IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. FERNANDO ARGUELLES, JR., ATTY. REYNALDO GERONIMO, ET.AL., Petitioners, vs.MAJ. GEN. JOSE BALAJADIA, JR., In his capacity as Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate, Respondent.

G.R. No. 167211 March 14, 2006AZCUNA, J.:FACTS: On March 15, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus because they were detained in a room at the Senate pursuant to an Order dated March 15, 2005 issued to respondent by the Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies (Senate Committee).

The Senate Committee scheduled a hearing on March 15, 2005 at 10:30 a.m. to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, regarding the alleged illegal sale of unregistered and high risk securities by the Standard Chartered Bank. At the hearing, Atty. Fernando Arguelles, Jr. and Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo were present as their counsel of the Standard Chartered Bank.The minutes of the hearing show that Standard Chartered Banks counsel provided the Senate Committee with a copy of the petition for prohibition. The banks counsel also filed an urgent motion to suspend or defer the proceedings of the Senate Committee apparently to await the action of the Court on the petition for prohibition.

During the hearing, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile declared that "there is one portion of the petition for prohibition that casts a slur on this Committee and the proceedings of the Committee." Senator Juan Ponce Enrile moved to cite the officers of Standard Chartered Bank and their counsel, Atty. Fernando Arguelles, Jr. and Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, for contempt for making the allegation.Senator Edgardo Angara, chairperson of the Senate Committee, issued an Order directing respondent Major General Jose Balajadia, Jr., sergeant-at-arms of the Senate, to detain for direct contempt of the Committee the officers of Standard Chartered Bank and their counsel, Atty. Fernando Arguelles, Jr. and Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, for a period of not more than six hours.

The persons who were detained in a room at the Senate then filed this petition for habeas corpus, alleging that the Committee acted in violation of the Constitution and without jurisdiction, for the following reason: that petitioners are being illegally deprived of their liberty at the Senate building.Petitioners prayed that respondent be directed to appear before this Court to produce their bodies and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without delay.

On March 18, 2005, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that they were released from the custody of the Senate by the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms on March 15, 2005 at 5:56 p.m. Notwithstanding their release, petitioners submitted that it is imperative that the issues involved in this case be resolved, because they are of unprecedented and transcendental importance and they involve the impact of the exercise of the powers of Congress upon human rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus has become moot.

HELD:YES

The petition has become moot.A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal.

The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty. Petitioners have been released. While the issues raised by petitioners are important, it is not appropriate to resolve them now in these proceedings. This is all the more so considering that the only respondent here is Maj. Gen. Jose Balajadia, Jr., the Senate sergeant-at-arms, impleaded in that capacity for holding petitioners in custody. The Senate Committee itself has not been made a respondent and, therefore, has not been given the opportunity to be heard on the issues sought to be resolved. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent. G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007CORONA, J.: FACTS: Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote, Giovannis guardian ad litem, filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. She averred in her petition that Giovanni N. Gallamaso is a Filipino Citizen, 16 years old, minor. As guardian ad litem, authorizing her to file in court a petition for change of name of said minor in accordance with the desire of his mother, who is residing and working abroadMinor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. He was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; and Giovanni has been known by that name since birth as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. That Giovannis mother might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child.

Publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered. The trial court also directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order.

Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.

RTC: After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.

From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding.CA: the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. ISSUE: Whether or not the apellee Capote guardian ad litem availed of the proper remedy on the change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: YES

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code:

According to the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours)

Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court must be heard in an adversarial proceeding.

HELD: YES

The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point is whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:

The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name. In this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough. (emphasis supplied)

A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.

PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999

KAPUNAN, J.:As a result of a judgment in a civil case (for recovery of property) in favor of private respondent, two (2) of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land and the other was the family home.

The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent.To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private respondent over the subject property including their family home which was extrajudicially constituted in accordance with law.Petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as family home is exempt from execution. In a last ditch effort to save their property, petitioners invoke the benefits accorded to the family home under the Family Code.ISSUE: Whether or not the family home of the petitioners as constituted by their father is exempt from execution.HELD: NOA family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is said, however, that the family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain specials cases.

Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted judicial and extrajudicially, the former by the filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court, and the latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper registry of property declaring the establishment of the family home. The operative act then which created the family home extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of the declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code.

Under the Family Code, however. registration was no longer necessary Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family. It reads:

The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

In the case of Manacop v. Court of Appeals 11 on the retroactive effect of the Family Code, particularly on the provisions on the family home, to wit:While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The applicable law, therefore in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.Art. 243 of the Civil Code states that: The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except: (2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property;

The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966.The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2).

Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the "family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated," 13 it is understood that the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another.