Implementing Consequence-Driven Cybersecurity · ICS Honeypot Experiment • Simulated ICS...

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Page 1: Implementing Consequence-Driven Cybersecurity · ICS Honeypot Experiment • Simulated ICS environment – IT network, OT network with HMI – 3 Internet-facing servers with RDP,
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Implementing Consequence-Driven Cybersecurity with Continuous ICS Monitoring & Threat Modeling

Phil Neray, VP of Industrial Cybersecurity

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Agenda

• NotPetya: How a Single Piece of Code Crashed the World (Wired)

• VPNFilter Update

• What Happens When You Expose an ICS Honeypot

• Implementing Consequence-Driven Cybersecurity with Continuous ICS Monitoring & Threat Modeling

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Why It Matters

“INSECURE BY DESIGN” NETWORKS

SUPPORT BUSINESS NEED FOR DIGITALIZATION

RANGE OF MOTIVATED ADVERSARIES

Image Credit: CyberScoop/Jolie Gender

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NotPetya: How a Single Piece of Code Crashed the World (WIRED)“Almost everyone who has studied NotPetya agrees on one point: that it could happen again or even reoccur on a larger scale. Global corporations are simply too interconnected, information security too complex, attack surfaces too broad to protect against state-trained hackers bent on releasing the next world-shaking worm.”

– Thomas Rid, Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies.

“Anyone who thinks this was accidental is engaged in wishful thinking.” — Cisco

• Propelled by a combination EternalBlue and Mimikatz; spread via intranets

• Spread within hours from a Ukrainian software firm to countless machines around the world, from a British manufacturer of Lysol to a chocolate factory in Tasmania

https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/

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Update on VPNFilter Malware

• Multi-stage router malware– MODBUS packet sniffer– Wipes firmware of devices– Uses BE malware from 2015 Ukraine grid attack

• Latest updates from Cisco Talos – Endpoint exploitation tool

• Redirects and inspects content of HTTP traffic• Download binary payload & perform on-the-fly patching of Windows executables

– Port scanning & network mapping tool• Identify additional devices for lateral movement/compromise

– DoS specific forms of encrypted communication (WhatsApp, QQ Chat, Wikr, Signal)– New ways to obfuscate or encrypt malicious traffic; build distributed proxy network

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https://cyberx-labs.com/en/resources/sans-webinar-vpnfilter-malware-and-implications-for-ics/

https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/09/vpnfilter-part-3.html

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ICS Honeypot Experiment

• Simulated ICS environment– IT network, OT network with HMI– 3 Internet-facing servers with RDP, SSH & weak passwords– DNS names registered; internal names resembled “well-known” electric utility

• In 2 days: compromised by xDedic RDP Patch tool• 10 days: access to back door from “new owner”

– Presumed bought access to ICS via black market

• Multipoint network reconnaissance to identify paths from IT to OT

https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/cw-podcasts-rs-2018-09-22.htmlhttps://www.cybereason.com/blog/industrial-control-system-specialized-hackers

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(1) Identify “Crown Jewel” Processes

• Functions whose failure would threaten your company’s very survival– Revenue– Lawsuits– Brand reputation– Theft of intellectual property– Major compliance violations

• Requires conversations with business owners & OT• Examples

– Safety systems– Critical manufacturing production lines– Transformers or gas compressor stations– Historians (pharma)

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(2) Map Digital Terrain

• Asset discovery & network topology mapping

• “How does information move through your network?”

• “Who touches your equipment — and how do do they connect?”

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(3) Illuminate Most Likely Attack Paths

• Tabletop exercises

• Pen testers

• Automated threat modeling– Map ICS topology– Identify vulnerabilities– Calculate most likely attack paths

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Simulating Attack Paths to Critical Assets

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CyberX shows visual simulation of entire attack chain, enabling

“what-if” scenarios for remediation and mitigation

(e.g., zoning, patching)

Choose your most critical “crown jewel” assets

as targets

CyberX finds all potential attack paths, ranked by risk

Automated ICS Threat Modeling

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(4) Options for Mitigation & Protection

• Reduce # of digital pathways to a minimum– Unauthorized Internet connections– Segmentation– Privileged identity management &

secure remote access• Address vulnerabilities

– Weak passwords– Unused open ports– Patching where possible

• Implement compensating controls– Continuous monitoring with behavioral

anomaly detection– Integration with firewall infrastructures

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Detect & Respond Faster

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Investigations & Threat Hunting

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Palo Alto NGFW

Panorama

Cell Switch

Cell Switch

Cell Switch

Zone Switch

Zone Switch

Cell Switch

Cell Switch

SOC/DMZ

Policy Approval & Push3

Automated NGFW Policy Creation2

SIEM

Engineering Workstation

HMI

Controllers

1 CyberX Alert

CyberX Firewall Integration

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CyberX at a Glance

• Founded in 2013 by military cyber experts with nation-state expertise defending critical infrastructure

• HQ in Boston with R&D and Threat Intelligence teams in Israel

• Purpose-built OT security platform– Asset management, vulnerability & risk management, continuous threat monitoring

– Non-invasive, agentless technology utilizing patented behavioral analytics & self-learning

– Integrates with existing SOC workflows & security stack for unified IT/OT monitoring

• Partnerships & integrations with major security companies & MSSPs worldwide– IBM Security, Palo Alto Networks, Splunk, ServiceNow, CyberArk, ArcSight, …

– Optiv Security, DXC Technologies, AT&T, Wipro, Singtel, …

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ICS Zero-Day Vulnerabilities Discovered by CyberX

• https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-351-01: Buffer Overflow• https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-300-03A: Buffer Overflow

• https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-16-306-01: Buffer Overflow

• https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-16-026-02: Buffer Overflow• https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-17-087-02: Arbitrary File Upload, Buffer Overflow

• https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-17-278-01A: Buffer Overflow• https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-17-339-01D: Improper Input Valid. (DDoS)

• https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-228-01: Uncontrolled search path element

• Undisclosed RCE vulnerability in controller (vendor Y)

CyberX researched featured in Chapter 7

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CyberX Central Manager Corporate SOCCyberX SO

C Enablement Services

SIEM

TicketingSystem

CyberX Malware Analysis Sandbox

Service

CyberX Global ICS Threat Intelligence

Scalable Multi-Tier Architecture with Centralized Control

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“Mandiant recently responded to an incident at a critical infrastructure organization where an attacker deployed a

malware framework —which we call TRITON —designed to manipulate

Triconex Safety Instrumented System

(SIS) controllers.” FireEye, December 14

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CONFIDENTIAL

21Palo Alto Networks Proprietary and Confidential

The TRITON attack “was not designed to simply destroy data or shut down the plant … It was meant to sabotage

the firm’s operations and trigger an explosion.”The New York Times

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/technology/saudi-arabia-hacks-cyberattacks.html

Goal: Disable plant safety systems?Campaign: Connected to Shamoon attacks?

Who: Likely Iran with assistance from Russia or N. Korea?

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CONFIDENTIAL

L4 L3

L2

L1 L0

TRITON Cyberattack on Petrochemical Facility

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Steal OT credentials1

Deploy PC malware2 3

Install RAT in safety PLC4

Disable safety PLC & launch

2nd cyberattackTriStationProtocol

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For More Information

ICS & IIoT Security Knowledge Base• Threat & vulnerability research (Black Energy, etc.), transcripts from

SANS webinars, CyberX “Global ICS & IIoT Risk Report”, research presentations from Black Hat Europe

See Us at Upcoming Events• CS4CA Europe (Oct. 2-3, London) — NISD presentation• ICS Cyber Security Summit (Oct. 9-10, London)• Palo Alto Network IGNITE Europe (Oct. 8-10, Amsterdam)

– Featuring joint session with CISO of leading manufacturer• MANUSEC (Oct. 9-10, Chicago)• ICS Cyber Security Conference (Oct. 22-25, Atlanta)

– Free ½-day hands-on workshop with Palo Alto Networks & CyberX– Joint session with Emerson Automation Solutions: “ICS Security Researchers &

Automation Vendors: Building Mutual Trust”

• EU Utility Week (Nov. 6-8, Vienna) featuring CISO from EWZ Energy

CyberX vulnerability research featured in Chapter 7 — free

download from CyberX