Impact of Quality in Orbital Science’s

Human Spaceflight Programs Presented at the 20th Conference on Quality in the Space and Defense Industries

Frank L. Culbertson

Senior Vice President and Deputy General Manager

Advanced Programs Group

Agenda

Orion

COTS/CRS

SRQ&A Impact on Programs

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Orion

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Orion Launch Abort System Summary

LAS is Designed to Remove the Crew during a Launch Vehicle Failure While on the Pad Up to Nominal Jettison at Approximately 200 kft

LAS Accomplishes this Mission

Using Three Solid Motors

Trajectory Optimization During the Abort

Lightweight Composite Structures

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PA-1 Mission

PA-1 Mission: Demonstrate Pad Abort Capability

The PA-1 LAS has over 300

Instruments on It to Measure

the Flight Environments

During the Test Flight

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PA-1 Integration Complete

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PA-1 Flight Test May 6, 2010 – Success!

•The Launch Abort System Developed for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle

Was Successfully Tested on May 6, 2010.

•The 97-second Flight Test Was the First Fully Integrated Test of the Launch

Abort System Developed for Orion

COTS/CRS

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Low Earth Orbit Transfer Operations

Drawing Upon Its 30 Years Of Satellite And Major Space Systems Development And

Operations Experience, Orbital Sciences Corporation Has Embarked On A New Venture

To Provide Low Earth Orbit Cargo Transfer Services To NASA’s ISS Program

• Under the joint NASA / Orbital

Commercial Orbital Transportation

Services (COTS) program, Orbital is

Developing the “Cygnus” Advanced

Maneuvering Space Vehicle, Which is

Designed to Meet the Stringent Safety

Requirements for International Space

Station (ISS) Operations.

• The Cygnus Spacecraft Will Provide

Cargo Resupply to the ISS Program under

the Cargo Resupply Services Contract

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International Space Station Overview The International Space Station is the largest and most complex international

scientific project in history. Led by the United States, the International Space Station draws upon the scientific and technological resources of 16 nations: Canada, Japan, Russia, 11 nations of the European Space Agency, and Brazil

More than four times as large as the Russian Mir space station, the completed International Space Station will have a mass of about 472,000 kg. It will measure 356 feet across and 290 feet long, with almost an acre of solar panels to provide electrical power to six state-of-the-art laboratories.

The station is in an orbit with an altitude of approximately 400 km with an inclination of 51.6 degrees. The orbit provides excellent Earth observations with coverage of 85 percent of the globe and over flight of 95 percent of the population.

The ISS houses an international crew of 6.

2012 a Big Year For Cygnus and Antares

COTS Demo and CRS Orb-1 Spacecraft

in Advanced Testing

Thermal Vacuum Testing, Mechanical

Environments for COTS Demo

EMI/EMC Testing, Thermal Vacuum

Testing and Mechanical Environments for

Orb-1

Demo Software Ready for Final Joint

Testing

Antares Forging Ahead with Significant

Hardware Deliveries and Integration

Activities for Test Launch and COTS

Demo Launchers

Pad Turnover in Less Than 2 Months!

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Currently Under Contract

to Support NASA

International Space Station

(ISS) Re-supply Missions

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Update – Welcome Antares

STAGE 1

• Liquid Oxygen/RP-1 fueled

• Two AJ26 engines with independent

thrust vectoring

• 3.9 meter booster derived from

heritage Zenit design

STAGE 2

• ATK CASTOR® 30/30B Solid Motor with Active

Thrust Vectoring

• Orbital MACH avionics module

• Cold-gas 3-axis Attitude Control System

PAYLOAD FAIRING

• 3.9 meter diameter by 9.9 meter envelope

• Composite Construction

• Non-contaminating Separation Systems

Designed to Provide

Versatile, Cost-effective

Access to Space for

Medium-Class Payloads

Antares Hardware Progress

Booster Main Engine

System

Upper Stack

1st Four Engines

Successfully

Hot-fire Tested @

Stennis

1st Three Engines

Delivered to Wallops

Hot Fire Test Engines

Integrated into Engine

Section

Upper Stack &

Cygnus Pathfinder

Complete

Upper Stack

Integration @

Wallops

Avionics Testing

Complete

Hot Fire and Test Flight Boosters

Being Processed @ Wallops

CRS Launch Cores Delivered

ORB-1 Launch

Booster Tankage

Complete

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Antares WFF Launch Site Progress

Horizontal Integration

Facility

Launch Pad Infrastructure

Ramp & Flame

Trench Complete

Tanks Installed

Deluge Tower

Complete

HIF GSE

Delivered

TEL Complete

Transporters

Available

TEL Pathfinder

On-Going

Structure

Complete

Interior

Complete

Occupancy 3/11

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Wallops Launch Pad Nearing Completion

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TEL Pathfinder Nov 2011 Featuring Rapid Retract and 2X Load Proof Test

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Aft Bay Mated to Core for Pad Hot Fire

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Engine 7 Acceptance Testing - 17 Nov 2011

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Cygnus Service Modules for Demo and Orb-1 in Test at Dulles VA

19 Orbital Proprietary Information

Orb 1 Cygnus Service Module in EMI and TVAC Testing at Dulles VA

20 Orbital Proprietary Information

Pressurized Cargo Modules at Thales Alenia, Italy

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Demo Mission Pressurized Cargo Module at Wallops Flight Facility

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Service Module/Pressurized Cargo Module Fit Check

Phased Safety Review

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COTS/CRS Safety Implementation Process

Cygnus safety requirements defined in the COTS Interface Requirements Document (IRD), with specific requirements for control of Catastrophic and Critical hazards Has been overriding consideration in Cygnus design trades, from inception of the program Redundancy in critical hardware functions

Follows “phased” safety review process with JSC/ISS Safety Review Panel (SRP) 3 Phases that correlate to spacecraft design maturity

First Review (Phase I) conducted in February 2009, with 80% of the SRP’s attention

directed to the Cygnus “Collision” hazard report Cygnus Phase II safety review (for detailed design phase) was successfully

completed in November 2009

Follow-on reviews have been held to brief the SRP on design updates and testing issues

Phase III Review in progress All hazard reports but Collision have been presented to the Board Some hazard controls have been closed to the “Verification Test Log” – to be closed closer

to flight

Phase I Lessons Learned

Show top-down approach to addressing system hazards

Puts emphasis on System Engineering; de-emphasizes subsystem bottoms-up approach

Show how causes logically map to the system architecture

Show that the Nominal Mission works and is safe

End to end vehicle performance works and is safe (under nominal scenarios)

Description of mission phases, including hardware required and performance criteria

End-to-end description of sensor to effector control functions

Analysis of error budgets (e.g. Trajectory, Navigation, Guidance, Control, Etc.) during approach to control trajectory dispersions

Fault tolerant approach for each failure and error type

Avoid overreliance on heritage spacecraft hardware and software

Can provide confidence in selected units, but must verify system requirements met for ISS Visiting Vehicles

Clearly demonstrate robustness of the Control Loop architecture

Show separate, independent control paths for inhibits and controls

Bias toward simplicity and control of hazard by design, as opposed to “reactive” controls

March 2010

Slide 27

Phase I Lessons Learned (cont)

Nominal Performance = expected system performance

FDIR Threshold = trigger limit for a fault (value in SW)

Fault Dynamics = worst case vehicle motion upon hitting FDIR limit (where you really are by end of the response)

Includes uncertainties, persistence, disable, switching, initialization, & transients

Budget Allocation = budgeted performance including worst-case uncertainties and transitions

Prefer to have larger than Fault Dynamics, but might not be in all cases

Safe Abort Threshold = auto-abort

FDIR THRESHOLD

SAFE ABORT THRESHOLD

NOMINAL PERF

FAULT DYNAMICS

BUDGET ALLOC

Address Time-to-Effect

•Minimize its application

•Clarify the limited situations where we have A non-

zero time-to-effect versus where prevention is

utilized

•Show by analysis our system time-to-effect

limitations, and that we are safe with our

implementation (see next slides)

Phase I Lessons Learned (cont)

The Major Takeaways

Successful completion of the Safety process requires engagement of the entire

engineering team!

S&MA, Systems, Subsystem leads

Safety design fully integrated into the System architecture

Strong review role by Chief Engineer, Program Management and independent senior

staff

Technical leadership must come from within the project

Consultants and Engineering Support contractors can provide an important support

and/or review role, but leadership must be within the project

Successful Safety program requires total

integration of the S&MA and Engineering

teams

SRP Phase III Progress to Date

Date Event Products

July 20

2011

Data Drop: SRP Phase III Part 1 HRs • CYG-03, -04, -05, -09, -11, -14

• Supporting Evidence

August 12

2011

Data Drop: CBCS Analysis / FDIR Design • CBCS Analysis

• CBCS Hardware Analysis

• CBCS Timing Analysis

• FDIR Design Documents

August 24-26

2011

SRP TIM: CBCS Analysis / FDIR Review • Summary Presentation (dropped Aug 15)

September 1

2011

SRP III Part 1: Review of 6 HRs

• Summary Presentation (dropped Aug 31)

• July 20 Data Drop

September 30

2011

Data Drop: SRP Phase III Part 2 HRs • CYG-02, -06, -07, -08, -10, -12, -13, -15

• Supporting Evidence

October 18-20

2011

SRP III Part 2: Review of 8 HRs • Summary Presentation (dropped Oct 14)

• Vol 3 – Evidence Index (dropped Oct 14)

• September 30 Data Drop

November 8-9

2011

SRP TIM: FDIR Design / CBCS Analysis Part 2 • Action Item Closure from Aug 24-26 Mtg

• System Timeline and Operability Analysis

• CBCS Analysis

April 2012 Data Drop: SRP Phase III Part 3 HR • CYG-01 Collision

• Supporting Evidence

May 2012 SRP III Part 3: Review of 1 HR • Summary Presentation

• Data Drop

Status of Cygnus SRP III Hazard Reports

HR ID HR Title Meeting Status Notes

CYG-01 Collision SRP III Part 3 Not yet Submitted Planned to submit for SRP in 2012

CYG-02 Battery Explosion SRP III Part 2 Open

Pending Orbital incorporation of

comments from Battery Specialist

and her approval voiced to the SRP

CYG-03 Impact with Detached Equipment SRP III Part 1 Approved 2 verifications on VTL

CYG-04 Impact with Moving Equipment SRP III Part 1 Approved 2 verifications on VTL

CYG-05 Depressurization of ISS SRP III Part 1 Approved 9 verifications on VTL

CYG-06 PCM Fire Event SRP III Part 2 Approved 8 verifications on VTL

CYG-07 Propulsion Explosion SRP III Part 2 Approved 9 verifications on VTL

CYG-08 Contamination, Toxicity, or Irrespirable Atmosphere SRP III Part 2 Approved 13 verifications on VTL

CYG-09 External ISS Contamination SRP III Part 1 Approved 0 verifications on VTL

CYG-10 Structural Failure SRP III Part 2 Open Pending NASA review of Fracture

Control Plan, Report, and MUAs

CYG-11 PCM Hull Fracture or Damage SRP III Part 1 Approved 4 verifications on VTL

CYG-12 EVA Crew Hazards SRP III Part 2 Approved 8 verifications on VTL

CYG-13 IVA Hazards to Crew SRP III Part 2 Open Pending NASA approval of a NASA

generated NCR for acoustic noise

CYG-14 Impact or Collision with Meteoroid or Debris SRP III Part 1 Approved 0 verifications on VTL

CYG-15 Radiation from Natural or Induced Environments SRP III Part 2 Open Pending Orbital’s completion of SM

EMI/EMC testing

CYG-16 Ground Hazards during Integrated Operations SRP III Part 2 Approved 49 verifications on VTL

Reliability Lab

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Background

76 Pressure Transducers (PT) have flown on similar Orbital Propulsion Subsystems

3 instances of PT output signal drift with PTs using pressure caps from Steel HT

3PX1

Root Cause for both confirmed failures attributed to material defects within the 304L

Pressure Cap Steel

Defects (Stringers) allowed leaks to propagate through pressure cap and into body cavity,

which resulted in output signal drift

No external leaks observed [postulated to be due to bar rolling orientation]

Leak

Location

Defect Details – Star-2 Unit Testing

Drifting unit removed from Star-2 and sent to Taber for evaluation/testing

Testing included leak visual inspection, baseline characterization, leak and snoop

– Leak testing confirmed an internal leak via presence of helium in the transducer evacuated chamber

– Snoop/IPA bath testing grossly located the leak location in the pressure cap

– Leak rate determined to be 5X10-6 scc/s GHe leak r

Unit was then shipped back for DPA in Orbital’s Reliability Analysis Lab

Leak

location

Bubble Traces

Defect Details – Star-2 Unit Testing Orbital Testing

Unit was received at Orbital and a “pie section” taken, centered around the suspected failure area

Cross sectioning of the pie section proceeded very slowly to ensure that any “smoking gun” stringer was not bypassed

Though no stringer was found to be planar and linearly continuous through the entire thickness, the suspected failure site had a high density of stringers that could have joined 3 dimensionally to traverse the entire thickness

As described by Orbital’s RAL: “These images capture what would seem to be the most likely leakage path for this failure. In addition to the MnS stringers imaged, there is a rather long, contiguous silicate stringer that was persistent during sectioning in this area (can be seen to the lower right image) and was probably a contributor to the leakage path.”

Summary

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Summary

Orbital has demonstrated its commitment to Quality in its Human Space Flight

Programs

Successful LAS Test

COTS and CRS Progress

Orbital Continues to Make Progress Toward Antares Test Launch and COTS

Demonstration Mission

Facilities at Wallops Nearing Completion

Antares Hardware for First 3 Missions Either Integrated or Available for Integration

Cygnus Spacecraft for First 2 Missions Completing Testing and Ready for Integration

at Launch Site in May 2012

Schedule for Major Mission Milestones Firming Up

Pad Turnover in Early April

Pad First Stage Hot Fire in May

Test Flight in June

COTS Demo in September (Dependant on NASA approval)

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Questions?