Impact of Socioeconomic Development on Regime Stability in Brazil

1964 Transition from Democratic Regime to Military Dictatorship

Felipe Bianchi

Student Number: S2620189

Master’s Thesis

MSc. Public Administration – International and European Governance

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Leiden University

The Hague, The Netherlands

Supervisor: Dr. K. Suzuki

Words: 18809

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Abstract

The current state of existing research shows strong empirical evidence for the influence of the

socioeconomic development of a country and its society on the stability of its regime.

Nevertheless, previous research so far has examined the two aspects of development – social

as well as economic – separately and has not developed an all-encompassing theoretical model

that could explain the entirety of the underlying mechanisms. This research contributes to the

state of the research by filling this gap and enquiring how socioeconomic development affects

regime stability. The study focuses mainly on the developing and testing of hypotheses

concerning the causal chain of societal and governmental reactions towards the socioeconomic

development of a country. Therefore, it takes the unique case of the fall of Brazilian democracy

in 1964 as its unit of analysis. Research suggests causal symptomatology of a low

socioeconomic development and regime destabilisation that links it to the governmental ability

to adapt to the cultural and institutional environment at stake. Especially for the coups d'état to

occur, a vicious circle of series of economic declines and varying governmental answers to

tackle the former in a short period, leading to an insurmountable entrenchment between the

political camps, had to arise. The present research on this topic built and developed on previous

research presents a triangulation, hence a combined theoretical framework taking the former

causal conditions as central for a regime instability to occur and moves outside the generally

presented conclusion of political science on the case of the regime transition in Brazil.

Keywords

socioeconomic development, regime stability, institutional coherence, cultural congruence

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Contents List of Acronyms 4

1. Introduction 5

2. Theoretical Framework 9 2.1 Current State of the Art 9 2.2. Contribution to the current Level of Knowledge 17

3. Research Design 19

3.1 Process Tracing 19

3.2 Case Selection 20

3.3. Operationalisation 21

3.4 Data 24

4. Findings 26

4.1 Context and Examination of the Proposed Mechanisms 26

4.1.1 Context of the Socioeconomic Development 26

4.1.2 Institutional and Societal Aspects 35

4.2 Alternative Mechanism Proposed in the Literature 43

5. Analysis 46

5.1 Assumptions by Literature 46

5.2 Alternative Assumption 50

6. Conclusion 51 6.1 Limitations and Future Directions 53

Bibliography 55 Appendix 67

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List of Acronyms

AEB - Anuário Estatístico Brasileiro

BNDES - Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social

FUNAG - Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão

IBGE - Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística

IPEA - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Applicada

JFK - John F. Kennedy

LBJ - Lyndon B. Johnson

SUDENE - Superintendência de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste

SUMOC - Superinterdência da Moeda e do Crédito

Parties:

PCB - Partido Comunista Brasileiro

PSD - Partido Social Democratico

PSP - Partido Social Popular

PTB - Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro

PTN - Partido Trabalhista Nacional

UDN - União Democratica Nacional

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1. Introduction

Since the German Historical School of Economics, with Max Weber as its figurehead and the

post-war school of Seymour Martin Lipset in the 1950s, political science has been concerned

with the question of the prerequisites for stable regimes. Scholars of this school have concluded

that the stability of regimes is affected by cultural and institutional conditions that are the

outcome of socioeconomic development (Griffith et al., 1956; Lipset, 1959; Schumpeter, 2010;

Weber, 1946). This view remains vital in contemporary research, as strong empirical and

statistical evidence has identified a strong correlation between the level of socioeconomic

development and the likelihood for regime destabilisation to occur (Goldstone et al., 2010;

Grimm & Leininger, 2012; Sheafer & Shenhav, 2012; Tomini & Wagemann, 2018). In this

sense, scholarship has suggested a causal relationship between the level of socioeconomic

development a country experiences and its effect on cultural and institutional evolution and, in

turn, its impact on the stability of a regime.

However, an explanation of the chain of causation remains to be composed. The present

explanation is relatively limited, given its simplification of the dynamics of the processes at

play (Tomini & Wagemann, 2018:712). Following examinations of the variables of the causal

chain from previous studies, which theorised causality of the destabilisation of regimes using

different units of analysis, the explanations attain more strength when the various causes are

combined into one overarching mechanism.

The most prevalent mechanism, based on the historical school, explains a positive (and

likewise negative) relationship between the variables ‘socioeconomic development’ and

‘regime stability’ by highlighting their reciprocal interference and the role of society and

institutions as intermediaries (Griffith et al., 1956; Lipset, 1959; Piketty, 2013; Schumpeter,

2010; Wallerstein, 1980; Weber, 1946). Furthermore, this school argues that economic

development stimulates the emergence of new classes that produce divergent values in society.

Hence, the extent to which a regime remains stable depends upon the effectiveness of its ability

to respond and adapt to societal preferences.

The contemporary school, in contrast, picks up the debility of the historical school to

analyse the internal and external factors shaping regimes (Goldstone et al., 2010).

Contemporary-school analysis is based on a three-stage time horizon where the interplay of

government and citizens is affected by three socioeconomic conditions: international exchange,

in time, affecting stability and, in some cases, the transition of a regime, which produces further

instability. Additionally, the contemporary school highlights the impact of the regime’s

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characteristics on its durability under the same conditions presented above. The logic is that

depending on the firmness of a government (democracies to successfully mediate between

actors or autocracies to successfully suppress movements), a country experiences more

instability when a regime is characterised as a semi-form (neither fully democratic nor fully

autocratic).

Although the level of socioeconomic development plays a statistically proven role in

modifying culture and institutions and consequently regime destabilisation, it remains unclear

how these features of the causal mechanism operate within one framework. Indeed, context is

an essential determinant for unravelling the causal process of the internal and external factors

at play. However, until now, no contemporary scholarship has empirically assembled the puzzle

of theoretical frameworks, offering an encompassing explanation for regime destabilisation to

occur (Tomini & Wagemann, 2018:712).

This study contributes to the completion of an overall theoretical framework with the

goal of answering the research question of how socioeconomic development affects regime

stability. A critical moment in Brazilian history that has not yet been analysed under these

theoretical conditions is assessed: the fall of its democracy in 1964 and the beginning of 21years

of military dictatorship. Central to this research is developing and testing hypotheses about the

causal mechanism of how culture and institutions are affected by and react to the dynamics of

socioeconomic change.

A process-tracing method is used in a narrative form that attempts to reconstruct and

sufficiently provide an answer to the causal dynamical mechanism of socioeconomic evolution

and its effect on the regime stability of a Latin American country (i.e., democratic breakdown).

This research hypothesises that both institutional and cultural evolution is initiated by

socioeconomic evolution, which in the long run challenges the stability of the regime at stake.

The responsiveness and adaptability of the regime towards the preferences of the actors in the

policy arena is vital. The condition of a regime is also crucial, affecting decisions over its

durability, that is, whether a current regime should continue or transition. Historical and modern

scholarship on the subject is incomplete. This research aims to fill this gap, providing an

explanation for the case of Brazil through a deductive method.

The coup of 1964 can be characterised as the accumulation of societal and

developmental economic divergences since the establishment of Brazilian democracy in 1946

(see i.e.: Green et al., 2018; Tomini & Wagemann, 2018). Initiated and performed by the

military, the coup was influenced by the differing preferences of the actors in the policy arena

(McCann, 1980; Stepan, 2015). The conservative and prosperous elite and the military were on

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one side, and the leftist working and impecunious rural class were on the other. The democratic

regime was unable to counter these developments (see Tables 7-9). Although the government’s

financial packages attempted to realise the Brazilian motto of Ordem e Progresso (order and

progress) and were determined to stimulate and equalise Brazilian socioeconomic development,

the regime could not stop the chain of causality (Presidência da República, 2011). Constant

switches in presidents with associated changes in the form of the economy, as well as the

growing emergence of social unrest, led the country into a socioeconomic crisis. Differing from

other research, this case examines mounting pressures, such as unprecedented migratory

movements, that evoked a military intervention. Previous research simply ascribed the reason

for the end of Brazilian democracy only to economic reasons, à la Lipset, without further

analysing societal or institutional components within these processes (Wallerstein, 1980).

Moreover, considering that Brazil experienced several regime destabilisations and

transitions in previous decades, this analysis highlights the multichain relationship between

socioeconomic aspects and regimes. Furthermore, this study considers societal and institutional

receptivity in the case of the military coup in 1964, which is distinctive in Brazilian history.

This case chiefly details the obstacles government and society faced in confronting

socioeconomic decline in light of attempted and implemented manoeuvres to tackle the crises

that were precursors to the coup.

The uniqueness of this case and reason for its selection is because key institutional and

societal processes leading to the end of the democracy are well-documented. These sources

yield a richness of supporting insights for the analysis of this case. Access to prior data, such

as government reports, programmes and proposals, as well as statistical and general institutional

data stored in government archives, is facilitated via online accessible governmental archives

such as the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) (Brazilian Institute of

Geography and Statistics), the Banco Central do Brazil, the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral

(Superior Electoral Court); the Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies); the Ministério

da Economia (Federal Ministry of Economics); the Presidência da República (Presidency of

the Republic); the BNDES – Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social

(National bank for Economic and Social Development); the IPEA - Instituto de Pesquisa

Econômica Applicada (Institute of Applied Economic Research) and the FUNAG – Fundação

Alexandre de Gusmão.

In addition to primary data, secondary data is applied, such as survey data provided and

categorised by research and governmental agencies, including the Brazilian Development Bank

(BNDES). The use of multiple data sources helps prevent selection bias through the

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triangulation of a comprehensive and diverse data set. The structure of this research is as

follows. The thesis begins with a review of the literature on the topic of socioeconomic

development, highlighting the need for a triangulation of theories to sufficiently embrace the

mechanisms at play. Furthermore, this section evolves the central argument of the combined

historical and modern research, indicating a causal chain rooted in socioeconomic development

affecting institutional and societal reactions leading to regime stabilisations or destabilisations.

Subsequently, the study specifies the research design, data collection and operationalisation,

providing extensive justification for the selection of the case of the transition from democracy

to military dictatorship, as well as a specification of the limits arising from this case. The

operationalisation section examines both statistical and empirical evidence, providing

information concerning the localisation of the data used. In the following part, a concise

introduction to Brazilian democracy before the military coup under institutional, economic and

societal terms, is presented along a timeframe of the years 1946–1964 to highlight the key

factors critical to this case. Afterwards, the research constructs an empirical narrative by

analysing the triangulated theoretical frameworks with historical evidence. Finally, the research

presents the results of the analysis and provides a conclusion.

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2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Current State of the Art

Socioeconomic Development. Vital for any political regime is to maintain stability and remain

unaffected by destabilising internal and external factors. Accordingly, ever since the Lipset

school, a growing body of literature has investigated the causes of regime destabilisation and

its underlying causal mechanisms.

The basis of this academic premise is that socioeconomic development has a significant

influence on the stability of a regime, assuming it to be the key driver for shifts in the form of

government to occur (Lipset, 1959). The Lipset school focused on two principal characteristics

of societal systems representing rather complex problems; the socioeconomic development of

a country and the degree of legitimacy the leading government enjoys (Lipset, 1959:71).

Following this argument, the form of government closely relates to the degree and stage of

economic development of a country. Thus, the better developed a country in economic aspects,

the greater the likelihood for a democratic form of government to emerge or the more stable a

democracy. In contrast, the less developed a country, the more likely an autocratic form of

government to emerge, and the more stable the autocracy. Generally, the theory assumes that a

certain degree of increase for both wealth and education is required, for political movements

aiming for a political amendment, to arise, that in turn might challenge the stability of a regime

(Griffith et al., 1956; Lipset, 1959).1

Arguably, economic development is closely connected to societal issues such as the

political culture at stake, and the link between civil society and the state, that in association to

the economic prosperity of a nation, evolutes and influences the form of government. The more

prosperous the economy, the likelier the rise in the education level, and the turn into a more

democratic form of political culture. The former goes along a societal or class reform, as an

emerging middle class aims for more political participation. Research pinpoints to a suction

effect that initiates migratory movements, hence stimulating urbanisation, which in turn

disorders the societal structure at stake. Following this logic, former leading classes, such as

the aristocracy or bourgeoisie, were increasingly challenged in their initial position by

emancipatory movements of the lower classes. Central to this logic is the impact of

1 Note that an increase in economic well-being is a necessary condition for movements to arise. Also, the case of an economic decrease might stimulate the volume of a political crisis (see Griffith, et al., 1956; Lipset, 1959; Nielsen, 2016, Weber, 1994).

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socioeconomic development chiefly on the middle and lower classes, as for them an increase

or betterment in essential factors, such as their income level or the overall education rate, is

larger than for better-established classes.2 Essential at this point are studies finding that lower

classes (characterised by workers, staff and undereducated citizens) tend to favour more

extremist parties due to their underprivileged circumstances. The emerging middle class, in

contrast, acts as a moderate, democracy-favouring and promoting group (Lipset, 1959,

Van Keersbergen & Vis, 2014:75). Thus, aristocracy and bourgeoisie summed up as the group

of elites represent a more non-democracy-promoting or favouring class. In his research, Bermeo

(2003) highlighted the importance of elites and their preferences, as well as their nexus with

the political regime at stake, crucially affecting the stability of a regime. Researchers such as

Brooker (2000) present evidence that the likelihood for autocratic regimes to emerge is higher

if an authoritarian culture is or was present in the respective country. Hence, the role of elites

and their preferences for or against a democratic process and their cultural linkages is not to

underestimate key drivers in explaining regime instabilities. Likewise, the progressive

involvement of civil society, hence the degree of politicisation, emerging through

socioeconomic development and welfare, is another determinant for regime transitions.

However, this process requires a substantial length of time, on average (Tilly, 2007). History

reveals plenty of evidence that the formerly described class restructuring promotes the

emergence of civil society, as shown by voluntary organisations, reinforcing the relationship

between citizens and the political class.3

Capitalism. The original assumption of Lipset included the conditions of capitalism for

democratic development in his research, which was first developed by Max Weber (Weber,

1994:19). Weber concluded that capitalism and democracy were elements concentrating into a

unique self-reinforcing complex (Nielsen, 2016). The rudimentary explanation was that

capitalism led to economic development, which consequently stimulated the emergence of the

mental, as well as the means of the foundation of modern men. The result was the rise of the

self-established class of the Burghers (in German: Bürger) as the first form of a middle class

advocating for its emancipatory participation in politics (Lipset, 1959:85; Schumpeter,

2010:110). Entrepreneurialism, together with the rules of Protestantism, emphasised the

responsibility of the individual and focused on austere living standards establishing the

2 In 1789 France, the drastically imbalanced socioeconomic discrepancy among the first and second classes, standing with the third, led to the rise of a revolution destabilising and ending the thousand-year-old monarchy (Lüthy, 1955; Sée, 1950). 3 The so-called Vereinsgründungen in Germany of the 19th century and emerging industrialisation were preconditions for the later establishment of political parties enabling the political participation of the lower and middle classes at the end of the century. This scenario led to the first German Republic in 1918, in consequence of a drastic deterioration in socioeconomic matters after World War I (Hein in Gall, 1993; Hoffmann, 2003).

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foundation of a continuous rise in the socioeconomic conditions as well as of modern

democracy (Barbalet, 2008; Lipset, 1959:85; Nielsen, 2016; Schumpeter, 2010:111).4

Nevertheless, Weber concluded that differences in the rise of any form of government

strongly depend on important historical events leading to a different set of outcomes. Hence a

range of Anglo-Protestant countries required no revolution, whereas for other countries

revolutions have been a precondition to overthrow an undemocratic form of government

(Lipset, 1959:72). Additionally, Weber assumed specific aspects to be central issues to

maintaining the democratic form intact, such as capitalism. However, for capitalism to exist,

following his definition, it requires as a precondition that property is privately owned, and

maximisable by its owners.

Works of Adam Smith and David Ricardo concluded that if goods and services are

characterised as property, their maximisation required the division of labour and the reduction

of trade limitations, hence a widening of the market and the establishment of a jurisdictional

frame for the owners. The larger the market, the more exchange, the higher the level of

production. That is, the higher the economic growth, the more people are concerned with the

protection of their property, and the more they aim for political involvement (Barbalet, 2008;

Ruffin, 2002). History has shown that through the introduction of modern capitalism and the

degradation of trade barriers, the industrial revolution was encouraged. The former resulted in

the long run in an overall increase of GDP, namely to an increase in the economic evolution of

the countries in the northern hemisphere, but also to the establishment of constitutions granting

its citizens increasing participation in politics (Lipset, 1959; Piketty, 2013). In sum, this

continuous interaction between the participants of the market and its institutions in a capitalist

surrounding, produced in a coordination process new regime.

Nevertheless, the theoretical framework of this school remains to explain how internal

and external factors affect the preferences of the actors involved. The quasi-alike evolutionary

characterisation à la Darwin, presented by this school, requires the inclusion of institutional and

societal factors to sufficiently explain the influence of modern capitalism and the high degree

of network complexity and its effect on regime stability or destabilisation (Tomini &

Wagemann, 2018; Witt, 1987).

The role of conflicts. Contemporary research following Lipset’s theory (see Grimm &

Leininger, 2012) focused on intrinsic and extrinsic factors shaping the influence of conflicting

objectives in the context of the assumption that socioeconomic development had a direct

4 The most famous example of self-ruling Burgher states are the cities of the Hanse that established the first form of a globalised trade network. A first network of free republican cities surrounded by monarchic regimes promoted an alternative form of government. It is no coincidence that most of the revolutions found their point of origin in cities of free Burghers.

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influence on the prioritisation of the actors in the political arena that affected regime firmness

(Grimm & Leininger, 2012:400; Lipset, 1959:103). According to the literature, intrinsic factors

refer to conflicting democratic objectives with one another, such as the degree of free and fair

elections vs the negotiation of power-sharing. In contrast, extrinsic factors refer to conflicting

objectives of political regimes with other influential policy goals, such as a regime’s and

society’s democratisation vs the increase of social or economic development. For instance,

governments might prioritise economic development over improving the democratic integration

of its citizens.

Crucial for the emergence of conflicts is the degree of development a country has

enjoyed so far. The research assumes that in the case of rising socioeconomic discrepancies

between the classes, it is likelier for the prospering group to vote for a respective political

supporter and promote democratic forms of government because both intrinsic and extrinsic

goals are met. In contrast, for underdeveloped and less-flourishing classes, the idea of an

alternative form of democracy that promises improvements – here intrinsic and extrinsic factors

are not met by the government (see election divergences) – becomes more appealing (Lipset,

1959; Schumpeter, 2010). Hence, the degree of (a) conflict within a country, (b) development

a country has enjoyed so far and (c) response of a political regime towards a conflict, under

socioeconomic and political pressures, as well as matters of the prioritisation of the actors, all

play a vital role in the durability of the political landscape (Grimm & Leininger, 2012:403).

Figure 1: Relationship observed.

Regime Stability. Following the definition of researchers such as Hurwitz (1973) and

Kaufmann et al. (2009), regime stability is defined as the capability of a regime to respond

efficiently towards emerging internal and external factors threatening their authority solidity;

or as the likelihood that a regime is destabilised or ended through revolutionary or military

actions.

Thus, research focused on two major hypotheses to explore the reasoning for stable and

unstable regimes, under the premise of socioeconomic influence. The first assumption of the

research is that (I) political stability is affected by institutional coherence (Sheafer & Shenhav,

2012:233-34; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The logic is that the stability of any regime is

affected by the degree of consistency and legitimacy an institution enjoys concerning the

Conflicts in a country

The degree of

development

The regime at stake

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emergence of a crisis and opposition in consequence of the governmental adaptability and

responsiveness towards these issues (Gates et al., 2006:907). Goldstone et al. (2010) visualised

their findings in a U-shaped structure where each end represents either a democracy or an

autocracy. The researchers took as their reference point, overlapping events occurring within a

country, but also the durability or longevity of a regime, to demonstrate (through sequencing)

the complexity of political stability or instability (Goldstone et al., 2010:192). Following their

logic, (a) a democratic regime is capable of adjustment and of preventing conflict, whereas (b)

an autocratic regime represses conflict between the government and the people, and both regime

styles, despite their form, are equally successful in establishing their authority. The (c) semi-

form of either a democracy or an autocracy, represented in an overall u-shape, is confronted

with only partial repression (autocracies); or with governments being unable to adjust policies

to the will of the people (democracies). Accordingly, the lack of a legitimised Hobbes’

Leviathan as a central, all-encompassing institution, centralising the power structure in one

government or person, is missing, resulting in an imbalance of the stately legitimacy

(Hobbes et al., 1651/2005). Further risk of political instability is additionally given in the

transition stage of one government type to another (Epstein et al., 2006). Additionally, the

literature focused on critical determinants such as the durability of regimes or the number of

regime changes lead to the regime destabilisations, to make the u-shape framework more

feasible.

This research includes the u-shape framework, established by Goldstone et al. (2010),

yet applies its own (yet extended) theoretical assumption to visualise the proposed obstacle (see

Graph 1). The x-axis represents the form of government, whereas y represents the degree of

stability a government enjoys, hence if x = 1 and y = 1 a democracy enjoys the full authority, if

x = −1 and y = −1 an autocracy enjoys full authority. The overall u-shape represents a semi-

form of either a democracy or an autocracy. According to the literature, ‘political stability is

anchored in institutional consistency’ (Gates et al., 2006:907). The estimation of a

government’s legitimacy depends solely on the degree of assertiveness it possesses; this

research uses electoral data and its respective outcome, and the number of coups, hence the

number of regimes and their durations, and the domestic conflict rate to explain whether the

democratic form of government was characterisable as stable, thus as a fully democratic regime,

or as a semi regime.

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Graph 1: U-Shape Curve.

The (II) assumption is concerned with the impact of the culture or the ‘cultural

congruence’ on regime stability (Shaefer & Shenav, 2012:235). Almost six decades ago,

Almond and Verba first introduced the concept of ‘cultural congruence’ as an influencing

component of politics. Ever since, literature highlighted an evident correlation between the

prevalent cultural landscape of society and the permanence of a regime (Ingelhart & Baker,

2000; Shaefer & Shenav, 2012:235). Although the theoretical basis foresaw a political

orientation to precisely shape a regimes durability, modern literature extended the horizon

towards emancipatory values or the index of freedom, as well as the degree to which citizens

are willing and able to assert their orientations (Shaefer & Shenav, 2012; Welzel, 2013; Welzel

& Dalton, 2014). The research allocates the concept of emancipation in the empowerment

process of humankind. As such, citizens becoming commanders of themselves, strive for more

liberty and democratic values. Citizens show a greater affinity to challenge prevalent hierarchy

systems and show greater empathy to contribute to a harmonisation of the political culture at

stake if the socioeconomic conditions improve. In short, the degree of politicisation or the

degree to which citizens are politicised depends on the socioeconomic development of a country

and the ability of a regime to confront or adapt to the former. Analogously, undemocratic

systems, are increasingly challenged by endogenous processes, affecting the evolution of

politics, society and economics (Goldstone et al., 2010; Shaefer & Shenav, 2012; Wejnert,

2014).

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1

1,2

-1,5 -1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5

U-CURVE

15

The diffusion of the value orientation is characterised, by researchers such as Tomini

and Wagemann (2018) or Rochon (1998:10), as a two-speed process; first, as an explosive and

quickly devolving process through revolutions or social unrest; and second, as a deliberate

process over generations. However, for diffusion to occur a process of cultural innovation

initiating a societal evolutionary process making democratic processes possible is required.

Hence, for democratic values to emerge, citizens require an increase in communication

technologies to facilitate the exchange of information, yet this presupposes an increase in

economy and education. In this sense, the population has to experience development in their

socioeconomic well-being first to develop new political interests and secondly have ways to

communicate with like-minded to create a movement (see Deutsch & Welzel, 2016). The

underlying assumption is the necessity of a government to be legitimised or seen as legitimate

to enjoy authority fully, but also to be consistent with the value set of its citizens to realise the

former (Inglehart & Baker, 2000:186).

Taking the former in respect to the u-shape structure proposed in assumption (I),

democracies that lack efficient and necessary democratic participation or autocracies unable to

prevent reforms, or to open themselves for the latter, promote the indirect destabilisation of

their authority.

In addition to assumptions (I) and (II), Tomini and Wagemann (2018:709) developed a

chart that characterises regime destabilisation as either opposition- or crisis-based.

Table 1: Forms of Threats (Tomini & Wagemann, 2018:709).

Central to understanding the rationale is the distinction between internal and external threats

that shape the outcome of the destabilisation. Internal threats refer to destabilisation caused by

governmental reactions towards the emergence of opposition in a crisis. Important here, as

described above, is the strength and adaptability of a government to find a suitable answer to

conflicting objectives. Depending on the solution presented, the government either solves a

crisis and disempowers an opposition or strengthens both the opposition and the crisis. A

different, external threat refers to regime destabilisation caused by a disloyal opposition

attempting to gain power through a coup d'état or a military intervention in a crisis against an

Opposion

Crisis

Forms of Threat Basis of Threat

Internal External

Government reaction towards crisis

Government reaction towards opposition

Disloyal Opposition

Military intervention against inept government

16

inept government (Tomini & Wagemann, 2018). According to both historical and contemporary

research, the likelihood for the simultaneous emergence of both external and internal threats is

possible but unproven (see Lipset, 1959; Tomini & Wagemann, 2018).

However, in respect to the debate concerned with regime destabilisations, apart from

Lipset’s school, theorists such as Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) concluded a reversed causal

assumption, taking democracy as a necessary condition for economic development, hence as an

indicator for regime stability. Although both authors, similar to Lipset, assume a divergence in

the emergence and durability of regimes along the northern and southern hemisphere, they

differ in their reasoning. The opposing school presumes a causal connection between the

resource richness or poorness of a country, hence the necessity to produce wealth, and the

stability of a regime. In this logic, countries of the northern hemisphere have tended to stand

for more stable democracies in the past, whereas countries of the southern hemisphere stood for

more unstable democracies. In their latest work, they have extended the former by the firmness

of the constitutions at play, which overarches the Lipsian and contemporary school, assuming

the constitutional framework to be a necessary component of regime destabilisation.

Nevertheless, this contemporary school fails to highlight the significant influence of the social,

economic or cultural interplay within the regime destabilisation processes. In comparison,

Lipset and his school depicted the socio-philosophical foundation of the German Historical

School of Economics, which detected a causal relationship between the socioeconomic

evolution and its irretrievable effect on society and institutions affecting regime stability

(Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Nielsen, 2016; Weber, 1994:19).

Table 2: Theoretical mechanisms presented and proposed in the literature explaining regime destabilisation as a causal mechanism of three components.

Altogether the body of literature on regime stability assumes that the socioeconomic

development, including its evolutionary effect on social and institutional aspects, is the variable

Social

Depending on the enjoyed degree of development and the social standing,

emergence of opposition or support for the regime at stake.

Mechanism Explanation

Socio-Economic Development Affect on the evolution of society and institutions

Governmental Institutional coherence and cultural

congruence

17

most significantly correlated to regime stabilisation or destabilisation. Nevertheless, research

has only presented evidence separately, excluding either economic or social developmental

factors that shape regime stability. The literature has not empirically elaborated the proposed

composition of both the historical and the contemporary theoretical puzzle (Grimm &

Leininger, 2012:409; Tomini & Wagemann, 2018:712). The next paragraph develops an

extensive argument for the approach to account for this omission.

2.2 Contribution to the current Level of Knowledge

The core of this research assumes a socioeconomic impact on regime stability, that is, an

explanation for institutional change conditioned by societal and economic facets. To extend the

state-of-the-art science, the research on institutional change and regime stability might benefit

significantly from a theory triangulation. This triangulation combines Lipset’s findings with

theories of the modern school concerned with internal as well as external factors at the macro

level, creating a broader picture and providing more evidence to support Lipset’s conclusions.

This multi-facet framework offers a comprehensive explanation of the interplay of a multitude

of institutional, economic and civil society actors in the context of regime stability and

destabilisation. Previous literature concerned with proving Lipset’s findings focused more on

democratic promotion without explicitly including a general aspect of regime destabilisation

and regime transitions.

Why is it more likely for one country to have a more stable form of government, whereas

another country such as Brazil faced a series of unstable regimes? Arguably, this phenomenon

roots in (1) the divergence in socioeconomic developments, (2) different reactions of

governments towards the influence of socioeconomic evolution on its economy, society and

politics, and (3) institutional coherence and cultural congruence at stake, which develops

differently in each country, stimulating the proposed causal chain (de-)stabilising regimes.

It is most apparent that in connection to the aforementioned extensions of Lipset’s

theory, a more vital linkage between regime shifts that are initiated by socioeconomic matters

is at play. In this sense, research indicating a change in economic matters has its focal point on

determinants such as GDP development, inflation rate and growth rates of sectorial production,

as well as the number of government interventions in the market and the implications this had

on the economy. Nevertheless, focusing on the development of an economy requires more than

the number of telephones or the degree of urbanisation to estimate socioeconomic development

and discrepancies in a country. Arguably, growth rates such as education, literacy, income or

18

the violence rate, and evidence concerned with the electoral evolution create a more

comprehensive picture (see Piketty, 2013). Piketty argues that growth rates of at least 1% are

vital for societal change to arise; consequently, societies not experiencing such a growth rate

(or less than 1%) as prevailing conditions remain almost the same (Piketty, 2013:133-34).

The present study attempts to close the theoretical gap and combine past research on

societal and economic development with research focused on institutional studies to find a

reasonable answer for regimes shifts. Past academic literature failed to present concluding

reasoning for Brazil to experience this vicious circle of changing regimes, the turn from

democracies towards autocracies and vice-versa. Research on Brazil either explained the

socioeconomic discrepancies in the classes or attempted to explain the end of the Brazilian

democracy in 1964 via a reduction to pure economic reasoning, excluding socioeconomic

factors central for the macro explanation of the causal mechanism. Consequently, previous

schools on this topic provided a rather vague argumentation that required a stronger focus on

both social as well as economic aspects to explain the ongoings in Brazilian politics, especially

from 1946–1964 that this research takes as its core. Particularly with the Brazilian case, this

research attempts to (1) instrumentalise the formerly established combination of theories to

provide a sustainable explanation for Brazilian politics and its instability in regimes (see 2.1),

and (2) improve and to amplify the current assumptions of research taking socioeconomic

development and its effect on society and institutions into a reciprocal causal chain as a

precondition for regime stability or destabilisation to occur. Similar to previous research, this

study analyses these processes in a short time horizon to estimate the real development of a

regime under the assumed causal chain of socioeconomic development and its influence on

society and institutions. Therefore, the examination of real growth rates and social evolutions

that differ from analysis over a long time horizon better explain regime shifts.

19

3. Research Design

3.1 Process Tracing This research investigates how the independent variable socioeconomic development

contributes to the outcome of regime stability or destabilisation by deliberately selecting the

fall of Brazilian democracy in 1964 – in this case the understanding of the causal contribution

of socioeconomic development to the military coup, hence the regime destabilisation.

To fulfil this investigative analysis, this research follows an explanatory outcome case-

centric process-tracing design (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Beach & Pedersen, n.d.:7-9). The

design purposefully aims to present a convincing explanation for a multichain-caused outcome

in a context-specific case (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Toskhov, 2016). Respectively, the research

starts with hypothetically deductive theory testing to extract plausible causal chains that might

explain the outcome in our case regime destabilisation; followed by the establishment of

hypotheses and the exploration of evidence to test and falsify the former. In the following

second part, the research utilises an inductive approach of quasi theory building – in this case,

the completion of theory puzzles to one general theory – exploring empirical as well as

statistical evidence for a narrative building and concludes the existence of a causal chain. It

combines theories to confront the risk of minimal sufficiency, due to a singular theorised causal

chain taking un-systematic mechanisms into account, in an iterative explanatory research

design. Hence sufficiency is given, if no other aspects then those assumed by the theory,

accounts for the outcome5 (Beach & Pedersen, n.d.:9).

In general, the period of Brazilian democracy since 1946 requires a periodisation, rather

than a simple enumeration of events that characterised this period. The periodisation framework

provides a sequential analysis of multiple facets to reproduce the correlation of economic,

societal and political factors that explain the regime transition of a democratically elected

government to a military autocracy. The former requires a fundamental analysis of the

socioeconomic development and the governmental and societal reaction towards it.

Consequently, it is crucial to analyse the preponderant processes that led to the coup in 1964

that ended the democracy. The narrative presented in this research is primarily focused on the

cause and effect of socioeconomic development on regime stability, hence confronts causal

inference by including different variables, such as cultural and institutional aspects into account

to create a higher degree of robustness.

5 This research understands causal chains as an interrelated mechanism requiring the collaboration of the individual components to produce an outcome, in our case – regime destabilisation. In the case that one component of the causal chain is missing, we expect a different outcome to arise.

20

3.2 Case Selection

On 31 March 1964, the military under the lead of General Castelo Branco, undertook a coup

d'état, ending the Brazilian Democracy of 1946 (Fausto, 2006; Folha de São Paulo. b., 1964).

The first permanent military autocracy in Brazilian history was a coup resulting from several

factors and involving multiple groups, including the institutional components of the leading

parties, the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), the Partido Social Democratico (PSB), and

the Partido União Democrático Nacional (UDN). Moreover, pressures included the rivalry

between president and congress, the economic components of the governmental stimulus

packages, such as the ‘Plano das Metas’, ‘Sudene’, the Alliance for Progress, the ‘Plano

Trienal’, and the switches in the economic system, but also the social aspect of rising

discrepancies among the classes, the first-ever mass migration in Brazilian history and the clash

of elites, military and conservatives with the urban, as well as rural farmers and the working

class. The coup and the military regime that followed influence Brazilian society and politics

to this day.

The case of the fall of Brazilian democracy was selected as the central case for this

research as it entails detailed and crucial information regarding the socioeconomic components

that affect regime stability. Research on the Brazilian democracy before the coup provides a

chance to explain the most prevalent mechanisms at stake that led to the end of a Western

democracy in post-war times, allowing for the forecast of future developments in other

democracies. It is perplexing that solely the military, yet no other institutional or societal actor,

undertook the coup and established a permanent autocracy, although the military represented

the guarantor of democracy in previous military interventions throughout the democracy since

1946 (Fausto, 2006; Green et al., 2018; McCann, 1980; Stepan, 2015). Additionally, this case

might be comparable to other military coups d'état at first sight, yet the Brazilian case is unique,

in both its history, as well as internationally, as the coup itself was in conformance with the

constitution6. Given state-of-the-art literature that suggests socioeconomic development is the

core for explaining regime stability or instability, the case of Brazil’s regime transition in the

1960s best explains the causal chain at play between socioeconomic development and the

institutional and societal reaction towards it. In sum, the exploration through the reconstruction

of the end of Brazilian democracy and its causal mechanisms might reveal significant aspects

overlooked so far by theory that until recently diagnosed solely economic causes as influencing

6 See Green et al., 2018; Stepan, 2015; and the constitution of 1946 in Câmara dos Deputados.

21

the military coup. Individual cases, different from common cross-cases, provide an opportunity

to highlight specific and unique mechanisms at stake (see Lipset, 1959).

This study takes the year of 1946 as the starting point, which was the year democracy

was established and former President Eurico Gaspar Dutra introduced a liberal, open-market

economy (Ayres & Fonseca, 2017). Nevertheless, this research particularly focuses on the

period from 1950 onwards, as it was the year of former president Getúlio Vargas’ re-election

as President of Brazil for the second time – although he was the leader of the Estado Novo,7 an

autocracy inspired by the populist regimes of Europe, his regime ended with the constitution of

1946 establishing democracy – and the economic and societal implications that should influence

the succeeding presidencies until 1964 (Levine, 1998). The day of the 1 April 1964, the

finalisation of the coup d'état is where the research concludes its analysis. Considering prior

and later military coups d'état, the degree of comparability is deficient, due to the uniqueness

of the Brazilian case.8

The design of this analysis presents a typical weakness of single case studies, such as

qualitative limitations, mainly due to the low degree of external validity. The applicability to

similar, yet differentiating cases, is with low certitude, given the likelihood that the findings are

context-dependent due to the single case framework (Toshkov, 2016:297-299). Nevertheless,

the strength of this design lies within its high internal validity, due to a wide range of data, and

the development of within-case inferences (Toshkov, 2016:301). As this case represents, one

of the first to be analysed through the combination of the historic Lipset and modern school –

based on the former – additional analyses on falls of democracies are required to extend

theoretical generalisability (Toshkov, 2016:302).

3.3 Operationalisation This research assumes a causal chain of mechanisms operating simultaneously on different

levels of analysis, initiated by and rooted in socioeconomic development.

The evaluation of the prognosticated verification takes the probabilities of its occurrence

as the base. That is, if an unlikely piece of evidence is detected, a more robust piece of inference

could be advanced. To accomplish this, the research provides the likelihood of the assumed

evidence a priori. Finally, testing the triangulated theoretical mechanism requires simultaneous

7 Vargas’s Estado Novo was an autocratic regime formed upon the ideology of nationalism and socialism like Mussolini, that attempted to create an integrated, egalitarian society. Yet with exceptions as Vargas excluded 1934 the constitutional inclusion of an anti-racism clause, declaring all citizens as equal, permitting no privileges rooted in the background of the citizen (see Fausto, 2006; Levine, 1998). 8 Considering different examples, the military was always seen as rival to the democratic regime, which was different in Brazil (Brenan, 2014; Griffin, 2007).

22

analysis of whether the assumed theoretical causal chain matches the observed mechanisms at

stake (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Toskhov, 2016). Thus, the analysis focuses on detecting several

pieces of evidence, confirming and even falsifying the predicted hypotheses to meet the

conditions of thoroughly designed research (Toskhov, 2016:302).

Socioeconomic Development: This research immerses into the societal, economic and

institutional contexts of the Democracy of 1946 that provoked the military coup of 1964.

However, the thesis specifically attempts to answer whether the development in socioeconomic

matters caused the coup.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): The fall of Brazilian democracy has been affected by a reciprocal

causal chain of institutional and societal reaction and counter-reaction to socioeconomic

development.

Given the high amount of presented empirical and statistical evidence in the literature,

presuming a negative correlation between the societal, economic (and institutional)

development and regime stability, it is very likely, that this research presents sufficient evidence

to confirm that socioeconomic development in Brazil has affected the stability of the democratic

regime. Respectively the probability of finding disapproving evidence is therefore low.

Nevertheless, if this research finds challenging evidence, it is enough to question the

theoretically assumed causal chain.

This research analyses in deep, the social, economic and institutional context to detect

and reconstruct the causal mechanism at stake, to confront Lipset (1959) and Wallerstein’s

(1980) assumption of solely economic effects as causes for the military coup, and to confirm

the triangulated proposal of historic and modern scholarship, that a multi-cause chain affected

the coup.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Governmental interventions into the market affected the reciprocal

causal chain.

In this case, the literature also provides enough empirical and statistical attestation to

predict a high likelihood of evidence to support the reciprocal causal chain. The following cases

if found, are assumed as evidence confirming H2; the increase of government debts to stimulate

the market, the introduction of stimulus packages of the government, the change of an open-

market economy towards a nation-centric economy, the switch vice-versa, the introduction of

social market economy measures vs the introduction of neo-liberalist austerity measures. On

23

the contrary, there is very unlikely to find evidence falsifying H2. Correspondingly, such

evidence would entail different forms of capitalism in Brazil at the same time, hence a non-

capitalist form of economy, such as a socialist economy; a governmental programme – here

programme might include jurisdictional changes – opposing and/or limiting the classical

capitalist economic framework of the free market and private ownership.

Institutional consistency and cultural congruence: In order to detect and test the proposition of

an institutional and cultural effect on the reciprocal causal chain, the research examines

Brazilian Democracy of 1946 to the extent to which governments experienced a lack of

authority, hence a regime destabilisation due to institutional factors, but also due to the lack of

congruence with the culture - political and economic preferences of the citizens – at stake. With

this, the analysis aims to determine the role that institutional and cultural factors played for the

military to intervene and end the democracy.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Institutional consistency and cultural congruence of all presidencies

were affected by the reciprocal causal chain of socioeconomic development and the

institutional and societal reaction towards socioeconomic development.

The likelihood of finding evidence that would proof H3 is high given the evidence

presented in the literature. Exemplifying a confirming piece of evidence would include a regime

that experienced series of governmental disruptions, such as continually changing governments

– in our case presidents – and military or societal interventions threatening a regime in its

stability, or the low congruence of regimes towards the preferences of its citizens, affected by

the causal chain. For instance, a democracy failing to provide fundamental rights for its citizens

or an autocracy failing in keeping repression constant in consequence of socioeconomic decline.

On the contrary, there is only a small likelihood that would disapprove with H3. Hence, such

evidence would entail, no institutional or cultural affection by the reciprocal causal chain,

therefore no effect of socioeconomic development on governments or society at all.

Worth noting is that this analysis is limited in the scope of a macro analysis of the actors

in the policy arena. Hence the individual preferences missed to include by the government are

excluded, macro phenomena such as migration processes or mass protests in consequence to a

missing governmental answer are taken as reference points to verify or falsify H3.

24

3.4 Data Primary Sources. The primary data used in this research are available via governmental

websites without further limitations. The IBGE, for instance, has stored every statistical record

taken for Brazil ever since its establishment, such as all census published since 1946, facilitating

an objective analysis of the socioeconomic development in Brazil, a crucial component of this

research (Bowen, 2009). Additionally, IBGE includes data in a specific section concerned

solely with the historical development of Brazil, offering further evidence for the analysis of

this study. Overall, this research analysed each of the annually published censuses for relevant

data, covering 24 years. IPEADATA, an additional governmental website, gives access to every

governmental statistical published, facilitating further analysis of the economic development in

Brazil.

Furthermore, this research examines additional statistical data published by federal

states such as São Paulo that extend the perspective of the development analysed. Also, the

study consults judiciary and legislative organs of the Brazilian government, such as the Câmara

dos Deputados, who published on their online webpage the original version of the Constitution

of 1946. The Câmara dos Deputados highlights articles and paragraphs that changed

throughout the Populist Republic as well as governmental decrees concerning the economy

made with Superinterdência da Moeda e do Crédito (SUMOC), as well as data characterising

all governmental stimulus packages, making a classification possible (Bowen, 2009). The study

reached out for autobiographic, and interview material of the actors at play, applying only the

material provided by themselves or that recorded these materials, without further editions by

third parties to hinder the transgression of the intentional meaning of the first party (Bowen,

2009). Here this research makes use of the JFK – Presidential Library, the LBJ – Presidential

Library, as well as of the Biblioteca Nacional – Digital – Brasil, all offering a range of

autobiographic material. Overall combining the aforementioned data, this research attempts to

construct a robust, all-encompassing narrative giving credence to this study (Bowen, 2009).

Secondary Sources. This research also included extensively secondary data. These include

experts such as Lipset (1959) or Griffith (1956) indicating a socioeconomic influence on regime

stability particularly for Latin American countries; or Tomini and Wagemann (2018), and their

characterisation of democratic breakdowns in consequence of the regime type. Also, this

research analysed the work of experts concerned with the historical evolution of Brazil, under

societal, economic and institutional aspects, among other things from historians such as

Green et al. (2018) or Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea Do

25

Brasil (CPDOC) –, but also the publications from the Federal University of São Paulo covering

additional neutral insights in the economic programmes of the governments throughout the

Populist Republic. This study also makes use of material provided in newspaper and

newsagencies archives such as the Folha de São Paulo or O Globo.

This research bears the challenge to access as much evidence as possible and likewise

reconstruct the mechanisms at stake (Bowen, 2009:32). In this sense, the study attempts to

provide a more accurate reproduction of this moment of Brazilian history via triangulation of

primary and secondary data that offers the possibility to reproduce the causal mechanisms in

the broader depth (Toskov, 2016). The goal here is to access as much evidence as possible and

likewise reconstruct the mechanisms at stake (Bowen, 2009:32). Overall, this study followed

the proposed procedure of Bowen on how to assess, qualify and analyse data as possible

evidence to meet the highest standards of academic research (Bowen, 2009)

26

4. Findings

4.1 Context and Examination of the Proposed Mechanisms

4.1.1 Context of the Socioeconomic Development

Although some researchers, reduced their analysis to economic reasons only, economic growth

affects more than just the economic sphere; it causes and stimulates the evolution of the social

dimension – referred to as a structural change in the level of production and employment

(Kuznets, 1966) – but also of the technological change – mainly the degree to which the

industrial and agricultural sectors enjoy technologisation/mechanisation (Szirmai, 2015).

Modern research extended the historical economic approach by proposing the addition of the

following data, to measure social development: the Gini coefficient to measure the development

of socioeconomic discrepancies among the citizens of a nation; the evolution of the rate of

illiterates; the production levels per capital and worker, as well as to measure the level of

freedom citizens enjoyed (Szirmai, 2015).

The regime instability of Brazil represents a relatively complex form, grown from the

accumulation of multiple aspects highlighting the necessity to include a multiplicity of data to

understand the perspectives of the mechanisms at play in deeper depth (see Goldstone et al.,

2010:205 – Brazil listed as a country that experienced a complex form of conflict). Following

the proposal of the literature, the inclusion of historical data permits the detection of significant

insights into the socioeconomic processes at play – hence requires a detailed investigation of

both economic, as well as social evolution in a specific time context, based on a range of

statistical evidence (Szirmai, 2015).

The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), established with the decree

n°24.609 in 1934, serving the purpose of annually providing a census, offers an all-

encompassing insight into the socioeconomic development, particularly of characteristics of the

country and its federal states, but also the discrepancies among them. The IBGE established an

online archive – a Biblioteca IBGE – with access to all Anuários Estatísticos Brasileiros (AEB)

(Brazilian Statistical Yearbooks) annually collected from 1934 onwards. Since 2006, the

Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Institute of Applied Economic Research),

established in 1964, offers a summary of all governmental statistical data on its website

IPEADATA.gov.br. Contemporary and historical data offered by the provider is continuously

updated based upon the latest findings.

This research focused on historical data of the census from 1940–1970, offering the

following findings:

27

Table 3: Brazil: Population, GDP, GDP p. capita and the annual inflation rate.

Source: IBGE (n.d.) and Skidmore (1977).

According to Table 3, the Brazilian economy, after the establishment of democracy in

1946, experienced series of economic boost and decline in consequence of series of

governmental stimulus packages and varying economic programmes – international-

developmentalism, based upon market liberalisation, vs national-developmentalism, based

upon market limitations, particularly for the foreign investors and capital (see Table 8, Chapter

4.2). Under the presidency of Dutra (1946–1950) GDP on average rose by 7.64%, whereas

under Vargas, the GDP slightly dropped to average growth of 6.175%; former president

Juscelino Kubitschek’s administration was the longest in the period of the Populist Democracy

(1956–1961), experiencing average GDP growth at 8.12%. The former presidency of João

Belchior Marques Goulart, last in the democratic period, instead of encountered the second

most challenging drop, ever measured in Brazil, from 6.6% in 1962 to 0.6%, leading Brazil into

recession – the first was under Dutra from 11.60% to 2.40% (see Araújo et al., 2005:571).

This research investigates the features of GDP development, such as the individual

sectors of the economy, to analyse the socioeconomic development in greater detail.

Concerning the development of the industrial sector, Brazil experienced constant industrial

growth. From 1946–1955 this sector grew by 9.3%, and contributed to GDP by 30.8%, whereas,

in the years of 1955–1964, data of the census indicate additional growth (see AEB 1965 – IBGE,

Inflation(Skidmore,

1977)

Inhabitants Variation (%) In Real (1999) -millions Variation (%) In Real (1999) In Dollar

(2000) Variation (%) Variation (%)

1945 45.592.012 2,4 54.120 3,2 1.187 649 0,82 -1946 46.716.901 2,5 60.398 11,6 1.293 706 8,91 -1947 47.914.604 2,6 61.848 2,4 1.291 705 0,16 -1948 49.184.989 2,7 67.847 9,7 1.379 754 6,87 3,51949 50.527.615 2,7 73.071 7,7 1.446 790 4,84 61950 51.941.767 2,8 78.040 6,8 1.502 821 3,89 11,41951 53.426.485 2,9 81.864 4,9 1.532 837 1,98 10,81952 54.980.590 2,9 87.840 7,3 1.598 873 4,27 20,41953 56.602.714 3 91.969 4,7 1.625 888 1,7 17,61954 58.291.319 3 99.142 7,8 1.701 929 4,68 25,61955 60.044.720 3 107.867 8,8 1.796 982 5,62 18,91956 61.861.108 3 110.995 2,9 1.794 980 0,12 21,81957 63.738.568 3 119.542 7,7 1.876 1.025 4,53 13,41958 65.675.093 3 132.452 10,8 2.017 1.102 7,53 17,31959 67.668.599 3 145.433 9,8 2.149 1.174 6,57 51,91960 69.716.943 3 159.103 9,4 2.282 1.247 6,19 23,81961 71.817.925 3 172.786 8,6 2.406 1.315 5,42 42,91962 73.969.307 3 184.190 6,6 2.490 1.361 3,5 55,81963 76.168.814 3 185.295 0,6 2.433 1.329 2,3 80,21964 78.414.141 2,9 191.595 3,4 2.443 1.335 0,44 86,61965 80.702.958 2,9 196.193 2,4 2.431 1.328 0,5 45,5

Year Population GDP GDP p. Capita

28

1965; Goldsmith, 1986). Other sources indicate an industrial growth of 7.9% between

1946/1952 and 9.9% for between 1952/1961 (Revista Conjuntura Econômica, 1971). II. Indices

do Volume Fisico da Produção Industrial – the index of the physical volume of the industrial

production in the period of 1949–1964 (AEB 1965- IBGE, 1965:127), confirms the growth in

the Brazilian industry, alongside an increase in the number of industrial products (see AEB

1965 – IBGE, 1965), and the increase in the number of workers in the industrial sector, from

1940–1950 by 49.35% and from 1950–1960 by 27.74% (the average percentage was calculated

from the data given in Table III, Appendix). Here, the state of São Paulo experienced the largest

growth, highlighted by the number of industrial output; in 1949, 47.8%, and in 1959, 55.7%

(see AEB 1950 - IBGE, 1950:124; AEB 1960 – IBGE, 1960:67-68; Colistete, 2007:95).

Additionally, the agricultural sector experienced a growth of only 3.6% and remained

the most significant contributor to GDP by 31.7% in between 1946–1955 yet experienced a

change in growth and contribution. About ‘Tables 6.1–6.3 – IBGE, 1990’ and to Table III –

Appendix, the agricultural sector experienced a nearly stagnating number of people employed

from 1940–1950 by 4.6% and a return in its increase in between 1950–1960 by 18.32% (the

average percentage was calculated from the data given in Table III, Appendix). Evidence

regarding the increase of pastureland in Brazil from 1940–1960 provides further support of the

rise in this sector. For example, in 1940, 5,072,919 ha and by 1960, 20,063,333 ha land were

considered as pastureland (IBGE, 1990). Furthermore, the commercial sector grew by 6.9%

from 1946–1955 and contributed to GDP by 20.6% (Goldsmith, 1986). Also, the increased

number of employers in this sector – between 1940 and 1950, 27.95% more people were

employed and in between 1950–1960, 56.70% (the average percentage was calculated from the

data given in Table III, Appendix) - confirms the growth. At the same time, the transport sector

grew by 9.8% (1946–1955) contributing 8% to GDP, here additional growth for the period

1950–1960 is confirmed through Table III – Appendix. In addition, not included in Goldsmith

analysis was the sector of the provision of services – in this sense, the provision of domestic

services – that employed 2,732,148 people. Another significant insight to the socioeconomic

development, is the share of inactive conditions, hence the non-participation of people in the

above, mentioned sectors, that was 53% in 1960.

Despite the sectorial evidence for economic growth in Brazil from 1946 to 1964, the

numbers of exports and imports provide further insights into the situation of the economy at

stake. According to IBGE (AEB 1965 - IBGE, 1965:312), that measured the gross national

expenditure (in the currency cruzeiro) and the contribution of exports in comparison to those of

imports to the Brazilian economy, until 1960 the imports and their consequent cost evolution,

29

exceeded the number of exports. Important to note is that the different cost evolution for the

number of imports emerged since the introduction of governmentally subsidised imports by the

Vargas and Kubitschek governments (Donnelly, 1973). The idea was to stimulate the number

of machines and technology imported, to in turn stimulate the economic growth (see Chapter

4.2). Though relating the number of imports to the number of industrial products produced in

Brazil, and the experienced economic growth, the impact of the government stimulus creation

for an increase in the number of imports becomes more feasible. It supports the analysis of the

GDP development and additionally of the socio aspect, as literature assumes an evolution the

moment a country is increasingly technologised (see AEB 1965 - IGBE,1965:104-110).

Although Brazil experienced a general economic development (see Table 3, above), the

increase in the cost of living confronted the population in their substantial being, in the years

of 1948/1949 – Dutra’s government - the inflation rate was kept under 10%, in the following

years after the overtake of Vargas, the rate grew nearly exponentially, reaching a peak in 1964

with a rate of 86,6% under President Goulart. Alongside the emergence of relatively high

inflations rates, this obstacle was enforced by a simultaneous drop and relative stagnation of

the GDP development, particularly in 1963 and the following years. Although the Brazilian

government, as presented in the following chapter in greater detail, applied for monetary

programmes a Milton Friedman – a reduction of the monetary expansion rate – it caused, in

consequence, a fall in the real stock in money and a drop in the output (see AEB 1965, in IBGE,

1965/Morley, 1971). The detection of the reasons for this increase in inflation is rather

complicated, as Brazilian governments applied the anti-inflation programmes, available and

supported by economic science at that time.

Economists are divided between cost-push and demand-pull causes of inflation. First

cost-push inflation is rooted in the increase of the nominal wages that in turn causes an upwards

shift in the supply curve; the demand curve, through the income effect shifts upwards in the

same extent as the supply curve and is supported by extra-governmental spending to stimulate

the market (Chen, 2018; Kenton, 2020; Schwarzer, 2018).

In consequence of rising loans, employers and imports tend to raise their prices to re-

finance the increase in cost. Therefore, the market experiences a proportional increase in the

nominal price level, increasing the inflation rate – wage-price circle –. At the same time, if the

market experiences a demand-pull, in consequence of an increase of the wages, yet the supply

side does not keep pace with the increase of the actual demand, the market experiences an

increase in prices, leading companies to estimate a false increase in demand through additional

profits gained. In the presence of bottlenecks, the increase in factor prices stimulates further

30

inflation (Schwarzer, 2018). Scientists and also data approve that Brazil experienced both

phenomena at the same time.

The development of the minimum wage is one component that highlights the

significance of the cost-push producing a rise in the inflation rate. Graph II presents the

development of the average real minimum wage level per annum, in the range of 1946–1964.

The calculation of the presented values based upon the monthly given minimal wage levels

provided by the stately platform of IPEADATA.gov.br. The platform itself provides the real

minimum wage per month as the value of the nominal minimum wage less the percentage of

the monthly inflation, in the current currency Real (IPEADATA, 2020, based on data published

by IBGE). According to the numbers – Table I Appendix for specific numbers – the annual

minimum wage level decreased from 1946 onwards, reaching an average annual wage level of

343.44 Reais in 1951. In the following year, 1952, after the elevation of the minimum wage

level by the Vargas government, the average level increased to 925.05 Reais. Ever since the

minimum wages experienced a series of decrease and increase, reaching 1185.52 at the end of

the democratic republic (see Chapter 4.2). Concerning economic theory, the drastic elevation

of the nominal wage level in 1952 caused the inflation rate from 10.8% in 1951 to 20.04%,

accompanied by a decrease in GDP of 7.3% to 4.3 % in 1952. At the same time, due to the

increase in loans, the market experienced a rise in demand, leading the companies to increase

the prices for their products (see Table 5 in Morley, 1971:192). However, as the number of

workers and the cost they have produced is smaller than the output of industrial goods,

minimising the effect of loans on the price level on the market, caution is required.

Graph 2: Minimum Wage Level (annual) (IPEADATA, 2020 and IBGE; see Appendix:

Table I).

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966

X = Years / Y = Minimum Wage Level in Real

31

The governmental measures to limit the increase in the inflation rate were other

significant components for the cost-push effect. Mainly the governments of Dutra, Vargas,

former president Jânio Quadros and Goulart through the SUMOC – the prior version of the

Brazilian Central Bank, reduced the ratio of credit for the private market to decrease the amount

of money available to re-finance governmental debt, massively increased in consequence of

Bretton Woods and the Plano das Metas.9 The research speaks in this case from a limited

working capital or investment capital for the private sector that is required to increase further

investment spending and expand the production. With increasing demand, the industry expands

its capacities (though further investments) to guarantee that supply satisfies the demand, but

with a simultaneous limitation of credit, companies create a substitute to the credit market,

hence increase the prices. As noted above, companies additionally have to compensate for

increased costs through the increase in minimum wages. Worth mentioning, the continuity of

market limitations for foreign actors in the market, proposed by Dutra and enforced under

Vargas, that created a nearly pure domestic market, resulting in quasi-monopoly for domestic

suppliers, provides further credence for the relatively extreme price increase in Brazil. In fact,

these measures were the opposite of Riccardo’s comparative advantage proposed in the

literature as necessary for stable economies to emerge (Ruffin, 2002).

Furthermore, data of IPEA (1966: 135) shows the decrease in the number of credit sales,

accompanied by a decrease in foreign investment. The former seems logic in the context of the

post-Kubitschek governmental focus on the reduction of governmental debts, that increased

drastically after the introduction of the Plano das Meta that attempted to stimulate Brazilian

economy in 5 instead of 50 years, which required a limitation of the credit volume available for

the private market, alongside the reduction of the inflation rate (see Table 8/Woodard, 2020).

Although the IMF requested Goulart to limit the minimum wage increase to 40%, the

government increased the level of wages over the proposed level paving the way for an

additional inflation rate increase of 86.6% in 1964.

This research detected another component of the economic dilemma the, since 1947/48,

performed governmental reduction of foreign capital and investment inflow, forcing, in

consequence, governments to stimulate imports via subsidies to support the GDP development

9 Note that a central bank is capable of increasing the amount of circulating money by emitting additional money through the increase in credits granted for the private market. Hence, banking institutes lend money in turn to private investors. In Brazil, however, the government was keen to reduce this money available to reduce the money fluctuation and likewise reduce its foreign debts. See ‘Foreign Debts in Consequence of Bretton Woods’ in the publication of Costa Leite Santos (2014) in JUSBRASIL.com.br and for the Plano das Metas, see the work of de Melo et al. in Abph.com.br.

32

through the modernisation of Brazilian industries. However, the former, together with the

governmental stimulus packages, required additional foreign debts, to substitute the missing

foreign capital inflow that might have supported the GDP growth but with the risk to displace

domestic competitors – as it was the case in 1946/47 – and as mentioned already to keep the

import rate high. Although later market openings facilitated foreign capital inflow and the

inclusion of flexible exchange rates – kept fixed between 1939–1952 – Brazil remained with its

regulations for foreign investors, limiting their effectiveness.

Societal Development. Except for economic development, Brazil experienced significant

changes in the standards of living. Following Table V – Appendix providing data of the

situation of living, the type of occupation and existing installations of privately occupied homes

in between 1940 and 1960 this research detected significant changes in the standard of living10.

Again, this research based its findings on the data provided by the AEB - Anuário Estatístico

Brasileiro (Brazilian Statistical Yearbook) of 1965, published by IBGE. Concerning the type

of occupation, the number of owners in comparison to tenants and different forms of occupation

continuously surpassed the latter. The number of owners increased between 1940–1950 by

52%, and from 1950–1960 by 42% – showing a decrease of 10%. At the same time, the growth

rate of the number of tenants decreased from 41% between 1940–1950 to 30% between 1950–

1960. In contrast to that, Brazil experienced little change in the development of undeclared

housing occupations, that remained nearly the same in between 1940 and 1960.

Following the data – see Table V-Appendix – concerning the existing installations in

the privately occupied homes, a constant increase in the housing standards is additionally

detectable. For the periods of 1940–1950 and 1950–1960, this research calculated a growth rate

of 52% and 80% of houses receiving piped water; a growth rate of 87% and 111%, for

electrified houses. The research calculated a significant rise in sanitary installations of 184%

for the first and 107% for the second period. The increase in the living conditions is also

supported by Table II – Appendix, that detected a continuous rise in the number of telephones

in private and public houses from 1907–1968 – the data provided by the publication of the

IBGE of 1990. For Lipset, the ability to use a telephone is a significant insight into the

socioeconomic growth of a country (Lipset, 1959). The number of telephones in 1944 of

373,489 for the overall country grew to 1,282,942 in 1964, the year of the coup.

10 This research calculated the presented growth rates (=pt) via the following formula: pt = xt-xt-1/xt-1 (see Hüpen, 2002:1)

33

Table II – Appendix offers another insight into the discrepancies among the federal

states in the degree of their development. The state of São Paulo had 168,278 telephones in

1950, whereas the state of Maranhão only had 1,004 at the same time. The picture remains the

same for the different states of the North compared to those of the South. Relating these findings

to the already presented fact of industrialisation that primarily took place in the South might

explain the different number of telephones in use. Also, Table V – Appendix (presented in the

previous paragraph) suggests an exponential growth of privately occupied homes, mainly in

urban and suburban regions between 1950 and 1960. Including the data concerned with the

overall degree of urbanisation in Brazil, highlighted with the population growth of the city and

state of São Paulo shown in Table 5, the suggestion of the assumption of a higher degree of

urbanisation particularly in the industrial hubs, is supported (see Table 4 in combination with

Table 5). In only two decades the number of inhabitants more than doubled. Hence the regions

among São Paulo became more urban.

Table 4: Urbanisation Rate.

Source: IBGE (2007).

Table 5: The Population Growth in São Paulo.

Source: Prefeitura de São Paulo, 2010.

To understand urbanisation tendencies particularly in the south of the country, it is

important to note, that beside the high socioeconomic discrepancies among the federal states,

the increasing mechanisation of the agriculture and the volatility of the coffee prices at the

international market, furthering this process to reduce costs, although governmentally

supported, caused an increase in unemployed citizens in the job market (Costa, 1988; Lopes,

1991:240-247; Welch, 1998). Significantly the underdeveloped – in aspects of industrialisation

1940 1950 1960 197031.24 36.16 44.67 55.92

PeriodUrbanisation Rate

City of São Paulo

State of São Paulo

Brazil

Years Number of Inhabitants

Growth Rate

Number of Inhabitants

Growth Rate

Number of Inhabitants

Growth Rate

1920 579.033 4.5% 4.592.188 3.6% 30.635.605 1.5%1940 1.326.261 4.2% 7.180.316 2.3% 41.236.315 2.3%1950 2.198.096 5.2% 9.134.423 3.6% 51.944.397 3.1%1960 3.781.446 5.6% 12.974.699 3.2% 70.119.071 2.9%1970 5.924.615 4.6% 17.771.948 3.5% 93.139.037 2.5%

34

– North-East of Brazil, offered little professional alternatives for the landless farmer-class than

to emigrate towards the industrial hubs of the South-East (Brazil: Security, 1961:50; Costa,

1988; Estrela, 2003:240; Welch, 1998). According to Table 6 – Migration, based on the

publication of IBGE,

Table 6: Internal-Migration in Brazil.

Source: Costa (1988:5) in connection to IBGE: AEB: 1955:71. Notes: (I) only Brazilian-born were included, and (II) proportional calculation to the number of citizens in respect to the AEBs.

between 1940 and 1960, more than 15 million people were migrating across the country,

particularly towards the industrial hubs São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (see Table VI –

Appendix). Inter-regional migrations, from the rural areas of the state of São Paulo towards the

urban areas of the federal state, accompanied the before named North-East to South-East

migratory processes (Estrela, 2003). In 1950 the state of São Paulo counted 1.064.009 domestic

migrants, which is a percentage of 12.61% of the overall population – given the data of Table

VI – Appendix. Although governmental programmes such as Sudene (see Table 8, in 4.1.2)

attempted to stop these migratory processes through direct presidential influence, they could

not stop these processes as seen in Table 5. In this sense, these migratory processes as a social

reaction towards the outcome of governmental responses towards the socioeconomic demand,

supported the causal chain, as one aspect of it. In addition, these developments highlight the

downside of capitalism that is the risk of market failure in terms of unequal allocation of

resources for every citizen. The latter is highlighted in the development of the Gini coefficient,

that was estimated, following the empirics, to have been over 0.65% prior to 1960 and around

0.535 in 1960, yet increased to 0.581, perceiving the largest increase in between 1963–1964

(Neri, 2014).

Abs. % (II) Abs. % (II) Abs. % (II)

2 592 000

3 826 000

5 409 000

4,7

5,1

5,6

5,9

2 060 000

4 421 000

6 957 000

3

4,1

6,4

7,6

9,24 652 000

8 248 000

12 365 000

12

13,5

Migration Inter-Stately (I) Inter-Regional (I) Intra-Regional (I)

3 050 000 7,7 1 211 000 1 839 0001940

1950

1960

1970

Year

35

Overall, from a purely socioeconomic standing, mainly the GDP development and the

increasing inflation rate, as well as the increasing discrepancies across the country, highlighted

by the emerging migration, were significant aspects of the period of 1946–1964.

4.1.2 Institutional and Societal Aspects Despite the extensive number of social and economic factors involved in the political process,

that as assumed in the literature affects the public, as well as the policy sphere, the present

research detected key institutional and societal actions and reactions that were critical to the

causal chain furthering the later military coup, in consequence of the above presented

socioeconomic evidence. Worth noting about the proposed causal chain, a precondition - the

institutional change conditioned by the emergence of new classes and political preferences –

that was expressed by the founding of democracy in 1946, has already happened. However, the

examination of the key institutional and societal facts is a chronological sequence of the

happenings before 1946, and not as the initial point of social and institutional evolution. Also,

according to the theoretical mechanism in the following, the examination focuses

simultaneously on both institutions and society.

Table 7: Civil Society – Structure and Characteristics.

Source: Bethell (2018); Bastos (2006); Colistete (2007); Diário do Congresso Nacional.a.; b.; c.; d. (1961); CPDOC.a. (n.d.); CPDOC.b. (n.d.); Fausto (2006); Folha de São Paulo (1961:4); Folha de São Paulo.a. (1964); Folha de São Paulo.b. (1964); Folha da Noite (1955); Green et al. (2018); Lopes (1991); Pereira (1982); Presidente da República\João Goulart pr (1964); Vargas (1951:9-14). Note: The Communist Party = PCB was forbidden in the Populist Republic, nevertheless, was kept vivant in the underground.

Advocate of Coronelismo (Autocratic, Feudalistic),

and Liberalism

Multiple, partially depending on Coronelismo

Marches in 1957/1958

Advocate of liberalist democracy and economy, partially of Trabalhismo a

Vargas

PSD, PTB, UDN, PTN 1954, 1957/1958, 1961 and 1964

Advocate of Trabalhismo (nationalism, socialism)

PTB, PSD, PCB* 1952, 1961 and 1964

Characteristics Party Significant Participation in Opposition

Advocate of Coronelismo (Autocratic, Feudalistic),

and Capitalism UDN Marches in 1957/1958

Advocate of Liberalism, market limitations and

monopolies. Partial advocate of autocratism

UDN, PSD, PSP Direct influence on politics in 1947 and

1954/55

Civil Society - Actors

Former Imperial Aristocracy and Agrarian

Bourgeosie

Industrialist Bourgeosie

Middle Class (Technocrats)

Workers

Farmers

36

Consequently, this research detected that Brazilian society as an entity is not

characterisable as homogenous, yet as a society of homogenous groups in a heterogeneous

environment – the elite (including the military), an emerging middle class, the urban and rural

workers and farmers – decreasingly segregated along the class hierarchy. Although these

societal changes emerged already under the Estado Novo, and led, according to the proposed

mechanism by Lipset (see Chapter 2), to the end of the autocracy and the beginning of

democracy, Brazil remained in a status of societal evolution. The rule of the former imperial

aristocracy and agrarian bourgeoisie, in short, the imperial elite, under the principle of

coronelismo11 remained nearly untouched by principal societal changes until the 1960s as

evidence suggests (Pereira, 1982). Here, the study detected the first level of conflict between

the imperial elite, attempting to remain in power yet with diminishing influence and the

emerging elite of industrialist burghers stressing the colonial system for emancipatory and

economic reasons (liberalism and likewise monopoly on the domestic market). Also, the

technocratic middle class claimed their constitutional right of a liberalist and capitalist

democracy, that was socially acceptable, via manifestation – not refusing the fraternisation with

the working class – to reach their goals and to diminish elitist lobbying. The working class once

the centre of the Estado Novo, ever since Vargas return in 1951, became highly politicised,

standing up for a national, and partially socialist way of overcoming socioeconomic

discrepancies and lacking emancipation (IBGE, 2006:361, 370; Bethell, 2018; Levine, 1998).

Nevertheless, although all workers were unionised since 1945, even in the new republic

their participation remained constrained (see Bethell, 2018). Although the increase in new

professions created these new classes, as presented in Table III – Appendix, stressing the

societal hierarchy at stake, the political emancipation of the electorate remained limited. The

newly established democracy of 1946 kept the Lei Saraiva from 1881 – abolished in 1986 –

that prohibited illiterates from any participation in elections, or to be elected (Tribunal Superior

Eleitoral. c., n.d; Art. 132 of the Constitution of 1946; Westin, 2016). About Table IV –

Appendix presenting the development of the literacy rate from 1940-1960, that this study based

upon the AEB of 1965, it becomes clear that less than half of the population was educated

enough to be granted the right to vote. However, this development reached a turning point in

the 1960s, as 60.52 % of the population, older than 15 years – was able to read (see Table IV -

Appendix in relation to Astorga et al., 2005). Further credence is given through the data

11 By coronelismo, this research means the feudal-like principle of Brazil`s politics; a society being loyal (partially forced) to a patron, central to a cities or regions society and receiving favours in return. Mainly the landed imperial gentry and local industrialists enjoyed these privileges (Green et al., 2018; Leal, 1977).

37

provided by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (Superior Electoral Court), that confirms growth

in the number of voters (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.b., n.d.). Hence, a majority of the citizens

was able to express their political will under the constitution ever since. However, for the most

extended period in the new democracy, the number of political actors in the arena was limited

to the number of electorates meeting constitutional conditions.

Table 7 provides an overview of the political affiliations of each group and their key

characteristics, along with examples of significant forms of shown opposition, that in

connection to Tables 8 and 9, highlight the level of conflict that confronted the policy arena. In

this sense, the study lends credence to H1 as the democracy and society continuously

progressed, through socioeconomic development, yet affected the government as seen in their

short durability.

Another important actor central for the ongoings in Brazil concerns the military.

Although evidence suggests a partial separation of the armed forces from society, this essential

part of Brazilian state apparatus played a vital role in the causal mechanism proposed in H3,

though it is not fully separable. The military may be characterised as a hybrid actor, being part

of society and likewise a governmental institution, following the presented evidence in the

empirics. Ever since its establishment, the Brazilian military recruited its members across the

social hierarchy. The leadership consisted in the majority of the former imperial elite and only

for a minimal part from the newly emerging middle class, nevertheless as evidence concerned

with the payment suggests, all members of the military enjoyed only a modest living (McCann,

1980:109-111).

Following Tables 8 and 9, forced arms were not only concerned with the protection of

democracy, yet perceived intra-political movements, affected by the causal mechanism.

Evidence presented suggests, that central for the participation of the military in the policy arena

– despite the fraternisation of sailors and workers in 1963 – was the decision and political

standing of the leadership. The latter was not free of internal conflict as the year of 1955 shows,

of the democracy defenders under the Minister of War Henrique Teixeira Lott and his military

opponents indirectly supporting former president of the Câmara dos Deputados and new

president of Brazil (according to the constitutional will) Carlos Coimbra da Luz in preventing

Kubitscheck to gain power. Although suppressed by Lott, the military interference always

occurred in consequence of a change in the political zeitgeist at stake. Moreover, the years of

1957/58 show, the military solely intervened once in a crisis on behalf of the presidential will.

In short, the military reflected, mirror alike, the inter-societal dispute and its affection in

consequence of socioeconomic development and the institutional answer towards it.

38

Table 8 provides an overview in the number of presidents, their party membership and

the longitude in office as well as the four ways presidents entered office. About Table 7, the

Presidents of the Populist Republic entered office by election through the electorate or via

constitutional foreseen succession (1. Vice-President / 2. President of the Chamber of

Deputies), by military intervention, and by the election of the Congresso Nacional as interim

president. It follows, that Brazil in 18 years hold only three presidential elections and was

confronted with five presidents who entered office via the constitutional foreseen way (see

Art.78-89)12. Additionally, although Brazil perceived constant changes in the number of

governments, the majority of which were not via elections, those switches never happened

contrary to the constitution.

In addition, this table provides the most significant economic and social programmes of

all governments, that aims to support the verification of the proposed causal mechanisms at

play. The number of government programmes in the short democratic period, some of which

differed significantly from each other as they corresponded to the spirit of the times, indicates

a correlation between socio-political affection and socioeconomic development.

12 Please see articles of the constitution of 1946 in Câmara dos Deputados.

39

Table 8: Overview of the Presidents and their economic and social programmes.

Source: Anais da Câmara dos Deputados. (1961); Ayres & Fonseca (2017); Bastos (2006); Barros Cavalcante & Olival Feitosa (2019); Besserman Vianna .a. (1990); Besserman Vianna .b. (1990); Bethell (2018); Bielschoswky (1988); BNDES (2020); Câmara dos Deputados. (n.d.); da Costa Franco (2008); de Campos (2017); CPDOC.b. (n.d.); Dantas (2011); Diário do Congresso Nacional .a.; b.; c.; d. (1961); Eletrobras (n.d.); Fausto (2006:410-443); Levine (1998); Mares & Trinkunas (2016); McCann (1980:122-126); Madureira de Pinho Neto (1990:151-154); Manuscrito do Presidente Getúlio Vargas (1951-1954); Ministério da Economia – Biblioteca Digital. a. (2020); Ministério da Economia – Biblioteca Digital. b. (2020); Ministério da Economia – Biblioteca Digital. c. (2020); Orenstein & Sochaczeweski (1990); Presidência da República (n.d); Presidência da República (2018); Saretta (n.d); SUMOC (1953); Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. a. (n.d.); Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. b. (n.d); Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. c. (n.d); Vargas (1951); Woodard (2020). Notes: (1) Officially until the April 2, yet the coup d'état took place on the previous day; (2) Superinterdencia de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste; (3) Plano Salte: Health, Nutrition, Transport, Energy, (4). Military interventions ending the corresponding presidency, (5). From a constitutional point of view, all presidencies ended and proceeded in the foreseen way, even in 1964 after the military coup d'état.

Concerning the institutional affection and reaction towards the socioeconomic

development of this research, in connection to Chapter 4.1, derived the following findings. First,

all governments of the Populist Democracy introduced a multitude of governmental aid

J. F. C. Café Filho24.08.1954 - 08.11.1955

PSP

> Economic Stabilization Program (Program of the Plutocracy Paulista) > Exchange Rate Reform > n° 108 and 113 SUMOC (Industrialization through de-nationalization)

/Democratically elected Vice-President

President by Constitution

> Increase of Minimal Wages. > attempt to grant the right to vote to iliterates (to end Lei Saraiva - 1881)

Democratically elected

Democratically elected

Interim President (by Constitution)

Democratically elected Vice-President President by Constitution

> Plano das Metas > SIDENE

> Politica Externa Independente (PEI) > Liberalism > Austerity

/

J. Kubitschek31.01.1956 - 31.01.1961

PSD

> Plano das Metas > SUDENE (2) > Concept of International Developmentalism

31.01.1961 - 25.08.1961

J. Quadros

25.08.1961 - 07.09.1961

P. R. Mazzilli

J. Goulart (4)08.09.1961 -

02.04.1964 (1)PSD

> Plano Trienal > Monopoly on Electric Production/Provision Eletrobras (1962)

PTN

PSD

/ / President of the Chamber of Debuties President by Constitution

11.11.1955 - 31.01.1956

PSD / / Interim President (by Constitution)

> Concept of Trabalhismo > National Developmentalism > Combat of Inflation > Credit Expansion > Monopoly on Petrol (Petrobas, 1953) > n° 1807 Lei do mercado livre 1952 (Market re-opening) > n° 70 SUMOC (mulitple exchange rates)

> Concept of Trabalhismo > Education Program. > Support of the Workers (increase of the minimum wages)

Democratically elected G. Vargas31.01.1951 - 24.08.1954

C. Coimbra da Luz (4)

N. Ramos

PTB

08.11.1955 - 11.11.1955

PSD

Democratically elected

President Period Party Economic Program Societal Program Elected / Interim

E. G. Dutra31.01.1946 - 31.01.1951

PSD

> Introduction of Liberalism to oppose national developmentalism of Vargas > Combat of Inflation and foreign devicit spending > Re-Introduction of Foreign Investment "Concept of International Developmentalism > Plano Salte (3) > Limitation of Foreign Investment (1947)

> Plano Salte > Rights for Urban Workes, rural workers excluded > no education program

40

packages to (a) confront the economic problems at stake and (b) stimulate the economic growth

through further industrialisation under the influence of the political zeitgeist. According to

Table 8, six economic stimulus packages – differing in the form of conceptualisation – were

introduced in only 18 years, though on average after every fourth year a different form of the

stimulus package was approved. Second, not all governments exclusively introduced packages

determined for the improvement of social conditions. Only four out of nine developed such

stimulus programmes to harmonise the socioeconomic development. Third, Brazil experienced

a continuous switch between international – and national – developmental characterised

capitalism, that in consequence affected the form of economy – liberalist or protectionist. As

shown in Chapter 4.1, this continuous switch in policy programmes concerned with the

economy affected the overall socioeconomic development in both the short and long run, but

that in turn, affected succeeding governments, lending credence to H213.

Moreover, the theoretical assumptions and the documentary of the zigzag pattern of

governmental economic stimulus packages indicate a generation of opposition within the

society in consequence of the socioeconomic development and the institutional reaction

towards it. The number of government changes from 1946–1964 – nine in total – and the

consequent change in the political couleur of the ruling governments, but also the form in

governmental change provides essential insights in the opposition building and its agitation,

hence the causal relationship between institutions and society, that proves the theoretical

proposed Hypothesis 3.

Concerning the opposition building, this research has detected two significant findings.

First that the opposition evolution towards a ruling government consisted of both civil society

and the military, or solely emerged from a civil society background, that did not share the same

political couleur as the ruling party; and second, an opposition evolving within the ruling

governmental party and supporting electorate – though the loss of supporters, turning into

political enemies, creating a disloyal opposition – see Table 9.

13 Please see Brazil: Security, 1961:44. President Quadros confirms the existence of the causal mechanism.

41

Table 9: Significant Forms of Opposition – Cause and Effect.

Source: Anais da Câmara dos Deputados. (1961); Araújo et al. (2005); Ayres & Fonseca (2017); Bastos (2006); Bethell (2018);

Brazil: Security, 1961:55-61, 59-61, 69-72; Colistete (2007); CPDOC.a. (n.d.); CPDOC.b. (n.d.); Diário do Congresso

Nacional.a.; b.; c.; d. (1961); Donnelly (1973); Dunne (2016); Fausto (2006:411-443); Folha de São Paulo (1961:4); Folha de

São Paulo.a. (1964); Folha de São Paulo.b. (1964); Folha da Noite (1955); Goldsmith (1986); Green et al. (2018); Lamarão

(n.d.); Lopes (1991:240-247); Mares & Trinkunas (2016); McCann (1980); O Globo (2013); Pereira (1982); Presidente da

República\João Goulart pr (1964); Welch (1998).

The chronological sequence of governments and their programmes about the

socioeconomic development of the country presented in Table 8, as well as the already

mentioned changes in the programmes within their governments, suggest an oppositional

reaction towards a deterioration in the socioeconomic development and well-being of both the

state and society, in consequence of missed governmental solutions to tackle an obstacle.

Following Table 8 and 9, the form of (1) government changes, either through (a) the democratic

form of showing discontent – via elections, the initiation of movements and manifestations and

military intervention to oppose democratically threatening tendencies, or (b) through

undemocratic measures, such as attempted and successful coups d'état; and (2) differing

governments and the consequent change of stimulus programmes and ideologies, but also the

short durability of governments, reflected the effect of oppositional agitation on the institution

– primarily the government. Also, the short time horizon of government changes mainly in the

1960s indicates an accumulation of opposition groups in the society that in combination with

the evidence concerning the economic development, accelerated the demanded governmental

responsiveness towards these grievances.

1952/1953

1957/58

1964 Civil Society and Military No Demand for wage increase (for both

military and society)Fraternized manifestation of soldiers

and the worker union Increase in wages for the soldiers, and an increase in the minimum wage level

End of Quadros Presidency via parliamentary approval

(25.08.1961)

1964 Civil Society and Military YesEconomics, Inflation rate and Minimum

Wages and potential coup by Goulart

Protest of Navy Soldiers and Worker Unions for an increase in wages.

Coup d´etats by armed forces (31.03.1964-01.04.1964)

End of the Brazilian Democracy

1961Party (UDN), Civil Society and

MilitarySpeculated Potential coup d´ etats by Quadros Speculative military threat

Manifestations

"Revolution of November 11th" through the Movimento

Constitutionalista Militar - To guarantee the democratically forseen succession of

Kubitschek.

"Junta Provisoria" of officials of the military (25.08.1961 - 07.09.1961)

never took over power, as the parliament continued to rule, and ended

the crisis via introducing the parliamentry democracy. Campanha da

Legalidade.

Introduction of limitations for foreign participants in the domestic market

Suicide of President Vargas

President C. d. Luz impeached by the Congress, Ramos followed as interim-

president by constitution

End of presidential - representative - democracy; introduction of parliamentary democracy

Two Marches (Mai.1957 and October 1958) and economic measures. Military

ended Marches.

Sumoc Nr. 174 and 175 permitting a depreciated exchange rate for coffee.

ManifestationsIncrease in Wages and the end of

Goulart as Minister of Finance

Signalised but never succeded

Yes

Yes

Industrialists vs. Foreign Competitiors

Economics, Inflation rate and Minimum Wages

Threat of the constitutional forseen succession of President Kubitschek by

President C. d. Luz

The constituionally forseen succession of Vice-President Goulart and the

military rejection

Yes (through presidential decret)

Hyperproduction of coffee and consequent drop in prices and call for

governmental subsidized coffee market to keep the prices stable

No Demand for and the implementation of

the wage increase

Military Intervention Cause Form Effect

Civil Society No Direct influence taking

Form of Opposition

Party (UDN), Civil Society and Military

Military

Parliamentary, Civil Society and Military

Year

1947

1954

1955

1961

Civil Society (Coffee Elite and UDN)

Civil Society

42

The proposed accumulative process presents firm evidence of the inefficient response

of the democratic regime towards matters of institutional coherence and cultural congruence.

This gives credence to the theoretically assumed likelihood for regime destabilisation to occur

conditioned by the semi-democratic framework of a regime. This study detected support for

this assumption in the constitution of 1946 that together with the findings shown above,

approves the characterisation of Brazil as deficient democracy.

The analysis of the constitution of 1946 allows the assumption that the overall

constitutional character was affected by and reflected the reciprocal causal chain prior to 1946

but likewise stimulated the proposed mechanism in the democratic period. The evidence

characterises the constitution as a compromise, as it was created by major competing camps of

the elite advocating their principle of coronelismo; the emerging industrialist bourgeoisie and

the technocratic middle class proposing a liberalist democracy and the trabalhistas defending

the national and socialist principle of the Estado Novo. Consequently, the duality of the leading

political camps led to the constitutional codification of a hybrid democracy (Senado Federal,

2012).

The economic order codified in Art. 14514 – establishing a liberal form of the economy

with social market economy aspects, in combination with Art. 146 and Art. 151 – permitting

the government intervention and the introduction of market-protectionist instruments – presents

a form of duality, as liberalism as such is undermined by protectionist proposed elements. Also

Art. 157 – demanding socially equitable economic development – and Art. 156 – creating a

basis for land reform – provides further government difficulty to respond successfully towards

the preferences of the actors in the policy arena (see Table 7 and Table 8). Followed by Art. 141

granting every citizen fundamental rights such as the permission to form political or worker

unions (Art. 141, §11) that is constrained by Art. 158, forming stately organised worker unions.

Besides, the grant for every citizen to vote (Art. 131), the law expels all analphabets (illiterate

persons) from this right (Art. 132), reducing the number of voters to only educated citizens.

Here the law demands unrestricted access to free education (Art. 166) to overcome this obstacle.

Although, elections were free held, until the 1960s the minority participated and decided over

the majority (see Art. 132 in connection with Lei Saraiva, 1881). Also, together with the modest

investment into education to overcome this restriction supports the semi-structure as

democracy. Besides, the constitutional demand of a military intervention in the case of an

emergency or a threat for the democracy leaving the interpretation of this instance open for the

leadership of the armed forces (Art. 177), highlights two significant implications. First, the

14 All articles of the constitution of 1946 were cited from Câmara dos Deputados.

43

constitutional correctness of all military interventions, and second, the vulnerability of the

regime stability in case of affected interests of the forced arms were affected by the

governmental actions. Comparing the events in Table 8 regarding the way in which presidents

have received their office with the articles of the 1946 Constitution provided for this purpose

(Art. 78-89), it can be concluded that de jure all actors have always complied with the

Constitution; de facto, however, they have undermined it through the military.

Overall, considering the formerly presented aspects and the findings examined, this

research successfully provides evidence supporting the characterisation of Brazil as a hybrid

democracy, which lends credence to H3 – hence localizes Brazil at the zero point in Graph 1.

4.2 Alternative Mechanism proposed in the Literature Foreign Influence. The substantial increase in foreign interest in the political orientation and

situation of Brazilian democracy gained importance no later than 1960, after the introduction

of the PEI plan, particularly of the US administration. Following the plan, President Quadros

envisaged an end to the exclusive market opening for the capitalist West and an opening to the

socialist market. The plan based on the need to generate additional markets for reasons of

stabilisation, both of the Brazilian economy and the democratic regime. As previous attempts

of Quadros’s predecessor, Kubitschek, to convince the America government of a second

‘Marshall Plan’ for Latin America to guarantee stabilisation of the continent in terms of

economic and ideological aspects, failed, Quadros had no option than to open Brazils market

(242. Telegram, 1958; Dantas, 2011; da Costa Franco, 2008). Thus, the introduction of the PEI

plan can therefore be interpreted as a political turning point, which fuelled the Americans’

concern about a fall in Brazilian democracy. Ever since the success of the Cuban Revolution in

1959, the US government changed its perspective towards South America, yet lagged specific

economic plan. It was for President Kennedy who initiated his ‘Alliance for Progress’ to create

economic cooperation with Latin American partners that focused not only on economic

development but also on social development, immediately after the introduction of PEI (Dunne,

2016; JFK Library, n.d.; in connection with Brazil: Security, 1961:7, 29-32; 40-43). As

evidence shows, later held analyses over the success and importance of the alliance, specifically

for Brazil, support the accusation against the United States, that the plan produced financial

gains only for the United States and worsened Brazil’s economic condition. However, it is

highly speculative if the US government attempted to destabilise Brazil via its economy, as

44

Kennedy’s plan foresaw precisely the opposite, as it based upon the ideals of the proposed

theoretical framework, to stabilise Brazilian democracy through stabilisation of its economy15.

Nevertheless, the unexpected end of Quadros in 1961 and the political disputes that

followed did not mean a fading of American interest. Instead, it was in the person of Goulart,

the successor provided by the constitution, America’s most significant concern, as he was seen

as a politically volatile politician, with contact to openly socialist actors such as his brother-in-

law Brizola – at this time the leading figurehead of the Campanha da Legalidade (Brazil:

Security, 1961:74). At the latest in 1962, as evidence suggests, the concern of the Kennedy

Administration over Brazils future under Goulart increased. The administration’s concluded

that a coup and the end of Goulart would be the only way to safeguard American interest (Brazil:

Security, 1962:88-97).

Although findings suggest, no direct military participation before 1964, American

interventionism becomes public, especially after the ultimatum of December 1962, in which

Kennedy demanded significant reforms to support Goulart’s presidency. As a result of

increasing tensions in the Brazilian political arena and missing manoeuvres of Goulart in

respect to the ultimatum16, the latest in October 1963, as evidence suggests the United States

endeavoured to intervene actively in Brazilian politics (see Meetings: Tape 114/A50, 1963, in

JFK – Presidential Library and Museum). The evidence points to an intensification of attempted

recruiting of paramilitary units to enable a successful coup; particularly after Brizola’s ‘Grupo

dos Onze’ was founded in 1963. The American side interpreted the group as a potential militia

of communism, potential of repeating the Cuban revolution. Documents provided by the

national security archive, that is, directly attached to the University of Washington, of the last

months of the Kennedy administration, suggest that already in October 1963 the US government

expected a coup from either Goulart or the military camp and that the United States initiated

the planning of a potential coup by taking the Brazilian military as centre. The United States

was well aware of the importance of the mobilisation of the Brazilian military, as the

constitution demanded the latter to defend the republic in the emergence of harm. Overall, the

escalation within Brazilian politics due to the proposed agrarian and land reforms by President

Goulart, and the drastic deterioration of the economy, led the Brazilian military leadership to

directly contact the American embassy, as telegrams sent from the ambassador to the CIA, only

a few days before the coup, show (Hershberg & Kornbluh, 2014; Kornbluh, 2004; Brazil:

15 Document p.41 of Brazil: Security, 1963, supports the assumption of no American intention to destabilize the Brazilian economy. 16 The letter of March 25, 1963, of the Brazilian Minister of Finance Dantas to David E. Bell, Administrator Agency for International Development, highlights the economic will of Brazil to reach the US amendments of the ultimatum of 1962, yet not the social aspects (see Brazil: Security, 1963:74).

45

Security, 1963:83-95). America’s concern was fuelled by the ambassador’s statements that

Goulart was supporting the banned Communist Party. Nevertheless, these telegrams provide

another insight: the military leadership under the lead of Castelo Branco several times before

requested support for a coup, and well informed the US government over their future actions.

The meeting of US officials over the situation in Brazil March 28, however, abandoned the

option of direct intervention, as there was the certainty of success of the military coup without

American help (Hershberg & Kornbluh, 2014; Kornbluh, 2004). After only two days, as the

call between former U.S. President Lyndon Johnson and his then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk

or the conference call published by the LBJ Presidential Library show between President

Johnson, former Under Secretary of State George Wildman Ball and Major General Chester

Clifton, the United States changed its opinion. To secure a military success, the United States

attempted to send three US tankers with military equipment to the port of Santos to guarantee

the end of Goulart (see Telephone conversation #2715, LBJ and Rusk, 1964, in LBJ –

Presidential Archive; and Telephone conversation #2718, LBJ and Rusk, 1964, in LBJ –

Presidential Archive).17

Even though the United States did not intervene in the coup as a result of its brevity and

success, additional telephone calls between President Johnson and then-National Security

Adviser McGeorge Bundy suggest that the White House only refrained from this attempt

because of the certainty that Goulart lost his presidency and that Pascoal Ranieri Mazzilli18

would become interim president (see Telephone conversation #2840, LBJ and Bundy, 1964, in

LBJ – Presidential Archive). Additionally, the Brazilian leadership let the US government

directly know that no support was needed.

Although there can be no question of America’s direct intervention in the coup of 1964,

America, especially Kennedy and his active involvement in Brazilian politics, ensured an

escalation of the hostile camps. If in 1961 one can speak of prevention of political chaos through

the creation of parliamentary democracy, the US government ensured through open

announcements about a feared turn of Brazil to communism that the worries of conservative

and military circles about the end of Brazilian democracy were stimulated.

17 Please see in addition the published documents of these points by P. Kornbluh in the National State Archive, 2004. 18 The US government alongside the military leadership proposed Mazilli as leadership to guarantee a stable regime transition.

46

5. Analysis

5.1 Assumptions by Literature

Figure 2: Proposed Mechanism.

Socioeconomic Development. The theoretical insights that can be drawn from the presented

evidence, resulting from the reciprocal mechanism of socioeconomic development, society and

institutions, central for the regime destabilisation in 1964, are manifold.

First, continuous economic growth can be confirmed, which was, however, marked by

strong booms as well as abrupt and rapid declines in the interim periods (see examples in Table

3). Central to this development was the steadily rising inflation rate, which increased

exponentially from the 1960s and peaked in 1964, as well as the effects of governmental

vacillation between liberalism and interventionism. This finding can be seen as an extension of

previous knowledge, as the latter was a necessary and sufficient condition for the course of the

economy. Central to this fact are the following findings: The economic engine of Brazilian

democracy from 1946 until its end was agriculture. Essential for the course of events was the

political zeitgeist, which saw economic success and stabilisation only in the industrial

development of the country (Furtado, 1961).

Consequently, the state-supported industrialisation of the country, as a result of anti-

liberalist market limitations, resulted in a substitution of the economies of scale that would

Socioeconomic Development

Institutions

Society

Regime Stability or Destabilisation

47

result in a free economy. Note that these subsidies were necessary for driving industrial

technologisation. Overall, these processes resulted in a vicious cycle of continuous subsidies

and the simultaneous accumulation of government debt, which stimulated inflationary growth.

Further knowledge results from the government’s fight against the inflation rate through

increased economic development and simultaneous reduction of the inflation rate, the latter

caused by the minimisation of the money supply in circulation. Nevertheless, the mechanism

described stimulated the latter many times over, if one follows the state of economic knowledge.

This novelty of facts leads to an expansion of the previous state of knowledge of research,

regarding the economic process in interaction with other factors.

Furthermore, it can be confirmed that the rapid industrialisation expected by the

historical school, which, according to the state of knowledge of this work, also led to equally

rapid growth in other sectors. This, in turn, triggered a similarly expected suction effect in the

direction of industrial hubs, which manifested itself in a steadily increasing wave of migration.

In particular, the correlation between industrialisation and migration processes holds essential

information about the state of socioeconomic development in the country and, contrary to what

researchers have expected so far. Primarily, the industrialisation process took place in specific

regions and not in the entire country. Furthermore, the technologisation of agriculture,

especially in the north-east of the country, resulted in a large number of workers becoming

available who, due to the lack of substitutes, had the south-east of the country as their sole

migration destination. As a consequence, this led to rapid urbanisation in the industrial centres

of the country and social distortions concerning the development of living standards.

Central to these developments, according to the evidence, are the governmental interventions

that approved the trend of discrepant industrialisation and stimulated it through financial aid.

Although Brazilian governments possessed legal possibilities for government interventions,

they failed to instrumentalise it to create a counter-trend, until at least the 1950s.

The latter stimulated, in consequence, the necessity of further momentous state

measures, which had in view beside the stabilisation of the economic growth, likewise the

catching up of the society. In this context, the Plano das Metas by Kubitschek should be

mentioned as an initiating programme, which, in addition to economic restructuring through

increased industrialisation, also attempted to confront emerging discrepancies within society. It

was the plan that contributed the most to the betterment of the socioeconomic conditions. An

essential part of it was the foundation of the new capital, Brasilia, as an anchor in the centre of

Brazil, that should create a further state-subsidised substitute for migrants and in turn, create

relief for the industrial centres. Furthermore, with the state improvements in education, the

48

distribution of future work should be brought into the equilibrium since an oversupply of

unqualified workers existed, and an overdemand for qualified forces was conditioned by a lack

of earlier interest in improving education. Notably, the programmes after Kubitschek resorted

to these practices to some extent but were confronted with an accumulation of debt, conditioned

by the application of Keynesian instruments by previous governments, which had to be reduced

by appropriate constraints.

Here the circle for the purely economic consideration closes with another extension of

knowledge, that Brazil, regarding the abundance of the considered aspects, was affected by a

constant change between Keynesian stimulation policy and austerity programmes, which could

not come to the correct effect given the shortness of the period and the continuous change

between them, taking place. Thus, such duality was a necessary condition for the accumulation

of problems of a purely economic nature, which directly influenced the course of social and

political development. In this sense, the development of the economy was also the result of just

mentioned social-institutionalist development.

However, from where did this state-driven and successively increasing accumulation of

state interventions whose essence was characterised by constant duality arise?

Society and Institutions. Another necessary and sufficient condition for the duality of the

interventions was captured by this work in the codified duality character of the constitution of

1946. Here, the view of its time of origin holds central knowledge, for the further course of the

economy and the society in the causal mechanism. Significant for the duality character of the

constitution were the political-social conditions, which reflected the political zeitgeist as a result

of socioeconomic change. The clash of ideologies between the camps of the advocates of feudal

supremacy, liberalist democracy and socialist, as well as communist movements, throughout

the regime transition prior to 1946, characterised and defined, in consequence, the compromised

character of the constitution.

On the one hand, the constitution guaranteed a liberal, democratic necessary order, and

on the other hand it undermined the former through corresponding articles that allowed

restrictions and maintained authoritarian political leadership in parts. At the same time, it

opened up and likewise limited the possibilities of any government of the populist democracy

to adapt its programmes to the prevailing oppositional tendencies and to enforce them.

However, at the same time, maintained and stimulated the continuity of social conflicts,

ideologies and discrepancies. In consequence, duality formed the legal basis for opposition

movements and their political demands. Besides, it also made military intervention possible and

49

ultimately guaranteed constitutional conformity since it approved and demanded it in the case

of threats to democracy. This legal finding already provides evidence of the semi-democratic

order described by researchers as a condition for regime destabilisation.

This confirmation receives further enforcement by the fact that the constitutional

character of duality was consistently realised in practice by the government, society and the

military, after which the hybrid character also emerged in practice.

The multiplicity of Brazilian governments, like programmes, but also the rapidity of the

latter and the brevity of government terms, are clear indications of insufficiency of the

democratic system. Furthermore, the opposition movement and its demands, as a consequence

of crises but also decisively in response to government agitations, reveal the following findings.

First, the government became entangled in the duality of the constitution and, through its

volatility of reforms, stimulated both the economic crisis and oppositional movements. Hence

was a necessary condition for the causal mechanism.

Furthermore, the same reaction to the constant change of the political zeitgeist

conditioned, on the one hand, the continuous need for institutional adaptation, and on the other

hand the creation of additional forms of opposition that made it impossible for any government

to serve any preference during this period. As a result of the inconsistent political style and lack

of confrontation and debate, the strengthening of disloyal opposition, which, as the evidence

shows, manifested itself in a variety of political intrigues and attempted overthrows, reinforced

the damage on democracy. The latter led to a multitude of military interventionism, which until

1961 aimed at defending and upholding the constitutional mandate. After the constitutional

crisis of 1961 however, military interventionism interspersed with social conflicts that

ultimately manifested the military, in the interplay of oppositional activity, in the role of the

central actor in destabilising and ending democracy. This also results in the theoretical novelty

that regimes can also be destabilised in conformity with the constitution, which was the case

for all military interventions during the democratic period (1946–1964).

In general, this research presents evidence, confirming the interplay of the postulated

mechanisms and likewise expanding the general body of knowledge with additional insights

into the actors’ characteristics. Thus, the study affirms that regime destabilisation, conditioned

by mutual and simultaneous interaction of crisis, oppositions and military in terms of agitation

of governments as a result of socioeconomic change, was stimulated by constant duality.

Furthermore, the alternative hypothesis of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) can also be

partially invalidated, since the mechanism as mentioned earlier, while pursuing the creation of

wealth as a primary goal, was not only the case as a result of the introduction of democracy, but

50

already belonged to the principles of trabalhismo19 of the autocratic Estado Novo and found its

way into the new constitution. Yet likewise, this study detected firm evidence for the correct

assumption of both the opposing and confirming school, taking constitutions as additional

precondition for regime destabilisations.

Overall, this thesis considers central to the final destabilisation of the system, the

accumulation of social, political and economic problems, which was conditioned by a multitude

of modest, previous destabilisations. Metaphorically speaking, it took a multitude of small

waves that destabilised the system, which in their wake piled up into a tremendous wave

inducing the end of the regime.

5.2 Alternative Assumption Additional Detected Mechanism. Another essential component that was not mentioned in the

theoretical framework, but can nevertheless be understood as an important component, and

therefore as an extension of the previous theory, is the influence of foreign powers on Brazilian

politics with regard to the 1964 coup. The first important implication of this fact is the reduction

in the number of foreign parties actively involved in these events. This research has thus been

able to discover in the role of the United States as an actor that exerted an evident and

momentous influence on Brazil. Primarily, this involvement was directed at influencing

economic-political issues aimed at ending the Goulart government as early as 1961 to achieve

consolidation of Brazil in terms of its affiliation with the capitalist West.

Second, the causality of this American interference was the dramatic escalation of

Brazilian domestic politics, as oppositional forces on the conservative and military side saw

their fears realised, which explains Goulart’s political style in 1962–1963. The latter was

characterised by political harassment abroad, as well as at home, stressed due to the

deterioration of the economic situation.

Third, it can be assumed that the military leadership under Castelo Branco only saw

itself in a position to carry out the coup after securing support from the American side in case

of need. Although the Americans did not actively participate in military actions or even the

coup itself, the partisanship of foreign forces stimulated the agitation and ideology of the

oppositions, which thereby further intensified the postulated mechanism.

19 See Levine (1998) and CPDOC.b. (n.d.).

51

6. Conclusion A variety of political science schools of thought have long argued that the socioeconomic

development of a country, in interaction with its society and institutions, is central to the

destabilisation of a regime. In particular, the characteristics of the respective regime,

determined by its constitution, are positively correlated with the destabilisation of the regime

itself. The present work addresses the research question of how socioeconomic development

impacts regime stability in Brazil in the context of the change from a democratic to an autocratic

system in 1964.

This study was able to determine that the impact of the relationship between

socioeconomic development and the destabilisation of regimes is due to a reciprocal

mechanism. Socioeconomic influences on society and government, and the influence of the

latter on the evolution of the socio-economy, comprise the causal mechanism. In particular, the

onset of regime destabilisation required an accumulation of conflicts caused by a deepening

economic and social crisis resulting in a series of waves of destabilisation. Moreover, for the

coup d’etat, foreign influence on the reciprocal mechanism was as an essential component

besides the aforementioned requirements.

This paper takes the propositions postulated from the historical and modern school as a

necessary condition for the occurrence of regime destabilisation of the Populist Republic. The

evidence assessed from a macro perspective suggests that Brazilian destabilisation successfully

occurred due to (1) an all-encompassing duality, reflected in the character of the constitution,

resulting from socioeconomic development and its influence on the changing society, thereby

manifesting a semi-democracy; (2) a realisation and stimulation of the duality, as mentioned

earlier, within society, including institutions and (3) and the exertion of the duality’s influence

on institutions resulting from the reciprocal mechanism, which altogether were necessary

conditions for the aggravation and accumulation of the Brazilian crises.

Central to the analysis of regime destabilisation is the consideration of both

socioeconomic aspects, in terms of their development and their effect on social and institutional

effects and reactions, as necessary conditions for the occurrence of a coup d’etat. In this sense,

separate considerations of the aspects at play would lead to distortion and a one-sided view of

the existing processes. This is due to the nature of the matter as socioeconomic development

and its all-encompassing influence already include social and political components in the

mechanics. Also, the analysis of merely economic reasons for destabilisation to occur would be

distorting, as essential aspects of social and institutional reactions, which are necessary to

understand the processes at work, would be ignored. The course of the Brazilian Republic in

52

1946 supports this assumption, as the multiplicity of governments, programmes, state

interventions in the market, oppositions and destabilisations, caused and were caused by this

proposed mechanism. Accordingly, this work provides empirical evidence supporting the

recommended triangulation of the theories that so far have been considered separately or only

partially together.

Furthermore, this study contributes to the expansion of knowledge for the following

reasons. First, so far as known, this thesis is the first to identify non-statistical, hence purely

empirical, evidence for the correlation of the postulated causal mechanism for regime

destabilisation. Previous studies on this topic have concentrated purely on finding statistical

evidence and neglected essential features of the process. Using a qualitative process-tracing

method, this work focused on a purely reciprocal causal mechanism, shedding light on the high

complexity of events in the course of the populist democracy and simplifying it for research.

The process-tracing method enabled this work to test and confirm the postulated theoretical

mechanisms of the causal process. Second, this work contributes to the convergence of

historical and modern schools in the field of political research, thus expanding knowledge for

the following reason. The successful empirical proof of the correlation of the triangulated model

confirms the correctness of previous schools of thought and provides a foundation for future

research. Third, this research contributes to the confirmation of the postulated mechanism, the

traits and aspects in question, including further indicators of the aspects.

Given the findings of this work, it can be concluded that Brazilian democracy was, from

the beginning, virtually doomed to be destabilised and overthrown. The conflicts of the final

period of the Estado Novo, which were rooted in a duality of political camps influenced by the

postulated mechanism, simultaneously formed the codified basis of the still-young democracy.

The Constitution, in connection with social, economic and political developments, left no

possibility of harmonisation and redundancy of the duality. In particular, the motto of the

republic, Ordem e Progresso, already hints at the symptomatology that led the country to fall.

The quest for order and progress stimulated the causal reciprocal mechanism and ultimately led

to its opposite in 1964. Another important facet of this work is the possibility in today’s politics

to examine the situation and mistakes of the past to avoid repetition. Although there is an

assumption that Brazil has changed and improved over the years, essential aspects of the causal

reciprocal mechanism can still be seen today. The longitude and nature of destabilisation may

be different, but a system characterised by duality still exists today. This work enhances views

of the past and facilitates learning from it.

53

6.1. Limitations and Future Directions This study has the typical limitations of within-case qualitative analysis. On the one hand, this

form of research design is confronted with the question of the validity of the research result,

since the selection and interpretation of the case is entirely dependent on the researcher.

Although this type of design allows for a broader insight into the events, it still bears the danger

of including the subjectivity of the researcher by bringing in personal expertise. Also, this

research has limited possibilities for generalising findings, as it focused specifically on the

unique case of the regime destabilisation of Brazil in 1964. By focusing on a specific case,

extrapolation to larger groups is therefore difficult. Although there have been many military

coups in the history of humanity, particularly in the 20th century, this does not imply a

necessary similarity that would support generalisability of these cases. Even if the mechanism

mentioned above comes into force concerning processes that lead to the destabilisation and fall

of regimes, they still require specific analysis. Also, if there are similarities between the case of

Brazilian democracy and those of southern European states, such as Spain and Italy in the

1930s, due to the semi-structured democracy and the omnipresent duality in the causal process

of socioeconomic influence, individual analyses are still required (Brenan, 2014; Griffin, 2007).

In the Brazilian case, one cannot speak of a shift between fascism and communism, but of a

multiplicity of political ideologies that emerged.

Furthermore, the design applied includes the circumstance of being borne out of the

researcher’s interest in the specific subject area, which makes future research questionable. This

circumstance can lead to entirely new results and make previous research findings inconsistent

or redundant. For example, the singularity of earlier research on the case of Brazil took

Kubitschek’s stimulus programme as the main reason for the end of Brazilian democracy

without, however, listing any informative sources or attempting to rationalise this circumstance

(i.e., Wallerstein, 1980). Nevertheless, this work has taken the aforementioned work, among

others, as an incentive to analyse the case of the end of democracy in Brazil from a new

perspective.

This case study holds several expectations for future research. On the one hand, it would

be advisable to follow up on the expansion of the findings of this research and continually

extend them. Likewise, a statistical examination of the empirical evidence produced here would

be advantageous in providing additional validity, free of the subjectivity of the researcher, for

the postulated causal mechanism and its effect on regime destabilisation. Thus, it is also

advisable to explore the possible continuity of the process mentioned above in other regimes in

Brazil to provide a general insight into the fundamental nature of the multitude of regimes that

54

the country has experienced. The following research question is recommended in this case:

What impact did socioeconomic development have on the number of regimes in Brazil? From

this, additional vital characteristics of Brazil can be identified that are essential for averting and

preventing future destabilisation or threats to democracy in Brazil. Other important questions

that would allow for a micro perspective and a more in-depth exploration of the characteristics

of individual social actors and their impacts within this process are the following: What role

did the elite and coronelismo play in the causal mechanism? How do military regimes evolve

under the influence of socioeconomic development? The hope resting in these questions is that

future research will develop a set of detection mechanisms based on the findings of this thesis

to identify individual case-specific assumptions and recommendations.

55

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Documents: Brazil: Security, 1961. JFKPOF-112-013-p0044 (1961, January 23 – October 23). Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Accessed December 15, 2020, from https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/112/JFKPOF-112-013 Brazil: Security, 1962. JFKPOF-112-014-p0099 (1961, October 1 – 1962, December 7). Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Accessed December 15, 2020, from https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/112/JFKPOF-112-014 Brazil: Security, 1963. JFKPOF-112-015-p0069 (1963, February 1 – October 11). Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Accessed December 15, 2020, from https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/112/JFKPOF-112-015 Diário do Congresso Nacional.a. (1961, August 26), p. 162-163. Câmara dos Deputados. Retrieved December 16, 2020, from https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/plenario/discursos/escrevendohistoria/emenda-parlamentarista Diário do Congresso Nacional.b. (1961, August 29), p. 165-175. Câmara dos Deputados. Retrieved December 16, 2020, from https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/plenario/discursos/escrevendohistoria/emenda-parlamentarista Diário do Congresso Nacional.c. (1961, September 3), p. 162- 163. Câmara dos Deputados. Retrieved December 16, 2020, from https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/plenario/discursos/escrevendohistoria/emenda-parlamentarista Diário do Congresso Nacional.d. (1961, September 7), p. 195- 213. Câmara dos Deputados. Retrieved December 16, 2020, from https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/plenario/discursos/escrevendohistoria/emenda-parlamentarista Anais da Câmara dos Deputados. (1961, September 1), p. 400-453. Câmara dos Deputados. Retrieved December 16, 2020, from https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/plenario/discursos/escrevendohistoria/emenda-parlamentarista 242. Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State (1958, May 23). FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1958–1960, AMERICAN REPUBLICS, VOLUME V. Office of the Historian. Accessed December 15, 2020, from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d242 Manuscrito do Presidente Getúlio Vargas defendendo o monopólio estatal na exploração de fontes energéticas. Classificação: GV rem 2 1951/1954.00.00/2 [Manuscript by President Getulio Vargas defending the state monopoly on the exploitation of energy sources. Classification: GV rem 2 1951/1954.00.00/2]. Arquivo: Getúlio Vargas. Retrieved December 29, 2020, from https://docvirt.com/docreader.net/DocReader.aspx?bib=GV_RemSup2&pagfis=5

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Presidente da República\João Goulart pr (1964, February 9) [President of the Republic Goulart pr (1964, February 9)]. JG pr 1964.02.19 (11 pages). Arquivo: Getúlio Vargas. Retrieved December 29, 2020, from https://docvirt.com/docreader.net/DocReader.aspx?bib=PresRepubli&pagfis=2738 Newspaper Articles: Folha de São Paulo. (1961, August 25). Archive Folha de São Paulo. Accessed December 15, 2020, from https://acervo.folha.com.br/leitor.do?numero=514&anchor=4489696&origem=busca&originURL=&pd=2ac988a19925b8ed40c86f27f892b9c8 Folha de São Paulo. a. (1964, March 26). Archive Folha de São Paulo. Accessed December 15, 2020, from https://acervo.folha.com.br/leitor.do?numero=1435&anchor=4448213&origem=busca&originURL= Folha de São Paulo (complete). b. (1964, April 1). Archive Folha de São Paulo. Accessed December 15, 2020, from https://acervo.folha.com.br/leitor.do?numero=1441&anchor=4420468&origem=busca&originURL=&pd=4b97c82bd131cc25147fabe36534f21d Folha da Noite (1955, November 11). Archive Folha de São Paulo. Accessed December 15, 2020, from https://acervo.folha.com.br/leitor.do?numero=43807&anchor=4709946&origem=busca&originURL= O Globo (2013, July 25). Em 1961, após sete meses de governo, Jânio Quadros renuncia à Presidência [In 1961, after seven months of government, Jânio Quadros resigned as President]. Acervo O Globo. Accessed December 15, 2020, from https://acervo.oglobo.globo.com/fatos-historicos/em-1961-apos-sete-meses-de-governo-janio-quadros-renuncia-presidencia-9187910

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Appendix Table I: Real Minimum Wages per Month – Basis for Graph 1 (Chapter 4.1).

Source: IPEADATA.com.br, 2020 – Publication of all real minimum wages per month. Note: The sum is the average real minimum wage per annum.

Table II: Number of Telephones – 1907–1968.

January February March April May June July August September October November December1946 604,05 602,43 604,05 597,42 591,05 580,09 571,74 538,65 518,24 499,33 486,04 476,51 555,81947 451 444,18 437,51 436,6 442,78 451,96 470,93 471,91 462,93 458,59 456,67 450,1 452,931948 443,25 442,11 441,54 440,41 437,62 434,3 433,21 431,58 429,97 428,36 427,3 425,71 434,6133331949 421,55 417,97 413,95 410 406,62 402,81 401,4 400,47 399,08 396,78 394,51 390,04 404,5983331950 390,92 390,04 388,72 388,72 397,69 397,69 387,41 386,54 385,24 381,82 378,88 375,58 387,43751951 368,35 361,01 354,32 349,65 345,09 340,66 338,98 337,32 335,68 332,44 328,94 325,83 343,1891671952 996,87 967,61 939,2 932,75 926,4 920,13 916,25 912,41 908,6 901,07 893,66 885,66 925,0508331953 870,77 856,37 842,44 834,04 825,81 818,35 808,62 799,7 790,4 788,68 786,97 785,83 817,3316671954 763,22 740,86 721,21 711,31 701,67 692,73 1367,18 1349,37 1332,01 1315,1 1298,61 1283,29 1023,046671955 1245,09 1208,43 1175,77 1164,44 1152,72 1141,83 1131,14 1120,65 110,35 1094,15 1078,42 1063,66 1057,220831956 1030,89 999,16 971,5 959,5 947,38 935,96 919,35 1430,25 1406,3 1384,26 1362,89 1342,7 1140,8451957 1298,17 1255,11 1216,97 1210,56 1204,21 1197,51 1195,43 1193,36 1190,88 1185,55 1180,27 1175,04 1208,588331958 1150,7 1126,97 1104,92 1091,27 1077,94 1064,95 1054,83 1044,91 1035,18 1020,76 1006,73 993,38 1064,378331959 1493,53 1425,41 1363,58 1340,06 1317,33 1295,37 1279,52 1264,05 1248,95 1221,46 1194,89 1169,7 1301,154171960 1127,97 1089,11 1051,83 1035,8 1020,25 1004,98 992,69 980,69 968,81 1514,49 1480,47 1447,95 1142,921961 1392,56 1341,46 1293,79 1265,01 1237,66 1211,29 1192,04 1173,24 1155,01 1552,51 1492,77 1437,46 1312,066671962 1345,67 1264,9 1193,28 1154,6 1118,34 1084,3 1056,74 1030,54 1005,7 975,81 968,05 921,13 1093,2551963 1336,39 1247,24 1169,19 1130,82 1094,91 1061,21 1024,92 991,03 959,32 922,58 888,6 856,91 1056,926671964 793,3 1485,14 1393,38 1348,84 1305,9 1266,87 1219,31 1175,19 1133,18 1081,29 1033,91 989,98 1185,52417

Year Real Minimum Wages per Month Σ

States of the Federation1907 1938 (1) 1944 1950 1961 1964 1968

BRAZIL 15 208 187 225 373 499 521 222 1 108 149 1 282 942 1 667 225 Rondônia — — 80 42 ... 191 610

Acre — — 2 65 ... 196 666Amazonas 270 726 1 237 1 568 3 077 3 051 6 213 Roraima — — — 37 ... ... 305

Pará 388 2 887 3 419 4 352 8 014 9 752 11 418 Amapá — — — — 96 132 365

Maranhão 297 705 916 1 004 2 103 2 154 3 249 Piauí — 400 700 700 1 600 2 052 3 462 Ceará 139 1 000 2 079 5 249 17 953 17 494 27 370

Rio Grande do Norte — 392 532 1 625 3 889 4 658 5 716 Paraíba 70 576 1 078 1 685 3 782 4 410 8 713

Pernambuco 631 4 101 6 089 8 434 8 083 22 475 34 889 Alagoas 132 597 779 842 1 010 2 691 6 398 Sergipe 5 450 500 750 1 720 1 898 2 226 Bahia 554 5 693 8 087 11 369 13 953 21 033 32 947

Minas Gerais 532 6 440 22 405 30 893 82 241 104 585 148 754 Espírito Santo 17 1 075 1 385 1 707 7 049 9 201 14 253 Ria de Janeiro 3 365 101 098 161 252 223 585 396 701 420 227 479 203

São Paulo 5 399 48 698 125 005 168 278 441 743 506 407 660 271 Paraná 488 3 095 7 152 12 347 33 084 40 867 55 239

Santa Catarina 106 582 3 808 4 863 10 086 11 188 16 010 Rio Grande do Sul 2 815 8 434 25 760 40 503 58 623 66 378 85 657 Mato Grosso (2) — 276 592 631 4 825 5 857 12 002

Goiás — — 642 693 8 517 11 477 20 454 Distrito Federal — — — — — 14 568 30 835

Number of Telephones

68

Source: IBGE (1990:477). Note: Relative Dates for 1968, here IBGE counted telephones in use; (1) number of telephones for the capitals of the federal states; (2) includes Mato Grosso do Sul. Also, the numbers of telephones for the Distrito Federal are available only from 1961 onwards, as the federal district was established only in 1960, the year of the inauguration of the new capital (Langland & Schwarcz, 2018). Table III: Professional Fields of Activity – 1940-1960.

Source: IBGE (1965:35). Note: This census counted people over the age of 10.

1940 1950 1960 1940 1950 1960Year / Absolute Numbers Year / Total %

Agricultural 9 453 512 9 886 934 11 697 798 0.3256 0.2704 0.2399

Professional Fields of ActivityPopulation over 10

0.0118

Transformational Industry1 137 356 1 608 309 2 059 962 0.0392 0.0440 0.0425

Extracting Industry390 560 482 972 573 443 0.0134 0.0132

0.0161

Commerce 749 143 958 509 1 520 046 0.0258 0.0262 0.0312

Construction Industry 262 700 584 644 785 014 0.0090 0.0160

0.0223

Provision of Services 1 437 320 1 672 802 2 732 148 0.0495 0.0458 0.0560

Transport, Communication, Logistics 500 184 697 089 1 088 798 0.0172 0.0191

0.0448

Inactive Conditions 14 279 251 19 440 628 26 110 204 0.4918 0.5318 0.5354

Others 827 823 1 226 103 2 184 052 0.0285 0.0335

1Total 29 037 849 36 557 990 48 761 467 1 1

69

Table IV: Literacy Rate, by age of groups – 1940-1960.

Source: IBGE (1965:35). Table V: Privately Occupied Homes.

Source: IBGE (1965:316). Note: The results of 1960 are probabilistic numbers.

Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women5 years and older 38,2 42,31 34,11 42,66 46,01 39,33 53,57 56,14 51,0310 years and older 43,04 48,15 37,99 48,35 52,62 44,17 60,63 64,03 57,315 years and older 43,78 50,18 37,48 49,31 54,7 44,06 60,52 64,9 56,24

Periods 1940 1950 1960

Age Literacy Rate by age of groups (%)

Years 1940 1950 1960 1940 1950 1960

The Situation of Living Urban / Suburban 2 509 639 3 730 368 6 550 784 31,77 37,13 48,61

Rural 5 388 130 6 315 831 6 924 688 68,23 62,87 51,39

Type of OccupationOwnership 3 450 109 5 256 178 7 739 077 43,68 52,12 57,44Tenantship 1 647 913 2 323 573 3 027 210 20,87 23,13 22,46

Different or No Declaration 2 799 699 2 486 448 2 709 185 35,45 24,75 20,1

Existing InstallationsPiped Water 1 025 562 1 563 272 2 833 622 12,09 15,56 21,03Electric Light 1 317 967 2 466 898 5 209 987 16,69 24,56 38,66

Sanitary Installation 1 167 973 3 317 562 6 862 327 14,79 33,02 50,92Total 7 897 769 10 046 199 13 475 472 100 100 100

Specification Privately Occupied HomesAbsolute Numbers % of the Total

70

Table VI: Development of Domestic Migrants in 1950.

States of Brazil

(Sudeste/Nordeste,

excluding the other

regions)

Total

Number of

Natural

Inhabitants

(1950)

Naturals of the

State

(1950)

Number of

domestic

Migrants

(1950)

Percentage of

domestic migrants

(1950)

São Paulo 8.440.768 7.360.340 1.064.009 12.61%

Rio de Janeiro 2.258.480 1.889.733 365.756 16.19%

Espiríto Santo 854.968 761.769 92.787 10.85%

Minas Gerais 7.684.837 7.469.031 210.868 2.74%

Alagoas 1.092.695 1.025.552 66.675 6.10%

Bahia 4.826.278 4.682.223 140.894 2.92%

Ceará 2.693.862 2.584.369 107.538 3.99%

Maranhão 1.582.157 1.420.188 161.117 10.18%

Paraíba 1.712.688 1.611.323 100.159 5.85%

Pernambuco 3.389.573 3.180.111 207.310 6.12%

Piaui 1.045.419 958.588 86.330 8.26%

Rio Grande do

Norte

967.417 889.665 77.288 7.99%

Sergipe 644.097 607.635 36.170 5.62%

Brazil 50.727.113 45.462.983 5.206.319 10.26% Source: IBGE (1955:71).

Note: Excluded in this table are the states of the North, and the South, here only regions of the South-East = Sudeste (São

Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espiríto Santo and Minas Gerais) and the North-East = Nordeste (Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará Maranhão,

Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piaui, Rio Grande do Norte, Sergipe), are presented, to highlight the drastic migratory movements

particularly in these regions. However, the total number of migrants for the country Brazil, include the numbers of all federal

states.