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Name : Andhyta Firselly Utami Student number : N1200283B Course code : HA9307 – Media and Politics Professor’s name : Dr. Goh Nguen Wah

Indonesian Press under the Politics of New Order:

A Toothless Watchdog Held In an Iron Kennel?

Indonesia’s current title as ‘world’s largest Muslim democracy’1 has not been there

forever. Less than 15 years ago, the archipelagic country was still far from achieving freedom

of expression, and instead struggled under a ruling authoritarian named Soeharto—the same

man who coined the term ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) to characterize his regime as he came

into power in 1966. Indeed, today’s Indonesia has been steadily enjoying a robust economic

growth of 6.1%,2 and a relatively good press freedom index at 68,00.3 In 1998, however,

Indonesia just hit the bottom of their record at -13.127%4, which was caused hugely by the

worldwide monetary crisis, worsened by its domestic corruption and the fact that its people

could not do anything to criticize nor advise the government about this condition. During

this period, ‘public opinion’ was a nearly impossible phrase, ‘rebellious’ media were shut

down, and news circulation was controlled immensely by the military. This essay aims to

analyze the role of press in the New Order regime by embarking on a historical visit to the

time when Indonesian journalists were silenced and had to live ‘under the shadow’.5 It

further seeks to explain why the strong, 32-year-old regime was so afraid of freedom of

press, and relate it to the relation between media and politics in the bigger picture.

I. The Onset

When the New Order first emerged, Indonesian people were delighted for what they

were promised: complete freedom of speech alongside a full-speed growth. After Old Order’s

declining performance, the new regime was welcomed with a huge anticipation and, at the

same time, expectation that it would improve Indonesia’s poor condition in various sectors—

politics, economy, as well as social. Gradually indeed, Soeharto’s leadership has proved itself

to be capable of achieving these ambitious targets, although it also meant that Indonesia has

to surrender before his military regime.

                                                                                                               1 Calvin Sims, “Indonesia: Gambling That Tolerance Will Trump Fear” in New York Times (April 15th, 2007), accessed from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/weekinreview/15sims.html?_r=0 2 Geoffrey C. Gunn, “Indonesia in 2012: An Electoral Democracy in Full Spate” in Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 1 (University of California Press, February 2013), pp. 117-125, accessed from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2013.53.1.117 3 Reporters without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2011/12 (2012), accessed from http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/press_freedom.htm 4 Indonesia Real Growth Rate in Index Mundi, accessed form http://www.indexmundi.com/indonesia/gdp_real_growth_rate.html 5 A phrase used by a senior editor of Tempo Magazine in one of his speeches regarding Media’s Role in Energy Initiatives (November 2012).

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Tragically for Indonesia’s press front, however, this also meant that they had to be

(willingly or unwillingly) supportive to the regime while simultaneously suppressed by it.

They could not, for example, publish reports or news that would criticize the government or

induce negative remarks about them. Whenever such sentiments appeared in the media, the

regime would not just approach and ask them nicely to stop doing so; they would threaten

these journalists and, when needed, their family.

In further legitimizing their control over the media, the New Order established the

Ministry of Information (Departemen Penerangan), under which all sorts and kinds of news

or insights circulating in the country were governed. Throughout that period, should any

media entity wish to continue its press-related activities, they had to publish reports or news

that supported the government; otherwise, the government would take ‘necessary measures’

to shut their office down.

One of the biggest measures against the press done by the New Order was Peristiwa

Malari (the Malari Event), i.e. the banning of as many as 12 news offices, on January 15th

1974.6 Not only the office buildings were closed and destroyed, but also many people were

killed and injuried in the process. The most tremendous one, however, was the revocation of

press printing permit (surat izin penerbitan press) for plenty prominent mass media in the

country, including Tempo magazine, Detik, as well as Editor. These three magazines were

closed down on on June 21st 1994 for its activities that were considered as ‘critical towards

the government’.7 This action was a response by the government toward the fact that they

printed investigation reports about the corruption done by a couple of government officials.

The incumbent Minister of Information, Harmoko, publicly announced this ban himself.

Later, the government promoted what they called as Pers Pancasila (Pancasila

Press—‘pancasila’ is Indonesia’s five principles, including ‘social justice for all the people of

Indonesia’), with its ground rule being ‘free and responsible’.8 In reality, what remained was

stricter restrictions with no space for actual freedom—a plethora of news offices were

banned, and their permit to publish news was revoked.

                                                                                                               6 As summarized from Vera W. Ardy, “Sistem Pers dan Komunikasi Indonesia Pada Masa Orde Baru” submitted as part of coursework in Communication Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (2008), accessed from http://disinijurnalvera.blogspot.sg/2008/12/sistem-pers-indonesia-masa-orde-baru.html 7 Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, Wartawan Independen, Sebuah Pertanggungjawaban (Jakarta: Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, 1995) 8 Sudirman Tebba, Jurnalistik Baru (Ciputat: Kalam Indonesia, 2005), page 22

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II. The Press Fights Back

Despite this strict control put out by the government, a number of news offices

actually still fought against the politics and policies of the New Order. One of the most

impressive media struggles was done by Tempo, the most prominent and important weekly,

political magazine in the country. Its editor-in-chief, Goenawan Mohammad, was a

respected intellectual in the country. His main philosophy—which later became the spirit of

Tempo—was that criticism was an essential part of journalism.

Two of the main strategies that were used by Tempo in its ‘war’ against the New

Order are: 1) semantics—change of active sentences to passive ones to hide real intentions, 2)

mouth-to-mouth publication as part of their marketing. These two tricks had played an

important role in ensuring the independence and openness of Tempo. The high tension and

pressure from the government could not stop them.

Even after the revocation of their printing permit, Tempo still tries to fight the

government back and issue ‘underground’ bulletins or flyers in order to keep the people

informed about the real issues that are going on as their guerilla effort to fight back.

Additionally, they also establish Tempo Interaktif as well as ISAI (Flow of Information Study

Institute-Institut Studi Arus Informasi) in the 1995.9 In addition to Tempo, there were also

several other independent journalist alliances whose histories were not recorded and much

exposed compared to Tempo.

III. Post-1998

Later on October 6th 1998 after the New Order regime was toppled down, Tempo

was reestablished and further rose as one of the biggest and most prominent political

magazine in Indonesia today. From then on, the relationship between Indonesia’s media and

government was enhanced. Within just a decade, Indonesia has managed to increase their

press freedom index by Reporters Without Borders and ranked 100th with a very high score

of 28.50 (per 2009).10 Today, Indonesian media play various role: 1) agenda setting, 2) trial

by the media, 3) investigative reporting and, to a certain extent, 4) privacy intrusion.11 For

what it’s worth, the government still runs their national television station, but they allow

many talkshows and news updates to criticize and give inputs to the government.

                                                                                                               9 Sudirman Tebba, Op. Cit. 10 Reporters without Borders, 2011-2012 World Press Freedom Index (Paris, 2012), page 9, accessed from http://en.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2012/C_GENERAL_ANG.pdf 11 Dr. Goh Nguen Wah,”Government and Media Relations” Lecture 1 slides.

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Lately in 2012, however, this stable number had to face major fallout of 29 places

from the previous year.12 Reasoned largely to the killing, kidnapping, and assault cases in

West Papua last year, Indonesia ranked 146th for 2011 which was a drop of 29 places from

117th in 2010. Additionally, a corrupt judiciary that is too easily influenced by politicians and

pressure groups and government attempts to control the media and Internet have prevented

the development of a freer press. 13 Indonesia’s overall score has also gotten progressively

worse, from 28.50 (2009) to 35.83 (2010) and 68.00 (2012).14

IV. What It Means

This part of the essay will further deal with three different layers of questions: 1)

how Indonesian press plays a role in the national politics of the New Order, 2) why the

strong, 32-year-old regime was so afraid of freedom of press, and 3) what is the relation

between media and politics in the bigger picture.

First, under the Ministry of Information and control of Press Council, the New

Order had successfully turned the function of media, mainly into an instrument for the

regime to maintain their power and support from the people. This also means, however, that

media cannot function its other ideal roles, which include reporting the truth and criticizing

the government where necessary. Instead, the public only received ‘selected’ news,

particularly ones that actually showed only the good sides of the government.

Second, the previous explanation has demonstrated how the New Order did realize

that media had a big influence in shaping Indonesian people’s opinions and support towards

the government. In their effort to ensure political security and maintain stability, the regime

decided to put their hands upon the work of the media. In other words, the press was an

instrumental tool for the New Order to sustain its power. From one side, this could mean

that the media was forced to give up their role as the people’s channel to the government. To

see it differently, however, one might argue that the situation also taught us that control over

the press is very essential in maintaining peace and order—especially under a corrupt regime

where the officials were chosen largely on kinship bases. This means that Indonesia in the

New Order period feared that the ‘fourth estate’ might stimulate political instability, induced

by the power behind the media and the information they might provide.

                                                                                                               12 Anita Rackman, “Indonesia Falls 29 Places in World Index of Press Freedom” in The Jakarta Post (January 26th 2012) accessed from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/media/indonesia-falls-29-places-in-world-index-of-press-freedom/493691 13 Reporters without Borders, 2011-2012 World Press Freedom Index (Paris, 2012), page 9, accessed from http://en.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2012/C_GENERAL_ANG.pdf 14 Anita Rackman, Op. Cit.

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Having learned from Singapore’s phenomenal book OB Markers, however, one

might argue that ‘the government knows best what is good for the people, and they want to

protect the people from bad influence, especially from the outside’.15 In fact, this argument

has been supported partly by the United Nations resolution: “The right of information ‘may

therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by

law and are necessary: a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; b) for the

protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.”16

However, what has been done by the New Order regime was hardly ‘necessary

measures for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or

morals’. Instead, it was the way for the government to hide the several failures of their

policies as well as their corrupt officials. Additionally, the media had also been used to solicit

support for Golongan Karya, the ruling party under Soekarno. This means that, all the

overwhelming control that made Indonesian media ‘a toothless watchdog in an iron kennel’

was not aimed to achieve political and economic stability per se, but also to protect the

president’s personal interest to sustain his power for 32 years.

In the bigger picture, one could not find the most ideal relationship between media

and the government during the New Order regime. I believe that the government should not,

at any cost, scare the media of reporting facts that they have to report—the government

should not keep media as their ‘dog’ and turn them toothless. What they should do, instead,

is building a sustainable relationship so that media can support the government’s policies

when they are indeed good, but at the same time let the media help the government to stay

alert when their policies have not been working well and the people aspire for a change.

Because in the end, both media and the government cannot function optimally without each

other being completely independent and work effectively.

                                                                                                               15 Cheong Yip Seng, OB Markers, as presented in the Guest Lecture on March 28th 2013. 16 Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (The United Nations, May 16th, 2011), accessed from http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/a.hrc.17.27_en.pdf