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Transcript of Index [link.springer.com]978-1-4615-2790-9/1.pdf · Index ABM Treaty (1972),57,59 Absolute gains,...
Index
ABM Treaty (1972),57,59Absolute gains, 106-107,313
model, 109-112neoliberal institutional model, 136
137,138payoff, 108structural model, 138-145
Absolute zero power, 218Accept, 310
defined, 304Accidents Measures Agreement (1971),
62Actors, defined, 300Africa, international cooperation and,
67-68Agendas, strategy of, 26Aggarwal, Vinod, 4Agreement on the Prevention of
Nuclear War (1973),62Alexander, 18Allan, Pierre, 4Anarchy
international, 105-106, 109, 116117
neoliberal institutional model, 134structural model, 143, 144, 146
Antarctica Treaty (1959), 57, 68Approximate equality, 285Arbatov, Georgi, 213Arbitration, 25Arena, 300, 305-306,317,320Argentinean public debt, 307-309
Arms building, 61Arms control, 60-61Arms race, 71n., 76, 78, 79Arms trade, 67Arms transfers, limiting of, 64Aron, Raymond, 136Assignment and matching, 25Assurance game, 119-120, 122Attack/accept (linkage offer), 259, 261-
262,267-268Auctions, 25Aumann, Robert, 13, 15, 16, 18-19,20,
22,211,212Aumann and Dreze theory, 211, 212Aumann-Shapley value, 210-211Austrian State Treaty of 1955, 57, 68Automata models of repeated games,
24Avoiding Accidental Nuclear War
(1971, 1973),57,61Axelrod, Robert, 20,49, 50, 76, 359Axelrod's repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma, 20
Bacharach, Michael, 17Backwards induction, 16Bargaining questions, 203Bargaining set, 23, 39Bargaining theory, 21-22
axiomatic, 21noncooperative, 21-22
373
374
Bargaining time, 207"Basic Agreement" of 1938, 362Battle of the Sexes, 49Bayesian equilibrium, 152, 154Bayes's rule, 191,233,237Belief, linkage possibility, 264Berlekamp, Elwyn, 17Bernheim, Douglas, 18, 24Bilateral coalitions, 56-58Bilateral labor-management
monopolies, 351, 356Bilateral relationships, international
security and, 54-56Binmore, Ken, 13, 14, 16,21,24Biology, 25Bipolarity, 120-122, 226Bipolar world, 54Bluffing, 184-185Bosnian Crisis (1908),248-249Bracken, 1., 44Brams, Steven, 4, 21, 25, 32, 77Brandenburger, Adam, 24Brito, 32Brownie points, 35, 36, 38
Called Bluff, 312-313Calmfors, L., 363-364Camp David agreement, 63Canadian Department of External
Affairs, 204Canadian Department of National
Defence, 204Canning, David, 21-22Caplow, Theodore, 2, 81-82Caplow's coalition theory, 2-3, 81-82Cardinal preference orderings (CPOs),
309,314Cardinal utility schemes, 78Case, James, 19Caucuses, 204-215, 216, 217, 219Centipede sequential game, 3, 4n.Centralization, 363-364Characteristic function, 22, 38-40, 41
43,44n-person game, 35-36
Characteristic function (coalitional)games, 22-23
Characteristic function form, 51, 53
INDEX
Characterizing function V(S),37-39Chemical weapons agreement, 57Chicken (game), 3,4,49, 76, 77, 78,
281constrained preferences, 311-313,
317contract curve above the stable
Nash equilibrium, 86, 87matrix, 12outcome, 303, 304
Cho, 18Classical cooperative game theory, 76,
78Classical game thoery, 78Classicism, 10-11, 13, 14-15Cline, Ray, 213, 214, 216Cline's index (measures of power
resources), 213, 214Closed economies, 141Clusters, 121Coalitional form, 34-35, 43-44Coalition-bargaining problems, 96-
100Coalition formation, theories of, 23Coalition Formation Game, 342Coalition games, 31-45Coalitions, 78-83, 87-95Coalition-stability analysis, 93Coalition structures, 210Coalition structure value (CS-value),
211,212-219Coalition theory, 2-3Cold War, 314-321Collective-good theory, 2, 78, 93, 98Colman, Andrew, 13, 15Column, 301Committee on Disarmament (1971),
57,63Committee systems, 218Common Agricultural Policy, 338-339Common knowledge, theories of, 23-
24Common-threat perception, 96Community of interest, 334-335Complementary gains, 83-84Complete information, 227, 228, 229,
231Conference on Disarmament in
Europe (CDE), 206
INDEX
Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE),203-219
Confidence-building measures, 203,206
Conflict, 301, 302, 303, 313Conflict analysis, 21Consensual democracy, 360Consensus, defined, 304Consistency of beliefs, 186-187Constrained preferences, 321 n.Constrained preference orderings
(CPOs), 309-311Contract curve, 86, 248Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE), 206, 213, 216, 217Conventional forces agreement, 57Conway, John, 17Cooperate, 301, 302, 303Cooperation, 301, 303
economic analysi of EC, 327-344in absolute-gains model, 109in international relations theory,
142-143,144,146in labor relations, 347-354, 358-365international 47-48
Cooperation procedure, 327- 328Cooperative equilibrium, 114Cooperative game, 51, 70n.Cooperative takeoff, 119Cooperative tipping point, 118Cooperators, minimum number of, 118Coordination, 76
contract curve above the stableNash equilibrium, 86, 87
Coordination game, 76, 78Core, ll, 39, 96
defined, 23Core group, 205Corporatism, 363-364, 369n.Correlated equilibria, 18-19Cost allocation, 26Cost-benefit, 185-186Council of Ministers, 328, 333-334,
338, 344Countercoalition,41Counterthreat concept, 34Countervailing strategy, 225A Course in Microeconomic Theory, 14
375
Credible neologisms, 197Crises, game-theoretic analysis, 275
294Crisis bargaining, 234
signaling difficulties with linkage,245-273
Crisis Game, 276, 277full cooperation, 283Nash equilibria, 277, 282-290, 293payoffs and strategies, 278-282
Critical cost, 188Critical risk, 97Cross-alliance rivalry, 121Crossover point, Crisis Game, 276,
277,279Cuban Missile Crisis, 287Cutoff strategy, 157-160, 162
Dalkey, N., 32Dart duel, 19Dasgupta,21Davis, Morton, 11, 14-15Deadlock (game), 302, 304, 354, 356,
359constrained preference orderings,
311-313payoff, 302-303
Deadlock "type" games, 322n.constrained preference orderings,
311-313Dean, Jonathan, 203Debt rescheduling, 305-306, 307-309,
314-321Decision rules, 151-152, 153, 160-163
n-step, 172Defect, 301, 302Defections, 253, 271, 272, 302-303,
331,364- 365Defection threats, 98-99Defense Cooperation, 57Defensive cooperation, 122Defensive positionality, 121, 122Demand, defined, 304Density, 153Desjardins, Robert, 11Deterrence
rational, 179-200signaling and, 182-185
376
Development, lack of, 67Dictatorial-sequential unanimity
games (DSUGs), 156, 161, 164165
Dictatorial-sequential veto games(DSVGs), 156
Differential games, 19Disagreement vote, 164, 165-168Discount factor, 111-112, 113, 114,
120minimum, 114, 115, 116
Discounting, 20Distributional-coalition theory, 93Divine equilibria, 17Divine sequential equilibrium, 253,
266,269Divinity, 271-272Dixit, Avinash, 13Dollar auction, 16-17Dominated strategies, 198
elimination of, 194-196, 197successive elimination of, 187
Dresher, Melvin, 19Dreze, Jacques, 211, 212Driffill, 1., 363-364Duels, 19Duopoly, 77Dyads, 80Dynamic models, 79Dynamic nonconstant-sum games, 32
Eastern caucus, 204-207, 211, 212Econometrica, 18Economic rigidity, 348Economics of industrial organization,
24Effective benefit, 97Effectiveness of the coalition, 90Effort levels, 91Ellsberg, 32Embargo, 133, 134Employee participation, 350Epidemics, 66-67Epoch,300,305-306,317,320Equilibrium, 154, 185-193
behavior off the path, 253beliefs off the path, 271effect on reputation, 184
INDEX
imperfect, 282linkage model, 252-265structural model, 141, 142subgame perfect, 282-286, 289-293
Equilibrium proposal, 340, 342, 343,344
Equilibrium theory, 180Escalation, 232-234
Crisis Game, 279-286, 287, 288dynamics of, 225-242partial, in Crisis Game, 277probability of, 233
Essays on the Foundations of GameTheory, 16
European Community (EC),cooperation in, 4
European Community (EC) Treaties,327-344
formal model of two-stagedecision-making process, 337-343
European Council, 333-334European Monetary Authority, 335,
336European Monetary System (EMS),
330,333,335-339,341European Parliament (EP), 327, 335,
338Evolutionarily stable strategy, 25The Evolution of Cooperation, 49Expected internal benefit (K*ij)' 97Expolitation, 256, 259, 260, 264, 301,
359Extensive form, 33-34Extensive form games, 152-174
with two-stage character, 156
Fair division, 26Falklands/Malvinas conflict, 308-309False warnings, 63Farquaharson, Robin, 26Fashoda crisis, 261Fenoaltea, S., 353-354, 366n.Fictitious play, 18Final position, crisis game, 281, 282,
290Finite, defined, 17Finite games of perfect information in
extensive form, 16-17
INDEX
Finite two-person zero-sum games instrategic form, 17-19
First-period equilibrium outcome, 133,134
First-strike advantage, and linkage,251
First-strike advantage for the receiver,255,256-260,264-265
First-strike advantage for the sender,261-262,264-265
First-strike systems, 61, 62Fishburn, 16"Flexible response" doctrine, 225Folk Theorem, 12, 114Forward induction, 17-18Fragmented linkage, 333"Free-for-all" power value, 215Free-rider problem, 78-79Free-trade agreements, bilateral, 329Free-trade outcome, 133, 134, 147n.,
148n.Friedman, James, 14,23Fudenberg, Drew, 14, 18,20Fun and Games, 13Functional differentiation, 143Functional nondifferentiation, 143
Gain, concept of, 82-83Gale, David, 25Gale's game, 16-17The Game of Business, 23Games and Information, 13Games and markets, 25Games in coalitional form, 22-23Games without side-payments, 23Game theoretical models, 79Game theory
coalitonal form, 13international cooperation and, 48-
53levels of difficulty, 9-10limitations of, 15sources for international relations
specialists, 9-26syndromes making books on subject
unsatisfactory, 10-11Game Theory and Economic Behavior,
18
377
Game Theory for the Social Sciences,15
"Game Theory" (Aumann) in NewPalgrave Dictionary of Economics,15
Game Theory in the Social Sciences, 15Game tree, 33Gately, 45General defection, 354, 355, 356, 359Generating function method, 215George, S., 335Gilpin, Robert, 105, 136Global security level, 80-81Gordon, D. G., 32Grand coalition, 52Great Britain, European Monetary
System and, 335-336, 337, 339Green, Jerry, 3, 152, 153, 161Greenberg, 1., 342Greenhouse effect, 65-66Greenwood, Ted, 226Grieco, Joseph, 121, 122, 123n., 149n.Guth, Werner, 20Guy, Richard, 17Guyer, M. 1., 32
Hamburger, Henry, 13, 15, 16Harmony (game), 303, 304
constrained preference orderings,311-313
Harrington, Robert, 18Harris, Milton, 20Harsanyi, J., 32Harsanyi function, 42Harsanyi-Zeuthen critical-risk
principle, 96Hart, Sergiu, 23, 211, 342Harvey, Frank, 281Hegemonic war, 136Helsinki Final Act (1975), 57, 63Hero (game), constrained preference
orderings, 311-313Hildebrand, Werner, 25Holler, Manfred, 14Homicidal Chauffeur, 19Hot Line Agreement (1963),57,58,61Howard, Nigel, 21Hypergames, 21
378
IATO (1949), 57Ideal point, 247IIIing, Gerhard, 14Imperfect equilibrium, 282Implementability of decision rules,
151-152model, 153-154
Implicit agreements, 59Imputation, 35, 36-37Incentive compatibility, defined, 22Incentive theory, 154Incomplete information, 32, 76, 226,
231-232games of, 19-20signaling and reputation modeled by
games of, 20Incremental cost, of submitting in a
limited retaliation, 230Index of instability, 32Indifference curves, 83, 86, 87
linkage, 247-248Indifference map, 83-85, 86-88Indifference point, 270Individual situations (IS), 306-309In extensive form, defined, 16-17Information costs, 332INF Treaty (1987),57,60,62,69Inside gains, 90Institutions, 359Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs), 57, 61-62, 66Interested player, 250International cooperation, 47-48
game theory and, 48-53international security and, 57-64outside area of international
security, 65-68International Journal of Game Theory,
18International regimes, defined, 332International relations theory, 129International security, 47, 76
international cooperation and, 5864
qualitative characteristic functionapproach,53-58
Intervention cost, 185-186, 188, 2oon.,201n.
Intriligator, Michael D., 2, 32
INDEX
Iran-Iraq War, 64Irresolute defender, 231-232, 233-234Irresolute player, 250, 254-255, 257,
258-260Irresolute senders, 262, 263-264, 271-
272Isaacs, Rufus, 19Issue areas, 330, 337Issue-linkage, 333, 338, 341, 344
James, Patrick, 281Japan, duels and games of timing, 19Jenkins proposals, 335-336Jervis, Robert, 128, 180, 181, 182, 183,
184,189, 190,2oon.Jervis paradox, 3Johnson, Harry, 133, 147n.Joint distribution, 153Joint ventures, 151
decision rule example, 172-174utility of, 151
Jones, Anthony, 11Journal of Economic Theory, 18Journal of Theoretical Biology, 25
Kalai, E., 342Kelly, Jerry, 26Keohane, Robert 0., 123n., 128,329Kernel, 23Kilgour, Marc, 4, 25King Solomon, dilemma of, 22Kirwan, A., 25Kohlberg, Egon, 18Kreps, David, 14, 18, 19,20Kurz, Mordechai, 23, 211, 342
Labor conflicts (1955-1985), bycountry, 349, 351
Labor market, nature of, 352-358Labor relations, 347-365
conflicts (1955-1985),349Labor unions, 359-360Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 3, 152, 153, 161Lambelet, Jean-Christian, 4Languages of game theory, 33-34Large-n Assurance problem, 119-120
INDEX
Law of the Sea negotiations, 204-205Leader (game), 303, 304
constrained preference orderings,311-313
constrained preferences, 317Legislative structure, strategy of, 26Lemma 1,282,289,290,292Lemma 2, 290, 291, 292"Lemmings" effect, 190Levin, Richard, 11Limited nuclear options, 225-242Limited retaliation, dynamics of, 231-
236Limited-retaliation equilibria, 234Limited retaliation strategy, 226-236Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, 57,
58,60Limiting arms transfers, 57Limiting missile proliferation, 57Linkage
enforceability issues, 248in crisis bargaining, 245-273logic of, 246-249model, 249-265"receptive to" condition, 255signaling properties, 249success possibility, 246, 248, 249
Linkage accepted, 260, 262-263, 269Linkage attack, 260, 262-263, 269Linkage offers, 262Linkage reject, 260, 262-263, 269Linked mix, 259-260, 262-263, 264,
268-269,272Lipson, Charles, 128The Ingic of Images in International
Relations, 182Loss, concept of, 82-83Luce, I>uncan, 15, 16, 17, 18,23Luterbacher, Urs, 2-3
MacI>onald, John, 23McGinnis, M.I>., 265Machina, Mark, 16Managerial prerogative, 363Mann, I., 215Marx, Karl, 352Matrix form, 17,34Maximizing behavior, 186-187
379
Maximum winning coalition, 120-121Maxmin approach, 41May, Francis, 11Mayaguez rescue, 180, 182-183, 184,
185,2oon.Maynard-Smith, John, 25Mechanical design, 22Mechanism, 154Mehlmann, Albert, 19Merrill, Samuel, 25Mertens, Jean-Francois, 18,21Metagames,21Minimax theorem, 13Mixed strategies, 185, 314
linkage in crisis bargaining, 270-272, 273n.
Mixed-strategy equilibrium, 185Monotone likelihood ratios, 154Moore, John, 22Morgan, T. C, 248Morgenstern, 0., 11,33, 34, 35, 330,
342Morgenstern's stable sets, 11Morrow, James, 4Moulin, Herve, 15, 19,24,26,85Mutual consensus, 310, 311, 314, 315,
316,318Mutual cooperation, 354, 355, 356, 359Mutual defection, 301, 302Mutual deterrence, 59, 61, 64, 69, 76,
78Myerson, Roger, 14, 18,22
Nacht, Michael L., 226Nalebuff, Barry, 3, 13,32Nash bargaining axioms, 21Nash bargaining functions, 89Nash Bargaining Game, 340Nash equilibria, 3, 16, 148n., 159,314
for the coalition, 94foundations, refinements, and
generalizations, 17-19illustration of full-preference
orderings, 317, 319in Crisis Game, 277, 282-288, 289,
290,293sequential equilibrium, 186utility functions and, 84-87
380
Nash equilibrium solution, IINational Security Council, IINATO High Level Task Force, 205Negotiation analysis, 219Neoliberal institutionalism, 127-130,
138-139,146n.model, 131-138structural model, 142, 143, 144, 145
Neorealism, 127Neutral and nonaligned nations
(NNA), 204, 206-207, 211, 212,216
Never Cooperate (NC) strategy, 110112,113, 1l7-118, 119
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,15-21,23,24
Neyman, Abrahim, 24No consensus (NC), 309, 310, 314, 315,
316,318defined,305
Non-convex-utility possibility curves,86
Noncooperative equilibrium, 116-117Noncooperative game of coalition
formation, 330Noncooperative games, 70n.Noncooperative game theory, 14Nonintervention, 191, 192, 194-195,
197, 198,20In.Nonproliferative regime, 59-60Nontransferable utility (NTV) games,
23"No regret" criterion, 152Normal form, 17North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 204-205, 206, 213,216
No sidepayment (NSP) game, 38N-person game theory, 15
characteristic function, 35inconclusive state of, 219
N-step decision rule, 172N -step unanimity rule, 17l-172Nuclear deterrence, 226Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) (1968),57.58.59-60Nuclear terrorism, 57Nucleolus, 23Nye, Joseph S., Jr., 123n.
INDEX
Oil crisis, 45Oligopoly theory, 24Olson, Mancur, 93Omniscience, paradox of, 76O'Neill, Barry, 2, 3, 32One-step unanimity rule, 168-169, 173Open economies, 141Operations research, 15Optimal reaction curve, 92, 94, 95, 99Ordering principle, 143Ordeshook, Peter, 13, 14, 18,22-23,26Ordinal preference orderings, 311Ordinal preferences, 299-321Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development(OECD) countries, 359, 363
labor relations and economicpolicies, 347
Origin of games, 299-321Orthogonal coalition game, 41"Our Common House," 57Outcome function, 154, 159
implementable, 154Outer Space Treaty (1967),57,60Owen, Guillermo, 23, 211Oye, Kenneth, 128Ozone depletion, 66
Panofsky, Wolfgang K., 226Pareto dominance, 253-254, 272Pareto efficient games, 330Pareto efficient proposal, 343, 344Pareto equivalence, 116Pareto optimal contract curve, 86Pareto optimal frontier, 87Pareto optimal limit, 99Pareto optimal set, 86Pareto suboptimal dominant-strategy
equilibrium, 265Partition form of games, 330Partition function form, 42-43,89,91,
161, 162Payoffs, 35, 36, 38
cardinal utility schemes and, 78characteristic function, 40Coalition Formation Game, 342Crisis Game, 276, 278-282, 283, 286,
287
INDEX
free-trade outcome and, 147n., 148n.international cooperation and, 49,
50, 52limited retaliation, 229-230, 235,
237linkage in crisis bargaining, 270multiple, 78-79neoliberal institutional model, 132-
133, 134, 135, 136Prisoner's Dilemma, 359relative gains, 112-113secondary, 78-79structural model, 139-141, 142tit-for-tat strategy in dyads, 110
PD-59,225Pearce, 18Pentagonal world of five global
powers, 54-56Perfect equilibria, 17, 18Perfect equilibrium point, 32Perfect information, defined, 16-17Perfect sequential equilibrium (PSE),
187,197-199,201n.Permutation method, 215Pivotal player, 215Plenary sessions, 207-209, 210Policy coordination, 331Polish debt rescheduling, 314, 317-321Political structure, 129-130Ponnsard, Jean-Pierre, 15Posterior implementability, 157Posterior implementable rules, 161,
164Posterior implementable social-choice
rules, 163Postlewaite, A., 342Powell, Robert, 3-4, 32, 226Power given a specific coalition
structure,2I1Power resource possibility frontier,
95-96Preemptive strike, crisis game, 276Preference orderings, 309-312, 320Prevail, defined, 304-305Principal-agent models, 22Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), 3, II, 13, 15,
21,49-50, 76-78Axelrod's repeated, 20bargaining space, 304
381
bilateral labor-managementmonopoly, 351, 356, 359, 362
constrained preference orderings,3I1-3B
contract curve above the stableNash equilibrium, 86
cooperation in repeated games, 24European Community cooperation
procedure, 329linkage studies, 265mutual cooperation, with
international regimes, 331, 332neoliberal institutionalism and, 130,
131, 132, 133, 135-136ordering and cold war illustration,
315-316payoff, 302-303relative-gains maximization model,
109strategies, 303structural realism and, 146n., 147n.
148n.as theory of cooperation, 219Tucker exposition, 32
Private values model, 163-164Probabilities, 16Profit sharing, 350Proper equilibria, 17Pseudoquadratic functions as utility
functions, 84Public good decision, 168-172Public-good theory, 78
Quadratic functions, as utilityfunctions, 84
Qualified majority equilibriumproposal, 343, 344
Qualitative characteristic function, 5358
Qualitative characteristic functionapproach, 53-58
Quotient games approach, 2I1, 212,214-217,219
Raiffa, Howard, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23RAND Corporation, IIRapoport, Anatol, II, 15,21,23,32,50
382
Rasmusen, Eric, 13-14,20Rational decision making, 300Rational deterrence, 179-200Rationality, 19Rationalizability, 18Reaction functions, 86, 87, 88Receiver (linkage), 247-248, 249Reciprocated cooperation, 353Recognition, Rapprochement (1971-),
57Refinements, defined, 17Regional conflicts in Asia, 57Regional Development Fund, 338-339Regional powers, 56Relative effort level inside the
coalition, 91Relative gains, 105, 106-123,313
definition, 108-109international politics as problem of,
106-107maximization, 107, 108maximization model, 109-122neoliberal institutional 'model, 136-
138structural model, 138-145
Relative-gains payoff, 108Relative losses, 137-138Relative power resources of the
coalition, 90Repeated-game model, 136Repeated games, 20-21Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game,
20,49Reputation, 181-182, 189, 190, 192
limited retaliation and, 231-232,242n.
modeled by games of incompleteinformation, 20
sequential equilibrium and, 193, 194,195,197-199
value of, 182Reputation paradox, 180, 199Resolute defender, 231, 233-234, 240Resolute player, 250, 254-255, 257,
258-260,261-262Resolute senders, 254, 257, 258-260,
261-262,263-264,271-272Retaliation, Crisis Game, 279-283,
286,289
INDEX
Retaliation function, 282, 288Revelation principle, 152
defined,22Reversed equilibrium, 192-193, 201n.Richardson, 32Riley, John, 20Risk, of defection, 97Risk aversion, 359, 364-365Roberts, 1., 342Rome Treaty, 327Roth, Alvin, 21, 23, 25, 211Row, 292Row, 301Rubinstein, Ariel, 16,24
Sabourian, H., 20Saltsjobaden compromise, 362SALT Treaties (1972,1979),57,60Schelbert-Syfrig, H., 365Schelling, Thomas c., 11, 31-32, 226-
227Schelling diagram, 118Schlesinger, James R., 226Schlesinger doctrine, 225, 231Schouer, Andrew, 22, 24Schwodiauer, Gerhard, 22, 24Scoring systems, 213Scoville, Herbert, 226Seabed Treaty (1970),57,60Security guarantee, 57Segmented labor market, 351Self-falsifying inferences, 184Seiten, Reinhard, 293-294Sender (linkage), 247-248, 249, 254Sequential crisis equilibria, 232, 236,
239- 242Sequential equilibria, 17, 18, 186-188,
191-193,271-272linkage model, 252-265refinements, 193-199
Sequential unanimity games (SUG),151-174
agreed termination, impossibility of,163-174
equivalence between posteriorimplementation and SUGimplementation, 161-163
implementability, 159
INDEX
optimal strategies, 157-159private values model, 163-164
Sequential veto game (SVG), 155, 156Settling regional disputes, 57Settling regional disputes in Africa
(1988),57,64Seven Weeks War (1866),248Shapley, Lloyd, 23, 25, 210-211, 212,
215Shapley-Shubik power index, 210-211,
214,215,216,217Shapley value, 2, 11,23, 52-53, 210
211,218,342Sharp, Jane, 206Shubik, Martin, 2, 15, 17, 19,23,210
211,212Sidepayments,44,51Signaling, 17-18
linkage, 249, 273n.modeled by games of incomplete
information, 20strategic use of, 182-185
Simultaneous announcement game,152
Single European Act (SEA), 327-328,330,332,337,338,342,343
Single Integrated Operational Plans(SIOP),231
Sino-American "rapprochement"(1972),75
Sino-Indian War (1962), 261Six-Nation Peace Initiative, 63Sobel, Joel, 20Social choice theory, 26Social decision rules, 157"Solvable Nuclear War Models," 32Sonnenschein, Hugo, 24Snidal, Duncan, 3, 78Spheres of Influence, 59Stability analyses, 93-96Stable equilibria, 17, 18, 113-114Stable set, 39Stag Hunt, 3,49, 323n.
constrained preference orderings,311-313
START, elimination of fixed-siteICBMs, 57, 61-62
Status quo decision, 153Steering committee (NATO), 205
383
Stein, Arthur A., 128, 273n.Step function, 160, 161, 162Stockholm Agreement (1987),57,63Strategic form, 17-19,33-34,40
defined,17Strategic Integrated Operational Plans
(SIOP),225Strategic interaction, 300-301
terminology problems, 301-305Strategies, 154
Crisis Game, 278-287limited retaliation and sequential
crisis equilibrium, 236-242Strategy and Conscience, 15Strong-majority-rule approach, 213Strong ordinal preferences, 32Structural realism, 127-130, 133, 134,
136- 138, 146n.structual model of absolute and
relative gains problem, 138-145Subgame imperfect equilibrium, 289Subgame perfect, 134-135Subgame-perfect equilibria, 143,282-
286,289-293Superadditivity assumption, 51, 71 n.Supergames, 20-21Supervision, 352-354, 366n.Survival Game, 50, 51, 60
dealing with international terrorism,63
Sutton, John, 21-22Sweden, labor relations, 362-363, 364,
365,368n.Switzerland, labor market, 4, 352, 355-
362,364-365, 367n., 368n.Symbolism of the moves, 3Symmetrical decision functions, 88Symmetric games, 70n.
Tactical linkage, 333Tariffs, 133, 134, 142, 147Taylor, P., 335Technology of warfare, 148n.Termination, agreed, impossibility of,
163- 174Terrorism, international, 63Theology, 76Theories of coalition formation, 23
384
The Theory of Industrial Organization,14
Theory of moves, 21Thinking Strategically, 13Thomas, L. c., 21, 25Threat, 39,44
characteristic and partition functionforms, 39-43
Threat concept, 34Threat Game, 281, 282Threat point, 340Threat strategies, 86threat value, 98Three-caucus form of bargaining, 204-
215Timing, games of, 19Tipping point, 118, 119, 120Tipping zone, 119Tirole, Jean, 14, 18,20,24Tit-for-tat rule, 49-50Tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, 110-112,
113, 117-118Tracing procedure, 18Tradeoff functions, 89, 91Tradeoff gains, 83-84Transaction costs, 332"Trembling-hand perfectness," 282,
285,289,293-294Triads, 78-100Trianguar trade, 50-51Trieste crisis (1954), 262Trilateral coalitions, 56-57Troops reduction, 203Tucker, A. W., 11, 32The 2X2 Game, 32Two-person game thoey, 15Two-person zero-sum games, 11Two-person zero-sum theory, 11Two-step unanimity rule, 169-172
Ultima ratio, 136Ultimate payoff (utility), as two-step
process, 108 .Unanimous equilibrium proposal
(UEP), 340, 342, 344Uninterested player, 250United Nations, 63United Nations (treaty) (1946),57
INDEX
United Nations Educational, Scientific,and Cultural Organization(UNESCO), constitution, 69
U.S. Army's Armored DivisionEquivalent method, 213
U.S. Electoral College, 218Unit square, games on, 19Universal divinity, 187, 196-197Universally divine equilibria, 17Unlimited attack, 228-229, 230-231Unlinked mix, 259. 262-263, 268, 272Unlinked offer, 258-259, 262, 264Unlinked offer accepted, 257-258,
266-267,260-261Unlinked offer rejected, 258-259, 261,
267Unstable dynamic equilibria, 86Upper constraint, of limit of resources,
90User's Manual, 18, 20Utilities, 16, 35, 36, 38, 77-79
extensive form game, 153for linkage issue, 250state's, 139strategies in linkages, 270-272
Utility functions (i), 89-91, 168,340Utility function (U), 83-84Utility possibility frontier, 86
Value, 39van Damme, Eric, 15, 18,20,25Vienna Arms Talks, 203-219Von Neumann, J., 11,33, 34, 35, 330,
342Von Neumann stable sets, 11Voting, strategy of, 26
Wage rigidity, 350Waltz, Kenneth, 105, 107, 128, 129
130, 136, 139, 143, 146War, structural model, 139-141, 142-
143War initiation, 76Warning systems, 63Warsaw Pact, 204, 206, 213Weber, Robert, 18,20,25Weber, Shlomo, 4, 342
INDEX
Western caucus, 204-207, 211, 212-213
Wiesmeth, H., 4Williams, John, IIWilson, Robert, 20Winning Ways for Your Mathematical
Plays, 17Winter War (1939-1940),246"Workers involved" series, 357-358,
367n."Working days lost" series, 357-358,
367n.Working groups, 204-205World powers, 54-56
Worth, 35, 36, 38
Yom Kippur War (1973), 277Young, H. P., 211Young, Peyton, 25
Zagare, Frank, 15, 770-1 normalization, 350-1 normalized form, 71n.Zero sum, defined, 17Zero-sum games, 11,49Zeuthen's principle, 322n.
385