IN THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF VICTORIA AT ... HER HONOUR: Introduction 1. It is submitted by the...
Transcript of IN THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF VICTORIA AT ... HER HONOUR: Introduction 1. It is submitted by the...
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IN THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT OF VICTORIA AT SUNSHINE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Case No. F13001010
DAMON ABBEY
Informant v JASON TODERO
Accused
MAGISTRATE: MAGISTRATE MACCALLUM
WHERE HELD: SUNSHINE MAGISTRATES’ COURT
DATE OF HEARING: 7 JULY 2016
DATE OF DECISION: 14 OCTOBER 2016
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: VICTORIA POLICE V TODERO
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2016] VMC030
REASONS FOR DECISION – VOIR DIRE
APPEARANCES:
Counsel Solicitors
For the Prosecution SC ALEX AUSTEN SUNSHINE PROSECTIONS UNIT
For the Accused PHILLIP BLOEMAN WITH
GORJAN NIKOLOVSKI JUSTIN MARCUS, BEHAN LEGAL
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HER HONOUR:
Introduction
1. It is submitted by the Defence that the police in this case have acted outside their
powers of entry, arrest and seizure of stolen power tools and other items, and that
the Prosecution should therefore be not permitted to rely on the evidence collected
by the police in relation to these charges. The Defence must satisfy the Court on
the balance of probabilities1 that the entry to the premises, the ensuing arrest of the
Accused and seizure of the items the subject of the charges was unlawful.
2. The Defence requests that the discretion established pursuant to section 138 of the
Evidence Act 2008 be exercised to exclude the evidence relied on by the
Prosecution in support of these charges. The exercise of this discretion is only
enlivened if it is established that the evidence was obtained by police as a
consequence of impropriety or illegality.
3. It is conceded by the Prosecution that if the Defence is successful in its submission,
there will be a dismissal of the charges.
The Charges
4. The Accused Jason Todero, is charged with having committed the following
offences:
a. at Coburg between 1 July 2015 and 20 August 2015 stealing a Paslode Nail
Gun, being property belonging to unknown and valued at $1000;
b. at Essendon between 1 July 2015 and 20 August 2015 stealing a Makita
radio, a drill and a hand angle grinder being property belonging to unknown
and valued at $500;
c. at Diggers Rest on or about 1 September 2014 to 31 December 2014
stealing a DeWalt cordless drill being property belonging to unknown and
valued at $350;
d. at Essendon between 1 July 2015 and 20 August 2015 stealing one Yarra
Tram Jacket being property belonging to Yarra Trams and valued at $350;
1 Evidence Act 2008, s.142; DPP v Pringle [2015] VCC 702, page 3 of 12, onus of proof lies with the Defence with respect to establishing unlawful conduct or impropriety by police.
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e. at Deer Park between 1 July 2015 and 20 August 2015 stealing one
registration plate (XIT 827) being property belonging to unknown and valued
at $35;
f. at Caroline Springs on 20 August 2015 possessing a drug of dependence,
namely, methylamphetamine;
g. at Caroline Springs on 20 August 2015 using a drug of dependence, namely,
methylamphetamine.
5. For the purposes of the voir dire, the following matters are conceded:
a. the identity of the Accused;
b. the address of the Accused;
c. the date and time of the entry by police of the Accused’s premises, his arrest,
the search of his person, and the seizure of the items the subject of the
charges.
6. It is conceded, therefore, that at approximately 8.55 am on 20 August 2015, four
police officers attended 3 Lauricella Place, Caroline Springs, arrested the Accused
in the bungalow in which he was living, and seized the items which are the subject
of the charges. Entry to the premises and seizure of the items was conducted
without warrant.
7. It is also conceded that police presence at the Accused’s bungalow on 20 August
2015 arises from a different crime for which the Accused was being investigated by
police, namely, the theft of power tools from a motor vehicle on 26 March 2015 at
Heidelberg Heights. Subsequent to this theft, through fingerprint identification, the
Accused’s left palm and left thumb prints were found on the external tool box of the
vehicle. The Accused was ultimately never charged with this crime, on the basis
that there was insufficient evidence.
8. Prior to his arrest, the Accused was of interest to police and he had been arrested
and interviewed in relation to another alleged theft from a motor vehicle of power
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tools on 20 July 2015 in Hillside. He was released pending summons and ultimately
not charged with any offences arising from this incident.2
9. On 20 August 2015, on the basis of the information contained in the two LEAP
reports from the reported thefts on 26 March and 20 July 2015, and the positive
preliminary latent Fingerprint Identification Report linking the Accused with the
Heidelberg Heights theft, four police officers (each of whom are the Prosecution
witnesses in this hearing) entered the Accused’s premises without a warrant to
arrest him for the theft of the power tools from Heidelberg Heights.
Submissions of the parties
10. In summary, the Prosecution asserts that the entry and search of the premises was
conducted lawfully pursuant to sections 459A of the Crimes Act 1958.
11. The Defence objection to the lawfulness of the Informant/police’s actions is to be
understood in two stages:
a. entry into the premises;
b. the arrest of the Accused and seizure of the items the subject of these
charges after entry into the premises.
Stage 1: Entry into the premises
Stage 1 – first question for determination
12. The first question to be determined on this voir dire is did the Informant/police have
the power to lawfully enter and arrest the Accused within his premises? The answer
to this question is dependent on the answer to the threshold question of whether the
Informant/police held a belief on reasonable grounds that the Accused had
committed a serious indictable offence in Victoria.
13. The Defence submits that the entry and arrest were unlawful because prior to entry
there were no reasonable grounds for the police to believe that the Accused had
committed a serious indictable offence, namely theft from a motor vehicle. The
Defence submits that the entry to the Accused’s premises was unlawful for the
following reasons: 2 Transcript of proceedings, Victoria Police v Todero (Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, F13001010, Magistrate MacCallum, 7 July 2016) pages 130-131.
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a. there was no signed and jurated statement from the Complainant of a theft or
identification of what was stolen;3
b. the fingerprint of the Accused located on the outside of the Complainant’s
vehicle was itself not sufficiently probative for police to even form a
suspicion;
c. the extraneous material of a prior uncharged incident could not rationally
inform a suggestion that the Accused committed the theft being investigated;
and
d. the Court should infer that police conduct amounted to an unauthorised
search for the stolen items without a warrant.4
14. The Defence submitted as a consequence that the arrest and entry were contrary to
the powers conferred on police under section 459A of the Crimes Act 1958.5
15. I have considered all of the evidence before the Court in this matter, the legal
submissions, the case law and legislation relied on by the parties and additional
case law that has considered these questions. I am satisfied that the Informant had
reasonable grounds for believing that the Accused had committed the offence of
theft from a motor vehicle, and that the entry into the premises by police to arrest
the Accused was lawful. I am also satisfied that the police presence on 20 August
2015 was not, as is submitted by the Defence, to enter the Accused’s premises and
search for the stolen items without having first obtained a warrant, but was to arrest
the Accused.
Stage 1 – second question for determination
16. The second question raised on the voir dire is, if any of the evidence obtained by
the Informant/police was improperly or illegally obtained, should it be admitted into
evidence, or should it be excluded pursuant to section 138 of the Evidence Act
2008?
17. The Defence submits that the evidence should be excluded under section 138 of
the Evidence Act 2008 and that the police conduct in this case was at a minimum
3 Defence submissions on Voir Dire, dated 19 August 2016 (Defence submissions), paragraphs 32-37 and 99. 4 Defence submissions, paragraphs 38- 43. 5 Defence submissions, paragraph 62.
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reckless6 as well as contrary to the Accused’s rights as recognised by the ICCPR
and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (`the Charter’).7
The Prosecution submitted that the Informant/police have not acted in an improper
or unlawful manner, but if the Court finds that some impropriety occurred, the
desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting it.8
18. As I have answered the first question in relation to the evidence concerning `Stage
1’ in the affirmative, it is not necessary to consider the second question.
Stage 2: After entry into the premises
Stage 2 – first question for determination
19. The first question for determination in relation to Stage 2, is were the power tools,
number plates and Yarra Tram jacket lawfully seized by police?
20. The Defence submits that once inside the premises, the items the subject of the
charges were not lawfully seized. The Defence submits that:
a. there is an insufficient evidentiary basis for the formation by the
Informant/police of a belief on reasonable grounds that a serious offence has
been committed, based on the authority in Ghani v Jones as applied in
Goldberg v Brown [2003] VSC 104 and the evidence should be excluded
pursuant to section 138 of the Evidence Act 2008;
b. the Accused was not cautioned by the Informant in relation to the possession
of stolen items and the Prosecution ought to be precluded from relying on
any answers or failure to answer questions as part of establishing
reasonable grounds when no caution had been properly administered.9
21. In R v Willis [2016] VSCA 176, the Court of Appeal has recently held that the onus
is on the Defence to prove facts giving rise to alleged breaches of section 464A of
the Crimes Act 1958. Once that onus is discharged, it is for the Prosecution to
6 Defence submissions, paragraph 83. 7 Defence submissions, paragraphs 87-96. 8 Written Submissions for the Prosecution, dated 5 August 2016 (Prosecution submissions), page 12, and paragraph 1. 9 Defence submissions, paragraphs 32-34 and 99.
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satisfy the court that the desirability of admitting evidence outweighs the
undesirability of admitting it.10
22. The Defence relies in respect of this submission on the arguments that it has raised
in relation to section 138 of the Evidence Act 2008 for the entry into the premises.
23. The Prosecution submits that the Informant/police lawfully seized the items the
subject of the charges in accordance with the authority in Ghani v Jones and as
applied in Goldberg v Brown [2003] VSC 104.
24. For the reasons I have set out below, the Defence have not satisfied the Court on
the balance of probabilities that the seizure of the items the subject of these
charges was unlawful, or that the Accused was not lawfully cautioned. It is therefore
not necessary to consider the further submissions by the parties in relation to
sections 138 and 139 of the Evidence Act 2008.
Evidence led by the Prosecution
25. The Prosecution called four witnesses:
a. The Informant, Detective Senior Constable Damon Abbey;
b. Detective Sergeant Andrew Beames;
c. Detective Senior Constable Tristan Barlow; and
d. Detective Senior Constable Chris Elzink.
26. The Prosecution relied on the following exhibits:
a. Preliminary Latent Fingerprint Identification Report 1251/156 dated 23
November 2015 (hereafter referred to as the Fingerprint Identification
Report);
b. Victoria Police LEAP Incident Report and Case Progress dated 5 March
2016, regarding incident number 150098687;
c. Police field incident notes of Informant Abbey, dated 20 August 2015;
d. Victoria Police Brief of Evidence, containing 14 photographs of seized items;
10 R v Willlis [2016] VSCA 176 at paragraphs 104, 110-111.
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e. Victoria Police Exhibit Log completed by Detective Senior Constable Chris
Elzink for search conducted at the Accused’s premises on 20 August 2015;
and
f. Victoria Police LEAP Incident Record Inquiry dated 20 July 2015, regarding
incident number 150225888.
Evidence led by the Defence
27. The Defence called no witnesses and did not tender any documentary exhibits.
Each of the Prosecution witnesses was cross-examined by the Counsel for the
Accused.
Relevant legislation and case law
28. At the hearing, the parties agreed on the application and interpretation of the
relevant legislation and case law. Further authorities were relied on by each of the
parties in their written submissions.
29. The powers of police officers to apprehend offenders without warrant is contained in
the Crimes Act 1958.
458 Person found committing offences may be arrested without warrant by any person
(1) Any person, whether a police officer or not, may at any time without warrant apprehend and take before a bail justice or the Magistrates' Court to be dealt with according to law or deliver to a police officer to be so taken, any person—
(a) he finds committing any offence (whether an indictable offence or an offence punishable on summary conviction) where he believes on reasonable grounds that the apprehension of the person is necessary for any one or more of the following reasons, namely—
(i) to ensure the attendance of the offender before a court of competent jurisdiction;
(ii) to preserve public order;
(iii) to prevent the continuation or repetition of the offence or the commission of a further offence; or
(iv) for the safety or welfare of members of the public or of the offender;
(b) when instructed so to do by any police officer having power under this Act to apprehend that person; or
(c) he believes on reasonable grounds is escaping from legal custody or aiding or abetting another person to escape from legal custody or avoiding apprehension by some person having authority to apprehend that person in the circumstances of the case.
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(2) For the purposes of paragraph (a) in subsection (1) offence means offence at common law or a contravention of or failure to comply with a provision of an Act of Parliament and unless otherwise by Act of Parliament expressly provided does not include a contravention of or failure to comply with a rule regulation by-law or other law made under an Act of Parliament.
(3) A person who has been apprehended without warrant pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (a) in subsection (1) in respect of any offence punishable on summary conviction (not being an indictable offence that may be heard and determined summarily) and taken into custody shall be held in the custody of the person apprehending him only so long as any reason referred to in the said paragraph for his apprehension continues and where, before that person is charged with an offence, it appears to the person arresting that person that the reason no longer continues the person arresting that other person shall, without any further or other authority than this subsection, release that person from custody without bail or cause him to be so released and whether or not a summons has been issued against him or a notice to appear has been served on him with respect to the offence alleged.
(4) In subsection (3), notice to appear has the same meaning as in the Criminal Procedure Act 2009.
459 Powers of police officer or protective services officer to apprehend offenders
(1) In addition to exercising any of the powers conferred by section 458 or by or under any other Act a police officer, or a protective services officer on duty at a designated place, may at any time without warrant apprehend any person—
(a) he believes on reasonable grounds has committed an indictable offence in Victoria (including any indictable offence which may be heard and determined summarily); or
(b) he believes on reasonable grounds has committed an offence elsewhere which if committed in Victoria would be an indictable offence against the law of Victoria (including any indictable offence which may be heard and determined summarily).
Note
There is a presumption in favour of proceeding by summons if an accused is a child—see section 345 of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005.
(2) If a protective services officer arrests a person under subsection (1), the protective services officer must hand the person into the custody of a police officer as soon as practicable after the person is arrested.
(3) In this section, designated place has the same meaning as it has in the Victoria Police Act 2013.
459A Entry and search of premises
(1) A police officer may, for the purpose of arresting under section 458 or 459 or any other enactment a person whom he—
(a) believes on reasonable grounds—
(i) to have committed in Victoria a serious indictable offence;
(ii) to have committed an offence elsewhere which if committed in Victoria would be a serious indictable offence; or
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(iii) to be escaping from legal custody; or
(b) finds committing a serious indictable offence—
enter and search any place where the police officer on reasonable grounds believes him to be.
(2) In order to enter a place pursuant to subsection (1), a police officer may, if it is necessary to do so, use reasonable force.
(3) In this section serious indictable offence has the same meaning as it has in section 325.
30. ̀ Serious indictable offence’ is defined in section 325(6) of the Crimes Act 1958 as
`an indictable offence which, by virtue of any enactment, is punishable on first
conviction with imprisonment for life or for a term of five years or more.’ The crime
of theft is punishable upon first conviction with level 5 imprisonment (10 years
maximum) and therefore falls within the operation of section 459A.
Evidence of the Informant
31. The Informant gave evidence that on 20 August 2015 he was performing general
criminal investigation duties involving the processing of outstanding fingerprint
identification reports. He said that on his immediate team were the other police
officers who were witnesses in this proceeding. That morning there were several
fingerprint identification reports, one of which belonged to the Accused. The
Informant’s task was to process the fingerprint identification reports and he was
specifically tasked with actioning the Accused’s fingerprint identification report.11
32. The Informant said that a fingerprint identification report consists of a LEAP incident
number and a `leader number’ which is a reference to the report of a crime.12 It
nominates the victim of a crime, the address where the crime was carried out as
well as the suspect. The Fingerprint Identification Report tendered in evidence
states that the victim’s name is Troy Shanley and refers to the offence of theft from
a motor vehicle attended on by police on 27 March 2015 at 21 Swanston St,
Heidelberg West. The Fingerprint Identification Report states that the left palm print
and the left thumb print of the Accused were located on the external tray tool box of
the victim’s motor vehicle.
33. The Informant said that on receiving the Fingerprint Identification Report of the
Accused, he investigated the LEAP database which enabled him to access the
11 Transcript, page 3. 12 Transcript, page 4.
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details of the incident as reported by the police member who attended to investigate
the theft from motor vehicle at Heidelberg Heights.13 The LEAP incident report was
tendered (LEAP Report March 2015). That document records a report of a theft of
power tools valued at $5000 from a motor vehicle, at 21 Swanston St, Heidelberg
Heights. It states that the victim’s vehicle was parked at the front of his address on
the road.
34. The LEAP Report March 2015 states that between 10pm and 7am unknown
persons forced entry into the toolbox in the tray of the victim’s vehicle and took
various power and hand tools valued around $5,000. The tools included power
drills, saws, screwdrivers and other tools. There were no identifying features on any
of the tools. The vehicle and the toolbox were both locked. No entry into the vehicle
itself was made. The report stated that there was no CCTV footage available or
witnesses or suspects’ names, but the victim suspected his ‘junkie’ neighbours may
have done it. The report states that there were no signs of forced entry, but forensic
evidence was recovered and the incident could not be investigated further until the
results were returned.
35. The Informant said during cross-examination that he had access to other police
intelligence (referred to by the Informant as `intel holdings’) in relation to the
Accused as well as the LEAP Report March 2015.14
36. At the conclusion of the voir dire, the Prosecution informed the Court that it had not
anticipated that the Defence case was to be focussed on the issue of the
reasonableness of the Informant/police’s belief. The Prosecution informed the Court
that it had specifically, therefore, not called relevant evidence which the Court
needed to hear in determining this issue. The Court gave the Prosecution leave to
re-open its case and to recall the Informant. The Informant then gave further
evidence about the other information held by police in relation to Mr Todero
recorded on the LEAP database. The prior incident concerned an alleged theft from
a motor vehicle at 21 Silvana Way, Hillside, reported on 20 July 2015 (Leap
Record Inquiry 20 July 2015). The Informant said that he had access to this
information prior to arresting the Accused.15
13 I note that the Fingerprint Identification Report refers to Heidelberg West, not Heidelberg Heights, but nothing turns on this. 14 Transcript, page 27, line 10. 15 Transcript, page 125.
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37. The LEAP Record Inquiry 20 July 2015 was tendered. The summary of the alleged
offence states that unknown offenders at approximately 05:00 hours on 20 July
2015 opened the back of the victim’s hardtop canopy on his vehicle which was
located in the driveway of the victim’s residence at the above address. The victim
states that he believed the offenders had picked the lock as there was no damage
to the vehicle. The offenders removed numerous Makita power tools valued at
approximately $3000. The victim had invoices of all tools purchased and all tools
had identifiable features. CCTV footage was available. The victim viewed the CCTV
footage which showed a male with gloves on break into his vehicle. The report
states that police were called back to the address by the victim who stated that the
same male person whom he had seen in the CCTV footage was present in the
street. The victim stated that he was going to keep the male there until the police
arrived. When police arrived the male was identified as Jason Todero. Police
reviewed the CCTV footage and confirmed that Mr Todero and his vehicle were a
good likeness to the images in the CCTV footage and Mr Todero was arrested. Mr
Todero provided a no comment interview and was released pending summons. The
Informant said he had no involvement in the investigation of the alleged offence.16
Further, the brief for this offence was not authorised,17 but the Informant did not
come to know this until within a month of the hearing.18
38. The Informant had viewed the Fingerprint Identification Report, the LEAP Report
March 2015 and the Leap Record Inquiry 20 July 2015 (hereafter referred to as
`the two LEAP Reports’) on the morning before the arrest. Upon viewing those
documents he decided to attend the address of the Accused for the purposes of
arresting him in relation to the offence of theft from the motor vehicle at Heidelberg
Heights.19 It is clear from his evidence that the Informant had formed a view as to
the reasonableness of the grounds for the arrest at this point in time, based on
these three pieces of information.
39. The Informant said that he made inquiries as to the Accused’s whereabouts. He
was at that time recorded as living at an address in Macleod. The Informant said
that all four officers attended that address to locate and arrest the Accused.20 On
16 Transcript, page 127, lines 7-9. 17 Transcript, page 128, lines 20-22. 18 Transcript, page 131, lines 7-9. 19 Transcript, page 8. 20 Transcript, page 10, lines 13-14.
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attending the address at Macleod the Accused’s father answered the door. He told
the Informant that the Accused no longer lived at that address and told them that he
was living with his mother at Caroline Springs. Later that morning the Accused’s
father called police and provided them with the address. The Informant then
attended another job in Preston in relation to an unrelated incident and then headed
to Caroline Springs in order to locate the Accused.
40. Once they arrived at the Caroline Springs address the Informant observed multiple
cars parked outside the address including a white van with a missing window. The
Informant said that Accused’s father had told him that the Accused was driving a
white van21 and was residing in a bungalow at the back of the premises.22 The
Informant went to the door of the bungalow and knocked waiting for approximately
30 seconds. No one answered the door and he could not hear anything. There were
no windows to look through. He said that he opened the unlocked door and from the
doorway he observed a male with long dark hair sleeping in the bed. That male
person matched the photograph and description of the Accused. The Informant
entered with the other police officers, woke up the Accused, confirmed his identity
and informed him that he was under arrest for theft from a motor vehicle.23
41. The Informant arrested the Accused24 and provided him with his caution and
rights25 which he did not want to exercise.26 The caution was given in relation to the
alleged offence of theft from motor vehicle at Heidelberg Heights. The Informant
then conducted a pat down search and located in the pockets of the Accused a
small zip lock bag containing 1.5 to 2 g of methylamphetamine. He gave evidence
that the pat down search was an `evidence and safety’ search conducted under the
common law.27
42. The Informant said he had noticed when he entered the premises various power
tools around the apartment and on the table next to the bed.28 He said that after
administering the caution,29 he asked the Accused where they came from. The
21 Transcript, page 9, line 31. 22 Transcript, page 10, lines 2-3. 23 Transcript, page 10, lines 12-31. 24 Transcript, page 11, line 7. 25 Transcript, page 11, lines 8-12. 26 Transcript, page 11, lines 18-20. 27 Transcript, page 11, lines 16-17. 28 Transcript, page 12, lines 1-2. 29 Transcript, page 12, lines 14-17.
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Informant read from his notes of that conversation, which he made on the same day
as the conversation:
“C & R: ‘Yes”
search of Todero conducted:
located quantity of ice in jean pocket approx. 1.5 grams.
Located within plain sight, large number of power tools.
I/S (I said): “Do you work in a trade?”
H/S (He said): “Yeah”
I said: “Which trade?”
He said: “I am a qualified landscaper”
He said: “So what is the go with all of these tools?”
He said: “I got them off Gumtree”.
I said (pointed to Paslode Nailgun): “How much did this one cost you?”
(No response)
I said: “I believe it to be stolen, so we will be seizing it. As for these other tools, I
believe them to be stolen also. So they will be coming along also.”30
43. The Informant said that the reason why he formed the view that the tools were
stolen was because they were investigating the theft of tools from a motor vehicle
and the Accused’s fingerprints were located on that vehicle from which a large
quantity of power tools had been stolen. When they attended the premises, the
tools were scattered all about in the bedroom. The Informant was of the view that
the tools in the bungalow did not look to be tools related to the Accused’s trade as a
landscaper. He said that no search of the bungalow was undertaken as all tools
were in plain sight.31
44. In cross-examination, the Informant confirmed that:
30 Transcript, page 12, lines 8-25. 31 Transcript, pages 12-13, 15, 37.
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a. he did not have responsibility for the initial investigation at Heidelberg
Heights;
b. in deciding to locate the Accused, the only documents that he had in his
possession were the Fingerprint Identification Report and the two LEAP
Reports;
c. he was tasked with actioning the Fingerprint Identification Report in relation
to the Accused;
d. the Accused had no prior convictions;
e. there were no particular identifying features of the tools, no suspects or
CCTV footage;
f. the LEAP Report March 2015 stated that the tools had been taken from an
unlocked car and that no inquiries had been made of the neighbours of the
victim and that no statement had been taken from the victim;
g. the Accused was not charged with the theft from the motor vehicle at
Heidelberg Heights, but was a targeted suspect in the investigation (meaning
that he was going to be arrested on that day);32
h. police did not receive an itemised list of power tools from the Complainant;
and
i. no statement was taken from the Complainant in relation to the theft.
45. The Informant also confirmed that the tools located in the Accused’s bungalow,
were not from the Heidelberg Heights theft.
46. The Informant said that at the point he started questioning the Accused about the
power tools in the apartment, he already had a belief that the tools were stolen,33
but he wanted to give the Accused the benefit of the doubt and allow an opportunity
for a lawful explanation to be given.34 At the point when the Accused could not tell
him the purchase price of the tools and became evasive in his answers, the
32 Transcript, page 27. 33 Transcript, page 36, lines 7-10. 34 Transcript, page 36, lines 7-11.
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Informant formed the view that the tools were stolen and would be seized so that
enquiries could be made.35
47. The Informant said that he did not caution the Accused again in relation to the drugs
found on the Accused’s person after the pat down search was done. Nor did he
caution the Accused again in relation to the tools that were located in the house.36
He said that he considered that one caution was sufficient.37
48. The Informant said that he did not expect to find the stolen property in the
apartment of the Accused as the theft had occurred six months earlier. He was not
there to conduct a search for the stolen goods. The sole purpose of police
attendance was to affect the arrest of the Accused and question him in relation to
why his fingerprints were located on the vehicle.38 The Informant conceded that
there were other explanations for why the Accused’s fingerprints were on the
toolbox but said that the purpose of the interview is to find this out.39 He agreed that
based on the Accused’s responses in the record of interview he formed the view
there was insufficient evidence to proceed with the charge. 40
49. The Informant said that he was aware that the Accused had not been working.
50. The Informant confirmed in re-examination that:
a. owing to the absence of CCTV footage or other evidence, there was no
person of interest in relation to the crime until the Fingerprint Identification
Report was generated;41
b. the Fingerprint Identification Report combined with the information in the two
LEAP Reports led to the formation of his belief on reasonable grounds that
the Accused was the person that police needed to speak to; 42 and
c. he suspected that the tools in the bungalow were from the Heidelberg
Heights theft, because that is the reason why police were in attendance on
that day.43
35 Transcript, page 36, lines 17-24. 36 Transcript, page 35, lines 27-31. 37 Transcript, page 34, lines 14-22. 38 Transcript, page 38 line 20; page 39, line 4. 39 Transcript, page 39, lines 29-40. 40 Transcript, page 40, lines 4-9. 41 Transcript, page 42, lines 11-19. 42 Transcript, page 42, lines 20-26.
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Evidence of Detective Sergeant Andrew Beames
51. Detective Sergeant Beames gave evidence that he was supervising the other three
officers on the day and they were tasked with the execution of forensic identification
files, being files containing fingerprint and DNA identifications. He confirmed that
Detective Abbey had the conduct of the matter concerning the Accused. They
visited two addresses related to this incident. The first was at Macleod. He said that
at that address they had spoken to the father of the Accused and the father told
them that the Accused, whom they considered to be suspect, was not there at the
time. Detective Sergeant Beames said he was familiar with the content of the
Fingerprint Identification Report related to the Accused. The other three officers
were in attendance and the visit lasted for 10 minutes. The father of the Accused
said that he may have been at his mother’s house in the western suburbs. After
visiting the father’s house they then went to another address to perform an
unrelated task. About an hour later they went to Caroline Springs, where they had
been told by the Accused’s father that the Accused was residing. They arrived there
at approximately 8:55 AM on 20 August 2015.44
52. Detective Sergeant Beames said he observed a white Toyota van registration
number QQL290 parked in the street out the front and it was missing a large
passenger window. All four officers went to the right-hand side of the house where
the Accused’s father had told them that there was a self-contained unit where the
Accused was living. Detective Sergeant Beames said that he entered through an
unlocked door following the other three detectives into a single room apartment. He
observed the Accused to be asleep in bed. Detective Sergeant Beames said that he
observed a number of power tools in immediate view.45
53. Detective Sergeant Beames said he and the other officers were in attendance in
relation to the alleged theft of items from a motor vehicle. He said that although he
could not specifically recall it, he thought Detective Abbey was the officer who had
arrested the Accused as he had the carriage of the matter. Detective Sergeant
Beames went and spoke to the Accused’s mother at the principal residence. The
other members remained in the self-contained unit with the Accused. Detective
43 Transcript, page 44, lines 5-10. 44 Transcript pages 46-48. 45 Transcript pages 48-49.
18
Sergeant Beames said that he then went about seizing the exhibits and updating
the family.46
54. Detective Sergeant Beames said that all officers together made the decision to
seize the tools.47 He said that he had formed the belief that some of the items were
stolen because the Accused had no reasonable explanation for the quantity of
power tools in the apartment, the Accused was in bed at 8:55 AM on a Thursday,
had no employment, looked in poor physical shape and acknowledged regular use
of ice.48 Detective Sergeant Beames had 30 years’ experience as a police officer
and based his suspicions on his experience. The Accused was placed under arrest
and the items were taken back to the Heidelberg Heights police station. Detective
Sergeant Beames had no further involvement with the matter.
Cross-examination of Detective Sergeant Beames
55. In cross-examination, Detective Sergeant Beames said that police practice upon
receiving fingerprint reports is to arrest the person and then question them.
56. Detective Sergeant Beames said that every situation is different and sometimes a
person under investigation has an explanation and ordinarily, a person may not be
arrested until there has been `a bit of conversation’. Conversations can take place
by telephone or by attendance. He said in this case they did not telephone the
Accused.
57. Detective Sergeant Beames denied, when it was put to him, that it was best police
practice to take statements from complainants for all crimes. He said the vast
majority of reported crimes are burglaries and thefts from motor vehicles. These are
high volume crimes for which statements are rarely taken due to limited resources.
He further said that he was not aware of any requirement in the Victoria Police
Manual to take a statement from all victims at the earliest opportunity.49
58. Detective Sergeant Beames confirmed that upon entry to the apartment and seeing
the tools lying around it that he thought the tools were stolen. He said that initially
he did a double take and thought to himself `there’s a lot of tools here’. After the
conversation with the Accused and his inability to provide an explanation for how he
46 Transcript, page 50. 47 Transcript, page 50, lines 22-26. 48 Transcript, page 51, lines 1-17. 49 Transcript, pages 57-59.
19
came to have the tools, he formed the view that it was highly likely that some or all
of them were stolen.50 His view was influenced by the acknowledgement by the
Accused of the extent of his ice use, which was disclosed directly to Detective
Beames.
59. He said he could not recall when he had the conversation with the Accused about
his drug use and whether this was before or after the tools had been seized. He
said there were a number of tools to be logged and seized and ongoing
conversations.
60. Detective Sergeant Beames said that he could not recall knocking at the door of the
bungalow prior to entry. He said that police practice is to try the door handle first if
they want the element of surprise. He said there would not have been much delay
before entry when he got to the door but he would not have noted in his notes
whether or not they knocked first.51 He also said for low level crimes such as this
one, police do not have time to run the risk of calling first, and then chasing a
suspect `through the western suburbs for days on end trying to get them for a fairly
straight forward matter’.52
Re-examination of Detective Sergeant Beames
61. In re-examination Detective Sergeant Beames clarified that police did not always
obtain the fingerprint identification report and automatically arrest. He said
sometimes there was a prior phone call or a conversation, it depends on what they
know about a suspect. He said sometimes there is an innocent explanation and
they take into account whether the person is working and if they have no prior
criminal history.53
Evidence of Detective Senior Constable Tristan Barlow
62. Detective Barlow gave evidence that he had 10 years police experience. On 20
August 2015 his duties commenced around 5:45 AM. There were several
outstanding investigations for fingerprints and DNA and he and his colleagues were
executing these. Detective Abbey was allocated a file. Detective Barlow had no
knowledge of that file. They left the office in the morning and went to the Accused’s
50 Transcript, page 60. 51 Transcript, pages 61-62. 52 Transcript, page 63, lines 4-8. 53 Transcript, page 63.
20
father’s house in MacLeod. They knocked on the door and were invited in by the
father and looked around the house for the Accused. The Accused was not there.
Detective Sergeant Beames spoke to the father who was cooperative. Detective
Barlow did not know what was said as he was outside at the time but thought it was
about the whereabouts of the Accused. They got back in the car and went to arrest
someone in Preston from an unrelated incident.
63. At some stage during the morning Detective Sergeant Beames received information
from the father of the Accused that the Accused was at his mother’s house in
Caroline Springs. They went to Caroline Springs and observed the premises to
have two separate living quarters and a white van was parked out the front.
64. Detective Barlow said that Detective Abbey went to the door and checked it. The
door to the bungalow was unlocked.54They walked in.55 He was behind him. When
the door opened they saw a bed set. They could see everything in the room from
the doorway and the Accused was sleeping in a double bed.
65. Detective Barlow said that Detective Abbey was leading the way.56 Detective Abbey
woke the Accused, told him he was under arrest because his fingerprints had been
recovered from an incident in Heidelberg Heights.57 The Accused was placed under
arrest by Detective Abbey who then conducted a search of the Accused. A small
quantity of drugs was located in a deal bag. He said it was Detective Abbey’s
decision to arrest the Accused and that he had no role in the arrest, he was present
as a support.58 He had a brief précis of the file and he understood that fingerprints
had been recovered identifying the Accused and connecting him with a theft in
Heidelberg Heights.
66. Whilst the Accused was being arrested, Detective Barlow looked around and
observed several tools lying in open sight on the floor and around the bed.59 There
was a short conversation between Detective Abbey and the Accused but the
Accused stopped talking after he made a reference to `Gumtree’.60 The tools were
54 Transcript, pages 65-69. 55 Transcript, page 69, lines 18-22. 56 Transcript, page 69, line 31. 57 Transcript, page 70, lines 1-12. 58 Transcript, page 70, lines 20-24. 59 Transcript, page 70, lines 16-20. 60 Transcript, page 71, lines 13-16.
21
seized. Detective Barlow assisted in securing the Accused and moving the tools to
the police car.
67. Detective Barlow said that he was of the belief that the tools had been stolen as
they were all high-value tools, the Accused had ice in his pocket and commonly ice
addicts steal tools in order to support their habit.61 He said that Detective Sergeant
Beames went back and forth to the mother’s house but the other three officers
stayed with the Accused. Detective Barlow acted as security (in relation to the
Accused) and labour (carrying the tools). When they returned to the police station
he logged the items into the police property database and the tools are still in police
possession.62
Cross-examination of Detective Barlow
68. In cross-examination, Detective Barlow said he had no independent recollection of
whether there was a knock on the door by Detective Abbey, but he could not say
one way or another.63 He said that in his notes he would not mention if there was a
knock or not.64 He said he did not know that the Accused had no prior history nor
did he know much about him, he was merely following the lead of Detectives Abbey
and Beames.65 Detective Barlow said the Accused was only given one caution on
arrest for theft of power tools from a motor vehicle.66 Detective Barlow said that the
formation of his belief that the Accused had stolen the tools was not only based on
the Accused’s lack of response to the question as to where the tools came from, but
also the fact that the Accused had ice in his pocket, that they were present to
execute a fingerprint file and the high resale value of the tools.67
69. Detective Barlow said that his common-law powers to seize the tools arose from his
understanding of the authority in Ghani v Jones.68
61 Transcript, page 71, lines 24-29. 62 Transcript, pages 71-72. 63 Transcript, page 78. 64 Transcript, page 78. 65 Transcript, page 80. 66 Transcript, page 80, lines 10-16. 67 Transcript, page 80. 68 Transcript, page 81.
22
Evidence of Detective Senior Constable Christopher Stewart Elzink
70. Detective Elzink gave evidence that he has been in the police force since 2002. On
20 August 2016 he was assisting with the execution of fingerprint identification
reports. The Accused was a person in whom the police were interested and were
trying to locate. The Accused’s file was allocated to Detective Abbey who had the
carriage of it. Detective Elzink said that he was assisting with the arrest.69 He knew
it related to theft of power tools from a motor vehicle in March 2015 at Heidelberg
Heights.70 That information had been obtained from the LEAP database.71 He and
the other officers went to the first address in Macleod and made inquiries about
where the Accused was and spoke to the Accused’s father. The Accused’s father
was cooperative and told them the Accused was not there. They then followed up
an unrelated matter and a phone call came through from the Accused’s father to
Detective Beames who told them that the Accused was residing at an address in
Caroline Springs.
71. All four officers attended Caroline Springs and they went to the western side of the
property which appeared to be a garage remodelled to a living area.72 There were
two cars in the driveway. His understanding was that the Accused was wanted for
an interview in relation to theft from a motor vehicle and if present he was going to
be arrested. This was his belief outside the premises.73
72. Detective Abbey was the first officer to reach the door of the bungalow where they
understood the Accused to be residing. Detective Abbey knocked at the door and
there was no answer. He tried the door handle and it was unlocked. From the
doorway Detective Elzink could see a bed at the far end with a couch and a coffee
table and power tools lying around.74 The Accused was asleep. They entered the
bungalow. The Accused was woken, advised as to why the police were there and
arrested. Detective Abbey gave the Accused his caution and read him his rights.75
All the officers were present when this occurred. The Accused was then searched
by Detective Abbey and the drug `ice’ was found on his person. The Accused was
then queried in relation to the power tools at the premises and asked where he got
69 Transcript, page 83. 70 Transcript, page 84. 71 Transcript, page 84. 72 Transcript, page 85. 73 Transcript, page 87, lines 1-9. 74 Transcript, page 86. 75 Transcript, page 87, line 15.
23
them. He told the officers he got them from Gumtree. When asked how much he
had paid for a particular tool, he did not answer or could not answer, and then the
Accused refused to answer further questions.76
73. Detective Elzink said that he believed that the tools were stolen. His reason for that
view was that they were lying around the living area and also the Accused had ice
on him and commonly power tools are given in exchange for drugs. He said he then
compiled an exhibit log. He took time to log all of the items seized and took them
back to the police vehicle. The tools remain in police custody. The Accused was
taken back to the police station for interview and Detective Elzink was the
corroborating police officer on the interview. At the time of the arrest of the
Accused, he believed that the grounds for arrest were founded on the Fingerprint
Identification Report.
74. In cross-examination, Detective Elzink said that Detective Abbey would have
knocked on the door before entering, that this was the general practice. Although he
did not recall it specifically, he said the police always give a person a reasonable
chance to come to the door.77
Assessment of the evidence of the Informant and the other police officers
75. All Prosecution witnesses were reliable and honest witnesses. Each witness was
subjected to cross-examination and maintained their version of events in cross-
examination. There was no evidence before the Court of contamination or collusion
between witnesses.
76. I have no reason to doubt the evidence of the Informant that the events on the day
of the arrest of the Accused transpired as he described them. There were some
inconsistencies in the evidence of the other officers. Mostly these were minor, save
for the evidence of Detective Sergeant Beames who stated that the officers entered
the bungalow of the Accused without knocking. Aside from this issue, which I will
address more directly later, the evidence of each of the officers was highly
consistent.
76 Transcript, page 87. 77 Transcript, page 92.
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Could the Informant have formed a belief on reasonable grounds that the Accused had
committed a serious indictable offence?
77. The issues raised on this voir dire reflects the tension that exists between:
“….two competing interests: that which the community has in the detecting and investigation of crime and in the efficient gathering of reliable evidence and its presentation in court; and that of the individual in resisting unnecessary harassment and invasion of privacy by State investigating authorities.”78
78. All Prosecution witnesses supported the Informant’s evidence that it was the
Informant who had responsibility for the execution of the Fingerprint Identification
Report generated in the name of the Accused, and that it was the Informant who
arrested the Accused.79 It is therefore, the Informant’s belief that is material in the
determination of this question. Importantly, the Informant’s belief must be examined
at the point in time before he entered the premises of the Accused.
79. Section 459A of the Crimes Act 1958 requires that police have reasonable grounds
for believing a person to be at a place before they enter that place and search for
him or her. All police officers gave evidence that they believed that the Accused
was living in the bungalow behind his mother’s home at 3 Lauricella Place, Caroline
Springs. They all said that they received that information from his father. I am
satisfied that the belief of the police that the Accused was living in the bungalow at
his mother’s house at the above address was a belief held on reasonable grounds.
80. The next question for determination is could the Informant have formed a belief on
reasonable grounds prior to entry of the Accused’s premises that the Accused had
committed a serious indictable offence based on:
a. the Fingerprint Identification Report;
b. the LEAP Report of 5 March 2015; and
c. the LEAP Record Inquiry of July 2015?
81. The Defence have cited to the Court various authorities which support the position
that statutes which interfere with rights require strict interpretation.80 Although some
78 Loughnan v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria Sitting At Melbourne & Anor [1993] 1 V.R. 685 at 689. 79 Transcript, page 44, lines 23-25. 80 Defence submissions, paragraphs 45-49.
25
of the authorities cited apply with respect to the interpretation of search warrants, I
consider them to have sound application in this case.
82. Both parties rely on the authority in George v Rockett81 as setting out the test for the
relevant hierarchy of states of mind that a person may hold.82 In that decision, the
High Court held that:
“When a statute prescribes that there must be "reasonable grounds" for a state of mind - including suspicion and belief - it requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to
induce that state of mind in a reasonable person.”83
83. Later in the same decision, the High Court held at paragraph [14]:
“Suspicion, as Lord Devlin said in Hussien v. Chong Fook Kam (1970) AC 942, at p 948, "in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: 'I suspect but I cannot prove.'" The facts which can reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient reasonably to ground a belief, yet some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown. In Queensland Bacon Pty. Ltd. v. Rees [1966] HCA 21; (1966) 115 CLR 266, a question was raised as to whether a payee had reason to suspect that the payer, a debtor, "was unable to pay (its) debts as they became due" as that phrase was used in s.95(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth). Kitto J. said (at p 303):
`A suspicion that something exists is more than a mere idle wondering whether it exists or not; it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust, amounting to 'a slight opinion, but without sufficient evidence', as Chambers's Dictionary expresses it. Consequently, a reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence. The notion which 'reason to suspect' expresses in sub-s.(4) is, I think, of something which in all the circumstances would create in the mind of a reasonable person in the position of the payee an actual apprehension or fear that the situation of the payer is in actual fact that which the sub-section describes - a mistrust of the payer's ability to pay his debts as they become due and of the effect which acceptance of the payment would have as between the payee and the other creditors.’
The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.” (Emphasis added)
81 (1990) 170 CLR 104. 82 The Defence submissions refer in detail to other authorities which have applied that proposition, at paragraphs 50-56. 83 (1990) 170 CLR 104, at 488.
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84. The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in R v Rondo,84 although it
concerns the interpretation of the applicable legislation in New South Wales with
respect to the meaning of the phrase `reasonable suspicion’, provides further
guidance.
“53 These propositions emerge:
(a) A reasonable suspicion involves less than a reasonable belief but more than a possibility. There must be something which would create in the mind of a reasonable person an apprehension or fear of one of the state of affairs covered by s.357E. A reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence.
(b) Reasonable suspicion is not arbitrary. Some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown. A suspicion may be based on hearsay material or materials which may be inadmissible in evidence. The materials must have some probative value.
(c) What is important is the information in the mind of the police officer stopping the person or the vehicle or making the arrest at the time he did so. Having ascertained that information the question is whether that information afforded reasonable grounds for the suspicion which the police officer formed. In answering that question regard must be had to the source of the information and its content, seen in the light of the whole of the surrounding circumstances.”
85. The principles of law that may be distilled from these judgments are as follows.
a. For the formation of a reasonable belief, there must be the existence of facts
which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person.
b. Suspicion is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking.
c. A suspicion is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust amounting
to an opinion, but without sufficient evidence.
d. The objective circumstances need not establish on the balance of
probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists as the assent of
belief is given on more slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of
the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the
grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may,
depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.
e. The material relied on must have some probative value.
84 [2001] NSWCCA 540, at 53.
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f. Assessing `reasonableness’ requires the Court to have regard to the source
of the information and its content, seen in the light of the whole of the
surrounding circumstances.
86. The assessment of whether there are reasonable grounds for belief must be judged
against “what was known or reasonably capable of being known at the relevant
time.”85
87. The Court of Appeal in Loughnan v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria Sitting At
Melbourne (Loughnan’s case)86 considered the interpretation of the applicable
procedure under s 464S of the Crimes Act 1958 for an accused to provide a blood
sample, and what information needed to be advanced to show reasonable grounds
for belief. Section 464S(1) provided that a police member may request a suspect to
give a sample of blood, but only if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
taking of blood would confirm or disprove the Accused’s involvement as a suspect
in the commission of that offence. The Court of Appeal held that the Court need not
be satisfied, even at the prima facie stage, that suspect has committed the offence,
but only that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect committed
the offence. The Court of Appeal held that the types of factual information relied on
by police and which are said to give a police officer reasonable grounds for his or
her belief, comprises information that is put forward not as evidence of its truth but
as information that gives rise to a belief and would generally be inadmissible at any
trial of the suspect.
“…where what is in question is the existence of reasonable grounds for a belief that the suspect committed the offence, the evidence put forward by the applicant will usually consist in large part of information which has been disclosed in consequence of police investigations. This information will ordinarily take a variety of forms and relate to a wide variety of facts or matters, and much of it will usually be contained in written statements. The information which the applicant has would, generally speaking, be inadmissible at any trial of the suspect if it was sought to prove through the applicant what his information was. But it is not hearsay for the purposes of his attempt at proof of the matters mentioned in para (b) of subs (3). The information is put forward not as evidence of its own truth, but simply as information: as part of the material which it is said gives the police officer reasonable grounds for belief.”87
88. The Court of Appeal continues:
85 Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612 at [40]. See also R v Rondo, above. 86 [1993] 1 VR 685 at 692, per Brooking, Phillips and Byrne JJ. 87 Loughnan’s case, at page 692.
28
“In each case information put forward by the applicant, whether it be matter of fact or opinion, is put forward simply as information, as constituting the basis for a reasonable belief or as constituting reasonable grounds, and accordingly is not hearsay.”88
89. Loughnan’s case specifically considered whether or not hearsay evidence could
form the evidentiary basis of such an application. It may also be relied on as
authority for a more general proposition, that the distinguishing feature of
information and facts relied on by police to justify an arrest in such circumstances
as are presently before the Court, is that the information relied on by police forms
part of the investigative process which often occurs at an early stage. The function
of this information is not for a determination of whether or not there is likely to be
sufficient evidence to justify a trial.89
90. Kyrou J in Slaveski v Victoria90 summarises the legal considerations which apply to
section 459 of the Crimes Act 1958, which engages the same test (a belief on
reasonable grounds).
“In George v Rockett, the High Court cited with approval the definition of ‘suspicion’ proffered by Kitto J in Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees: ‘A suspicion that something exists is more than a mere idle wondering whether it exists or not; it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust, amounting to “a slight opinion, but without sufficient evidence”’.
The Court held that ‘[b]elief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.’ While belief is a more certain state of mind than suspicion, it need not be informed by actual proof. As their Honours said:
The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof.
The information upon which the police officer formed his or her belief may take a variety of forms and relate to a wide variety of matters. When the reasonableness of that belief is in issue, the fact that the information may be inadmissible as hearsay at a later trial of the arrested person is irrelevant because it is put forward, not as evidence of its own truth, but as part of the material that is said to have given the police officer reasonable grounds for the belief.
The police officer must believe that a particular indictable offence has been committed, and not just an indictable offence in some general sense.” (Authorities omitted.)
88 Loughnan’s case, at page 692. 89 See lines 35-50 of Loughnan’s case, at page 693, citing Wigmore on Evidence. 90 [2010] VSC 441, at paras 99-102.
29
91. There can be no doubt that the evidence upon which the Informant relied to effect
the arrest of the Accused would be insufficient to satisfy the Court beyond
reasonable doubt that the Accused had committed the Heidelberg Heights theft. I
am satisfied, however, that it was sufficient to give rise to a belief on reasonable
grounds justifying his arrest in this case.
92. As stated by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in R v Rondo, the relevant
inquiry is made at the time police entered the bungalow to arrest the Accused. The
Court must consider the material that the Informant had access to in light of all of
the circumstances having regard to the sources of the information and their content.
In this case, the sources of the material relied on by the Informant were the reports
of the investigating officers as recorded on LEAP as well as the Fingerprint
Identification Report, which was also generated by police. The Fingerprint
Identification Report identifies that the Accused’s fingerprints were found on the
external tray tool box of the vehicle.
93. I consider the presence of the Accused’s fingerprints at the scene of the crime to be
of significant probative value, and that when combined with the information held by
police from the two LEAP Reports, was enough to give rise to a belief on
reasonable grounds that the Accused had committed the Heidelberg Heights theft.
These sources of information in combination are objective facts sufficient to induce
the state of mind of a belief on reasonable grounds in a reasonable person.
94. The Defence submits that the Court should look behind this information and is
critical of the Informant for not making further general inquiries in relation to the
circumstances of the offending. The Defence submit in particular that:
a. the Informant had no prior knowledge of the alleged offences as he was not
responsible for the initial investigations of either matter;
b. the Informant did not investigate any innocent explanations for the presence
of the fingerprint on the tool box (e.g. leaning on the tool box or knowing or
working with the victim);
30
c. the Informant did not take into consideration that the Accused has no prior
convictions;91
d. the Informant did not investigate the neighbours of the victim of the
Heidelberg Heights theft whom the victim suspected committed the theft; and
e. the Informant did not receive from the victim a list of items said to be stolen
and therefore was not aware of the exact tools said to have been stolen.92
95. Importantly, the Court of Appeal in Loughnan’s case also held that the Court’s
finding of a belief on reasonable grounds does not preclude the existence of other
possibilities, based on different material. For this reason, the Defence’s argument
that the Informant should have made further general inquiries before arresting the
Accused must be rejected.
“That reasonable grounds exist for believing that the suspect has committed the offence is not necessarily inconsistent with the fact that other possibilities exist too, based upon further and different material. The conclusion on the issue of guilt may depend upon the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the evidence that is gathered at the investigative stage, yet acceptance or rejection of evidence in that sense, as ultimately true or correct, forms no part of the task confronting the court under s464U(3)(b). That was a fundamental misconception in the plaintiff's submissions.
Thus, for the purposes of subs(3)(b), it may be enough that certain information has been gathered, if the court is satisfied by reference to that information that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the suspect was the offender. If the court is so satisfied, it is irrelevant under subs(3)(b) that there are other objective facts or other information received which, if accepted, suggest that he was not the offender. A useful example of this was provided by the submission made to us. Counsel said that the plaintiff had learnt of a statement obtained by the police from a neighbour of the deceased woman, to the effect that she heard raised voices at the deceased's home at about 8.15 am on the day the body was found. The plaintiff, we were told, wished not only to put that statement before the magistrate, but also to lead evidence from his mother that he, the plaintiff, was at home with her at that time of the day. All this seems to us irrelevant to the question for the magistrate, which is the existence and sufficiency of the grounds that are relied upon by the applicant to sustain the belief asserted. The inquiry is not into the existence or not of other grounds for that belief or of grounds for some other and different belief.”93
Further legal authorities that have considered the difference between suspicion and
belief
96. The Defence relies on further authorities which have considered the legal difference
between suspicion and reasonable belief in support of its argument. In my view,
91 Defence submissions, paragraph 6. 92 Defence submissions, paragraph 7. 93 Loughnan’s case, at 696.
31
these authorities may be confined to their facts. The Defence submissions cite
Neave JA (as she then was) in R v De Simone94 where her Honour held that an
Intergraph message to police alleging that `a shoplifter’ was being aggressive could
not have on its own provided the basis for a belief on reasonable grounds that the
person had committed the offence of theft and that it was necessary for the police to
make enquiries about the circumstances of the alleged offending. It is noted
however, that Vincent and Weinberg JA disagreed with her Honour.95 The
statement by Neave JA in her minority judgment cannot be interpreted to cast a
general duty on police to make enquiries about the circumstances of the alleged
offence. Further, the facts in this case are very different from those presently before
the Court and may be distinguished for that reason. Each case will be different and
whether or not a belief on reasonable grounds can be formed will depend on what
details the information contains.
97. The Defence also relies on the case of DPP v Bella Bernath.96 In this case Mullaly
J held that the following evidence was insufficient for the police to found a suspicion
on reasonable grounds enlivening search powers under section 82 the Drugs
Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981:
a. at 2am in the morning police officers observed a man and a woman in a car
in an industrial estate;
b. there was no obvious lawful reason as to why they were there;
c. police did not accept their explanation that they were having sexual
intercourse as they were fully clothed;
d. when the details of the female occupant were checked, she had outstanding
warrants for some offences related to the possession of illegal items;
e. the co-accused appeared nervous; and
f. information about the name that was provided to police, George Bernath,
indicated that there were prior matters for drug matters and possession and
94 (2008) VSCA 216, paragraphs 36-37. 95 Ibid, paragraphs 2, 102-106 per Vincent and Weinberg JA. 96 County Court, unreported, 29 June 2012.
32
traffic matters, as well as an outstanding warrant (although this evidence was
held by the Court to be unclear).97
98. Judge Mullaly held that the above information was not enough for the police to form
a reasonable suspicion, but in so holding, specifically excluded the evidence of the
police that the co-accused had volunteered that she had two crack pipes in the car.
His Honour said that if “the evidence of the pipes is added to the mix, it would have
the effect of making the suspicion held by the police officer based on reasonable
grounds when combined with the other factors.”98
99. The Defence submit that Mullaly J’s statements should be interpreted to mean that
his Honour did not take into account the past minor prior convictions for drug related
offending and the outstanding warrant in relation to drugs.99 The Defence submits
that given there was no indicia of recent drug use observed by police officers at the
scene, “the circumstances of a prior interview with police (and release without
charge) cannot be said to have any probative value other than that of suspicion.”100
The Defence submit therefore that the fact that the Accused was interviewed and
released pending summons for a similar crime “cannot in any rational manner bear
upon the likelihood of the Accused having committed the offence for which the
police attended the premises.”101
100. I disagree that Judge Mullaly’s ruling can be accurately interpreted in this
manner. His Honour specifically states that the existence of the above facts in the
absence of the ice pipes was insufficient for there to be a reasonable suspicion, but
if he had admitted this evidence `to the mix’, which includes the information about
the past and current criminal history of the suspects, he would have found that there
existed reasonable grounds.102 Judge Mullaly’s ruling supports the converse
argument that the Court must look at all of the facts available to police at the time of
the arrest or search and must consider the effect of all of those facts in combination.
101. I do not disagree with the Defence submission that the `simple fact of past
conduct of a similar nature cannot rationally inform the mind of police prior to
97 Ibid, pages 176-177. 98 Ibid, page 177, lines 28-31. 99 Defence submissions, page 17. 100 Defence submissions, page 17. 101 Defence submissions, page 17. 102 Bernath’s case, at page 177 (lines 17-31).
33
arrest.’103 That is however not the situation which is presently before the Court.
What is at hand is reliance by police on three objective sources of information. The
LEAP reports are both reliable and factual and the Fingerprint Identification Report
is of significant probative value. The combination of all three sources of information
was sufficient to found a belief on reasonable grounds in the Informant that the
Accused had committed the crime of theft of power tools from the motor vehicle.
Failure to provide a jurated statement
102. The Defence is specifically critical of the Informant’s failure to obtain from the
victim of the Heidelberg Heights theft a jurated statement about the theft.104 The
Defence submit that case law, including the High Court authority in George v
Rockett, have established that applications for search warrants to locate stolen
goods must be on oath.105 The Defence relies on the Victoria Police Manual –
Procedures and Guidelines106 in support of its proposition. The Victoria Police
manual stipulates that:
“Justification for searches of properties
Where information is received which justifies a search of a property,
members seeking approval to conduct a property search should take all
reasonable steps to ensure that the information is accurate, recent and has
not been provided maliciously or irresponsibly.
Applications for approval of a search of a property should not be made on
the basis of uncorroborated information from anonymous sources.”
103. This, however, was not according to the police a search of the Accused’s
premises for the tools, it was a search of the premises for the purposes of making
an arrest. The Informant denied, when the matter was put to him in cross-
examination, that he was present to search for the power tools. The four detectives
each gave evidence that they attended the Accused’s premises to arrest him,
having obtained the Fingerprint Identification Report linking him with the Heidelberg
Heights theft. They also gave consistent evidence that when they entered the
premises and arrested the Accused, they could see in plain sight, the stolen goods
103Defence submissions, page 18. 104 Defence submissions, paragraphs 7(g) and 32-37. 105 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104. 106 Defence submissions, paragraph 36.
34
scattered around the bungalow. Each of the officers maintained their evidence
under cross-examination, and their evidence was consistent.
104. The Informant gave evidence in cross-examination that he did not expect to
find any power tools from the Heidelberg Heights theft at the property, as it is his
experience that once stolen, these tools are quickly passed on or sold. The
Informant said that because the police were investigating the Accused for theft of
power tools on 26 March 2015 at Heidelberg Heights, he assumed that the tools in
the bungalow were from that theft. As the proper inquiry is what information was
known to the Informant at the time of entering the premises to make the arrest of
the Accused, it is not relevant that the Informant came to understand later that
these tools were not from the Heidelberg Heights theft.
105. Given the high degree of consistency in the evidence of the detectives in
relation to this issue, and the fact that their evidence was not impugned in cross-
examination, I have no reason to doubt the evidence and I accept it.
106. In addition, Detective Sergeant Beames stated that for high volume crimes
such as thefts and burglaries, statements from complainants are rarely taken. I do
not consider Detective Sergeant Beames’ evidence to be inconsistent with the
Victoria Police Manual with respect to searches of properties. The Victoria Police
Manual extract relied on by Defence requires police to take reasonable steps to
ensure that the information is accurate, recent and has not been provided
maliciously or irresponsibly, and corroborated. It does not require a jurated
statement. The evidence of all police members was consistent in that they were not
present for the purposes of a search for property, they were present to arrest the
Accused on the basis of the information that they had from the two LEAP reports
and the Fingerprint Identification Report. There is nothing to suggest that the
information upon which police acted was not accurate or that it had been provided
maliciously. The police position is that the two LEAP reports were supported by the
Fingerprint Identification Report. As I have said, I consider that information to be
enough to satisfy the requirements of s459A of the Crimes Act 1958.
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107. In any event, the Victoria Police Manual `does not have the force of
statute’107 and a breach of the Victoria Police Manual by an officer `does not, in and
of itself, invalidate any action taken by the officer’.108
Submissions regarding propensity reasoning
108. I disagree with the Defence that the reference in the Prosecution submission
to the similarity between the Heidelberg Heights and Hillside thefts is an argument
advanced in such a way as to engage the rules of evidence concerning tendency
reasoning. That argument may well apply if the Prosecution were seeking to adduce
the evidence at trial. What is in issue is what information the Informant had access
to in forming the requisite state of mind prior to his decision to arrest the Accused.
The Prosecution submission advances the argument that the similarity of the
offending was a further building block in the formation of a belief on reasonable
grounds. I do not consider it relevant or necessary to engage further with the
arguments about tendency evidence raised by Defence, and I also note that these
arguments did not form part of the voir dire.
109. The Defence has, for the above reasons, not satisfied the Court on the
balance of probabilities that the Informant did not hold a belief on reasonable
grounds prior to his entry into the Accused’s bungalow that the Accused had
committed a serious indictable offence. I find therefore, that the Informant/ police
have complied with the requirements of section 459A of the Crimes Act 1958 with
respect to the entry of the premises where the Accused was residing for the
purposes of searching for the Accused, and arresting him.
Prosecution submissions in relation to Informant’s observations on entry
110. The Prosecution submits that the Informant’s policing experience as well as
his observations of the Accused once inside the bungalow was also information that
gave rise to his belief on reasonable grounds that the Accused had committed a
serious indictable offence for the purposes of section 459A of the Crimes Act
1958.109 These additional matters are relevant only to the Informant’s state of mind
and actions after entry. In order for the entry by police into the Accused’s premises
to be lawful and not constitute a trespass, the Informant must have formed a belief
107 Slaveski v Victoria, at paragraph 207. 108 Slaveski v Victoria, at paragraph 208. 109 Prosecution submissions, paragraphs 7(iv) and (v) and 12.
36
on reasonable grounds before entry. In my view, for the reasons given above, the
Informant did have a belief on reasonable grounds based on the information that he
had prior to entry. The Informant’s observations after his entry to bungalow are
matters to be considered in relation to the second aspect of the Defence
submissions, relating to the lawfulness of the seizure of the items found in the
bungalow. I will now turn to that question.
The lawfulness of police actions after entry into the bungalow; cautioning the Accused
and the seizure of the stolen items
111. The Defence submit that the lawfulness of the seizure of the stolen items
needs to be analysed in separate time frames, before and after the Accused was
questioned.110
112. It is submitted that any belief must have been formed before the Accused
was interviewed, and that no adverse inference can be drawn from his right to
remain silent.111 The Defence submit further that the Accused was never cautioned
with respect to the possession of stolen goods when spoken to by the Informant
about them, and the Prosecution ought to be precluded from relying on any
answers or failure to answer questions as part of establishing reasonable grounds
where no caution has been properly administered.112
113. The Prosecution does not disagree that no negative inference may be drawn
against an accused for exercising his or her right to silence.113 The Prosecution
submits that the Accused was cautioned by the Informant, and that he chose not to
exercise his rights. The absence of any reasonable explanation by him after he
elected not to exercise his rights may, according to the Prosecution, be taken into
account by the police member who is establishing reasonable grounds.
114. In order to address this question, the Court must determine whether on the
balance of probabilities, it is satisfied that the Accused was cautioned in relation to
the theft of the power tools. The relevant provisions of the Crimes Act 1958 with
respect to the cautioning of accused persons is as follows:
110 Defence submissions, page 26, paragraph 98. 111 Defence submissions, page 26, paragraph 99. 112 Defence submissions, page 26, paragraph 99 citing Crimes Act 1958 s 464A and R v Lancaster [1998] 4 VR 550. 113 Prosecution submissions, page 9.
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464 Definitions
(1) For the purposes of this Subdivision a person is in custody if he or she is—
(a) under lawful arrest by warrant; or
(b) under lawful arrest under section 458 or 459 or a provision of any other Act; or
(c) in the company of an investigating official and is—
(i) being questioned; or
(ii) to be questioned; or
(iii) otherwise being investigated—
to determine his or her involvement (if any) in the commission of an offence if there is sufficient information in the possession of the investigating official to justify the arrest of that person in respect of that offence.
suspect means a person of or above the age of 18 years who—
(a) is suspected of having committed an offence; or
(b) has been charged with an offence; or
(c) has been summonsed to answer to a charge;
464A Detention of person in custody
(1) Every person taken into custody for an offence (whether committed in Victoria or elsewhere) must be—
(a) released unconditionally; or
(b) released on bail; or
(c) brought before a bail justice or the Magistrates' Court—
within a reasonable time of being taken into custody.
(2) If a person suspected of having committed an offence is in custody for that offence, an investigating official may, within the reasonable time referred to in subsection (1)—
(a) inform the person of the circumstances of that offence; and
(b) question the person or carry out investigations in which the person participates in order to determine the involvement (if any) of the person in that offence.
(3) Before any questioning (other than a request for the person's name and address) or investigation under subsection (2) commences, an investigating official must inform the person in custody that he or she does not have to say or do anything but that anything the person does say or do may be given in evidence.
(4) In determining what constitutes a reasonable time for the purposes of subsection (1) the following matters may be considered—
(a) the period of time reasonably required to bring the person before a bail justice or the Magistrates' Court;
(b) the number and complexity of offences to be investigated;
(c) any need of the investigating official to read and collate relevant material or to take any other steps that are reasonably necessary by way of preparation for the questioning or investigation;
(d) any need to transport the person from the place of apprehension to a place where facilities are available to conduct an interview or investigation;
38
(e) the number of other people who need to be questioned during the period of custody in respect of the offence for which the person is in custody;
(f) any need to visit the place where the offence is believed to have been committed or any other place reasonably connected with the investigation of the offence;
(g) any time taken to communicate with a legal practitioner, friend, relative, parent, guardian or independent person;
(h) any time taken by a legal practitioner, interpreter, parent, guardian or independent person to arrive at the place where questioning or investigation is to take place;
(i) any time during which the questioning or investigation of the person is suspended or delayed to allow the person to receive medical attention;
(j) any time during which the questioning or investigation of the person is suspended or delayed to allow the person to rest;
(k) the total period of time during which the person has been in the company of an investigating official before and after the commencement of custody;
(l) any other matters reasonably connected with the investigation of the offence.
Note
Section 78D of the Corrections Act 1986 provides for the application of section 464A in relation to persons detained under that Act.
115. The relevant provisions with respect to the consequences which flow from a
failure to caution an accused person are set out in the Evidence Act 2008 as
follows:
139 Cautioning of persons
(1) For the purposes of section 138(1)(a), evidence of a statement made or an act done by a person during questioning is taken to have been obtained improperly if—
(a) the person was under arrest for an offence at the time; and
(b) the questioning was conducted by an investigating official who was at the time empowered, because of the office that he or she held, to arrest the person; and
(c) before starting the questioning the investigating official did not caution the person that the person does not have to say or do anything but that anything the person does say or do may be used in evidence.
(2) For the purposes of section 138(1)(a), evidence of a statement made or an act done by a person during questioning is taken to have been obtained improperly if—
(a) the questioning was conducted by an investigating official who did not have the power to arrest the person; and
(b) the statement was made, or the act was done, after the investigating official formed a belief that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the person has committed an offence; and
(c) the investigating official did not, before the statement was made or the act was done, caution the person that the person does not have to say or do anything but that anything the person does say or do may be used in evidence.
39
(3) The caution must be given in, or translated into, a language in which the person is able to communicate with reasonable fluency, but need not be given in writing unless the person cannot hear adequately.
(4) Subsections (1), (2) and (3) do not apply so far as any Australian law requires the person to answer questions put by, or do things required by, the investigating official.
(5) A reference in subsection (1) to a person who is under arrest includes a reference to a person who is in the company of an investigating official for the purpose of being questioned, if—
(a) the official believes that there is sufficient evidence to establish that the person has committed an offence that is to be the subject of the questioning; or
(b) the official would not allow the person to leave if the person wished to do so; or
(c) the official has given the person reasonable grounds for believing that the person would not be allowed to leave if he or she wished to do so.
(6) A person is not treated as being under arrest only because of subsection (5) if—
(a) the official is performing functions in relation to persons or goods entering or leaving Australia and the official does not believe the person has committed an offence against a law of the Commonwealth; or
(b) the official is exercising a power under an Australian law to detain and search the person or to require the person to provide information or to answer questions.
Analysis and findings
116. Section 464A(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 provides that if a person suspected
of having committed a crime is in custody for that offence, an investigating official
may within a reasonable time referred to in subsection (1) -
(a) inform the person of the circumstances of that offence; and
(b) question the person or carry out investigations in which the person participates
in order to determine the involvement (if any) of that person in the offence.
117. Subsection 464A(3) provides that before any questioning (other than a
request for the person's name and address) or investigation under subsection (2)
commences, an investigating official must inform the person in custody that he or
she does not have to say or do anything but that anything the person does say or
do may be given in evidence. This obligation was referred to in short hand by the
Informant and the other police witnesses, as the Informant giving the Accused his
`caution and rights’.114The Accused’s rights include the requirement to be informed
before any questioning or investigation of the right to communicate with a friend,
relative and legal practitioner.115 The Defence have not raised any issues with
114 Defence submissions, paragraph 99. 115 Crimes Act 1958, s.464C.
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respect to breach of the Accused’s rights pursuant to section 464C of the Crimes
Act 1958.
118. Kyrou J in Slaveski’s case116 has summarised the common law with respect
to communication of the reason for the arrest of an accused person:
“In Christie v Leachinsky, the House of Lords held that the arrester ordinarily must inform the arrestee, at the time of the arrest, of the offence, or the facts that are said to constitute the offence, for which the arrest is effected.
Numerous decisions of Australian courts have referred to Christie with approval.
The arrester need not communicate the reason for the arrest to the arrestee using technical or precise language. The sufficiency of the communication is to be considered as a matter of substance and by reference to the principle that
a person is, prima facie, entitled to his freedom and is only required to submit to restraints on his freedom if he knows in substance the reason why it is claimed that this restraint should be imposed.
Provided that the arrestee is informed of the facts that are said to constitute the offence for which the arrest is effected, it does not matter that he or she is later charged with a different offence from that specified by the arrester. As Lord Simonds said in Christie:
if the act constituting the crime is the killing of another man, it will be immaterial that the arrest is for murder and at a later hour the charge of manslaughter is substituted. The arrested man is left in no doubt that the arrest is for that killing.
…..
There are some circumstances in which an arrester is excused from immediately informing the arrestee of the reason for the arrest, including where:
(a) the arrestee prevents the arrester from doing so, for example, by violently resisting the arrest or absconding;
(b) the circumstances are such that the arrestee must know the general nature of the offence for which the arrest is effected, such as where he or she has been given prior notice of the proposed arrest and the reason for it or has been ‘caught red-handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven’; and
(c) the arrestee is unable to understand the reason because of a disability, an inability to speak English or intoxication, provided that the arrester does all that a reasonable person would do in the circumstances.
In these situations, the arrestee must be informed of the reason for the arrest at the earliest reasonable opportunity.
In Victoria, the common law as stated in Christie has been supplemented by legislation. Section 21(4) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (‘Charter’) provides:
116 Paragraphs 111-114 and 116-119.
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A person who is arrested or detained must be informed at the time of arrest or detention of the reason for the arrest or detention and must be promptly informed about any proceedings to be brought against him or her.
Section 21 is contained within Part 2 of the Charter, which sets out numerous human rights. Part 2 commenced operation on 1 January 2007. Section 38(1) of the Charter provides that it is unlawful for a ‘public authority’, which includes Victoria Police, to act in a way that is incompatible with a human right contained in Part 2. This section, however, is contained within Division 4 of Part 3 of the Charter, which did not commence operation until 1 January 2008, after the events of this proceeding. (Authorities omitted).”
119. Subsection 464A(2)(a) states that an investigating official may inform the
person of the circumstances of the offence they are suspected of having committed,
and they may question them or carry out investigations. The Court of Appeal in R v
Willis117 supported the submission that although section 464A(2)(a) was couched in
permissive terms, it was mandatory in effect.118 The reason for this is that:
“…any suspect in custody questioned about an offence without first having been adequately informed of the circumstances of the offence would, prima facie, have established that the evidence obtained thereafter was improperly obtained. In other words, the breach of section 464A(2)(a) would, of itself, trigger the possible operation of section
138 of the Evidence Act 2008”.119
120. Subsection 464A(3) provides that an investigating official must before any
questioning or investigation commences advise a person that he or she does not
have to say or do anything but that anything the person does say or do may be
given in evidence. Subsection 464A(3) must be read with the preceding subsections
(1) and (2) such that the information to be provided by an investigating official under
subsection (3) should be in respect of the offence for which the person is being
investigated. Importantly however, case law has established that the investigating
officer may not know the `precise nomination’ of the crime.120 The question
becomes, has the suspect been `told enough at the outset to meet the requirements
of section 464A(2)(a).’121 This position is consistent with the authority in Christie v
Leachinsky, which provides that an Accused must know in substance why he or she
is under arrest.
121. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Informant told the
Accused that he was under arrest for the crime of theft from a motor vehicle and
that the Informant told him that he did not have to say or do anything but that
117 [2016] VSCA 176 118 [2016] VSCA 176, at paragraph 186. 119 Ibid. 120 R v Lancaster [1998] 4 VR 550, cited in R v Willis [2016] VSCA 176, at paragraph 125. 121 R v Willis [2016] VSCA 176, at paragraph 123.
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anything the person did say or do may be given in evidence. Each of the officers
gave evidence that upon establishing his identity, the Accused was immediately
informed that he was under arrest for the crime of theft of power tools from a motor
vehicle and cautioned. The contemporaneous note of the Informant, states “C & R:
‘Yes”, an abbreviated notation reflecting that the Accused was cautioned and
informed of rights. The contemporaneous note of the Informant supports his
evidence and the evidence of each of the other officers.
122. In relation to the power tools, I accept the Informant’s evidence that he
believed at the time of the arrest and seizure of those items, that they were the
fruits of the Heidelberg Heights theft. I accept that his belief was based on the only
information that the police had at the time. The situation cannot be analysed with
the benefit of hindsight. According to the authority in R v Lancaster, it was not
necessary for the Informant to be more precise than he was when cautioning the
Accused about the offence. R v Lancaster makes it clear that the precise
nomination or details of a crime may not be known to police at the time of the arrest.
What is of the utmost importance is that the Accused understands in substance he
or she is under arrest for an offence, and has the right to remain silent in relation to
that offence. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Accused was well
aware that he was under arrest for the crime of theft from motor vehicle and that he
had the right to remain silent in relation to that offence.
123. I also accept that the Accused, not electing to exercise his right to remain
silent, engaged in a conversation with the Informant about where he got the power
tools from. All of the officers gave evidence that the purpose of the conversation
was to learn whether the Accused had a reasonable explanation for his possession
of the goods. This explanation was sought by police so that the Accused could be
afforded the opportunity to prevent the ensuing seizure of the goods on the basis
that they were believed to be stolen. The explanations provided were not accepted
by police as there appeared from their point of view, to be a lack of connection
between the nature of the Accused’s trade and the type of tools found on the
premises. Also, the fact that he told police that he was an ice user, that he was not
at work on a weekday and that he could not tell them how much he had paid for a
particular tool gave the officers reasonable grounds to believe that the power tools
were stolen. All of these things quite reasonably, in my view, gave the police
officers further grounds to fortify their belief upon entry, that the tools were the fruits
43
of the Heidelberg Heights theft, or `material evidence to prove the commission of
that crime’.122
The seizure of the stolen items
124. The parties agree that the relevant legal test for the lawful seizure of goods is
set out in Ghani v Jones, as applied by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v R:123
“In that case Lord Denning exemplified the relevant principles as follows:
`The decision causes me some misgiving. I expect that the car bore traces of its impact with the brick wall. The police had reason to believe that Lynn and Waterfield were implicated in a crime of which the marks on the car might be most material evidence at the trial. If Lynn and Waterfield were allowed to drive the car away, they might very well remove or obliterate all incriminating evidence. My comment on that case is this: The law should not allow wrongdoers to destroy evidence against them when it can be prevented. Test it by an instance put in argument. The robbers of a bank 'borrow' a private car and use it in their raid, and escape. They abandon it by the roadside. The police find the car, i.e., the instrument of the crime, and want to examine it for finger prints. The owner of the 'borrowed' car comes up and demands the return of it. He says he will drive it away and not allow them to examine it. Cannot the police say to him: 'Nay, you cannot have it until we have examined it?' I should have thought they could. His conduct makes him look like an accessory after the fact, if not before it. At any rate it is quite unreasonable. Even though the raiders have not yet been caught, arrested or charged, nevertheless the police should be able to do whatever is necessary and reasonable to preserve the evidence of the crime." (Authorities omitted) 12. Lord Denning went on to identify principles which can be deduced from authority as follows: "First: The police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that a serious offence has been committed - so serious that it is of the first importance that the offenders should be caught and brought to justice. Second: The police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that the article in question is either the fruit of the crime (as in the case of stolen goods) or is the instrument by which the crime was committed (as in the case of the axe used by the murderer) or is material evidence to prove the commission of the crime (as in the case of the car used by a bank raider or the saucer used by a train robber). Third: The police officers must have reasonable grounds to believe that the person in possession of it has himself committed the crime, or is implicated in it, or is accessory to it, or at any rate his refusal must be quite unreasonable. Fourth: The police must not keep the article, nor prevent its removal, for any longer than is reasonably necessary to complete their investigations or preserve it for evidence. As soon as the case is over, or it is decided not to go on with it, the article should be returned. Finally: The lawfulness of the conduct of the police must be judged at the time, and not by what happens afterwards."
122 Ghani v Jones¸ cited in Goldberg v R [2003] VSC 104, paragraphs 11-12. 123 [2003] VSC 104, Paragraphs 11-12.
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125. Ghani v Jones is also authority for the proposition that if in the course of
arresting a person for a serious offence, or where a police officer enters a person’s
property pursuant to a warrant, `in the course of their search they come upon any
other goods which show him to be implicated in some other crime, they may take
them provided they act reasonably and detain them no longer that is necessary.’124
126. There is no question that theft from a motor vehicle is a `serious indictable
offence’ within the meaning of section 325(6) of the Crimes Act 1958.
127. In relation to the first limb of the test, I am satisfied that police had
`reasonable grounds for believing’ that a serious offence had been committed by
the Accused, and I refer to and repeat my reasons as given above.
128. Each officer gave evidence that upon entering the bungalow, they each saw
a large number of power tools that were scattered in an unusual fashion around the
bungalow. After the Accused was arrested and cautioned, the police did not accept
the explanation given by the Accused as to the presence of the power tools in his
bungalow. Some of the police officers gave evidence that the Accused was not
working on a weekday, had a physical appearance consistent with that of an ice
user, was found to be in possession of ice and told Detective Beames that he was a
regular user of ice. These matters, quite reasonably in my view, gave rise to a belief
on reasonable grounds in the officers that the items in question were either the
fruits of the crime of theft from a motor vehicle, or material evidence that would
assist in proof of the commission of that crime.
129. I am furthermore satisfied that on the basis of all of the above evidence,
Informant/ police had reasonable grounds to believe that the Accused, who being
the person in possession of the power tools, had himself committed the crime of
theft from motor vehicle, and upon the formation of this reasonable belief, could
lawfully seize the property.
130. As stated above, it is conceded that the power tools the subject of these
charges are not from the Heidelberg Heights theft. However, as set out above, the
relevant inquiry according to Ghani v Jones is that `the lawfulness of the conduct of
the police must be judged at the time, and not by what happens afterwards.’ I am
satisfied, applying the principles in Ghani v Jones, that at the time of seizing the
124 Ghani v Jones (1970) 1 QB 693 at page 706A.
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power tools, the Informant/police believed that the items were the fruits of the theft
on 26 March 2015 at Heidelberg Heights. In all of the circumstances, the belief of
the Informant/police as to this matter is in my view a reasonable one.
131. The stolen number plates and the Yarra Tram jacket that were seized by
police must be separately considered, as it cannot be accepted that the police
reasonably believed these objects had any connection with the Heidelberg Heights
theft. I am of the view that the seizure of these objects was lawful according to
Ghani v Jones which provides authority for the proposition that where police are
investigating offences, if they happen upon the fruits of other crimes, they may
seize them for as long as reasonably necessary to complete their investigations, or
in order to preserve it as evidence.
Further submissions on police impropriety; what can be inferred from the evidence of
‘knocking’
132. The Defence submit that the Court should infer from the evidence that police
did not enter the Accused’s premises to arrest him, but rather to search for the
power tools from the Heidelberg Heights theft without first having obtained a
warrant under section 465 of the Crimes Act 1958. The Defence submitted that the
evidence of the police officers was inconsistent with respect to whether or not the
Informant knocked before entering the premises. It was submitted that the Court
should conclude that the Informant did not knock before entering:
“….as a consequence of such a finding, the court should infer (the only reasonable inference open, it is submitted) that the Police knowingly elected not to conduct themselves in such a manner that would allow the Accused to come to the door, as then the opportunity
for the police to conduct a search of the premises would be lost.”125
133. It is submitted that failing to knock before entering, the police knowingly
conducted themselves in an improper manner.126
134. The evidence of the four officers was inconsistent with respect to whether or
not Detective Abbey knocked before entering the bungalow, and it is not possible to
conclude based on the evidence before the Court that there was knocking, or that
entry to the premises occurred without knocking. Even if this Court were to
conclude that the officers entered the bungalow without knocking, I do not agree
125 Defence submissions, page 12, paragraph 42. 126 Defence submissions, page 12, paragraph 42.
46
that this leads necessarily to the inference that police were in attendance for
purposes of an unlawful search for property without a warrant. The evidence given
by each of the police officers, which I have accepted, does not support that
conclusion.
135. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities
that the police entered the bungalow of the Accused to arrest him, not to search for
the power tools from the Heidelberg Heights theft. Given the high degree of
consistency between the police officers as to the purpose of their attendance at the
bungalow, and the absence of any evidence of contamination of this evidence or
collusion, I have no reason to doubt it.
Conclusions
136. For all of the above reasons, the Defence has not satisfied me on the
balance of probabilities that the police acted beyond their powers in entering the
premises of the Accused, arresting him and seizing the items the subject of these
charges. The Defence application is dismissed.