No. 14-

In theSupreme Court of the United States

__________

ILLINOIS,PETITIONER,

v.

DERRICK A. CUMMINGS,RESPONDENT.

__________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorarito the Illinois Supreme Court

__________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI__________

*Counsel of Record

LISA MADIGAN

Attorney General of IllinoisCAROLYN E. SHAPIRO*Solicitor General

MICHAEL M. GLICK

BRETT E. LEGNER

ELDAD Z. MALAMUTH

Assistant Attorneys General100 West Randolph StreetChicago, Illinois 60601(312) 814-5376cshapiro@atg.state.il.us

Attorneys for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Fourth Amendment permits apolice officer to request a driver to produce hislicense during a lawfully-initiated traffic stop butafter reasonable suspicion or probable cause hasdissipated, where the officer’s conduct is reasonableunder the totality of circumstances and the stop isnot unreasonably prolonged.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED...........................................i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......................................iv

OPINIONS BELOW....................................................1

JURISDICTION ..........................................................1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ........2

STATEMENT ..............................................................2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .........6

I. This Court Should Resolve The Split OverWhether The Fourth Amendment Requires ATraffic Stop To Cease The Moment SuspicionDissipates Or The Stop’s Purpose IsOtherwise Satisfied.............................................7

A. There is a clear split among the federalappellate and state high courts ..................7

B. The question is important and recurring.13

C. This case is an ideal vehicle forresolving the conflict .................................14

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued

II. This Court Should Reverse The IllinoisSupreme Court And Make Clear That AnOfficer May Request A Driver’s LicenseDuring A Lawfully-Initiated Traffic StopWhere The Officer’s Conduct Is ReasonableUnder The Totality Of Circumstances AndThe Stop Is Not Unreasonably Prolonged........16

CONCLUSION ..........................................................23

APPENDICES ...........................................................1a

A. People v. Cummings,6 N.E.3d 725 (Ill. 2014)(opinion affirming order granting motion tosuppress) .........................................................1a

B. People v. Cummings,984 N.E.2d 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)(opinion affirming order granting motion tosuppress) .......................................................28a

C. People v. Cummings,11 CF 60 (Whiteside Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2011)(order denying motion to reconsider)...........37a

D. People v. Cummings,11 CF 60 (Whiteside Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2011)(oral order denying motion to reconsider) ...38a

E. People v. Cummings,11 CF 60 (Whiteside Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2011)(oral order granting motion to suppress).....42a

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page(s)

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009)..................17

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)...............18

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)............20, 22

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)....................16

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) ......................17

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Courtof Nev., Humboldt Cnty.,542 U.S. 177 (2004) ................................................20

Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).......................6

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) .......... passim

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)...........20, 21

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ........6, 15, 21

Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) .......16

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) .............7, 16, 17

Pennsylvania v. Mimms,434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam)...........................21

People v. Harris, 886 N.E.2d 947 (Ill. 2008).............12

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

People v. Mason, 310 P.3d 1003 (Colo. 2013) ...........10

State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)..........9

State v. Candelaria,245 P.3d 69, 75 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010) ......................9

State v. Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d 427(Wis. Ct. App. 1990) .................................................9

State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452 (Id. 1992) ...................9

State v. Howard, 803 N.W.2d 450 (Neb. 2011).........10

State v. Jenkins, 3 A.3d 806 (Conn. 2010)................11

State v Louthan, 744 N.W.2d 454 (Neb. 2008).........10

State v. Overbey, 790 N.W.2d 35 (S.D. 2010) .............9

State v. Reynolds, 890 P.2d 1315 (N.M. 1995) ..........9

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ...........................4, 16

United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency,182 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1999) ....................................8

United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano,441 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006) ..............................12

United States v. Alexander,448 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2006) ..................................8

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

United States v. Brock,632 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 2011) ..................................21

United States v. Burleson,657 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 2011) ..............................10

United States v. Childs,277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc) ....................6

United States v. De La Cruz,703 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013) ........................10, 12

United States v. Diaz-Castaneda,494 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................20

United States v. Everett,601 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2010) ..............................6, 11

United States v. Fernandez,600 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2010)...............................11, 20

United States v. Guijon-Ortiz,660 F.3d 757 (4th Cir. 2011) ..................................11

United States v. Harrison,606 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ............6, 11

United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).19, 20

United States v. Macias,658 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2011) ...........................11, 12

United States v. Martin,411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005) ....................................8

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. 543 (1976) ................................................21

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) .............19

United States v. Rice,483 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2007) ..............................20

United States v. Rodriguez,741 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2014), pet’n forcert. filed, No. 13-9972 (May 1, 2014)......................8

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) ..........22

United States v. Soriana-Jarquin,492 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 2007) ..................................20

United States v. Turvin,517 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................11

United States v. Valenzuela,494 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2007) ................................12

Constitutional Provision:

U.S. CONST. amend. IV...................................... passim

Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)......................................................1

625 ILCS 5/6-112 (2011)............................................19

625 ILCS 5/11-212 (2012)..........................................14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-1m (2013)...............................14

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4611a (2013)............................14

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:398.10 (2013) .....................14

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 590.650 (2013) ................................14

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 114-10.01 (2013) ...........................14

R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-21.1-4 (2013).............................14

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art 2.133 (2013)....................14

Wash. Rev. Code § 43.43.480 (2013).........................14

W. Va. Code. § 17G-2-3 (2013) ..................................14

Other Authorities:

Christine Eith and Matthew R. Durose, Contactsbetween Police and the Public, 2008, Table 2, at 3(Bureau of Justice Statistics 2011)...........................13

Illinois Traffic Stop Study, 2012 Annual Report .....13

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The State of Illinois respectfully petitions for awrit of certiorari to review the judgment of theIllinois Supreme Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court (App.1a-27a) is reported at 6 N.E.3d 725 (2014). Theopinion of the Illinois Appellate Court, Third JudicialDistrict, (App. 28a-36a) is reported at 984 N.E.2d1162 (2013). The Oral Ruling of the Circuit Court ofthe Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, Whiteside County,Illinois granting respondent’s motion to suppress(App. 42a-47a), the Circuit Court’s Oral Rulingdenying petitioner’s motion to reconsider (App. 38a-41a), and its Order denying petitioner’s motion toreconsider (App. 37a) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The Illinois Supreme Court entered judgmenton March 20, 2014. On April 22, 2014, the IllinoisSupreme Court allowed the State’s motion to staythat court’s mandate pending the filing andresolution of a petition for a writ of certiorari in thisCourt. On June 11, 2014, Justice Kagan extendeduntil August 17, 2014 the time to file this petition forcertiorari, which is extended to August 18, 2014pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 30.1. Thejurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.§ 1257(a).

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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Fourth Amendment to the United StatesConstitution provides in relevant part: “The right ofthe people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effects, against unreasonable searchesand seizures, shall not be violated.”

STATEMENT

The decision below affirms the suppression ofevidence—the lack of a valid driver’s license—obtained during a traffic stop. The Illinois SupremeCourt held that although the traffic stop wasinitiated lawfully, the police officer’s request for adriver’s license nonetheless violated the FourthAmendment. The court so held because that requestwas not “related to” the reason for the stop, App. 15a,which was an outstanding arrest warrant for thevehicle’s owner, a woman, and because when hemade the request, the officer knew that respondent,a man, was not the subject of the warrant. TheIllinois Supreme Court concluded that the requestfor the license was not “tethered to” the arrestwarrant and was therefore unconstitutional. App.10a. The Illinois Supreme Court’s analysis failed toevaluate the reasonableness of the particular stopand the officer’s conduct during it, insteadannouncing a rule that is erroneous and, by thecourt’s own admission, App. 14a, in conflict withother state and federal appeals courts. The judgmentbelow should be reversed, either summarily or afterbriefing and argument.

1. On January 27, 2011, Officer Shane Bland ofthe Sterling, Illinois, police department, noticed avan with what appeared to be an expired

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registration. App. 2a. A check revealed that althoughthe registration was valid, there was an outstandingarrest warrant for the vehicle’s owner, a womannamed Pearlene Chattic. Ibid. Bland pulled up nextto the van at a stop sign and attempted to identifythe driver, but he did not have a clear view. App. 2a-3a. Officer Bland initiated a traffic stop, exited hisvehicle, and approached the driver’s side of the van.App. 3a. He saw that the driver, respondent, was aman, and was thus not Chattic. App. 3a. There wereno passengers. Ibid.

Bland testified that “standard operatingprocedure” was to ask for a driver’s license and proofof insurance during every traffic stop. Ibid. Blandtherefore asked to see respondent’s driver’s licenseand proof of insurance. Ibid. Respondent did nothave a valid license, so Bland cited him for drivingwith a suspended license. App. 2a-3a.

2. In the Whiteside County trial court,respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtainedfrom the traffic stop. App. 2a. After a hearing atwhich respondent and Bland testified, the trial courtfound that the facts were not in dispute and creditedBland’s testimony that he could not determine thedriver’s sex prior to the stop. App. 3a, 43a, 45a.Nonetheless, the trial court held that Bland’s requestfor respondent’s license was unconstitutional becausehe “could tell right away [respondent] wasn’t her”and “[o]nce he makes that determination on a verysimple reason for the stop * * * going anywherefurther with that, without further explanation to anindividual who * * * clearly had to believe that hewas not free to leave,” violated the FourthAmendment. App. 4a, 47a. The State filed a motion

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to reconsider, which the trial court denied. App. 37a,41a.

3. The State appealed. In a two-to-one decision,the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. App. 28a-36a.After noting that the parties did not dispute thatBland initiated the stop lawfully, the court held thatthe stop “should have ceased” “as soon as Blanddetermined that Chattic was not the driver of thevan.” App. 32a. The dissent argued that the trafficstop was not unduly prolonged and that after alawfully-initiated stop an officer may explain thebasis for the stop and request a license, even oncereasonable suspicion has dissipated. App. 35a.

4. In a five-to-two decision, the Illinois SupremeCourt affirmed. App. 1a-27a. The majority reasonedthat traffic stops “are less like formal arrests, andmore like investigative detentions,” and addressedthe reasonableness of the stop under Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1 (1968). App. 7a. The court explained that“[s]uch a detention is reasonable if it was initiallyjustified, and it was ‘reasonably related in scope tothe circumstances which justified the interference inthe first place.’” Ibid. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).The majority held that because “Bland lackedreasonable suspicion after he learned [respondent]could not be the subject of the outstanding arrestwarrant, his request for [respondent’s] licenseimpermissibly prolonged the stop and violated thefourth amendment.” App. 15a-16a.

In so concluding, the majority reasoned that a“traffic stop that is initially justified can becomeunlawful ‘if it is prolonged beyond the timereasonably required’ to complete the purpose of thestop.” App. 7a (internal citation omitted) (quoting

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Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).According to the majority, “Caballes links thereasonableness of a traffic stop’s duration to thereason for the stop,” and to “pass constitutionalmuster, a request for identification must be tetheredto * * * the reason for the stop.” App. 10a. Themajority held that the officer’s request was nottethered to the stop’s purpose because he hadalready concluded that the driver was not thevehicle’s registered owner. App. 10a-11a.

Chief Justice Garman, joined by one otherjustice, dissented. The dissenters found no“tethering” principle in Caballes and argued that themajority was attempting to resurrect the very testthat Caballes rejected. App. 17a-19a. The dissentexplained that Caballes upholds police conduct in atraffic stop so long as it does not unreasonablyprolong the stop and the stop is otherwise executedin a reasonable manner. Ibid. (citing Caballes, 543U.S. at 407-08). Here, because the stop was notprolonged beyond the “‘ordinary inquiries incident tosuch a stop,’” the dissent argued, Bland’s licenserequest should be upheld. App. 17a, 25a (quotingCaballes, 543 U.S. at 408).

In finding the stop and the license requestreasonable, Chief Justice Garman noted that thestop was initiated lawfully and that the intrusion onprivacy interests was “minimal” and not subject tothe unbridled discretion of police officers. App. 24a-25a. Finally, the dissent expressed concern that themajority’s holding would hinder the ability of lawenforcement officals to maintain the controlnecessary to ensure their safety during traffic stops,which are “‘especially fraught with danger to police

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officers.’” App. 26a (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983)).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Court should grant certiorari in this case toresolve a split over appropriate police conduct duringa traffic stop once reasonable suspicion (or probablecause)1 has dissipated or the purpose of the stop has

1 There is disagreement in the lower courts about howthe level of suspicion governs the conduct of traffic stops. See,e.g., United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc) (holding that whether an officer may askquestions unrelated to the traffic stop’s purpose may depend inpart on whether the stop was supported by reasonable suspicionor probable cause); United States v. Harrison, 606 F.3d 42, 45(2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“When a traffic stop is supported byprobable cause, the occupants of the car have no ‘right to bereleased the instant the steps to check license, registration, andoutstanding warrants, and to write a ticket, had beencompleted.’”) (quoting Childs, 277 F.3d at 953); United States v.Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 488 n.4 (6th Cir. 2010) (imposing samestandard regardless of whether stop was initiated due toreasonable suspicion or probable cause). For purposes of thiscase, however, this Court need not reach that question, whichwas not in dispute in the Illinois Supreme Court. See App. 10a(discussing Bland’s reasonable suspicion to pull respondentover); App. 16a (Garman, C.J., dissenting) (same). Becausewhat is justifiable under reasonable suspicion would certainlybe permissible under the higher standard of probable cause,this Court can provide guidance for all traffic stops simply byresolving this case on the assumption that the stop here wasinitiated under reasonable suspicion. Alternatively, becausethere was in fact probable cause to initiate the stop here, seeHill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1971) (when officershad probable cause to arrest defendant, they had probablecause to arrest other person who was not occupant but was onlyperson in defendant’s apartment when police arrived), thisCourt could limit its holding to such traffic stops withoutaddressing stops initiated with reasonable suspicion. Or this

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otherwise been fulfilled, a split that the IllinoisSupreme Court itself acknowledged. App. 14a. Andcertiorari is warranted because police officers needconsistent guidance about the standards by whichtheir conduct is evaluated, especially given the largenumbers of traffic stops that occur each day. Seeinfra at 12-13. Finally, this Court should reverse thejudgment below because the Illinois Supreme Courtboth ignored this Court’s longstanding direction that“the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment isreasonableness,” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39(1996), and effectively created an unworkable rulethat a traffic stop must cease immediately once therequisite suspicion has dissipated or the purpose ofthe stop is fulfilled.

I. This Court Should Resolve The Split OverWhether The Fourth Amendment RequiresA Traffic Stop To Cease The MomentSuspicion Dissipates Or The Stop’sPurpose Is Otherwise Satisfied.

A. There is a clear split among thefederal appellate and state highcourts.

1. Despite this Court’s regular reminders that“the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment isreasonableness,” id. at 39, and that the question ofreasonableness must be evaluated on the totality ofcircumstances, see ibid., lower courts are splitregarding whether the Fourth Amendment

Court could conclude that since the suspicion had dissipated bythe time of Bland’s disputed actions, the precise level ofsuspicion that initially justified the stop is not relevant.

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categorically prohibits police from extending a trafficstop, however briefly, including by requesting adriver’s license, after reasonable suspicion orprobable cause has dissipated or the purpose of thestop has otherwise been fulfilled.

Some courts have heeded this Court’sinstructions. These courts apply a case-by-casereasonableness analysis to evaluate theconstitutionality of a particular extension of a trafficstop. The Eighth Circuit, for example, has expresslyembraced the view that because “‘the constitutionalstandard is reasonableness measured by the totalityof the circumstances, we should not be governed byartificial distinctions.’” United States v. Rodriguez,741 F.3d 905, 907-08 (8th Cir. 2014), pet’n for cert.filed, No. 13-9972 (May 1, 2014) (quoting UnitedStates v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 648,649 (8th Cir. 1999)). 2 As a result, that court hasupheld a number of canine sniffs that took placeafter the original purpose of the stop has beenfulfilled, focusing not on the relationship between thedog sniff and the original purpose of the stop butrather on whether, under the circumstances, the stopwas unreasonably prolonged. See, e.g., ibid.(upholding “seven- or eight-minute delay” as deminimis and thus reasonable); United States v.Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006) (four-minute delay upheld); United States v. Martin, 411F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005) (two-minute delayupheld).

2 A petition for writ of certiorari is pending in Rodriguez

v. United States, No. 13-9972 (filed May 1, 2014). This Courtcould grant certiorari in both cases or hold one in abeyancewhile deciding the other.

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Nor is the Eighth Circuit unique. See, e.g., Statev. Overbey, 790 N.W.2d 35, 42-43 (S.D. 2010)(reasonable for police to perform dog sniff afterissuing citation where defendant did not wait forprolonged period). See also State v. Candelaria, 245P.3d 69, 75 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010) (“As long as thevehicle has been validly stopped, for whateverreason, police may always ask the driver to produce”license, registration, or insurance documents, “evenafter the original suspicion evaporates,” because thedriver has no legitimate expectation of privacy insuch documents.) (citing State v. Reynolds, 890 P.2d1315, 1316-18 (N.M. 1995)); State v. Box, 73 P.3d623, 630 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (detention afterissuing written warning to perform dog sniff lastedless than one minute and was de minimis).Moreover, some courts have found it reasonable forofficers to ask for driver’s licenses when the initialcontact is precipitated by a lawfully-initiatedmotorist-assist or community-caretaker stop, evenonce it is clear that the driver needs no help. SeeState v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Id. 1992) (officerasked for license of driver of car waiting for differentcar stopped for vehicle equipment violation); State v.Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d 427, 428-30 (Wis. Ct. App.1990) (answering affirmatively “whether an officerwho learns that a motorist needs no assistance maystill demand to see a driver’s license and conduct astatus check at the scene”); Reynolds, 890 P.2d at1320 (upholding as reasonable detention and requestfor license and identification during stop precipitatedby safety concern).

But other courts, like the Illinois SupremeCourt here, have adopted a bright-line rule that oncesuspicion dissipates or the purpose of the stop is

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otherwise satisfied, no further inquiry or detention ispermissible in the absence of new reasonablesuspicion. In United States v. De La Cruz, 703 F.3d1193, 1196-99 (10th Cir. 2013), for example, theTenth Circuit struck down a request foridentification by federal agents who had determinedthat the person they had stopped was not the personthey were looking for, explaining that “[o]ncereasonable suspicion has been dispelled, ‘[e]ven avery brief extension of the detention without consentor reasonable suspicion violates the FourthAmendment.’” Id. at 1197 (quoting United States v.Burleson, 657 F.3d 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 2011)).

Other courts have likewise adopted this bright-line rule. See, e.g., People v. Mason, 310 P.3d 1003,1007 (Colo. 2013) (“Because the officers lackedreasonable articulable suspicion to detain thedefendant for further questioning or investigationafter issuing him a summons and completing thetraffic stop, the contraband seized from his vehiclewas properly suppressed as the product of an illegaldetention.”); State v Louthan, 744 N.W.2d 454, 462(Neb. 2008) (rejecting de minimis rule and holdingthat officer cannot extend traffic stop after fulfillingpurpose of stop even momentarily for dog sniffwithout additional reasonable suspicion); State v.Howard, 803 N.W.2d 450, 460 (Neb. 2011) (applyingLouthan rule). The split is entrenched and ready forresolution.

2. Not only do the cases adopting a bright-linerule conflict with cases from other state and federalappellate courts, including state high courts, butthey are logically inconsistent with the case lawevaluating for reasonableness activity that prolongs

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a traffic stop where that activity takes place beforethe purpose of the stop is satisfied. Most federalcourts of appeals to address the question agree that“the proper inquiry is whether the totality of thecircumstances surrounding the stop indicates thatthe duration of the stop as a whole—including anyprolongation due to suspicionless unrelatedquestioning—was reasonable.” Everett, 601 F.3d at494 (italics in original) (internal quotation marksomitted). See also, e.g., United States v. Guijon-Ortiz,660 F.3d 757, 766 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying deminimis exception and holding that “principalinquiry * * * is the ‘officer’s diligence—i.e., hispersevering or devoted application to accomplish theundertaking of ascertaining whether the suspectedtraffic violation occurred, and, if necessary, issuing aticket.’”) (quoting Everett, 601 F.3d at 494); UnitedStates v. Fernandez, 600 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2010)(asserting that neither request of passenger’s licensenor records check “prolonged the duration of theoriginal stop”); Harrison, 606 F.3d at 45 (“We holdthat this additional questioning [of five to sixminutes] did not prolong the stop so as to render itunconstitutional.”); United States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding “brief pause[]to ask questions during traffic stop[], even if thosequestions are unrelated to the purpose of the stop”).See also State v. Jenkins, 3 A.3d 806, 826 (Conn.2010) (“These inquiries are permissible even if theyare irrelevant to the initial purpose of the stop,namely, the traffic violation, so long as they do not‘measurably extend’ the stop beyond the timenecessary to complete the investigation of the trafficviolation and issue a citation or warning.”). But seeUnited States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 518-19 (5th

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Cir. 2011) (holding that any questioning that isunrelated in scope to original reason for stop andthat extends the time of the stop at all must bejustified by separate reasonable suspicion).

Indeed, even the Tenth Circuit, which issued DeLa Cruz, and the Illinois Supreme Court have heldthat that an officer may conduct limited questioningunrelated to the stop’s justification before issuing acitation. See United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006) (no constitutionalproblem where questions “did not appreciablylengthen the detention”); United States v.Valenzuela, 494 F.3d 886, 888 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Thedetention arising from a traffic stop does not becomeunreasonable merely because the officer asksquestions unrelated to the initial purpose for thestop, provided those questions do not unreasonablyextend the amount of time the subject is delayed.”);People v. Harris, 886 N.E.2d 947, 956-58 (Ill. 2008)(holding that requesting identification and runningwarrant check on occupants of lawfully-stoppedvehicle does not violate Fourth Amendment). Thesecases are logically incompatible with those courts’subsequent bright-line restrictions on officers’conduct once the purpose of the stop is fulfilled, asthe dissents in those later cases pointed out. De LaCruz, 703 F.3d at 1203 (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting)(citing Alvarez-Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1258-59); App.17a-18a (Garman, C.J., dissenting) (citing Harris,886 N.E.2d at 957-58, 960). Moreover, the tensionbetween the older and the newer holdings creates anincentive for police officers to extend the business ofthe stop artificially so that they do not run afoul ofDe La Cruz and Cummings.

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Due to the significant split that the IllinoisSupreme Court’s decision below exacerbated and thelogical incompatibility of its holding with other caselaw governing the scope of questioning during trafficstops, and with, as explained in Part II, infra, thisCourt’s own precedent, certiorari and reversal arewarranted.

B. The question is important andrecurring.

The numerous cases cited above demonstratethat the question presented here recurs frequently.Millions of traffic stops occur throughout the countryannually. In Illinois alone, in 2012, there were2,132,006 traffic stops. Illinois Traffic Stop Study,2012 Annual Report, at 2. 3 Moreover, these stopsrepresent a majority of the interactions betweencitizens and police. According to recently availabledata from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2008,over fifty-nine percent of the more than forty millionUnited States residents who interacted with policedid so due to traffic stops. Christine Eith andMatthew R. Durose, Contacts between Police and thePublic, 2008, Table 2, at 3 (Bureau of JusticeStatistics 2011).4

In light of the frequency of traffic stops andtheir central role in the relationship between lawenforcement and the public, officers and citizens

3 Available at www.idot.illinois.gov/Assets/uploads/files/Transportation-System/Reports/Safety/Traffic-Stop-Studies/2012/2012%20Illinois%20Traffic%20Stop%20Summary.pdf (last visited, August 15, 2014).

4 Available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf(last visited, August 15, 2014).

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alike need clear guidance on the parameters of trafficstops. Requesting a license as a routine part of anysuch stop, see infra at 17, however, is in doubt forpolice departments in some states, including Illinois.

Moreover, Illinois requires its police officers tocollect certain demographic information aboutdrivers pulled over in many traffic stops, regardlessof whether a traffic citation issues, for purposes ofstatistical analysis to determine whether policepractices appear to have a disparate impact onminorities. 625 ILCS 5/11-212 (2012). Other stateshave similar provisions. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §54-1m (2013); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4611a (2013); La.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:398.10 (2013); Mo. Rev. Stat. §590.650 (2013); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 114-10.01 (2013);R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-21.1-4 (2013); Tex. Code Crim.Proc. Art 2.133 (2013); Wash. Rev. Code § 43.43.480(2013); W. Va. Code. § 17G-2-3 (2013). Yet policeofficers may not be able to continue traffic stops longenough to comply with these simple and entirelybenign requirements. See 26a & n.3 (Garman, C.J.,dissenting). This Court should resolve this importantand recurring issue.

C. This case is an ideal vehicle forresolving the conflict.

This case turns on a pure question of law, andthe facts are straightforward and undisputed. Blandcould not determine the driver’s sex prior toapproaching the vehicle, but he recognized thatrespondent was not the subject of the arrest warrantbefore asking for his license. The State did notcontend that the length of the stop was justifiedbecause Bland developed suspicion of any separate

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criminal activity, and the Illinois Supreme Court wasclear that the license request, by itself, violated theFourth Amendment. There are no disputes of factthat would impede a resolution of the legal question.

Nor can it be disputed that Bland’s actions werereasonable. He requested respondent’s license andregistration at the very beginning of the stop, and hedid so as a “matter of routine.” App. 3a, 24a. Thus,this case turns entirely on whether reasonableness isthe appropriate criterion. If it is, then Bland’sactions are constitutional. It is only through thecategorical rule adopted by the Illinois SupremeCourt that the interaction’s legality can bequestioned.

Finally, the issue presented here is one of purefederal law. The Illinois Supreme Court did not relyon—indeed, did not even mention—the Stateconstitution. Cf. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 (holding thatthis Court does not have jurisdiction over state courtdecisions relying on “adequate and independent stategrounds”).

The legal question here is isolated, distilled, anduncomplicated by factual disputes. It is the idealvehicle to resolve this critical Fourth Amendmentissue.

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II. This Court Should Reverse The IllinoisSupreme Court And Make Clear That AnOfficer May Request A Driver’s LicenseDuring A Lawfully-Initiated Traffic StopWhere The Officer’s Conduct Is ReasonableUnder The Totality Of Circumstances AndThe Stop Is Not Unreasonably Prolonged.

The Illinois Supreme Court erred in holdingthat the request for a license from the driver of alawfully-stopped vehicle, by itself, impermissiblyprolonged the stop in violation of the FourthAmendment where the requisite suspicion for thestop had dissipated. Although no case from thisCourt squarely addresses the issue, this Court’sprecedents, and in particular its most recentteachings on the proper conduct of traffic stops, pointto only one possible conclusion, making reversal—either summary or plenary—appropriate.

1. Because a traffic stop is a seizure, a policeofficer must have reasonable suspicion to initiate it.Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (2014);Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. Here, there is no disputethat Bland acted properly when he pulled respondentover. App. 10a-11a, 16a. See supra at 6 n.1. All thatis at issue is Bland’s conduct after he lawfullyinitiated the stop.

2. “[T]he ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendmentis reasonableness.’” Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39(quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250(1991)). And reasonableness turns on “the totality ofthe circumstances.” Ibid. Despite both this teachingand the fact that this Court has deliberately and“consistently eschewed bright-line rules,” ibid., the

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Illinois Supreme Court effectively created a rulerequiring police officers to end traffic stops at thevery moment that reasonable suspicion dissipates or,presumably, as soon as the purpose of the stop isotherwise fulfilled. This holding cannot be squaredwith Robinette’s rejection of the Ohio SupremeCourt’s rule that after fulfilling the purpose of atraffic stop, the police officer must inform the driverthat he is free to go before asking for consent tosearch his car. Id. at 36, 39-40. In other words, thisCourt has already held that even where a policeofficer has no further justification to hold the driver,continuing the interaction may well be reasonableand thus lawful.

3. During a lawful traffic stop, a police officer isnot limited to actions and inquiries related to thereasons for the original stop as long as the officerdoes not unreasonably prolong the stop. Arizona v.Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (“An officer’sinquiries into matters unrelated to the justificationfor the traffic stop * * * do not convert the encounterinto something other than a lawful seizure, so longas those inquiries do not measurably extend theduration of the stop.”). 5 Indeed, this Court has

5 Johnson’s statement is in tension with the three-

decades-old language of the plurality in Florida v. Royer, 460U.S. 491 (1983). In Royer, the plurality explained that taking atraveler’s identification and airline ticket and removing himfrom the main airport concourse into a small, closet-sized roomfor questioning constituted an arrest for which probable causewas necessary. Id. at 501-05. In the course of reaching thisholding, the Royer plurality stated that, in a Terry stop, the“investigatory detention must be temporary and last no longerthan is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id. at500. Johnson rejects such a rigid rule, 555 U.S. at 333, and such

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upheld a canine sniff that was entirely unrelated tothe traffic offense that precipitated the stop.Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-09. Thus, contrary to theIllinois Supreme Court’s reasoning, there is norequirement that everything that happens duringthe traffic stop be “tethered to” that original purpose.See App. 10a. Instead, the reasonableness of the stopdepends on the officer’s overall conduct in light of theoriginal purpose.

4. The nature of the officer’s inquiries andactions are central to the reasonableness inquiry. Inevaluating reasonableness, this Court has noted thatin addition to investigating the original reason forthe stop, there may be other “ordinary inquiriesincident to such a stop.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.Indeed, once lawfully pulled over, the reasonabledriver undoubtedly expects to be asked for hislicense, as even the Illinois Supreme Courtacknowledged. App. 10a (noting that “a policeofficer’s request for a driver’s license may be anexpected, preliminary, and routine part of everytraffic stop”). See also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.420, 437 (1984) (“A motorist’s expectations, when hesees a policeman’s light flashing behind him, are thathe will be obliged to spend a short period of timeanswering questions and waiting while the officerchecks his license and registration, that he may thenbe given a citation, but that in the end he most likelywill be allowed to continue on his way.”). Thus, arequest for a license at the beginning of a lawfultraffic stop, as in the instant case, see supra at 14, is

a rule is inconsistent with this Court’s case law, as described inthis Part of this petition. This case provides an opportunity forthis Court to resolve any lingering confusion.

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not intrinsically unreasonable. 6 In fact, in Illinoisand likely in other states, such a request will oftenbe part of officers’ routine collection of datamandated by state law. See supra at 13.

And in evaluating whether an officer’s conductis reasonable, this Court has also considered thenature of the privacy interests allegedly infringed.Thus, in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983),and in Caballes, this Court based its constitutionalanalysis of canine sniffs in part on the fact that theirintrusion on any legitimate privacy interest isminimal. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (noting “limiteddisclosure” of information available through caninesniff and determining that canine sniff in publicplace is not a search); Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409(holding that “the use of a well-trained narcoticsdetection dog * * * during a lawful traffic stop,generally does not implicate legitimate privacyinterests”).

Likewise, as in this case, there is no invasion oflegitimate privacy interests when an officer asks alawfully-stopped driver for the license he is requiredby law to have. See 625 ILCS 5/6-112 (2012). Driverswho, like respondent, are driving unlawfully have nolegitimate privacy interest in hiding that fact. SeeCaballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (refusing to credit aslegitimate a privacy interest in carrying contraband)(citing United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 123

6 Indeed, this Court could narrowly reverse the IllinoisSupreme Court here simply by holding that the request for alicense is one of the “ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop,”Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, and thus presumptivelyconstitutional.

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& n.22 (1984)). And for the legal driver, providingthe license is highly unlikely to lead to the revelationof personal or embarrassing information. See id. at409 (noting that erroneous drug dog alert does not“in and of itself, reveal[] any legitimate privateinformation”). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.648, 657 (1979) (comparing greater “anxiety” likelyproduced by individual traffic stops to lesser fear andannoyance caused by traffic checkpoints where allcars must stop); App. 23a-25a (Garman, C.J.,dissenting) (relying on reasoning of Prouse).

Indeed, “it is well established that an officermay ask a suspect to identify himself in the course ofa Terry stop.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court ofNev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004).Following that reasoning, many federal circuit courtshave concluded that police may ask for identificationfrom passengers as a matter of course during trafficstops. See Fernandez, 600 F.3d at 62 (holding thatofficer “did not need an independent justification toask [passenger] for identification”); United States v.Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007)(“The police may ask people who have legitimatelybeen stopped for identification without conducting aFourth Amendment search or seizure.”); UnitedStates v. Soriana-Jarquin, 492 F.3d 495, 500 (4thCir. 2007) (“If an officer may ‘as a matter of course’and in the interest of personal safety order apassenger physically to exit the vehicle, * * * he maysurely take the minimally intrusive step ofrequesting passenger identification.”) (quotingMaryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997));United States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1084 (10th Cir.2007) (“because passengers present a risk to officersafety equal to the risk presented by the driver, an

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officer may ask for identification from passengersand run background checks on them as well”). Ifpolice can ask a passenger for a license withoutseparate suspicion, surely that is true for the driver.7

That the officer here acted pursuant to“standard operating procedure,” App. 3a, 24a, and“as a matter of routine,” ibid., also contributes to thereasonableness of the license request. There are goodreasons for such procedures. Most notably, trafficstops are “especially fraught with danger to policeofficers.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1047. It is thus crucialthat police officers remain in control of the situationduring such stops. Indeed, this Court has sorecognized in allowing officers to order drivers andpassengers alike to step out of the vehicle during alawful stop for a traffic violation. See Pennsylvania v.Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1977) (per curiam)(drivers); Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414-15 (passengers).Reasonable procedures like asking for a license canhelp the officer maintain control and authority whileeliminating the possibility that such requests will bemade in a discriminatory or otherwise unreasonable

7 To illustrate the point further, police may, without

any individualized suspicion, ask for identification atcheckpoints that have been set up permissibly. See UnitedStates v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (upholdingcheckpoints stops by border patrol that “involve[d] only a briefdetention of travelers during which all that is required of thevehicle’s occupants is a response to a brief question or two andpossibly the production of a document evidencing a right to bein the United States”) (internal citations and quotation marksomitted). See also United States v. Brock, 632 F.3d 999, 1002-03(7th Cir. 2011) (officers at sobriety checkpoint may requestlicense). Thus, if a traffic stop is initially justified, requesting adriver’s license does not, by itself, create a Fourth Amendmentviolation, regardless of the presence of individualized suspicion.

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manner. Cf. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 (noting problemof officers having “standardless and unconstraineddiscretion”).

5. A contrary rule would provide perverseincentives. It would encourage officers to delayasking for key information, confirming or dispellingreasonable suspicion or probable cause, or issuing acitation, so that they can continue to ask questions.And it would open the floodgates of litigationregarding the exact moment that each traffic stopshould have ended. To be sure, in this case, Blandimmediately knew that respondent was not thesubject of the warrant, but in many cases, theidentity of the driver, even the driver’s sex or race,might not be obvious, leading to inevitable litigationover what the officer should have known beforeasking for the license. Likewise, in numerous otherscenarios involving lawful traffic stops, the exactmoment that reasonable suspicion or probable causedissipates will be unclear.

* * *

This Court should clarify that no artificial lineat the “end” of a traffic stop replaces reasonablenessas the relevant touchstone. See United States v.Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (“Much as a ‘brightline’ rule would be desirable, in evaluating whetheran investigative detention is unreasonable, commonsense and ordinary human experience must governover rigid criteria.”). This Court should thus reversethe Illinois Supreme Court, either summarily orafter full briefing and argument.

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CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should begranted.

Respectfully submitted,

*Counsel of Record

LISA MADIGAN

Attorney General of IllinoisCAROLYN E. SHAPIRO*Solicitor General

MICHAEL M. GLICK

BRETT E. LEGNER

ELDAD Z. MALAMUTH

Assistant Attorneys General100 West Randolph StreetChicago, Illinois 60601(312) 814-5376cshapiro@atg.state.il.us

AUGUST 2014