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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 174 of 2013

-------1. The State of Jharkhand

2. The Secretary, Personnel, Administrative

Reforms and Rajbhasa Department,

Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi

3. The Deputy Secretary, Personal, Administrative

Reforms and Rajbhasa Department, Government

of Jharkhand, Ranchi ... ... Appellants

Versus

Jaishree Jha ... ... Respondent

------- CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR -------

For the Appellants : Mr. Jai Prakash, A.A.G. For the Respondent : Mr. R. Krishna, Advocate

-------

C.A.V. on 21/01/2014 Pronounced on 28/1/2014

The State of Jharkhand has preferred this Letters

Patent Appeal challenging order dated 21.02.2013 passed in

W.P.(S) No. 2431 of 2012 whereby, the final order dated

19.04.2012 has been quashed with cost of Rs. 60,000/-.

2. The respondent herein (the writ petitioner) was

appointed in the State Administrative Service. She was

posted as Block Development Officer in Bero Block during

the period between 14.08.1988 and 07.11.1990. A

show-cause notice was issued to her on the allegation of

committing irregularity and non-adjustment of funds while

she was posted in Bero Block. She was put under

suspension on 08.03.1996 and a charge-memo dated

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17.04.1996 was served upon her in which various charges

of financial irregularity were framed. On 23.09.1996, an

enquiry officer was appointed however, as the presenting

officer did not turn up during the enquiry proceeding for

about one year, the enquiry officer showed his inability to

continue and conclude the proceeding. On 23.09.1997, the

Divisional Commissioner, Patna was appointed as

conducting officer. He held the proceeding on five different

dates between 01.01.1998 to 07.05.1998 however, inspite

of notices sent to the department, neither the presenting

officer appeared nor the department produced any evidence

or witness. On 07.05.1998, the enquiry officer submitted an

interim report recommending that the suspension order

may be revoked however, the enquiry may proceed. On

31.08.1998, another enquiry officer was appointed who

conducted the proceeding on as many as sixteen different

dates. Neither any witness was examined nor any

document was exhibited on behalf of the department and

the presenting officer also appeared on few dates only. On

30.10.2001, the presenting officer was directed to present

written submission and on the same day, the enquiry

proceeding was closed. An enquiry report dated 23.10.2002

was submitted finding all the charges, except charge no. 5

(a), proved. The petitioner approached this Court in W.P.(S)

No. 1367 of 2003 challenging the entire departmental

proceeding and the enquiry report which was submitted on

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23.10.2002. Thereafter, a second show-cause notice was

issued to the respondent on 29.08.2006, to which the

respondent submitted her reply on 16.09.2006. However,

no final order was passed. During the pendency of the writ

petition, the final order dated 01.03.2007 was passed

imposing punishment of “censure” and withholding three

annual increments.

3. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed

by the respondent herein and quashed the final order dated

01.03.2007. The State of Jharkhand preferred Letters Patent

Appeal being L.P.A. No. 103 of 2012 which was disposed of

by order dated 28.03.2012 modifying order dated

06.01.2012 to the extent that the department was granted

liberty to pass a fresh order, in accordance with law. By

order dated 19.04.2012 “a penalty of censure” has been

inflicted upon the respondent. Aggrieved, the respondent

approached this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2431 of 2012 which has

been allowed by the impugned order dated 21.02.2013.

4. Mr. Jai Prakash, the learned Additional

Advocate-General appearing for the appellant-State of

Jharkhand has assailed the impugned order dated

21.02.2013 on the ground that the findings recorded by the

learned Single Judge that “there was no material on record

to substantiate the charges against the petitioner”, is

contrary to the record produced by the department. The

learned counsel has also questioned the direction issued in

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paragraph no. 48 of the impugned order whereby, the claim

of the writ petitioner for promotion was directed to be

considered by the department. The learned counsel has

submitted that there is a mechanism provided under the

Rules which has to be followed for recommending the name

of a person for promotion in the I.A.S. Cadre. The procedure

prescribed thereunder involves several consultation and

recommendation and therefore, the direction of the learned

Single Judge contained in paragraph no. 48 cannot be

sustained in law. The learned Additional-Advocate General

has further submitted that, the award of cost of Rs. 60,000/-

to be paid to the writ petitioner was not justified. Since the

impugned order contains no reason for awarding cost of

Rs. 60,000/- and infact without identifying the reason which

warranted infliction of cost to be paid to the writ petitioner,

the order awarding cost to the writ petitioner is liable to be

interfered with. He has referred to decisions rendered by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2009) 16 SCC 351,

(2010) 15 SCC 776, (2010) 11 SCC 233 and (2011) 14 SCC

692.

5. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted

that, the case against the respondent is based

on 'no evidence'. During the departmental proceeding, no

document was produced, exhibited and proved by the

department in support of the charges framed against the

respondent. Even the documents which have been annexed

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along with the charge-memo, have not been proved in the

course of the departmental enquiry and therefore, no

reliance can be placed on those documents for proving the

charge against the respondent. The learned counsel for the

respondent has submitted that, for no fault of the

respondent, the departmental proceeding was continued for

more than 18 years and in the end, only a punishment of

“censure” has been awarded to the respondent. Since the

delay in the departmental proceeding has been caused due

to laches on the part of department itself, the punishment

awarded to the respondent is liable to be quashed. Relying

on a document filed before the Writ Court, the learned

counsel for the respondent has submitted that, the penalty

order dated 19.04.2012 has been passed on the direction of

the Chief Minister and therefore, it is liable to be quashed.

The learned counsel has further submitted that, by penalty

order dated 01.03.2007 and 19.04.2012, only a minor

punishment has been awarded to the respondent however,

the departmental proceeding was continued illegally for

more than 18 years and therefore, it is apparent on the face

of record that the departmental proceeding against the

respondent was continued only to deny her the legitimate

promotion in higher grade/rank. To fortify his contentions

the learned counsel has relied on decisions reported in

(2009) 2 SCC 570, (2006) 5 SCC 88, (2012) 5 SCC 242,

(2010) 10 SCC 539 and (2010) 2 SCC 772.

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6. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant-State of

Jharkhand has contended that reliance of the learned Single

Judge on the report of the Chief Secretary, Principal

Secretary of Department of Personnel and Administrative

Reforms and the Deputy Commissioner for holding that,

there was no material to substantiate the charge against

the respondent, was misplaced in as much as, in all the

three reports the authorities have not recorded that there

was no evidence against the respondent. Referring to

paragraph nos. 26 and 39 of the impugned order dated

21.02.2013, the learned counsel for the appellant has

submitted that, the findings recorded by the learned Single

Judge is contrary to the materials placed on record. We

have gone through the entire record and carefully examined

the submission of rival parties. We are unable to accept the

submission of the learned Additional Advocate-General.

Though, a reference has been made to the report of the

Chief Secretary, Principal Secretary of Department of

Personnel and Administrative Reforms and the report of the

Deputy Commissioner, the learned Single Judge has

quashed the impugned order on the ground of its being

mechanical, cryptic and being violative of the principles of

natural justice besides, holding that the case against the

respondent is based on “no evidence”.

7. We find that the specific plea of the writ petitioner

that the enquiry conducted against her was improper and in

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violation of the principles of natural justice has not been

challenged by the department by producing cogent

evidence. The plea of the writ petitioner that no material

was produced by the department in support of the charges

framed against her, has also not been controverted by the

appellant in the present proceeding and therefore, merely,

because a reference to the reports of the Chief Secretary,

Principal Secretary of Department of Personnel and

Administrative Reforms and the report of the Deputy

Commissioner, has been made by the learned Single Judge,

the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that there

was no material/evidence brought on record in support of

the charges framed against the petitioner, cannot be held to

be contrary to the record of the case. In fact those reports

are not part of the disciplinary proceeding against the

respondent and therefore, the department also cannot be

permitted to rely on those reports. We find sufficient

reasons for agreeing with the findings recorded by the

learned Single Judge.

8. In this connection referring to the contention raised by

the learned counsel for the respondent that the documents

furnished along with the charge-memo could not have been

considered by the enquiry officer, we find that during the

departmental proceeding, the department did not produce

any witness. Inspite of repeated notices issued by the

successive enquiry officer, the department did not examine

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any witness. It cannot be disputed that mere production

and marking of a document is not enough. The execution of

a document has to be proved by admissible evidence. The

charge-memo would indicate that in support of the charge,

the department relied on an interim enquiry report of one

Aabhash Kumar Jha; however, he also has not been

examined by the department. It is not the case of the

department that the respondent herein admitted the

contents of the documents and therefore, we are of the

opinion that the enquiry officer could not have based his

finding on the documents annexed with the charge-memo.

9. In “Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank”,

reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 when the management

merely tendered the documents and no witness was

examined to prove the documents, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court held that the reliance placed by the enquiry officer on

those documents, was erroneous as the documents

produced by the Department could not have been treated

as evidence.

10. In “M/S. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Workmen

& Ors.”, reported in (1971) 2 SCC 617,the Hon'ble Supreme

Court has held thus,

14. “…..... When a document is produced in a Court or a Tribunal the questions that naturally arise is, is it a genuine document, what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true. ….............. Even if all technicalities of the Evidence Act are not strictly applicable except insofar as Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the rules prescribed

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therein permit it, it is inconceivable that the Tribunal can act on what is not evidence such as hearsay, nor can it justify the Tribunal in basing its award on copies of documents when the originals which are in existence are not produced and proved by one of the methods either by affidavit or by witness who have executed them, if they are alive and can be produced.............”

11. Relying on the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, the learned Additional Advocate-General

has submitted that the findings recorded in the

departmental proceeding was not liable to be interfered

with by the Writ Court. It was contended that the High

Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India cannot reappreciate the evidence as it has not been

constituted as a Court of Appeal and, since the learned

Single Judge has reappreciated the evidence and came to a

conclusion that the case against the petitioner is based on

'no evidence', the impugned order dated 21.02.2013 is

liable to be set-aside. In view of the facts brought on record

in the proceeding before the Writ Court, we are of the

opinion that the finding recorded by the learned Single

Judge is not based on reappreciation of the evidence on the

record. The fact that the documents produced by the

department cannot be considered legal evidence, on the

basis of which a finding of misconduct cannot be recorded,

we are in agreement with the finding of the learned Single

Judge that the case against the petitioner is based on 'no

evidence'.

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12. Further, from the enquiry proceeding dated

12.04.1999 it appears that the enquiry officer has recorded

that the documents requested by the respondent were not

supplied to her. When an objection was taken by the

department that the documents requested by the

respondent were either not issued or were not relevant for

the proceeding against the respondent, on 01.06.1999, the

department was directed to submit an application in that

regard. However, from the proceeding before the enquiry

officer, it does not appear that the stand taken by the

department was ever pleaded on affidavit before the

enquiry officer. On 15.10.2001, the Drawing and

Disbursing Authority was directed to appear with the

records however, neither the Drawing and Disbursing

Authority appeared before the enquiry officer nor the

records were produced and on the next date, that is, on

30.10.2001, the enquiry proceeding was closed. The

enquiry officer has submitted the enquiry report only on the

basis of the charge-memo and the documents furnished

along with the charge-memo. The delinquent employee

was not even afforded an opportunity to present her case.

In a departmental proceeding after the evidence led by the

department concludes, a delinquent employee must be

afforded an opportunity to produce evidence in support of

his/her case and submit representation to the enquiry

officer. Admittedly, such a procedure has not been adopted

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by the enquiry officer and after a lapse of about one year,

the enquiry report dated 23.10.2002 was submitted finding

the charges except, charge no. 5 (a), proved against the

respondent. Thus, we find that, the procedure adopted by

the enquiry officer was not in consonance with the

principles of natural justice.

13. The learned Single Judge has taken note of the

manner in which the impugned order dated 19.04.2012 has

been passed without discussing any evidence or material on

record. In the earlier proceeding also, the penalty order

was passed without discussing any evidence on record and

without even indicating that the disciplinary authority

agreed or disagreed with the findings recorded by the

enquiry officer. The order passed by the Writ Court on

06.01.2012 was affirmed by the Letters Patent Court with

the following observations:

“However, we are of the considered opinion that

there is no illegality in the order passed by the

learned Single Judge dated 06.01.2012, as the

impugned order, which is placed on record as

Annexure-17, clearly indicates that the order is

not only an order without assigning any reason,

but has passed only after narrating the facts of

the case and without even holding that

Disciplinary Authority has concurred with the

findings recorded by the inquiry officer and

straight away order of punishment has been

passed after stating that in view of the inquiry

report punishment is inflicted.”

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14. In the impugned order dated 21.02.2013 the learned

Single Judge has expressed anguish, over the manner in

which the impugned order dated 19.04.2012 has been

passed, in these words;

“Earlier order of the respondents, holding the

petitioner guilty, was quashed by this Court due

to the said infirmities. The manner of the order

was deprecated and the matter was remitted to

the respondents to pass a fresh order, in

accordance with law. The respondents have

again passed laconic and non-speaking order,

making mockery of the said direction of this

Court.”

15. In England, at one time it was thought that there is no

requirement for recording reasons by the administrative

authorities for its decision. Lord Denning M.R., in “Breen Vs.

Amalgamated Engineering Union”,reported in (1971) 2 Q.B.

175, recorded his dissenting opinion that “the giving of

reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.”

The Committee of Justice in its report has expressed its

view thus; “No single factor has inhibited the development

of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of

any general obligation upon public authorities to give

reasons for their decisions.”

16. In “Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. Vs. Union of

India”, reported in (1976) 2 SCC 981, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court has held that the rule requiring reasons to be given in

support of the order, must be observed in its true spirit and

mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the

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requirement in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has

observed thus;

6. “...........It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasijudicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasijudicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai v. Testeels Ltd.1. But, unfortunately, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reasons in support of the order made by him confirming the demand for differential duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law. The Collector in revision did give some sort of reason but it was hardly satisfactory. He did not deal in his order with the arguments advanced by the appellants in their representation dated December 8, 1961 which were repeated in the subsequent representation dated June 4, 1965. It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a Court of law. But the order of the Collector could have been a little more explicit and articulate so as to lend assurance that the case of the appellants had been properly considered by him. …........ The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasijudicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law...........”

17. In “Woolcombers of India Ltd. Vs. Workers Union”,

reported in (1974) 3 SCC 318, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

has held as under:

5. “…...... The giving of reasons in support of their conclusions by judicial and quasijudicial authorities when exercising initial jurisdiction is essential for various reasons. First, it is calculated to prevent unconscious unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching the conclusions. The very search for reasons will put the authority on the alert and minimise the chances of unconscious infiltration of personal bias or unfairness in the conclusion. The authority will adduce reasons which will be regarded as fair

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and legitimate by a reasonable man and will discard irrelevant or extraneous considerations. Second, it is a wellknown principle that justice should not only be done but should also appear to be done. Unreasoned conclusions may be just but they may not appear to be just to those who read them. Reasoned conclusions, on the other hand, will have also the appearance of justice. …............ So it is necessary to emphasise that judicial and quasijudicial authorities should always give the reasons in support of their conclusions.”

18. A perusal of the penalty order dated 19.04.2012

discloses that the disciplinary authority has only recorded

the chequered history of the case over last 16 years. After

indicating the penalty imposed on 01.03.2007 and the

orders passed by this Court in earlier proceeding, the

disciplinary authority has concluded thus;

“In the light of order of Hon'ble Court, the charge against Smt. Jha, the defence submitted by her, reply of second show-cause, enquiry report and other relevant documents have been considered again. The charge against Smt. Jha is clearly serious in nature. After review, the charge of dereliction of duty, providing inappropriate benefit to outside suppliers in the implementation of schemes for vested interests and the charge of misappropriation and misuse of government fund by working arbitrarily against Government direction are proved. Smt. Jha is guilty of dereliction of duty and financial irregularity and therefore, under Rule 49 of Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rule, 1930, she is awarded penalty of Censure, which shall come in force with effect from the date of issuance of the order and it is decided to close the departmental proceeding.”

19. It is apparent from the order dated 19.04.2012 that

the specific defence taken by the delinquent officer to the

proceeding before the enquiry officer has not been

discussed by the disciplinary authority. In fact none of the

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defence taken by the delinquent officer has been

considered by the disciplinary authority. Even a finding has

not been recorded by the disciplinary authority whether the

defence of the officer is accepted or not. The agreement or

disagreement with the enquiry report has also not been

indicated in the final order dated 19.04.2012. We are of the

opinion that the penalty order dated 19.04.2012 does not

satisfy the requirement of law.

20. Coming to the contention of the learned counsel for

the respondent that the penalty order dated 21.02.2013 is

liable to be interfered with as, it has been passed on the

dictate of the Hon'ble Chief Minister, we find that the

respondent herein produced a document before the Writ

Court which would indicate that the file relating to the

disciplinary proceeding against the respondent was placed

before the Chief Minister on 12.04.2012 and he gave a

direction to impose penalty of “censure” upon the

respondent. It is settled law that the statutory

duty/discretion must be exercised by the person or authority

in whom the duty/discretion is vested and if such discretion

is exercised under direction or in compliance with

instructions of some other person or authority, it would

amount to failure to exercise the discretion altogether. This

principle has its genesis in the maxim 'delegatus non potest

delegare' which has been succinctly explained in the

Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol.-I as under,

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“In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. I, in respect of sub-delegation of powers it has been said: “In accordance with the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, a statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided, (H. Lavender & Son Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government) unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words or necessary implication (Customs and Excise Comrs. v. Cure and Deeley Ltd. and Mungoni v. Attorney General of Northern Rhodesia). There is a strong presumption against construing a grant of legislative, judicial, or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub-delegation; and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of which the designated body should address its own mind. Allam & Co. v. Europa Poster Services Ltd. …”

21. In “Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. and another v. Employees'

State Insurance Corpn.”, reported in (1994) 5 SCC 346, the

maxim, 'delegatus non potest delegare' has been explained

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court thus,

12. “..................... The maxim delegatus non potest delegare was originally invoked in the context of delegation of judicial powers saying that in the entire process of adjudication a judge must act personally except insofar as he is expressly absolved from his duty by a statute. The basic principle behind the aforesaid maxim is that “a discretion conferred by statute is prima facie intended to be exercised by the authority on which the statute has conferred it and by no other authority, but this intention may be negatived by any contrary indications found in the language, scope or object of the statute”. (Vide John Willis, “Delegatus non potest delegare, (1943) 21 Can. Bar Rev. 257, 259).”

22. In “Purtabpore Co. Ltd. Vs. Cane Commissioner of

Bihar & Ors.” reported in (1969) 1 SCC 308, the Cane

Commissioner, Bihar passed an order reserving certain

villages under clause 6 (1) (a) of the Sugar Cane Control

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order 1960. The Chief Minister directed the Cane

Commissioner to divide the area into two portions and

allotted one portion to another person. On the direction of

the Chief Minister, the Cane Commissioner passed orders

which were challenged before the High Court. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court has held that the executive officers

entrusted with statutory discretion cannot be absolved from

their duty to exercise their personal judgment in individual

cases unless explicit statutory provision has been made for

that. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus,

11. “….....The Cane Commissioner merely carried out the orders of the Chief Minister. It is true that the impugned orders were issued in the name of the Cane Commissioner. He merely obeyed the directions issued to him by the Chief Minister. We are unable to agree with the contention of Shri Chagla that though the Cane Commissioner was initially of the view that the reservation made in favour of the appellant should not be disturbed, he changed his opinion after discussion with the Chief Minister. From the material before us, the only conclusion possible is that the Chief Minister imposed his opinion on the Cane Commissioner. The power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner under Clause 6(1) is a statutory power. He alone could have exercised that power. While exercising that power he cannot abdicate his responsibility in favour of anyone — not even in favour of the State Government or the Chief Minister. It was not proper for the Chief Minister to have interfered with the functions of the Cane Commissioner. In this case what has happened is that the power of the Cane Commissioner has been exercised by the Chief Minister, an authority not recognised by clause (6) read with clause (11) but the responsibility for making those orders was asked to be taken by the Cane Commissioner.”

23. In the background of the law laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, we find that the final order dated

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19.04.2012 is vitiated on account of the order passed by the

Chief Minister on 12.04.2012. The record produced by the

respondent indicates that the file relating to departmental

proceeding against the respondent was placed before the

Chief Minister when he ordered imposition of penalty of

“censure”. The opinion of the Chief Minister appears to

have weighed with the disciplinary authority. Our attention

has not been drawn to any rule which provides that the

record of the disciplinary proceeding was required to be

placed before the Chief Minister.

24. Now, coming to the facts of the case, we find that, the

show-cause notice was issued to the respondent on

18.01.1995 whereas, the alleged irregularities committed by

the respondent pertains to the year, 1989-1990. The

respondent was suspended on 08.03.1996 and the

charge-sheet was drawn on 17.04.1996. After a lapse of

more than six years the enquiry report was submitted on

23.10.2002. The respondent herein approached this Court

in the year, 2003 itself, however, the final order was passed

in the year, 2007 which was quashed by this Court.

Thereafter, the penalty order was passed in the year, 2012.

The materials brought on record would indicate that the

delay in the departmental proceeding can be attributed

solely to the Department. After the charge-sheet was drawn

in the year, 1996, three enquiry officers were changed. The

proceeding before the enquiry officer would indicate that,

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the department did not cooperate during the enquiry

proceeding as the department failed to examine any

witness and the presenting officer did not appear on most of

the occasions. We are of the view that keeping a person in

suspense while the departmental proceeding was kept

pending for many years, would certainly affect the physical

and physiological condition of the delinquent employee.

Pendency of the departmental proceeding for a long period

would keep the person in a state of agony. The learned

Single Judge has also recorded that the prolong

departmental proceeding has caused immense mental

stress and agony to the writ petitioner.

25. In “State of Punjab Vs. Bani Singh”, reported in (1990)

Supp. SCC 738, the proceeding was initiated in the

year, 1987 with respect to the irregularities committed in

the year 1975-77. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it

will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to proceed

further.

26. In “M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors.”, reported in

(2006) 5 SCC 88, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed

thus,

16. “............ The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and they continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer.”

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27. In “State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan” reported in (1998)

4 SCC 154, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under,

19. “It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations.”

28. Taking note of earlier decisions of the Court, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in “P.V. Mahadevan Vs. Managing

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Director, T.N. Housing Board”, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636

observed that keeping the higher government official under

charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause

unbearable mental agony and stress to the officer

concerned. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not permit the

department to proceed further in the departmental enquiry

and it was quashed at the stage of enquiry itself. In view of

the facts brought on record, we are of the opinion that for

the mistake committed by the department in continuing the

departmental proceeding for more than 18 years, the

respondent should not be made to suffer. The respondent

has been awarded only a penalty of “censure” and, she has

already undergone mental agony and suffering due to the

prolonged proceeding which was initiated in the year, 1996.

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no reason

to interfere with the impugned order dated 21.02.2013

whereby penalty order dated 19.04.2012 has been quashed.

However, in so far as, the direction contained in paragraph

no. 48 of the impugned order is concerned, we clarify that

the claim of the respondent would be considered in

accordance with law. Further, since no reason has been

assigned by the learned Single Judge for awarding cost of

Rs. 60,000/- to be paid to the Writ-Petitioner, we are inclined

to accept the submission of the learned Additional

Advocate-General that award of cost to the respondent is

not justified and accordingly, that part of the impugned

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order is set-aside.

30. In the result, the Letters Patent Appeal is partly

allowed in the above terms.

(R. Banumathi, C.J.)

(Shree Chandrashekhar, J.)Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi The 28th day of January, 2014Amit/A.F.R.