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THE

INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

ISLAMABAD

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PUBLIC TALK

March 21, 2006

“The Indo-US nuclear deal”

Dr. Shireen M Mazari

It was on July 18, 2005 that President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh issued a joint statement proposing the resumption of full US civilian

nuclear trade with India. The deal was being negotiated since then and was

finally signed, on March 2, by Bush and Singh when the former visited

India.

Under this US-India Agreement on Civilian Nuclear Cooperation – as the

deal is formally known – the US has offered New Delhi nuclear fuel and

technology provided it separates its civil and military nuclear facilities and

places the former under international inspections.

So far, India has pledged only to accept “voluntary” safeguards over nuclear

facilities that it chooses to designate as civilian. That could allow India to

withdraw any nuclear facility or nuclear weapons-usable material from

international safeguards for national security reasons. The Indo-US deal, in

its present form, provides no substantive guarantee that foreign nuclear

technology or spent fuel might not be used for India’s nuclear weapons

programme.

India has agreed to put 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors on the civilian list and

under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

According to the IAEA, India would work with the International Atomic

Energy Agency to work out the India-specific safeguards for its civilian

nuclear facilities.

There are three main issues which arise out of this deal:

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First, it undermines the international nonproliferation regime. By asking

India to separate its nuclear facilities from its civilian ones, the US is de

facto accepting India’s nuclear weapons’ status since it is allowing it

unfettered development of its weapons programme. In fact, by providing

nuclear fuel for civilian reactors, it will allow India to utilize all its

unsafeguarded indigenous fissile material for its weapons production.

Thus, the NPT stands undermined because the US is contravening its

obligations under this Treaty, especially Article I and Article III:2 of the

Treaty.

Article I states:

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to

any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;

and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon

State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear

explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article III:2 states:

Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or

special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed

or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable

material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the

source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards

required by this article.

Just as the US killed the CTBT, it has now challenged the validity of the

NPT.

That is why it is really bizarre to find the head of the IAEA, Dr Baradai,

come out in support of this deal. "This agreement is an important step

towards satisfying India´s growing need for energy, including nuclear

technology and fuel, as an engine for development. It would also bring India

closer as an important partner in the non-proliferation regime," he said. "It

would be a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-

proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear

safety."

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In fact, the Indo-US nuclear deal is the final nail in the coffin of the NPT. So

how can contravention of an international nonproliferation treaty consolidate

the nonproliferation regime? An equally pertinent question now arises that if

the US is itself contravening the NPT, how can it penalize Iran for any

alleged violations of this Treaty – given that both the US and Iran are Parties

to the Treaty?

Of course, the US is trying to get India accepted as a nuclear weapon power

within the context of the NPT through “the backdoor” – hence the provision

that under the deal, India would “assume the same responsibilities and

practices” as the five original nuclear-weapon states – but there is no legal

provision for this, unless states like Pakistan are also brought in and the

mechanism would have to be a formal Protocol which cannot only make an

exception for one state. At present, this aspect of the deal contravenes

Article IX of the NPT which only recognizes five nuclear weapon states –

those that tested before 1967.

Apart from the NPT, the deal also undermines the provisions of the Nuclear

Suppliers’ Group, which forbids the transfer of nuclear technology to non-

NPT, nuclear weapon states. But of course the NSG is a suppliers’ cartel and

the rules can be altered even if it means undermining the credibility of the

Group as a whole – which is what will happen. In any event, the approval of

the 45-member NSG will be required for the transfer of nuclear

materials/technology to India – if the US still remains committed to any

form of multilateralism! Also, one can already see a scramble to sell to India

in the nuclear field with France and Britain making overtures to India, in this

context.

Second, the Indo-US deal contravenes American national laws – especially

the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act which bars nuclear trade with states

like India and Pakistan. But unlike the NPT, this is a national law, which can

be amended by the Bush Administration if it can convince Congress. And

the Amendments can be India-specific.

Third, and perhaps most critical from Pakistan’s perspective, the Indo-US

nuclear deal totally undermines the strategic stability that presently prevails

in South Asia between Pakistan and India. In fact, we need to see the deal

within the overall military cooperation between the US and India which

directly impinges upon Pakistan’s security parameters.

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In the post-bipolar world, Indo-US collaboration began in 1992, when an

Indo-US Army Executive Steering Committee was set up. This was followed

by the setting up of the Joint Steering Committee of the two Navies, which

conducted joint naval exercises in 1992. In 1993, within the context of India,

the US Congress sought to establish new categories for providing assistance,

which would be in keeping with the new realities. This was intended to bring

India closer to the US position. In 1995 the US and India signed their first

agreement relating to defence relations, which provided for joint exercises

and a trade programme.

The bonding between Vajpayee and Clinton, in March 2000, reflected the

coming together of the two states. The Vision document signed by Clinton

and Vajpayee declared a “resolve to create a closer and qualitatively new

relationship between the US and India” on the basis of “common interest in

and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international

security.”i This document declared that India and the US were partners in

providing “strategic stability in Asia and beyond.”ii

Since the Clinton visit to India, the military-strategic cooperation between

the two countries has moved apace with the Bush Administration continuing

and expanding the framework of this stragetic partnership. On April 17,

2002, in the first major US-Indian weapon deal in more than 10 years, India

agreed to buy 8 Raytheon Co. long-range weapons locating radars. The radar

system worth $146 million is designed to pinpoint enemy’s long-range

mortars, artillery and rocket launchers. On May 22, 2003, the US approved

the sale of Israel's Phalcon airborne early warning system worth $ 1.2 billion

to India.

The present thinking in the US, in terms of its relationship with India, was

most clearly stated in the September 2002 National Security Strategy paper

(NSSP) put out by the Bush Administration. “The Administration sees

India’s potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty

first century and has worked hard to transform our relationship

accordingly…

“The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral

relationship with India based on the conviction that U.S. interests require a

strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies,

committed to political freedom protected by representative government.

India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We have a

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common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital

sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting

terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia.”iii

Dismissing earlier concerns over the development of India’s nuclear and

missile programmes, the NSSP stated that “while in the past these concerns

may have dominated our thinking about India, today we start with a view of

India as a growing world power with which we have common strategic

interests.”iv

It is in this context that we need to examine the 2005 strategic agreements

that evolved as a result of the Manmohan Singh visit to the US in Summer

2005 – the 10-year Defence Pact and the Nuclear Agreement. Taking some

of the central factors of the Indo-US defence agreement one by one, the

fallout for Pakistan can be assessed more clearly.

The most important, both in the short term and long term, is the Indo-US

agreement to cooperate on missile defence (MD). This is not surprising

given that India was the first state that welcomed the US decision to launch

into a missile defence programme. Since then, India has set itself on the

course for acquisition of a similar capability – beginning with acquiring

Russian aerial platforms, the Phalcon radar system from Israel and a plan for

the acquisition of the Arrow missile system from the US. Acquisition of

missile defence capability by India directly destabilises the nuclear

deterrence in South Asia as well as undermining Pakistan’s doctrine of

minimum deterrence and nuclear restraint. To sustain a credible deterrence

Pakistan will have to begin multiplying its missiles and warheads very soon

– as well as deploying its nuclear arsenal in a scattered fashion into the

interior of the country. While there is no need for a direct arms race, the

“minimum” will be moved to a much higher level unless Pakistan is able to

also acquire missile defence capability – which does not seem likely for

quite some time. In this context, the successful testing by Pakistan of its first

cruise missile, Babur (Hatf VII), on August 11, 2005, with an initial range of

500 kilometres, could be seen as Pakistan’s first response to the Indo-US

MD cooperation.

The instability is further heightened by another of the components of the

Indo-US defence agreement – that of activating the Proliferation Security

Initiative (PSI) in this region with India becoming a partner. The PSI is part

of the US notion of “coalitions of the willing” which seek to undermine

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prevailing international law – in this case the law of the sea – by attributing

to members of the coalition the right to stop traffic on the high seas and in

international airspace on a mere hint of suspicion of transportation of WMD

material or components. One does not require too much wisdom to see how

this pretext can be used to harass other states and their nationals – especially

given that there is no provision of compensation for wrongful interventions!

Beyond the MD and PSI aspects, there is the element of joint weapons

production between the US and India which implies transfers of state-of-the-

art technology to India and includes joint military research and development

projects. This again will put pressure on Pakistan in terms of its nuclear and

conventional weapon systems. The US has also committed to India for

transformative systems in areas such as command and control and early

warning. These will then become force multipliers for India and again put

pressure on Pakistan’s weapon systems.

It is in this context that the Indo-US nuclear deal is particularly threatening

for Pakistan. Apart from allowing India a multiplier affect in its weapons

production by liberating its unsafeguarded fissile material totally for military

facilities, it separates the nuclear status of India form that of Pakistan. This

could be a first step for renewing pressure against Pakistan’s nuclear

programme in the future – at any time – now that the linkage has ended.

Hence there is a need for Pakistan to gear up its lobbying not just in the US

but also in other capitals of the world to undermine this agreement before the

US Congress approves it. In any event, the full implications of the deal need

to be reiterated over and over again to global audiences – both states and

civil societies.

Finally, the US rationale for the deal is truly absurd.

The main one is the often heard statement that India has a record of

responsible behaviour on nonproliferation matters. US Undersecretary of

State, Nicholas Burns has made this claim and more recently his boss,

Condoleezza Rice also felt compelled to state this in a column. But does this

gel with reality?

No. And this is coming out more and more as new information comes to

light. Most recently (March 10), Albright and Basu of the Institute for

Science and International Security wrote that the ISIS had “uncovered a

well-developed,active, and secret Indian program to outfit its uranium

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enrichment program and circumvent other countries’ export control efforts.”

Also, according to them, India leaked out senszitive nuclear technology in

order to procure material for its nuclear programme.

But even before these revelations, India’s proliferation record was highly

suspect. It had a strategic relationship with Iraq, which included nuclear

cooperation going back to the first Indian nuclear test in 1974, as highlighted

in a document of the Washington, D.C.- based Institute for Science and

International Security (ISIS). It was in 1974 that Saddam flew into India

specifically to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Indira Gandhi

government. This agreement included exchange of scientists, training and

technology transfers. Iraqi scientists were working in India's fuel

reprocessing laboratories when India separated the plutonium for its first

nuclear explosive device.

Later, those same Iraqi scientists were in charge of the nuclear fuel

reprocessing unit supplied to Iraq by the Italian company, CNEN. This was

followed by an Indian scientist spending a year at the Iraqi Atomic Energy

Commission's computer centre training Iraqis in the use of nuclear computer

codes.

So it was hardly surprising to find Iraq supporting India’s nuclear tests. The

Ba'ath Party's newspaper, Al-Thawra, declared, “We cannot see how anyone

can ask India not to develop nuclear weapons and its long-range missiles at a

time it is like any other big state with its human and scientific potential.”

(ISIS brief, May 28, 1998) Also, in May 1998, a Baghdad weekly, owned by

Saddam Hussein's eldest son Uday, announced that India had agreed to

enroll several groups of Iraqi engineers “in advanced technological courses”

scheduled for mid-July. The field of training was left unspecified.

An Indian company, NEC Engineers Private Ltd., is believed to have helped

Iraq to acquire equipment and materials “capable of being used for the

production of chemicals for mass destruction,” according to a CNN report of

January 26, 2003. The company also sent technical personnel to Iraq,

including to the Fallujah II chemical plant. Between 1998 and 2001, NEC

Engineers Private Ltd. shipped 10 consignments of highly sensitive

equipment, including titanium vessels and centrifugal pumps to Iraq.

India also had a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran, signed in February

1975. It began helping in the completion of the Bushehr plant between 1980-

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1983, including the sending of nuclear scientists and engineers to Iran in

November 1982.v In 1991, despite US opposition, India negotiated the sale

of a 10 megawatt nuclear reactor to Iran and Dr Prasad worked in Bushehr

after he retired in July 2000 as head of the Nuclear Corporation of India.

That is why, in February 2004, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Hasan

Rowhani, visited New Delhi for talks with the Indian Prime Minister.vi

Nor is this all in terms of WMD proliferation. In 1992, India supplied

thiodyglycol and other chemicals also to Iran and, in 1993, 30 tonnes of

trimethyl-phosphite was supplied to Iran by United Phosporous of India.vii

It

is also known that an Indian company exported chemicals to Iraq for

Saddam’s missile programme and a director of that company, Hans Raj Shiv

was under arrest in New Delhi.viii

As for a strong commitment to protection of fissile material, there is a record

of nuclear thefts and missing fissile material in India, including an Institute

of Strategic Studies, based primarily on Indian sources.ix

Of course, when members of the Bush Administration declare that Pakistan

and India have different nuclear histories and are at “different places”, they

are correct. The Pakistani state did not sign any nuclear cooperation deals

with suspect nuclear proliferators. Pakistan did not take the initiative to

nuclearise South Asia. And Pakistan has no ambitious power projection role

for its nuclear force – merely a defensive one. But it is the Indian state’s

record on nuclear proliferation that is highly suspect.

Finally, no one in Pakistan should be under any delusions in term of

expecting the US to give Pakistan similar nuclear recognition or assistance.

So we need to launch an all-out offensive against this Indo-US nuclear deal

and link it to our own cooperation with the US – because the deal has direct

implications – both short and long term for Pakistan’s security parameters.

i “India-US Relations: A Vision for the 21

st Century”. www.indianembassy.org/inews/2000-

inews/september-2000.pdf

ii Ibid.

iii See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002. The White House,

Washington, September 17, 2002. iv Ibid.

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v Ibid.

vi Ibid.

vii Ibid.

viii Ibid.

ix S.Mazari & M.Sultan, Nuclear Safety and Terrorism: A Case Study of India. Islamabad Papers. No. 19.

The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad: November 2001