Impact of North Korean Nuclearization on Japan’s Nuclear...

Impact of North Korean Nuclearization on Japan’s Nuclear Policy

Ms. ANUPAM SHUKLA

Ph D Scholar in Japanese Studies

Centre for East Asian Studies (CEAS)

Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Delhi-110067, INDIA

ABSTRACT

The North Korean Nuclear Crisis is one of the most debated issues of the contemporary world

order. North Korea’s nuclear programme has raised security concerns world over. While the

security concerns over the issue in global context seems relevant, the immediate threat that

lies for Japan is a matter of grave concern for the Japanese. Historical evidence is a proof that

the two nations i.e. Japan and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), have not

been in the best of terms since the Korean occupation by the Japanese and the historical

animosity between the two is yet to be resolved. The purpose behind choosing this particular

topic came with the interest in exploring North Korea’s nuclear programme and also to

analyse the impact it has served in the Japan-US relationship.This study has analyzed how

changing dynamics of East Asia has redefined Japan nuclear policy. The study tried to this by

focusing on North Korea as the primary source of threat. While the role of the rise of China

and other actors in the region is also considered, the central independent variable is North

Korean provocations.. The direct threat for Japan from North Korea is very high as it hosts

the US bases on its territory. North Korean nuclearisation brought Japans’ nuclear policy to

the fore. Japan’s resolution to renounce nuclear weapons can be traced back to 1968 when the

prime minister declared his four nuclear principles in the Diet and pledged that Japan will not

manufacture, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil. Japan

has reacted to North-Korea nuclear proliferation rather than taking a policy directive. Japan

has continued to rely on economic and financial sanction in response to North-Korean tests.

Keywords:North Korean Nuclear Crisis, security concerns, Fragile relation, nuclear

. programme, Japan nuclear policy. economic and financial sanction

Introduction

Japan is the only country in the world which has been attacked by nuclear weapons (by the

fag end of the Second World War). Thus, there is a big presence of anti-nuclear sentiments in

the public. Japan, for a long time, has pushed and advocated for nuclear non-proliferation,

disarmament and a commitment against acquiring an indigenous nuclear arsenal. The

advocacy for disarmament, in particular, has been notable. Japan does not possess nuclear

weapons and has long cherished a goal of making the public aware of nuclear disarmament

and increasing international public opinion on its goals.

Journal of Xi'an University of Architecture & Technology

Volume XII, Issue IV, 2020

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Though Japan is an ardent advocate of nuclear disarmament it is always surrounded by

nuclear weapons in the era after the World War II. In the beginnings of the cold war US and

USSR started equipping themselves with nuclear weapons which came to light during the

nuclear threat issued by the US during the Korean War. Cold war dynamics enabled the

People’s Republic of China to receive Soviet Union’s technical help which enabled the PRC

to develop nuclear technology. Historical grievances of China with Japan aggravated the

Japanese threat perception Cold war politics unfortunately led to nuclear proliferation there

by belligerent states like North Korea acquired nuclear technology and even resorted to

nuclear tests in 21st Century. Japanese nuclear policy and her defence partnership with the

US were largely influenced by this volatile nuclear condition of North East Asia. Japan

started to face nuclear dilemma on one hand committed to nuclear disarmament and on other

hands dependence on the US for nuclear protection.

Timeline of Japan’s nuclear policy

Japan’s nuclear policy is significantly shaped by the incident of on attack of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki by nuclear weapons in 1945 during end of War. After the Second World War, Japan

demonstrated its determination for peace, and ‘resolved that never again shall we be visited

with the horrors of war through the action of government” (Preamble of the Japanese

Constitution). Japan's policy on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is made up of

three important factors introduced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967 to the diet. These

principles were broadened into the four-pillar nuclear policy in 1968:

1. The Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 - this promotes Japan's usage of nuclear

technology completely for peaceful purposes.

2. Tokyo's signing and ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT) and its proactive promotion for global nuclear disarmament.

3. Tokyo's reliance on the US’s extended nuclear deterrence for protection from a

potential nuclear attack by hostile neighbours.

4. Japan pledges that it will not develop, hold, or allow the installation of nuclear

weapons on the Japanese territory.

These are the three principles plus the fourth addendum. Particularly, the fourth pillar called

for adherence to the principles “only if the other three principles can be guaranteed in all

situations.” This explicitly implies that a change of circumstances in the regional or global

order might facilitate Japan to develop its own indigenous nuclear program. Amid anxiety



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over US involvement in the Vietnam War as well as hostility between North and South

Korea, this clause served to reassure the Diet that the nuclear option can hypothetically be

considered if any of the conflicts escalated to threaten Japanese national security.

There is speculation that there is a possibility of Japan becoming nuclearised despite Japan

having a long-standing stance against nuclear weapons. Japanese Diet witnessed a debate in

1960’s and 1970’s on the matter of Japan becoming the signatory to NPT. This was in part

also due to the raising questions whether NPT would limit access to peaceful usage of nuclear

technology especially with regards to production of Nuclear energy. There were also

concerns that the treaty had many discriminatory tendencies against non-nuclear weapons

states. However United States at one point of time considered the possibility of Japan

developing its own nuclear arsenal based on the Japanese nuclear technology advances. This

was evident in a report dated to 1957 (Hayes 1993).

In 1968, Prime Minister Sato initiated a secret study by nongovernmental body on the

advantages and disadvantages of Japan having nuclear weapons. This report became public

knowledge in 1994 on being revealed to the public. The report concluded that US extended

nuclear deterrence is sufficient for Japanese security and nuclearisation will have disastrous

ramifications. Nevertheless, North Korea’s nuclear and missile development program in the

early 1990’s led to Japan’s initial opposition to the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapon (NPT) in 1995. “Japan’s civilian H-2 rocket

development, plutonium recycling program and China assertive military posture, this entire

factor has promoted speculation that Japan might take counter-measures, including

production of nuclear weapons”. (Kase Yuri 2001)

In December 2012, the opposition, the Liberal Democratic Party, returned to power after

defeating the Democratic Party of Japan which had been in power since 2009 when they won

the lower house elections. While both parties have different opinions on post-Fukushima

energy policies, they hardly differ on policies of nuclear weapons and on North Korean

nuclear weapons proliferation.

Before the DPJ ascent to power in 2009, the LDP was initiated the process of preparing new

‘National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG)’ for the nation, which was considered to bring

about a more assertive defense policy. However political transformation leading to the rise of left

oriented DPJ which suspended the adoption of the NDPG until the end of 2010 .NDPG were

subjected to further consideration as both parties had a different approach to regional conflict. In



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2010, the NDPG published under the DPJ government made a major shift in the country's

strategic concept from "basic defence force" to "dynamic defence capability" in response to a

rapid transformation of the regional security environment. These included increasing threats

posed by North Korean nuclear and missile programs and concerns over China’s military

modernisation and naval activities in the East China Sea. (Japan Ministry of Defense 2011).

However, Japan's nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy remained the same under the

DPJ government, namely that "Japan will play an active role in international nuclear

disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and will continue to maintain and improve

credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrent as a vital element, through

close cooperation with the U.S." (Japanese Ministry of Defense2011)

The probe into the secret pact on U.S. nuclear transits in 1969 that allowed the United States

to bring nuclear weapons into Okinawa in case of a threat was ordered by the new DPJ

government, which ousted the LDP the previous year after more than fifty years in power.

The existence of the secret agreement had been denied for decades.

The composition of the 2010 NDPG document sparked heated debates over the Three Non-

Nuclear Principles. The main focus was on the third principle: non-introduction of nuclear

weapons. Many scholars were completely against the third principle, and the NDPG

guidelines were resubmitted in August 2010 along with their suggestions. In the end, the

panel was vehemently for retaining the three principles, and denied a clause in which

introduction of nuclear weapons may be considered. Thus, despite these debates, it is highly

unlikely that Japan in the future will reconsider these principles (Japan Ministry of Defense

2011).Japan’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) was established in December 2013. The

NSS consists of Japan’s fundamental policies in defence and security and it is the first ever

National Security Strategy to cover Japan's security policies for the coming decade. The

government also issued its new National Defence Program Guidelines. As expected, the new

defence policy presents more assertive and "proactive pacifism" (Japan Times 2013). Japan

needs to strengthen its security to counter the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons

program, tightening cooperation with the United States over extended deterrence,enhance

ballistic missile defence cooperation and maintaining interceptor missiles that would be used

for ballistic missile defence (Japan Ministry of Defence 2014).

As for Japan’s nuclear policy, the National Defense Program Guidelines of 2014 affirm that

Japan continues to have a pivotal role in international nuclear disarmament and non-

proliferation. By being the only country to suffer from nuclear attacks, Japan has a moral



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authority and duty to persuade the world that nuclear weapons do not lead to significant

security issues. Regarding North Korea nuclear weapons, Japan continues to maintain the

US’s extended nuclear deterrence umbrella (Japan Ministry of Defence 2014).

The Abe administration on the 19th

of September 2015, tabled before Japan’s parliament a

legislative package that would reinterpret article nine of the constitution and allow the Japan

Self-Defense Forces to attack a hostile neighbour that would attack its ally in the region (the

United States).This new law permits the JSDF to attack a hostile force even if Japan itself is

not attacked. The overall extent of this new interpretation was limited in its scope to the

regional area surrounding Japan as its junior partner, the Komeito party, is vehemently

opposed to belligerent activity in regions outside Japan. Nevertheless, this ignited various

controversies in the Diet over the scope of Japan’s pacifism as the opposition Democratic

Party and the Japanese Communist Party are opposed to any reinterpretation of Japan’s

pacifism (The Japan Times 2018).

Japan's official policy does not support negotiating a nuclear weapons convention to prohibit

nuclear weapons. Japan, along with some U.S. allies, endorses what it views as more practical

and realistic methods to reduce nuclear threats.

Nevertheless, Japan and the United States demonstrated their commitment to a world free of

nuclear weapons on various occasions. To commemorate the 70th anniversary of the atomic

bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan and the United States issued a joint statement on

the horror of Nagasaki and Hiroshima atomic bombing on the 28th

of April 2015 when Prime

Minister Abe visited Washington D.C. (MOFA 2015)

Japan’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy

Japan is the world's only non-nuclear power that is allowed to reprocess spent nuclear fuel for

peaceful civilian purposes. Shortly after the oil shocks of the 1970’s, it became evident in Japan

that nuclear energy was the most important source the country can have for energy. Hence, they

invested heavily into plutonium-based fuel cycles for their nuclear power plants which allow

reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Thus, Japan has developed fast-breeder reactors, nuclear fuel

reprocessing, and use of MOX (uranium/plutonium mixed oxide) fuel in nuclear reactors. Most of

Japan's nuclear power plants remain shutting down because of safety concerns in the wake of the

2011 Fukushima disaster. Unless many of them are brought back online, Japan will not be able to

consume all the plutonium extracted at the Rokkasho plant. But if Japan's stockpile of plutonium

increases without any prospect of being used, the nation's reprocessing project could come under



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suspicion in the international community because increase in the volume of plutonium, can also

be used to make nuclear weapons and tempt other countries to adopt similar policies. This can

lead to security issues and nuclear transport issues. Today, Japan has second largest

plutonium reserve after U.S, thus the country can make thousands of nuclear weapons. Japan

has no natural sources of Uranium and has thus invested heavily into the recovery and reuse

of plutonium. Before the events of the Fukushima disaster, Japan relied heavily on nuclear

energy for its energy needs. As the country has almost no indigenous sources of energy,

nuclear energy made up approximately 30% of its energy consumption. There were plans to

increase this to 40% by 2030 and 50% by 2050 as nuclear energy is a clean source of energy.

Japan had 54 functional nuclear energy power plants across the country, the third highest in

the world after the United States and France. Before the events of the triple disaster, Japan

even had plans to construct two new nuclear power plants. (“Nuclear Power in Japan”.

“World Nuclear Association”)

However, the Great East Japan Earthquake had devastated the Tohoku region on the 11th

of

March 2011 and caused a catastrophic nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear

Power Station under the aegis of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and this as a

result caused a huge public outcry in the country and in the world against nuclear energy.

Thus, after this disaster, the DPJ government launched a review of the existing nuclear energy

policy. All the existing nuclear power plants suspended operations and the construction of

new nuclear power plants was immediately halted.

In light of the worldwide failure of breeder reactors, and post-Fukushima constraints on

traditional reactors, most of Japan's plutonium will never become fuel. Instead, it can be

disposed of as waste. The U.S. government has recently made a similar decision, abandoning

plans to use recovered weapons plutonium in fuel and instead intending to bury it.

Thus, the US-Japan collaboration to dispose of plutonium instead of its reuse is a safe an

better alternative to make up for misguided bilateral relations which until now promoted

nuclear energy.

Nuclearisation Debate

Japanese public opinion is against Japan being nuclearised and its frowned on if any Japanese

officials argue in favour of the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. But shortly after North

Korean nuclear test on the 9th

of October, 2006, ruling party Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

policy affairs chairman Nakagawa Shoichi declared on national television that “thinking about



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the surrounding circumstances, views that [Japan] should possess nuclear arms have naturally

emerged. It is necessary to discuss it thoroughly.” A few days later, Foreign Minister Aso

Taro reiterated that “When a neighbouring country has come to posses [nuclear weapons], it

is important to debate this in various ways as one way of thinking.” (Asahi Shimbun, 2006).

Demetriou (2009) is one scholar who vehemently advocates the introduction of a nuclear

weapon in India. He uses the late finance minister, Nakagawa Shoichi’s statements as

justification for the introduction of a nuclear weapon in Japan’s arsenal. Often, the

justification most pro-nuclear weapon scholars use is the neorealist argument: that nuclear

weapons are a weapon for peace as they maintain a regional balance of power and prevent

military hostility (Waltz 1995). Likewise, defence officials have also reported their interest in

acquiring nuclear weapons to the media, on the condition of anonymity due to controversies

involved in such as suggestion (Kubo & Kelly 2017).

Neighbouring countries have expressed concerns that Japan might nuclearise due to the

presence of officials on television discussing the possibility of that option. Recent tension

developing in the region, particularly North Korea Nuclearisation, has led to increased

discussions in Japan about the subject of nuclear weapons which was hitherto taboo. This

includes discussions on altering or omitting the three nuclear principles (Mochizuki

2007).Abe responded that Japan is committed to the three nuclear principles and argued that

the comments by officials cannot be censored as Japan is a liberal democracy and believes in

complete freedom of speech (Japan Times, November 9, 2006).

The Japanese government conducted a clandestine study on possessing the nuclear weapons

option; this was leaked to the press on December 2006 and was titled “On the Possibility of

Developing Nuclear Weapons Domestically.” The report examined the technical feasibility of

producing tactical nuclear weapons. The report concluded that because of a multitude of

technical problems, it would take up to three years to develop tactical nukes and the overall

cost was estimated to be 20-30 billion yen for merely a small stockpile (AP News 2000).

Some conservative political leaders like Nakagawa, Aso, and others are trying to reconsider

nuclear options in Japan’s security policy. Though Abe has reconfirmed that the three non-

nuclear principles will be preserved, he is reluctant to prevent a thorough discussion of

Japanese options at the private sector level (Mochizuki, 2007).

Japan’s identity as a peaceful and non-nuclear weapons state has been linked to its global

commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and its commitment to the nucle umbrella of the United States and related agreements such as the US-Japan security treaty.

Japan has been revising its “peace state” security policies to deal with new security



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challenges. In 2014, Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appointed a new Director General to

the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), a powerful legal counsel responsible for interpreting

Japan’s constitutional restriction on the right of exert collective self-defence. Abe also

reconvened the Yanai Commission and requested that it conduct a second study to look at

whether the Japanese government should reinterpret Article 9. The Commission found that

the regional security challenges Japan faced — the North Korea nuclear and cyber threat

along with China’s growing military might — had become even more severe than in 2007,

when the commission was first convened. The Commission also found it necessary to

reinterpret Article 9 in order to permit the SDF to participate in collective security operations

due to North Korea Nuclearisation challenges.

The report was acknowledged by the CLB. That year, the ruling government LDP overturned

the original interpretation of Article 9 and for the first time since the end of World War II,

Japan allowed itself to exercise collective self-defence in limited circumstances. The United

States expressed support for the change.

In April 2015, both countries updated the operational guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

for the first time since 1997.The updated guidelines supported Abe’s reinterpretation and

changed to work with the new, global nature of the alliance. Japan also passed its new

security laws in September 2015. These allowed the JSDF to exercise collective self-defence

in four scenarios as outlined by the CLB in 2014:

1. Defending U.S. naval ships from attack in international waters while those ships are

protecting Japan.

2. Intercepting ballistic missiles targeting the U.S. and U.S. bases in the Pacific theatre.

3. Allowing GSDF to use weapons to respond to attacks on allied forces during peacekeeping

operations.

4. Providing logistical support to foreign forces during peacekeeping operations.

While the self-defense force mandate is still limited, the reinterpretation permits it to operate with

allies and United Nations Peacekeepers in limited circumstances outside Japan, which allows for

increased coordination between the U.S. military and the JSDF, including evacuation as well as

search and rescue missions. In May 2017 — the 70th anniversary of the enactment of the post

war constitution — Abe announced once again that he intended to redraft the constitution by

2020. Abe continued those plans for revision once more after the LDP won the snap election

for Lower House seats later that October 2017. (Japan Today, April 30, 2018). Thus, even if



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Japan does let go of its image as a pacifist nation, there will be influential voices advocating

that it remains a non-nuclear weapons state.

Nevertheless, despite speculation that Japan is indeed nuclearising, there is ardent advocacy

for Japan’s pacifist status in the public as well as the international society.

Japan-US nuclear relationship

The US-Japan alliance has been the most important part of Japan’s national strategy since the

end of the Second World War. The alliance served a minimalist security policy at the time as

Japan had just started recovering from the war, but has now evolved to become the main part

of Japan’s security policy. Despite being guarded by the United States, Japan’s role in the

alliance has been continually evolving since the inception of the alliance and the country now

plays a much greater role in it. Tokyo’s views on disarmament have been tempered by the

protection and aegis of the US extended nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons for Japan

cannot be only an object of non-proliferation and disarmament. It is also about Japan’s

security and defense. Keeping in mind that Japan’s security is enabled by the US extended

nuclear deterrence – Japan is under the so-called ‘nuclear umbrella’. According to Yoshihide,

Japan has had a dual identity with respect to security: “a potential great power” that can shape

the international security and “a self–restraining state” that manifests its domestic culture of

pacifism and antimilitarism. The alliance with the United States enabled Japan to reconcile

these two identities in its own version of realism. (Yoshihide 1998)

Japan’s 2013 NSS also insists that in the light of the threat of nuclear weapons, the US’s

extended nuclear deterrence is indispensable (emphasis added). It is very likely that the role

of nuclear weapons will increase rather than decrease in light of North Korea’s nuclear

development, China’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal, and the shifting balance of power

in East Asia. Thus, looking from the eyes of Japan’s defence and security needs, the extended

nuclear deterrence is not an end but a means to its security needs.

The joint statement by the SCC (Security Consultative Committee) in 2013 was a landmark

document in Japan-US bilateral relations. It made it clear that both nations share the same goals—the promotion of democracy, human rights, free and fair markets, peace, and the rule

of law. The document came out in strong condemnation of North Korea’s nuclear and

ballistic missile programs and was clear that the primary goal of both Nations in the Korean

peninsula was peace and denuclearisation.



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The statement laid the groundwork for strengthening security and defence cooperation. A

new focus was emphasised on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.

More importantly, for the first time in the US-Japan security alliance, an emphasis was put on

more trilateral and multilateral exercises with countries such as Australia, India, the Republic

of Korea, as well as various Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand. The statement

further assured that there will be more military upgrades for Japan.

The main pillars of Japan’s response to North Korea’s nuclearisation have been termed as

‘dialogue and deterrence. ’The dialogue part of this can be ascertained by Japan’s presence as

a main discussant in the six-party talks; Japan has been a main partner of the six-party talks

right from the beginning, however the views of the country are not in line with the other

members in the talks. The core of Japan’s needs in the talks were represented by Japan’s

many concerns in Japan-DPRK relations, such as abduction of Japanese citizens by North

Korean agents and the smuggling of narcotics into Japan by North Korea. Thus, these

concerns led to Japan playing a more marginalised role in the discussions and concerns over

the Bush administration being reluctant in giving Japanese diplomats a bigger role in the

discussions. The Japanese government wished to be a leading member of the talks but was

appalled at being sidelined from the discussions and that their abductee issue as well as the

DPRK’s ballistic missile programme was note addressed(Joint US-Korea academic studies

2011).The six-party talks ceased to function as a viable framework to deal with the nuclear

issue as a result of Pyongyang’s more assertive and determined position to maintain its

nuclear programme and the apparent advancement of nuclear weapon, including the delivery

vehicles such as its claim to have developed Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).

Japan’s main concern is not only nuclearisation of North Korea but also North Korea’s

nuclear proliferation thereby preventing North Korea from proliferating nuclear weapons to

other countries. As for deterrence (or punishment), the Japanese government has introduced

sanctions against Pyongyang in line with UN resolutions. At a more operational level, closer

US-Japan cooperation as well as trilateral US-Japan-South Korea partnership are becoming

more important. In the meantime, North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities increased in



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2016. This was apparent with the conduct of two nuclear weapons tests and the launch of 20

missiles over Japanese territory during this year. This has led Tokyo to deploy its Ballistic

Missile Defence (BMD) capability over the islands on a permanent basis rather than its

hitherto semi-permanent basis – this includes SM-3 missiles on both Aegis cruisers as well as

the Patriot missile battery systems. This includes the deployment of a patriot missile battery

on the compound of the defence ministry in Tokyo.

Japan’s position of pursuing nuclear disarmament while relying on the US’s extended nuclear

deterrence is seen as hypocritical both abroad and in domestic circles. Beyond charges of

indecisiveness and hypocrisy, it poses a dilemma to Tokyo particularly when dealing with the

issues of ‘humanitarian impact’ of nuclear use, an increasingly topical issue in the world, and

the treaty to ban nuclear weapons. Japan has been unsure on whether to support documents

on humanitarian consequences on various occasions such as at UN conferences on the

humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Also, the United States wanted Japan to vote

against the nuclear weapons ban treaty in 2016. It is Japan that made the world aware of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the ramifications of nuclear weapons, however, the argument

that nuclear weapons can never be used is contradicted by Japan’s official position on the

protection of the US nuclear umbrella – nuclear deterrence cannot work if we are assuming

that nuclear weapons will never be employed. Going by domestic criticism and the words of

foreign minister Kishida, Tokyo argues that it will participate in the treaty negotiations. There

are, however, questions whether it is sensible for Japan or any other country to join the

discussions as the very merits of the treaty has been called into question. This shows the basic

dilemma from which Tokyo cannot escape.

In United Nations, historic vote was held on nuclear arm ban treaty on July 7, 2017, 122 NPT

states parties adopted the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty (NWPT). The most significant

multilateral development on nuclear arms control since the adoption of the NPT, the NWPT

bans the acquisition, development, production, manufacture, possession, transfer, receipt,

testing, extra-territorial stationing, and use and threat of use of nuclear weapons (UNGA,

2017.) Opened for signature in the UN General Assembly (GA) on September 20, it was

signed by 50 states the same day and will enter into force 90 days after 50 states have ratified

it.

“US allies dutifully joined the nuclear-armed countries to boycott the UN conference,

describing it as impractical, ineffective, and unrealistic. Japan walked out after delivering a



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sharply critical opening statement. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said the negotiations ‘could

further deepen the rift between nuclear and nonnuclear-weapon states and cause an adverse

effect”. (Japan Times, Feb 2017)

Non Proliferation efforts by Japan

In addressing proliferation threats and challenges, export control is of particular significance and

there are three major aspects. The first problem comes to the proliferation of nuclear Weapons by

pariah states such as North Korea. This involves the use of intelligence Communities as

well as patrolling by the military, naval, and coastal forces. The international community at large

has been vigilant following the 9/11 attacks on the United States on the 11th of September, 2001.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is one of the main things and Japan has been an

active participant and has held exercises with various countries. Thanks to cooperation by

intelligence agencies and cooperation worldwide in monitoring the illegal transfer of weapons,

there have been some successful cases of interception of illegal transfer of weapons caches and

related materials and equipment, such as seizures in Thailand and other North Korean

shipments. The second part in question is about how to control weapons sales and movement,

involving both international controls like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and

domestic/national controls and regulations. Japan has been an active member of the MTCR as

well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Zangger Commission for nuclear materials,

Australia Group (AG) for chemical and biological weapons and the Wassenaar Arrangement

(WA) for conventional weapons. As for national-level arms transfers and weapons control, there

is now a completely new context within which Japan needs to deal with these issues as a result of

the relaxation of the ‘three no arms export principles’, the process of which started in

2011. For a long time since 1976, Japan was completely against arms transfers and cooperation

in R&D with other countries. The government led by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda in

December 2011 decided that it was time to relax this principle due to the escalation of costs of

defence and the domestic fiscal situation.

The Abe government which came after Noda is more committed to weapons export and equipment

cooperation with countries across the world including major European countries such as the UK and

France. In conducting joint R&D and joint production in the future, Japan has been concerned with



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the sensitive issue on how to transfer to third countries. Japan wants to make sure that these weapons

and technology will not end up in violent countries and pariah states – including those which are

currently engaged in violent conflict. The biggest concern, of course, is North Korea. Tokyo wants to

ensure that North Korea will not benefit from technology and products that Japan develops with

other countries. This represents a challenge for Japan-US equipment cooperation. Another notable

seeming lack of threat perception related to proliferation is about nuclear security and the threat of

nuclear terrorism. The Barack Obama administration of the US championed nuclear security and

convened the annual Nuclear Security Summit. Its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of April 2010

described nuclear terrorism as the ‘most immediate and extreme danger’ facing the United States.

While Japan shares the importance of nuclear security including the danger of nuclear terrorism and

successive Japanese Prime Ministers attended nuclear security summits, it can still be argued that

there are many differences between the United States and Japan (and perhaps, but to a lesser level,

with European countries) over what they perceive as threats. To be sure, as a country that possesses a

large number of civilian/commercial nuclear reactors throughout the country and maintains a

substantial amount of radioactive materials including plutonium, Tokyo has always been a major

player in the field of nuclear security, mainly in the framework of the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA). However, it is quite another matter whether it is a national security threat that

requires constant attention at the summit level. Tokyo’s approach seems to be to deals with the issues

of nuclear security from a technical point of view.

Japan’s basic nuclear policy is derived from her history with nuclear weapons. Although many

scholars and countries have alluded to the danger of Japanese Nuclearization in the response to

North-Korea Nuclearization but it is unlikely that these external factors will drive Japan to cross

the nuclear threshold. North Korean nuclear test has tightened the Japan-U.S. alliance, thereby

mitigating Japanese concerns about U.S. security abandonment. Japan can

Protect it self from North-Korea threatened nuclear arsenal by nuclear and conventional

extended deterrence by the United States, Missile defence deployment and Japan’s own

conventional defence capabilities.

Japan’s nuclear policy has been shaped by numerous factors. Firstly it was shaped by Japan’s own

history of devastation due to nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and later by her pacifist

constitution. Later it was influenced by the rise of cold war and rising nuclear conflict in the region.



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Japan secured ‘Extended deterrence’ from US under these circumstances there by losing the need for

nuclear weapons. Rise of Nuclear weapons in North Korea in the late 1990’s culminating in the

nuclear test of 2006 brought radical changes in the Japanese Nuclear policy thinking. Japan even

considered going for them. However Japan continued her earlier policy bowing to her own

commitment towards complete nuclear disarmament. This way Japanese Nuclear policy never been

solely directed by North Korea’s nuclearisation,

However, North Korean nuclearisation resulted into intense domestic debate over nuclear policy

in Japan. Thus each episode of testing by North Korea has resulted in media, scholars and

politicians publically denouncing the event but also many of them seeking assertion of

nuclearisation. However debates on nuclearisation have always seen positive trends considering

the complete security challenges on Japan also her international standing. Japan’s international

standing on Nuclearisation and her post World War fight for complete nuclear disarmament was

given due respect. It can be concluded that given the broader platform as discussed , there is little

chance that Japan will nuclearise itself.

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