IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ... 14-15, John Doe 3-9, Linebarger Goggan Blair &...

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.

LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMPSON LLP, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS.

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CAUSE No. 4:15-cv-03227 JURY

JOINT PRETRIAL ORDER

1. APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

José D. Iraheta Major, United States Air Force 4520 W. Oakellar Ave. Unit 13307 Tampa, FL 33681 Telephone: (832) 755-3195 Facsimile: (832) 201-0355 E-mail: [email protected]

PLAINTIFF, PRO SE

Edward J. “Nick” Nicholas Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP 4828 Loop Central Drive, Suite 600 Houston, TX 77081 [email protected] Attorney for Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris County, and Elisa Hand Randall B. Clark McGuireWoods, LLP 600 Travis Street, Suite 7500 Houston, Texas 77002

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[email protected] Attorney for Defendants CountryWide Home Loans Inc., Bank of America N.A., BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P. f/k/a CountryWide Home Loans Servicing L.P.

2. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP (“Linebarger”), Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District (“CFISD”), Elisa Hand, Harris County, and John Doe 1-15 improperly added, billed, collected, and/or sought to collect various penalty, fees, and interests amounts related to Plaintiff’s real estate property violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) and Plaintiff’s civil rights under the Civil Rights Act, Section 1983. Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP (“Linebarger”), Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District (“CFISD”), Elisa Hand, Harris County, and John Doe 1-15, violated the RICO statutes, tortiuously interfered with Plaintiff’s contractual relationship with his lenders, were negligent, made negligent misrepresentations, committed fraud, and defamed Plaintiff’s character. Defendants CountryWide Home Loans Inc., Bank of America N.A., BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P. f/k/a CountryWide Home Loans Servicing L.P. was negligent, violated the Texas Property Tax Code Section 31.02(a) and (b), and improperly paid over $14,000, to Defendants Linebarger, CFISD, and Harris County in various penalty, fees, interests, and property tax amounts related to Plaintiff’s real estate property ignoring Plaintiff’s rights under the Texas Property Tax Code and charging Plaintiff 10.875% annual interest.

3. JURISDICTION

This is an action over which the Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to

U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901, et seq. The amount in controversy is in excess of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Accordingly, the Court also has federal diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). No challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction have been presented.

4. MOTIONS

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Plaintiff: Docket No. 206, Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions Defendants:

Docket No. 209, MOTION for Summary Judgment by BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, Bank Of America, NA, Countrywide Home Loans Inc.

Docket No. 194, MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by

Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Elisa Hand, Harris County, John Doe 1 & 2, John Doe 10-13, John Doe 14-15, John Doe 3-9, Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar

Docket No. 193, MOTION for Sanctions, MOTION to Dismiss

Complaint, MOTION for Default Judgment against All Plaintiffs, MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment , MOTION to Compel Deposition by Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Elisa Hand, Harris County, John Doe 1 & 2, John Doe 10-13, John Doe 14-15, John Doe 3-9, Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar.

5. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Plaintiff: (1) Contends Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP,

Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Elisa Hand, Harris County, and John Doe 1-15 lack any immunity to/from Plaintiff’s claims for violations of SCRA, CRA, RICO, tortious interference with Plaintiff’s contractual relationship with his lenders, negligence and common law negligence, negligent misrepresentations, fraud, and defamation of Plaintiff’s character.

(2) Contends Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Elisa Hand, Harris County, and John Doe 1-15 violated Plaintiff’s SCRA’s rights, privileges, and immunities.

(3) Contends Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Elisa Hand, Harris County,violated his civil rights by depriving Major Iraheta of a federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity with respect to the Walton property and Defendants violated the federal staturoty rights, privileges, or immunities granted to him under the SCRA.

(4) Contends that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson,

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LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, Harris County, and Elisa Hand violated his rights under Texas Property Tax Code, Section 31.02, with respect to Plaintiff’s Walton and/or Madeira properties;

(5) Contends that the property taxes on Plaintiff’s Pleasantbrook, Walton, and Madeira were not delinquent;

(6) Contends that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, CFISD, Elisa Hand, and Bank of America violated his rights under Texas Property Tax Code, Section 31.02, with respect to Major Plaintiff’s Pleasantbrook property.

(7) Contends that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, and John Doe 1-15 acted without authority, outside of their statutory mandate;

(8) Contends that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Elisa Hand, and John Doe 1-15 On violated RICO 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)–(c);

(9) Contends that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, CFISD, Harris County, Elisa Hand, and Bank of America were negligent in their actions and/or ommissions;

(10) Contends that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, CFISD, Harris County, and Elisa Hand tortiuously interfered with Plaintiff’s contractual relationship with his lenders;

(11) Contends that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, CFISD, Harris County, and Elisa Hand defamed Plaintiff’s Character;

(12) Contends that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, CFISD, Harris County, and Elisa Hand made negligent misrepresentations;

(13) Contends that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, CFISD, Harris County, and Elisa Hand committed fraud;

(14) Contends he is entitled to Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, Actual Damages, Compensatory Damages, and Punitive Damages 6. ADMISSIONS OF FACT

Plaintiff: Plaintiff is not aware of which facts admitted by the Defendants.

7. CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT

Plaintiff: Plaintiff is not aware of which facts are disputed by the Defendants.

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8. AGREED PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff: Plaintiff is not aware of any legal propositions of laws agreed to by the Defendants.

9. CONTESTED PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff:

(1) Defendants lack any type of immunity for Plaintiff’s claims: see Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1407, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673, 684, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 14, *22-23 (U.S. 1980); McDaniel v. Town of Double Oak, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 1666, *27, 2012 WL 662367 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Mar. 1, 2012); Nivens v. City of League City, 245 S.W.3d at 474; Dallas County Cmty. College Dist. v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868, 876-79 (Tex. 2005); Camacho v. Samaniego, 954 S.W.2d 811, 822 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, pet. denied); Austin Nat'l Bank of Austin v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 272, 71 S.W.2d 242, 246 (1934); Shaw v. Phillips Crane & Rigging, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex. 1982); and Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Schindler, No. A14-90-00385-CV, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 1431, 1991 WL 94414 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] June 6, 1991, writ denied); City of Dallas v. England, 846 SW 2d 957 - Tex: Court of Appeals, 3rd Dist. 1993; Tex. S. Univ. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 212 S.W.3d 893, 907 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dis] 2007, pet. denied); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 169, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1834, 118 L. Ed. 2d 504, 515, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2702, *19, 60 U.S.L.W. 4383, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4244, 92 Daily Journal DAR 6644, 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 230 (U.S. 1992); Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 406-07; see Poole v. Houston & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882); Cantey Hanger, LLP, 467 S.W.3d at 482 (quoting Dixon Financial Servs. v. Greenberg, Peden, Siegmyer & Oshman, P.C., No. 01-06-00696-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 20, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.)); Gaia Envtl., Inc. v. Galbraith, 451 S.W.3d 398, 399, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 10100, *1 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2014);

(2) Plaintiff’s property taxes on the Pleasantbrook, Walton, and Madeira properties were not delinquent: see TEX. PROP. TAX CODE § 31.02(a) & (b);

(3) to state a claim for SCRA relief, Plaintiff is “required to plead facts sufficient to prove the following elements of a SCRA claim: (1) an interest at a rate above six percent (2) assessed against a servicemember while on active duty (3) based on delinquent property taxes relating to "property ... owned individually by a servicemember or jointly by a servicemember and a dependent or dependents."; Davis

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v. City of Philadelphia, 821 F.3d 484, 489 (3d Cir.2016); (4) Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj

Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Elisa Hand, and John Doe 1-15 committed, and are liable for violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims: see Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1407, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673, 684, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 14, *22-23 (U.S. 1980); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 101, 106 (1989) Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978). West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982); City of Canton v. Harris, 489; U.S. 378 (1989); Gold v. City of Miami, 1998 WL 54803 (11th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488 (11th. Cir. 1997); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1170 (11th Cir. 2009); Halberstam v. Welch, 227 U.S. App. D.C. 167, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983), Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 128 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1994);

(5) Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Elisa Hand, and John Doe 1-15 committed, and are liable for, RICO violations: see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1); Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991); European Cmty. v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1282 (2d Cir. 1991); Bank of N. Ill. v. Nugent, 584 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); LaFlamboy v. Landek, 587 F. Supp. 2d 914, 937-38 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Bonsall Vill., Inc. v. Patterson, No. 90-0457, 1990 WL 139383, at *4-6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1990); Friedlob v. Trustees of Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, 905 F. Supp. 843, 858-59 (D. Colo.1995); Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 488-93; Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1366-67 (7th Cir. 1988); Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1987); Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 388 F.3d 990, 1004 (7th Cir. 2004); Craig Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Viacom Outdoor, Inc., 528 F.3d 1001, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 714 (2d Cir. 1987)); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 995 F. Supp. 451, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

(6) Plaintiff is entitled to damages, including punitive damages: See Smock v. Iowa Interstate Railroad Ltd et al, Case No. 4:07-cv-04007-MMM-JAG, (M.D. Illinois); Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(2); Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F. 2d 211(1985); Canfield v. Atlas Storage S. Bay, LLC, No. 12-CV-1574, 2012 WL 4062479 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2012); Gordon v. Pete’s Auto Service of Denbigh, 637 F.3d 460-461 (4th Cir. 2011); Com-Tech Assocs. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 753 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d , 938 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Hale, 13 F.3d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir.1994); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 761 (9th

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Cir.1985); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978).

(7) Should the Court contemplate imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff, it must do the same against the Defendants for their, and their counsel’s, conduct during the March 18, 2017 deposition Plaintiff conducted of Defendant Elisa Hand and Harris County employee Irma Calvillo: see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 30(c)(1), & 37; Timms v. LZM, L.L.C., 657 Fed.Appx. 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam), citing Eastway Gen. Hosp. Ltd. v. Eastway Women’s Clinic, Inc., 737 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1984); Craig v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, 384 F. App’x. 531, 533 (8th Cir. 2010)(paraphrasing the Advisory Committee’s comments to Rule 30(d)(2)). Deville v. Givuadan Fragrances Corp., 419 F. App’x. 201, 207 (3rd Cir. 2011)(upholding sanctions for abusive, unprofessional and obstructive conduct during deposition); Specht v. Google, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 596, 598-599, 603 (N.D. Ill. 2010)(imposing sanctions for speaking objections that obstructed the deposition); BNSF Ry. Co. v. San Joaquin Valley RR Co., 2009 WL 3872043, *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2009)(imposing sanctions for inappropriate and burdensome objections); . Accident Care Specialists of Portland, Inc. v. Allstate Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-01033-MO (D. Or. Jan. 6, 2014). 10. EXHIBITS

A. Plaintiff’s Exhibits’ List is attached as Exhibit A.

B. Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar,

Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Elisa Hand, Harris County, and John Doe 1-15 Exhibits’ List is attached as Exhibit B.

C. Defendants CountryWide Home Loans Inc., Bank of America N.A.,

BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P. f/k/a CountryWide Home Loans Servicing L.P. Exhibits’ List is attached as Exhibit C.

11. WITNESSES

A. Plaintiff’s Witness’ list is attached as Exhibit D.

B. Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar,

Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Elisa Hand, Harris County, and John Doe 1-15 Witness’ List is attached as Exhibit E.

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C. Defendants CountryWide Home Loans Inc., Bank of America N.A., BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P. f/k/a CountryWide Home Loans Servicing L.P. Witness’ List is attached as Exhibit F.

D. If other witnesses to be called at the trial become known, their names,

addresses, and subject of their testimony will be reported to opposing counsel in writing as soon as they are known; this does not apply to rebuttal or impeachment witnesses.

12. SETTLEMENT

All settlement efforts have been exhausted, this case cannot be settled, and it

will have to be tried by a Jury, as requested by Plaintiff. 13. TRIAL

A. Plaintiff anticipates that the trial will last 10 trial days. B. Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar,

Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Elisa Hand, Harris County, and John Doe 1-15 anticipate that the trial will last______ trial days.

C. Defendants CountryWide Home Loans Inc., Bank of America N.A., BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P. f/k/a CountryWide Home Loans Servicing L.P. anticipate that the trial will last______ trial days.

D. Logistical problems:

(1) Plaintiff:

• As an active duty servicemember, Plaintiff is subject to military authority, control, and disposition. Plaintiff has already deconflicted the July 12, 2017 Pre-trial conference, and the Jul/Aug trial term, any changes to either pre-trial conference and trial term have the potential for Plaintiff to be unavailable and seek a stay pursuant SCRA.

• Plaintiff currently resides out-of-state in Tampa, Florida. • Plaintiff’s list of potential witnesses include various

witnesses that also reside out-of-state. • Plaintiff intends to use audio, visual, and computer

equipment.

(2) Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj

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Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Elisa Hand, Harris County, and John Doe 1-15:

(3) Defendants CountryWide Home Loans Inc., Bank of America N.A., BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P. f/k/a CountryWide Home Loans Servicing L.P.:

14. ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS

A. Proposed questions for the voir dire examination are attached as Exhibit

G: B. Proposed including instructions with authority, charge, definitions, and

special interrogatories, are attached as Exhibit H. C. Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law are

attached as Exhibit I. Date:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Approved:

Date:

José D. Iraheta Major, United States Air Force 4520 W. Oakellar Ave. Unit 13307 Tampa, FL 33681 Telephone: (832) 755-3195 Facsimile: (832) 201-0355 E-mail: [email protected] PLAINTIFF, PRO SE

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Date:

Edward J. “Nick” Nicholas Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP 4828 Loop Central Drive, Suite 600 Houston, TX 77081 [email protected] Attorney for Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris County, and Elisa Hand

Date:

Randall B. Clark McGuireWoods, LLP 600 Travis Street, Suite 7500 Houston, Texas 77002 [email protected] Attorney for Defendants CountryWide Home Loans Inc., Bank of America N.A., BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P. f/k/a CountryWide Home Loans Servicing L.P

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HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

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EXHIBIT A - PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBITS

TBD

Date:


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HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

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EXHIBIT B - Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School

District, Elisa Hand, Harris County, and John Doe 1-15 Exhibits’ List TBD

Date:

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HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

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EXHIBIT C - Defendants CountryWide Home Loans Inc., Bank of America

N.A., BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P. f/k/a CountryWide Home Loans Servicing L.P. Exhibits’ List

TBD

Date:

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HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

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PLAINTIFF’S POTENTIAL WITNESS LIST

TBD

Date:


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HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

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EXHIBIT E - Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP, Pankaj Parmar,

Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Elisa Hand, Harris County, and John Doe 1-15 Witness’ List

TBD

Date:

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HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

§ § § § § § § § § § § § §


EXHIBIT F - Defendants CountryWide Home Loans Inc., Bank of America

N.A., BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P. f/k/a CountryWide Home Loans Servicing L.P. Witness’ List

TBD

Date:

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HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

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EXHIBIT G - VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS

1. Has anyone here previously served as a juror either in a criminal or civil case? 2. Have you or a close family member sued or been sued by someone? If so,

what was the nature of the lawsuit? Does that experience affect your ability to be fair to all parties in deciding this case?

3. Has anyone here previously been a Defendant in a Court proceeding? 4. Have you or a close family member ever testified in a lawsuit? Does this

experience affect your ability to be fair to all parties in deciding this case? 5. Does anyone have any issues, or problems, understanding Legal issues? 6. Does any of you feel that a person should not have aright to bring a lawsuit

against a county, a school district, or they agents and employees? If so, please explain why.

7. If yes, has your previous experience as a juror affected your ability to be fair to all sides in the case?

8. Has anyone here served as either a state or federal grand juror? If yes, has your previous experience as a grand juror affected your ability to be fair to all sides in the case?

9. Does anyone know or has anyone dealt with the Major Iraheta, the defendants, or their attorneys? If yes, please identify the person you know or have dealt with, the nature of your relationship, and whether that relationship would hinder or affect your ability to give a fair trial to all of the parties in this case.

10. Does anyone have, or know a person that has, a financial interest in this case? 11. Does anyone have any problems, issues, or bias with the expected length of

this trial? 12. Does anyone have any issues, or conflicts, that may interfere with your ability

to serve as a juror for the duration of this trial?

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13. Which neighborhood do you live? 14. Does anyone know, or has anyone served, in the military? 15. Does anyone know a person, or has anyone ever been, or is currently

employed by any of the Defendants? 16. Does anyone know a person, or has anyone has, had any business dealings

with any of the Defendants? 17. Does anyone have any friends, or relatives, that have ever been, or are

currently employed by any of the Defendants? 18. Does anyone know of any reason he or she may be prejudiced for or against

the Major Iraheta or defendants because of the nature of the case, or otherwise?

19. Does anyone own a home/residential property? 20. Does anyone know of a person, or has anyone has, received an over-65

property tax exemption? 21. Does anyone know the property tax exemptions available to homeowners in

Texas? 22. Is anyone familiar with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act? 23. Have you read in the newspapers, read on the internet, seen on television, or

heard on the radio anything about this case, or do you have any knowledge of the facts or events of this case?

24. What is your education level? 25. Is anyone here a lawyer, married to a lawyer, or in a substantial relationship

with a lawyer? 26. Has anyone here studied law or worked in a law office? 27. Notwithstanding what you feel the law is or should be on a particular subject,

will you apply the law as I give it to you at the end of this case? 28. Does anyone here, because of the nature of your employment, feel that you

may not be able to judge this case impartially? 29. You may be called upon in this case to decide liability and/or award money

damages. Do any of you have any religious, philosophical, or other belief that prevents you from acting as an impartial juror in this case?

30. Has anyone ever, or know someone who has, worked at a collection agency? 31. Has anyone ever, or know someone who has, worked at a law firm? 32. Does anyone have any personal experience with a defamation claim? 33. Does anyone have any personal experience with a civil rights claim? 34. Does anyone have any personal experience with a Servicemember Civil Relief

Act claim? 35. Does anyone have any personal experience with a RICO claim? 36. Does anyone have any personal experience with a fraud claim? 37. Does anyone have any personal experience with a negligent representation

claim? 38. Does anyone have any personal experience with a negligence claim?

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39. Has anyone had experience with a similar case? 40. Has anyone had experience with the Legal System? 41. Does anyone have attitudes towards the Legal System? 42. Is everyone aware of your responsibility to apply Law to facts? 43. Does anyone have attitudes towards the Defendants or Major Iraheta? 44. Has anyone ever been a witness in a trial? 45. Does anyone have any reservations or qualms about this case? 46. There are two aspects to this case. First, you will determine whether the

conduct of the defendants makes them liable to the Major Iraheta. Only if you find a defendants liable do you then move on to determine damages. Would any of you, if the evidence supported a finding that one or more defendants is liable to Major Iraheta, have any hesitancy in awarding full, fair and adequate damages based upon the evidence, to Major, to compensate him for the Defendants’ actions? If yes, please explain.

47. Major Iraheta alleges that the Defendants violated his civil rights by virtue of depriving him of federal statutory rights, privileges, and immunities under the Servicemember Civil Relieft Act and thereby causing him to be injured. Do you have any bias towards Major Iraheta or the Defendants that would make it difficult to sit on this case based on those allegations? If yes, please explain?

48. What contact have you had with the Defendants through your work? In your social life? In any other aspects of your life?

49. Do you believe that a county and a school district, their agents and/or employees, in assessing and collecting taxes, also have a duty to comply with the law, in all circumstances? Please explain.

50. Have you heard or read about incidents of misconduct by any of the Defendants?

51. Do you have an opinion of which is more important, profits, or preserving military personnel federal and state statutory rights? If so, what is your opinion.

52. Are you willing to enforce the civil rights of Major Iraheta as would any other right he and you are entitled to as citizens of this country?

53. This is a lawsuit brought by Major Iraheta against Harris County, CFISD, the law firm Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, and their employees or agents. Do you agree that citizens who believe they have been treated illegally or unfairly have a right to bring suit against governmental or municipal entities?

54. Do you have any problem with the idea of Major Iraheta suing a county and/or a school district because of the actions their employees or agents?

55. What is your opinion with Judge Gorsuch quote "Nobody is above the law in this country”?

56. You will also be instructed that punitive damages may be awarded, if liability is found, when the conduct of an individual defendant is so egregious as to exhibit reckless disregard for the rights of the plaintiff, Major Iraheta, so as to require an award which is additional to compensatory damages, whose

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purpose is to punish that defendant or deter them from future similar misconduct. A. Does any of you believe that you would have difficulty, if the evidence

supported it, with the concept of awarding punitive damages, in this particular case? Please explain.

57. If you were Major Iraheta, would you be completely comfortable having you as a juror on this case?

58. Can you think of anything in your own life that reminds you of this case? What and how?

59. Is there anything that you have seen or heard that would make it hard for you to render a verdict in this case?

60. Is there anything you’d prefer to discuss in private? 61. Is there anything we haven’t asked you that you think we should know?

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HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

§ § § § § § § § § § § § §


EXHIBIT H - PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1. DUTIES OF THE JURY

It is my duty and responsibility to instruct you on the law you are to apply in this case. The law contained in these instructions is the only law you may follow. It is your duty to follow what I instruct you the law is, regardless of any opinion that you might have as to what the law ought to be.

If I have given you the impression during the trial that I favor either party, you must disregard that impression. If I have given you the impression during the trial that I have an opinion about the facts of this case, you must disregard that impression. You are the sole judges of the facts of this case. Other than my instructions to you on the law, you should disregard anything I may have said or done during the trial in arriving at your verdict.

You should consider all of the instructions about the law as a whole and regard each instruction in light of the others, without isolating a particular statement or paragraph.

The testimony of the witnesses and other exhibits introduced by the parties constitute the evidence. The statements of counsel are not evidence; they are only arguments. It is important for you to distinguish between the arguments of counsel and the evidence on which those arguments rest. What the lawyers say or do is not

evidence. Plaintiff, Major José Iraheta is not an attorney, nor is he represented by an attorney. He is the person who filed the lawsuit at the courthouse and presented his side of things to you himself. You may, however, consider their arguments in light of the evidence that has been admitted and determine whether the evidence admitted in this trial supports the arguments. You must determine the facts from all the testimony that you have heard and the other evidence submitted. You are the judges of the facts, but in finding those facts, you must apply the law as I instruct you.

Do not let bias, prejudice or sympathy play any part in your deliberations. A corporation and all other persons are equal before the law and must be treated as equals in a court of justice.

You are required by law to decide the case in a fair, impartial, and unbiased manner, based entirely on the law and on the evidence presented to you in the courtroom. You may not be influenced by passion, prejudice, or sympathy you might have for the plaintiff or the defendant in arriving at your verdict. Sources: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 3.1 (2014). 2. BURDEN OF PROOF

This is a civil case, involving claims for violations of Major Iraheta’s rights under the Servicemember Civil Relief Act, the Civil Rights Act, and the Texas Property Tax Code; as well as for violations of the RICO Act, negligence and common law negligence, tortuous interference, defamation of Major Iraheta’s character, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. Major Iraheta, who is the plaintiff and not represented by an attorney, is the party who is asserting those claims against the defendants. He has the burden of proving the elements of his each of his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. However, as I shall instruct you, there are times when the burden will shift to the Defendant to prove its affirmative defenses. In that case, it is the Defendant who must prove its defense by the preponderance of the evidence.

To establish by a preponderance of the evidence means an amount of evidence that is enough to persuade you that Major Iraheta’s claims are more likely true than not true. If you find that Plaintiff, Major Iraheta has failed to prove any element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, then he may not recover on that particular claim.

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Imagine, if you will, a scale with Major Iraheta’s evidence as to each of his claims on one side and the Defendant's evidence on the other side. If the scales are exactly even, you should find for the Defendant. If, on the other hand, the evidence on Iraheta’s side tips the scale in his favor, even to the slightest degree, he has met his burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence, and you should find in Major Iraheta’s favor. Sources: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 3.2 (2014); Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, Eleventh Circuit, Instruction No. 3.7.1, 3.7.2 (2013); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002); Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2001); 3C Kevin F. O'Malley, et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions - Civil §§ 171.60, 171.61, 172.51 (5th ed. 2001).

3. CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE

It is your duty to determine the facts based upon the evidence which has been presented to you. The evidence you are to consider consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the documents and other exhibits admitted into evidence, and any fair inferences and reasonable conclusions you can draw from the facts and circumstances that have been proven. You may draw whatever inferences from that evidence you feel are reasonable and justified in the light of your common experience. You may make such deductions and reach conclusions that reason and common sense lead you to make from the evidence.

Generally speaking, there are two types of evidence. One is direct evidence, such as testimony of an eyewitness. The other is indirect or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that proves a fact from which you can logically conclude another fact exists. As a general rule, the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, and it is for you to decide how much weight to give the evidence.

Arguments, statements or other remarks by the lawyers are not evidence.

Therefore, you may not treat questions, objections, or other things the lawyers may have said during the trial as such. Additionally, you may not consider as evidence any testimony or document that has been excluded or that I have instructed you to disregard.

Sources: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the

Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 2.18, 3.3 (2014); 3C Kevin F. O'Malley, et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions - Civil §§ 171.46, 172.51 (5th ed. 2001).

4. WITNESSES

You alone are to determine the questions of credibility or truthfulness of the witnesses. In your deliberations you may be confronted with conflicting evidence. The weight of the evidence as to a fact does not depend on the number of witnesses who testify. You will have to decide which testimony to believe, which not to believe, and how much weight to give each person’s testimony. You should decide whether you believe what each witness had to say, and how important that testimony was.

In weighing the testimony of the witnesses, you may believe or

disbelieve any witness, in whole or in part, you may consider the witness’s manner and demeanor on the witness stand, any feelings or interest in the case, or any prejudice or bias about the case, that he or she may have, and the consistency or inconsistency of his or her testimony considered in the light of the circumstances. Has the witness been contradicted by other credible evidence? Has he or she made statements at other times and places contrary to those made here on the witness stand? You must give the testimony of each witness the credibility that you think it deserves.

You are not to decide this case by counting the number of witnesses who have testified on the opposing sides. Witness testimony is weighed; witnesses are not counted. The test is not the relative number of witnesses, but the relative convincing force of the evidence. The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to prove any fact, even if a greater number of witnesses testified to the contrary, if after considering all of the other evidence, you believe that witness

To decide whether you believe any witness you should ask yourself the

following questions:

1. Did the witness have any particular reason not to tell the truth? 2. Did the witness have a personal interest in the outcome of the case? 3. Did the witness impress you as one who was telling the truth? 4. Did the witness seem to have a good memory? 5. Did the witness have the opportunity and ability to accurately observe the things he or she testified about? 6. Did the witness appear to understand the questions clearly and

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answer them directly? 7. Did the witness’s testimony differ from other testimony or other evidence?

Source: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 3.4 (2014); Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Ninth Circuit, Instruction No. 3.6 (2001); Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, Eleventh Circuit, Instruction No. 3.4 (2013). 5. EXPERT WITNESSES When knowledge of technical subject matter may be helpful to the jury, a person who has special training or experience in that technical field is permitted to state his or her opinion on those technical matters. However, you are not required to accept that opinion. As with any other witness, it is up to you to decide whether to rely on it. When a witness is being paid for reviewing and testifying concerning the evidence, you may consider the possibility of bias and should view with caution the testimony of such witness where court testimony is given with regularity and represents a significant portion of the witness’s income. Source: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 3.5 (2014); Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, Eleventh Circuit, Instruction No. 3.6.1, 3.6.2 (2013). 6. SIMILAR ACTS

Evidence that an act was done at one time or on one occasion is not any evidence or proof whatsoever that the act was done in this case. Then how may you consider evidence of similar acts? You may consider evidence of similar acts for the limited purpose of showing Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris County, and Elisa Hand’s motive, intent, and knowledge which are at issue in this case. Such evidence may not be considered for any other purpose whatsoever. You may not use the evidence to consider or reflect Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris County, and Elisa

Hand’s character. Source: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 2.10 (2014); 7. BIAS -CORPORATE, GOVERNMENTAL, AND MUNICIPAL PARTY INVOLVED

Your decision must be based only on the evidence presented here. You must not be influenced in any way by either sympathy for or prejudice against anyone.

The fact that Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, and Bank of America are corporations, and that Harris County and Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District are governmental entities or municipal agencies, involved as parties must not affect your decision in any way. A corporation and governmental entity or municipal agency, and all other persons stand equal before the law and must be dealt with as equals in a court of justice.

Since a corporation can act only through its officers, employees, or other agents, any negligent act or omission of an officer, employee, or other agent, of a corporation, in the performance of that person’s duties, is held in law to be the negligence of the corporation.

Since a governmental entity or municipal agency can act only through its

officers, employees, or other agents, any negligent act or omission of an officer, employee, or other agent, of a governmental entity or municipal agency, in the performance of that person’s duties and within the scope of their authority, is held in law to be the negligence of the governmental entity or municipal agency. An officer, employee, or other agent acts “within the scope of their authority” only when they are engaged in the performance of duties expressly or impliedly assigned to them by the governmental entity or municipal agency. A the governmental entity or municipal agency is not responsible for acts of its officers, employees, or other agents performed outside the scope of their authority. Source: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 2.16 (2014); Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, Eleventh Circuit, Instruction No. 3.6.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 (2013); Smock

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v. Iowa Interstate Railroad Ltd et al, Case No. 4:07-cv-04007-MMM-JAG, Document 74 & 76 (M.D. Illinois); Graves v. City of Waterloo, Iowa et al, Case No. 6:10-cv-02014-JSS, Document 54 (M.D. Illinois). 8. IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES

You should also ask yourself whether there was evidence tending to prove that the witness testified falsely concerning some important fact; or whether there was evidence that at some other time the witness said or did something, or failed to say or do something, which was different from the testimony he or she gave during the trial.

You should keep in mind, of course, that a simple mistake by a witness does not necessarily mean that the witness was not telling the truth as he or she remembers it. If a witness has made a misstatement, you need to consider whether that misstatement was simply an innocent lapse of memory, a mistake, or an intentional falsehood. Additionally, you must decide how significant the misstatement was in relation to the witness’s credibility. The significance of that may depend on whether it has to do with an important fact or with only an unimportant detail. Source: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 2.11 (2014); Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, Eleventh Circuit, Instruction No. 3.5.1 (2013).

9. THE SERVICEMEMBER CIVIL RELIEF ACT (“SCRA”)

The Servicemember Civil Relief Act is a federal law passed by Congress that provides protections for military members as they enter active duty. It covers issues such as rental agreements, security deposits, prepaid rent, evictions, installment contracts, credit card interest rates, mortgage interest rates, mortgage foreclosures, civil judicial proceedings, automobile leases, life insurance, health insurance, property taxes, and income tax payments.

The SCRA provides that any interest imposed on a servicemember’s late

property taxes during a period of active duty may not exceed six percent. 50 U.S.C. §§ 3991(a), (d), 3937(a), and 3911(2)(A)(i), (3). The law also bars any additional charges or interest under the guise of a “penalty.” 50 U.S.C. § 3991(d). These property tax interest rate and penalty protections extend only to “property . . . owned individually by a servicemember or jointly by a servicemember and a dependent or dependents.” 50 U.S.C. § 3991(e) (emphasis

added). The SCRA defines a “servicemember” as “a member of the uniformed services.” 50 U.S.C. § 3911(1).

Major Iraheta claims Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson,

LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, Harris County, and Elisa Hand violated his SCRA rights, privileges, or immunities with respect to the Walton property and Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP violated his SCRA rights, privileges, or immunities with respect to the Madeira property. To state a claim for relief of SCRA violations, Major Iraheta is required following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) an interest at a rate above six percent; (2) assessed against a servicemember while on active duty; (3) based on delinquent property taxes relating to “property . . . owned

individually by a servicemember or jointly by a servicemember and a dependent or dependents.” 50 U.S.C. § 3991(e)

If you find that the Defendants violated Major Iraheta’s SCRA rights,

then you must also find that any debt, connected to Major Iraheta’s Walton and/or Madeira properties that included penalty, interest, attorney fees, other fees was unlawful.

Source: 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901-4043; Davis v. City of Philadelphia, 821 F.3d 488, 489 (3d Cir.2016) 10. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (“CRA”)

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal civil rights law passed by Congress that provides a remedy to persons who have been deprived of their federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities under color of state law.

For purposes of CRA, the definition of “person” includes Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Harris County, and Elisa Hand.

The traditional definition of acting under the color of state law requires that the defendant have exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law”,and such actions may result in liability even if the defendant abuses the position given to him by the state. A private actor may also act under color of state law under certain circumstances.

A governmental entity or municipal agency is said to have an unconstitutional policy when it fails to train its employees, and the failure to

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train amounts to deliberate indifference to an obvious need for such training, and the failure train will likely result in the employee making a wrong decision. An unconstitutional policy may also exist if an isolated action of a government employee is dictated by a "final policymaker," or if the authorized policymaker approves a subordinate's decision and the basis for it.

Major Iraheta is suing under Section 1983, Defendants Linebarger

Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Harris County, and Elisa Hand for alleged deprivations, or violations, of his federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities granted to him under the SCRA.

Elements of § 1983 Claim

Major Iraheta must prove both of the following elements by a

preponderance of the evidence:

First: Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris County, and Elisa Hand acted under color of state law.

Second: While acting under color of state law, Defendants Linebarger

Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris County, and Elisa Hand deprived Major Iraheta of a federal statutory right.

I will now give you more details on action under color of state law, after which I will tell you the elements Major Iraheta must prove to establish the violation of his federal statutory right.

Action Under Color of State Law

The first element of Major Iraheta’s claim is that Defendants

Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris

County, and Elisa Hand acted under color of state law. This means that Major Iraheta must show that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris County, and Elisa Hand were using power that they possessed by virtue of state law.

A person can act under color of state law even if the act violates state law. The question is whether the person was clothed with the authority of the state, by which I mean using or misusing the authority of the state.

By “state law,” I mean any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state. And when I use the term “state,” I am including any political subdivisions of the state, such as a county or municipality, and also any state, county or municipal agencies.

Deprivation of a Federal Right

The second element of Major Iraheta’s claim is that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris County, and Elisa Hand deprived him of a federal statutory right, privilege, and immunity.

The SCRA, a federal law, provides that any interest imposed on a

servicemember’s late property taxes during a period of active duty may not exceed six percent. 50 U.S.C. §§ 3991(a), (d), 3937(a), and 3911(2)(A)(i), (3). The law also bars any additional charges or interest under the guise of a “penalty.” 50 U.S.C. § 3991(d). These property tax interest rate and penalty protections extend only to “property . . . owned individually by a servicemember or jointly by a servicemember and a dependent or dependents.” 50 U.S.C. § 3991(e) (emphasis added). The SCRA defines a “servicemember” as “a member of the uniformed services.” 50 U.S.C. § 3911(1).

In this case, Major Iraheta claims that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris County, and Elisa Hand assessed, demanded and received, payment for penalties, interest over 6%, and various other fees which Major Iraheta claims are strictly prohibited by the SCRA.

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To state a claim for relief of deprivation of a federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity, Major Iraheta is required to plead facts sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following elements:

(1) a violation of federal rights, privileges, or immunities occurred by the

Defendants; and (2) the federal right, privilege, or immunity at issue is intended to benefit

the putative plaintiff, Major Iraheta.

Defendant Harris County may also be held liable for the actions of its employees and agents, such as Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand if Defendant Harris County failed to train and supervise them properly. Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP may also be held liable for the actions of its employees and agents, such as Defendants Pajkaj Parmar, Leah Stolar, Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand if Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP failed to train and supervise them properly.

Major Iraheta also claims that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair &

Sampson, LLP and Harris County are additionally liable because: (1) Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP failed to adequately train Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand; and (2) Harris County failed to adequately train Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand.

To state a claim for relief that Defendants Harris County and Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP failed to adequately train their agents and employees properly, Major Iraheta is required to plead facts sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following elements:

(1) one or more defendants violated one or more of Major Iraheta’s

federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities by: (a) imposing an interest on his late property taxes during a period of active duty, that exceeded six percent; (b) assessed, charged, or demanded any additional charges, fees, or interest; or (c) assessed, charged, or demanded any additional penalty;

(2) Defendants Harris County, or Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, failed to train one or more defendants adequately, in such a manner so as to represent a policy or custom of the Defendants Harris County, or Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, showing deliberate indifference by the Defendants Harris County, or Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP to the

federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities of active duty military personnel; and (3) Major Iraheta was injured by the violations of his federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities.

Major Iraheta also claims that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP and Harris County are additionally liable because: (1) Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP failed to adequately supervise Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand; and (2) Harris County failed to adequately supervise Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand.

To state a claim for relief that Defendants Harris County and Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP failed to adequately supervise their agents and employees properly, Major Iraheta is required to plead facts sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following elements:

(1) one or more defendants violated one or more of Major Iraheta’s

federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities by: (a) imposing an interest on his late property taxes during a period of active duty, that exceeded six percent; (b) assessed, charged, or demanded any additional charges, fees, or interest; or (c) assessed, charged, or demanded any additional penalty;

(2) Defendants Harris County, or Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, received notice of acts in contravention of the SCRA by its agents or employees;

(3) Defendants Harris County, or Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, demonstrated deliberate indifference to, or tacit authorization of the prior acts acts in contravention of the SCRA;

(4) Defendants Harris County, or Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, failed to take sufficient remedial action;

(5) Major Iraheta was injured by the violations of his federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities.

Source: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 10.2, 10.4 (2014); Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, Eleventh Circuit, Instruction No. 5.6, 5.7 (2013); 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901-4043; Davis v. City of Philadelphia, 821 F.3d 488, 489 (3d Cir.2016); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 101, 106 (1989) Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978). West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326

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(1941)); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982); City of Canton v. Harris, 489; U.S. 378 (1989); Gold v. City of Miami, 1998 WL 54803 (11th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488 (11th. Cir. 1997); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1170 (11th Cir. 2009). 11. TEXAS PROPERTY TAX CODE TEX. PROP. TAX CODE § 31.02

(a) “Except as provided by Subsection (b) of this section and by Sections 31.03 and 31.04 of this code, taxes are due on receipt of the tax bill and are delinquent if not paid before February 1 of the year following the year in which imposed.”

(b) An eligible person serving on active duty in any branch of the United States armed forces during a war or national emergency declared in accordance with federal law may pay delinquent property taxes on property in which the person owns any interest without penalty or interest no later than the 60th day after the date on which the earliest of the following occurs:

(1) the person is discharged from active military service; (2) the person returns to the state for more than 10 days; (3) the person returns to non-active duty status in the reserves; or (4) the war or national emergency ends. Major Iraheta alleges his taxes on his Pleasantbrook, Walton, and Madeira

properties were not delinquent. To succeed in his claim that property taxes were not delinquent, Major Iraheta must prove for each year tax year, each of the following four facts by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) he was not discharged from active military service; (2) he did not return to the state for more than 10 days; (3) he did not returns to non-active duty status in the reserves; or (4) the war or national emergency did not end. If you find that Major Iraheta’s property taxes were not delinquent, then

you must find that any debt, connected to Major Iraheta’s Pleasantbrook,

Walton, and Madeira properties that included penalty, interest, attorney fees, other fees was unlawful. Major Iraheta also claims that Defendants Elisa Hand, Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, CFISD, and Bank of America violated his rights under the Texas Property Tax Code when Bank of America made payments, on his Pleasantbrook property account, for taxes, penalty, interest, and fees to Defendants Harris County, CFISD, and Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP. To succeed in his claim that Defendants Elisa Hand, Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, CFISD, and Bank of America violated his rights under the Texas Property Tax Code, Major Iraheta must prove for each year tax year, each of the following four facts by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) Defendant Bank of America paid taxes, penalty, interest, and fees to any of the following: Defendants Harris County, CFISD, and Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; and

(2) Major Iraheta’s Pleasantbrook property taxes were not delinquent. Source: TEX. PROP. TAX CODE § 31.02(a) & (b). 12. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) – 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)– Acquiring or Maintaining an Interest in

or Control of an Enterprise

Major Iraheta asserts claims against Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand for allegedly violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, commonly known as RICO. Major Iraheta specifically claims that Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand violated § 1962(b) of RICO.

To succeed on this claim, Major Iraheta must prove each of the following four facts by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) you must find that one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity; (2) through the pattern of racketeering activity, one, or more, of the

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand acquired or maintained, directly or

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indirectly, an interest in or control of an enterprise; (3) the enterprise engaged in, or had some effect on, interstate or

foreign commerce. (4) Major Iraheta was injured by the actions of one, or more, of the

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand.

Now I’ll provide you with some additional instructions to apply as you consider the facts that Major Iraheta must prove.

First, Major Iraheta must prove that one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. “Racketeering activity” is an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 1434, and 18 U.S.C. § 1341. I’ll explain the law about these statutes to help you determine whether Major Iraheta proved by a preponderance of the evidence that one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand violated these statutes. An act of “racketeering activity” is sometimes referred to as a “predicate act.”

A “pattern of racketeering activity” means that one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Handcommitted at least two distinct predicate acts. Distinct does not have to mean different types. But by itself, proof of two or more predicate acts doesn’t establish a pattern under RICO.

To prove a pattern of predicate acts, Major Iraheta must show that the acts were related to one another. Two or more acts of racketeering activity that aren’t related don’t establish a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. Predicate acts are “related” to one another if they have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods. Predicate acts are also related if they have common distinguishing characteristics and aren’t isolated events.

To be related, the predicate acts don’t have to be the same kind of acts. For example, the acts may comprise one act of Mail Fraud and one act of Wire Fraud. A pattern of racketeering activity requires predicate acts showing continuity. This can be demonstrated in two basic ways. The first is to demonstrate related predicate acts extending over a substantial period of time. The second is to show conduct that doesn’t occur over a substantial period of time but, by its nature, is likely to be repeated into the future.

Again, “racketeering activity” means an act that violates, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), 18 U.S.C. § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and 18 U.S.C. § 11341. But you

can’t consider just any racketeering act one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand allegedly committed in violation of one of these statutes as bearing on whether one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand has committed two or more predicate acts as a pattern of racketeering activity.

To determine if there is a pattern of racketeering activity, you must consider only those specific racketeering acts Major Iraheta alleges against Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand. And you can’t find that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity” unless you unanimously agree on which of the alleged predicate acts, if any, make up the pattern.

So it’s insufficient if you don’t all agree to the finding of what two or more predicate acts one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand committed. In other words, half of you can’t find that the predicate acts are A, B, and C and the rest of you find that the predicate acts are X, Y, and A.

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand have engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity if you find that:

(1) a “pattern” of predicate acts, and (2) that Major Iraheta has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand committed each of the two or more predicate acts that you find make up that pattern.

(2) Major Iraheta must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand, through the pattern of racketeering activity, acquired or maintained an interest in, or control of, an enterprise. To find that Major Iraheta has established this element, you must find by a preponderance of the evidence not only that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand had some interest in or control over an enterprise, but also that this interest or control was connected to the pattern of racketeering activity. It isn’t sufficient that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand engaged in racketeering activities if they acquired an interest in, or control of,

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the enterprise through legitimate activities. [Alternative #1: Individual or entity enterprise: An “enterprise” may

consist of an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity. In this case, the enterprise is alleged to be Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP & Harris County.]

[Alternative #2: Association-in-fact enterprise: An “enterprise” doesn’t have to be a legal entity. It can be an association of persons or entities. In this case, the enterprise is alleged to be the collection of delinquent/non-delinquent property taxes, penalty, interest, and fees. The association between the enterprise’s members might be loose or informal. But the enterprise must have at least a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and a duration sufficient to permit those associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.]

(3) Major Iraheta must prove that the enterprise engaged in or had an effect on interstate or foreign commerce. “Engage in or have an effect on interstate or foreign commerce” means that the enterprise either engaged in, or had an effect on commerce between two or more states, or on commerce between a state and a foreign country.

(4) Major Iraheta was injured by one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand violations of § 1962(b), – 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) Conduct the Affairs of the Enterprise

Major Iraheta asserts a claim against Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand forallegedly violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, commonly known as RICO. Major Iraheta specifically claims that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand violated § 1962(c) of RICO.

To succeed on this claim, Major Iraheta must prove each of the following five facts by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) the existence of an enterprise; [Alternative #1: Individual or entity enterprise: An “enterprise” may

consist of an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity. In this case, the enterprise is alleged to be Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP & Harris County.]

[Alternative #2: Association-in-fact enterprise: An “enterprise” doesn’t have to be a legal entity. It can be an association of persons or entities. In this case, the enterprise is alleged to be the collection of delinquent/non-delinquent property taxes, penalty, interest, and fees. The association between the enterprise’s members might be loose or informal. But the enterprise must have at least a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and a duration sufficient to permit those associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.]

(2) the enterprise engaged in, or had some effect on, interstate or foreign commerce.

(3) one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand was employed by or associated with the alleged enterprise.

(4) Fourth, you must find that one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand participated, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise.

(5) one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand participated through a pattern of racketeering activity.

In the alternative to showing a pattern of racketeering activity, Major Iraheta will meet his burden if he is able to show the collection of an unlawful debt. “Unlawful debt" is defined as a debt “is unenforceable, in whole or part, due to usury laws”. Major Iraheta claims the one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand took collection actions on a debt that was unlawful because it included amounts greater than 6% interest, attorney fees, penalty, and other fees, all of which are prohibited by the SCRA.

To succeed the alternative to showing a pattern of racketeering activity, Major Iraheta must prove each of the following five facts by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) the debt was unlawful; (2) one, or more, of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson,

LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand took

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collection actions to collect that debt. Source: Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, Eleventh Circuit, Instruction No. 7.2, 7.3(2013); 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901-4043; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(6); United States v. Bertolino, 964 F.2d 1492, 1496-1497 (5th Cir. 1992); Sykes v. Mel Harris and Associates, LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1282 (2d Cir. 1991); Bank of N. Ill. v. Nugent, 584 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); European Cmty. v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236-237 (1989); Al-Kazemi v. General Acceptance & Inv. Corp., 633 F. Supp. 540 (D.D.C. 1986); Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1999)

12. NEGLIGENCE & COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE

Major Iraheta alleges claims of negligence and common law negligence against all the Defendants for their actions resulting in violations of the SCRA, CRA, RICO, and the Texas Property Tax Code.

“Negligence” or “negligent” is the failure to use "ordinary care". "ordinary care" as the conduct of a reasonably careful or reasonably prudent

person would use under the same or similar circumstances. In deciding whether a Defendant was negligent, or failed to use ordinary care, you must consider what that individual knew or should have known, and the actions he failed to take that a reasonably careful or reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances.

To succeed in his negligence claims, Major Iraheta you must find the following:

(1) any Defendant failed to use ordinary care, and/or failed to take

actions that a reasonably careful or reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances;

(2) Major Iraheta was injured by that Defendant’s actions in (1), and/or omission of those actions in (1)

13. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE

Major Iraheta alleges tortious interference claims against Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand. Tortious interference, is the

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intentional interference with contractual relations, and occurs when one person intentionally damages someone else's contractual or business relationships with a third party causing economic harm.

Major Iraheta alleges Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand tortuously interfered with Major Iraheta’s contractual relationship with Countrywide Home Loans and Citimortgage by communicating to them information the Defendants knew, or should have known to be false, and/or incorrect, on Major Iraheta’s Pleasantbrook and Walton properties tax accounts. Major Iraheta further alleges the Defendants interference by communicating to Countrywide Home Loans and Citimortgage demands for payments of illegally assessed penalties, interest, attorney fees, other fees, and threatening legal action and foreclosure on Major Iraheta’s Pleasantbrook and Walton properties.

To succeed in his negligence claims, Major Iraheta by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties.

2. Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. 3. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the

relationship. 4. Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. 5. The contractual relationship is breached. 6. Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs.

Source: Commerce Bank v. Deborah Flavin Durland, 141 S.W.3d 434 (Mo.Ct.App. 2004); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C (1979); Venhaus v. Shultz, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 1079—1080, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432 (2007) 14. DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER

Major Iraheta claims that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand negligently published that his Pleasantbrook, Walton, Madeira property tax accounts were delinquent, that he owed penalty, interest, attorney fees, other fees;

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statements that were false and a defamatory. Major Iraheta further alleges the Defendants defamed his character by communicating to Countrywide Home Loans and Citimortgage that Major Iraheta’s property tax accounts were delinquent and Defendants made demands for payments of illegally assessed penalties, interest, attorney fees, other fees, and threatening legal action and foreclosure on Major Iraheta’s Pleasantbrook and Walton properties. Defendants statements and communications damaged Major Iraheta’s reputation and/or subjected Major Iraheta to public contempt, disgrace or ridicule, and caused Major Iraheta to suffer additional damages when Countrywide Home Loans/Bank of America made more than $14,000 in payments to Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, and CFISD.

To succeed in his defamation of character claims, Major Iraheta by a

preponderance of the evidence: (1) the statement[s] made by Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair &

Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand were false;

(2) the statements are not true. (3) the statement(s) made by Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair &

Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand tended to lower hi in the opinion of a substantial respectable group or to deter other people from dealing with her. Maj Iraheta need not prove that anything Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand said actually did lower him in the opinion of another person, or that any statement actually did cause any person not to associate or deal with him. He must prove that the statement tended to do that. Major Iraheta’s feelings about Defendant’s words are not enough. You must decide whether Defendant’s words alone or how and when Defendant said them have a tendency to lower other people’s opinion of Major Iraheta.

Source: Ryan v. Herald Assoc., Inc., 152 Vt. 275, 283 (1989); Burgess v. Reformer Publishing Corp., 146 Vt. 612, 619 (1986). 15. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

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Major Iraheta alleges claims of negligent misrepresentation against Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand.

Negligent misrepresentation means negligently making false, or misleading, statements of fact knowing that third parties will likely use or rely on the information and/or causes, or induces, another party to take an action based on the false, or misleading statements.

To succeed in his negligent misrepresentation claims, Major Iraheta must prove by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) one, or more, Defendants made a false, or misleading, representation as to a past or existing fact.

(2) the representation made by one, or more, Defendants must have been made with the intent to induce the other party to rely upon it.

(3) a third party must have believed the misrepresentation and reasonably relied on it.

(4) As a result of the third party reliance on the misrepresentation, Major Iraheta suffered damages. Source: Section 552 of Restatement of Torts (Second); In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 834 F.Supp.2d 566, 591(S.D. Tex. 2011) 16. FRAUD

“Fraud” is defined as as trickery, deceit, intentional misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure for the purpose of inducing another another to act. It also includes false representation of a matter of fact by words or conduct or by the concealment of what should have been disclosed that deceives or is intended to deceive another so he shall act upon it to his legal injury.

Major Iraheta alleges claims for fraud against against Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand for knowing that the amounts sought, demanded, billed, and/or collected, and/or sued for penalty, interest, and various fees were prohibited by the SCRA.

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To succeed in his negligent misrepresentation claims, Major Iraheta must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that a material representation was made; (2) the representation was false; (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was false or

made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the speaker made the representation with the intent that the other party

should act upon it; (5) a party acted in reliance on the representation; and (6) Major Iraheta thereby suffered injury

Source: In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001); In re E.P., 185 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. App. Austin 2006). 17. DECLARATORY RELIEF

If you find that Major Iraheta has proved any of his SCRA and/or CRA claims, then you must make the following declarations:

A. A Declaration that Mr. Parmar, remainder of Linebarger

Defendants, and the Harris County Defendants violated Major Iraheta’s civil rights, and the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on April 30, 2007, and May 11, 2007, when the Linebarger Defendants and the Harris County Defendants brought a suit seeking payment of interest, in excess of 6%, penalty, attorney fees, abstract fee, for tax years 2004-2006.

B. A Declaration that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act for each and every demand, assessment, request, bill, or levy made for payment of “Penalty & Interest”, “PENALTY & INTEREST”, “33.07/33.08 Fees”, “penalties, interest, attorney’s fees”, and/or “abstractor’s costs [and/or fees]”.

C. A Declaration that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act each time they sought, and each time they received, under threat of lawsuit and foreclosure, payments for

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“penalty & interest & attorney fees”, of “Penalty & Interest”, “PENALTY & INTEREST”, “33.07/33.08 Fees”, “penalties, interest, attorney’s fees”, and/or “abstractor’s costs [and/or fees]”;

D. A Declaration that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand Defendants violated Major Iraheta’s civil rights, and the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983, each and every instance and each violation of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act;

E. A Declaration that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand defamed Major Iraheta’s character. 18. DAMAGES

If you find that Major Iraheta has proved any one of his claims, then you must award Major Iraheta such sum, as you find by the preponderance of the evidence, that will fairly and justly compensate him for the damages he suffered as a direct result of the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand acts and/or violations of law(s). Major Iraheta’s damages claims has three distinct components – actual damages, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. You must consider each separately.

- Actual Damages You may award an amount for actual damages to Major Iraheta for those damages he is able to prove by the preponderance of the evidence for:

(1) expenses Major Iraheta has incurred as a result of Defendants’ actions and/or Major Iraheta’s injuries;

(2) additional credit costs Major Iraheta has incurred; (3) loss of Major Iraheta’s credit and loss of credit opportunity

- Compensatory Damages

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If you find that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP,

Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Elisa Hand, Robert Cortez, CountryWide Home Loans, and Bank of America are liable to Plaintiff Major Iraheta, then you must determine an amount that is fair compensation for all of Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s damages. These damages are called compensatory damages. The purpose of compensatory damages is to make Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s whole—that is, to compensate Plaintiff Major Iraheta for the damage that he has suffered. Compensatory damages are not limited to expenses that Plaintiff Major Iraheta may have incurred because of Major Iraheta injury. If Plaintiff Major Iraheta wins, he is entitled to compensatory damages. You may award damages for any pain, suffering, or mental anguish that he has suffered because of Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Elisa Hand, Robert Cortez, CountryWide Home Loans, and Bank of America wrongful conduct.

You may award compensatory damages only for injuries that Plaintiff Major Iraheta proves were proximately caused by Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Elisa Hand, Robert Cortez, CountryWide Home Loans, and Bank of America allegedly wrongful conduct. The damages that you award must be fair compensation for all of Plaintiff Major Iraheta damages, no more and no less.

No evidence of the monetary value of such intangible things as pain, suffering, humiliation, or emotional distress has been, or need be, introduced into evidence. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded for these elements of damage. Any award you make should be fair in light of the evidence presented at trial.

If you decide to award compensatory damages, you should be guided by dispassionate common sense. Computing damages may be difficult, but you must not let that difficulty lead you to engage in arbitrary guesswork. On the other hand, the law does not require that Plaintiff Major Iraheta prove the amount of his losses with mathematical precision, but only with as much definiteness and accuracy as the circumstances permit.

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Additionally, if you find that the Major Iraheta has been deprived of a federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity, you may award damages to compensate him for the deprivation. Damages for this type of injury are more difficult to measure than damages for a physical injury or injury to one's property. There are no medical bills or other expenses by which you can judge how much compensation is appropriate. In one sense, no monetary value we place upon a federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity can measure their importance or compensate Major Iraheta adequately for his deprivation. However, just because these federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities are not capable of precise evaluation does not mean that an appropriate monetary amount should not be awarded. The precise value you place upon any federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity which you find was denied to Major Iraheta is within your discretion. You may wish to consider the importance of the federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity, the role which this federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity has played in the history of our republic, and the significance of the right in the context of the activities which the Major Iraheta was engaged in at the time of the violation of the federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity. - Punitive Damages

You may award punitive damages, and if you do so, you should fix the amount using calm discretion and sound reason. You must not be influenced by sympathy or dislike of any party in the case. In addition to the damages mentioned in other instructions, the law permits the jury under certain circumstances to award the injured person punitive damages in order to punish the defendant for some extraordinary misconduct and to serve as an example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct. In order to award punitive damages, you must find:

(1) in favor of Major Iraheta on any of his claims against a particular defendant;

(2) find that the conduct of that defendant, was recklessly and callously indifferent to Major Iraheta’s rights.

If you make both of these findings, then, in addition to any other damages to which you find Major Iraheta entitled, you may award the Major Iraheta an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it is appropriate to punish that defendant or to deter him or her and others from like conduct in the future.

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Whether to award the Major Iraheta punitive damages and the amount of those punitive damages are within your sound discretion. Factors you may consider in awarding punitive damages include, but are not limited to the following: the nature of the defendant's conduct; the impact of the defendant's conduct on Major Iraheta; the likelihood that the defendant would repeat the conduct if a punitive award is not made; the value of Major Iraheta’s federal statutory rights, privileges, and immunities under the SCRA, CRA, and Texas Property Tax Code; and any other circumstances shown by the evidence, that bear on the question of the size of any punitive award.

You have the burden to determine if punitive damages are adequate if you find that one, or more, Defendants intentionally violated Major Iraheta’s SCRA rights, the CRA, the Texas Property Tax Code, or intentionally violated the RICO statutes, was negligent, committed fraud, tortious interference, defamed Major Iraheta’s character, negligently made a misrepresentation; keep in mind that the law allows you to award punitive damages.

If you find that any of the Defendants acted with malice or reckless indifference Major Iraheta’s rights under the SCRA, the CRA, the Property Tax Code and/or that one, or more, Defendants intentionally violated Major Iraheta’s SCRA rights, the CRA, the Texas Property Tax Code, or intentionally violated the RICO statutes, was negligent, committed fraud, tortious interference, defamed Major Iraheta’s character, negligently made a misrepresentation you may find that punitive damages are proper.

If you determine from the evidence received in this case that the defendant’s conduct justifies an award of punitive damages, you may award an amount of punitive damages which all jurors agree is proper. In fixing the amount, you should consider the following questions: How offensive was the conduct? What amount of punitive damages is needed, considering the defendant’s financial condition, to prevent a repetition? Source: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 15.2, 15.3(2014); Smock v. Iowa Interstate Railroad Ltd et al, Case No. 4:07-cv-04007-MMM-JAG, Document 74 & 76 (M.D. Illinois); Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).

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42 U.S.C. § 1981a(2); 3C Kevin F. AMALIA, et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions - Civil § 172.70 (5th ed. 2001). Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F. 2d 211(1985).

19. CIVIL ALLEN CHARGE

Please continue your deliberations in an effort to reach a verdict. This is an important case. The trial has been expensive in terms of time, effort, money and emotional strain to all parties involved. If you should fail to agree on a verdict, the case may have to be tried again. There is no reason to believe that the case can be retried, by either side, better or more exhaustively than it has been tried before you.

Any future jury would be selected in the same manner and from the same source as you were chosen. There is no reason to believe that those jurors would be more conscientious, more impartial or more competent to decide the case than you are.

It is your duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching a verdict if you can do so, consistent with your individual judgments. You must not surrender your honest convictions as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinions of the other jurors or just to reach a verdict. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but you should do so only after consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors.

In the course of your deliberations, you should not hesitate to reexamine your own views, and to change your opinion if you are convinced that it is wrong. To reach a unanimous verdict, you must examine the questions submitted to you openly and frankly, with proper regard for the opinions of others and with a willingness to reexamine your own views. If a substantial majority of you are for a verdict for one party, each of you who holds a different position ought to consider whether your position is reasonable.

I suggest that you now carefully reexamine and consider all the evidence in the case in light of my instructions on the law. In your

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deliberations you are to consider all of the instructions I have given to you as a whole. You should not single out any part of any instruction including this one.

You may now continue your deliberations. Sources: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 2.8 (2014). 20. DUTY TO DELIBERATE; NOTES

It is now your duty to deliberate and to consult with one another in an effort to reach a verdict. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. During your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own opinions and change your mind if you are convinced that you were wrong. But do not give up on your honest beliefs because the other jurors think differently, or just to finish the case.

Remember at all times, you are the judges of the facts. You

have been allowed to take notes during this trial. Any notes that you took during this trial are only aids to memory. If your memory differs from your notes, you should rely on your memory and not on the notes. The notes are not evidence. If you did not take notes, rely on your independent recollection of the evidence and do not be unduly influenced by the notes of other jurors. Notes are not entitled to greater weight than the recollection or impression of each juror about the testimony.

When you go into the jury room to deliberate, you may take

with you a copy of this charge, the exhibits that I have admitted into evidence, and your notes. You must select a [jury foreperson] [presiding juror] to guide you in your deliberations and to speak for you here in the courtroom.

Your verdict must be unanimous. After you have reached a

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unanimous verdict, your jury foreperson must fill out the answers to the written questions on the verdict form and sign and date it. After you have concluded your service and I have discharged the jury, you are not required to talk with anyone about the case.

If you need to communicate with me during your deliberations, the jury foreperson should write the inquiry and give it to the court security officer. After consulting with the attorneys, I will respond either in writing or by meeting with you in the courtroom. Keep in mind, however, that you must never disclose to anyone, not even to me, your numerical division on any question.

You may now proceed to the jury room to begin your deliberations. Sources: Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Ass'n of the Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases, Instruction Nos. 3.7 (2014).

1


HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

§ § § § § § § § § § § § §


DEFINITIONS

1. “Major Iraheta” and/or “Plaintiff” refers to Jose Iraheta. 2. “Direct evidence” is the testimony of a person who asserts that he or

she has actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness. 3. “Circumstantial evidence” is proof of a chain of facts and

circumstances that tend to prove or disprove a fact. 4. “preponderance of the evidence” means and refers to the amount of

evidence that is enough to persuade you that Major Iraheta’s claim is more likely true than not true.

5. “Linebarger” refers to Defendant LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMPSON LLP, its agencies, directorates, departments, offices, administrative entities, its divisions, subdivisions, controlling persons, subordinates, and all of its officers and officials, whether elected and/or appointed, employees, attorneys, agents, contractors, dependent and independent, accountants, representatives, or authorized agents.

6. “Harris County” refers to Defendant Harris County, its agencies, directorates, departments, offices, administrative entities, its divisions, subdivisions, controlling persons, subordinates, and all of its officers and officials, whether elected and/or appointed, employees, attorneys, agents, contractors, dependent and independent, accountants, representatives, or authorized agents.

7. “CFISD” refers to Defendant Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School

2

District, its agencies, directorates, departments, offices, administrative entities, its divisions, subdivisions, controlling persons, subordinates, and all of its officers and officials, whether elected and/or appointed, employees, attorneys, agents, contractors, dependent and independent, accountants, representatives, or authorized agents.

8. “Lenders” refers to Countrywide Home Loans Inc., Bank of America N.A., BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P. F/K/A Countrywide Home Loans Servicing L.P., CitiMortgage Inc., Pentagon Federal Credit Union (“PFCU”).

9. “Enterprise” means and refers to any individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.

10. The "SCRA" means and refers to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, previously codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 501, et seq.

11. “RICO” means and refers to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §1961, et seq.

12. “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;

13. “racketeering activity” means any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), and section 1343 (relating to wire fraud);

14. “person” includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property;

15. “Related” is defined as “acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, methods of commission, or otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events”.

16. “Mail fraud” is defined as A mailing is caused when one knows that the mails will be used in the ordinary course of business or when one can reasonably foresee such use. It does not matter whether the material mailed was itself false or deceptive so long as the mail was used as a part of the scheme, nor does it matter whether the scheme or plan was successful or that any money or property was obtained.

17. “unlawful debt” means a debt which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury.

18. The “Texas Property Tax Code” means and refers to Tex. Prop. Tax

3

Code § 31.02 (a) thru (g). 19. The “Pleasantbrook property” means and refers to 8718 Pleasantbrook

Dr., Houston, Harris County, Texas 77095 and Harris County Appraisal District Tax Account Number 119-890-001-0033;

20. The “Waton property” means and refers to 610 Walton St., Houston, Harris County, Texas 77009 and Harris County Appraisal District Tax Account Number 033-129-087-0012;

21. The “Madeira property” means and refers real property assigned Tax Account No. to 00-8349-03-04500 by Montgomery County, TX.


HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

§ § § § § § § § § § § § §


VERDICT

On the claims of plaintiff Major José Iraheta, we, the Jury, find as follows:

VERDICT – SCRA CLAIMS

On Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s claims that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, Harris County, and Elisa Hand violated his SCRA rights, privileges, or immunities with respect to the Walton property and Defendants violated his SCRA rights, privileges, or immunities with respect to the Madeira property, as explained in Instruction No. 9, in whose favor do you find? (If you find in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on this claim, then you must award damages in some amount in the “Damages” section of the verdict form. However, if you find in favor of Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, Harris County, and Elisa Hand, then do not award any damages.)

_______Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; _______Leah Stolar; _______Harris County, _______Robert Cortez, _______Elisa Hand; _______Pajkaj Parmar

DAMAGES

Step 1: Actual

Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his SCRA violations claim, what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “actual” damages, as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18? (If you find that Plaintiff Major Iraheta has failed to prove actual damages, then only consider “compensatory damages” and “punitive damages” in Step 2 & 3.)

$ expenses incurred as a result of Defendants actions

$ additional credit costs Major Iraheta has incurred

$ loss of Major Iraheta’s credit and loss of credit opportunity

Step 2: Compensatory

Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his SCRA violations claim, what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “compensatory damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 8?

$ for past physical pain and suffering

$ for past mental pain, anguish, stress, suffering, humiliation, emotional distress

$ for Major Iraheta’s deprivation of a federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity

Step 3: Punitive Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his SCRA violations claim, what amount, if any, do you award for “punitive damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18?

$ for punitive damages

SPECIAL FINDINGS OF FACT

Step 1: Do you find that one, or more Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, Harris County, and Elisa Hand violated Major Iraheta’s SCRA rights?

No Yes

Step 2: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 1, any debt, connected to Major Iraheta’s Walton and/or Madeira properties that included penalty, interest, attorney fees, other fees was unlawful?

No Yes

VERDICT – CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS

On Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s claims that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, Harris County, and Elisa Hand violated his civil rights by depriving Major Iraheta of a federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity with respect to the Walton property and Defendants violated his SCRA rights, privileges, or immunities granted to him under the SCRA, as explained in Instruction No. 10, in whose favor do you find? (If you find in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on this claim, then you must award damages in some amount in the “Damages” section of the verdict form. However, if you find in favor of Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, Harris County, and Elisa Hand, then do not award any damages.)

_______Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; _______Leah Stolar; _______Harris County, _______Robert Cortez, _______Elisa Hand; _______Pajkaj Parmar

Step 1: Did one, or more of the above named Defendants, act under color of state law (See Instructions No. 10)?

No Yes

Step 2: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 1, then do you find that one, or more of the above named Defendants intentionally commit an act, under color of state law, deprived Major Iraheta of, and/or violated, a federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity (See Instructions No. 10)?

No Yes

Step 3: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 2, then do you find that the federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities of the SCRA are intended to benefit Major Iraheta?(See Instructions No. 10)?

No Yes

DAMAGES

Step 1: Actual

Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his civil rights (Section 1983) violations claims, what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “actual” damages, as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18? (If you find that Plaintiff Major Iraheta has failed to prove actual damages, then only consider “compensatory damages” and “punitive damages” in Step 2 & 3.)



Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his civil rights (Section 1983) violations claims, what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “compensatory damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 8?



$ for Major Iraheta’s deprivation of a federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity


If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his civil rights (Section 1983) violations claims, what amount, if any, do you award for “punitive damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18?


SPECIAL FINDINGS OF FACT – FAILURE TO TRAIN

Step 1: Do you find that Defendants Harris County and/or Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP failed to adequately train their agents and employees (See Instructions No. 10)?

No Yes

Step 2: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 1, then do you

find that additional compensatory and punitive damages are warranted against Defendants Harris County and/or Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP?

No Yes

Step 3: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 2, then what amount if any, do you award in additional compensatory and punitive damages are warranted against Defendants Harris County and/or Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP?

$_________________ Compensatory

$_________________ Punitive

SPECIAL FINDINGS OF FACT – FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Step 1: Do you find that Defendants Harris County and/or Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP failed to adequately supervise their agents and employees (See Instructions No. 10)?

No Yes

Step 2: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 1, then do you find that additional compensatory and punitive damages are warranted against Defendants Harris County and/or Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP?

No Yes

Step 3: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 2, then what amount if any, do you award in additional compensatory and punitive damages are warranted against Defendants Harris County and/or Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP?

$_________________ Compensatory

$_________________ Punitive

VERDICT – TEX. PROP. TAX CODE § 31.02 CLAIMS

On Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s claims that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, Harris County, and Elisa Hand, and Bank of America violated his rights under Texas Property Tax

Code, Section 31.02, with respect to Major Iraheta’s Pleasantbrook, Walton, and Madeira properties as explained in Instruction No. 11, in whose favor do you find? (If you find in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on this claim, then you must award damages in some amount in the “Damages” section of the verdict form. However, if you find in favor of Defendants then do not award any damages.)

_______Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; _______Leah Stolar; _______Harris County; _______Robert Cortez; _______Elisa Hand; _______Pajkaj Parmar; ________Bank of America

DAMAGES

Step 1: Actual Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his § 31.02 violations claim, what amount, if any, do you award against Bank of America for the following types of “actual” damages, as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18? (If you find that Plaintiff Major Iraheta has failed to prove actual damages, then only consider “compensatory damages” and “punitive damages” in Step 2 & 3.)





Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his § 31.02 violations claims, what amount, if any, do you award against Bank of America for the following types of “compensatory damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 8?




If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his § 31.02 violations claim, what amount, if any, do you award against Bank of America for “punitive damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18?


SPECIAL FINDINGS OF FACT

Step 1: Do you find that Major taxes on his Pleasantbrook, Walton, and Madeira properties were not delinquent?

No Yes

Step 2: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 1, any debt, connected to Major Iraheta’s Pleasantbrook, Walton, and/or Madeira properties that included penalty, interest, attorney fees, other fees was unlawful?

No Yes

Step 3: Do you find that Defendants Elisa Hand, Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, CFISD, and/or Bank of America violated § 31.02 and/or Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s rights under § 31.02, for tax year 2004?

No Yes

Step 4: Do you find that Defendants Elisa Hand, Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, CFISD, and Bank of America violated § 31.02 and/or Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s rights under § 31.02, for tax year 2005?

No Yes


No Yes


No Yes

Step 7: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 3, 4, 5, & 6 then

what amount if any, do you award in additional compensatory and punitive damages are warranted against Defendants Bank of America & Elisa Hand

$_________________ Compensatory

$_________________ Punitive

VERDICT – RICO CLAIMS

On Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s RICO 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)–(c), as explained in Instruction No. 12, in whose favor do you find? (If you find in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on this claim, then you must award damages in some amount in the “Damages” section of the verdict form. However, if you find in favor of Defendants, then do not award any damages.)

_______Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; _______Leah Stolar; _______Robert Cortez; _______Elisa Hand; _______Pajkaj Parmar

Step 1: Do you find that one, or more, of the above named Defendants operated or managed an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, as explained in Instruction No. 12?

No Yes

Step 2: Did you find an “unlawful debt”(as explained in Instruction No. 12) in TEX. PROP. TAX CODE § 31.02 and SCRA VERDICTS above?

No Yes

Step 3: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 2, do you find that one, or more, of the above named Defendants took any actions to collect an “unlawful debt”, as explained in Instruction No. 12? (you answered “yes”to this step, then skip to Damages Section, otherwise continue with Step 4)

No Yes

Step 4: Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that one, or more, of the above named Defendants committed mail fraud?

No Yes

Step 5: Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that one, or more, of the above named Defendants committed bribery?

No Yes

DAMAGES

Step 1: Actual

Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his RICO violations claim, what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “actual” damages, as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18? (If you find that Plaintiff Major Iraheta has failed to prove actual damages, then only consider “compensatory damages” and “punitive damages” in Step 2 & 3.)



Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his RICO violations claim, what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “compensatory damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 8?




If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his RICO violations claim, what amount, if any, do you award for “punitive damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18?


VERDICT – NEGLIGENCE & COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS

On Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s claims of negligence and common law negligence against Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, CFISD, Harris County, Elisa Hand, and Bank of America, as explained in Instruction No. 12, in whose favor do you find? (If you find in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on this claim, then you must award damages in some amount in the “Damages” section of the verdict form. However, if you find in favor of Defendants then do not award any damages.)

_______Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; _______Leah Stolar; _______Harris County; _______Robert Cortez, _______Elisa Hand; _______Pajkaj Parmar; _______ Bank of America; ________ CFISD

DAMAGES

Step 1: Actual

Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of negligence and common law negligence (explained in Instruction No. 12), what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “actual” damages, as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18? (If you find that Plaintiff Major Iraheta has failed to prove actual damages, then only consider “compensatory damages” and “punitive damages” in Step 2 & 3.)





Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of negligence and common law negligence, what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “compensatory damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 8?




If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of negligence and common law negligence, what amount, if any, do you award for “punitive damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18?


VERDICT – TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIMS

On Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s claims of tortious interference against Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, CFISD, Harris County, and Elisa Hand as explained in Instruction No. 13, in whose favor do you find? (If you find in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on this claim, then you must award damages in some amount in the “Damages” section of the verdict form. However, if you find in favor of Defendants then do not award any damages.)

_______Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; _______Leah Stolar; _______Harris County; _______Robert Cortez, _______Elisa Hand; _______Pajkaj Parmar; ________ CFISD

DAMAGES

Step 1: Actual

Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of tortious interference (explained in Instruction No. 13), what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “actual” damages, as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18? (If you find that Plaintiff Major Iraheta has failed to prove actual damages, then only consider “compensatory damages” and “punitive damages” in Step 2 & 3.)



Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of tortious interference (explained in Instruction No. 13), what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “compensatory damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 8?




If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of tortious interference (explained in Instruction No. 13), what amount, if any, do you award for “punitive damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18?


VERDICT – DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER CLAIMS

On Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s claims of for defamation of character against Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, CFISD, Harris County, and Elisa Hand as explained in Instruction No. 13, in whose favor do you find? (If you find in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on this claim, then you must award damages in some amount in the “Damages” section of the verdict form. However, if you find in favor of Defendants then do not award any damages.)


DAMAGES

Step 1: Actual

Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of defamation of character (explained in Instruction No. 14), what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “actual” damages, as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18? (If you find that Plaintiff Major Iraheta has failed to prove actual damages, then only consider “compensatory damages” and “punitive damages” in Step 2 & 3.)



Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of defamation of character (explained in Instruction No. 14), what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “compensatory damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 8?




If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of defamation of character (explained in Instruction No. 14), what amount, if any, do you award for “punitive damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18?


VERDICT – NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS

On Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s claims negligent misrepresentation against Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, CFISD, Harris County, and Elisa Hand as explained in Instruction No. 15, in whose favor do you find? (If you find in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on this claim, then you must award damages in some amount in the “Damages” section of the verdict form. However, if you find in favor of Defendants then do not award any damages.)


DAMAGES

Step 1: Actual

Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of negligent misrepresentation (explained in Instruction No. 15), what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “actual” damages, as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18? (If you find that Plaintiff Major Iraheta has failed to prove actual damages, then only consider “compensatory damages” and “punitive damages” in Step 2 & 3.)



Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of negligent misrepresentation (explained in Instruction No. 15), what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “compensatory damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 8?




If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his claims of negligent misrepresentation (explained in Instruction No. 15), what amount, if any, do you award for “punitive damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18?


VERDICT – FRAUD CLAIMS

On Plaintiff Major Iraheta’s fraud claims against Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, CFISD, Harris County, and Elisa Hand as explained in Instruction No. 16, in whose favor do you find? (If you find in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on this claim, then you must award damages in some amount in the “Damages” section of the verdict form. However, if you find in favor of Defendants then do not award any damages.)

_______Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; _______Leah Stolar; _______Harris County; _______Robert Cortez, _______Elisa Hand; _______Pajkaj Parmar; ________ CFISD; ________ Bank of America

DAMAGES

Step 1: Actual

Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his fraud claims (explained in Instruction No. 16), what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “actual” damages, as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18? (If you find that Plaintiff Major Iraheta has failed to prove actual damages, then only consider “compensatory damages” and “punitive damages” in Step 2 & 3.)



Damages

If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his fraud claims (explained in Instruction No. 16), what amount, if any, do you award for the following types of “compensatory damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 8?




If you found in favor of Plaintiff Major Iraheta on his fraud claims (explained in Instruction No. 15), what amount, if any, do you award for “punitive damages,” as such damages are explained in Instruction No. 18?


VERDICT – DECLARATORY RELIEF

Step 1: Did you find in favor of Major Iraheta on his SCRA claims (see VERDICT – SCRA RIGHTS CLAIMS)?

No Yes

Step 2: If you answered “yes” to the question in Step 1, do you make the following Declaration?

“We the Jury Declare that that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act for each and every demand, assessment, request, bill, or levy made for payment of “Penalty & Interest”, “PENALTY & INTEREST”, “33.07/33.08 Fees”, “penalties, interest, attorney’s fees”, and/or “abstractor’s costs [and/or fees]”.

No Yes


“We the Jury Declare that Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act each time they sought, and each time they received, under threat of lawsuit and foreclosure, payments for “penalty & interest & attorney fees”, of “Penalty & Interest”, “PENALTY & INTEREST”, “33.07/33.08 Fees”, “penalties, interest, attorney’s fees”, and/or “abstractor’s costs [and/or fees]”

Step 4: Did you find in favor of Major Iraheta on his Civil Rights claims (see VERDICT – CIVIL RIGHTS)?

No Yes


“We the Jury Declare that Mr. Parmar, remainder of

Linebarger Defendants, and the Harris County Defendants violated Major Iraheta’s civil rights, and the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on April 30, 2007, and May 11, 2007, when the Linebarger Defendants and the Harris County Defendants brought a suit seeking payment of interest, in excess of 6%, penalty, attorney fees, abstract fee, for tax years 2004-2006”

No Yes


“We the Jury Declare that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand Defendants violated Major Iraheta’s civil rights, and the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983, each and every instance Major Iraheta was deprived of a federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity and each violation of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act”

No Yes

Step 7: Did you find in favor of Major Iraheta on his Defamation of Character claims (see VERDICT – DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER)?

No Yes


“We the Jury Declare that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand defamed Major Iraheta’s character”

No Yes Date: Time:

Foreperson Juror

Juror Juror

Juror Juror

Juror Juror

Juror Juror

Juror Juror

1


HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE IRAHETA

PLAINTIFF,

V.


DEFENDANTS.

§ § § § § § § § § § § § §


EXHIBIT I -PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 1. THE SERVICEMEMBER CIVIL RELIEF ACT (“SCRA”)

The Servicemember Civil Relief Act is a federal law passed by Congress that provides protections for military members as they enter active duty. It covers issues such as rental agreements, security deposits, prepaid rent, evictions, installment contracts, credit card interest rates, mortgage interest rates, mortgage foreclosures, civil judicial proceedings, automobile leases, life insurance, health insurance, property taxes, and income tax payments.

The SCRA provides that any interest imposed on a servicemember’s late

property taxes during a period of active duty may not exceed six percent. 50 U.S.C. §§ 3991(a), (d), 3937(a), and 3911(2)(A)(i), (3). The law also bars any additional charges or interest under the guise of a “penalty.” 50 U.S.C. § 3991(d). These property tax interest rate and penalty protections extend only to “property . . . owned individually by a servicemember or jointly by a servicemember and a dependent or dependents.” 50 U.S.C. § 3991(e) (emphasis added). The SCRA defines a “servicemember” as “a member of the uniformed services.” 50 U.S.C. § 3911(1).

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar;

Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, Harris County, and Elisa Hand violated Major

2

SCRA rights, privileges, or immunities with respect to the Walton property and Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP violated Major Iraheta’s SCRA rights, privileges, or immunities with respect to the Madeira property. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901-4043; Davis v. City of Philadelphia, 821 F.3d 488, 489 (3d Cir.2016) 2. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (“CRA”)

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal civil rights law passed by Congress that provides a remedy to persons who have been deprived of their federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities under color of state law.

For purposes of CRA, the definition of “person” includes Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, Harris County, and Elisa Hand.

The traditional definition of acting under the color of state law requires that the defendant have exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law”,and such actions may result in liability even if the defendant abuses the position given to him by the state. A private actor may also act under color of state law under certain circumstances.

A governmental entity or municipal agency is said to have an unconstitutional policy when it fails to train its employees, and the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to an obvious need for such training, and the failure train will likely result in the employee making a wrong decision. An unconstitutional policy may also exist if an isolated action of a government employee is dictated by a "final policymaker," or if the authorized policymaker approves a subordinate's decision and the basis for it.

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP; Pajkaj Parmar;

Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez; Harris County, and Elisa Hand acted under color of state law and deprived of, or violated, Major Iraheta’s federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities granted to him under the SCRA.

Defendant Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP failed to

adequately train and supervise Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand.

Defendant Harris County failed to adequately train and supervise Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert

3

Cortez, and Elisa Hand.

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901-4043; Davis v. City of Philadelphia, 821 F.3d 488, 489 (3d Cir.2016); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 101, 106 (1989) Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978). West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982); City of Canton v. Harris, 489; U.S. 378 (1989); Gold v. City of Miami, 1998 WL 54803 (11th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488 (11th. Cir. 1997); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1170 (11th Cir. 2009). 3. TEXAS PROPERTY TAX CODE TEX. PROP. TAX CODE § 31.02

(a) “Except as provided by Subsection (b) of this section and by Sections 31.03 and 31.04 of this code, taxes are due on receipt of the tax bill and are delinquent if not paid before February 1 of the year following the year in which imposed.”

(b) An eligible person serving on active duty in any branch of the United States armed forces during a war or national emergency declared in accordance with federal law may pay delinquent property taxes on property in which the person owns any interest without penalty or interest no later than the 60th day after the date on which the earliest of the following occurs:

(1) the person is discharged from active military service; (2) the person returns to the state for more than 10 days; (3) the person returns to non-active duty status in the reserves; or (4) the war or national emergency ends. Major Iraheta’s property taxes on his Pleasantbrook, Walton, and Madeira

properties were not delinquent.

4

Any debt, connected to Major Iraheta’s Pleasantbrook, Walton, and Madeira properties that included penalty, interest, attorney fees, other fees was unlawful. Defendants Elisa Hand, Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, CFISD, and Bank of America violated Major Iraheta’s under the Texas Property Tax Code when Bank of America made payments, on his Pleasantbrook property account, for taxes, penalty, interest, and fees to Defendants Harris County, CFISD, and Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP See TEX. PROP. TAX CODE § 31.02(a) & (b). 4. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) – 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)– Acquiring or Maintaining an Interest in

or Control of an Enterprise

Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand for allegedly violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, § 1962(b) & (c) by:

(1) taking action to collect, and/or collecting an unlawful debt; (2) committing mail fraud; (3) committing wire fraud; (4) committing bribe(s).

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901-4043; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(6); United States v. Bertolino, 964 F.2d 1492, 1496-1497 (5th Cir. 1992); Sykes v. Mel Harris and Associates, LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1282 (2d Cir. 1991); Bank of N. Ill. v. Nugent, 584 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); European Cmty. v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236-237 (1989); Al-Kazemi v. General Acceptance & Inv. Corp., 633 F. Supp. 540 (D.D.C. 1986); Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1999)

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5. NEGLIGENCE & COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE All of Defendants were negligent in their actions enumerated in Major Iraheta’s complaint. 6. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand tortuously interfered with contractual or business relationships with Major Iraheta’s lenders.

See Commerce Bank v. Deborah Flavin Durland, 141 S.W.3d 434 (Mo.Ct.App. 2004); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C (1979); Venhaus v. Shultz, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 1079—1080, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432 (2007) 7. DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand defamed Major Iraheta’s character. See Ryan v. Herald Assoc., Inc., 152 Vt. 275, 283 (1989); Burgess v. Reformer Publishing Corp., 146 Vt. 612, 619 (1986). 8. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand made negligent misrepresentations that injured Major Iraheta. See Section 552 of Restatement of Torts (Second); In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 834 F.Supp.2d 566, 591(S.D. Tex. 2011) 11. FRAUD

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand committed fraud. Source: In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001); In re E.P.,185 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. App. Austin 2006).

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12. DECLARATORY RELIEF

The Court finds necessary the following declarations:

A. A Declaration that Mr. Parmar, remainder of Linebarger Defendants, and the Harris County Defendants violated Major Iraheta’s civil rights, and the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on April 30, 2007, and May 11, 2007, when the Linebarger Defendants and the Harris County Defendants brought a suit seeking payment of interest, in excess of 6%, penalty, attorney fees, abstract fee, for tax years 2004-2006.

B. A Declaration that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act for each and every demand, assessment, request, bill, or levy made for payment of “Penalty & Interest”, “PENALTY & INTEREST”, “33.07/33.08 Fees”, “penalties, interest, attorney’s fees”, and/or “abstractor’s costs [and/or fees]”.

C. A Declaration that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act each time they sought, and each time they received, under threat of lawsuit and foreclosure, payments for “penalty & interest & attorney fees”, of “Penalty & Interest”, “PENALTY & INTEREST”, “33.07/33.08 Fees”, “penalties, interest, attorney’s fees”, and/or “abstractor’s costs [and/or fees]”;

D. A Declaration that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand Defendants violated Major Iraheta’s civil rights, and the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983, each and every instance and each violation of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act;

E. A Declaration that the Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Robert Cortez, and Elisa Hand defamed Major Iraheta’s character. 13. DAMAGES

Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Elisa Hand, Robert Cortez, CountryWide Home Loans, and Bank of America are liable to Plaintiff Major Iraheta,

Plaintiff Major Iraheta is awarded actual damages, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.

Compensatory damages are awarded for Major Iraheta’s pain, suffering, or mental anguish suffered because of Defendants Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, Harris County, CFISD, Pajkaj Parmar; Leah Stolar; Elisa Hand, Robert Cortez, CountryWide Home Loans, and Bank of America wrongful

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conduct. Additional compensatory damages are awarded for Major Iraheta’s deprivation

of a federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity. Punitive damages are awarded to Major Iraheta to punish the Defendants for

their extraordinary misconduct and to serve as an example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct. See Smock v. Iowa Interstate Railroad Ltd et al, Case No. 4:07-cv-04007-MMM-JAG, Document 74 & 76 (M.D. Illinois); Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ... 14-15, John Doe 3-9, Linebarger Goggan Blair &...

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