 30,000 officers and men.

In the meantime, the constructiondivision of the general staff hadcommissioned Majors Solomon and Gibbto select a site for cantonment in the vicinityof Columbus. On July 12 they announcedtheir selection of a site on Macon Roadabout three miles east of Columbus, whichlay between two main railroad lines. Laterin the same month Colonel Clopton, of thetanks corps, recommended the area nearColumbus as especially suited for a tankschool. In September, following the Chiefof Staff’s approval of the recommendationthat the Infantry School of Arms beremoved from Fort Sill, orders were issuedby the War Department on September 12which directed the transfer of the school toColumbus. Similar orders were issued atthe same time to the school’s offshoots, theSmall Arms Firing School at Camp Perry,Ohio, and the Machine Gun School atCamp Hancock, Georgia.

Colonel Eames arrived in Columbus onSeptember 21 and he lost no time inpreparing for the arrival of the remainderof the personnel and the reopening of theInfantry School of Arms in its new location.He at once established his headquarters inColumbus in a building at the southwestcorner of First Avenue and Thirteenth Streetwhere the offices of the construction firmwhich was to build the cantonment to house

the school were located. One of the firstmatters to engage Colonel Eames’ attentionwas that of providing shelter for the troopswho were due to arrive in little more thana week. Plans for a temporary camp andthe problems in connection with itsconstruction were discussed during aconference which Colonel Eames held onSeptember 23 with Major John P. Jones,Quartermaster Corps and representatives ofthe contractors who were to build thetemporary camp. On the following day,Colonel Eames visited the area east ofColumbus, which was then the proposedsite of the cantonment, and designated thelocation of the temporary camp for theschool. On Major Jones he imposed theresponsibility of having the camp ready forthe expected arrival of the troops soon afterOctober 1.

In the meantime, representatives of thetwo other schools, which were to beabsorbed by the Infantry School of Arms,had arrived in Columbus, and with them,Colonel Eames discussed the requirementsof the consolidated school preparatory tothe designation of the actual site it was tooccupy. While the area east of Columbus,which had already been selected as the siteof a cantonment, appeared to be satisfactoryfor general war-training purposes, it did notentirely fulfill the technical requirementsof the Infantry School of Arms. OnSeptember 25, Colonel Eames and MajorsCritchfield and Maloney of the Small ArmsFiring School located an area on thesouthside of Columbus which appeared topossess topographical features that weremore suited to the needs of the school. Oneof these was a site for a class “A” riflerange, an important feature of theinstallation of the consolidated school.Although Colonel Eames’ board hadoriginally endorsed the area nearFayetteville as its first choice, he evidentlyfound the Columbus site, on closeracquaintance, to be the better of the two,for just a few months later he gave hisunqualified approval to its superiorqualifications. He said in the course of histestimony before the Senate Military AffairsCommittee at that time: “The commandinggenerals of the Western Department, theSouthern Department, and SoutheasternDepartment were each directed by the WarDepartment to send a board of officers intoall the states comprised in their departmentsin order to locate a suitable place for this


Colonel Henry E. Eames

school. These boards went out and spent a month or two in acareful examination of hundreds of sites, extending from Californiato Virginia, and in every state between. As a result of that, thethree boards reported certain sites as suitable, and certain othersas quite unsuitable. After a period of time, the proceedings ofthese boards were sent to me as president of the fourth board, andI examined them; and my board went over the territory, as I say,from the Pacific to the Atlantic looking for a site that would meetthe military requirements of the school with which I was familiar;and this place at Columbus was decided upon in preference toanything we saw.”

Acquisition of the Land for the Infantry SchoolOctober was a month of rapid physical development for the

reunited school. On October 4 a number of instructors arrivedfrom Fort Sill. On the fifth, Colonel Eames was appointedcommandant of the Infantry School of Arms to succeed ColonelMiller, who had not come to Columbus. On the sixth, the firsttroops arrived from Fort Sill. These were the two officers and 503men comprised in the Infantry School of Arms Detachment, anda medical officer, who arrived at their destination at 2 a.m. ColonelMorton C. Mumma, commandant of the Small Arms Firing School,at Camp Perry, Ohio, preceded his command by a few weeks, andarrived in Columbus on the eighth. Favorable changes in the warsituation in Europe resulted in the approval by the Secretary ofWar on October 9, of modified plans for the Infantry School ofArms which reduced its capacity to 24,000 officers and men, andits area to 115,000 acres. This action was followed on October 19by the Secretary’s approval of an expenditure of $3.6 million topurchase a tract of land comprising 115,000 acres, the boundariesof which were left to the discretion of Colonel Eames. On the19th also, local attention was concentrated momentarily on thetemporary camp when, in compliance with a request made inSeptember by the Rotary Club, it was ceremoniously christened“Camp Benning.” Legal machinery for the acquirement of thelands for the school was set in motion on October 23 by the requestof the Secretary of War to the Attorney General of the United

States to institute condemnation proceedings on behalf of theGovernment. The arrival on October 26 and their assignment tothe Infantry School of Arms of 40 officers and 700 men of theSmall Arms Firing School, completed the transfer of personneland ended the brief career of that institution. On October 28 thecontract for construction of the camp was awarded.

Construction work for the new camp, and local condemnationproceedings to acquire the 115,000 acres of land comprised inthis area, were both started on the second of November and beganwhat promised to be a month of rapid progress in thereestablishment of the school. But in little more than a week camethe armistice. The effect of this momentous event, which endedthe greatest conflict the world has ever suffered, was notimmediately apparent at Camp Benning. The construction workat the new site proceeded as rapidly as the contractors’ facilitiespermitted, and the school, on December 2, enrolled a class ofabout 100 recent West Point graduates and resumed its courses ofinstruction as if nothing had happened. It was, of course, a matterof general knowledge that the war’s end would ultimately affectconditions at Camp Benning but to what extent was not known.However, the construction division of the general staff was eventhen working on a revision of the plans of the school on a peacetimebasis, and on December 26, the modified plans which reduced theschool’s capacity to 10,000, were completed. At the end of theyear the school had two sites, but it had yet no home and itspersonnel of approximately 125 officers and 1,200 men were stilloccupying the temporary camp east of Columbus.

The Struggle Begins to Keep Benning/Infantry SchoolOpen

For Camp Benning and the Infantry School of Arms the arrivalof 1919 marked the advent of a long period of uncertainty andhazard. Vague apprehensions disturbed those to whom the futureof the infantry’s school was a matter of concern. Rumors that thecamp and the school were to be abolished reached Columbus.Already opposing interests were marshalling their forces for thecontest which was to decide the fate of the camp.

On January 9 the Assistant Secretary of War issuedorders which directed the suspension of construction andland acquirement and the salvaging of all materials andconstruction work, either wholly or partially completed.

Since its relocation to the Columbus site, the schoolhad undergone a series of reductions in area and trainingcapacity. Originally intended as a school for 30,000officers and men, its personnel capacity was successivelyreduced to 24,000 and then to 10,000, which the latterfigure represented its proposed peacetime capacity. Itsarea, too, which had begun at a quarter of a million acreshad dwindled to 115,000. It soon became evident to themilitary authorities that even more extensive reductionswould have to be made in the project if the camp was tobe retained for a peacetime school. Soon after thecessation order had halted the construction at the camp,Colonel Eames and Major Jones were called upon by thewarplans and construction divisions of the general staffto assist in preparing plans and estimates for a peacetimeinfantry school with a personnel capacity of 5,040 andan area of 98,000 acres. This work was completed and


After the end of World War I, the status of the Infantry School and Fort Benningbecame uncertain.

the new plans were transmitted to theoperations division on January 27.

Paradoxically, it would seem that while asteady process of physical contraction wasbeing applied to the school, the month ofFebruary presaged the adoption of a policy ofimmense expansion of the scope of theschool’s work. The trial of combat hadrevealed many latent defects in our infantrytraining methods and had emphasized otherswhich had been self-evident but unavoidablein the hasty mass production of new infantryofficers. Contemplation of these flaws in theinfantry’s war-effort developed quickly arealization of the necessity for finding meansof obtaining uniformity and greater efficiencyin infantry training methods. The infantry’sschool was regarded as the proper instrumentwith which to accomplish this end, andforthwith a study was conducted to broadento the character of the school from one dealingprimarily with the technique of armament toan institution whose teachings would embrace the entire field ofinfantry tactics and would impart a knowledge of the cooperationof infantry with other arms. From these deliberations, which wereto exert a strong influence on the future character of the school,no conclusions were manifested until fall. On February 22 theWest Point class which had begun a short course of instruction inDecember graduated.

March began as a harbinger of material progress, for on theeighth the Assistant Secretary of War issued orders which directedthe continuation of the execution of the peacetime plan of theschool. An expenditure of $9.2 million was allowed, of which$6.6 million was for construction, and the remainder for purchaseof land. Officially, the work of building the camp was resumed.Actually, it had never entirely stopped, despite the mandate ofJanuary. Major Jones, the constructing quartermaster, who seemsto have been an officer whose talents included rare qualities ofinitiative, ingeniously interpreted his instructions to salvage thework as meaning to carry on to completion all partially finishedbuildings, and then to preserve them from deterioration by theapplication of paint. However, superior authority of that timemay have regarded his adroit translation of his orders, hisoperations were of immense practical permanent value in thedevelopment of the embryonic camp.

After a respite of three weeks, instructional work was resumedwhen a new class of student officers enrolled on March 15 for athree-month course. On March 23 the garrison of Camp Benningwas augmented by the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantryfrom the demobilization center at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

Early in April the reunion of the school’s dismembered partswas completed by the arrival on the third of some 200 men of theCamp Hancock machine-gun center and their consolidation withthe personnel of the school on the fifth. This detachment, whichincluded two demonstration machine-gun companies — oneanimal-drawn and the other motorized, was accompanied by anumber of officers, both instructors and students. Colonel Eamesconcluded his important labors as commandant on April 22 upon

the arrival of his successor, Major General Charles S. Farnsworth.Colonel Eames thereupon became executive officer of the school.

On June 17 the Infantry School of Arms began its move fromthe temporary camp on Macon Road to its new but uncompletedhome at what is now Fort Benning. Uncertainty still obscured thefuture of the new camp. The local authorities, actuated by an ardentdesire to save the camp for the school, did everything they couldtoward affecting this end. One of their plans, by which they hopedto avert abandonment of the camp, was the production of anappearance of intensive training activity to impress congressionalor other influential observers. The idea seemed to be that thepresence of a large class of student officers engaged in importantstudies would make less feasible an interruption of the school’scareer, and might also aid to divert any sentiment which favoredsuch a move. At any rate, this is the only explanation which hasbeen advanced to account for the decision to retain the class ofofficers which should have been graduated on June 15, for anadditional three-month course. While the school was in processof removal and settling, the students enjoyed a two-week holidayperiod, during which they recuperated to some extent from theenervating effects of a long spell of hard work in the hightemperatures of summer. They returned to their classes on June30 and carried on their strenuous work of bayonet combat, drillsand firing of weapons in the intense midsummer heat. It was atrying ordeal and a severe test of morale. The months of June andJuly saw a succession of curiously contradictory orders whichalternately granted carts blanche authority to proceed with thedevelopment of Camp Benning and summarily checked suchactivities. The authorization which the Secretary of War had givenin March for the completion of the project had allottedapproximately $2.6 million for the purchase of the land required.On June 5 the officer in charge of the acquirement of land wastold “to spend as much as may be needed” for the procurement ofthe 98,000 acres which the camp was to have, although it wasapparent even then that the transaction would require more thanthe allotted sum. On July 1, the Secretary of War again placed an


Soldiers used to sleep in tents in the early days of Fort Benning. The silo in the background ofthis 1925 photograph was part of Arthur Bussey’s plantation, which he sold to the governmentso that the School of Infantry could be built.

official ban on all construction work andpurchase of land for Camp Benning. Allunexpended funds hitherto allotted for thesepurposes were to revert to the United StatesTreasury. Apparently the injunction did notaffect operations at Camp Benning untilJuly 5, for the local quartermaster recordsshow that land purchases and constructionwork ceased officially on that date. Localenterprise again met the situation. Withsuch materials as were at hand, theinhabitants of the camp set about improvingtheir living conditions and, despite thesharp limitations placed upon suchactivities, they accomplished a great dealbefore winter. This, and the previous localsolution of pressing problems, seemed toprove that there is more than one way ofkilling a cat or of saving an infantry school.

More ChallengesIn June, Colonel Paul B. Malone was

recalled from duty with the Army ofOccupation in Germany to become assistantcommandant of the Infantry School ofArms. He was also to act as representativeof the War Department to acquaintCongress with the necessity for and theobjectives of the school and to induce thatbody to approve the project. ColonelMalone’s duties in Washington as liaisonofficer between the War Department andCongress began in July and extended overa period of eight months. One of his firstacts was to begin the preparation of a digestof information on matters relating to theschool plan for the members of Congress.The importance of an infantry school in theArmy’s educational system was cogentlydemonstrated by an analysis of theAmerican casualties of the World War. Thisshowed that the infantry suffered 89 percentof the combat casualties and indicatedcertain deficiencies in training. A schoolfor the infantry, he argued, was an absolutenecessity, no matter what the size the Armywas to be. By a brief discussion of thegeneral features of existing Army posts,cantonments and camps, he proved that theCamp Benning area was the only availableone which fulfilled the requirements of anall-year-round infantry school. He outlinedan organization plan and the new characterof training for commissioned andnoncommissioned personnel of the threecomponents of the Army. He procured theapprobative statements of such eminentsoldiers as Generals Hunter Liggett, Robert

L. Bullard, and Charles P. Summerall.Among others, endorsements of the schemewere given by the chief of the tank corps,then a separate arm, the director of airservice, the chief of the militia bureau, andby two influential civilian organizations,the Military Training Camps Associationand the National Rifle Association. About200 infantry officers and several officersof other arms participated in the work ofacquainting Congress with the necessity ofcompleting the Camp Benning project.

An impetus was given to the school’sinstructional activities on July 10 when twoclasses of noncommissioned officers begana three-month course. On September 5another class of officers arrived for aphysical training course of one month. Withtwo classes of officers and two ofnoncommissioned officers in session at onetime, the school presented a scene ofbustling training activities, as theauthorities no doubt had intended it should,when Colonel Malone conducted acongressional inspection committee toCamp Benning in the fall.

The study, which the general staff hadbegun on the question of infantry training,resulted in a definition of policy which wasannounced in War Department generalorders on September 25. The infantry wasto have its own special service school whichwas “to develop and standardize theinstruction and training of officers in the

(techniques) and tactics of their arm of theservice.” The infantry’s school was tooperate under the supervision and controlof the chief of infantry, who was directedto draft special regulations for the conductof the school. General Farnsworth, assistedby Colonel Malone and Colonel Monroe C.Kerth, at once began the preparation of theregulations, and in January 1920, submitteda draft to the War Department.

On September 30 the class which beganin March (a course which should haveended in June) finally graduated. A newclass of recent West Point graduates arrivedon October 1. On October 15, the remainderof the 29th Infantry arrived from CampShelby. Colonel Eames was placed in chargeof the school’s department of experiment onNovember 1 and was designated a memberof the Infantry Board on December 24.Mobile Laundry Unit No. 5 arrived onNovember 5, but it did not operate untilthe following year. General Pershing cameto Camp Benning on December 10 toinspect the school. Seas of mud,overflowing streams, liquid roads, and asodden camp, awaited him. The inundation,which resulted from a downpour of severaldays’ duration prior to his arrival, is knownto this day as the “Pershing Flood.”

At the close of 1919, the infantry’sschool had made little advancement towardpermanency, and, friendless and forlorn,was still floundering in a quagmire ofuncertainty.

The new year, 1920, began with littlepromise, and January was void ofaccomplishment until the 23rd, whenGeneral Farnsworth sent the draft of thenew school regulations to the WarDepartment. The importance of thisdocument in shaping the character of theschool was not evident, however, untilseveral months later.

The month of February had, in previousyears, held a singular significance for theschool. February 1920 was to be noexception, for on February 11 officialsreceived the War Department order whichinvested it with the dignity of a distinctivetitle, “The Infantry School.” February 20,1920, will ever remain a red-letter day inthe history of the Infantry School, for it wason this date that Congress approved theplan to retain and develop Camp Benning.The promise of support for the school planwhich Representative Anthony of Kansasand other members of the committee had


Colonel Paul B. Malone

given to Colonel Malone when theyvisited Camp Benning had not been anempty one. At last the status of theInfantry School was definitely fixed andplans for its conduct and developmentcould proceed with confidence. FromFebruary to April, plans for clothing theschool in its new character as the InfantrySchool were being perfected along thelines which had been indicated in thetentative regulations which GeneralFarnsworth had submitted in January.These were approved and published bythe War Department as SpecialRegulations No. 14, dated April 22, 1920.In them were prescribed the neworganization of the Infantry School, theduties of its staff and departments, theclasses of students and the manner ofselecting them, the courses for therespective classes and the methods bywhich they would be carried out. Someidea of how far the process of evolutionhad advanced the character of the InfantrySchool beyond that of its antecedent of 1907, may be gleaned by acomparison of the respective objectives and organizations of thetwo schools. The immediate objective of the earlier school was toraise the marksmanship standards of the Pacific Division by givingto “selected officers and enlisted men a higher degree of practicaland theoretical instruction in the use of small arms than it ispracticable to obtain at posts, with a view to making them betterinstructors and thereby increasing the fire efficiency of theorganization to which they belong.” The school staff at this timeconsisted solely of an officer in charge and an assistant instructor.More comprehensive were the purposes of the later school. “Thechief aim of all courses will be to develop in the student the qualityof leadership and the capacity to instruct others. Instruction inresearch will form part of each course with a view to developingthe habit of independent investigation and thus arriving atconclusions by analysis and deduction,” reads a paragraph in thespecial regulations of the 1920 school. For the organization of theschool, the latter prescribed a commandant, an assistantcommandant, a secretary, a director for each of the fourdepartments, and such instructors and other assistants as wererequired. The scope of instruction of the Infantry School hadgrown, almost immeasurably, from a curriculum limited to subjectsrelated to marksmanship and musketry, to the whole field of(techniques) of the numerous modern infantry weapons, the tacticsof all units to, and including, the reinforced infantry brigade, andthe cooperation of infantry with other arms. Students for theMonterey school were drawn from a limited area and command,while the Infantry School of 1920 was opened to the infantrymenof all three components of the Army.

With its new investitures of title, estate, and career, an era ofrenaissance had begun for the Infantry School. It had not yetrecovered its strength but it no longer had to expend all its energyin a struggle for the right to exist.

In the spring of 1920, several small increments of demonstration

troops were added to the garrison.The 32d Balloon Company came inMarch, the 344th Tank Battalionand Company D 7th Engineers inApril, and a detachment of the airservice with 10 airplanes in May.

On June 5 Colonel Eamesdeparted from the Infantry Schoolto take up new duties elsewhere incompliance with orders which hadbeen issued in April. On July 31,General Farnsworth was relieved ascommandant to become the Chief ofInfantry, with the rank of majorgeneral.

Brigadier General Walter H.Gordon was appointed his successor,and he arrived to take command onSeptember 20.

The school year of 1920-21 wasthe first in which were conducted theprescribed courses of the modernInfantry School. Since the issuanceof the special school regulations in

April, the War Department had added to the mission of the schoolthe requirements of training efficient commanders and staff officersfor all units, and of preparing officers for the advanced traininggiven in the general service schools. The new courses, amplifiedto the additional requirements, were scheduled to begin on October1, but unsettled conditions in the service made it so difficult toassemble the students that the classes did not commence untilNovember 1. An exception was that a group of recent graduates ofthe military academy who arrived in time to begin the basic courseon October 1. This group was carried as a separate class throughoutthe school year as it had advanced too far in its work to be mergedwith the other basic group upon the latter’s arrival. Approximately650 regular officers reported for enrollment in the four classes,the field officers,’ company officers,’ and the two basic classes,but the actual enrollments were reduced somewhat by the necessityof using prospective students to fill vacancies in the school staffand post organizations. A national guard class, the first of thethree-month courses for this component, began on November 1.

Two important demonstration units were added to the garrison inthis month. The medical demonstration detachment of seven officersand about 100 enlisted men, assembled from five corps areas, arrivedon the second. On the 20th, the 1st Battalion 83d Field Artilleryarrived after an overland march from Camp Knox, Kentucky.

Despite the hampering effect of the primitive environment inwhich it was carried on, the instructional work of the schoolproceeded steadily. Classes came and went. Courses were improvedlittle by little as experience indicated where changes for the bettercould be made. By 1921 the school had acquired enough experiencein the extensive fields of its work to justify a revision of whatmight be termed its character, Special Regulations No. 14. Bythis time, the school had also undertaken the revision of severaltraining documents and the preparation of others. On January31, 1921, the first class of National Guard officers graduated.Another class began a similar course on March 1, which terminated


Brigadier General Walter H. Gordon

near the end of May. All the regular courses ended on June 30after a two-week extension to compensate for the late opening ofthe classes in the fall of 1920. In October the regular courses for1921-22 began with 439 students enrolled. An indication of thebroadened character of the school’s training program was thecommandant’s recommendation in August 1921 that in additionto the 29th Infantry at full war strength, there also be a battalionof field artillery, a battalion of tanks, a company of engineers, anobservation squadron, a medical demonstration unit, a pigeon loftand a balloon company stationed permanently at the InfantrySchool as demonstration units. However, the schedule of troopdemonstrations had to be curtailed considerably. This setback inthe training scheme was due to the reduction of the 29th Infantryto a two-battalion regiment, the disbandment of the medicaldemonstration detachment, and the withdrawal of the air servicedetachment. In 1921 the majority of the regular Army studentswere newly commissioned and, according to the assistantcommandant, Colonel Paul B. Malone, “knew little of theunwritten laws of the service.” Nevertheless, they apparentlyentered into their studies wholeheartedly, for Colonel Malone paysthem high compliment in the school’s annual report. “On thewhole,” said the colonel, “the conduct of the classes was excellent,the morale high, and the feeling that a great work for the Armyhad been accomplished was general, almost universal.”

This evidence of student esprit appears to have been acircumstance of conspicuous brightness in an otherwise gloomyyear. Besides the disheartening problems associated with theliving conditions of Camp Benning, General Gordon wasconfronted with others of totally different character but ofequally disturbing influences. One of these was the problem ofadequate transportation service between Camp Benning andColumbus. The schedule of the one daily train which the Centralof Georgia Railroad operated to and from the camp, was whollyunsuited to the needs of the majority of the garrison, whichfound itself interned during its hours of freedom from duties.This circumstance was regarded as a golden opportunity by anumber of individuals who forthwith engaged in the businessof transportation between the camp and the city. Soon scoresof nondescript vehicles, operated by persons of no particularresponsibili ty, were haphazardly engaged in carryingpassengers between Camp Benning and Columbus. GeneralGordon desired the establishment of a reliable transportationsystem to displace the unregulated jitneys. Accordingly,negotiations were begun with the management of the Columbusstreet railways. An offer of the free use of the government’stracks to the camp was made to the company. This did notappear to be sufficient inducement, and the street railwaycompany asked, in addition, that it be given a monopoly on allpassenger and freight transportation, and a guarantee that thegovernment would reimburse the company for any deficitincurred in operating the line. The latter point could not beconceded and the negotiations fell through. With the streetrailway company eliminated, Columbus’ interest in the camptransportation system seemed to be limited to a small circle ofautomobile dealers and independent vehicle operators.However, when a proposal to establish a regular passenger busline between Camp Benning and Columbus was made by a Mr.Howard of Atlanta, the subject at once became a matter of


community concern. In May 1921, a counterproposal offered bythe automobile dealers of Columbus was laid before the CampActivities Committee, a local citizens’ organization. The committeeregarded Mr. Howard’s proposal as the better one andrecommended that General Gordon accept it. This he did, and theHoward Bus Line was given the exclusive automobiletransportation privilege between the camp and the city. Thecontract did not become effective until August as General Gordonallowed the independent operators 90 days in which to withdrawtheir service.

Another problem of no mean proportions was the constantreadjustment of all activities which was made necessary by thegrowing shortage of enlisted personnel. This was particularlyevident in 1921 following the promulgation of the WarDepartment’s order which permitted the discharge of any soldierwho desired to leave the service. This state of affairs was, ofcourse, one which local authority had to accept with such grace asit could. However, in midsummer of 1921, General Gordon madeemphatic protest against a proposed reduction of one-fourth ofthe force of nurses at Camp Benning. “If we had modern quartersfor our families, officers and enlisted men,” he said, “the necessityfor hospital accommodations would be very much less.”

Constant criticism by casual, but high-ranking observers didlittle toward lightening the general’s cares. “The personalappearance of the officers at Benning is the worst we have seen inthe army,” is a criticism transmitted to the harassed commandantby the Chief of Infantry.

As a final, but by no means all-inclusive recital of the minorburdens borne by General Gordon, a list of some of the ill-starredevents of this year will be illuminative. In March, during a firingexercise, a tank fired a six-pound shell into one of the officers’quarters in Block 23. Just a few days later an artillery shell fell onthe railroad near Harp’s Pond and a civilian workman narrowlyescaped death or injury. In the same month a violent stormdestroyed wire communication lines, unroofed buildings, movedsome from their foundations, and damaged a great amount ofsubsistence and other supplies. In May, a fete day, whose programincluded a ceremony, demonstrations, a baseball game, and a publicreception, was broken up by another violent storm. In June thelocal water supply dried up and it was necessary to improvise atemporary source of supply. On October 27, President Hardingand his party visited Camp Benning.

While no untoward incident occurred, the plans for thepresidential visit had to be curtailed to a great extent. A gloomyoutlook for the future was prohesied by General Farnsworth inthis same month when he wrote, “It is becoming increasinglydifficult to get personnel, money and materials for Benning. Thisis not because of any opposition to Benning, but because of thenecessity for economy in the army. The economy is real economyand not simply talk about economy.” Only a year before GeneralGordon, viewing hopefully the immediate future, had written toGeneral Farnsworth, “I feel, too, that we are meeting successfullythe crisis that the Infantry School is now going through and thatin another year the troubles of today will be forgotten in theimproved conditions and in the school’s success.” A vain hope,indeed, as it turned out to be, but at the end of 1921 GeneralGordon was regarding the school’s prospects for the forthcomingyear with optimism and courage unimpaired.


With its riflemen, grenadiers,and SAW gunners, theStryker brigade combat team

(SBCT) rifle squad carries a significantamount of firepower to the battlefield. Twoof its potentially most lethal weapons systemsare the M2 machine gun or MK-19 grenadelauncher, either of which can be mountedon the Stryker itself on a Remote WeaponSystem (RWS). The focus of a Strykerinfantry battalion is the dismountedinfantry squad, supported by the Stryker(FM 3-21.1, ch. 1-1). Direct fire supportfrom the Stryker’s M2 or MK-19 is a vitalpart of the dismounted attack, andaccurate fire from the Stryker can be adevastating weapon when applied by aproficient gunner-vehicle commander(VC) team.

Mastery of RWS skills greatlyincreases the lethality of a SBCT riflesquad. In order to prepare our Strykercrews for combat, the 4th Battalion, 9thInfantry Regiment conducted Table VI andTable VII gunnery at the Yakima TrainingCenter in Washington from August 14-24,2006. Forty-two crews fired both day andnight practice and qualification tables overthe course of nine training days, with 31crews meeting both the day and nightqualification criteria. The modestqualification numbers, combined with thedifficulty those 31 crews had in qualifying,indicates the need for a coherent, focusedbattalion gunnery program. In this articleI will discuss some of the trainers’observations and conclusions, especially inregards to the lack of preparation forgunnery and the need for heavy emphasis

on the Stryker Gunnery Skills Test (SGST).I will also list recommendations forimprovements both to our own battalion’sgunnery training program and to thetraining and evaluation guidelines listedin FM 3-22.3 (Stryker Gunnery) ,including revised gunnery tables that notonly take into account the variancesbetween M2 and MK-19 Strykers, but alsobetter fit the contemporary operatingenvironment in Iraq.

Pretraining and PrerequisitesTo prepare vehicle crews, particularly

gunners, for Stryker gunnery, FM 3-22.3specifies numerous prerequisites that crewsmust complete before executing thegunnery tables. Crews must completetarget acquisition practice, weaponmounting and dismounting, range card(handwritten and digital), and combatvehicle recognition before executingpractice and qualification tables (FM 3-22.3, Chapters 9-9 and 9-10). The purposeof this training is to build proficiency atthese fundamentals before putting a crewthrough gunnery evaluation. Unfortunately,our battalion was not able to meet the time-intensive prerequisites specified in FM 3-22.3. Battalion-resourced pre-gunnerytraining consisted of two M2familiarization ranges, with a MK-19 rangehaving to be cancelled due to trainingconflicts. Companies were instructed tohave their crews complete the SGST (FM3-22.3, App. C-3), which consisted ofseveral PMI tasks such as assembly/disassembly, headspace and timing, etc.

The lack of pretraining for gunnery was

IMPROVING STYRKERGUNNERY TRAINING

CAPTAIN JOSHUA DAILEY

clearly evident when crews executed thepractice and qualification tables. Lack offamiliarity with their weapons systems alsoimpaired some crews’ effectiveness whendealing with weapon malfunctions,especially MK-19 malfunctions.Experience demonstrated the need forrigorous application of SGST standards atthe battalion level.

PlanningChapter 10 of FM 3-22.3 specifies the

requirements for Stryker gunnery practiceand qualification tables. The FM requiresthat for a M2-equipped Stryker, at least oneday and night target must be at a range of600 meters or less, and one day and onenight target must be at a range of 1,400meters or more. MK-19-equippedStrykers must engage one target at 800meters or less and one target at 1,500meters or more. Targets are all exposedfor 60 seconds, but Chapter 10 requiresthat Strykers have significantly less timeto pull into a firing position and engagethe target. The FM also specifies that oneengagement by day and by night must befired under NBC conditions, and one dayengagement must be fired using onlymanual traverse. For ammunition,Chapter 10 allots 21 rounds per target forM2 Strykers, and 8 rounds per target forMK-19 Strykers. There were 23 totaltargets for all day and night tables, whichmeant that each vehicle was allotted 483rounds of .50 caliber ammunition or 184rounds of 40mm ammunition. M2 gunnersreceived ammunition DODIC A557 (4+1ball-tracer mix) and MK-19 gunners

received either B584 (TPT) or BA12 (TPTchalk).

When planning the gunnery tables, wefollowed the basic examples and guidelinesfound in FM 3-22.3. Also, we included anadditional engagement condition underwhich the gunner simulated running outof ammunition, having to reload withengagement time running. Tables VI andVII each had five day engagements and fournight engagements. All Table VIengagements were fired from stationary

positions. Some Table VII engagementswere fired from the quick halt. A matrix ofthe engagements can be found on the nextpage. In order to receive a “GO” on anengagement, M2 gunners had to hit eachtarget presented in the engagement. MK-19 gunners had to either hit each target orhit within five meters of the target,simulating the five-meter bursting radiusfor a 40mm high explosive (HE) round.The impact was observed by the tower

evaluators and graded accordingly. Crewshad to score three out of five GOs for dayTable VII and two out of four GOs for nightTable VII to be considered a GO for Strykergunnery.

ExecutionDue to operations simultaneous with

Stryker gunnery, we had a minimal rangestaff to execute gunnery. The officer-in-charge (OIC) and range safety officer(RSO) manned the tower and gave

Tech Sergeant John M. Foster, USAF

A Soldier with the 172ndStryker Brigade Combat Team

patrols Mosul, Iraq, in aStryker in March 2006.



TRAINING NOTES

TABLE VI DAY incoming crews the range orientation and safety briefprior to execution; they also gave crews their radioprompts during the gunnery tables. Three evaluators(all 19K staff sergeants — selected due to theirextensive gunnery experience) took turns watching theexecution of the lanes on the range tower’s FLIR(forward looking infrared), recording the scores, andgiving the completed crews their after action reviews(AARs) after each table. We had four safeties (19Ksergeants — also selected for their gunnery experience)who rode in each vehicle as it executed the tables, bothto ensure crews followed all safety procedures and toobserve crews’ engagement methods and offer adviceduring AARs. Two Strykers executed each tablesimultaneously, with four to six Strykers firing daily.At the beginning of each engagement, the OIC wouldgive a radio prompt to the vehicle commander, whichwould read as follows:

“C22 this is Tower, you have enemy troops in yoursector to the right of TRP 2; engage and report, out.”

The VC and gunner would then begin scanning,with engagement time beginning when the targetbecame exposed.

There were several difficulties that weencountered while executing gunnery. First, whenweapons systems had malfunctions, we had amechanic from our battalion’s combat repair teamwho was at the range and tasked with weaponsrepair. When conducting future gunnery training,we will also ensure that we have ample maintenanceassets on-hand to correct any malfunctions thatoccur due to the heavy firing that weapons endureduring gunnery. Rigorous application of the SGSTwould also help alleviate malfunction-relatedhindrances by allowing some malfunctions to becorrected by operator immediate action.

Almost every crew had to recycle through theammunition supply point (ASP) for additionalammunition after completing the day tables, usingalmost twice the amount of ammunition allotted. Someof the less-experienced gunners used entire boxes ofammunition just to zero their weapon systems. Forboth M2 and MK-19 Stryker crews, the allotment ofammunition should be increased significantly, withamount of rounds per target varying based on the typeof target, the range to target, and conditions underwhich the crews are firing. Recommended adjustmentsto ammunition allocations can be found in the tableabove.

There were few problems with the ammunitionitself. DODIC A557 (.50 cal 4+1) created an excellentthermal and visual signature for gunners and VCs touse to adjust their fire onto target. BA12 (40mm chalk)created an excellent visual signature by day, but at nightits impacts could be observed only by the range tower’s

TABLE VI NIGHT

EVENT CONDITION TYPE DISTANCE(M)

Engagement 1 Normal Troops 700

Engagement 2 Normal Truck 1100

Engagement 3 Manual Troops 500Bunker


Engagement 5 NBC Bunker 1200


Engagement 1 Normal Bunker 500



Engagement 4 NBC Truck 1400

TABLE VII DAY




Engagement 1 Normal Troops 400 Quick Halt


Engagement 3 Manual Troops 750Bunker 900

Engagement 4 Normal Troops 1150 Quick Halt Truck 1300

Engagement 5 Normal Troops 1000Bunker 1000

TABLE VII DAY




Engagement 3 Normal Truck 1100 Quick Halt

Engagement 4 Normal Bunker 1000

RECOMMENDED AMMUNITION ADJUSTMENTS

Captain Joshua Dailey is currently serving as the assistant operations officer for the4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, FortLewis, Washington.

Editor’s Note: This is an abridged version of the original article. The article contains manytactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and other matters of value to our readers, butsince Infantry is an unclassified, open-source publication that reaches 50 other nations andtheir armed forces, these are matters best discussed only among ourselves and participatingallies. Readers interested in the complete article can contact the magazine staff at (706) 545-2350 or e-mail: [email protected].


FLIR, making it almost impossible for gunners toadjust their fire. B584 (40mm TPT) created a far bettersignature at night.

The tables themselves also required someadjustments during execution. One of theadjustments was the reshuffling of the manualengagements to the end of each table. Also, wefound that the ammo-change condition proved tobe of limited value. Due to a higher than expectedrate of ammunition consumption, many gunners hadto change ammunition boxes without beingprompted to do so, making the artificial conditionredundant.

For future gunnery training I would create twoseparate tables for MK-19 and M2-equipped Strykers.The ranges and types of targets presented during thetables need to correspond to the contemporaryoperating environment that most of the crews willexperience when deployed. The majority ofengagements in theater by Stryker units occur atshort range against insurgent infantry in urbanenvironments. Examples of possible revised gunnerytables can be found to the right.

CONCLUSIONSThe battalion’s gunnery tables yielded excellent

training and good lessons learned for all whoparticipated. If executed in accordance with FM 3-22.3, Stryker gunnery requires weeks of well-planned and focused training on fundamentals suchas target acquisition, RWS zeroing, and adjustingfire onto target. However, most of the Stryker crewshad done little more than an M2 range prior toexecuting gunnery, and some had done no priortraining at all. If it had not been necessary to devotethe bulk of the training time to preparing for theother training events, Stryker crews could havegained greater proficiency in gunnery fundamentals;proficiency that would have paid great dividendsduring the gunnery tables and in combat.

AMMO BASE 200- 600- 1000- TARGETTYPE ALLOTMENT 600m 1000m 1400m CONDITION TYPE

NBC: +4 Troops: +4.50 cal 16 +0 +6 +10 Manual: +8 Vehicle: +0

NBC: +4 Troops: +0 40mm 12 +0 +4 +8 Manual: +6 Vehicle: +4





Engagement 3 Normal Troops 600 Quick Halt Bunker 400

Engagement 4 Normal Troops 900Troops 500

Engagement 5 Manual Troops 200Bunker 300

M2 TABLE VII




Engagement 2 NBC Troops 300

Engagement 3 Normal Troops 600 Quick Halt Bunker 400

Engagement 4 Normal Troops 500Troops 200

Engagement 5 Manual Troops 200

MK-19 TABLE VII

Recently, a former company commander of mine, who isnow a tactical officer at the United States Military Academy, asked me what I would share with cadets

who were soon to be commissioned. I reflected back to my timespent as a platoon leader in Fallujah, Iraq, and Gardez,Afghanistan. The two deployments were on opposing ends of thespectrum of Army operations. Countless combat operations,typically cordon and searches targeting both Saddam loyalists andinsurgents, characterized our time in Iraq. As a battalion, wewere in contact daily. Our mission in Afghanistan was to facilitatethe country’s first ever national elections. It was, arguably, astability and support operation. While the battalion was in contacton more than one occasion, operations there were nowhere nearas intense as those in Iraq. Despite the differences in the twodeployments, I have identified some common principles that whenapplied at the small unit level, led to mission success. Theseprinciples are versatility, aggressiveness, and safety.

PRINCIPLES FOR THE

SMALL UNIT LEADERCAPTAIN SCOTT SHIRK

Army doctrine is full of concepts, definitions, and terms. As acadet at the United States Military Academy, as a second lieutenantat the Infantry Officers Basic Course (IOBC), and again as acaptain at the Infantry Captains Career Course, I’ve studied andused mnemonics to memorize and learn concepts such as thePrinciples of War, the Tenets of Army Operations, and the Elementsof Combat Power. That being said, what I do not intend to do isundermine doctrine or force junior leaders to remember three more“principles.” I would like to illustrate, based on experience, whythese principles are important and how they can contribute tomission accomplishment.

VersatilityFM 3-0, Operations, defines versatility as the ability of Army

forces to meet the global, diverse mission requirements of full

Photo by Sergeant Jeffrey Alexander

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 26th InfantryRegiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1stInfantry Division, secure the perimeter during acordon and search operation in Iraq.


TRAINING NOTES


spectrum operations. Leaders and Soldiersat all levels must be able to quicklytransition from full spectrum to stabilityand reconstruction operations. In April2004, our battalion redeployed from Iraqafter nearly a year of a fairly intenseoperations tempo (OPTEMPO). In Augustof 2004, we were rapidly deployed toAfghanistan. We expected our juniorleaders to make the transition, includingnew tactics, techniques and procedures(TTPs) and rules of engagement (ROEs),seamlessly. The contemporary operatingenvironment (COE) mandates that juniorleaders also understand the environment inwhich they will be operating. Often, it is asecond lieutenant or even a staff sergeantwho is speaking to an indigenous personon behalf of the Army. In Afghanistan, ourplatoon was deployed to secure a pollingsite in Sayed Karam. As a first lieutenant,I held daily meetings with the tribal eldersand the mayor of town while my squadleaders worked hand-in-hand with the chiefof police. Leaders must be versatile enoughto understand the cultural, political, social,economic and religious aspects of theoperating environment and potentially beable to communicate their understandingto indigenous personnel.

Small unit leaders must also be able toperform unique missions for which theymay not have been trained. For example,the enemy in Iraq prefers to attack coalitionforces using improvised explosive devices(IEDs) placed along the roadside. As asecond lieutenant, I was never trained on“react to IED.” I was, however, taught howto react to a near ambush. With the help ofNCOs and experienced Soldiers, we wereable to develop SOPs for reacting to IEDsbased on existing doctrine. Leaders mustbe able to apply what they have been taught(doctrine) to what they have to do, usingthe assets they have. That being said, wemust learn and understand not only thecapabilities of our own units, but also thoseof the units fighting on our right and left.My task organization for the polling centersecurity mission in Sayed Karam,Afghanistan, included my platoon (anairborne anti-tank platoon), two Marinesquads, a 60mm mortar section, a Ravenunmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) team, acombat camera team, and an interpreter.The typical second lieutenant or sergeant

first class does not know what a MarineCorps assault squad brings to the fight orhow far and long a Raven UAV can fly. Wehad to be versatile enough to incorporatethese assets into our team to accomplishthe mission. This is particularly importantbecause in the COE, platoons are operatingin company-sized battlespaces withcompany-level assets and companies areoperating in battalion-sized battlespaceswith battalion-level assets. Small unitleaders need to be students of their craftand be able to operate independently inareas much larger than they are accustomedto with assets inorganic to them.

AggressiveSmall unit leaders must be aggressive.

“Aggressive” does not mean “shoot firstand ask questions later,” but rather thedesire to take the fight to the enemy. Everyleader in the Army must embody theWarrior Ethos. Equally important is hisability to instill this into his subordinates.This includes all branches of the Army, notsolely the combat arms. In the COE, everySoldier, regardless of military occupationspecialty or unit affiliation, is a shooter.Nothing illustrates this point better than theinfamous ambush of the 507th MaintenanceCompany in Nasiriyah, Iraq. Beingaggressive keeps the enemy on his toes,makes him think twice about attacking anddenies him sanctuary and the ability toattack.

What does this mean for the small unitleader? It means that if he makes contact,he must aggressively react to it. Use fireand maneuver to fight the threat, not to getaway from it, but to eliminate it. In stabilityand support operations (SASO), this

translates into projecting an aggressiveposture to prevent an enemy attack. Whenall Soldiers are pulling 360-degree security,when weapons are at the ready, and whenhelmets, eye protection and IBAs are wornproperly and fastened, units present anaggressive posture. An aggressive postureprevents attacks, and displaysprofessionalism and discipline. FromAugust 2003 through March 2004, thebattalion area of operations (AO) for the1st Battalion, 505th Infantry, 82ndAirborne Division, was a large swath ofland in Iraq’s Anbar Province that includedAl Fallujah. The majority of the units thatwere ambushed with catastrophic results inthat AO were nonaffiliated combat support(CS) and combat service support (CSS)units. These units typically had a poordefensive posture; in general, crew servedweapons were not properly manned andtactical convoy procedures were notfollowed. The enemy is a thinking enemyand understands discipline. He wouldprefer to engage a “soft target.” To theenemy, a soft target is identifiable by aperceived poor level of discipline.

SafetyThe third principle is safety. Safety is

not just for training or for making sureSoldiers come back in one piece from a longweekend. Safety includes common sense,force protection and sound, responsibledecision making. Safety must be instilledat the lowest level. One of the best waysto stay safe is to provide realistic trainingfor Soldiers. When NCOs and juniorofficers plan and execute realistictraining it instills confidence in even themost inexperienced Soldiers. A confidentSoldier is less likely to be unsafe. Thefirst time a Soldier maneuvers while asupport by fire element is engagingshould not be “downrange.” Ourbattalion deployed to both Iraq andAfghanistan with minimal notice, yet weensured that every Soldier who deployedhad undergone a minimum of squad live-fire training. The live-fire training wasrealistic; it incorporated newly developedTTPs such as mounting and dismountingHMMWVs, which was fairly new for anairborne infantry battalion. Additionally,it is important to take administrativemeasures for force protection. These

“Aggressive” does notmean “shoot first and askquestions later,” but rather

the desire to take the fight tothe enemy. Every leader inthe Army must embody the

Warrior Ethos. Equallyimportant is his ability to

instill this into hissubordinates.

include personal hygiene and tasks as simple as taking malariaprophylactic medication. In Iraq, my platoon “lost” severalSoldiers due to dysentery and rashes caused from animal and insectinfestations. On one occasion, an NCO had such poor personalhygiene that a weasel was actually sharing his sleeping bag withhim. We became aware of this only after the NCO came downwith a rash. Something as simple as ensuring your Soldiers keepthemselves clean can be a force multiplier.

On the tactical side, being safe means mitigating risk and notgiving the enemy any “freebies.” In both Afghanistan and Iraq,one of the enemy’s most dangerous capabilities are IEDs. In Iraq,a second lieutenant from a sister unit was killed while personallyinspecting a suspected IED site along a main supply route (MSR).The officer literally walked to within 20 meters of theemplacement. His death could have been prevented by the use ofoptics and other assets. For example, in Afghanistan, we wereable to utilize the Raven UAV to reconnoiter our routes to detectIEDs and small arms ambushes.

Another example of tactical safety is aggressively patrollingwithin a 10-kilometer radius of friendly operational support bases.For the enemy to place accurate mortar and rocket indirect fireson us, he must be within 10 kilometers. Rockets and mortar attacksare frequent and casualty-causing occurrences in both Iraq andAfghanistan. By patrolling this ring, we can reduce the enemy’sability to emplace these systems.

Finally, it is important to remember that the COE and currentOPTEMPO now make it necessary for units to be responsible forlarger AOs. For example, as a platoon leader operating inAfghanistan, I was responsible for an area that would typically becontrolled by a company. Platoons are occupying company-sizedbattlespaces; companies are occupying battalion-sized battlespacesand so on. This means that small unit leaders are responsible for


TRAINING NOTES

At the time this article was written, Captain Scott Shirk was a student atthe Infantry Captains Career Course. He is a 2002 graduate of the UnitedStates Military Academy and is currently a platoon training officer at the U.S.Army Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He has served asan infantry platoon leader during both Operations Iraqi Freedom and EnduringFreedom while assigned to the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute InfantryRegiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

securing large patrol bases and safe houses. In Afghanistan,lieutenants and platoon sergeants are establishing and operatingfrom safe houses. They must understand how to establish gooddefensive plans. They need to know now how to plan a defense,employ weapons systems in the defense, and maintain goodcommunications. These are key elements of force protection whenoperating in small units separate from the main body.

It is obvious how the principles of versatility, aggressiveness,and safety can contribute to mission accomplishment. By nomeans are these principles all encompassing, and they are notintended to replace doctrine or add to it. In fact, all of theprinciples are discussed in one form or another in a modernArmy manual or publication. The aforementioned principlesare simply one officer’s summation of what enabled his unit tobe successful in the COE under varying conditions. Today’sArmy is full of combat veterans. The majority of Soldiers haveat least one, often two or three, deployments to either Iraq orAfghanistan under their belt. It is of vital importance to ourArmy that this experience is passed on to the inexperiencedSoldier and future commissioned leaders.

Photo by Master Sergeant Andy Dunaway, USAF

A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment,3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, providessecurity during a patrol of a village in Iraq.

In an effort to make readers aware of street literatureand Arabic books about Usama Bin Laden, Infantry Magazine is featuring a third in a series of review

essays that will introduce American military readers tounique perspectives and information on Bin Laden. TheAl-Qaeda leader and the movement he has created are muchtoo important to ignore what is written about him both inArabic print and on the internet.

This third essay will explore the work of Khalid KhaleelAsaad who in 2000 published Muqatil Min Makkah: Al-Qissa Al-Kamila lee Usama Bin Laden (Warrior fromMecca: The Complete Story of Usama Bin Laden). Thisbook is a 388-page expose on the myriad of connections BinLaden has had with Afghan Mujahideen commanders,Sudanese government officials, the Egyptian MuslimBrotherhood, and much more. The title is a misnomer, as itis not entirely a complete biography, but it does contain abetter picture of Bin Laden’s early involvement with theSoviet-Afghan War and less information about the battlesin which he participated, like the Defense of Jaji and the Battle ofJalalabad. What it does offer is some insight into Usama BinLaden as a planner, organizer, political operator, and perhaps oneof the better discussions on his closeness to the Sudanesegovernment.

This is the author’s third book on Bin Laden, with a 1991book on Usama Bin Laden in Saudi Arabia and a 1994 biographyof Usama Bin Laden’s father, Mohammed Bin Laden, both writtenin Arabic. There is no biography on Asaad, but he seems to be aninvestigative journalist and independent writer. His 2000 book, whichis the subject of this review, was published by Al-Alam lil NahsirPublishers out of London, a place whose liberal asylum laws hasmade it a haven for Islamist militant rejectionists until the recentwave of attacks on the London transportation system. This reviewessay demonstrates that jihadist literature and biographies of majorIslamist militant figures can be found not only on Arab streetcorners but a few blocks from a London pub as well.

Bin Laden’s Gradual Involvement in the Soviet-AfghanWar (1980-1985)

This particular book discusses the gradual involvement ofUsama Bin Laden in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union.Bin Laden’s odyssey began 17 days after the Soviet invasion onChristmas Day 1979. This places Bin Laden’s first foray seekingout what he could do for the jihad in mid-January 1980; he was21 years old. His first actions were not in Afghanistan but inPakistan, where he donated $3 million to Pakistani Islamistorganization Jamiat-e-Islami (The Islamic Group) to be distributed

to Afghan mujahideen (jihadists, but at the time, during the ColdWar, American officials would have considered them freedomfighters). Between 1980 and 1983, Bin Laden made frequent tripsbetween Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, looking for ways to contributedirectly to Afghan fighters. In 1983, he arrived in the Pakistanfrontier town of Peshawar on the Afghan border and donated $5million to Afghan mujahideen groups. During this period heinvested another $5 million to create a pipeline for young Arabsto volunteer for the Soviet-Afghan War. The book outlines severalpipelines:

(1) The Bin Laden Foundation and Construction Company inCairo, Egypt, used its experience of moving a massive amount ofEgyptian laborers to work in Saudi Arabia to export Egyptianjihadists to Pakistan and then onto Afghanistan. They would arrivefirst in Jeddah, stay at a transit house called Bait Al-Ansar (Houseof Volunteers), and await further transfer to Peshawar. Bin Ladenat this stage had direct control of this pipeline and not the othertwo.

(2) The World Muslim League at the time maintained 1,112offices and projects worldwide. During the start of the Soviet-Afghan War, they began with humanitarian work, creating 15clinics in Peshawar for Afghan refugees and facilitated inbringing 900 Arabs (300 of whom were Egyptian) intoAfghanistan including Mohammed Shawky Islambooli, olderbrother of President Anwar Sadat’s assassin Khalid Islambooli.The World Muslim League, an arm of the Saudi government,provided $180 payments for volunteers, processed passports,and typically kept the Arab volunteers in Jeddah for two weeks


LIEUTENANT COMMANDER YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, USN

Book Provides Additional Insightinto Bin Laden’s Past

Courtesy photo

Ayman Al Zawahiri and Usama Bin Laden


before sending them on to Pakistan.(3) The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

advertised and raised funds for the Soviet-Afghan War. They created pipelines as wellfor those wanting to participate physicallyin the jihad against the Soviets. Theirprimary source of recruitment was Egyptianuniversity campuses. The MuslimBrotherhood drives became a distinctcounterculture and a jihadist revival thatswept up hundreds of students. The bookalso highlights how clerics in Egypt beganweaving the name of Usama Bin Laden asa leader and organizer of jihad inAfghanistan.

It is important to pause and realize thatthese pipelines to Afghan jihad were notseparate and distinct, but complementedone another in bringing Arabs to the frontin the fight against Russian forces. Arabsecurity and intelligence agencies, whichhad battled jihadists aggressively since the1967 Six-Day War, saw in these pipelinesthe opportunity to rid themselves of Islamistmilitants with the hope that they would notreturn from fighting the modern forces ofthe Soviet 40th Army. Waiting for theseArabs were representatives of SheikhAbdullah Azzam and Usama Bin Laden.Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, who was killedin a 1989 car bomb in Peshawar,established Maktab Al-Khidmat lilMujahideen (The Services Office forArab Fighters, Maktab Al-Khidmatfor short), the first establishment toundertake the organization,reception, and orientation of theseyoung Arabs. Known as the fightingcleric, he also brought SunniIslamist militant groups to theUnited States in the mid to lateeighties, and as Bin Laden’s formerprofessor at King Abdul-AzizUniversity, served as his mentor.Maktab Al-Khidmat would be thetemplate Bin Laden would use toestablish Al-Qaeda. Bin Ladenbrought organizational as well asadministrative skills, fundraising,and military talent to theorganization. Due to numerouscomplaints of the inefficiency ofMaktab Al-Khidmat, Bin Ladenorganized it with:

A military committee thatoversaw military training and

conducted topographical studies of Afghanterrain, as well as escape routes along theAfghan-Pakistan border;

An Administrative Committeethat was responsible for the clothing,feeding, and lodging of Arab-Afghans; and A Travel Committee that arranged

visas, flights, and caravan routes fromCairo to Jeddah, on to Peshawar, thenfinally to Afghanistan, and back. They alsoperfected medical evacuations of woundedmujahideen, both Arab and non-Arab, tomajor treatment facilities in Saudi Arabia.

Bin Laden Settles in Pakistan andAfghanistan (1985-1989)

Usama Bin Laden would use hisexperiences of organizing Sheikh Azzam’soffices for Arab jihadists to not only becomea major executive of this organization, butalso to form his own stand-alone trainingcamps in 1985 called Massadah Al-Ansar(Lion’s Den of Companions). These campswere located in the Afghan mountain regionof Jaji near the southeastern border ofAfghanistan close to the Pakistan border(Read the Infantry Magazine’s July-August2006 article “Street Literature on UsamaBin Laden Part II: The Soviet-Afghan WarYears A Review of a 1991 Street

Autobiography of Bin Laden,” for detailson Bin Laden’s establishment of MassadahAl-Ansar and the Battles of Jaji andJalalabad). What is not clear in manyArabic accounts about Bin Laden is whenhe ventured out on his own away from hismentor and spiritual professor AbdullahAzzam, and if Azzam objected to Bin Ladenestablishing his own camp. What is clearafter 1985, is that Bin Laden remained inPakistan and Afghanistan on a morepermanent basis. He initially focused hisefforts on building Massadah al-Ansar andrecruiting Arab, Asian, and African fightersto this unit. After participating in thedefense of Jaji from Soviet assault in 1986and then the Battle of Jalalabad in 1987,he returned briefly to Saudi Arabia toconduct fundraising. Bin Laden’s effort atcreating Massadah Al-Ansar is a clearindication of his desire to elevate Arabsupport from financial and logistical todirect combat.

The book devotes a chapter to Bin Ladenand his fighting of the Soviets. Although itlacks tactical detail, the book does showhow the introduction of more modernweapons increased the lethality of theAfghan mujahideen fighters andexponentially raised the potency of Afghan

TRAINING NOTES


insurgency tactics against the Soviets. As an example, the bookcites how when AK-47 assault rifles and rocket propelled grenades(RPGs) were made more available to the Afghans the morale,quality, and quantity of attacks on Soviet forces increased. Whenprovided SAM-7 anti-air shoulder-fired missiles, this elevated theirconfidence and tactical options. From 1979 to 1984, the bulk ofmodern weapons fielded by Afghans fighting the Soviets wereeither captured or stolen with the complicit cooperation of Afghancommunist regulars who deserted to the Afghan mujahideenfactions. The book cites the 1982 Soviet military operation in thePanshir Valley when the Russians, as if on parade, demonstratedtheir armored might to frighten the Afghan fighters. This onlystiffened Afghan resolve and led them to assess the Russianformation for lethal hit-and-run targets of opportunity. Sovietinfantry carried anti-tank weapons when the Afghan mujahideenhad no tanks. The book contains a unique chapter dealing withBin Laden’s arrangements to import weapons from China intoAfghanistan. These weapons included Kalashnikov assault rifles,RPGs, 82mm anti-tank guns, 12.7mm machine guns, 14.5mmanti-air guns, 81mm artillery guns, 107mm rockets, and BM-12rockets

Another military deal mentioned in the book is Bin Laden’sarrangement to import surplus Syrian military uniforms andequipment into Afghanistan, a connection he would use later toprovide uniforms to the Sudanese Army. This makes sense as BinLaden’s mother and first wife come from a prominent Syrianfamily. This combination of fundraising, engineering capabilityand ability to access military equipment and bulk supplies on theworld market in addition to his fighting experience, organizationalskill and leadership is unique and demonstrates that should UsamaBin Laden be neutralized it will be highly difficult to find anyonein Al-Qaeda with such diverse talents and cultivated connections.

Evolution of the Radicalist Afghan MujahideenFactions

The book traces the ideological foundations of the mujahideenfactions that fought the Soviet Union and benefited most fromArab and Pakistani support to those Afghan leaders who espousedthe jihadist gospel of Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966). Amongthe early jihadist Afghan leaders and spiritual founders of manyof the more violent of the dozen mujahideen factions was AfghanSheikh Ghulam Mohammed Niazi, who would later rise to beDean of Islamic Jurisprudence at Kabul University. Niazi receivedhis Islamic training at Egypt’s Al-Azhar University and becameclosely linked with the Islamist politics of the Muslim Brotherhoodduring its repression under Egyptian strongman Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Niazi returned to Afghanistan in the late ’60s and hishard-line Islamist worldview stimulated professor BurhanuddinRabbani, as well as students Abdul-Rab Al-Rassul Sayyaf andGulbuddin Hekmetyar. These students demonstrated against theAfghan monarchy of Zahir Shah in 1972, calling for theestablishment of an Islamic state. In 1969, the four formed anorganization at the university Jamiat-e-Islami, in which ProfessorRabbani was head, Sayyaf his deputy, Hekmetyar his operationschief, and Niazi the overall spiritual advisor. They would serveas a bulwark against pro-communist student unions; even

Hekmetyar would spend time in jail, on the charge of murderinga known communist student leader. Hekmetyar would not lastlong in Afghanistan, beginning his political career with the murderof a Communist student leader Saidal Sokhandan in 1972. Jamiatwas violently anti-secular but it is within these student groupsthat the Jamiat-e-Islami led by Rabbani and Hizb-e-Islami (TheIslamic Party) led by Hekmetyar in exile in Pakistan were born.These two organizations would become the most violent andintolerant of the dozen mujahideen factions fighting the Sovietsand would receive the lion’s share of support from Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Department (ISI). Today, Hekmetyar is amongthose wanted by the United States; he currently lives in Iran,skirting the Iranian and Afghan border.

These groups of mainly Pashtun tribesmen married up withtheir Pakistani counterparts and shortly after the Soviet invasionof Afghanistan would call a significant meeting of all like-mindedstudent groups in Peshawar to declare a formal jihad against theSoviet Union. Among the items on the agenda for discussion wasRabbani arguing the futility of direct combat against Soviet forces,and Hekmetyar pushing for a suicidal jihadist commitment as theonly remedy to free Afghanistan from the Soviets.

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the Soviet-AfghanWar

During the Soviet-Afghan War, the book discusses the closenessby which Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was involved with jihadists.It is important to realize the times, and the United States as wellas Arab allies caught in the grip of the Cold War did not object toviolent extremists directing their anger and jihad against the Sovietarmy. Deputy Murshid (Supreme Guide) Omar Tilmissany wasgiven a full-honor reception by Pakistan’s dictator Zia-ul-Haq,who was convening a major convention of the Afghan JihadCommanders within a year of the Soviet invasion. The MuslimBrotherhood established offices for donations and recruitmentsnot only all over Egypt, but also in Kuwait and Peshawar. TheIslamic Medical Union in Egypt recruited doctors to serve in thejihad and conducted massive humanitarian drives for the Afghans.The Afghan jihad commander Sayyaf was a key speaker in the1986 convention of the Islamic Medical Union in Egypt. Islamistradical educators led by the Muslim Brotherhood penetratedschools in Afghan refugees centers in Pakistan infusing childrenwith a politicized Islamist world view and new recruits for theAfghan mujahideen factions. The book alleges that the MuslimBrotherhood with funding from Usama Bin Laden opened anIslamic College of Jurisprudence in 1985. This was a time inwhich Bin Laden created Massadah Al-Ansar and had 280 fightersunder his own command called the khurasa (silent) brigade, hisfighters were divided into two groups: an assault group led byMohammed Islambooli (brother of Anwar Sadat’s assassin) and asupport group. The support group’s tasking was to defendMassadah Al-Ansar, fire mortars, and man anti-air weapons andartillery. The support group were given training in on surface-to-surface missiles, this group was led by Ahmed Attiyah Zahrani.

The first assault led by Bin Laden in 1986 and witnessed bySayyaf saw his group decimated by overwhelming Soviet andAfghan communist firepower. This led Sayyaf to comment that

Arabs did not make worthy fighters. Bin Laden licked his wounds,recruited and developed his network of caves at Massadah Al-Ansar in the mountain region of Jaji.

KHAD (Communist Afghan Intelligence) TacticsKhedamat-e Etelea’at-e Dawlati (KHAD) was the feared

Afghan Intelligence apparatus modeled on the Soviet KGB andin the service of the Soviet intelligence and the Afghan Communistregime. KHAD existed from 1978 to 1992 and the book highlightsa few of its tactics against Afghan Islamist fighters that included:

·Co-opting an Egyptian cleric of Al-Azhar University, Abdel-Rahman Al-Najar, to conduct an official visit to Afghanistan anddeclare the mujahideen a group of highway bandits.

·KHAD operatives spreading into Afghan refugee camps inorder to spread disinformation with the objective of stimulatingtribal warfare.

·Assassination attempts on key jihadist figures like Rabbani,Sayyaf and Hekmetyar (all three were close to Usama Bin Laden).

·Characterizing the mujahideen factions as bandits,highwaymen and drug dealers not interested in state policy butenriching themselves.

These techniques seemed to cause the jihadist fighters and theirleaders the most consternation, according to the book whichdevotes considerable pages to these four KHAD counterinsurgencyoperations.

Bin Laden’s Sudan Years (1991-1996)Sheikh Hassan Al-Turabi is an eloquent Sorbonne-educated

lawyer and cleric who is fluent in English, French, and Arabic.He is also a founding member of Sudan’s National Islamic Front(NIF) and a key advocate of establishing an Islamist state in Sudan.Turabi in collaboration with a cadre of army officers, among themGeneral Omar Bashir, sought to rule Sudan on an Islamist model,after deposing the long-reigning dictator General Jafar Numeiriand creating ideal conditions for Islamist militant terror to thrive.Turabi and Bin Laden have known each other well since1982, and the book offers amazing details of BinLaden’s relationship with the Sudanese governmentduring his five years in Sudan after his exile fromSaudi Arabia.

Bin Laden’s first order of business in Sudan wasto pay $5,000 to become a Consultative Member ofthe National Islamic Front. He then made the roundsof Sudanese ministries, visiting officials from theministries of health, agriculture, industry, and tradeto assess the variety of investment projects in Sudan.Bin Laden also married Turabi’s sisterMaha, and through his connections withhim that stretch back to 1982 wasgranted access to all Sudanesegovernment officials and business elite.Bin Laden was given an exemption fromimport duties and he imported $35million in German constructionequipment, with an eye to constructbridges, roads and housing. He made a

$10 million contribution to an Arab-Afghan relief fund in Sudandesigned to resettle those jihadists who fought in the Soviet-AfghanWar and could not return to their respective Arab countries. Thebook states that he created a total of 23 military training camps inSudan, judging from his extensive land holdings this number ofcamps is within the realm of the possible. The book also postulatesthat Bin Laden sought out projects that Arab governments leftuncompleted and sought to finish the job himself as a means ofgarnering popular support from the people and government.Projects left uncompleted by Arab governments include:

King Fahd Road linking Port Sudan and Khartoum. BinLaden completed the 700 kilometer road and renamed the Tahedi(Challenge) Road.

Port Sudan Airport was a joint project in which the Saudigovernment and Bin Laden competed to take credit (Bin Ladenprovided $30 million in financing and sustainment costs for theairport).

Mosque left unfinished by the Kuwaiti government inJuba, extreme Southern tip of Sudan that is a transportation hubfor Nile traffic going to Uganda, Kenya and the Congo (formerlyZaire) was finished by Bin Laden.

Bin Laden spent and lost a fortune in Sudan. The book discussesthe following transactions, with Bin Laden evolving into anemergency bank fund for the sanctioned Sudanese government:

Completing the Atbara-Khartoum Road (500 kilometers).Opening Al-Shamal Bank with $50 million in return for

1 million acres of land in Korfodan in the south and western Sudan(Darfur).

$80 million desperately needed by Sudanese leader OmarBashir to import wheat and avert food riots.

Hospitals, daycares, eldercare, a stadium.Financial guarantor of an arms deal between the cash

strapped Sudan and Iran.Imported Syrian army surplus uniforms and field

equipment for the Sudanese Army.Paid for oil on behalf of the Sudanese

government.Bin Laden was offered a Sudanese diplomatic

passport, and Sudan’s policy of requiring no visasfor anyone coming from a Muslim countryallowed him to bring remnants of his MassadahAl-Ansar group to Sudan. What finally led to

the Sudanese expulsion of Bin Laden, which wasnot easy for Khartoum that had come to rely onhis financial leverage, were several factors:

Attempted assassination of PresidentMubarak of Egypt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

strained relations between Sudan and itspowerful neighbor to the north.

U.S. pressure on the Sudaneseto exile or bring to justice Bin Laden asmore and more terror attacks were linkedto him and his group.

Saudi pressure as Bin Ladenwas issuing threats on the life and personof King Fahd from Sudan.

TRAINING NOTES


Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a Navy Medical Service Corps officer whohas been on special detail in the Washington, D.C.,area. From 2002 to 2006 he was Middle East PolicyAdvisor at the Office of the Secretary of Defensefor International Security Affairs. He currentlyserves as a Counterterrorism Analyst. He wishesto thank PS1(SW/AW) David Tranberg, USN, whois an undergraduate at the University of MarylandUniversity College for his valuable comments andedits to this review essay. The author also wishesto thank the John T. Hughes Library and theUniversity of Pennsylvania Library for making thisArabic biography of Bin Laden available for studyand analysis.

Bin Laden wasrunning weapons fromSudan to Egypt via thecamel caravan routesand providing them toEgyptian Islamic Jihadand the Egyptian IslamicGroup in Aswan whichthen distributed themthroughout Egypt.

ConclusionThe book continues

with Bin Laden and theTaliban, which is poorly written and not asdetailed as his previous years inAfghanistan. The author seems obsessedwith the conspiracy theory that Bin Ladenwas supported and encouraged by the CIAand then turned on them when he feltabandoned by the agency. There is nosourcing in this book or basis to back upthis assertion; common wisdom is that theCIA operated via the Pakistani ISI(intelligence) which doled out material andfinancial support to the Afghan fighters,favoring the more militant Hekmetyar,Rabbani and Sayyaf triumvirate.

What can be learned from this Arabicbiography?

(1) Bin Laden’s gradual ascent to hiscurrent position as leader of Al-Qaedaincludes going through initial failures andlearning from his mistakes.

(2) Bin Laden, although he surroundshimself with older mentors through theyears (Zawahiri, Turabi, Atef and Azzam)is influenced by them, but he does have hisown strategic and tactical vision such asleaving Azzam’s group to venture on hisown in creating an Arab fighting force tocombat the Soviets in Afghanistan.

(3) Wherever Bin Laden may be hiding,look to the lessons learned from hisSudanese odyssey, and rest assured he hasthe loyalty of his protectors cemented bymarriage, money and tribal connections. Itwas not easy for Sudan to rid themselvesof Bin Laden and it was also not easy forTaliban leader Mullah Omar to give himup after 9-11.

(4) Pay close attention to the many waysin which Arab fighters were exported toAfghanistan. Many were brought in usingthe efficient processing methods ofimporting laborers from third world

countries to the Gulf.The pipeline wasdiverted to Afghanistanand instead of laborers;jihadists were given achance to travel toAfghanistan.

(5) Running asindependents, Egypt’sMuslim Brotherhoodcaptured 88 seats inEgypt’s 454 seatparliament in 2005; weignore the history of

this organization at our own peril. Notethe capabilities highlighted in the book theMuslim Brotherhood brought to the Soviet-Afghan War and their ability to turnmilitant should the need arise. They cannotbe allowed to politically participate in Arabgovernments, while expressing theirapproval of violence as a means of politicalexpression.

Books like Asaad’s must be assessed,analyzed and debated, with efforts tohighlight Arab views and perspectivesabout America’s main adversaries.American military planners must begin toenter the decision-cycle of our enemies andreading and highlighting excerpts fromArabic biographies of jihadists allows forthe acquisition of the vocabulary,personalities and places inherent in thejihadist movement. Much like America’sobsession with Russian military doctrineand policies during the Cold War, thisconflict will require the same focus onArabic books by allies who fight jihadists,adversaries who support jihadists, and theenemy — the jihadists themselves.

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enter the decision-cycle ofour enemies and readingand highlighting excerptsfrom Arabic biographiesof jihadists allows for the

acquisition of thevocabulary, personalitiesand places inherent in the

jihadist movement.



TRAINING NOTES

Bullet Weight Muzzle Velocity Muzzle EnergyCartridge In Grains Type Feet per Second Foot Pounds

7x57mm Mauser 175 Gr. RN, FMJ 2300 2055

.45-70 Gov’t 500 Gr. RN, Lead 1430 2270

.30/40 Krag 220 Gr. RN, FMJ 2000 1954

.30/03 220 Gr. RN, FMJ 2200 2364

.30/06 150 Gr. SP, FMJ 2700 2428

RN= Round Nose FMJ= Full Metal Jacket SP= Spitzer, Pointed Bullet

COMPARATIVE BALLISTICS

In the history of the U.S. Army Infantry School, progress springs fromlessons learned, often from discovery of a new enemy capability or atechnological gain of our own. Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthurestablished the School of Musketry in 1907 because of shortcomings thathe and others — among them Teddy Roosevelt — had identified during theSpanish-American War of 1898, the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902),and the Boxer rebellion of 1900. U.S. Regular Army Soldiers and New Yorkand Maryland units in Cuba in the Spanish-American War carried the Krag-Jørgensen U.S. Magazine Rifle, Model 1896, (pictured at right) chamberedfor the .30 caliber U.S. cartridge, commonly referred to as the .30/40 Krag.Militia (National Guard) units in Cuba carried the single-shot Springfield .45/70 rifle whose black powder round left a smoke cloud that betrayed theshooter’s position and invited return fire. Realizing the range advantagethat the smaller, faster 7x57mm Mauser round offered, the governmentreplaced the .30/40 Krag with the .30 caliber Model 1903 Springfield(pictured at left), but retained the heavy round-nosed 220 grain bullet. Whenthe German Army adopted a light, pointed (Spitzer) bullet for their 7.92x57mmMauser service rifle in 1905, our own ordnance technicians were quick torecognize the advantages of increased velocity, flatter trajectory, and range,and in 1906 the service cartridge held a 150 grain pointed bullet with amuzzle velocity of 2700 feet per second. The .30/06 was to remain ourservice cartridge for over five decades, until replaced in 1957 by the7.62x51mm standard NATO round. The Springfield and its cartridge werestill in use in a sniping role during the Vietnam War. The Rod Bayonet on theSpringfield shown here was only issued until 1905, when the M1905 knifebayonet replaced it. Since that time, all U.S. rifles have had knife bayonets.

Photos courtesy of the National Infantry Museum.

WWWWWEAPONSEAPONSEAPONSEAPONSEAPONS C C C C CORNERORNERORNERORNERORNER

THE SCHOOL OF MUSKETRY:TWO RIFLES THAT MADE A DIFFERENCE

The War for Korea: 1945-1950, AHouse Burning. By Allan R. Millett.Lawrence, KS: University Press ofKansas, 348 pages, $39.95. Reviewed byBrigadier General (Retired) Curtis H.O’Sullivan.

Some call the Korean War the forgottenwar, but even less remembered is the five-year period preceding that event — fromthe country’s liberation from Japan to theattempt by the northern part of thepeninsula, the Democratic People’s Republicof Korea (DPRK), to reunify the HermitKingdom. This is the first in a two-volumehistory of the Korean War. Highly respectedmilitary historian Allan Millett is eminentlyqualified to fill this gap. He has used sourcesthat will be new to most readers.

To provide the setting, he begins byreviewing the political history of Koreaunder Japanese rule, 1910-1945, withemphasis on the rising nationalism startingin 1919 when self-determination wassweeping the world. Before the start of thethat period, President Teddy Roosevelt hademerged as the greatest American villainin Korean history by sacrificing them forthe benefit of Japan in 1905 — and winningthe Nobel Prize for it. Hopes were raisedby President Wilson at Versailles, only tobe dashed. This was followed by a strugglefor liberation. The incomplete war in Chinathat started in 1937 and the wider PacificWar starting in 1941 heavily impacted thiscolonial possession as it was severelyexploited. The latter war gave the UnitedStates a chance to reverse the betrayal of1905 and, at the Cairo Conference ofNovember 1943, the final communique that“in due course Korea shall be free andindependent.” In August of that year, the38th parallel was established as a fieldexpedient which has survived to this day.Two occupation zones were created, and acontinuing friction began.

The Americans moved to make Korea aUnited Nations responsibility, and that newworld body soon established UNTCOK (UNTemporary Commission on Korea). Theirefforts were to no avail for unification and

the Republic of Korea declared itsindependence on August 15, 1948. Theformal declaration of the DPRK followedon September 9, 1948. This was followedby growing hostilities between the twoentities. A number of critical eventsoccurred in 1949 and early 1950. The PRKbuilt up its armed strength with assistancefrom its Communist neighbors. Americanforces departed, to be replaced by anadvisory group. The People’s Republic ofChina achieved its independence and wasripe for external adventures againstimperial threats. The Soviets tested theirfirst A-bomb and the global balance ofpower was changed for the next halfcentury. NATO was created and theattention of the superpowers turned in thatdirection. U.S. Secretary of State made astatement (drafted by George Kennan) thatwas interpreted as a lack of interest by theU.S. in defending South Korea. Thus,groundwork was laid for an invasion fromthe North — and it came! The book servesas an object lesson about the unintendedconsequences when signals are misread onboth sides and is useful for anyone wishingto broaden their understanding of theKorean conflict.

Perhaps because it didn’t happen, thestory doesn’t include the planned invasionof Korea. When resistance was anticipated,it was contemplated that an entire fieldArmy would be required, rather than thesingle XXIV Corps that was used for theoccupation. The headquarters chosen wasTenth Army which had been activated inJune of 1944 under Lieutenant GeneralSimon Bolivar Buckner for an invasion ofFormosa, but was diverted to Okinawa inApril 1945, where he was KIA, June 18.He was replaced by General Vinegar JoeStilwell, who was the first four-star sincePershing in August 1918 to assumecommand at that grade (others served timeon the job and some never made it). Inaddition to XXIV, he was to have aCommonwealth Corps. Left without amission, the Tenth was deactivated October1945, and Stilwell returned to the U.S. for

a brief tour as President of the WarEquipment Board before becoming CG ofthe Sixth Army at the Presidio of SanFrancisco in 1946 to his death in October.

The Gift of Valor, A War Story. ByMichael M. Phillips. New York:Broadway Books, a division of RandomHouse, Inc., 241 pages, $12.95 softcover.Reviewed by Major Keith Everett, U.S.Army Reserve.

The Gift of Valor is the 2004 story of aMarine who died trying to protect hisbuddies from an attack while on patrol inIraq. In January 2007, President Bushawarded the Medal of Honor to MarineCorporal Jason L. Dunham who saved thelives of two Marines when he dove on topof a grenade. Starting from a typical storyof a Marine unit bonding as men traintogether, play together and experiencehardship, Phillips develops his story byintroducing each Marine involved.

The story of Dunham turns out to be agood primer for what to do when under fire:fire suppression, drag your wounded tosafety, and finally, take out the enemy orget the hell out of the area. The basic skillshave to be sharp. If you wonder what couldhappen if your convoy is attacked, thisaccount is a good place to start exploringthe “what if” scenarios to prepare you andyour Soldiers.

The process of conducting mortar roundcrater analysis is advanced and is describedas a method of pinpointing where theinsurgents set up mortar to fire their rounds.This does not help at the time, but afterseveral mortar round incidents, you beginto see traffic patterns in the city.

The second half of the book details howa team of medical Soldiers tried to saveDunham after an initial triage placed himin an area for those expected to die. Whilenot intended as a medical text, this accountgives a good idea of how the doctors dealwith severe head wounds and the manydifficulties of surviving such a wound.


BOOK REVIEWS

The Gift of Valor is more than just atribute to a young Marine’s selflesssacrifice, it is a glimpse into life and deathon the battlefields of Iraq.

The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare inthe Upper South, 1861-1865. By RobertR. Mackey. Norman, OK: TheUniversity of Oklahoma Press, 2004, 288pages. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel(Retired) Albert N. Garland and PatriciaA. Weekley.

Our present experiences in Iraq andAfghanistan tend to blind us to the realitiesof 19th century irregular warfare conductedby the U.S. Army.

The author is a serving U.S. Armyofficer who has made an in-depth study ofthat kind of warfare and how it wasconducted during our Civil War. He is quickto disabuse us of making any specificconnection between yesterday’s irregularwar (asymmetric, as we call it today) andtoday’s guiding principles. In studying thisbook, it is well to keep in mind the author’sfrequent use of certain terms. But beforehe starts his campaign studies he spellsthem out in some detail in pages 6-9. Healso stresses the fact that “as a reflection ofmilitary thought in the mid-19th century... the legacy of irregular warfare had a solidbasis in historical example and militarytheory of the time.”

I agree with the author’s belief that mostof the historical studies prepared since 1865“have been flawed by inadequate definitionsof unconventional warfare and a lack ofanalysis of the relationships andinteractions between guerrilla andconventional military operations” duringthe Civil War.

In clarifying the war behind the linesbetween 1861 and 1865, Mackey has wadedthrough a mass of material to gain hisobjective in a convincing manner. After anexcellent introduction, which prepares thereader for his chapter organization andwriting, Mackey divides his overall area ofoperations into three distinct parts:Arkansas, Virginia, and Tennessee/Kentucky. For each section, he tells us ofthe operations by both Confederate andUnion forces; the major leaders on bothsides, such as Thomas C. Hindman, Marcus

L. Harrison, John Singleton Mosby, JohnHunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest;and each army’s methods of operation. Hecompletes his final step to his objective ina fine wrap-up chapter titled: “The End ofthe Uncivil War.” His chapter notes,bibliography, and index occupy their usuallocations.

I heartily recommend this book. And ifyou are a Civil War buff who believes thereis nothing new to be written or learned fromthis conflagration, read this book and thentell me, honestly, if you still feel the same.

Humanitarian Intervention, Assistingthe Iraqi Kurds in Operation ProvideComfort, 1991. By Gordon W. Rudd.Washington, DC: Department of theArmy, 280 pages, $34. Reviewed by MajorKeith Everett, U.S. Army Reserve.

Gordon Rudd wrote his doctoraldissertation on the humanitarianintervention to save Kurdish refugees inIraq in 1991 and converted the dissertationinto this book. Rudd, who had served withSpecial Forces and infantry units in the U.S.Army, taught national security studies andserved as a Department of Defense historianafter retiring.

After Desert Storm ended, about onemillion Kurds and other refugees fled theirhomes from the advancing Iraqi Army inMarch and April 1991. An estimated 500,000Kurdish men, women and children fled tothe mountains of southern Turkey. The harshweather conditions and lack of necessarysupplies caused much suffering and death.Rudd’s account focuses on how the U.S.military organized, planned and deployed todeal with the massive problems that camewith such a large number of refugees.

The book reads like a converteddissertation, sometimes hiding thefascinating story of saving refugees behindthe dry style of academia. Outstandingcontent, however, makes this humancatastrophe guidebook required reading forofficers assigned to work humanitarian ordisaster relief missions. The organizationaldetails alone will save precious man-hoursin setting up a response effort to similarcatastrophes.

The United Nations planning wasinadequate considering the huge numbers


involved in the Kurdish refugee situation;prepositioned stocks of food, water, andshelter were wiped out within a week. Analert order was sent on a Friday night toAir Force Major General James Jamersonand by Sunday, the first airdrops of supplieslanded in the refugee area. The 10thSpecial Forces Group was deployed andworked on the immediate problems of waterpollution, poor sanitation ,and malnutritionin an attempt to stop the high death rate.

The joint task force staff came into thecrisis with no formal doctrine and nooperational plans for a massivehumanitarian assistance operation. TheSpecial Forces were required to walk a fineline in providing security from armedmilitia groups and bringing humanitarianaid to the refugees.

If you take brief notes while readingRudd’s work, the result will be a roughguideline for a humanitarian intervention,such as:

1. Assign sectors to an SF “A-team;”2. Organize refugee camps by

establishing drop zones, landing zones,identifying the leaders of the group,establishing work parties, establishing fooddistribution, medical care distribution andbasic field sanitation for disposal of waste;

3. Create a clean water source andorganize the non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) to provide variousforms of assistance; and

4. Organize immunization clinics toprevent disease outbreaks as well asorganize meetings to pass information,promote security, understanding and theeventual relocation of refugees.

The humanitarian story has many usefulpointers throughout such as sending morecommunication support initially to cutthrough the chaos and create order. It alsodiscusses the task force’s efforts to bring inclean water and identifies which effortsworked better than others.

Humanitarian Intervention is aninvaluable guide to running large scalehumanitarian operations. Every officershould get a copy, read through ithighlighting the lessons learned, and keepit on their professional reference bookshelfat least until retirement. This guide tosetting up humanitarian operations couldsave a lot of trouble and lives during thenext humanitarian crisis.


SUBSCRIPTION AND UNIT DISTRIBUTION INFORMATIONPersonal subscriptions: Infantry Magazine is

available to subscribers at a cost of $15 for one year (sixissues) or $28 for two years (12 issues). Subscriptions forforeign (non-APO) addresses cost $50 for one-year or$98 for two-year subscriptions. Payments must be in U.S.currency, by money order, or by check. Checks and moneyorders should be made payable to Infantry Magazine.

To begin a subscription, send your name and addressalong with payment to:

Infantry MagazineP.O. Box 52005Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005

Above, Sergeant Joshua Wettlin of the 1st Battalion, 23rd InfantryRegiment, 2nd Infantry Division, talks on the radio during acombined cordon and search mission with Iraqi Army soldiers.

At left, a Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment,10th Mountain Division, stands guard outside while fellow Soldierssearch a cave during a mission in the Paktika Province ofAfghanistan.

Unit distribution: Free copies of Infantry Magazineare distributed to Infantry and infantry-related units aroundthe U.S. Army and our sister services including activeduty, Reserve and National Guard units. We presentlysend 3 copies to each battalion, brigade, and divisionheadquarters for the command group, with 3 copies goingto each staff section and company/troop/battery. Unitsmay request up to five copies per company-size unit.

Currently, some magazines are being returned due toincorrect mailing addresses or unit designations. If youwould like to add your unit to our distribution list or needto change the address or designation of your unit, pleaselet us know via mail, e-mail, or telephone. (See contactinformation below.) Please provide a complete unit nameand address along with a duty phone number.

Infantry Magazine Contact InformationE-mail — [email protected] — (706) 545-2350/6951 or DSN 835-2350/6951Web site — www.infantry.army.mil/magazine (will need to enter AKO login and password)

Sergeant Tierney P. Nowland

Staff Sergeant Justin Holley

Infantry - Fort Benning · Infantry • INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin...

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