Indian People’s Tribunal on Environment & Human … Oustees...Indian People’s Tribunal on...

Indian People’s Tribunal on Environment & Human Rights


THE INDIAN PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL ON ENVIRONMENT AND

HUMAN RIGHTS

THE SECOND REPORT

THE STATUS OF THE MANIBELI OUSTEES

BY JUSTICE B.G. KOLSE PATIL (RETD.)


SALIENT FEATURES OF THE NARMADA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Number of Dams : 30 major, 135 medium, 3,000 minor. Major Dams : 5 hydel, 6 multi-purpose, 19 irrigation, 10 on Narmada river, 20 on tributaries. Cost : Over Rs. 30,000 crores (no official available). Benefits: Irrigation 4.8 million ha. Submergence : Over 6 lakh ha (no official estimate available) Population Displaced : Over 1 million people (no official estimate available) THE SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT Location : Vadgam, District Bharuch, Gujarat Dam : Full reservoir (FRL): 455 feet

Minimum Draw Down Level: 363 feet Length: 3,970 feet.

Cost : Revised estimate for compressed construction schedule (July 1988)

Rs. 11,154 crores. Benefits : Irrigation 18.87 lakh ha; Power 1450 MW:

Installed capacity; 300 MW firm power; Urban water supply, Flood control.

Canal System : Length of main canal 445 km; 35 Branch canals; total distribution network about 75, 000 k.m.

Submergence :39,134 ha (forest land 13,744 ha; culturable land 11,318 ha). Population Displaced : Over 1 lakh people of whom 60 to 70% are scheduled castes/tribes. Justice B G Kolse Patil was born on the 18th September 1942 in Ahmednagar, Maharashtra. He completed his schooling in Ahmednagar and then transferred to the Poona Law College where he completed his LLB. Justice Kolse Patil specialized in criminal law. He was District Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor in Poona from 1980 to 1985. From 1985 to 90 he served as a Judge of the High Court. In 1990 Justice Kolse Patil resigned from the High Court to serve social causes on a full time basis. At present he stays in Poona but tirelessly travels around the country to advise, inspire and help people’s movements.


NOTE ON JUSTICE B.G. KOLSE PATlL'S VISIT TO MANIBELI

The Indian People's Tribunal decided to visit Manibeli after it was submerged. This was after reading alarming reports in the newspapers describing the conditions of the tribals, human rights violations and the tardy process of rehabilitation of the project affected people. Despite the short notice and his extremely busy schedule Justice B.G. Kolse Patil consented to visit the area to ascertain the extent and adequacy of rehabilitation of the Manibeli oustees. I accompanied Justice Kolse Patil on this two-day field investigation. On August 21, 1993 we left for Manibeli via Baroda and Kevadia. The road till Kevadia is in an excellent condition, but immediately after Kevadia; as one approaches the affected villages, the road degenerates into a bumpy dirt track. At Kevadia we took a slight diversion to visit the village of Koti. In 1961, these villagers were among the first to be displaced by the Narmada Valley Development Project, when their land was acquired by the government to construct guesthouses and quarters for government officials. From Koti to Manibeli is a rough journey by jeep and then by boat, of about two and a half-hours duration. Due to the partial construction of the dam and the heavy rains the river has risen to a height of 80m (approximately the height of a nine storey building). This rise of the level of water submerged several low-lying villages in Maharashtra and Gujarat. The water is brown with mud and silt and all around one can see the rotting skeletal remains of trees. Despite this and the precarious condition of our boat we could not help noticing the picturesque scenery of the valley. The valley is surrounded by a protective shield of gently sloping, green hills, flanked on three sides by thick forests. On the grassy, treeless parts of the hills the Adivasis have re-built their houses, in an attempt to reconstruct their lives. Today the villagers of Manibeli possess only the clothes on their back and the few animals that escaped the floods. Clearly, the whole episode has left an indelible mark. Each one had a sorry tale. They were bitter and hurt. More than anything else, they resented the authorities ignoring their desire to live in dignity and peace. Sitting among them and listening to their traumatic experiences at the various rehabilitation sites we were moved by their aspiration to remain on their ancestral lands and their struggle to do so. On Sunday, August 22, 1993 we had planned to visit Vadgam. We were told that its residents had always been open to moving to any rehabilitation site. However, till today, even after submergence they have not been allotted any alternate land. The Official Secrets Act is in force in the area due to which we were unable to visit the village. We were able to meet with Mr. A. Kumar the Assistant Collector (SSP) as well as Ms. M. Patkar of the Narmada Bachao Andolan, who in turn presented both sides of the issue. We are very grateful for their co-operation. Deepika D'Souza Co-ordinator Indian People's Tribunal (IPT) Engineer's House, Fourth Floor, Apollo Street, Mumbai - 400 023


THE SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT

BACKGROUND The Narmada Valley Development Project is the largest and possibly the most controversial hydro-electric and irrigation projects of India It comprises 30 large dams including the huge Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) and the Narmada Sagar Project (NSP), 135 medium and over 3,000 small dams. If ever built, these 3,000 odd dams would transform the Narmada. Plans to dam the Narmada go back to 1863. An Englishman, Mr. Balton, submitted a proposal to the Government to build a dam across the river in order to irrigate the area between the rivers Tapti and Mahi. The idea cropped up once again in 1901 when the First Irrigation Commission Report made observations on irrigation possibilities in the Narmada Basin. These plans were dismissed, as the commission concluded that the black cotton soil of the Narmada basin was unsuitable for canal irrigation and would lead to large-scale water logging. After independence, attempts to harness the Narmada waters continued. The Central Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission made plans to build a 162 feet high dam near Navgam (Bharuch Dist.) in Gujarat. This was the beginning of the Sardar Sarovar Project. In 1962 Jawaharlal Nehru laid the foundation stone of the Vadgam dam. At the same time, six villages were acquired for the construction of the Kevadia Colony, the administrative centre of the project, and the helipad to receive the then Prime Minister. Incidentally, people whose lands were acquired then have not yet been granted "project affected" status. Many still await rehabilitation. Work on the project was stalled because of conflicts between Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The three states could not agree on sharing of the Narmada water. In 1969, the dispute was referred to the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT). Its decision, the NWDT Award, was handed down in 1979. The Tribunal accepted 28 million acre feet (maf) as the flow of the Narmada. Of that, 9 maf was apportioned to Gujarat. Hydroelectric benefits were also shared between the three states. These benefits are based on the existence of a second dam project, the Narmada Sagar (NSP), further upstream in Madhya Pradesh. SSP is crucially linked to Narmada Sagar. 25%-30% of SSP's benefits will be lost if NSP is not built. The Tribunal also laid down conditions regarding the resettlement and rehabilitation of those who would be displaced by submergence. The planned 455-metre dam will submerge 37,000 hectares, including prime forest land and rich agricultural soil. This will cause a tremendous loss to flora and fauna and possibly rare species of medicinal herbs, many of which still need to be surveyed. The authorities do not take this loss into consideration while evaluating the viability of the project. No comprehensive impact assessment has been done. The problems that plague large dams such as water-logging, salinity, reservoir siltation have already begun to affect this project. Many of the purported benefits of the Sardar Sarovar are exaggerated. For example, it is claimed that the dam will provide water to the water starved areas of Kutch and Saurashtra. In reality, no drinking water plan exists. The costs of drinking water have not been calculated.


Kutch and Saurashtra will get only 1.6% and 9% respectively of the water from SSP. Most of the water will be consumed by Central Gujarat districts that don't face water shortages anyway. The benefits of power and irrigation, similarly, have been exaggerated. The black cotton soils of the SSP command area, being highly water absorbent and unsuitable to intensive irrigation, are vulnerable w waterlogging. Once the canal network is constructed, the power benefits will be fall considerably. Moreover, the SSP will consume more power than it will generate for Gujarat. The darkest side is, however, the human angle. At least two lakh people from 245 villages in Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh will be displaced by the SSP reservoir. In Gujarat and Maharashtra, the overwhelming majority of them are tribal. There is no national policy on resettlement and rehabilitation in India. The majority of the 21 million people displaced by dams since Independence were given petty cash compensation and robbed of their lands, autonomy and livelihood. As a result, many face destitution. Many have joined the ranks of urban slum dwellers. Project protagonists assure the public that this will not happen at SSP as the Tribunal Award provides for "land for and land" compensation and other benefits. The Award stipulates that displaced persons should regain at least their previous standard of living and be resettled and rehabilitated one year prior to submergence. Nevertheless, the fate of those "oustees" resettled suggests that these principles are being violated. The shifting process has not been voluntary or participatory and was often accompanied by police presence. The sites are beset with problems. People are undergoing tremendous hardships. A definite drop in the standard of living has been recorded in several cases (refer to the Morse Report 1992). Moreover, the resettlement policy was not designed for tribal peoples and does not safeguard their integrity and wellbeing. It may well, in the long run, be responsible for ethnocide. The resettlement practices also violates the International Labour Organisation Convention (ILO 107) of 1957, to which India is a signatory. This affirms the right of tribal people to their traditional lands and stipulates that upon displacement tribals should get lands suitable to provide for their present needs and future development. In 1985, the World Bank agreed to a $450 million dollar loan for the SSP, two years before the Ministry of Environment and Forests granted environmental clearance for the project. Because of tremendous opposition to the project in India and abroad, an Independent Review of the project was conducted in 1991-92. In June 1992, the Morse Committee issued its report. It found that the Sardar Sarovar Projects were flawed, that resettlement and rehabilitation of all those displaced was not possible and that the environmental impacts of the projects were inadequately addressed. The Bank was guilty of human rights violations. SSP had violated the stipulations of the NWDT Award, loan agreements between the Bank and the Indian government and the Bank's own recommendations on the project. The Bank withdrew its financial support to the project in March 1993. Inspite of the Morse Report and the Bank's withdrawal, construction of the dam continued and is now at a height of 61 metres. This has brought devastation to the people in the submergence area of SSP this monsoon. The Narmada River, which was the lifeline of the people of the Narmada Valley, has become their disaster.


All internationally recognised standards explicitly state that the process of resettlement and rehabilitation must proceed at a pace required to meet the needs of people. There is a definite link between dam construction and the process of R and R. The latter cannot be short-circuited by the threat of imminent submergence. This principle has been violated. People of the submergence area in villages like Manibeli have opposed the dam in defence of their right to live in their natural environment. They also question to the purpose behind the construction of the dam and the viability of the project itself. The government has, however, silenced their protests by using repressive means and has proceeded with dam construction. It has also failed to rehabilitate people who do not oppose the dam, and are willing to relocate. These are direct violations of the stipulations laid down by the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal Award. It clearly maintains that the displaced populations must be rehabilitated at least one year before submergence. It is also contrary to the order of the Supreme Court in Dr B.D. Sharma vs States of Gujarat and Maharashtra and the Union Government in 1990, which states that rehabilitation must be completed at least six months before submergence. In July, heavy rains, flash floods, and the backwater effect of the dam converted the area into a dangerous death trap. Submergence of low-lying areas in the catchment area became certain. As a result, untold damage to houses, land, crops, and cattle took place in 12 villages in Maharashtra and 14 villages in Gujarat. In all 30 families in Maharashtra and 86 families in Gujarat have been rendered destitute. The project will go down in the history of post-independent India for highlighting the conflict between development and the rights of indigenous and rural peoples over their natural environment. It has also sharpened the focus on questions concerning mega development projects and their environmental sustainability and economic feasibility. Lyla Mehta Researcher, 2nd Floor, Wadia House, Wodehouse Road, Colaba, Bombay 400021


REPORT BY JUSTICE B.G. KOLSE PATIL

I visited Manibeli on the request of the Indian People's Tribunal (IPT) to look into the circumstances that led to the submergence of tribal lands and houses in the monsoon of 1993. We were told that on the l6th Of July '93, 12 villages of Maharashtra and 14 villages of Gujarat were affected by the backwater floods of the Sardar Sarovar Dam. In Manibeli itself, 16 houses were submerged along with 30 houses in the village of Vadgam. Altogether the flooding has led to the eviction of 30 families in Maharashtra and 86 families in Gujarat. It must be emphasized that the Indian People's Tribunal did not go into the general issue about whether the dam should be built, but restricted itself to the question of submergence, and in that context, rehabilitation and resettlement. Accordingly we visited Manibeli and Koti on the 21st Of August '93 and met the affected tribals in their new make-shift houses. The scene was one of utter destitution. The tribals appeared to have no food and clothing. The makeshift houses were put together by the tribals and were devoid of any household articles. The government seems to have done very little and appears to be totally oblivious of the national and international attention focused on this issue. All the government seems to have provided the tribals with, are some tin sheds! These are totally inappropriate they leak in the rains, in summer they are sure to turn into mini furnaces, and in winter they will afford little shelter from the cold. These have obviously been constructed with little thought for the welfare of the tribals and ate merely an attempt to make `paper compliance' with the requirements of rehabilitation and resettlement. I have no hesitation in saying that these sheds are cruel and heartless and not even fit for cattle to live in.

THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT Among others I met Narainbhai (Sarpanch of the village), Keshavbhai, and Vithalbhai, all of whose houses have been submerged. They told us that the government officers and police had repeatedly told them that only two houses and the Surpanseshwar Temple would be submerged this monsoon while those at a higher level would not. In Manibeli, for example, Keshavbhai who occupied the lowest lying house in the village was forcibly evicted from his land in June 1993. After strong protests by the Nimrod Batch Angolan the house was re-built. Officials advised him to build it at an elevation of 70 metros. He complied after being assured by the collector that his new house would not be affected this monsoon. Despite this assurance, his house was completely submerged and the land rendered useless. If this is the lack of planning for the first submergence what can we expect in the days to come. We asked the assistant collector, Mr. Anon Kumar, who cooperated with the PIT despite short notice, as to why the submergence had taken place even of those houses in respect of which assurances had been given that they would not be affected. He said that the government and the police did not expect the water to rise so fast and to that level! On behalf of the government, Mr. Kumar made an interesting presentation. He said that, the tribals in Chimalkhadi, Pimpal Chowk, Paula and Akrani have become increasingly hostile to any government intervention; to the extent that they do not even allow the government officials to enter the villages and conduct surveys. He stated that the Andolan is the first to complain that the government does not do its job, it is they however who set the tribals


against the government. He requested me to visit other villages like Somaval for instance where the people have interacted with the government and have successfully been rehabilitated. He introduced me to Tedia a tribal from that village who when questioned stated that he was extremely happy with the government's rehabilitation package. He also stated that the newspapers do not report the government side of the story. The media sympathises entirely with the anti dam lobby. I must record my appreciation for the assistance given to some of the tribals by Mr. Kumar, but I cannot help but feel that his enthusiasm is probably due to the fact that he is new to his job and that he is possibly out of step with the vast bureaucracy. India would perhaps be a great country if there were many more Anoop Kumar but unfortunately this is not so. I am told that when the Indian People's Tribunal visited areas on earlier occasions, government officials took the stand that they were not bound to appear before the tribunal and so stayed away. Mr. Kumar did not resort to such technicalities and spoke to us in a forthright and honest manner. I now deal with the objections and remarks of the Assistant Collector. He frankly admitted that his predecessors could have been at fault and those earlier attempts at rehabilitation of the tribals was not that satisfactory and that proper surveys etc. may not have been conducted. These were factors that had contributed to the present day tragedy. The admission of the government provides a clear reason for the fact that the tribals are currently hostile to the government. The hostility arises from the non-performance and not because of any so called motivated actions of the NBA in organising the people against the Government. It is too superficial to accept that the tribals are being manipulated. Tedia and others who have been rehabilitated in reality are mere 6,000 families among the 40,000 project affected people. I had no occasion to visit the villages suggested by the Assistant Collector and therefore I do not know to what extent his observations are accurate and whether the person produced before me namely Shri Tedia has a point of view which is, indicative of the thinking of the rest of the persons in his village. The assistant collector urgently expressed the need to expedite the joint surveys of the areas that are likely to be submerged. His anxiety is understandable. He complained that the NBA has not co-operated in the matter and neither have the tribals. The tribals on their part complained that in the earlier stages there were a number of police atrocities inflicted. They say that their two boats have been recently sunk by the police, which rendered them immobile, until such time as they were able to procure another one. He also referred to the ideological difference between the government and the tribals. He felt that the tribals were not convinced that the dam was beneficial either to them or to the public at large. He also admitted frankly that the tribals were not economically secure at the new rehabilitation sites. As far as Manibeli is concerned, I enquired when the displaced tribals were given land. The Assistant Collector stated that they were given land in June 1993 just about a month prior to submergence. This appears to be contrary to the provisions of the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal Award 1979 which requires that the tribals be given a six month period after they have been given alternate lands and during the six month period they are permitted to till the land that they originally owned. The Assistant Collector also sent me a letter dated the 27th August 1993 in response to my


request that the latest submergence schedules be provided so that the tribals may know when the water will rise and to what extent. He informed me in the letter that on the 16th July 1993 a flood of 76.62 metres came and temporarily submerged 12 huts of Manibeli. I find the use of the word `temporary' very misleading because it gives the impression that the submergence is for a short time and the deprivation is thus only partial. The Gujarat High Court recently in an order dated 30th April 1993 (Civil Application No. 909 '93; annexed with this report) held in the context of `temporary submergence' that "once there is submergence, the houses would be lost permanently and there would not be any point in coming back." There is very little difference between temporary and permanent submergence because even in temporary submergence the land and houses are completely destroyed. In his letter he expressed his inability to provide me with latest submergence schedules as he did not have a copy and he said he regretted the `mismatch' of data as submergence schedules are prepared at varying stages of time. This is exactly the tribal's grievance: that nobody is willing to tell them what the precise position is. It is really surprising that as late as the end of August'93 the Assistant Collector of the SSP did not have a copy of the submergence schedule and wanted me to collect it from the office of the Secretary of Rehabilitation, Maharashtra State. This is a very sad reflection on the way in which the government is approaching the whole issue of submergence.

THE EXPERIENCE OF MANIBELI It is very revealing that a large number of tribals of Manibeli are vociferous in their opposition to the rehabilitation scheme proposed. Their first grievance is that the collective unity of tribal life is broken up into small fragments. Secondly they make the grievance that their lifeline with the forest is now broken and this disrupts the whole of tribal life. Thirdly, they find that the dam is of no personal benefit to them. It may result in benefits to people living in the cities, but has certainly not benefited the rural people. Many of those who have seen the alternate plots of land being offered to them clearly stated that the land was unsuitable in one way or another. In fact that feel so strongly about the alternative sites that they say that it is better to die on their existing plots than to live on the rehabilitated sites. On the whole, I perceived a very strong in-built tribal resistance to the entire scheme of the government and it makes me believe that such a resistance cannot be explained away by saying that it is induced by the NBA activists who are politically motivated. Government must look for the reasons of tribal disenchantment in their own follies and mistakes and avoid rudeness and rancour in their approach to the tribals. In this regard I had the occasion to go through the report of the Morse Committee Report of the Sardar Sarovar Project and the relevant parts of their report I have extracted in Appendix B. I had also the occasion to read the Tata Institute of Social Sciences Report on the ~ question of rehabilitation. TISS is the body, which has been set up officially to monitor the rehabilitation of the tribals. It discloses a very shocking state of affairs because the report broadly indicates that the rehabilitation is very poorly done. The v carelessness of the authorities makes me feel that perhaps they had no real intention whatsoever to rehabilitate the tribals. What little they are doing now is because the Narmada Bachao Andolan has made the tribals aware of their rights and because of the international attention being focused on this issue. A summary of this report ' can be found in Appendix C. I shudder to speculate that what would have happened if the tribals were not organised and if the international community was not concerned about the issue. Perhaps the fate of the


Narmada tribals would have been the same as in other projects in India, where tribals have been displaced again and again. B.D. Sharma; ex-Commissioner for Schedules Castes And Tribes, has poignantly described the tribals displaced by `development' projects in his various reports. He has shown how in majority of the cases the tribals have been forcibly evicted without land or compensation.

THE VIEWPOINT OF THE NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN While speaking to the members of the NBA they were at pains to emphasise that the whole issue of public policy and public interest found in the Land Acquisition Act requires review. Too often the Government has used the Land Acquisition Act to acquire land of the tribals on a mere pretext of it being in the public interest. In fact the real interest in displacing tribals to acquire their land was a private one. There is much truth in the point of view of NBA. However I am not going into this aspect in respect of the Narmada project, as it is not within my terms of reference. In my experience as a Judge of the Bombay High Court and in public life I know that there are numerous instances where the Government has acquired land for rehabilitation ostensibly in public interest. When one looks at the real reason for acquisition one notices those private parties and generally well to do private parties stand to benefit by the acquisition. We were not able to visit the villages in Gujarat. We were told by the Assistant Superintendent of Police of the Rajpipla region that it would not be possible to go to Vadgam because the Official Secrets Act was in force and permission had to be obtained to go into the area. This is another aspect of the repressive arm of the state. The Official Secrets Act is not meant to be used to stifle investigations and lawful agitations. This act has been grossly misused time and again and this has been stretched to a ridiculous extent of covering an entire dam site as within its purview! The NBA also showed me copies of the recent orders of the Gujarat High Court. These orders apparently restrain the authorities from evicting tribals unless the provisions of the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal Award are complied with. I reproduce here the relevant provisions of the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal Award:

Sub-Clause N. Provision for Rehabilitation: IV (6) (ii) In no event shall any areas in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra be submerged under the Sardar Sarovar unless all payment of compensation, expenses and costs as aforesaid is made for acquisition of land properties and arrangements are made for the rehabilitation of the oustees therefrom in accordance with these directions and intimated to the oustees.

Sub-Clause V. Program for Payment to be made by Gujarat in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra:

V (3) (iii): Gujarat shall at each successive stage of submergence intimate to Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra the area coming under submergence at least 18 months in advance. The inhabitants of the area coming under the respective stages of submergence will be entitled to occupy or use their properties without being required to pay anything for such occupation and use till a date to be notified by the State concerned which date shall not be less than six


months before submergence. They must vacate the area by the notified date. The above provisions clearly indicate that unless rehabilitation and resettlement is done to the satisfaction of the tribals they should not be evicted. They also specify that rehabilitation and resettlement should be done in such a manner as to give the tribals a higher quality of life after resettlement. After meeting the tribals at Manibeli I have no doubt that the rehabilitation and resettlement policy of the Government and its implementation is such that rather than improving their quality of life it will probably render them utterly destitute and probably result in loss of life and livelihood.

PREMEDITATED SUBMERGENCE Although I do not believe this is the case, let me assume for the moment that the tribals and the Andolan persons are intransigent and are unwilling to move, no matter what. Even then, I find it very difficult to accept the Authorities viewpoint and explanation that they were unaware that the water level would rise as quickly as it did. With all the technical expertise available to the Government, it is unbelievable that the Government has not been able to predict the nature and extent of the submergence. I therefore conclude that rehabilitation, resettlement program, which the government offers, is too little, and it has come too late. Water has certainly; been used as a weapon to drive the tribals from their homes. The grievances of the NBA appear genuine. They say if the government is serious about the rehabilitation and resettlement the very least it could do is to provide the Andolan activists with information regarding the submergence. At least then the tribals will know how many are going to be evicted by the rising water and when. Much of this information is withheld. I was shown the submergence schedules. Discrepancies and the inaccuracies were brought to my notice. The latest figures are not given. It is most unfair for the authorities to play a cat and mouse game with the tribals as it seems to be doing.

CONCLUSION In concluding, I wish to strongly emphasise that it is imperative that there be an independent, frank and fearless review by persons who are in no way connected with the Government. This review must go into the rehabilitation and resettlement aspects as well as the basic dispute regarding the construction of the dam itself. I am not expressing any view personally because it is not my present concern. If there are persons who say that the dam ought not to be constructed they should be given as much of ~a hearing as the persons who say that the dam ought to be constructed. I am told by the NBA that they are optimistic about the Government Review but the reports appearing in the newspapers appear to be very contradictory and the government appears to have a switch on and switch off attitude regarding the review. An impartial and quick review such as the one done by the Morse Committee is the need of the hour. Justice B.G. Kolse Patil Flat No. 101, First Floor, Charlie Villa, A Road, Churchgate,


Bombay – 400 020


APPENDIX A

Extracts, from the Civil Application No. 909 of 1991 in Special Civil Application No. 4385 of 1991. Coram: R.A.Mehta & R.K. Abichandani. JJ. (30th April 1993) The said order of the Supreme Court holds that: - "Rehabilitation should be so done that at least six months before the area is likely to be submerged, rehabilitation should be completed and should be in respect of home, substitution of agricultural property and such other arrangement which are contemplated under the rehabilitation scheme." In the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondents, it is averred in paragraph 33 that: "The Award clearly stated that in no event shall any area be submerged under SSP, until all payments of compensation, expenses are made for acquisition of land and properties and arrangements are made for rehabilitation of the oustees therefrom in accordance with the directions and intimated to the oustees." We have already granted interim in terms of paragraph 44 (M) of the petition, which reads as follows: - "44(M) Pending hearing and final disposal of the petition, granting interim relief restraining the respondents from forcibly removing the people of Vadgam, Surpaneshwar, Borida and Mokhaki and their belongings and from disturbing their occupation, and enjoyment of lands and provisions of Narmada Tribunal Award, the World Bank Agreements and Resolutions of the Government of Gujarat, the R & R of the SSP oustees and from enforcing, acting upon or taking any action in pursuance of the notice dated 31.12.1991 issued to the people of these villages." Extracts, from Misc. Civil Application No. 769 Of 1993 In Special Civil Application No. 4385 Of 1991. Coram. - S.D: Shah & R.D. Vyas, JJ. (Date: l9th July, 1993) Order (Per S.D. Shah, J.) In this Application for contempt filed by the original petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 4385 of 1991, a grievance is made about removal of large number of people from village Vadgam, Surpaneshwar, Mokhadi and Borida, (which is said to be part and parcel of village Vadgam) in contravention of the order of injunction grant; d by the Division Bench on 30.4.1993. It is further averred in the application that despite order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 24th February, 1993 as clarified on 30th April, 1993, the respondents have forcibly removed some of the families without making provision for full resettlement and rehabilitation. In the course of hearing of this M.C.A. an agency known a9 `Sardar Sarovar Punarasvat'. Agency which was created by a Government Resolution applied to this court for being impleaded as a party in the main petition and on such application being granted by this Court it has through its counsel Mr. K.G. Vakharia not only filed the affidavit in reply but has addressed the Court also. The stand of the applicant is challenged by the affidavit in reply,


which is filed by such agency of the respondents and it is their case that none of the families were forcibly removed from the areas to be submerged temporarily or permanently and that such families have of their own either vacated the areas or have gone to temporary tin sheds provided by the respondents at higher level. When confronted with the factual situation that in fact nearly 18 families have come down to kevadia colony and members of such families are practically stranded it was directed by the Court that such families and/or their representatives should remain present before this Court on l9th July, 1993 i.e. today and we are informed by Mr. Girish Patel, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that 15 representatives of 15 families have come today and they are present in the Court. As on today, the position is that because of the submergence of area where these 15 families were staying, they are stranded homeless and are put to a helples5 situation. May be sufficient arrangement was made for them in the year 1991 and may be that such persons have vacated and left the area of their resettlement. At present without deciding their rights we are of the opinion that since actual submergence of the area has resulted into uprooting of these 15 families, some appropriate arrangement shall have to be made by the respondents.

Appendix B The Findings and Recommendations of the Morse Committee on Resettlement and Rehabilitation. The Bank and India both failed to carry out adequate assessments of human impacts of the Sardar Sarovar Projects. Many of the difficulties that have beset implementation of the Projects have their origin in this failure. There was virtually no basis, in 1985, on which to determine what the impacts were that would have to be ameliorated. This led to an inadequate understanding of the nature and scale of resettlement. This inadequate understanding was compounded by a failure to consult the people potentially to be affected. In drafting the terms and conditions of the 1985 credit and loan agreements, the Bank failed to take adequate account of the fact that a large proportion of those at risk from the development of the Sardar Sarovar Projects are tribal people. This meant that insufficient account was taken of the principles enshrined in the Bank's 1982 Operational Manual Statement outlining its policies regarding tribal people. As a result of 'both the inadequate database and the failure to incorporate provisions of the Bank's policies in the 1985 credit and loan agreements, the provisions for resettlement and rehabilitation do not adequately address the real needs of those to be affected. The Bank failed to ensure that those affected by construction of the canal and irrigation system would be entitled to resettlement benefits. The disparity between Gujarat's policy and the policies of Maharashtra and M.P. meant those oustees' right to choose between relocation in Gujarat and their own state was rendered meaningless.


Implementation of resettlement in Maharashtra has been limited by both policy defencies and availability of irrigable land: The record of resettlement and rehabilitation in India, which has been unsatisfactory virtually every project with a large resettlement component, should reasonably have prompted the Bank to adopt a less flexible standard for resettlement and rehabilitation project - affected people. In this context, the Bank's incremental strategy to obtain compliance, made explicit in 1989 greatly undermines prospects for achieving success, resettlement and rehabilitation. '

Appendix C Review Of Resettlement And Rehabilitation In Maharashtra Of The Monitoring And Evaluation Team For Maharashtra (The Tata Institute Of Social Sciences). 'This report summarises the findings of six years of work completed by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, in its capacity as the monitoring and evaluation (M & E) agency, for the Maharashtra submergence villages of the Sardar Sarovar Project. The Tata Institute of Social Sciences was appointed for this task by the government of Maharashtra a, required by the terms of the contract with the World Bank. These experiences have been documented in 19 reports. The Sardar Sarovar Dam is expected to impound water to the full reservoir level of 45 feet. It will submerge 37,000 hectares (92,500 acres) of land in three states: Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The canal and irrigation systems aggregate to 75,000 km. submerging 85,000 hectares (2,12,5000 acres) of land. The length of the water catchment of the dam is slated to be 123 km. Conservative estimates place the number o1 displaced at approximately 1,52,000 persons (about 27,000 families as per government estimates), residing in 245 villages of these states, to affected by the submergence. The break up-by states are Gujarat 23,590, Maharashtra 13,500, and Madhya Pradesh 1,15,000. In addition about 1,40,000 farmers are likely to be affected by the canal and irrigation systems, some in a major way and others marginally. The later, however, will stand to gain form the irrigation when it becomes available. The land purchased form absentee landlords in Gujarat to relocate the PAP's is likely to displace an almost equal number of tenant farmers. Further, people living downstream, numbering thousands, more, and those located in the backwater z0ne, will be affected. Compulsory afforestation, and the development of a sanctuary, will displace hundreds of families, since the consequence o1 the destruction of the environment are sought to be compensated through the means, One estimate places this category of project affected persons at 42,000 (approximately 7,000 families). These figures reveal the magnitude of direct and indirect dislocation. No one really knows the exact magnitude of the likely displacement in all its dimensions, and the spin-off effects are yet to be measured. The existing figures on the amount of surplus land available these states for compensating even the directly displaced are far lower than the required amount. Therefore, whether in fact sufficient land will be found is not known. The SSP has undergone many financial and economic cost benefit exercises. As per the government records, the cost benefit ratio is positive. However, most of these exercises have been conducted without fully accounting for the social and environmental costs. The


Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) Award of 1978 gave its report on R and R based on the critical minimum requirements of resettlement for the displaced. It is not on the clear whether a detailed costing of the R and R had been undertaken. The award was hailed as a break through in rehabilitation as it made provisions far beyond those of earlier projects where only cash compensation (often under valued) had been provided. It stated that the project-affected persons must:

a) Improve or at least regain the standard of living they were enjoying prior to displacement,

b) Be relocated as village units, "padas", (hamlets) or families, in accordance with their preference as far as possible;

c) Become fully integrated within the community in which they are resettled; and,

d) Be provided with appropriate compensation and adequate social and physical rehabilitation infrastructure.

The general compensation package, designed for this purpose, is characterised by state specific variations with regard to certain aspects. It comprises the following: 1) A minimum of two hectares (five acres) of irrigated land has to be provided to each

landholder. In Maharashtra, on hectare of irrigated land has to be provided to all landless families, post - 1978 encroaches (i.e. those not in possession of title deeds for their lands), major sons, and major unmarried daughters of PAP's.

2) There is non-uniformity in the policy across Maharashtra and Gujarat regarding the compensation for land. The PAPs of Maharashtra are entitled to Rs.3, 750 to Rs.4, 500 per hectare as opposed to the Gujarat figure, which is placed at Rs. 10, 000 (1990-91) reporting.

3) In Maharashtra the PAP's are provided with food ration for a three-month period after shifting. In contrast, in Gujarat (for Maharashtra PAP's) a subsistence allowance of Rs.4, 500 is to be paid to all PAP familie5 by the first year after resettlement. In both Gujarat and Maharashtra a resettlement grant of Rs. 750, with January 1980 as a base and a rise of 8% for every year; and a grant in aid of up to Rs. 500 for each family. All this is in addition to compensation for the land.

4) In Maharashtra, PAPs are entitled to house plots measuring approximately 60.sq.mt, while those in Gujarat are entitled to about 8 sq.mt. House building loan and subsidy, and free transportation of all salvaged and household material are also to be provided.

5) Within agriculture during the initial period land is to be developed be the government. There is also to be diversification towards horticulture and cash cropping. Secondary and tertiary activities are to be initiated including dairy, supported by training and marketing.

6) Areas have to be demarcated for fuel wood and fodder cultivation. 7) In the resettlement colony, physical infrastructure is to be provided through the

construction of approach and internal roads, transport facilities, drinking water, domestic and street lighting and residential and day schools.

Several policies were not included in the original package. For instance, financial compensation is now provided to the PAP's for a year after they move to the new location site. This was introduced when it was realised that it takes some time to clear rocks and roots/ground level growth so as to permit cultivation. Another problem was of "tapu" lands, i.e. lands becoming surrounded by floodwaters, thus becoming islands rendered by


floodwaters, thus becoming islands rendered inaccessible to the owner. Prior to completion of negotiations on the issue of the loan, the World Bank had not appraised the R and R component. It therefore asked Scudder and expert on resettlement issues, to analyse the situation related to the extent of displacement and to the R and R measures adopted by the state governments. After his review in 1984, he concluded that the resettlement of the displaced was likely to occur in a very unfavourable environment. India's past record of reservoir related relocation did not meet the World Bank standards. The provisions of the award represented a major advance in India, yet they did' not meet the requirements of the World Bank policy guidelines on involuntary resettlement. Six years later, in 1991-92 the World Bank deputed the Morse Commission (The Independent Review) to conduct a further appraisal of the progress of the project with specific regard to the R and R and the amelioration of the environmental impact of all the aspects of the project. The commission concluded that environmental and social trade-offs have been made without a full understanding of the consequences. The social and environmental costs were understated; as a result, the financial benefits of the dam tended to be overstated. Further, it was maintained that the rehabilitation of all the displaced would be impossible under the present circumstances. R and R: In Award and World Bank Terms Survey of PAP's: As mentioned earlier according to Scudder's report, the extent of displacement was not known and, hence no clear plans for resettlement could be envisaged. The award and certain World Bank benchmarks assume relevance only if these aspects are clearly explicated. As the staff governments are still not aware of the extent of displacement assurance cannot be provided that all PAP's would be appropriately rehabilitated. A simple calculation based ~n the Maharashtra and Gujarat baseline village studies, shows that each family, on an average, owns or has access to two to five hectares of land. Hence, even at the minimum norm, for the Maharashtra PAP's alone, about 7,000 to 8,000 hectares of cultivable land is required. The government of Maharashtra obtained 2,700 hectares of forest land, to be cleared for purposes of resettlement Since additional land was required for persons newly designated as PAP's, due to policy changes, another 1,500 hectares is being considered for this purpose. Thus, even if a total of 4,000 hectares of land is released by the government, it will prove to be inadequate as families grow and have to seek an alternative livelihood for which there is no provision in the resettlement colonies. It is anticipated that they will be reduced to landless and, possibly, even migrant wage labourers. It is also doubtful whether Gujarat would be able to make available the required land for all those from the other two states, who indicate their preference for relocation in Gujarat, in view of the fact that Gujarat buys land at a rate of Rs. 35,000 to Rs. 75,000 per hectare, and the land prices are expected to continue to escalate since Government is acquiring so much land. The per family financial allocation for rehabilitation is the range Rs. l lakh to Rs. 1.25 lakh only. This is clearly not adequate to meet procedural and incidental costs and other expenses, in addition to land costs.


Maintaining integration of village community: An important element of the award was the relocation of PAPs in units of their preference. However, due to the non-availability of large land plots, they are unable to express their preferences. In most resettlement colonies, there is no possibility of relocating an entire village. For the Maharashtra PAPs, the most striking example in this regard, is in the first resettlement colony of Parveta (Gujarat), which is inhabited by families from Manibeli (a submerging village in Maharashtra), but the major sons had to go elsewhere - Lunadra and Sihandra (Gujarat). Maintaining village as well as community integration has been problematic as there are factors beyond economic imperatives influencing the PAPs' decision-making: (a) proximity to forest, and (b) retaining inter-group ties by resettlement at the same sites. The outcome of this is that the villages have been split; in some cases members of the same pada have been resettled in different colonies, inter sub-group ties have been broken and families have been divided. Non-submerging hamlets: There exist problems at yet another level, as except a few villages in Gujarat and Manibeli village in Maharashtra, all other villages will not be entirely submerged. A few hamlets are to be left out in each village. People residing in these non-submerging parts are not being resettled but will be left behind in inaccessible mountain areas around the rim of the reservoir. For the non-submerging hamlets in Maharashtra, access to t3ujarat will be completely cut off. Villages along the Narmada River are dependent on Gujarat for its market and for a range of social reasons. Markets on the Maharashtra side are located at a great distance from these hamlets. People living in these truncated villages are also likely to be affected by water borne diseases generated because of the reservoir. They will have no access to health care, because the nearest PHC or sub-centre will be more than a six-hour walk across the Satpura ranges and even those would become inaccessible during monsoon. These isolated hamlets will not constitute viable units, wherein survival itself cannot be assured. Procedures: The R and R procedures require that PAPs be served eviction notices, detailed asset surveys conducted, compensation notices issued and amount fixed, and submergence notices issued. As people of this region are illiterate, they are to be explained the meaning of these processes. It has been noted that not all persons whose lands are to be submerged have received the required notices. The level of awareness is not very high either as a number of people who are to be affected by the submergence do not know this. There are others who believe that their lands will be submerged but do not feature in the submergence list of the government. In Akkalkuwa there are 97 persons who maintain that they are to be exposed to submergence but have not received notices. At least 31 PAPs from these villages have also not received compensation notices. Even among those who have received them, some are yet to receive compensation. A total of 107 persons, out of 391, did not receive any form of compensation, till early 1993. In Akrani taluka, an entire village did not receive compensation notices 'sikka'; in Paula village, the eviction notices were left at the headsman's house, and were consumed by white ants.


In Gujarat, the PAPs who moved to Tentalav and Ambavadli settlements maintain that they received an equal amount or more agricultural land than owned by them in their original villages. However, in Parveta, about 18 per cent claimed that they received less land. In Chhindiapura and Khadaga all the PAPs received smaller plots as compared to their original holdings. In 1991, 27 per cent of persons resettled in Khadaga and 9 per cent of the Parveta inhabitants were yet to receive land, while 65 per cent of the Gujarat oustees resettled in Parveta stated that they were dissatisfied with the land quality. Moreover, most of the major sons in 11 of the new sites have not received agricultural land and house plots. Forty-eight oustees in Sandhia, Chhindiapura and Vaghavali have been given less than the requisite 68 sq. mt. for housing purposes. A series of discrepancies have been noted in the land selection and identification process in Gujarat. People have been shown a specific piece of land but allotted an alternative one, of poorer quality. In some cases, the land allotment has been cancelled after being sanctioned. There have also been instances, where more than one person has been allotted the same piece of land. In general, the choices offered to PAPs have been minimal, if at all. The PAPs are compelled to wait for long periods outside the rehabilitation office for submitting applications and collecting documents to which they are entitled. In Parveta, the first batch of 81 Maharashtra PAPs received the first installment of subsistence allowance as late as 1988, although they had shifted in 1985. The shifting allowances in most cases were paid only after a lapse of at least two years. This led to an unwarranted financial burden on the PAPs, because they had to finance the land clearance as well. Each PAP in Parveta incurred an average expenditure of Rs. 18,000 in the process of resettlement, which was not reimbursed as it exceeded the amount earmarked for this purpose. A series of problems have also been related to the payment of compensation. The people who have received the amount are dissatisfied as they maintain that the 1985 land survey for regularising encroached land was not complete; hence, all their lands we: e not recorded and it was difficult to prove that they had been cultivating the land prior to 1978. Due to non-uniformity of policy across states, the PAPs of Maharashtra received only Rs. 3,750 to Rs. 4,500 per hectare of land as opposed to Rs. 10,000 received by the Gujarat PAPs. This created a feeling of deprivation among the former. Adopting the policy of 'first come best served'. The first set of families received good quality of land while those who moved in later were allotted poorer quality of land, sometimes too rocky for cultivation. 34 % of the Parveta households applied for alternative lands because of poor quality: Land clearance too was slow; in some cases it took up to three years. Upto 15% of the families were affected by this slowness of procedures, while 18 households have returned their lands to he government as they were not willing to shift out of Manibeli. As birth certificates cannot be produced and, therefore disputes have arisen as to whether a person is 18 years or below. In a tribal society, birth certificates, or any other method of marking births or deaths, do not exist. Problems of encroachers: Families in the submergence villages have cultivated these lands since generations without


'pattas' (title deeds). Whenever a family expanded, the members took up additional land, cleared and began to cultivate it. However, now the non-patta holders are termed 'landless' for purposes of rehabilitation. They are called the encroachers. Since such persons would get only one hectare, their standard of living would be severely affected in a cash economy. This would be against the basic principle of the award; that all displaced should regain at the least, if not improve, their standard of living. This is in contrast to the Gujarat package, wherein; two hectares of land are available for the same category. In Maharashtra (Somaval settlement), a forest is being cleared for R and R purposes. This forest contains unrecorded settlements wherein the original residents depend upon the forest for their subsistence. The PAPs are required to adjust to both, the host village and the unrecorded settlements, as members of the latter now have to share their minimal sources with an additional set of people. Clearing the forest has already reduced their access. Hence, incidents of tension have been noted in these areas. In most resettlement colonies inhabited by the Gujarat PAPs, integration with the host villages is yet to be attained. Except the site of Khadaga, problems have been identified in the other sites. These relate to a variety of factors. A large number in the host population, employed as labourers on the sites purchased by the R and R department suddenly lost all employment. The PAPs unlike the absentee landowners do not require their services as they cultivate their fields with the help of family labour. In addition the arrival of so many persons has created a situation of surplus labour, reducing job opportunities for them. Further people associated with the land in a share cropping capacity have been reduced to landless labourers. The host population was also not involved in the process of R and R. They got to know of impending changes only through hearsay. The interaction in most sites is minimal. There is virtually no exchange or interaction on a daily basis. Preparation of site before resettlement and availability of infrastructure: It was envisaged, under the terms of the award that when villages or sections of villages relocate, infrastructure of schools primary health centre and transport would be provided. In the case of the Maharashtra PAPs who moved to Parveta due to batch wise shifting at the initial stage, infrastructural facilities were inadequate. The tin sheds were leaking only one hand pump was functional there was no electricity, roads, health facility, toilets a grazing ground. The first batch of persons experienced serious health problems due to nutritional deficiency and lack of proper health care. In 1988, 17 deaths, (a number of them children below five years) were recorded out of a total of 350 persons in this settlement. Conclusions 1) Given the base line situation the resources available and the approach adopted the

implementation of the award is far from satisfactory, across both the states reviewed in this paper. It is also doubtful whether the governments can take on the full dimensions of the task, given the problems highlighted at the micro-level with the rehabilitation of just a few families. The tense situation in the Narmada valley region is the outcome of the serious problems relating to rehabilitation of this tribal community. A project symbolising development has caused the deprivation of a group of people who lived beyond `development' strategies for centuries. Bringing people into the mainstream should not adversely affect their life situation. The claim is now


being put forward that they have access to government services in the resettlement sites. This is unjustified since they were supposed to be entitled to these services even in their original villages as these areas have been demarcated for coverage under the tribal subplan. They had a basic right to services such as health or education.

2) Problems have emerged due to a variety of reasons. At the macro-level there was clearly the need to: (a) gauge the exact dimension the total impact of the project (on the people, flora and fauna) at the stage of project formulation; (b) determine the exact number of PAPs at the very outset; and (c) determine the nature and the extent of resources and finance required for resettling the displaced. None of these were fully undertaken before commencing the construction of the dam. At the very outset it needs mention that there is need for a systematic review wherein an effective cost-benefit exercise needs to be undertaken with a major emphasis on accounting for the social costs and not only the causes of water likely to reach a certain number of beneficiaries.

3) With specific regard to R and R there are problems with-the policy package as well, which have been documented in this summary. The basic problem pertains to nonparity of the package across the three states. Though people in all the three states are exposed to the same situation, there are vast differences in the R and R provisions, which have not been modified by the government of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh to bring them on par with the government of Gujarat.

4) If the people from these two states do opt to resettle in Gujarat, non-availability of land in sufficient quantities is going to pose difficulties due to the magnitude of displacement in Madhya Pradesh. The experience of all the three states clearly reveals that land for cultivation and resettlement cannot be acquired easily. Claims being put forward regarding the availability of land lack authenticity, as much of this land has been proved to be non-arable. The governments have not acquired land for resettlement using legislative measures such as the Land Acquisition Act, Land Reform Act and Land Ceiling Act. The 1984 amendment to the Land Acquisition, 1894, provides for land acquisition to resettle people. Instead, in Gujarat land is now bought in the open market in small bits and pieces. Thus it maybe difficult to obtain land of adequate size to resettle even 30 to 40 families in one location. This prevents effective relocation of groups, which represented cohesive social units. The resettlement experience of Gujarat villages is already available as evidence: families from 19 villages are resettled in over 175 locations. The government of Maharashtra has chosen t resettle people in the clear felled forest area. Private purchase of land cannot permit large-scale resettlement due to limited availability. Forest land cannot be a source of agricultural land for the resettled given the magnitude of displacement caused and depleted forest reserves. The options of the governments of Maharashtra and Gujarat thus have limitations as also repercussions and in conditions of large-scale R and R they cannot be justified or sustained. Hence the non-availability of suitable and adequate land in their own state, and the unwillingness of people to move to unknown areas, easily gives rise to the use of external pressures or force, besides leaving no options for the concerned person to choose between alternatives: The choice is, then between being wiped out or accepting whatever is offered without protest.

5) The adoption of the policy of `divide and shift' in the villages has devastating effects on the welfare and community life of the originally cohesive groups. In the process the original villages are divided into non-viable social units and relocated. Further, the government is attempting to resettle people by marginalising the advocacy groups spearheading the anti-dam movement. In the absence of advocacy groups it is possible


that the people will not be able to put the necessary pressure for resettling them with the full provisions of the award and its subsequent modifications in the light of experience in implementation.

6) The SSP has highlighted one point very clearly: large-scale displacement of people from land cannot be sustained.

7) The time has come to look for alternatives to large dams in order to minimise submergence of land and displacement of people. High population density on land implies large displacement. When the area of submergence is large the problem of displacement assumes serious dimensions.

Note This report could not have been written without the active co-operation of the people living in the Narmada region. This article is dedicated to their cause. Ajith Kumar, A Ahire, J Gawale, D Mali and R Mohite stayed in the villages over extended periods to collect data under difficult conditions. The faculty involved from the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, at different stages, included, C Sengupta, V Mathrani, Shiva Raju, and I.U.B Reddy. The team leaders were S Parasuraman and Nandini Rao. Overall guidance and encouragement were provided by A.S. Desai and Sarthi Acharya.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

The report of The Independent Review – The Morse Committee Report The Sardar Sarovar Project: Experiences with Resettlement and Rehabilitation. A Summary by the Monitoring and Evaluation Team for Maharashtra – Tata Institute of Social Sciences Final order and decision of the Narmada water disputes Tribunal Directions of the Supreme Court, 9.8.91 Special Civil Application No 4385 of 1991 With Civil application no 1464 of 1991 With Civil application No 309 of 1993 With Civil application No 112 of 1993 Misc. civil application No 769 of 1993 In special civil application No 4385 of 1991 Report of Assistant Collector, Dhule, Sardar Sarovar Project Review of Current status and next steps SSP, World Bank communication for executive directors. Dated 11.9.92. Pg. 13 Selected Pages of submergence schedule published by the Narmada control authority – Narmada Control Authority, March 91 Reports of Milind Kothawale on the recent submergence and destruction in Maharashtra villages ‘Drowning in Manibeli’ human rights campaign on Narmada 31.5.93 ‘A Village under Siege: Force & Repression in Manibeli’ Report of the team of observers (Justice (Retd.) D s Tewata, Kamini Jaiswal and Prashant Bhushan, On the human rights violations In the SSP, Dated 9.6.93 The official secrets act notification and a covering note thereof ‘Vadgam: the first victim of the rising waters report on Vadgam – Lyla Mehta, July ’93 ‘Forced evictions of Tribals oustees Due To SSP In five submerging villages of Gujarat’ – Bela Bhatia Report, concluding remarks, 15.7.93 K P Singh (director (Rehab), NVDA, MP) Letter Dated 15.6.93 about slow progress of SSP oustees of MP.


Fax Messages dated 16.8.93 and 18.8.93 from GOM regarding submergence in 1994 ‘Manibeli: a village that can save the Narmada valley’ a note on Manibeli 22.1.92 ‘Police atrocities at Manibeli: report of a visit’ – Ashish Kothari. Mainstream Report of 2.5.92 ‘Towards sustainable and just development’ NBA. Oct ’92 ‘Oustees Abandon Alternative Land’ Indian Express, Baroda 4.3.92

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