India's Counter Insurgency Experience
Transcript of India's Counter Insurgency Experience
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INDIA’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY EXPERIENCE
Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.)Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi
Visiting Senior Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, London
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OVERVIEW: INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
• NATION BUILDING PROCESS MARKED BY RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM, ETHNIC TENSIONS AND ECONOMIC DISPARITIES.
• CONTINUING MILITANCY/ INSURGENCY IN KASHMIR AND NORTH-EASTERN STATES.
• RISING MAOIST/ NAXAL INFLUENCE ACROSS CENTRAL INDIA AND LINKAGES WITH NEPAL.
• ISI CONTINUING TO EXPLOIT INTERNAL WEAKNESSES. MUMBAI BLASTS ARE LATEST MANIFESTATION OF ISI DESIGNS.
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OVERVIEW: INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
• NATION BUILDING PROCESS MARKED BY RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM, ETHNIC TENSIONS AND ECONOMIC DISPARITIES.
• CONTINUING MILITANCY/ INSURGENCY IN KASHMIR AND NORTH-EASTERN STATES.
• RISING MAOIST/ NAXAL INFLUENCE ACROSS CENTRAL INDIA AND LINKAGES WITH NEPAL.
• ISI CONTINUING TO EXPLOIT INTERNAL WEAKNESSES.
The age of terrorism.
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OVERVIEW: INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
• NATION BUILDING PROCESS MARKED BY RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM, ETHNIC TENSIONS AND ECONOMIC DISPARITIES.
• CONTINUING MILITANCY/ INSURGENCY IN KASHMIR AND NORTH-EASTERN STATES.
• RISING MAOIST/ NAXAL INFLUENCE ACROSS CENTRAL INDIA AND LINKAGES WITH NEPAL.
• ISI CONTINUING TO EXPLOIT INTERNAL WEAKNESSES.
Cult of the suicide bomber.
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OUTLINE • STATE OF PROXY WAR IN J&K.
• INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH-
EAST.
• MAOIST/ NAXALITE THREAT.
• EMERGING CHALLENGES.
• REASONS FOR SUCCESS.
• POLICY OPTIONS (??)
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STATE OF STATE OF PROXY WAR PROXY WAR
IN J&KIN J&K
STATE OF STATE OF PROXY WAR PROXY WAR
IN J&KIN J&K
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VICTIMS OF TERRORISM IN J&K
VICTIMS OF TERRORISM IN J&K
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TOTAL: 10,739
March 31, 2006
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March 31, 2006
TOTAL: 3,323
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March 31, 2006
TOTAL: 12,389
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TOTAL: 19,676
March 31, 2006
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March 31, 2006
TOTAL: 15,712
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TOTAL: 18,658
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TOTAL: 6,234
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Peak: 70 per cent in 2003
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TOTAL: 3,616
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WEAPONS WEAPONS RECOVEREDRECOVEREDWEAPONS WEAPONS
RECOVEREDRECOVERED
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TOTAL RECOVERED: 27,735
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TOTAL RECOVERED: 1,267
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TOTAL RECOVERED: 1,942
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TOTAL RECOVERED: 364
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TOTAL RECOVERED: 10,060
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TOTAL RECOVERED: 5,288
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TOTAL RECOVERED: 62,945
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7.097 MILLION ROUNDS
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TOTAL RECOVERED: 6,214
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TOTAL RECOVERED: 36,900 Kg
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PRESENT SITUATION• Despite fencing, sensor technologies and three-tier deployment, 900 terrorists being killed annually and huge recoveries of arms and ammunition being made.
• ISI has succeeded in maintaining pool of about 1,500 terrorists in J&K.
• 59 camps are functional across LoC; 2,000 terrorists are ready for deployment.• Kill ratios are better this year – to 1:8 to 1:11 (Pak: 1:1.85 in NWFP and Balochistan). (Source: Maj Gen Ashok Mehta)
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HOT PURSUIT?• Concept mooted by L. K. Advani, Home Minister, who subsequently backtracked.
• Civilian journalistic jargon, not military term.
• Gen Musharraf: “(hot pursuit) will be paid back in the same coin.”
• Pak Foreign office: “This (hot pursuit) could trigger a nuclear war.”
• Infiltration avenues: LoC, Nepal, Bangladesh, India’s western seaboard, legal Visas.
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DEDUCTIONS• SEMBLANCE OF NORMALCY, MARKED BY:
– REASONABLY UN-INTERRUPTED CIVILIAN LIFE (EDUCATION, HOSPITALS, POLITICS).
– TOURISM FLOURISHING. (GRENADE BLASTS?)– ECONOMY LOOKING UP – J&K HAS HIGHEST PER
CAPITA INCOME AMONG AFFECTED STATES.– RELATIVELY LOWER INFILTRATION LEVELS.
• SPORADIC INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE; SOFT TARGETS.
• INCREASING NUMBER OF SURRENDERS.• POLITICAL DISAFFECTION CONTINUES.• SHAKY RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS.
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DEDUCTIONS• SEMBLANCE OF NORMALCY, MARKED BY:
– REASONABLY UN-INTERRUPTED CIVILIAN LIFE (EDUCATION, HOSPITALS, POLITICS).
– TOURISM FLOURISHING.– ECONOMY LOOKING UP – HIGHEST PER CAPITA
INCOME AMONG AFFECTED STATES.
• LIMITED INFILTRATION.• SPORADIC INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE.• INCREASING NUMBER OF SURRENDERS.• THREE-WAY RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS.• POLITICAL DISAFFECTION CONTINUES.
The counter-proxy war strategy of fighting militancy within India’s borders has yielded only marginal returns.
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DEDUCTIONS• SEMBLANCE OF NORMALCY, MARKED BY:
– REASONABLY UN-INTERRUPTED CIVILIAN LIFE (EDUCATION, HOSPITALS, POLITICS).
– TOURISM FLOURISHING.– ECONOMY LOOKING UP – HIGHEST PER CAPITA
INCOME AMONG AFFECTED STATES.
• LIMITED INFILTRATION.• SPORADIC INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE.• INCREASING NUMBER OF SURRENDERS.• THREE-WAY RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS.• POLITICAL DISAFFECTION CONTINUES.
The situation has reached “strategic stalemate”.
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DEDUCTIONS• SEMBLANCE OF NORMALCY, MARKED BY:
– REASONABLY UN-INTERRUPTED CIVILIAN LIFE (EDUCATION, HOSPITALS, POLITICS).
– TOURISM FLOURISHING.– ECONOMY LOOKING UP – HIGHEST PER CAPITA
INCOME AMONG AFFECTED STATES.
• LIMITED INFILTRATION.• SPORADIC INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE.• INCREASING NUMBER OF SURRENDERS.• THREE-WAY RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS.• POLITICAL DISAFFECTION CONTINUES.
The army and other security forces can do no more by way of counter-proxy war operations and WHAM.
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DEDUCTIONS• SEMBLANCE OF NORMALCY, MARKED BY:
– REASONABLY UN-INTERRUPTED CIVILIAN LIFE (EDUCATION, HOSPITALS, POLITICS).
– TOURISM FLOURISHING.– ECONOMY LOOKING UP – HIGHEST PER CAPITA
INCOME AMONG AFFECTED STATES.
• LIMITED INFILTRATION.• SPORADIC INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE.• INCREASING NUMBER OF SURRENDERS.• THREE-WAY RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS.• POLITICAL DISAFFECTION CONTINUES.
Political divisiveness, intransigence of Hurriyat, lackadaisical governance and continued Pakistan support are hampering reconciliation efforts.
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DEDUCTIONS• SEMBLANCE OF NORMALCY, MARKED BY:
– REASONABLY UN-INTERRUPTED CIVILIAN LIFE (EDUCATION, HOSPITALS, POLITICS).
– TOURISM FLOURISHING.– ECONOMY LOOKING UP – HIGHEST PER CAPITA
INCOME AMONG AFFECTED STATES.
• LIMITED INFILTRATION.• SPORADIC INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE.• INCREASING NUMBER OF SURRENDERS.• THREE-WAY RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS.• POLITICAL DISAFFECTION CONTINUES.
Remaining roots of militancy/ terrorism are mostly in POK and Pakistan.
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INDIA
ITBP
NEPAL
BANGLADESH
SRI LANKA
MAHARASTRA - SMUGGLING &GUJARAT OF ARMS/RDX
AP - LINKS WITH COMMUNAL ELEMENTS AND MAOISTS
J&K - ARMS, TERRORISTS, PROXY WAR
UP - ASSIST FUNDAMENTALIST ORG ALONG INDO-NEPAL BORDER
NE - TRG, SUPPORT TO INSURGENTS LIKE ULFA, NSCN(IM), PLA
ISI LINKAGES
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN
Ways and means need to be found to raise the cost for Pakistan to wage its proxy war against India.
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INSURGENCY INSURGENCY IN THE IN THE
NORTH-EASTNORTH-EAST
INSURGENCY INSURGENCY IN THE IN THE
NORTH-EASTNORTH-EAST
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Incidents 1,335 1,312 1,332 1,234 1,332
Extremists 572 571 523 404 405 killed
Security 175 147 90 110 70 Forces killed
Civilians 600 454 494 414 393 killed
VIOLENCE IN THE NORTH EAST
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PRESENT SITUATION• All seven NE states have been engulfed in insurgencies that have paralysed admin-istration, law and order and development.
• Main causes: • Failure of State and Central governments to integrate isolated region with national mainstream – feeling of alienation. • Ethnic tensions.• Socio-economic deprivation.• Failure of political leadership.
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PRESENT SITUATION• Main causes (continued):
• Domination of economy by outsiders.• Demographic shift due to illegal migration from Bangladesh. Foreigners Act approved by the Government favours migrants.• External exploitation: ISI aid, shelter provided by Bangladesh (new hub of international terrorism).• Vote-bank politics. Imposition of CMs from outside.
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PRESENT SITUATION
• Autonomous Councils (VI Schedule of Constitution) have failed due to poor management at political and bureaucratic level.
• Poor governance and rampant corruption in utilising government grants.
• Lack of employment opportunities for the youth make them vulnerable to exploitation.
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PRESENT SITUATION• Approach of Central and State Governments:
• Neither the Centre nor the states have ever had a coherent, consistent policy to deal with the insurgencies.
• On-off counter-insurgency policies: Op Bajrang, Op Rhino.
• State police is incapable of dealing with externally aided insurgencies.
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PRESENT SITUATION
• Centre’s view is that law & order is a state subject and the Centre’s job is to provide additional paramilitary forces.
• ‘Peace talks’ have been stagnating in various NE states for decades with virtually no progress except that in some cases the cease-fire has held.
• ‘Packages’ announced by visiting PMs are mostly for political gains.
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PRESENT SITUATION
• Centre’s view is that law & order is a state subject and the Centre’s job is to provide additional paramilitary forces.
• ‘Peace talks’ have been stagnating in various NE states for decades with virtually no progress except that in some cases the cease-fire has held.
• ‘Packages’ announced by visiting PMs are mostly for political gains.
These movements are having a crippling impact on national unity.
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PRESENT SITUATION
• Centre’s view is that law & order is a state subject and the Centre’s job is to provide additional paramilitary forces.
• ‘Peace talks’ have been stagnating in various NE states for decades with virtually no progress except that in some cases the cease-fire has held.
• ‘Packages’ announced by visiting PMs are mostly for political gains.
The insurgencies need to be tackled by the Centre and the States on priority basis through a comprehensive national-level strategy.
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MAOIST/ MAOIST/ NAXALITENAXALITETHREATSTHREATS
MAOIST/ MAOIST/ NAXALITENAXALITETHREATSTHREATS
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TD
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TD• Jehanbad:
jail break
• Latehar:
train hijack
• Udaygiri:
jail break
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NAXAL VIOLENCE (STATE VISE)
2002 2003 2004 2005 Inci- Deaths Inci- Deaths Inci- Deaths Inci- Deaths dents dents dents dents
Andhra 346 96 577 140 310 74 532 206
Chhattisgarh 304 55 256 74 352 83 380 165
Jharkhand 353 157 342 117 379 169 308 118
Bihar 239 117 250 128 323 171 183 94
Maharashtra 83 29 75 31 84 15 95 53
Orissa 68 11 49 15 35 8 42 14
Madhya. P 17 3 13 1 13 4 20 3
Uttar Pradesh 20 6 138 15 26 10 1 -
West Bengal 17 7 6 1 11 15 14 7
Other States 18 1 16 - 11 1 10 8
(Kerala, Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu)
Total 1,465 482 1,597 515 1,533 566 1,594 669
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PRESENT SITUATION• Naxalite movement began in 1967; gained momentum in recent years.
• > 150 districts in 12 states, 35% of population affected.
• 39 left wing extremist groups. PWG and MCC merged to form CPI (Maoists).
• Policy of ‘militarisation’ since 2001. People’s Guerrilla Army formed to act as ‘revolutionary vanguard’.
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PRESENT SITUATION• Naxalite movement began in 1967; gained momentum in recent years.
• > 150 districts in 12 states, 35% of population affected.
• 39 left wing extremist groups. PWG and MCC merged to form CPI (Maoists).
• Policy of ‘militarisation’ since 2001. People’s Guerrilla Army formed to act as ‘revolutionary vanguard’.
Maoist incidents account for over 60% of the violence: killings, kidnappings, extortion, abduction, IED blasts and destruction of property.
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PRESENT SITUATION• Naxalites do not belong to any religion or community. They are mainly Dalits, Adivasis or other marginalised sections of society totally indoctrinated by the teachings of Mao and Marx.
• Links with Nepalese Maoists, ULFA, and LTTE for training and modern weapons.
• Links with Turkish and Philippine terrorist organisations likely.
• Strength: 20,000 UG, 50,000 OG and more than 1,00,000 in frontal organisations.
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PRESENT SITUATION• Growth of Naxalite movement due the exploitation and oppression of Dalits, Adivasis and other landless people by feudal agrarian system with strong interface of caste and class.
• Mine owners, contractors and forest mafia are using the Naxal muscle power to extort money from corporate world, businessmen and government officials.
• It is estimated that PWG and MCC extort between Rs 5,000 to 7,000 million annually.
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PRESENT SITUATION• Growth of Naxalite movement due the exploitation and oppression of Dalits, Adivasis and other landless people by feudal agrarian system with strong interface of caste and class.
• Mine owners, contractors and forest mafia are using the Naxal muscle power to extract money from corporate world, businessmen and government officials.
• It is estimated that PWG and MCC collect between Rs 5,000 to 7,000 million annually.
Next step: Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) extending from Nepal, Bihar, Dandakaranya regions to Tamil Nadu to gain access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.
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ANALYSIS• Different states have dealt with the situation differently – but always with vote banks in mind.
• In Orissa there is a proposal to raise battalions from Adivasis of Naxal region to deal with Naxals because the police ‘cannot enter the area’ due to ‘logistical difficulties’!
• In Andhra Pradesh when the Congress government came to power peace was declared by them as the Naxals were considered ‘our own misguided people’.
• This view quickly changed to an all out offensive by the state when the Naxals killed a Congress leader!
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ANALYSIS• Salwa Judum (purification hunt) is a government-sponsored peace campaign – neither voluntary nor spontaneous.
• It is also without protection. 27 participants were killed near Dharbaguda (Konta) in IED blast. Several other incidents.
• State police are unable to cope with these raiders of the night and keep losing weapons.
• Clearly, concerned state governments are at their wits’ end.
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ANALYSIS• Central Government is apathetic though it claims that it has a policy. (“Status Paper on Naxal Problem” issued by MHA, March 13, 2006).
• Three main reasons:
• Naxal menace not an emotive issue like Kashmir.
• Confusion whether Naxals are “terrorists” or not – “social justice” tag.
• Notion that Naxal menace is “not as bad as it seems”.
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FUNDS RELEASED
State 2001-02 2002-03 2003-2004 2004-05 2005-06 2005-06
• Andhra Pradesh 4 193.82 217.35 221.00 282.00 601.85
• Bihar 3,885.10 180.00 43.68 60.41 184.99 250.00
• Madhya Pradesh 711.06 82.37 139.82 23.52 8.00 100.00
• Maharashtra 262.66 - 81.42 125.55 72.16 200.00
• Orissa 567.29 168.00 86.85 65.77 54.60 200.00
• Chhattisgarh 32.25 36.83 160.87 200.00 200.14 500.00
• Jharkhand 18.80 54.00 98.07 341.27 166.90 200.00
• Uttar Pradesh - 29.17 - - 96.30 100.00
• West Bengal - - - - 77.53 150.00
Total 9,670.98 954.38 831.71 1,098.52 1,462.47 2,000.00• (Crore)
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ANALYSIS• Salwa Judum (purification hunt) is a government-sponsored peace campaign – neither voluntary nor spontaneous.
• Also without protection. 27 participants were killed near Dharbaguda (Konta) in IED blast. Several other incidents.
• State police are unable to cope with these raiders of the night and keep losing weapons.
• Clearly, concerned state governments are at their wits’ end.
The situation is gradually but perceptibly spinning out of control.
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ANALYSIS• Salwa Judum (purification hunt) is a government-sponsored peace campaign – neither voluntary nor spontaneous.
• Also without protection. 27 participants were killed near Dharbaguda (Konta, C’garh) in IED blast. Several other incidents.
• State police are unable to cope with these raiders of the night and keep losing weapons.
• Clearly, concerned state governments are at their wits’ end.
How long will it be before the army is whistled-in to stem the rot?
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ANALYSIS• Salwa Judum (purification hunt) is a government-sponsored peace campaign – neither voluntary nor spontaneous.
• Also without protection. 27 participants were killed near Dharbaguda (Konta, C’garh) in IED blast. Several other incidents.
• State police are unable to cope with these raiders of the night and keep losing weapons.
• Clearly, concerned state governments are at their wits’ end.
Can the army take on another major internal security commitment?
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ANALYSTS’ PRESCRIPTIONS
• K. Subrahmanyam: If the war against terrorism is to be won, Jehadi extremists in Pakistan have to be liquidated. International pressure…• Maj Gen Ashok Mehta: We can control terror in two ways… pre-emptive action and investing money…• Maj Gen Afsir Karim: Create a backlash among terrorists… incremental and pragmatic offensive action…
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ANALYSTS’ PRESCRIPTIONS
• Lt Gen V K Sood: Take pre-emptive action and outsmart them before they can attack us…• K P S Gill: Tough action… (Punjab style), foolproof security measures, constant supervision of arrangements, plugging of loopholes (better coordination).• Cmde C. Uday Bhaskar: Legitimate use of force… empathetic use of ‘soft power’ to win against ideology.
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The Maoist threat is real and imminent. Overall, the national response to the problem has been inadequate, if not flawed, both at policy formulation and policy execution levels. To cope with the threat, India needs a well-deliberated and finely calibrated response strategy with compatible operating doctrines, structures, resources and expertise.
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COUNTER-COUNTER-TERRORISM TERRORISM
ARRANGEMENTSARRANGEMENTS
COUNTER-COUNTER-TERRORISM TERRORISM
ARRANGEMENTSARRANGEMENTS
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COUNTER-TERRORISM ARRANGEMENTS
• Joint Task Force on Terrorism– Set up to overcome Centre-State jurisdiction
problems in combating terrorism.– Has identified 56 vulnerable places.– In each a Special Action Group (SAG) set up.– Each comprises six hand-picked state police
officials and two IB officials for rapid action on information becoming available.
– Could draw on resources of Multi-Action Group (MAG) that also has military representation and a data bank.
– SAGs have withered under present NSA.
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COUNTER-TERRORISM ARRANGEMENTS
• Intelligence Coordination Group–Set up on recommendations of GoM
after Kargil conflict.–Task: Intelligence tasking and
reviews.–Headed by NSA. Members: Cabinet
Secretary, Secretaries Home, Defence and Foreign Ministries, Intelligence Chiefs.
–Regular meetings held under Brajesh Mishra. Present NSA not keen on it.
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COUNTER-TERRORISM ARRANGEMENTS
• Technical Coordination Group–Initiated by Brajesh Mishra for
enhancing technical capabilities for intelligence gathering.
–Headed by NSA. Includes Cab Secretary, Principal Scientific Advisor, SA to RM, Intelligence Chiefs, Proposed CDS.
–National Technical Facilities Organisation (NTFO) set up for gathering signals intelligence, but yet to take off.
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COUNTER-TERRORISM ARRANGEMENTS
• National Information Board–Apex body in India’s information
security architecture.–Headed by NSA. –Has met only once under J N Dixit in
July 2004. Inactive since then.–Its absence sorely felt with recent
espionage cases: Navy War Room leak; cyber spy case at NSC Secretariat.
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EMERGING EMERGING CHALLENGESCHALLENGESEMERGING EMERGING
CHALLENGESCHALLENGES
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EMERGING CHALLENGES
• Sectarian and caste violence – average 600 cases of communal riots each year.
• Organised crime – film, construction industries, others. International links.
• Subversion – 200 ISI modules detected and dismantled so far.
• New forms of terrorism.
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EMERGING CHALLENGESNew forms of Terrorism:
• Cyber-terrorism.
• RDDs (Radiological dispersal devices).
• Threats to India’s nuclear installations.
• Threats to India’s maritime assets (offshore oil platforms, attractive commercial targets like VLCCs).
• Bio-terrorism.
• Nuclear terrorism??
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REASONS REASONS FOR FOR
SUCCESSSUCCESS
REASONS REASONS FOR FOR
SUCCESSSUCCESS
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Reasons for Success
• Realisation that insurgents are our own misguided youth. Complete lack of ‘occupation forces’ syndrome.• Hence, use of minimum force:
• Small arms only.• NO area weapons; not even 2 and 3 inch (81 mm) mortars.• Rare use of rocket launchers – with Brigade Commander’s approval.
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Reasons for Success
• Artillery, helicopter gunships and ground strike fighter aircraft have never been used.• Immense emphasis on winning the battle of ‘hearts and minds’:
• Help in building schools, computer centers, dispensaries, micro-hydel projects in rural areas.• Medical camps.• Disaster relief.
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Reasons for Success
• Stress on Rear Area Security: • Road clearance operations. • Anti-ambush drills.• Quick reaction teams.• Vigorous patrolling.
• Coordinated intelligence acquisition (humint, electronic).• Resilience of individual soldiers.• Regimental system.
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Reasons for Success
Human Rights:• Specialised training in Corps Battle Schools before induction into deployment areas.• Operations planned carefully to avoid undue inconvenience to people.• Each soldier carries ‘10 Commandments’.• Full access to state and central Human Rights Commissions. • Transparent investigation of allegations of human rights abuses and exemplary punishment to defaulters.
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Reasons for Success
Human Rights:• Very strong media presence and complete freedom to report.• Vocal advocacy of human rights by various NGOs.• Commanders personally charged with responsibility for protection of human rights.
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COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL STRATEGY
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION
SURRENDERREHABILITATION
SOCIO-ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT
PRO-ACTIVE
STRATEGIC
CULTURE
INTERNAL SECURITY
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Your turn!
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POLICYPOLICYOPTIONSOPTIONSPOLICYPOLICY
OPTIONSOPTIONS
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POLICY OPTIONS
Pro-active counter-proxy war, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations combined with comprehensive socio-economic development and political efforts to end alienation.
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ANALYSTS’ PRESCRIPTIONS
• Lt Gen V K Sood: Take pre-emptive action and outsmart them before they can attack us…• K P S Gill: Tough action… (Punjab style), foolproof security measures, constant supervision of arrangements, plugging of loopholes (better coordination).• Cmde C. Uday Bhaskar: Legitimate use of force… empathetic use of ‘soft power’ to win against ideology.
Except Naxalite/Maoist terrorism, roots of terrorism in India lie across the border in Pakistan and even Bangladesh.
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ANALYSTS’ PRESCRIPTIONS
• Lt Gen V K Sood: Take pre-emptive action and outsmart them before they can attack us…• K P S Gill: Tough action… (Punjab style), foolproof security measures, constant supervision of arrangements, plugging of loopholes (better coordination).• Cmde C. Uday Bhaskar: Legitimate use of force… empathetic use of ‘soft power’ to win against ideology.
Covert offensive methods are necessary to destroy these roots. Trans-LoC strikes to raise the cost for Pakistan should be an option.
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POLICY OPTIONS
• Need to reduce army’s involvement in internal security duties.• New national-level IS Force??
• Under MoD – 5th armed force.• With army’s ethos and training.• Under army’s operational control.• Could be initially based on present RR and some AR battalions.
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POLICY OPTIONS
• Need to reduce army’s involvement in internal security duties.• New national-level IS Force??
• Under MoD – 5th armed force.• With army’s ethos and training.• Under army’s operational control.• Could be initially based on present RR.
Sub-conventional warfare is here to stay.
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POLICY OPTIONS
• Need to reduce army’s involvement in internal security duties.• New national-level IS Force??
• Under MoD – 5th armed force.• With army’s ethos and training.• Under army’s operational control.• Could be initially based on present RR.
Need for unconventional, out-of-the-box thinking.
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THREATTHREATFROMFROM
PAKISTANPAKISTAN
THREATTHREATFROMFROM
PAKISTANPAKISTAN
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• NUCLEAR-CAPABLE PAKISTAN REMAINS INDIA’S
MAJOR MILITARY THREAT IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
• PAKISTAN ARMY’S STATED AIM:– WREST KASHMIR FROM INDIA THROUGH
PROXY WAR AND POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE.
– CONTAIN INDIA IN COLLUSION WITH CHINA TO PREVENT INDIA FROM EMERGING AS A SOUTHERN ASIAN POWER.
– DESTABILISE AND WEAKEN INDIA INTERNALLY.
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• TO OFFSET CONVENTIONAL ASYMMETRY,
PAKISTAN ARMY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO RESORT TO SUB-CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, INCLUDING ACTS OF TERRORISM, TO ENSURE INDIAN ARMY REMAINS COMMITTED IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS.
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SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM • PAKISTAN IS WAGING A LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AGAINST INDIA THRU SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY.
• THE AIM IS TO DEGRADE INDIA’S INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND MILITARY ASSETS BY A GRADUAL PROCESS OF ATTRITION AND COERCIVE STRATEGIES THAT INCLUDE MASS CASUALTY ATTACKS, DESTABILISATION AND SUBVERSION OF ADMINISTRATION.
• PAKISTAN BELIEVES THAT INDIA’S SECURITY APPARATUS AND COHESION AS A STATE WILL EVENTUALLY COLLAPSE UNDER THE ONSLAUGHT OF TERRORISM, INTERNAL TURMOIL AND ETHNIC AND COMMUNAL TENSIONS.
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• TO OFFSET CONVENTIONAL ASYMMETRY,
PAKISTAN ARMY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO RESORT TO SUB-CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, INCLUDING ACTS OF TERRORISM, TO ENSURE INDIAN ARMY REMAINS COMMITTED IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS.
• PLAY NUCLEAR CARD WHEN IT SUITS PAKISTANI INTERESTS (KASHMIR AS NUCLEAR FLASHPOINT).
• EMPLOY ISI TO SPAWN MADRASA CULTURE AND CREATE A COMMUNAL/ SECTARIAN DIVIDE.
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• FIND NEW MEANS TO DESTABILISE INDIA AND ITS ECONOMY:– CIRCULATION OF FAKE CURRENCY.– CYBERWAR TO DISRUPT INDIAN
NETWORKS.
• CONTINUE EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT INDIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
• MAKE POLITICAL OVERTURES TO KASHMIRIS.
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• FIND NEW MEANS TO DESTABILISE INDIA AND ITS ECONOMY:– CIRCULATION OF FAKE CURRENCY.– CYBERWAR TO DISRUPT INDIAN
NETWORKS.
• CONTINUE EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT INDIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
• MAKE POLITICAL OVERTURES TO KASHMIRIS.
The Pakistan army has a stranglehold over the nation’s polity.
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• FIND NEW MEANS TO DESTABILISE INDIA AND ITS ECONOMY:– CIRCULATION OF FAKE CURRENCY.– CYBERWAR TO DISRUPT INDIAN
NETWORKS.
• CONTINUE EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT INDIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
• MAKE POLITICAL OVERTURES TO KASHMIRIS.
The army dictates the country’s Kashmir policy and nuclear policy.
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• FIND NEW MEANS TO DESTABILISE INDIA AND ITS ECONOMY:– CIRCULATION OF FAKE CURRENCY.– CYBERWAR TO DISRUPT INDIAN
NETWORKS.
• CONTINUE EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT INDIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
• MAKE POLITICAL OVERTURES TO KASHMIRIS.
The real threat to peace and stability between India and Pakistan is the Pakistan army.
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• FIND NEW MEANS TO DESTABILISE INDIA AND ITS ECONOMY:– CIRCULATION OF FAKE CURRENCY.– CYBERWAR TO DISRUPT INDIAN
NETWORKS.
• CONTINUE EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT INDIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
• MAKE POLITICAL OVERTURES TO KASHMIRIS.
The Pakistan army will decide whether the present peace process will be allowed to proceed.
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• FIND NEW MEANS TO DESTABILISE INDIA AND ITS ECONOMY:– CIRCULATION OF FAKE CURRENCY.– CYBERWAR TO DISRUPT INDIAN
NETWORKS.
• CONTINUE EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT INDIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
• MAKE POLITICAL OVERTURES TO KASHMIRIS.
Assessment: The Pakistan army cannot fight on three fronts: Kashmir, western border and internal unrest.
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• FIND NEW MEANS TO DESTABILISE INDIA AND ITS ECONOMY:– CIRCULATION OF FAKE CURRENCY.– CYBERWAR TO DISRUPT INDIAN
NETWORKS.
• CONTINUE EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT INDIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
• MAKE POLITICAL OVERTURES TO KASHMIRIS.
Assessment: The present peace process is a tactical ploy – not a strategic change of heart.
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THREAT FROM PAKISTAN• FIND NEW MEANS TO DESTABILISE INDIA AND ITS ECONOMY:– CIRCULATION OF FAKE CURRENCY.– CYBERWAR TO DISRUPT INDIAN
NETWORKS.
• CONTINUE EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT INDIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
• MAKE POLITICAL OVERTURES TO KASHMIRIS.
Assessment: Pakistan’s proxy war will become more sophisticated -- focus on easy deniability.
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POLICY OPTIONS
However, does India’s strategic culture permit such a course of action?
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INDIA’S INDIA’S STRATEGIC STRATEGIC
CULTURECULTURE
INDIA’S INDIA’S STRATEGIC STRATEGIC
CULTURECULTURE
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INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE• ANCIENT EMPIRES ENDED WITH ASHOKA
THE GREAT WHO RENOUNCED WAR AND EMBRACED BUDDHISM.
• INDIA WAS DIVIDED INTO SMALL KINGDOMS AND PRINCIPALITIES.
• HIMALAYAN SHIELD FORM THE NORTH.• INDIAN KINGS FAILED TO MODERNISE
THEIR ARMIES AND SUFFERED CONSECUTIVE DEFEATS.
• CONQUERORS ENTERED INDIA MOSTLY THROUGH KHYBER PASS IN THE WEST.
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INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE• ANCIENT EMPIRES ENDED WITH ASHOKA
THE GREAT WHO RENOUNCED WAR AND EMBRACED BUDDHISM.
• INDIA WAS DIVIDED INTO SMALL KINGDOMS AND PRINCIPALITIES.
• HIMALAYAN SHIELD FORM THE NORTH.• INDIAN KINGS FAILED TO MODERNISE
THEIR ARMIES AND SUFFERED CONSECUTIVE DEFEATS.
• CONQUERORS ENTERED INDIA MOSTLY THROUGH KHYBER PASS IN THE WEST.
Panipat Syndrome
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INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE• ANCIENT EMPIRES ENDED WITH ASHOKA
THE GREAT WHO RENOUNCED WAR AND EMBRACED BUDDHISM.
• INDIA WAS DIVIDED INTO SMALL KINGDOMS AND PRINCIPALITIES.
• HIMALAYAN SHIELD FORM THE NORTH.• INDIAN KINGS FAILED TO MODERNISE
THEIR ARMIES AND SUFFERED CONSECUTIVE DEFEATS.
• CONQUERORS ENTERED INDIA MOSTLY THROUGH KHYBER PASS IN THE WEST.
India lacks a strategic culture.
-- George Tanham
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TANHAM’S ARGUMENT • Indian elites… "show little evidence of having
thought coherently and systematically about national strategy.'‘
• Tanham gave four key reasons:– Geography lent Indian thinking an "insular perspective
and a tradition of localism and particularism.'' – The discovery of history by Indian elites in the past 150
years was the second element. – This leads inexorably to the third: the primacy of culture
in India's world outlook and the "assumed superiority'' of this culture.
– The British Raj nurtured in Indian thinkers a predisposition toward a predominately defensive, land-dominated strategic orientation.
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INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE • ANCIENT EMPIRES ENDED WITH ASHOKA
THE GREAT WHO RENOUNCED WAR AND EMBRACED BUDDHISM.
• INDIA WAS DIVIDED INTO SMALL KINGDOMS AND PRINCIPALITIES.
• HIMALAYAN SHIELD FORM THE NORTH.• CONQUERORS ENTERED INDIA MOSTLY
THROUGH KHYBER PASS IN THE WEST. • INDIAN KINGS FAILED TO MODERNISE
THEIR ARMIES AND SUFFERED CONSECUTIVE DEFEATS.
India has a very well-defined strategic culture.
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• ANCIENT EMPIRES ENDED WITH ASHOKA THE GREAT WHO RENOUNCED WAR AND EMBRACED BUDDHISM.
• INDIA WAS DIVIDED INTO SMALL KINGDOMS AND PRINCIPALITIES.
• HIMALAYAN SHIELD FORM THE NORTH.• CONQUERORS ENTERED INDIA MOSTLY
THROUGH KHYBER PASS IN THE WEST. • INDIAN KINGS FAILED TO MODERNISE
THEIR ARMIES AND SUFFERED CONSECUTIVE DEFEATS.
Offer the other cheek when slapped on one.
INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE
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