impeachment defense

8/14/2019 impeachment defense

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ARTICLE I

RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD

MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE

ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS

SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A

MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT

The allegations contained in Article I of the impeachment should not be sustained

by the Impeachment Court since there is no factual nor legal basis to uphold the same.

The alleged betrayal of public trust through Chief Justice Corona’s track record

supposedly marked by partiality in favor of the Arroyo administration cannot hold water

when the prosecutors purposely select the “partial cases decided by the !upremeCourt with the mere regular participation of CJ Corona and disregarding the vote of the

latter to other cases not favoring the Arroyo administration. "n the “dubious

appointment as midnight appointee# the same is already settled in the case of $e

Castro v. Judicial and %ar Council &J%C' (.). *o. +,+--# April -# -+- where such

decision of the !upreme Court# in the e/ercise of its 0udicial function# must be

respected by the other co1e2ual branch.

Betrayal of P!l"# Tr$t t%ro&% CJ Coro'a($ Tra#) Re#or* Mar)e* By Part"al"ty

The complainants in the impeachment complaint allege that CJ Corona3s vote in

decisions affecting (4A constitute betrayal of public trust. *otably# CJ Corona did not

pen those decisions. It must be emphasi5ed that CJ Corona cannot be held accountable

for the outcome of cases before the !upreme Court which acts as a collegial tribunal.

%y mentioning the decisions and actions of the !upreme Court# complainants

demonstrate their lack of understanding of the concept of a collegial body like the

!upreme Court# where each member has a single vote.+

!ection +6# Article 7III of the +,89 Constitution states that:

Conclusions in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in

consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the

1 Answer to Verified Complaint for Impeachment, 12 December 2011.



opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the chief

Justice shall be issued .

This provision clearly embodies the concept of collegial body of the !upreme Court.

%efore a decision can be made# there must first be a consultation among the Justices. It

would be improbable# if not impossible# for CJ Corona to solely affect the decisions of

the court since there is a mandatory process of consultation with the Justices who shall

all deliberate the facts and the laws of the case. If CJ Corona did vote in favor of the

Arroyo administration# he did so because it was his duty to ad0udicate and to give his

own independent legal opinion on the case as a Justice of the !upreme Court. Also# his

vote cannot entirely affect the decision since he is only one person as opposed to the

ma0ority vote needed for a decision.

4oreover# !ection +; of the same Article provides that “the decision shall state clearly

and distinctively the facts and the law on which it is based. <ith this provision# it isdifficult to prove the allegations of the complainants that Corona is indeed bias because

the Constitution re2uires that every court decision must be supported by the correct

facts and laws. It would be hard to bend the clear mandate of the law 0ust to

accommodate a decision favoring the past administration. 4ore so# the Constitution is

crafted in such a way that safeguards from possible abuses are placed to protect the

sovereign from erring public officials.

D!"o$ a++o"'t,e't a$ M"*'"&%t A++o"'tee

The allegation of the complainants that the appointment of CJ Corona is

unconstitutional is already settled in the case of $e Castro v. Judicial and %ar Council

&J%C' (.). *o. +,+--# April -# -+-.

According to the ruling of the !upreme Court =n %anc in upholding the appointment of

CJ Corona# the prohibition under !ection +># Article 7II does not apply to appointments

to fill a vacancy in the !upreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

In the decision of the court, they made mention of the two constitutional provisions

that are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (!ecutive

"epartment#, provides for a $an in ma%ing appointments $y the president two

months immediately $efore the ne!t presidential elections and up to the end of his

term e!cept temporary appointments to e!ecutive positions when continued vacancies

therein will pre&udice pu$lic service or endanger pu$lic safety. The other, Section '



(1#, Article VIII (udicial "epartment#, states that any vacancy (in the Supreme

)ourt# shall $e filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

In resolving the conflict, the court too% notice of the allocation of the awesome

powers of government among the three great departments, the *egislative (Article

VI#, the !ecutive (Article VII#, and the udicial "epartments (Article VIII#

em$odied in the )onstitution. The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle

of separation of powers that underlies the political structure.

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and,

among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the

President. he presidential power o! appointment is dealt with in

"ections #$, #% and #& o! the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the

'udicial Department and de!ines the duties and (uali!ications o!

)embers o! the "upreme Court, among others. "ection $*#+ and "ection o! this Article are the provisions speci!ically providing !or the

appointment o! "upreme Court 'ustices. In particular, "ection states

that the appointment o! "upreme Court 'ustices can only be made by the

President upon the submission o! a list o! at least three nominees by the

'-C "ection $*#+ o! the Article mandates the President to !ill the

vacancy within / days !rom the occurrence o! the vacancy.

0ad the !ramers intended to extend the prohibition contained in "ection

#%, Article VII to the appointment o! )embers o! the "upreme Court,

they could have explicitly done so. hey could not have ignored themeticulous ordering o! the provisions. hey would have easily and

surely written the prohibition made explicit in "ection #%, Article VII as

being e(ually applicable to the appointment o! )embers o! the "upreme

Court in Article VIII itsel!, most li1ely in "ection $ *#+, Article VIII. hat

such speci!ication was not done only reveals that the prohibition against

the President or Acting President ma1ing appointments within two

months be!ore the next presidential elections and up to the end o! the

President2s or Acting President2s term does not re!er to the )embers o!

the "upreme Court.

The pronouncement made by the Court in this case is a valid e/ercise of 0udicial review.

It is the power of the courts to test the validity of e/ecutive and legislative acts in light of

their conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts

over the other departments# but merely an e/pression of the supremacy of the

Constitution. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is



upheld. And the !upreme Court simply upheld the duty of the ?resident to appoint a

Justice in case of vacancy.

!ettled is the rule that a co1e2ual branch of the government must respect the official

duties and functions of the other branch. The doctrine of separation of powers

according to Justice @aurel is intended to secure action# to forestall overaction# to

prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency.6 *o other branch must meddle with the legal

e/ercise of official function of another branch. The Judiciary is an independent

department of the government who has a mind of its own. Considered as court of last

resort.# it cannot afford to be incomplete at any time. ;

To 2uestion the decision of the !upreme Court shall run in contrast with the doctrine of

separation of powers enunciated by the Constitution. And without independence and

integrity# courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor

as champions of 0ustice.>

4oreover# another safeguard of the Constitution in avoiding the appointment to be the

sole discretion of the ?resident is the creation of the Judicial and %ar Council who shall

be responsible for the nomination of at least three nominees. The provision would curb

the singling out of the choice on a particular Justice.

It should also be noted that on the same provision# the Constitution provides that

vacancy for the lower courts shall be filled within ninety days from the submission of the

list of nominees. <hile the appointment of the members of the !upreme shall be made

for every vacancy. The provision relating to !upreme Court members has no2ualification as to the time of appointment.

The filing up of vacancies in the Judiciary is for the interest of the public and there is a

showing of compelling reason to 0ustify the issuance of the appointment during the

period of the alleged ban. *o other than the Chief Justice of the !upreme Court retired

and the need to replace the Chief’s place is of public necessity to uphold the integrity of

the Court.

2 Antonio B. Nachura, utline re!iewer in political law, 200", citing An#ara ! $lectoral

Commission, %& 'hil. 1&".& Isa#ani Cru(, Constitutional )aw. 2d ed. *.C.+ Central )awboo 'ub., 2000, citin#

'an#asinan -rasportation Co. !. 'C, /0 , th upp./upra at note 2 upra at note &.% ection ", Article VIII, 1"3 Constitution.



The appointment prescribed for the 0udiciary is intended to “de1politici5e the courts of

0ustices# ensure the choice of competent 0udges# and fill e/isting vacancies as soon as

possible so as not to unduly disrupt 0udicial proceedings.

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