India s Past Philology and Classical Ind

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India’s past, philology, andclassical Indian philosophyA L E X W A T S O N

TO acquaint ourselves with what may

have happened in South Asia in the

deep past, we rely primarily on things

that happen to have survived from

that time, such as texts, archeological

remains, monuments and other kindsof artefact. To investigate specifically

what South Asians thought , as opposed

to what they did, it is the texts that are

of supreme importance. Indeed inso-

far as thoughts are constituted entirely

out of concepts derived from language

– a position taken by some but not all

of India’s1 pre-modern philosophers –

the literary compositions preserved in

manuscripts and inscriptions afford us

the possibility of entering into the minds

of thinkers removed from us by manycenturies.

The distinction between ‘texts’

and ‘manuscripts’ should be clear.

Kalidasa’s Meghaduta (‘Cloud

Messenger’), say, is one text. It is pre-

served in a number of manuscripts.

A manuscript is a physical object;

a text is a literary composition.2 The

fact that a text consists not of matter

but of language means that whereas a

manuscript can be observed by sight

and touch (and, I suppose, smell and taste!), a text can be observed by sight

(i.e. by reading it) and by hearing.

Indeed many of India’s oldest texts

were composed without any recourse

to writing and were preserved for

many centuries not by manuscripts,

but by oral-transmission.It was probably from the last

few centuries BCE that manuscripts

(in Sanskrit and Prakrit) began to be

written and copied in India. While

many texts survive from earlier than

that period, no manuscripts survive

from as far back as that. The texts that

have come down to us from Classical

India typically exist only in copies of

copies of copies of copies… Since

scribes are human, copying mistakes

enter the transmission at every stage.Thus when I mentioned above texts,

archeological remains, monuments

and other artefacts that have survived

from the past, I was eliding an impor-

tance difference between the first of

those and the rest. An artefact, a statue

say, that survives today is the same

statue that was produced previously.

A text that survives today, by contrast,

will have gone through numerous small

changes each time its manuscripts are

copied.Some of these may be deliberate

modifications on the part of a scribe.

But many will be inadvertent. If so, they

may result in a nonsensical, ungram-

matical sentence. Or they may result

in a corruption that is harder to spot, one

that contains no syntactical flaw. Thus

1. In this article I use ‘India’ and ‘Indian’ assynonymous with ‘South Asia’ and ‘SouthAsian’.

2. I am here, for simplicity’s sake, reducing athreefold distinction between works, textsand manuscripts into a twofold one.


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to be a pukka Sanskrit philologist,

which simply means someone capable

of accurately understanding texts

written in Sanskrit, one must also be a

text critic, that is to say someone

capable of identifying these many cor-

ruptions and presenting hypotheses

about what the author actually wrote.

This is time-consuming and labour-

intensive work, ideally involving as

it does the collation of all available

manuscripts of a text. But once one

has become aware of the huge number

of corruptions existing in the manu-

scripts – and printed editions based on

those manuscripts – of every surviv-

ing classical Sanskrit text, it is work

that comes to seem indispensable.

I am making this point because manyassume that a printed edition of a San-skrit text can unproblematically be

assumed to be the words of its author.

Those who proceed on this assump-

tion erect an edifice of ‘knowledge’

on shaky foundations. The eureka

moment that consists in diagnosing

and removing a corruption takes one

closer to the thoughts of an author. It

is comparable to the fine-tuning of a

radio dial such that extraneous noiseand distortion reduce, allowing a voice

to come across with more clarity and

less interference. To read over corrup-

tions without being aware that they are

corruptions results in at best fuzzy and

at worst incoherent thoughts being

wrongly attributed to the author.

The other reason for my dwell-

ing on this point is to introduce readers

to one of the ideological divides in the

field of Sanskrit studies. There are

those who affirm the indispensability of this text critical work (the creation of

new, improved editions based on the

collation and comparison of manu-

scripts and parallel passages); and there

are those who see it as actually holding

back progress by being overly preoc-

cupied with small issues of wording.

There are two ways in which the field can be advanced: by the provision of

new data, and by the construction of

new analyses of previously available

data. The ‘providers’ are the philolo-

gists, working with manuscripts and

producing, based on those, printed edi-

tions and translations. The ‘construc-

tors’ are theorists or historians of social

and political formations, of science, of

philosophy, of religion, of literature.

The providers work at the cutting edge

of the mine or the quarry, as it were,

chipping away to extract gems and

marble. The constructors use these to

create edifices of relevance to their

own sub-field. Presented like this, it

looks like we have a division of labour,

rather than a battle. But it is both, for

the constructors frequently accuse the

providers of being unable to think crea-

tively, unaware of the wider picture,

and obsessed with inconsequential

minutiae. University positions, they

argue, should not be given to those

scholars but rather to people who

actually ‘do something’ with the mate-

rial. And the providers often accuse

the constructors of being insuffi-

ciently familiar with primary sources,

cavalier in their use of them, and moreconcerned with the sensational than

the true.

An American philosopher (Rich-

ard Heck) tells his students that there

are essentially two ways one can chal-

lenge others’ claims: by asking either

‘oh yeah?’ or ‘so what?’, the first doubt-

ing accuracy and the second doubting

relevance. The providers throw the ‘oh

yeah?’ question at the constructors and

the latter throw the ‘so what?’ question

at the providers. I am not sure of theextent to which this infighting harms

or helps the discipline. It may be that

it provides a helpful curbing of the

excesses of both sides.

I do not feel the need to come

down on one side to the exclusion of

the other, given that I see both as nec-

essary. But I do oppose those who

see text critical work as dispensable.

A knock-down argument here is the

enormous extent of unpublished San-

skrit literature. How many Sanskrit

manuscripts exist? We do not know the

answer, but a recent educated guess

places them at thirty million.3 The

number of surviving Greek manu-

scripts, for the sake of comparison,

is about thirty thousand. It is only a

minute fraction of surviving Sanskrit

texts that have been published, let

alone studied in detail. This alone

points to the desirability of having

an army of philologists engaged in the

production of critical editions, even if

they are not simultaneously engaged

in work of interest to those who do not

know Sanskrit.

My own approach has been to start by taking a not previously translated

text, or a part of a text,4 to collect

manuscripts, prepare an edition that

improves upon the editions published

so far, and prepare a heavily annotated

translation. I regard that as a neces-

sary precursor to further analysis.

Indeed for three of the texts I have

3. See Dominik Wujastyk, ‘Indian Manu-scripts’, in Jörg Quenzer and Jan-UlrichSobisch (eds.), Manuscript Cultures: Mappingthe Field . 2014.

4. The Nareshvaraparikshaprakasha (acommentary on ‘An Examination of theSoul and God’ by Sadyojyotis), the Matan-gavrtti (a commentary on the Agama knownas ‘The Elephant’), and the Paramoksha-nirasakarikavrtti (a commentary on ‘Theverses that Refute the Conceptions of Libe-ration Advanced by Other Schools’ bySadyojyotis), all three composed in Kashmir

by Bhatta Ramakantha, a 10th century adeptin the tradition of Shaiva Siddhanta; the

Nyayamanjari (‘Flower-Garland of Logic’),composed in Kashmir by Jayanta Bhatta, a9th century philosopher in the tradition of

Nyaya; and the Haracaritacintamani (‘TheWish-Fulfilling Jewel that Tells of the Exploitsof Shiva’), composed in Kashmir in the 13thcentury by Jayadratha, a Shiva bhakta. Thearticles and large parts of the books are avail-able here: http://harvard.academia.edu/AlexWatson


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32

worked on – the Nareshvara-

parikshaprakasha, Matangavrtti

and Paramokshanirasakarikavrtti

(see footnote 3) – it was simply not

possible to accurately apprehend the

author’s thoughts on the basis of the

existing editions, so full were they of

corruptions. For a fourth, the Nyaya-

manjari, an edition exists that is not

bad. But even here, if one takes the

time to consult two manuscripts

neglected by the editors – one written

on birch bark in Sharada script, and one

on palm leaf in Malayalam script –

then improvements can be made that

result in previously inaccessible

nuances of thought coming across.

But if my research were to end

with this philological groundwork, it

would hardly motivate me to rise from

bed in the morning. While that atten-

tion to linguistic detail brings a certain

satisfaction, the exciting part is what

it enables: a further examination of and

engagement with the philosophical

ideas. In this second stage I approach

the material not merely as a passive

observer, but as a fellow participant in

the debate in question.

Much of my energy for the study of

Indian philosophical texts derives from

a sense of their as yet untapped poten-

tial for enriching contemporary phi-

losophy. It may seem strange to some

that ideas from the distant past could

be enlightening today. Are not such

ideas ‘of merely historical interest’?

The history of physics, for example,

holds no claim on a physicist. A physi-

cist may well be interested in the his-

tory of their discipline (perhaps to

remind them of how physics got towhere it is today, or to show them

where past physicists went wrong);

but if they are not, they are not losing

an opportunity to improve their phys-

ics. The history of physics is prima-

rily history, not physics. Those who

engage in the history of philosophy, by

contrast, are actually doing philosophy.

That is one of the differences between

the history of philosophy and ‘the

history of ideas’ or ‘intellectual his-

tory’, these latter two being branches

of history.5

There are two reasons for this differ-

ence between, on the one hand, the

history of philosophy and, on the other

hand, the history of science or the

history of ideas. One is the level of

immersion in, engagement with, and

evaluation of the ideas that character-

izes the history of philosophy. They

are treated philosophically, not as his-

torical curiosities to be assigned to an

intellectual museum, or epipheno-

mena to be set in their socio-economic

context. The other is that while there

is evolution and some progress in phi-

losophy, past philosophies are not

rendered redundant by subsequent

ones. Some assertions put forward by

philosophers in the past may have

turned out to be empirically falsified.

But in that case they were not philo-

sophical assertions but empirical ones.

During the last century there

was a shift among metaphysicians

away from idealism towards realism(and among philosophers of mind

from dualism towards physicalism).

But that was not because idealism (or

dualism) was refuted. The spotlight

shifted towards this new terrain be-

cause of a growing awareness of dif-

ferent, neglected territory waiting to

be explored. But an exclusive focus

on this new territory leads to the older

approaches and paradigms remaining

in the dark and their potential insights

being unavailable. Thus philosopherswould do well to remind themselves

of the history of their discipline in

order to become aware of the limits

of their current methodologies and

preoccupations. To look to past phi-

losophies for inspiration is not, or

certainly need not be, conservative.

It rather affords the radical possibility

of challenging the narrow horizons

of the discipline as it is conducted

today.

While this assertion of the rele-

vance and value of the history of phi-

losophy has required some defence, to

combat those who over-generalize

notions of progress from the natural

sciences and technology, surely the

relevance and value of studying the

belletrist ic literature of the past

requires no such defence. The fact

that a novel has been written in our

own time does not mean that it will

move us more, or teach us more about

human nature, than a work written by

Kalidasa.

Much of my own work in the His-tory of Indian Philosophy is concerned

with a complex of enduring philoso-

phical problems, those that surround

‘personal identity’.6 What, if anything,

is the essence of a sentient being?

How long does an individual beinglast? Am I numerically the same thing

as I was just after I was born (even if

I no longer contain any cells that I

5. See Bernard Williams, Descartes: TheProject of Pure Enquiry, 1978, p. 9; and theconcluding chapter of Adrian Moore, The

Evolution of Modern Metaphysics; MakingSense of Things, 2011.

6. The Self ’s Awareness of Itself. Bhatta Ramakantha’s Arguments Against the Bud-dhist Doctrine of No-Self. Vienna, 2006.‘Ramakantha’s Concept of Unchanging Cog-nition (nityajnana): Influence from Buddhism,Samkhya and Vedanta’, in J. Bronkhorstand K. Preisendanz (eds.), From Vasubandhuto Caitanya. Studies in Indian Philosophyand Its Textual History. Papers of the 12th

World Sanskrit Conference, 2010a, Volume10.1, pp. 79-120. ‘Bhatta Ramakantha’sElaboration of Self-Awareness (svasamve-dana), and How it Differs from Dharmakirti’sExposition of the Concept’, Journal of IndianPhilosophy 38(3), 2010b, pp. 297-321. ‘TheSelf as a Dynamic Constant; Ramakantha’sMiddle Ground Between a Naiyayika Eter-nal Self-Substance and a Buddhist Stream of Consciousness-Moments’, Journal of Indian


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did then)? What are the criteria for

individuation of people? Is a human

being a thing or a process? Is it inco-

herent to claim that one and the same

individual could continue to exist after

the death of its body? On the one hand

were various Buddhist views claiming

that we have no self, no essence, that

we are changing – not only qualita-

tively but also numerically – in every

single moment, that we are a process

rather than a thing. These views

attained a new level of sophistica-

tion with Dignaga (ca. 470-530) and

Dharmakirti (6th or 7th century). On

the other hand were various thinkers

belonging to the text-traditions of

Nyaya (e.g. Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara,

Bhasarvajna, Jayanta Bhatta), Vaishe-

shika (e.g. Prashastapada, Shridhara,

Vyomashiva) and Sankhya who

claimed that we have an eternally

unchanging self. In the middle ground

between these extremes we find the

Mimamsa view of Kumarila (an older

contemporary of Dharmakirti’s) and

the views of various Jain philosophers.

Then there were others who came

up with views different from all of

the above: Advaita Vedantins such as

Shankara and Mandanamishra, Vaish-

nava Vedantins such as Yamunacarya,Ramanuja, Madhva, Jayatirtha and

Vyasatirtha, Non-Dualistic Shaivas

such as Utpaladeva and Abhinava-

gupta, Dualistic Shaivas such as

Narayanakantha and Ramakantha.

The coexistence within the Indiantradition of rational debate of so many

opposed groups is in itself remarkable

and has not yet received the attention it

deserves – neither inside ‘the academy’

nor among the politicians or general

public who make essentialist pro-

nouncements about ‘the Hindu tradi-

tion’ or ‘the Sanskrit tradition’. As

knowledge of this Sanskrit tradition

of philosophical debate between

the various schools becomes more

widespread, these one-sided charac-

terizations will become untenable –

invalidated by the spectacle of a far

greater diversity that was contained

within, and celebrated by, these schools.

Contemporary Euro-American philo-sophers tend to address the issues of

selfhood enumerated above in igno-

rance of the fact that sophisticated

South Asian intellectuals have been

reflecting on them for many hundreds

of years longer than western thinkers;

many of the issues that arose in Europe

in the period between Descartes and

Kant had already been debated in

India for the previous thousand years

– in ways that overlap, but differ in

unexpected and revealing ways, for

example by making use of different

distinctions. There is a growing aware-

ness within the discipline of Philoso-

phy of its parochialism and need tointernationalize. Some who have been

trained exclusively in western philo-

sophy are looking to, and drawing on,

the Indian material. Once more schol-

ars emerge who are trained to access

and make analytical use of both the

South Asian and the western material,

the encounter between the two tradi-

tions is sure to yield new perspectives

on a variety of problems.

It is my hope – and there are

some signs that it is not an unrealisticone – that Indian philosophy will

soon begin a similar trajectory to that

taken by Greek philosophy in the

middle of the twentieth century, when

it moved from being restricted to

Classics syllabi to becoming a manda-

tory part of every philosophy degree.7

Philosophy 42(1), 2014, pp. 173-193. And seeforthcoming articles in PurushottamaBilimoria (ed.), Routledge History of IndianPhilosophy, Routledge, London; and in JoergTuske (ed.),The Bloomsbury Research Hand-book to Indian Epistemology and Metaphys-ics, Bloomsbury, London.

7. Personal communication, Jonardon Ganeri,6 November 2013.

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