EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 21.6.2017

SWD(2017) 236 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of

information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements

{COM(2017) 335 final}

{SWD(2017) 237 final}

2

Table of Content

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 4

2. Policy context ............................................................................................................... 5

2.1. Initiatives taken by the EU ........................................................................................... 5

2.2. Initiatives taken by EU Member States and third countries ....................................... 11

2.3. Scope of the envisaged initiative ................................................................................ 12

3. Problem Definition, Drivers and Consequences ........................................................ 13

3.1. Problem Definition ..................................................................................................... 13

3.2. Drivers ........................................................................................................................ 23

3.3. Consequences ............................................................................................................. 25

3.4. Examples on income flows that leave the internal market untaxed ........................... 26

4. Why The European Union Should Act ...................................................................... 29

5. Scope of this impact assessment ................................................................................ 32

6. Objectives ................................................................................................................... 33

6.1. General Objectives ..................................................................................................... 33

6.2. Specific Objectives ..................................................................................................... 33

7. Policy options ............................................................................................................. 34

7.1. Personal scope ............................................................................................................ 36

7.2. Material scope ............................................................................................................ 37

7.3. Exchange of information ............................................................................................ 41

8. Analysis of impact...................................................................................................... 44

8.1. Baseline scenario: No EU policy ............................................................................... 44

8.2. Action is undertaken to enact the mandatory disclosure of potentially aggressive

cross-border tax planning arrangements .................................................................... 45

8.3. Personal Scope ........................................................................................................... 45

8.4. Material Scope ........................................................................................................... 48

8.5. Exchange of information ............................................................................................ 54

9. Comparison of options ............................................................................................... 59

9.1. Personal scope ............................................................................................................ 59

9.2. Material scope ............................................................................................................ 61

9.3. Exchange of information ............................................................................................ 63

9.4. The Preferred Option.................................................................................................. 65

10. Analysis of Impacts of the preferred policy option .................................................... 67

11. Choice of the legal instrument ................................................................................... 70

11.1. Commission Recommendation (non-binding instrument) ......................................... 70

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11.2. EU Code of Conduct for intermediaries (non-binding instrument) ........................... 70

11.3. EU Directive (binding instrument) ............................................................................. 71

12. Monitoring and Evaluation ........................................................................................ 71

13. Glossary...................................................................................................................... 73

Procedural Information .......................................................................................... 77 Annex 1:

Stakeholder consultation ........................................................................................ 80 Annex 2:

Consultation Strategy ............................................................................................. 87 Annex 3:

Who is Affected by the Initiative and How ........................................................... 90 Annex 4:

Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation (DAC) ........... 92 Annex 5:

Mandatory Disclosure Rules: OECD BEPS Action 12 ......................................... 93 Annex 6:

Regimes in Place in Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom ........................... 95 Annex 7:

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1. INTRODUCTION

Tackling tax avoidance and evasion is among the political priorities in the EU, with a view to

creating a deeper and fairer single market. In this context, the Commission has presented in

recent years a number of initiatives in order to promote a fairer tax system. Enhancing

transparency is one of the key pillars in the Commission's strategy to combat tax avoidance

and evasion. In particular the exchange of information between tax administrations is crucial

in order to provide them with the necessary information to exercise their duties efficiently.

Recent leaks, including the Panama Papers, have highlighted how certain intermediaries

appear to have actively helped their clients to make use of aggressive tax planning schemes in

order to reduce the tax burden and to conceal money offshore. Whilst some complex

transactions and corporate structures may have entirely legitimate purposes, it is also clear

that some activities, including offshore structures, may not be legitimate and in some cases,

may even be illegal. Different and complex structures, often involving a company located in a

jurisdiction which is low tax or non-transparent, are used to create distance between the

beneficial owners and their wealth with a view to ensuring low or no taxation. Certain

taxpayers use shell companies registered in tax/secrecy havens and appoint nominee directors

to conceal their wealth and income by hiding the identity of the real owners of the companies

(beneficial owners). The Commission Staff Working document on Corporate Income

Taxation in the European Union1 as well as the Commission staff working document prepared

for the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package2, provide evidence on profit shifting and base erosion

practices.

Given the nature of tax avoidance and evasion, the impact on total tax loss is difficult to

measure. A recent study commissioned by the European Parliamentary Research Service3

found that corporate income tax revenue loss from profit shifting within the EU amounted to

about EUR 50-70 billion in 2013. The UK reported that the overall cost of tax avoidance was

GBP 2.7 billion in 2013-14.4

Several calls have been made to the EU to take the lead in this field and further investigate the

role of intermediaries. In particular, the European Parliament has called for tougher measures

against intermediaries who assist in tax evasion schemes.5 Member States at the informal

ECOFIN Council of April 20166 invited the Commission to consider initiatives on mandatory

disclosure rules inspired by the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action

127, with regard to introducing more effective disincentives for intermediaries who assist in

tax evasion schemes. In May 2016, the Council presented conclusions on an external strategy

and measures against tax treaty abuse8. In this context, the ECOFIN invited “the Commission

1 Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2015)121 final "Corporate Income Taxation in the European

Union" 2 Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2016)06 final "Anti Tax Avoidance Package: Next Steps

towards delivering effective taxation and greater tax transparency in the EU" 3 European Parliamentary Research Service – EPRS (2015): "Bringing transparency, coordination and

convergence to corporate tax policies in the European Union" 4 HM Revenue & Customs (2015): "Measuring tax gaps 2015 edition" 5 European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2016 on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect

(2016/2038(INI)) 6 Informal ECOFIN Council of 22 April 2016 7 OECD Base erosion and profit shifting – BEPS (2015): "Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 12:

Mandatory Disclosure Rules". See also for further clarification the entry in the glossary. 8 Council of the European Union (2016), Conclusions on the "Commission Communication on an External

Strategy and Recommendation on the implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse − Council

conclusions", 25.5.2016 (May 2016 ECOFIN Conclusions).

5

to consider legislative initiatives on Mandatory Disclosure Rules inspired by BEPS Action 12

of the OECD project in order to introduce more effective disincentives for intermediaries who

assist in tax evasion or avoidance schemes”.9

With the aim to enhance transparency, the OECD/G20 Action 12 recommends countries to

introduce a regime for the mandatory disclosure of aggressive tax planning arrangements but

does not define any minimum standard for member countries to comply with. Instead, the

recommended actions are drafted as alternatives without pointing to preferred options. The

final report on Action 12 was published as part of the set of BEPS actions in October 2015.

The report stresses that the lack of timely, comprehensive and relevant information on the

aggressive tax planning strategies is one of the main challenges faced by the tax authorities

worldwide.

The set of BEPS measures, as recommended by the OECD, has been endorsed by the G20 and

most EU Member States have committed, in their capacity as OECD members, to implement

them. Furthermore, the current G20 President, Germany, has identified tax certainty as one of

the main themes.10

Providing tax administrations with timely information on the design and

use of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes supplies them with an additional tool to

take appropriate measures against certain tax planning schemes, which ultimately increases

tax certainty and is fully compatible with the G20 priorities.

The July 2016 Communication on further measures to enhance transparency and the fight

against tax evasion and avoidance11

outlined the Commission's assessment of the priority

areas for action in the coming months, at EU and international level. Increasing oversight of

intermediaries was identified as one of the areas for future action. Indeed, Lux Leaks and the

Panama Papers12

have demonstrated that the role of intermediaries in the area of aggressive

tax planning has not been addressed in a comprehensive fashion. The European Parliament

(EP) and EU Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) are pushing for swift action.

In fact, Member States adopted EU legislation for the automatic exchange of foreign account

information according to the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) and also implemented

several of the BEPS Actions on Transparency and Fairer Taxation through common rules. It is

now critical to ensure that these instruments are actually applied and bring positive results as

well as that they are not circumvented.

It is therefore critical to act on time and make use of the existing momentum. Deferring this

initiative to a later stage would risk that it would be out of context or no longer useful.

2. POLICY CONTEXT

2.1. Initiatives taken by the EU

Aggressive tax planning includes taking advantage of the technical features of a tax system or

of mismatches in the interaction between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing

the overall tax liability of a taxpayer or group of companies. A key characteristic of these

practices is that they usually involve strictly legal arrangements which however contradict the

9 May 2016 ECOFIN Conclusions, point 12. 10 G20 priorities: https://www.g20.org/Webs/G20/EN/G20/Agenda/agenda_node.html 11 European Commission, Communication on further measures to enhance transparency and the fight against

tax evasion and avoidance, COM(2016) 451 final, 5.7.2016 (Panama Communication). 12 The Panama Papers consists of 11.5 million leaked documents from Panamanian Law form Mossack Fonesca,

detailing how the corporate service provider helped creating 214,488 offshore entities around the world for

its clients since the 1970's. https://panamapapers.icij.org/

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intent of the law. Aggressive tax planning may also benefit from weaknesses in compliance

frameworks or even extend to measures resulting in tax evasion.

A number of initiatives at the EU level, which aim at tackling tax avoidance by improving the

coherence of tax systems and increasing tax transparency, have been adopted in recent time or

are still under consideration. Some of these initiatives represent a direct response to – and go

even beyond – the new international standards developed by the G20/OECD with the BEPS

project.13

All of these initiatives aim to clamp down on aggressive tax planning. None of these measures

specifically addresses the role of intermediaries in aggressive tax planning. This issue is one

of the remaining elements for finalising our agenda on implementing BEPS in a coordinated

fashion in the EU. Only some of the initiatives are aimed at gathering information that could

be used for detecting and countering aggressive tax planning and where certain intermediaries

could help to assist in the detection and response. However, the use of information would only

be possible with considerable time delay. Therefore, further efforts concerning the existing

information tools or in the field of coherence do not represent a direct alternative to an

instrument which would target the intermediaries directly and would ensure that information

is available to tax authorities early in the process, in the best case before the potentially

2.1.1. Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive

At EU level, the efforts to tackle aggressive tax planning and implement the anti-BEPS

measures led to the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive of 12 July 2016 (ATAD).14

ATAD focuses

on legally-binding measures aimed to create a minimum level of protection for the internal

market against corporate tax avoidance.15

Furthermore, on 21 February 2017, the Council

agreed its position on rules aimed at neutralising 'hybrid mismatches' in the interaction of the

tax systems between Member States and/or between the system of a Member State and that of

a third country16

. The agreed directive is the latest of a number of measures designed to

prevent tax avoidance, mainly by large companies. It seeks to prevent taxpayers from

exploiting mismatches between two or more tax jurisdictions for the purpose of reducing their

overall tax liability. Such arrangements can result in a substantial erosion of the taxable bases

of corporate taxpayers in the EU.

2.1.2. Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC)

EU Member States have agreed that their tax authorities cooperate in order to apply their

taxes correctly to their taxpayers and combat tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance.

Council Directive 77/799/EEC17

was the first response to the need for enhanced mutual

assistance in the field of taxation. This was replaced by Council Directive 2011/16/EU18

,

which is the essential piece of legislation on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation

('DAC'). The DAC establishes useful tools for better cooperation between tax administrations

13 OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) 14 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that

directly affect the functioning of the internal market, OJ L 193, 19.7.2016, p. 1–14 (ATAD).. 15 The anti-avoidance measures in the ATAD are: controlled foreign company (CFC) rule, exit taxation, interest

limitation general anti-abuse rule and rules on hybrid mismatches. 16 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as

regards hybrid mismatches with third countries − General approach, 6595/17, ECOFIN 143, 21 February

2017. 17 Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent

authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, OJ L 336, 27.12.1977, p. 15–20. 18 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and

repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, OJ L 64, 11.3.2011, p. 1–12 (DAC).

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in the European Union, such as exchanges of information on request, spontaneous and

automatic exchanges, and the participation in administrative enquiries, simultaneous controls

or notifications of tax decisions amongst tax authorities19

.

The Directive was recently amended several times as a result of which its scope was

significantly extended to also cover: automatic exchange of financial account information20

;

exchange of information involving cross-border tax rulings and advance pricing

arrangements21

; and country-by-country reporting requirements for multinational enterprise

groups operating in the EU22

. The most recent amendment to the DAC23

was legally adopted

on 6 December 2016 and ensures that tax authorities have access to beneficial ownership

information gathered in the context of anti-money laundering.

The DAC was adopted in 2011 and Member States started applying its rules on 1 January

2013, with the exception of the provisions on the automatic exchange of information, which

followed on 1 January 2015. Under spontaneous exchange, a country provides its treaty

partner(s) with information about likely tax evaders if it happens to uncover such information

during its own audits. Automatic exchange consists of a periodic exchange of information of

pre-defined content from the authorities of one country to the authorities of another regarding

the income of residents of the second country. In the case of cross-border tax rulings and

advance pricing arrangements, the exchange is to all other Member States and the

Commission. When it comes to the latter, the disclosed information is subject to certain

limitations. The exchange is usually in electronic form and takes place on a mutually agreed

periodic basis. Information exchange on request is a response by one country to a request for

information by another country.

2.1.3. Extension of the DAC to financial account information (DAC 2)

DAC 2 amended Directive 2011/16/EU, in order to include a mandatory automatic exchange

of financial account information in the field of taxation. Section VIII(D)(4)(c) of the Directive

stipulates that the European Commission publishes a list of jurisdictions with which there is

an EU agreement in place to provide Member States with financial account information to the

standard mentioned in the extension of the Directive. The list currently comprises the Swiss

Confederation, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Republic of San Marino, the Principality

of Andorra, the Principality of Monaco and Saint-Barthelemy.

2.1.4. Extension of the DAC to information on cross-border tax rulings and advance

pricing arrangements (DAC 3)

DAC 3 amended Directive 2011/16/EU, in order to extend further the automatic exchange of

information; that is, to cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements in the EU. This

amendment was aimed at discouraging the engagement in potentially aggressive tax planning

schemes in the EU by requiring the automatic exchange of information on advance cross-

border tax rulings in the EU. However many aggressive tax planning schemes do not involve

19 An outline of the Directive and its main provisions can be found here. 20 Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory

automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, OJ L 359, 16.12.2014, p. 1–29 (DAC 2). 21 Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376 of 8 December 2015 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards

mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, OJ L 332, 18.12.2015, p. 1–10 (DAC

3). 22 Council Directive (EU) 2016/881 of 25 May 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory

automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation (DAC 4). 23 Council Directive (EU) 2016/2258 of 6 December 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards access to

anti-money-laundering information by tax authorities (DAC 5).

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the issuance of a ruling and are therefore not subject to this requirement. Some Member States

do not operate an advance tax ruling practice or their practice is very limited. Furthermore,

taxpayers do not seek tax rulings from the authorities in connection with all structures they

put in place. Finally, tax rulings may relate only to a specific transaction or a limited part of a

tax planning scheme, which, if looked at individually – i.e. outside the full picture - would

possibly not give rise to suspicion. Consequently, a substantial portion of aggressive tax

planning schemes are neither reported nor exchanged.

2.1.5. Extension of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation to country-by-country

reporting (DAC 4)

DAC 4 lays down an obligation for reporting revenues, profits before tax, taxes paid or

accrued and the number of employees to tax authorities on a country-by-country basis. It

should be noted that only large multinationals with a total consolidated group revenue

exceeding EUR 750 million in the preceding financial year are captured by this reporting

obligation. In addition, country-by-country reporting may not allow authorities to identify

specific cases of aggressive tax planning. Thus, although the provided information may give

an indication of certain BEPS-related risks, the set of high-level information that is given to

the tax authorities does not usually include details of specific tax planning schemes. However,

such reporting is confined to corporate income tax, and it is unlikely to bear direct effects on

intermediaries as long as the ultimate responsibility for tax liabilities remains with the

taxpayers.

2.1.6. Access to Information on Beneficial Ownership (DAC 5)

Recent media leaks, known as the Panama Papers, revealed how secret companies and

accounts can be used to hide income and assets offshore, often for tax evasion and other illicit

purposes. Although important progress has already been made at EU level to tackle such

practices, especially through the series of initiatives on transparency, it was found that there

are still gaps in the tax framework and this need to be addressed in order to prevent tax abuse

and illicit financial flows.24

For this purpose, tax authorities must know the ultimate

beneficiary behind a company, trust or fund. Yet, this information is not always available

throughout the EU.

The Commission proposed legislation25

in this field whereby tax authorities can have access

to national anti-money laundering information, particularly with regard to beneficial

ownership registers and due diligence controls. The relevant legislation took the form of an

amendment to the DAC. These amendments to the DAC aimed to reinforce the measures

introduced by the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive.26

24 In parallel to the proposal to amend the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the Commission also

presented a Communication setting out priorities for our work towards fairer, more transparent and more

effective taxation. 25 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards access to anti-money-laundering

information by tax authorities, COM(2016) 452 final, 5.7.2016. 26 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of

the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive

2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text

with EEA relevance), OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73–117.

9

2.1.7. Revision of the fourth AML Directive with targeted amendments and Panama

Communication27

In the context of the fight against tax avoidance, money laundering and terrorism financing,

the Commission proposed to further reinforce EU rules on anti-money laundering, to counter

against terrorist financing and increase transparency on the beneficial ownership of companies

and trusts.

2.1.8. EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions

In the External Strategy for Effective Taxation, the Commission set out a new EU listing

process to identify and address third-country jurisdictions that fail to comply with tax good

governance standards. Member States have endorsed this initiative and called for a first EU

list to be ready within 2017.

The new listing process is part of the EU's political priority to fight against tax evasion and

avoidance and promote fairer taxation, both in Europe and beyond. The EU needs stronger

instruments to tackle external tax avoidance and deal with third country jurisdictions which

refuse to play fair. A single EU list should be expected to carry much more weight than the

current patchwork of national lists, and will have an important dissuasive effect on third

country jurisdictions that operate harmful tax regimes. It will also be clearer and fairer for

businesses and third country jurisdictions, as it will be transparent, objective and aligned with

international tax good governance standards.

Recently, the Commission presented the scoreboard of its pre-assessment of all third-country

jurisdictions for tax purposes. This was the first step in the new EU listing process. On the

basis of the scoreboard results, Member States are meant to decide on the third-country

jurisdictions to be screened against tax good governance criteria in greater detail. The

screening began in early 2017.28

2.1.9. EU financial market sectorial legislation

EU law in the area of financial regulation already contains certain existing or forthcoming

reporting requirements which are - to some extent - relevant for aggressive tax planning

structures. This includes the Market Abuse Regulation, the Prospectus Regulation and

MiFID229

, which could result in reporting requirements regarding tax planning. However,

they only apply in precise circumstances and could be usefully completed by a more

horizontal legislation.

Public country-by-country reporting (public CbCR), a proposed amendment to the

Accounting Directive30

, may be seen as a deterrent to aggressive tax planning schemes. It is

thus likely to create a disincentive for intermediaries. So far, public CbCR is mandatory for

EU banks and the extractive and logging industry. In April 2016, the Commission proposed to

27 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/849

on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist

financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC, COM(2016) 450 final, 5.7.2016. 28 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tax-common-eu-list_en 29 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial

instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349–

496. 30 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial

statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending

Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives

78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, p. 19–76.

10

expand it to very large companies in all the other sectors31

. However, like for DAC4, such

reporting is unlikely to bear direct effects on intermediaries as long as the ultimate

responsibility for tax liabilities remains with the taxpayers.

The Audit Regulation32

ensures that auditors do not provide tax services during their audit

mandate. It does not lay down any obligations for auditors to identify aggressive tax planning

schemes and does not regulate auditors when they provide services such as tax advice to non-

audit clients.

Overall, the EU has made great progress on tax transparency in recent years. With those

measures in place, Member States should be in a better position to increase the collection of

revenues where taxpayers try to avoid or evade taxes. However, the tax instruments available

in the EU are not sufficient. In particular, they do not explicitly require that Member States

collect timely information on tax avoidance and evasion schemes from intermediaries.

Neither is there an obligation to exchange that information, where relevant, with other

Member States. The DAC contains a general obligation for tax authorities in EU Member

States to spontaneously communicate information to the other EU tax authorities in certain

circumstances. This would include a loss of tax revenue in a Member State or savings of tax

resulting from artificial transfers of profits within groups of companies. Yet, such exchange

would only occur after aggressive tax planning schemes have been implemented. At present,

Member States do not hold this information a priori.

Having said this, if the relevant information were received prior to the implementation of

aggressive tax schemes, it would enable Member States to take appropriate measures timely.

The current legislative framework (both in the EU and within the national context) is not

designed to ensure that tax administrations receive timely information about potentially

aggressive tax planning schemes which are readily available for implementation or already in

use by taxpayers. This is critical regardless of whether a scheme is purely national or of a

cross-border dimension. It is therefore necessary to complement the current framework with

an additional tool, to ensure the ex-ante flow of information.

2.1.10. Initiatives taken by the OECD

In July 2013 the OECD published its Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS

Action Plan)33

identifying fifteen actions to counter against base erosion and profit shifting in

a comprehensive manner. The Action Plan set deadlines to implement these actions. One of

the proposed actions is BEPS Action 12 on mandatory disclosure rules.34

Based on the final report on BEPS Action 12, mandatory disclosure offers tax administrations

a number of advantages over other forms of disclosure, as it requires both taxpayers and

promoters to report information early in the tax compliance process. In addition, the OECD

report points out that "countries that have introduced mandatory disclosure rules indicate that

they both deter aggressive tax planning behaviour and improve the quality, timeliness and

31 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU as

regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches, COM(2016) 198 final,

12.4.2016. 32 Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on specific

requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities and repealing Commission Decision

2005/909/EC, OJ L 158, 27.5.2014, p. 77–112. 33 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 2013, available here. 34 For a detailed description of BEPS Action 12 see Annex 6.

11

efficiency in gathering information on tax planning schemes allowing for more effective

compliance, legislative and regulatory responses"35

.

BEPS Action 12 is not a minimum standard like some other elements of the OECD Action

Plan. Instead, it allows countries the freedom to introduce elements from amongst the options

given in the final report. A minimum standard could result in a more consistent application in

the EU or worldwide. Furthermore, mandatory disclosure is not included in the scope of the

multilateral instrument (i.e. Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related

Measures to Prevent BEPS36

- more than 100 jurisdictions committed to it in November 2016,

for the purpose of swiftly implementing a series of tax treaty measures to update international

tax rules and lessen the opportunity for tax avoidance by multinational enterprises). Finally,

BEPS Action 12 is not part of the BEPS Inclusive Framework either. As such, it is not subject

to a review process looking at its implementation by member countries.

2.2. Initiatives taken by EU Member States and third countries

Ireland, the UK and Portugal operate mandatory disclosure regimes37

in response to existing

practices of aggressive tax planning which are enabled and promoted by intermediaries.

2.2.1. The system in Ireland

Ireland’s mandatory disclosure regime was first introduced in 2011, with some amendments

made subsequently. The regime is intended to act as an early warning mechanism for

"aggressive tax avoidance schemes". The regime provides that promoters or taxpayers, either

in contemplation or implementation of certain transactions, shall give information, as

specified by the Irish Revenue relating to any transactions that give rise to a ‘tax advantage’

where one of the main benefits of the transaction is such tax advantage.

2.2.2. The system in the UK

The disclosure of tax avoidance schemes (DOTAS) regime introduced in 2004 essentially

requires promoters of certain types of tax avoidance schemes, or in some cases users of such

schemes, to disclose them to HMRC. The regime has been subject to several changes over the

time that it exists. Its scope has gradually been broadened and so, it now covers the whole of

Income Tax, Corporation Tax, Capital Gains Tax, and certain arrangements relating to Stamp

Duty, Land Tax and Inheritance Tax. The regime also applies, with necessary modifications,

to National Insurance contributions and Value Added Tax. In the Budget of March 2015, the

Government announced a package of measures to ensure that the DOTAS regime keeps pace

with the current avoidance market. As part of this, the Government launched a consultation on

the detail of changes to strengthen the DOTAS hallmarks and the results were published in

February 2016. New changes are expected in regard to the Indirect Tax Avoidance Disclosure

Regime and penalties for enablers of abusive tax planning arrangements in line with measures

recently published on 5 December 2016.

Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) found that additional revenue of between

GBP 225 million and GBP 650 million a year had been collected against what would have

been achieved without disclosures made under DOTAS38

.

35 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Mandatory Disclosure Rules, Action 12: 2015 Final

Report, pp. 22-23. 36 OECD, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS, OECD

Publishing, 2016, available here. 37 See Annex 8. 38 National Audit Office, HMRC, Report by the Controller and Auditor General, Tax Avoidance: Tackling

Marketed Avoidance Schemes, HC 730, Session 2012-13, 21.11.2012, p. 26.

12

2.2.3. The system in Portugal

The Portuguese Mandatory Disclosure Regime is based on the UK regime and was put in

place in 2008. The Portuguese authorities have received almost 100 reports on tax schemes

from intermediaries (promoters) since their mandatory disclosure regime was introduced.

They reached a peak between 2009 and 2011. Around 25% of reports came from users, who

are obliged to report where the promoter is not resident in Portugal or is prevented by the

rules of profession (e.g. lawyers), or the tax planning scheme is developed in-house. The

definition of intermediaries is broad and covers corporations and individuals. Schemes under

discussion are those, where 1) achieving a tax advantage (relating to income taxes) is a sole or

main purpose, and 2) one of the following hallmarks applies: i) the participating entity is

subject to a special regime or is tax exempt, ii) (hybrid) financial instruments and derivatives

are involved, iii) there is a use of tax losses. If a reported scheme is considered abusive, it is

published together with the provision of the law based on which it should be defeated. Some

reported schemes were outside of the scope and others were not seen as problematic.

Outside the EU, a number of countries have introduced national mandatory disclosure

regimes, such as the USA, Canada, South Africa, India and Israel. Each of them has chosen a

slightly different approach, which is yet in line with the objectives of BEPS Action 12.

Existing national regimes for disclosure are confined to national tax bases. The obligation to

report is therefore triggered by the question of whether a certain scheme could have an impact

on the domestic tax base. Hence, for the time being, these national regimes do not cover

cross-border schemes, which would potentially affect residents and the tax bases of other

Member States.

In France and Germany, there have been initiatives to introduce mandatory disclosure, but

legislation has not (yet) been adopted for various legal reasons. Alternative disclosure

instruments can be found in other Member States such as co-operative compliance or

horizontal monitoring.

Member States naturally endeavour to defend their own tax base and as a result look for

information on schemes which seek to reduce the domestic base. However, from a cross-

border perspective, there are loopholes in national regulations. A potential legislative

initiative at EU level should not discourage or even substitute existing national systems, but

rather build upon them and also consider the cross-border dimension of potentially aggressive

tax planning structures. Thus, the EU internal market requires a greater degree of cooperation

and therefore there is a need for monitoring cross-border schemes. Currently, Member States

do not receive such information on a timely basis.

2.3. Scope of the envisaged initiative

2.3.1. Framework and aims

This initiative complements the series of legislative acts that were passed at the level of the

EU over the previous years in implementation of some of the conclusions in the context of the

BEPS project of the OECD/G20 and the work of the Global Forum in the field of

transparency. The main aim remains linked to curbing tax evasion and avoidance through

capturing aggressive tax planning schemes. These schemes may have escaped the framework

of anti-tax avoidance and transparency rules that the Member States adopted through Union

legislation in the context of implementing BEPS and the CRS over the last couple of years.

The initiative generally envisages that potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning

schemes be disclosed to the authorities. The proposed rules do not presume the existence of

13

tax avoidance. It is also considered whether the disclosure should be coupled with exchange

of information.

The disclosure should give the authorities the opportunity to investigate into these schemes

and reach a conclusion on whether those should be acceptable or not. In return, the authorities

would be expected to legislate in order to render the disclosed schemes that they have found

to be unacceptable illegitimate.

The ultimate aim of the proposed rules is to discourage the availability of such schemes for

taxpayers altogether.

2.3.2. Link to OECD/G20 Action 12 of the BEPS Project

The envisaged initiative follows the recommended options of the OECD report on Action 12

but goes beyond a mere implementation of EU commitments under Action 12. The OECD

report on mandatory disclosure does not lay down any minimum standard. In addition, the

recommended actions are drafted as alternatives without pointing to preferred options.

Therefore, only the fact that the proposed initiative lays down binding rules (in the form of a

Directive) is a step further than the OECD Action 12.

In addition, the disclosure is coupled with a proposed system for the automatic exchange of

the disclosed data amongst tax authorities. This element comes on top of the OECD Action

12, which is limited to the disclosure of data.

It is also worth mentioning that this initiative is meant to cover gaps in the CRS of the Global

Forum, as it broadly applies within the Union under the Administrative Cooperation

Directive.

2.3.3. Penalties

On the consequences of non-reporting/penalties, the envisaged initiative treats this area as

falling within the sovereign control of Member States. As the delineation of penalties remains

outside the ambit of EU legislation, there will not be any detailed assessment of options in this

respect. Member States would only undertake to ensure that effective and dissuasive penalties

be put in place. However, in addition to penalties posed at national level, due to the increased

transparency the initiative creates disincentives for intermediaries to design and market new

schemes plus reputational risks in case of non-compliance with a reporting obligation. It also

creates disincentives for taxpayers to use potentially aggressive tax planning schemes that

would have to be reported as well as disincentives to engage with intermediaries that carry a

reputational risk triggered by non-compliance with the rules.

3. PROBLEM DEFINITION, DRIVERS AND CONSEQUENCES

3.1. Problem Definition

The detected underlying problem is that certain tax planning schemes are being designed and

promoted by intermediaries and used by taxpayers for the purpose of avoiding or evading

taxes. Most services provided by intermediaries are legal and legitimate, but recent scandals

have demonstrated that in many cases intermediaries design structures that play a significant

14

role in devising and using aggressive tax planning schemes. According to one of the findings

in a recent study issued by the European Parliament39

, the offshore structures cited in the

Panama Papers were set-up for a broad range of motives, including: undesirable but legal tax

planning, aggressive tax avoidance, illegal tax evasion, hiding and shielding assets, money

laundering and crime financing.

39 European Parliament (2017) IP/A/PANA/2016-05 PE 602.030 "Role of advisors and intermediaries in the

schemes revealed in the Panama Papers – Study for the PANA Committee, p. 15.

15

Figure 1: Problem Tree

Source: European Commission (2017)

Enterprises

Competitor not applying aggressive

tax planning (e.g. SMEs)

SocietyState authorities

Enterprise applying

aggressive tax planning

Tax evasion and

avoidance

Unfair competitive advantage

Lack of information on aggressive tax

planning schemes

Base erosion

Observed unfairness

Social dissatisfaction

Unfair competitive

disadvantage

Aggressive tax planning

Design and use of aggressive tax planning schemes

Dri

vers

Pro

ble

mD

ire

ct

con

seq

ue

nce

sIn

dir

ect

co

nse

qu

en

ces

Distortion of the Internal Market

No effective nor transparent monitoring of compliance

Lack of timely information on aggressive tax planning

for MS tax authorities

Differences amongst national frameworks on disclosures

requirements

Substantive tax legislation in place enabling aggressive tax

planning designed by intermediaries

Inter-mediaries

Market opportunities

Promoting schemes to many users

Individuals

Individual applying

aggressive tax planning

Individual not applying aggressive

tax planning

Aggressive tax

planning

Tax evasion and

avoidance

Wealth concen-tration

WealthDistribu-

tion

Wealth ineauqlity

16

3.1.1. Design and use of aggressive tax planning schemes

Aggressive tax planning is a major concern for the EU and internationally, given that it leads

to losses of tax revenues for countries; for example, through schemes leading to double non-

taxation. Aggressive tax planning is facilitated by disparities amongst national tax systems

which, in their interaction, often suffer mismatches that lead to double non-taxation. In

addition, taxpayers may also work out arrangements that take advantage of preferential tax

regimes within a Member State, or beyond a single jurisdiction, and reduce their overall tax

bills. Lack of transparency and the absence of an obligation to disclose potentially aggressive

tax planning schemes create incentives, in particular for taxpayers engaged in cross-border

activities, to set up structures that channel taxable profits towards low tax countries. The

result is that certain – usually high-tax countries - see their tax bases being eroded. From an

EU point of view, such a situation creates distortions in the internal market and jeopardizes its

proper functioning as well as hampers the application of more growth-friendly tax policies at

national level. Furthermore, it threatens the social contract at large, as honest taxpayers

(individuals and companies) might become less inclined to comply with the rules.

3.1.2. Role of Intermediaries

Taxpayers are rarely experts in the company or tax law of all jurisdictions which they use in

structuring their business in a tax efficient way. They usually rely on intermediaries who

assist them in the design of the most appropriate structure. These intermediaries include,

amongst others, consultants, lawyers, financial (investment) advisors, accountants, solicitors,

financial institutions, insurance intermediaries, and company-formation agents. Intermediaries

advise clients on structuring their business, to reduce tax-related costs and they receive a

premium fee as remuneration. It is also common that intermediaries design and/or market

certain standard schemes to more users/clients. In this way, they make a profitable business

out of facilitating tax optimisation, which sometimes may carry the characteristics of

aggressive tax planning and lead to the avoidance of tax. The role of intermediaries in this

process is of primary importance and the lack of disincentives only facilitates their behaviour.

Aggressive tax planning schemes usually involve complex structures which are deployed

across multiple jurisdictions and in particular, use offshore centres. These schemes take

advantage not only of differences in the tax systems between jurisdictions but also of

regulatory disparities. Furthermore, taxpayers may exploit the fact that jurisdictions often

require divergent degrees of transparency, for example limited commitment to the

international exchange of information through agreements for tax purposes. Planning these

schemes therefore involves intermediaries with a wide knowledge that covers more than one

tax system and several tax-related domains.

3.1.3. Evidence of the involvement of intermediaries in aggressive tax planning schemes

There is a wide range of different types of intermediaries and geographic locations which

intermediaries commonly use to set up opaque structures. These locations involve a number

of jurisdictions, including offshore centres which are identified as hallmarks for tax evasion

and avoidance. A current study40

seeks to analyse the main characteristics of the "go-

betweens". These are the 'intermediaries', who advise clients to contact offshore service

40 The Greens/EFA Group (2017): "Usual suspects? Co-conspirators in the business of tax dodging".

17

providers for setting up an offshore entity.41

The definition in the study for intermediaries is

the following:

"We understand intermediaries as a go-between for a client seeking an ultimate

offshore service provider in order to create (and sometimes run) one or several

offshore entities. These intermediaries are often unknown to the public but play a key

role in the existence of shell companies in tax havens".42

The study provides data on where intermediaries are located by continent and also gives more

details for Europe.

Figure 2: Global distribution of intermediaries

Source: Study by the Greens/EFA Group (2017): "Usual Suspects? Co-conspirators in the business of tax dodging", p.9

41 The data used in the study is from the following three datasets: Panama Papers, Offshore Leaks and the

Bahamas Leak. 42 The Greens/EFA Group (2017): "Usual suspects? Co-conspirators in the business of tax dodging", p5.

10 292

5 704

3 497

2 095 1 979

429 187

2 000

4 000

6 000

8 000

10 000

12 000

Asia Europe North andCentralAmerica

SouthAmerica

Unidentified Oceania Africa

18

Figure 3: Top 10 European countries where intermediaries operate

Source: Study by the Greens/EFA Group (2017): "Usual Suspects? Co-conspirators in the business of tax dodging",

p.10

The wide range of categories of intermediaries which vary from banks and company service

providers to consultancies is outlined in the table below:

Table 1: International intermediaries and the countries they operate in

(top 10 of 144 intermediaries)

Position Name Countries

Number of

offshore companies

requested

1 United Bank of

Switzerland

Bahamas, Cayman Islands, France, Germany, Hong

Kong, Jersey, Luxembourg, Monaco, Singapore,

Switzerland, Taiwan, UK, US, Indonesia, Canada

13 285

2 Crédit Suisse Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, UAE, UK, US,

Bahamas, China, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Liechtenstein,

Monaco

11 347

3 Trident Corporate

Services

Bahamas, BVI, Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man 8 507

4 Offshore Business

Consultant Ltd.

Hong Kong, China, Unidentified 7 515

5 Orion House Belize, Hong Kong, Jersey 7 061

1 540

1 321

403 336

249 210 203 176 170 124 200

400

600

800

1 000

1 200

1 400

1 600

1 800

19

Position Name Countries

Number of

offshore companies

requested

Services

6 Prime Corporate

Solutions

Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Gibraltar 4 300

7 Citibank UK, Singapore, Jersey, Switzerland, Hong Kong,

Indonesia, US, Bahamas, Jersey

3 393

8 G.S.L. Law &

Consulting

Russia, Cyprus, Unidentified 2 909

9 HSBC Singapore, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Israel,

Jersey, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Singapore, Switzerland,

Taiwan, UK, US, Guernsey, Bahamas, Switzerland

2 882

10 Ansbacher Bahamas, Switzerland, British Virgin Islands 2 262

Source: Study by the Greens/EFA Group (2017): "Usual Suspects? Co-conspirators in the business of tax dodging",

p.21

The increasing use of entities in offshore jurisdictions since 2000 is demonstrated in the

recently published study by the European Parliament43

. Since 2000 there has been a surge in

the number of entities registered in offshore jurisdictions which may be explained by

increasing globalisation and digitalisation, which make it easier to establish and maintain

offshore structures. Although this trend has decreased in recent years due to the financial and

economic crisis and as result of several policy measures, including the adoption of more

stringent anti-money laundering standards, global private wealth of high net value individuals

is projected to rise at a compound annual rate of 6% over the next five years to reach United

States Dollar (USD) 224 trillion in 202044

with accelerating digital innovation leading to new

investment products in a wide range of geographic locations.

43 European Parliament (2017) IP/A/PANA/2016-05 PE 602.030 "Role of advisors and intermediaries in the

schemes revealed in the Panama Papers – Study for the PANA Committee". 44 Boston Wealth Management Report 2016: http://www.fondstrends.ch/fileadmin/pdf/BCG-Navigating-the-

New-Client-Landscape_June_2016.pdf

20

Figure 4: Establishment of entities across time

Source: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (2016).

According to this study the amounts of unpaid taxes and fines can be substantial: for France

alone taxpayers involved in the Panama Papers already owed tax authorities EUR 1.2 billion

in taxes and fines. The study underlined the broad range of intermediaries involved in the

Panama Papers:

Figure 5: Type of intermediary (share of entities) in Panama Paper

Source: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (2016).

21

In order to create aggressive tax planning schemes, intermediaries propose complex structures

involving many jurisdictions which often include offshore financial centres. The Second

Review of the Savings Directive45

reflects the involvement of offshore centres as suitable

locations for setting up intermediary entities within structures that involve legal entities and/or

arrangements, like trusts, often using onshore financial centres. The analysis in the review on

publically available statistics by the Swiss National Bank and aggregate statistics of the Bank

of International Settlements (BIS), supplemented at the time with bilateral statistics from the

BIS, obtained on a non-disclosure basis. Although the statistical data is no proof of facilitating

tax evasion, the complexity of structures and indeed the evidence leaked in the Panama Papers

show that the creation of such structures largely relies on the knowledge and skills of

intermediaries.

In its issue for 2010, the annual publication Banks in Switzerland by the Swiss National Bank

encompasses some very detailed geographical and/or client breakdowns in 'Table 38

Fiduciary business, by country'. The definition of a fiduciary business, for the purposes of the

report on Banks in Switzerland, can be found in the 1997 edition of the publication, which is

not available in English. It follows that the definition is an unofficial translation.46

It is clear

that a fiduciary business primarily consists of deposits from non-residents (fiduciary

liabilities) which are afterwards re-deposited abroad in the name of the bank, but for the

account of the depositor. Fiduciary liabilities are heavily represented in offshore centres.

Eight countries which may be considered to be offshore centres list amongst the first 15

countries that represent an average of 67% of the fiduciary liabilities.

45 European Commission (2012) SWD(2012)16 final, "Commission Staff Working Document presenting an

evaluation for the second review of the effects of the Council Directive 2003/48/EC" 46 Fiduciary transactions include investments, loans and equity interests which the bank holds or grants in its

own name, but for the account and at the risk of the customer, on the basis of a written agreement. The

instructing customer bears the full currency, transfer, price and collection risks and is the exclusive

beneficiary of all accruals from such transactions; the bank only charges a commission. Fiduciary funds

received by the banks mainly come from abroad and are almost exclusively invested abroad. They essentially

consist of short term foreign investments in third banks or in branches legally dependent on Swiss banks. In

the latter case, these transactions must appear in the balance-sheet, since they involve a commitment from the

branch towards the head office in Switzerland.

22

Figure 4: Geographical breakdown of fiduciary liabilities 2002 - 2010

Source: Swiss National Bank ("Banks in Switzerland 2010)"

The same order and similar shares regarding the BVI, Panama and the Bahamas emerge from

the data that features in the Panama Papers. Specifically, it appears that more than 113 000

offshore trusts and companies have been created in the BVI with almost 50 000 in Panama

and around 17 000 in Bahamas.

The International Locational Banking Statistics of the BIS includes quarterly data on assets

and liabilities of domestic banks and branches of foreign banks in the 43 reporting

countries.This is broken down on a bilateral basis per country of each counterparty47

.

Nevertheless, it is not possible to differentiate between deposits from individuals, non-bank

financial entities and commercial entities or other structures within the total amount of the

non-bank balances48

.

The analysis in the Second Review of the Savings Directive, based on a breakdown per

counterparty jurisdiction, showed that the share of accounts of offshore non-banks in EU

banks is around 20%. This amounts to around USD 1 trillion for 2007.

47 There is also a breakdown of the data by sector and the country of residence of the counterparty, as well as

according to the country of the reporting banks. The sectorial breakdown includes liabilities to non-banks. 48 The latest BIS data have some non-country-specific aggregates for a breakdown of the non-banks share into

other financial corporations and non-financial corporations, but no country-specific data.

23

Figure 5: Share of accounts of offshore non-banks in EU banks

Source: Bank for International Settlements – 2001-2010 Quarterly data supplied by BIS on liabilities per

offshore/onshore jurisdictions per domestic banks and foreign bank branches of reporting jurisdictions

Some of those accounts would also be attributable to non-bank financial entities. BIS

statistics49

on cross-border positions show that, based on aggregate data for all jurisdictions,

broadly 50% of the liabilities are towards non-bank non-financial entities.

3.2. Drivers

3.2.1. Lack of timely information on aggressive tax planning schemes for Member States'

tax authorities

Countries around the world have been developing tax compliance strategies in order to be

able to deal more effectively with aggressive tax planning. Usual tax compliance strategies

based on the analysis of tax returns and conventional tax audits are not sufficient to ensure

timely access to relevant information on the tax planning.50

The absence of a mandatory disclosure regime in most Member States presents no

disincentive for intermediaries and users who remain enabled to design, market and use

aggressive tax planning schemes. While some Member States provide for voluntary disclosure

regimes at the domestic level, no similar instrument is envisaged for cross-border schemes.

Furthermore, the entire BEPS Action Plan lacks a binding legal effect on the OECD member

countries. It follows that OECD countries have to take measures to implement these actions

through their domestic law, bilateral treaties, or a multilateral instrument. While the OECD

has set up an Inclusive Framework to monitor BEPS implementation and participating

countries have committed to implement the comprehensive BEPS Package, the peer review

49 Bank for International Settlements – BIS (2016): "Cross-border positions, by residents and sector of

counterpart" 50OECD (2011) Report: Tackling Aggressive Tax Planning through Improved Transparency and Disclosure

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Other

Offshore

24

and monitoring process concerns only the four BEPS minimum standards51

. Action 12 does

not constitute a minimum standard.52

It only takes the form of recommendations that allow for

several options and approaches which may lead to substantially divergent disclosure regimes

in different countries.

Only 3 out of 28 Member States operate a mandatory disclosure regime. The analysis of their

statistics reveals that the number of disclosures drastically decreased after the first years of

introduction in the domestic context.

UK HMRC DOTAS Direct Tax Disclosure was first launched in 2004 and received 503 direct

tax disclosures for the 8-month period from 1 August 2004 to 31 March 2005. The number of

notifications decreased to fewer than 10 in the 6-month period from 1 April 2014 to 30

September 201453

.

The reason for this decrease of disclosures has not been identified in detail by national

authorities. This could be due to (i) fewer schemes being devised and used, which would be a

success; or (ii) intermediaries engage in illegal activities, i.e. non-reporting is illegal; or (iii)

intermediaries re-design the schemes that they market so that those are no longer subject to a

mandatory disclosure.

The remaining 25 Member States do not accommodate a mandatory disclosure regime and the

OECD framework in connection with Action 12 does not create an obligation upon them to

enact one. However, such circumstances lead to lack of transparency on the applied

administrative practice. For instance, without receiving information on the elements of

potentially aggressive tax schemes relevant to a particular multinational enterprise, activity or

business, the affected Member States are unlikely to be aware of the impact that such schemes

can have on their tax revenues. Consequently, they cannot react to them.

3.2.2. Differences amongst national frameworks on disclosure requirements

A mandatory disclosure regime is only established in three EU Member States and while the

main characteristics are rather similar, there are some differences between these three

systems. In other areas, e.g. automatic exchange of tax rulings and CbCR, the adopted

legislation is about to be transposed and enter into force but these areas capture a different

type of information. The existing differences amongst national frameworks on disclosure

prevent an efficient and coherent collection of information on aggressive tax planning

schemes across the EU.

3.2.3. Neither effective nor transparent monitoring of compliance with existing law

The complexity of existing tax laws contributes to ineffective and non-transparent monitoring.

The lack of transparency facilitates aggressive tax planning and prevents the national

authorities from gathering information on aggressive tax planning schemes and consequently,

from levying tax on income taxable in their country.

3.2.4. Existing tax legislation may enable aggressive tax planning

Aggressive tax planning consists in taking advantage of the technical features of a tax system

or of mismatches in the interaction between two or more tax systems for the purpose of

reducing the overall tax liability of a taxpayer or group of companies. A key characteristic of

51 See BEPS Actions 5, 6, 13 and 14 in OECD (2013), "Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting",

OECD Publishing. 52 OECD (2015), "Mandatory Disclosure Rules, Action 12 - 2015 Final Report", Executive Summary, p. 9. 53 Last period for which figures are publically available are provisional. See HM Revenue & Customs (2014),

"Tax avoidance and disclosure statistics"

25

these practices is that they usually involve strictly legal arrangements which however

contradict the intent of the law. Aggressive tax planning may also benefit from weaknesses in

the compliance frameworks. A study published by the European Commission on Structures of

Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators54

has identified and examined seven common model

aggressive tax planning structures in the EU:

A hybrid finance structure

A two-tiered intellectual property structure with a cost-contribution arrangement

A one-tiered intellectual property structure with a cost-contribution arrangement

An offshore loan structure

A hybrid entity structure

An interest-free-loan structure

A patent-box aggressive tax planning structure

As a matter of principle, these structures would fall within the definition laid down in the

Commission's Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning.55

Since 2016, Member States

have agreed to coordinate their policies in clamping down on aggressive tax planning. They

thus adopted a set of anti-tax avoidance measures in the form of minimum standards (ATAD).

This framework was complemented with more comprehensive rules on hybrid mismatches in

2017 (ATAD 2). Yet still, other features remain available at least for the foreseeable future

and new ones may be developed in the meantime.

3.2.5. Insufficient beneficial ownership information (external factor)

An entity with an anonymous beneficial owner enables aggressive tax planning schemes to be

established in a way that they take advantage of mismatches between two or more tax and/or

regulatory systems. Although measures have been taken in the meantime to allow national tax

administrations access to information on the beneficial owner, this remains a weak point.

Namely, intermediaries use their expertise to exploit the rules by setting up structures that

make it burdensome or even impossible to identify the ultimate beneficial owner(s). In

particular, aggressive tax planning schemes often use third-country jurisdictions and

especially offshore centres where the regulatory framework on the identification of beneficial

ownership and its enforcement are inadequate.

3.3. Consequences

3.3.1. Effects on Taxpayers (individuals and companies)

Aggressive tax schemes disrupt the functioning of the internal market. Notably, the lack of

transparency grants certain taxpayers a competitive advantage. This is, in particular, true for

those companies and individuals that have the resources to make use of professional advice

from experts that act as intermediaries in proposing aggressive tax optimisation schemes. On

the other hand, companies that do not engage in aggressive tax planning schemes or shift

profits to low-tax jurisdictions tend to suffer higher costs, as compared to those who benefit

from aggressive tax planning schemes.

The situation looks similar in the field of individuals. Those who can afford to lower their tax

liability through expert tax advice tend to be wealthier than those who pay their fair share of

tax.

54 European Commission (2015) Taxation Papers Working Paper N.61, "Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax

Planning and Indicators Final Report" 55 Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 on aggressive tax planning, C(2012) 8806 final.

26

3.3.2. Effects on intermediaries

The absence of an obligation to disclose advice on aggressive tax planning schemes results in

the creation of business and market opportunities for certain intermediaries. Whereas the large

majority of intermediaries is engaged in business as usual, some of them are fully specialised

and/or engaged in the design and promotion of aggressive tax planning schemes and offer

their services on the market to taxpayers.

3.3.3. Effects on Member States and national tax administrations

The tax administrations of Member States seek to prevent losses of tax revenue that result

from aggressive tax planning schemes. However, with only insufficient information on the

structure of such schemes, Member States end up in a position whereby they cannot respond

effectively to the challenges in a globalised world and become less able to defend their tax

base. Otherwise, attempts by tax administrations to improve tax collection may result in

increasing administrative costs (e.g. introduction of complex anti-abuse measures). Thus, to

enhance their tax revenues, Member States may engage in the design of complex counter-

measures (such as special tax regimes to incentivise enterprises to shift profits towards their

jurisdictions etc.).

3.3.4. Effects on citizens and society

Citizens are indirectly affected, mainly in their capacity as individual taxpayers. Given that

Member States lose tax revenues if multinational enterprises or wealthy individuals escape

from paying their fair share of tax, States are inclined to make up for this loss by raising taxes

through the least mobile tax bases; for example, income from employment. This results in

unfairness.

Recent press reports on the Panama Papers, but also on the use of aggressive tax planning

structures by big multinational enterprises, have led to public criticism. There is a widely held

perception that companies, in particular multinational enterprises, avoid contributing their fair

share to the funding of public goods by artificially lowering their taxable income. This is

made more acute in the context of the current austerity measures being imposed on countries

that need to engage in fiscal consolidation. Many citizens feel that companies avoid taxes

while they see themselves faced with increasing tax burdens.

3.4. Examples on income flows that leave the internal market untaxed

Example 1 – No Withholding Tax – Zero Rate at Destination

Company A, a franchisee of an MNE headquartered in a major trade partner of the EU, is tax

resident in MS A which is a high-tax jurisdiction.

Company A is licensed to use intellectual property (IP) of the MNE group via the group´s IP

centre on an island in the Caribbean where corporate tax is at zero rate.

To avoid paying the high withholding tax (WHT) of 15% on royalties from Company A to the

group's IP centre in the Caribbean (due to the absence of a tax treaty), the group sets up a

NewCo in an EU MS where outflows in the form of dividends, interest and royalties are

subject to no WHT.

Company A is no longer directly licensed for the use of IP from the Caribbean entity but

instead via NewCo, which is given the function of sub-licensing the group IP across the EU.

27

Company A pays royalties to NewCo. The Interest & Royalties Directive does not apply to the

transfer between Company A and NewCo but there is a tax treaty which follows the OECD

Model and provides for no WHT on royalties.

Further, when NewCo passes the royalties to the Caribbean affiliate, there is no WHT

because the MS where NewCo is tax resident has unilaterally abolished WHT on outflows.

NewCo is taxable on the royalties that it receives from Company A but its tax base is

significantly reduced by the fact that it pays out most of these amounts to its Caribbean

affiliate.

NewCo passes royalties tax-free to its Caribbean parent company where this income is

taxable at zero rate.

Who is liable to disclose

Under a scheme of mandatory disclosure, the law firm which advised and possibly carried out

the formalities for setting up NewCo would need to inform on the specifics of this scheme. The

disclosure of the arrangement would have to be done in the Member State of NewCo if the

intermediary has a presence (e.g. at least an office) there.

If the intermediary advised from outside the EU (e.g. the third country where the MNE is

headquartered) and collaborated with a local firm for the formation of NewCo, it would be

for the local firm to report. In the event that the third-country intermediary only gave tax

advice and sold the scheme to the MNE group but NewCo was set up by in-house lawyers, the

obligation to disclose would be shifted to the taxpayer, i.e. NewCo.

Relevant hallmarks

Generic: the scheme above could be a massively marketed scheme

A massively marketed scheme would be designed by promoters/ tax experts with the aim to

generally address situations whereby a third-country taxpayer wishes to mitigate/ eliminate

its liability to withholding tax on royalty income in the EU. It would not look at the specific

details of the corporate and business structure of the taxpayer.

The scheme would be sold for a fee, which would vary depending on the services supplied by

intermediary. For instance, the intermediary may only sell the scheme or may also be

involved in tis implementation.

The intermediary/ (taxpayer) may be in a position to prove that the creation of NewCo has a

main aim other than obtaining a tax advantage, e.g. there is a need to centrally manage all

EU franchise contracts for the MNE group and the actual activity of NewCo proves that it is

actively involved in doing this. In such case, the scheme is not captured by the hallmark and

does not need to be reported. In the opposite case, the fact that MNE group benefits from no

or minimal withholding tax on the royalties that NewCo pays out of the EU is a clear tax

benefit and should be sufficient to bring the scheme within the scope of the hallmark.

Specific: zero taxation in the Caribbean.

If the outbound royalty payments are subject to zero rate tax in the Caribbean, the scheme

would be captured by hallmark C.1.b).ii

It would suffice that one of these two hallmarks captures the scheme, for the purpose of

making it reportable.

28

Example 2 – Mismatch - Transparency/Non-Transparency of an Entity

Company A is resident for tax purposes in third country A and licenses IP to entity B, a

wholly-owned subsidiary, in EU MS B.

Entity B is treated as transparent under the law of MS B but has opted to be considered as

non-transparent for tax purposes from the viewpoint of third country A.

Entity B sub-licenses the use of its IP to subsidiaries of the group in several MS.

The subsidiaries pay royalties for the use of the IP back to entity B.

MS B does not see a taxable presence of entity B in its territory (not even a permanent

establishment, as most of the management of the licences takes place from abroad).

Given the fact that MS B would not supply a tax residence certificate for transparent entity B,

the franchisees will need to apply the tax treaty with third country A. It is assumed that all

these applicable tax treaties follow the OECD Model and so provide for no WHT on royalties.

From the point of view of MS B, the royalty payments are deemed to be paid to Company A,

which is the only shareholder/partner of entity B.

Third country A treats entity B as non-transparent, i.e. a company resident for tax purposes in

MS B.

Third country A would therefore not tax the royalties paid to B (unless it decided to apply

controlled foreign company legislation on company A).

Who is liable to disclose

Under a scheme of mandatory disclosure, the law firm which advised and possibly carried out

the formalities for setting up entity B would need to inform on the specifics of this scheme.

The disclosure of the arrangement would have to be done in the Member State of entity B if

the intermediary has a presence (e.g. at least an office) there.

If the intermediary advised from outside the EU (e.g. the third country where company A is

resident for tax purposes) and collaborated with a local firm in MS B, it would be for the

local firm to report. In the event that the third-country intermediary only gave tax advice and

sold the scheme to company A but entity B was set up by in-house lawyers, the obligation to

disclose would be shifted to the taxpayer, i.e. entity B.

Relevant hallmarks

Generic: the scheme above could be a massively marketed scheme; it would be sold for a fee.

The observations made on generic schemes under Example 1 would also apply to the facts of

this example.

Specific: not subject to tax in the third country of destination.

Considering that third country A treats entity B as non-transparent, it assumes that it is

resident for tax purposes in MS B and has been subject to corporate tax there. Consequently,

If the royalty payments are not taxable in the third country of destination, the scheme would

be captured by hallmark C.1.b).i.

In addition, there would be a mismatch as the same entity would be treated as transparent in

the EU MS and non-transparent by the third country. Even if the scheme were not captured by

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the hallmark above referring to the level/ existence of tax liability, it would still fall within the

scope of C.1.e) due to the mismatch.

It would suffice that one of these two hallmarks captures the scheme, for the purpose of

making it reportable.

It should be clarified that reporting a scheme under the proposed Directive does not imply that

the scheme(s) necessarily involve(s) arrangements of tax avoidance. The tax authorities will

have to assess the disclosed details in combination with the tax file of the taxpayer concerned.

The aim is that the tax authorities receive information about potentially aggressive tax

planning schemes before these schemes are implemented and that this enhances their

effectiveness in clamping down on tax avoidance.

4. WHY THE EUROPEAN UNION SHOULD ACT

Article 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is the legal base

for legislative initiatives in the field of direct taxation. Although no explicit reference to direct

taxation is made, Article 115 refers to directives for the approximation of national laws as

those directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market. It follows that,

under Article 115 TFEU, directives are the only available legal instrument for the Union.

Based on Article 288 TFEU, directives shall be binding as to the result to be achieved upon

Member States but leave the choice of form and methods to the national authorities.

Given that the scope of the proposed rules is limited to direct taxes, it would not have been

possible to refer to Article 113 TFEU on the harmonisation of legislation in turnover taxes.

The lack of transparency facilitates activities of certain intermediaries involved in promoting

and selling aggressive tax planning schemes. As a consequence of this, Member States suffer

from the shifting of profits, which would otherwise be generated and become taxable in their

territory, towards low-tax jurisdictions and often experience an erosion of their tax bases. In

addition, such a situation should be expected to give rise to conditions of unfair tax

competition against businesses that refuse to engage in these illegitimate activities. The

ultimate outcome is to distort the operation of the internal market.

Experience shows that national provisions against aggressive tax planning cannot be fully

effective. The disclosure requirements under national rules would be limited to the domestic

territory and therefore only deal with a single fragment of a cross-border scheme. In fact, such

schemes usually involve numerous companies with tax residence in a variety of jurisdictions.

Sometimes, when it comes to multinational groups, the taxpayer in a single jurisdiction may

not even be fully informed of the structure of a scheme that stretches across the group. It

would therefore be unrealistic to expect to receive the full picture of a cross-border scheme

applying to a multinational group through placing an obligation of disclosure to a local

subsidiary. In addition, if only part of a scheme becomes known to the authorities, it is very

possible that the potentially harmful elements of the scheme escape.

Many of the structures devised to avoid taxes have a cross-border dimension while also

capital and persons are increasingly mobile, especially within an integrated market, such as

the internal market of the EU. The need for collective action at EU level to improve the

current state of play has become apparent and can usefully complement existing initiatives in

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this area, in particular within the context of the DAC. This is all the more so, as existing

instruments at national level have shown to be only partially effective in increasing

transparency.

Typical structure of aggressive tax planning arrangements

A typical cross-border tax planning arrangement or a series of arrangements would involve a

structure that engages more than one jurisdiction within the EU (and that possibly stretches

even to third countries). In accordance with the proposed rules, the intermediary who carries

the responsibility vis-à-vis the taxpayer(s) for designing and implementing the arrangement(s)

shall file the requisite information with the tax authorities. In the business practice, it is

usually the case that the intermediary exclusively deals with one taxpayer within a group; that

is, the top company in the shareholding tree. It follows that in such cases, individual national

measures oriented towards disclosing the domestically-focussed individual bits of a broader

arrangement or series of arrangements would be impossible to apply. This is because there

would be no presence of an intermediary in most of the subsidiary jurisdictions. Inevitably, it

would be the intermediary who signed with the taxpayer that would have to disclose the EU-

wide dimension of an arrangement(s).

It can also occur that, depending on the specifics of a tax planning arrangement, lower-tier

group companies with a predominantly domestic focus sign a contract with intermediaries.

This would often refer to the local aspects of a broader cross-border scheme for a corporate

group. In this context, although it could be possible to identify the intermediary related to the

local aspect of the overall arrangement, one would normally need to have a global picture, in

order to identify the contrived steps that make such a scheme illegitimate. Namely, if seen in

isolation (e.g. State by State), the domestic dimension of a scheme is often unlikely to provide

the authorities with sufficient input for assessing whether a part of a certain scheme should be

acceptable or not. It therefore follows that a country-by-country notification of pieces in the

puzzle, without knowledge of the full picture, would not fulfil the ultimate objective of this

initiative, i.e. to clamp down on tax avoidance and evasion and consequently, improve the

functioning of the internal market. On the contrary, a localised approach would exacerbate the

fragmentation of the market.

Example 1

In Example 1 under section 3.4, the intermediary (e.g. law firm which advised and possibly

carried out the formalities for setting up NewCo) would need to inform the authorities about

the specifics of this scheme, including by providing a summary of the facts. The disclosure of

the arrangement will have to be done in the Member State of NewCo if the intermediary has a

presence (e.g. at least an office) there. If the intermediary is not identifiable, in terms of

physical presence in the EU, the responsibility for disclosure will shift to the taxpayer, i.e. the

group member which signed the contract with the intermediary.

In this example, it becomes obvious that a disclosure of solely the local aspects of the scheme

(e.g. the situation in Member State A) would not suffice for identifying the tax-related motive

behind the creation of New Co.

Example 2

In Example 2 under section 3.4, the intermediary (e.g. law firm which advised and possibly

set up the hybrid entity B) is most likely to carry the obligation of disclosing the relevant data

of the entire scheme to the authorities. Assuming that the intermediary is based, or maintains a

presence, in Member State B, the intermediary will need to notify the full picture to the tax

authorities of that Sate. Thus, it will not be enough to disclose only the local aspects that

solely pertain to Member State B. In fact, in such case, the authorities would be unlikely to

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trace the element of hybridity which is inherent in this scheme and leads to double non-

taxation.

Subsidiarity

Both examples demonstrate that a country-by-country disclosure of fragments of the overall

schemes would not supply the authorities with the necessary minimum of knowledge to

identify an arrangement or a series of arrangements in their entirety and assess whether it is

legitimate or not. Considering that the mandatory disclosure is aimed to inform tax authorities

about schemes with a dimension beyond a single State, it would be necessary to embark on

any such initiative through action at the level of the EU, in order to ensure a uniform approach

to the identified problem. Thus, the internal market needs a robust mechanism to address

loopholes in a uniform fashion and rectify existing distortions by ensuring that tax authorities

receive appropriate information, on a timely basis, about aggressive tax planning schemes

with cross-border implications.

Uncoordinated action undertaken by Member States based on own initiative would create a

patchwork of rules on the disclosure of schemes by intermediaries while it would perpetuate

unfair tax competition between States.

What is more, action on disclosure at the level of the EU would bring an added value, as

compared to individual Member State initiatives in the field. This is because the proposal

exclusively deals with cross-border situations, which is not the focus of the existing national

regimes on mandatory disclosure. In fact, most of the aggressive tax planning schemes are

structured to have a cross-border dimension or impact, as they have the aim of shifting taxable

income towards low-tax jurisdictions. In this light, the EU is in a better position than any

Member State individually to ensure the effectiveness and completeness of the system for this

exchange of information.

On this point, stakeholders confirmed at the consultation stage that the most interesting tax

planning schemes for them are those with a cross-border element. It follows that the

disclosure of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes at the level of the Union brings a

definitive advantage into the equation: it allows tax administrations to obtain the full picture

of a structure of cross-border transactions and its impact on the overall tax base. In addition,

the automatic exchange of information among tax authorities increases the chances of

identifying potentially aggressive tax schemes, as reportable information will be available to

all Member States. It should also be considered that a common cross-border system for the

internal market should be expected to gradually fix as a level-playing field which could

complement national systems of disclosure. It is thus true that national rules of a purely

domestic dimension may be circumvented if taxpayers moved activities and wealth to a

jurisdiction without rules of disclosure.

Proportionality

The assessed policy response represents a proportionate answer to the identified problem

since it does not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective of the Treaties for a better

functioning of the internal market without distortions. Indeed, the common rules will be

limited to creating the minimum necessary common framework for the disclosure of

potentially harmful arrangements:

(i) The common rules are limited to addressing potentially aggressive tax planning

schemes with a cross-border element.

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(ii) The imposition of penalties for non-compliance with the national provisions that

implement the Directive into national law will remain under the sovereign control of

Member States.

Leaving the decision on this element exclusively to individual national initiatives, or relying

on the effectiveness of a soft-law initiative, would mean that some States could decide to act,

while others not. This is notably so, given that BEPS Action 12 is not a minimum standard

and implementation in the EU could therefore diverge substantially. Indeed, 39 out of 131

stakeholders replied in the public consultation that, in case there was no EU action, no

transparency requirements would be introduced and 107 stakeholders stated that it is likely or

very likely that differing transparency requirements would be introduced. Furthermore, the

exchange of information on disclosed cross-border schemes would not be ensured if it were

left to individual action by Member States. For all these reasons, introducing a reporting

requirement at EU level linked with exchange of information could resolve the identified

problems and contribute to improving the functioning of the internal market.

This impact assessment evaluates whether there is a need for action at EU level and to what

extent a harmonised approach is needed for the EU internal market. Like for other recent EU

initiatives in this field, there are strong indications that if action is eventually taken,

aggressive tax planning arrangements cannot be efficiently addressed within domestic

legislation or through bilateral tax treaties.

5. SCOPE OF THIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT

This assessment looks into the possibilities of introducing mandatory disclosure rules with the

objective to enhance transparency in the design and promotion of aggressive tax planning

schemes.

The term 'intermediaries' refers to any natural or legal person who is sufficiently linked to an

EU Member State and is responsible for the design, marketing, organisation or management

of a potentially aggressive tax planning scheme. The concept also includes those who provide

assistance or advice in creating, developing, planning, organizing, marketing or implementing

such a scheme. The term comprises consultants, lawyers, financial (investment) advisors,

accountants, solicitors, insurance intermediaries, financial institutions, and company-

formation agents known as Trust and Company Service Providers.

The assessment discusses who should report to tax administrations and which types of taxes

should be covered. Regarding the reportable schemes, the focus is on potentially aggressive

tax planning structures, which implies that a reportable scheme may not necessarily be

illegitimate or illegal. Whether a scheme is reportable depends on certain criteria referred to

as 'hallmarks'. The composition of hallmarks is also under assessment.

Another topic of analysis concerns the form and frequency of the exchange of information

on disclosed schemes between Member States, i.e. whether the exchange should be

spontaneous or automatic. Finally, the text discusses how this information should be

exchanged.

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6. OBJECTIVES

Figure 6: Objectives of the policy intervention

Source: European Commission (2017)

6.1. General Objectives

The general objective of a potential initiative would be to improve the proper functioning of

the internal market, which is currently undermined by the use of aggressive tax planning

schemes, as these schemes result in market distortions and cause a lack of fairness. It is true

that national corporate tax systems in the EU are not fully harmonised and Member States are

– to some extent – free to provide exemptions and incentives for taxpayers. Yet, at the same

time, it is widely agreed that there is an urgent need for curbing tax planning practices which

take advantage of mismatches in the interaction between corporate tax systems, exploit

beneficial tax regimes, or interpret the law in a way that was not envisaged by the legislators.

In this context, it would be crucial to stand against the lack of transparency or uncertainty

over beneficial ownership. If tax authorities receive more timely information about potentially

aggressive tax planning schemes with a cross-border element, they should be able to take

appropriate measures.

6.2. Specific Objectives

6.2.1. Fighting tax evasion and avoidance through identifying aggressive cross-order tax

planning schemes

In order to efficiently fight against tax evasion and avoidance, it is necessary to track

potentially aggressive tax planning schemes and to respond to the tax risks they pose. The

national authorities need to receive information on a timely basis – ideally, already before a

scheme is implemented – and it is also crucial to identify the users and promoters of such

schemes. It is then up to them to take immediate action such as changing the law in order to

prevent the implementation of certain arrangements or to focus on certain arrangements in the

context of upcoming audits.

6.2.2. Improving transparency and timely access to information on aggressive cross-border

tax planning schemes

Transparency and access to the right information at an early stage should allow the authorities

to improve the speed and accuracy of their risk assessment and make timely and informed

decisions on how to protect their tax revenues. Ideally, information about a certain scheme

should be obtained before this is implemented and/or used. Disclosure within a strict deadline

would maximize the tax administration’s ability to assess the risk of schemes at an early stage

and, if necessary, take appropriate actions to prevent a loss of tax revenue and/or increase the

deterrent effect.

Create a deterrent for the design and use of aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes

Fight tax evasion and avoidance through identifying aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes

Specific direct objective

Specific indirect objective

Proper functioning of the Internal MarketGeneral

objective

Improve transparency and timely access to information on aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes

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6.2.3. Creating a deterrent to the design and use of aggressive cross-border tax planning

schemes

It should be expected that the mandatory disclosure of potentially aggressive tax planning

schemes would dissuade intermediaries from designing and marketing such schemes. When

the national tax authorities receive information, they can take appropriate action to ensure that

their tax legislation is sufficiently developed to tackle the disclosed schemes. Furthermore,

dissuasive penalties in case of non-compliance are of high importance in ensuring an effective

mechanism. Monetary sanctions are the most common, while some countries combine this

with non-monetary sanctions. The main purpose of setting penalties is as deterrence. As far as

more material sanctions for intermediaries involved in aggressive tax planning schemes, such

as sanctions within professional regulation or increased publicity, are concerned, it should be

left to the national level to deal with.

7. POLICY OPTIONS

An initiative that addresses the identified problems would need to delineate the objectives it

seeks to achieve and the mechanisms that can best bring these objectives into fruition. The

challenge is how to design a proportionate system which would target the most aggressive

forms of tax planning. The OECD report on BEPS Action 12 gives examples of the

approaches taken by tax authorities in a number of jurisdictions around the world, including

the three national mandatory disclosure regimes that exist in the EU, namely in Ireland,

Portugal and the UK.

The policy choices can in practice be drawn between a context where there is a (mandatory)

disclosure of information on potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements to tax

authorities and a context where there is no such obligation, i.e. the so-called status quo.

The public consultation set out a list of policy options for stakeholders. Some of these options

concerned the type of appropriate legal instrument for the proposed initiative. That is, whether

legislation or a soft law act in the form of a Recommendation or Code of Conduct presents the

optimal solution. Amongst the options that built on binding rules, the stakeholders were

invited to mainly consider the possibility of agreeing a common framework for disclosing

information to tax authorities or alternatively, of coupling the disclosure with an automatic

exchange of the disclosed data across tax authorities in the EU.

Following the consultations with stakeholders, it became clear that all of the available policy

choices which involved binding rules would lead to a similar outcome. Thus, if there is a

(mandatory) disclosure of data to the tax authorities, it always enables some form of exchange

of information. This is because spontaneous exchanges form part of the general framework of

the Directive on Administrative Cooperation. Therefore the exchange of information is

present in distinct forms under all policy options that involve a disclosure of data.

It was further considered that the only real comparison between policy choices could in

practice be drawn between a context where there is an obligation to disclose information on

potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements (coupled with exchange of information) and

a context where there is no such obligation, i.e. the so-called status quo. In addition, the

prospect for limiting the exchange of information to spontaneous exchanges would not appear

consistent with the series of initiatives that the Commission has lately undertaken in the field

of Transparency. Thus, the framework for information exchange, both in the rules that

implement the common reporting standard in the EU and in advance cross-border rulings,

involves automatic exchanges. In this context, it is necessary to assess the constituent

35

elements of a policy choice consisting of a mandatory disclosure of reportable cross-border

arrangements coupled with automatic exchange of information. The following questions

appear mostly relevant:

Who has to report?

Which type of taxes is covered?

What types of schemes should be disclosed, i.e. what is a reportable scheme?

Which hallmarks should be used to identify reportable schemes?

Should only new or also existing schemes be included?

Should there be an exchange of information on disclosed schemes?

What form and which means should be used for information exchange?

Some questions will not be tackled by this impact assessment, as they precisely pertain to the

way that Member States have organised their public administration and judiciary. These

matters can be dealt with more effectively at national level:

What should be the consequences of non-compliance by intermediaries or taxpayers?

What should be the follow up by Member States after receiving reports?

How should collected information be used?

Table 2: Overview of Options

Policy options concerning disclosure regime

Baseline scenario No action

Specific features Description of options

Personal scope

Subject of reporting obligation

1. Single requirement (only intermediaries or only users)

2. Double requirement (intermediaries and users)

3. Primary and secondary requirement (intermediaries or users)

Material scope

Type of taxes covered 1. All taxes

2. Direct taxes only

Composition of hallmarks

1. Generic hallmarks

2. Specific hallmarks

3. Generic and specific hallmarks

Timeframe 1. Only new schemes

2. New and existing schemes

Exchange of information

Form and frequency of exchange of information

1. Spontaneous exchange

2. Automatic exchange

Means for exchange of information

1. Compulsory publication in the Member State of disclosure

2. Direct exchange between Member States

3. Indirect exchange through a central directory Source: European Commission (2017)

Under the baseline scenario, Member States that have a mandatory disclosure scheme (three

Member States currently) could exchange information in the framework of the DAC if they

considered that the information is relevant to other Member States (spontaneous exchange).

36

As far as the alternatives to the baseline scenario are concerned, the assessment identifies a

number of features relevant to the scope and content of the disclosure as well as to the

possibility of information exchange. The available options for shaping each feature of a

possible disclosure scheme are mutually exclusive, which implies that for each feature only

one of the options can be chosen. Hence, the approach is to choose the preferred option for

each feature individually.

7.1. Personal scope

Two key players are involved in the implementation of tax planning schemes: (i)

intermediaries, who design and promote the schemes and (ii) taxpayers, who use the schemes.

There are different options regarding who should be required to report. For each of the key

players, there can be three basic situations: they are never liable to report; or, they are always

liable to report; or, they have to report under certain circumstances.

According to the OECD report on BEPS Action 12 recommendation, countries adopting

mandatory disclosure rules will need to decide whether or not they introduce a dual reporting

requirement that applies to the intermediary and taxpayer (see the option under 7.1.2) or a

reporting obligation that falls primarily on the promoter (see the option under 7.1.3).

However, where the primary reporting obligation falls on the promoter it is recommended that

the reporting obligation switches to the taxpayer where:

• The promoter is offshore;

• There is no intermediary;

• The intermediary asserts legal professional privilege.

Mandatory disclosure regimes, which exist in practice, usually rely on the role of both

intermediaries and taxpayers. Nevertheless, a mandatory regime can be built around the role

of only one key player, either the taxpayer or intermediary (see the option under 7.1.1)

7.1.1. Single requirement (only intermediaries or only users)

Under this option, either only intermediaries or only users are subject to a reporting

obligation. Intermediaries are identified through the activity they conduct regarding the tax

planning, rather than through their affiliation to a certain professional group. Therefore, the

concept of an intermediary should include a non-exhaustive list of certain professions, such as

lawyers, tax advisers, accountants, wealth managers, bankers, company and trust service

providers etc. At the same time, it should extend to anybody who is involved in the design,

promotion and marketing of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes.

Users are taxpayers who accept the advice received from intermediaries, in cases where an

intermediary is involved, and implement such schemes. Users, in certain circumstances,

develop potentially aggressive tax planning schemes without the involvement of

intermediaries.

Under this option, there would only be a single reporting requirement, either for the

intermediaries, who design and market schemes, or for the users, who implement schemes.

7.1.2. Double requirement (intermediaries and users)

According to this option, the reporting obligation is jointly placed on both the intermediary

and the user. This means that intermediaries have to report on schemes within the scope of the

obligation and, in addition, taxpayers have to provide information about specific transactions

(e.g. in their tax declarations), regardless of whether the intermediary has already disclosed

these transactions. Accordingly, the intermediary's obligation to disclose would not be waived

by the fact that the user will provide information on the same scheme.

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7.1.3. Primary and secondary requirement (intermediaries and/or users)

Under this option, a primary reporting obligation is put on intermediaries. However, in order

to ensure that the schemes under discussion are reported in all situations, the reporting

obligation should be shifted to the user of the scheme in one of the following scenarios:

a) Non-EU intermediary: Where an intermediary of the scheme is not located in the EU, it

may become impossible to ensure the intermediary's compliance. Therefore, the obligation to

disclose potentially aggressive tax planning schemes would capture intermediaries who

market, promote, sell, enable the set-up of such schemes and fulfil one of the following

conditions:

(i) they are incorporated or organised in a non-incorporated legal form in an EU

Member State;

(ii) they are registered with a professional association in an EU Member State;

(iii) they maintain premises in an EU Member State from where they habitually

exercise their activity related to tax planning.

b) No intermediary: It may be that a scheme is developed by the user for internal use, for

example an "in-house" scheme. This may be the case, for example, for large multinational

corporations which have the necessary internal resources to devise such schemes.

c) Intermediary bound with legal professional privilege or secrecy rules: Some intermediaries

may not be in a situation to make a disclosure legally, due to specific legal constraints related

to the domestic regulation of their profession. These issues commonly involve legal

professional privilege and secrecy rules. In their contributions to the proposal a number of

stakeholders noted the need for any proposal to uphold the professional secrecy/legal

professional privilege to facilitate full and frank disclosure between those who need legal

advice and their lawyers and safeguarding this in the public interests and also for taxpayers. It

is also worthwhile mentioning that the clients have may have the choice to waive the right to

legal privilege or secrecy. In such a case, disclosure may still be provided by the intermediary.

Only in case of no waiver would the obligation to report be shifted to the user. Both scenarios

ensure that the legal privilege or secrecy is not infringed upon and the reporting is secured at

the same time.

If none of the conditions in a) is fulfilled and in cases b) and c), the obligation to disclose

should be shifted to the user of a potentially aggressive tax planning scheme. The user of the

scheme should remain legally responsible for the disclosure obligations, including any

default, regardless of whether the intermediary fulfils the necessary disclosure requirements.

7.2. Material scope

7.2.1. Type of taxes covered

7.2.1.1. All taxes

A reporting requirement may concern schemes that relate to any type of tax. The OECD

report on BEPS Action 12 indicated that jurisdictions which have introduced mandatory

disclosure regimes have included a broad range of taxes; amongst them, income taxes and

value added taxes. The sub option to cover all taxes will be discarded and not retained for the

comparison of options later on. The prospect for covering all taxes would not seem justified

as the exchange of information on VAT, customs duties, excise duties, as well as on social

security contributions, is already covered by other legislative instruments on administrative

cooperation, which specifically focus on these types of taxes.

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In theory, any type of tax or duty may suffer from aggressive tax planning. However, the

problem definition shows that the concerns are related to international tax issues which are

precisely linked to income taxes. On this premise, it is justified to focus on direct taxation.

7.2.1.2. Direct taxes

This option excludes certain types of taxes and instead concentrates on direct taxation,

notably personal and corporate income tax.

7.2.2. Object of reporting (hallmarks)

When it comes to the object of reporting, there are two aspects to be considered. The first

question is which tax planning schemes should fall under the scope of the proposal and the

second question is what information should be reported and exchanged. This chapter outlines

which schemes should be reported.

Targeting the appropriate tax planning schemes lies at the heart of this transparency initiative.

Tax authorities are likely to be interested in situations where loopholes or mismatches in the

interaction of tax systems are exploited to obtain tax benefits. A disclosure regime needs to be

designed in a way that there is legal certainty about the types of schemes or arrangements that

should be disclosed to tax authorities. Here the question is which approach or which

techniques could help target and capture the key information that tax administrations need in

order to make informed policy decisions, while avoiding over-disclosure or undue compliance

burdens on taxpayers and administrations. One crucial element in this exercise is the

indicators or criteria which clearly identify the schemes that would have to be reported; these

are the so-called hallmarks. It is sufficient that a tax planning scheme meets one of the

hallmarks to be identified as potentially aggressive and become subject to reporting.

Definition of hallmarks in the BEPS Action 12 OECD report

Hallmarks act as tools to identify the features of schemes that tax administrations are

interested in. They are generally divided into two categories: generic and specific

hallmarks. Generic hallmarks target features that are common to promoted schemes, such

as the requirement for confidentiality or the payment of a premium fee. Generic hallmarks

can also be used to capture new and innovative tax planning arrangements that may be

easily replicated and sold to a variety of taxpayers. Specific hallmarks are used to target

known vulnerabilities in the tax system and techniques that are commonly used in tax

avoidance arrangements such as the use of losses.

Existing national disclosure regimes use hallmarks (and sometimes also other filters) to target

schemes in the tax authorities' interest. It should be stressed that the fact that a scheme is

reportable does not automatically mean that it amounts to tax avoidance or tax evasion. Some

of the hallmarks which have generally been linked to abusive tax transactions may also be

found in legitimate transactions. Therefore, the disclosure regime seeks to identify potentially

aggressive tax planning schemes and does not judge whether a scheme under disclosure is

actually abusive or aggressive.

Another important observation is that existing disclosure regimes are not designed to pick up

all tax avoidance schemes. For the purpose of designing the EU disclosure regime, the

primary target should involve potentially aggressive tax planning schemes with a cross-

border element. The cross-border element would generally imply that the user and/or any of

the intermediaries and/or any of arrangements/transactions in the scheme are not all linked to

the same Member State. Intermediaries would have to identify the cross-border element and

include it to their report.

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A key question is which hallmarks should be included in the EU disclosure regime. One

approach could be to delineate them through major categories, i.e. generic and specific

hallmarks. On that basis, one can identify three major options.

7.2.2.1. Generic hallmarks

Under this option, the EU regime would include only generic hallmarks. These refer to the

behaviour of intermediaries. They focus on marketing and the form in which advice on tax

planning schemes is supplied. They target features which are common to mass marketed and

standardised products, either existing or new and innovative. The following items include

typical generic hallmarks used in a number of jurisdictions:

"Premium fee” or “contingent fee” hallmarks: the amount that the client pays for the

advice can be attributed to the value of the tax benefits obtained under the scheme.

"Confidentiality" hallmarks where the promoter or adviser requires the client to keep

the scheme confidential.

"Standardized tax product" or "marketability" hallmarks intended to capture widely-

marketed schemes.

Generic hallmarks only become relevant where they additionally fulfil a minimum standard

requirement that relates to whether the relevant schemes point to tax avoidance or their main

benefit is to obtain a tax advantage. According to the OECD report on BEPS Action 12, most

generic hallmarks in national regimes (with the exception of the United States) are designed

on this basis.

According to the OECD report on BEPS Action 12, it is recommended that generic hallmarks

include a confidentiality and premium/contingent fee. A country may also wish to adopt

additional generic hallmarks such as the one applying to standardised tax products.

7.2.2.2. Specific hallmarks

Under this option, the EU regime would include only specific hallmarks. Specific hallmarks

reflect the particular concerns of tax authorities, and target areas of perceived high risk, such

as the use of losses, leasing contracts, the use of hybrid instruments and income conversion

schemes. Those concerns include situations of double non-taxation. Some hallmarks

specifically target cross-border schemes e.g. schemes involving entities located in listed third

countries. Some other specific hallmarks do not draw any such distinction. Other sets of

hallmarks specifically look at schemes aimed at separating legal from beneficial ownership or

concealing them. Specific hallmarks also refer to the possibility of exploiting mismatches that

result from the interaction of disparate national tax systems and may lead to double non-

taxation (e.g. different rules on depreciation between two Member States may result in having

the same asset depreciated in two separate jurisdictions; i.e. the State of the economic owner

and that of the legal owner).

The following set of specific hallmarks was listed for the purpose of the Commission's public

consultation in November 2016.

Set of specific hallmarks listed in the Commission's Public Consultation

1. Use of jurisdictions included in the (future) EU list of third country jurisdictions that fail to comply with tax

good governance standards.

2. Use of certain legal arrangements/entities (trusts and similar) in jurisdictions that pose difficulties in

identifying the beneficial owner.

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3. Use of entities subject to zero taxation or less than a certain % (to be defined), including hybrid entities (i.e.

entities that are treated as transparent by one country but as non-transparent by another country).

4. Schemes designed to circumvent the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for automatic exchanges of financial

account information.

5. Use of a group company in a low tax jurisdiction for intra-group financing of other group companies in high

tax jurisdictions.

6. Use of group companies with very little substance that are nevertheless entitled to tax treaty benefits and

through which large amounts of money flow.

7. A general artificial arrangement or an artificial series of arrangements created for the essential purpose of

avoiding or evading taxation and which leads to a tax benefit.

8. A transfer pricing arrangement not in conformity with the arm's length principle and/or the OECD transfer

pricing guidelines.

9. A profit allocation between different parties of the same group that it is not in conformity with the arm's length

principle and/or the OECD transfer pricing guidelines.

10. A preferential treatment under the application of the national tax law that is not in line with the general

application or interpretation of the law.

The respondents to the public consultation ranked the hallmarks based on their relevance for

classifying aggressive tax planning schemes in the following order:

7. A general artificial arrangement;

10. A preferential treatment under the application of national law;

4. Schemes designed to circumvent the CRS ; and

2. Difficulties in identifying the beneficial owners.

Hallmark 1. Use of future EU list of third country jurisdictions that fail to comply with tax

good governance standards was considered by stakeholders to be less relevant.

A specific consideration would be required for the hallmarks related to the EU list of third

countries because the procedure leading to the establishment of the list has not yet been

finalised and so the final list and other details are not known for the time being.

There is also a group of specific hallmarks that targets arrangements which are designed to

assist the evasion of tax by making it difficult to identify the beneficial owner of income and

gains:

The use of certain legal arrangement/entities (trusts and similar) in jurisdictions that

pose difficulties in identifying the beneficial owner;

Transactions designed to circumvent the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for

automatic exchanges of financial account information;

Transactions that have the effect of obscuring or concealing the relation between legal

and beneficial ownership, for example through the use of a power of attorney or

nominees.

7.2.2.3. Generic and specific hallmarks

Under this option, the EU regime would use a compilation of both generic and specific

hallmarks and thus jointly cover both previous options. This option is the most comprehensive

of the three available ones and combines the two basic concepts; that is, the effectiveness of

broad generic hallmarks in capturing a large part of (massively) marketed schemes and the

precision of the specific ones which can better reflect tailor-made schemes.

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7.2.3. Timeframe for reporting

If the main objective of a disclosure regime is to provide tax authorities with timely

information on aggressive tax planning schemes, then an appropriate timeframe should be an

important feature. The actual disclosure takes place normally within specific time limits (days

or months) after the obligation to report has been triggered. Certain points in time may be of

higher relevance than others. The timeframe could be linked to the availability of the scheme

or its implementation. It may also depend on who is to make the reporting – i.e. the

intermediary or the user. One option could be a combination of both.

In this regard, the OECD report makes the following recommendation, which could be

followed in the EU regime:

"156. It is recommended that where the promoter has the obligation to disclose then

the timeframe for disclosure should be linked to the availability of the scheme and that

the timescale for disclosure should aim to maximise the tax administration’s ability to

react to the scheme quickly and to influence taxpayers’ behaviour. This would be

achieved by setting a short timescale for reporting once a scheme is available.

157. Where a taxpayer is required to disclose it is recommended that the disclosure is

triggered by implementation rather than availability of a scheme. In addition, if only

the taxpayer discloses (i.e. because there is no promoter or the promoter is offshore)

the timescale for reporting should be short to maximise the tax administration’s ability

to act against a scheme quickly."

Consideration should be given as to whether schemes that pre-date the entry into force of a

disclosure regime should be included or the disclosure obligation should be limited to the

schemes created subsequently. It should be noted in this regard that many tax schemes are

multi-annual and may well still be active after the disclosure obligation enters into force

despite having been created prior thereto. Furthermore, these schemes may also have been

modified after their creation and taken on different characteristics which would need to be

assessed under the disclosure regime.

7.2.3.1. Only schemes introduced after the legislation for mandatory disclosure has entered

into force

Intermediaries will report information only on schemes that will be created after the EU

disclosure regime enters into force. This option would not entail any retrospective elements

and would cover schemes that have been implemented in the past but due to their life-cycle

still have an impact on taxes paid.

7.2.3.2. Both existing and new schemes

Intermediaries will report information on existing active schemes as well as schemes that will

be created after the EU disclosure regime enters into force. This option ensures that all

aggressive tax planning schemes in the scope of the initiative at the time of entry into force

would be reported. Tax administrations may have an interest to receive information not only

about new but also existing schemes.

7.3. Exchange of information

One of the key questions is whether information on potentially aggressive tax planning

schemes which is reported to national tax administrations should stay with them or would be

of interest to any other tax administration in the EU. Like in other areas, such as the automatic

exchange of information on tax rulings, there seems to be an interest on the side of EU

Member States to share information in so far as there is a potential impact on the tax base of

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other Member States. That is the core element of exchange of information triggered by the

Directive on Administrative Cooperation. Both Member States and stakeholders appear

willing to exchange information, at least when it comes to potentially aggressive tax planning

schemes with a cross-border element.56

A mandatory disclosure regime for intermediaries brings most benefits if it is coupled with

exchange of information between EU Member States. There are different options regarding

the design of the exchange of information.

7.3.1. Form and frequency of exchange of information

7.3.1.1. Spontaneous exchange

Under this option, the release of information would be triggered by the fact that the national

tax authorities become aware of a tax scheme the details of which it would be useful to share

with other authorities. The exchange would take place on a case-by-case basis. Each Member

State would have to send information within a specified timeframe. The information could be

sent within a limited period (for instance, a month) following the date of disclosure. The

Member State where the disclosure takes place would decide which other Member State(s) the

information may be foreseeably relevant to.

7.3.1.2. Automatic exchange

The release of information would take place at pre-established regular intervals. These

intervals could be set freely, for instance, monthly or quarterly.57

At the end of each interval,

Member States would be required to either exchange the information on the disclosed tax

planning schemes during this interval, or confirm that they have not received any relevant

information during that period. Member States would share information with all other

Member States and possibly also with the Commission. Automatic exchanges should not

preclude spontaneous exchanges either.

7.3.2. Means for exchange of information

7.3.2.1. Compulsory publication in the Member State of disclosure

Under this option, each Member State would be required to make the information received

publicly available. Not only tax authorities would receive information, but also a wider group

of interested stakeholders would have access to what was disclosed.

7.3.2.2. Direct exchange among Member States

Each Member State would exchange information directly with all other Member States and

possibly also with the European Commission. Under this option, standard channels of

communication in the field of administrative cooperation could be used.

7.3.2.3. Indirect exchange through a central directory accessible to Member States

Each Member State receiving reports from intermediaries or users would send the information

to a central directory which would be fully accessible to the other Member States and for a

limited number of information items, to the European Commission. The Directory for the

automatic exchange of information about potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning

schemes between tax authorities will essentially be the same mechanism as the one that the

Commission has set up for the automatic exchange of information on cross-border tax rulings

(DAC3). This type of exchange would provide more options for the management of

56 See feedback received from Member States in Annex 2. 57 "Automatic" exchange should not be confused with "automated" exchange.

43

information, as compared to a simple bilateral exchange (for instance, access any time,

management of information on follow-up). The Central Directory will be hosted by the

Commission and its operation has been estimated to cost around EUR 480,000 over the first

five years, including its set up and operation. In addition, there is an assessment of

administrative expenditure (e.g. human resources, missions, seminars, etc.) of around EUR

206,000.

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8. ANALYSIS OF IMPACT

8.1. Baseline scenario: No EU policy

Under the baseline scenario, there would be no EU policy on the mandatory disclosure and

automatic exchange of information of potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements. By

effect, the situation across the EU would be likely to present significant disparities. Some

Member States would operate national schemes, as currently do Ireland, Portugal and the

United Kingdom whilst others would decide not to go for any type of mandatory disclosure

regime. In addition, amongst the States with disclosure regimes, a question would be whether

a certain disclosure regime is limited to purely domestic schemes or extends to cover the

domestic impact of cross-border schemes.

Only 30% of the respondents to the public consultation considered that Member States would

be likely/very likely to introduce transparency requirements at all if the baseline scenario were

kept. From the main stakeholder groups who replied to this question 38% of consultancy/tax

advisors, 32% of private citizens, and 21% of NGO's thought this would be the case. What is

more, 82% of respondents considered that if transparency requirements for disclosure were

introduced at the national level, they would be likely/very likely to diverge significantly. All

stakeholder categories provided high affirmative responses to this question.

Member States expressed general support in the meeting of Working Party IV on 2 March,

2017 on the proposal for the EU to address the issues raised in the Panama Papers and that a

focus on the cross-border elements was regarded as proportionate.

Impacts of the option on:

Intermediaries:

They would likely re-structure their business based on the overall picture of the market.

They would be most likely to move their consulting, advertising, promoting and

implementing activity towards the States that do not provide for the disclosure of

potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements.

As Member States would introduce regimes independently, the impact on intermediaries

would diverge and the latter may be faced with legal uncertainty over the applicable

framework in each Member State.

The national obligations to disclose would create a compliance cost for intermediaries,

although they would naturally shift this amount to their clients as part of their fees.

Taxpayers

To the extent that this is possible under their business or wealth structure, as

appropriate, taxpayers would try to avoid going through the disclosure obligations by

switching their business or moving their wealth to another Member State (or third

country).

Disparate regimes across the EU would result in legal uncertainty for taxpayers,

especially for those who operate across the border in more than one jurisdiction.

Tax authorities

Those Member States that decided to introduce a disclosure obligation would increase

the administrative burden of the public sector, even though such information seems to

be complementary to the main bulk of data that States already receive through tax

returns.

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While Member States that decided to introduce a disclosure obligation will have a better

overview of the tax affairs of their taxpayers, they may also face some loss of tax

revenues if taxpayers move their wealth or business to another Member State in order to

avoid the disclosure.

General economic considerations

Without a harmonised approach to mandatory disclosure and the automatic exchange of

information, the internal market would suffer distortions and unfair tax competition,

considering that States without rules on disclosure would clearly present an advantage,

as compared to those where certain schemes would have to be reported.

The fragmentation and differences of transparency requirements in the EU would risk

leading to tax arbitrage in the EU. Such a situation could reduce the effectiveness of

other (possibly) existing transparency requirements (e.g. common reporting standard,

advance cross-border rulings).

Society

In the wake of a number of scandals in the field of tax avoidance, lack of further action

vis-à-vis the promoters of aggressive tax planning schemes and their users could fuel

discontent and distrust from the citizens and honest taxpayers.

8.2. Action is undertaken to enact the mandatory disclosure of potentially aggressive

cross-border tax planning arrangements

In analysing policy options available to address the issue of aggressive tax planning any

solution must have a broad scope to include the wide range of intermediaries, both EU and

non-EU, that are involved in creating aggressive tax planning schemes. Similarly, given the

wide geographic range of schemes used in aggressive tax planning, as evidenced in section 3.

- Problem Definition, any solution should include a cross-border element that may not only

involve EU Member States but also third country jurisdictions, in particular off-shore

financial centres. All the policy options are designed to satisfy these objectives. However,

their design would have different impacts on the main groups who would be required to use,

implement and administer these schemes.

8.3. Personal Scope

The impact of the following three policy options is considered regarding who will have the

responsibility for disclosure:

(a) Single requirement (only intermediaries or only taxpayers)

Intermediaries

If the disclosure obligation were exclusively borne by intermediaries, those engaged in

reportable tax planning schemes would have to undertake the cost of reporting in all

cases. They would have to carry the costs of reporting on such schemes to the national

authorities once those are made available to a specific taxpayer for implementation.

Intermediaries should be expected to minimise the costs of compliance, e.g. by using the

summary information sheet that they prepare for their clients as a basis for the

notification form under the EU mandatory disclosure regime.

They would be most likely to shift the compliance cost of the disclosure to their clients,

i.e. the taxpayers.

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The existence of a mandatory disclosure regime can also enhance the reputation of

intermediaries, especially where their disclosed regimes do not result in counter-

measures by the authorities. It could lead to higher quality control standards in their

work, including the possibility of gradually setting the blueprint for a profession-wide

code of conduct.

Such obligation should deter intermediaries from devising aggressive tax planning

schemes, although some might also find ways to avoid this obligation (e.g. through

professional privileges or secrecy rules).

Taxpayers

If taxpayers had a disclosure obligation, it would act as a deterrent to engaging in

aggressive tax planning, thereby contributing to the fairness of the tax system.

To the extent that taxpayers do not design their own schemes, it would be very difficult

for them to comply with an obligation to disclose such schemes ex ante, i.e. before at

least the first steps of implementation were taken.

Some large corporate taxpayers with in-house tax departments would not be likely to

face particular difficulties in complying with their disclosure obligation.

Tax authorities

Receiving information on the specific features of potentially aggressive tax planning

schemes prior to their implementation or immediately after the first step has been

accomplished should be great help in clamping down on tax avoidance and aggressive

tax planning.

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. Considering that the intention of disclosing a potentially aggressive

cross-border tax planning scheme will materialise, either through the intermediary or the

taxpayer, this option does not seem to bring any particular impacts to the fore.

Society

The obligation to disclose potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes in

the field of direct taxes is part of an initiative aimed to respond to the citizens' demand

for more transparency in tax matters.

(b) Double requirement (both intermediaries and taxpayers)

Intermediaries

Intermediaries would have to ensure that their client reported the same details about a

scheme, since this could be double-checked. As reporting of the same schemes would in

practice take place twice and originate in two separate sources (i.e. intermediaries and

taxpayers), the authorities would be in a better informed position to scrutinise a case.

Such a situation would contribute to establishing a level-playing field of fairness.

Intermediaries would be most likely to shift the compliance cost of the disclosure to

their clients, i.e. the taxpayers.

There is a high risk of replication in the content of the disclosure, which would be likely

to compromise business efficiency, especially considering the fact that intermediaries

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should be expected to be marketing various reportable schemes in parallel. In this sense,

they are impacted by economies of scale.

Taxpayers

If taxpayers had a disclosure obligation, it would act as a deterrent to engaging in

aggressive tax planning

Taxpayers could bear the cost of disclosing information twice, as the intermediary who

would sell them a reportable tax planning scheme would possibly include its cost of

disclosure in the price.

There is a high risk of replication of data but, given that a taxpayer is commonly

attached to one single scheme, the overall impact of this replication should remain

minimal.

Tax authorities

The double disclosure should allow the authorities to receive more comprehensive

information and compare the accuracy of facts, as disclosed, in individual cases, which

would contribute to a level-playing field of fairness. However, this also implied

additional work on the side of the tax authorities (more information to process).

Whether this dual reporting would produce benefits in excess of the costs of reporting

twice is not known.

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. Considering that the intention of disclosing a potentially aggressive

cross-border tax planning scheme will materialise, through a combination of data given

by both the intermediary and the taxpayer, this option does not seem to bring any

particular impacts to the fore.

Society

The obligation to disclose potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes in

the field of direct taxes is part of an initiative aimed to respond to the citizens' demand

for more transparency in tax matters.

(c) Primary and secondary requirement (intermediaries or taxpayers)

Intermediaries

Intermediaries would have to undertake the compliance cost of reporting in most cases;

that is, they would always need to report unless they are entitled to a waiver based on

professional secrecy rules, etc.

Intermediaries would be most likely to shift the compliance cost of the disclosure to

their clients, i.e. the taxpayers.

The existence of a mandatory disclosure regime can also enhance the reputation of

intermediaries, especially where their disclosed regimes do not result in counter-

measures by the authorities. It could lead to higher quality control standards in their

work, including the possibility of gradually setting the blueprint for a profession-wide

code of conduct.

48

Such obligation would act as a deterrent vis-à-vis the intermediaries from devising

aggressive tax planning schemes.

Taxpayers

Their engagement is secondary, which implies that they contribute to the need for

transparency but only to the extent that there is a risk of reportable schemes remaining

undisclosed due to the absence or other inability of an intermediary.

They would need to bear the cost of disclosure but it should be expected that in the

majority of cases, the compliance obligation would fall on the intermediary.

Tax authorities

Given that most intermediaries would provide tax planning services on a regular basis,

placing the primary obligation to inform on them would mean that the tax authorities are

in a position to identify those liable to report.

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. Considering that the intention of disclosing a potentially aggressive

cross-border tax planning scheme will materialise, either through the intermediary or the

taxpayer, this option does not seem to bring any particular impacts to the fore.

Society

The obligation to disclose potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes in

the field of direct taxes is part of an initiative aimed to respond to the citizens' demand

for more transparency in tax matters.

With regard to the Public Consultation the most popular option for respondents at 36% was

that both the taxpayer and the intermediary should report the scheme. From the main

stakeholder groups there was a wide range of responses regarding this option: who replied to

this question there was a wide range of preferences with 84% of NGO's (84%), 54% private

citizens (54%), consultancy/tax advisors (11%) and Trade/business associations (8%).

8.4. Material Scope

(i) Taxes covered

The question is whether all taxes should be covered or the disclosure requirement should be

limited to direct tax only.

(b) Direct taxes

Given that direct and indirect taxation are structured in a fundamentally different fashion, a

tax planning scheme would normally be aimed to reduce the tax liability in either of the two

fields but not in both at the same time. It follows that, if the material scope of the envisaged

initiative were limited to direct taxes, tax planning schemes involving indirect taxation would

have to be looked at separately, possibly in the context of the VAT Directive.

Intermediaries

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Although intermediaries would benefit from economies of scale and so the obligation to

disclose information in relation to all taxes should not create significant difficulty to

them, the prospect for concentrating on the direct tax implications of their cross-border

schemes would still allow them to process information in a more targeted manner and

be more precise in the output that they pass to the tax authorities.

Taxpayers

For taxpayers of a smaller size (e.g. Small and Medium Enterprises), limiting the

disclosure obligation to direct taxes would obviously facilitate their compliance

obligations significantly.

Larger taxpayers should be less impacted by the broadness of the disclosure obligation.

Still though, a disclosure limited to direct taxes could enhance legal certainty as it

would allow taxpayers to develop a more targeted approach and concentrate on the

details of the reportable schemes.

Tax authorities

The fact that tax authorities would receive information limited to direct taxation would

not compromise their prospects for monitoring compliance in the field of indirect

taxation, as they could make use of other mechanisms to get access to information in

that field (e.g. under VAT legislation).

The majority of tax planning schemes with a cross-border dimension is structured to

achieve income and capital tax savings. In indirect taxation, tax optimisation would be

likely to follow different routes (primarily the VAT Directive or Customs).

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. On this premise and considering that most potentially aggressive cross-

border tax schemes involve direct taxes, the prospect for limiting the obligation to

disclose these schemes to direct taxation is unlikely to create issues.

Society

The obligation to disclose potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes in

the field of direct taxes is part of an initiative aimed to respond to the citizens' demand

for more transparency in tax matters.

With regard to the Public consultation there was no specific question regarding the material

scope of the proposal. However, respondents did not propose including indirect taxes within

the scope of the proposal.

(ii) Composition of Hallmarks

(a) Generic hallmarks

Intermediaries

As the scope of these hallmarks would be broad and non-customised to address specific

schemes, intermediaries would be in a position to easily identify and report to the

authorities off-the-shelf products that they have sold to clients. This exercise should not

involve any additional compliance cost.

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However, if all schemes that fall within generic hallmarks had to be reported, there

would certainly be a degree of duplication, since essentially the same scheme may have

been sold to more than one client.

Taxpayers

Where taxpayers are called on to disclose their cross-border tax planning schemes to the

authorities, they certainly bear a compliance burden. Yet, schemes falling within the

concept of a generic hallmark should be relatively straightforward to report on. The

taxpayer only needs to review its portfolio of schemes and pass the relevant information

to the authorities.

However, it is true that the smaller the taxpayer, the less its resources and the higher the

cost of disclosure.

Tax authorities

Potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes become subject to disclosure

if they fulfil some generally construed criteria; for example, if they involve the payment

of a fee which is proportional to the tax benefit of the taxpayer. The fact that the

"gateway" criteria are so general may require more effort by the authorities to prove that

a certain disclosed scheme actually qualifies as tax avoidance.

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. On this premise and considering that generic hallmarks are sufficiently

broad to capture most potentially aggressive cross-border tax schemes, the prospect for

focussing the obligation to disclose on these schemes would be in line with the internal

market related objective of this initiative.

Society

The obligation to disclose potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes

which fall within the generic hallmarks is part of an initiative aimed to respond to the

citizens' demand for more transparency in tax matters.

(b) Specific hallmarks

Intermediaries

Specific hallmarks usually address customised tax planning schemes which have been

devised to meet the needs of specific clients. Intermediaries should be in a position to

immediately identify which of this type of schemes they have provided clients with and

report them to the tax authorities.

Given that specific hallmarks essentially deal with customised schemes, there would be

little risk of duplication in the disclosure.

Taxpayers

Taking into account that schemes falling within the specific hallmarks can involve

elaborate structures, taxpayers may need to process the details of these schemes in order

to determine whether those are reportable.

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Although this can be a demanding exercise, it should also be considered that more

complex schemes would normally relate to larger taxpayers. For this type of taxpayers,

the compliance cost would remain low because they have the expertise.

Tax authorities

Tax authorities should be expected to possess the expertise to deal with complex

schemes. In fact, tax authorities should be expected to have the resources to process the

disclosed information, match it with the file of the concerned taxpayer and determine

whether the respective scheme actually qualifies as tax avoidance.

Considering that specific schemes are not marketed massively, the tax authorities should

not estimate to receive high numbers of such schemes.

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. On this premise and considering that some potentially aggressive cross-

border tax schemes may be structured in particularly elaborate fashion, the prospect for

focussing the obligation to disclose on these schemes would be in line with the internal

market related objective of this initiative.

Society

The obligation to disclose potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes

which fall within the specific hallmarks is part of an initiative aimed to respond to the

citizens' demand for more transparency in tax matters.

(c) Generic and specific hallmarks

Intermediaries

Generic and specific hallmarks would address both "off-the-shelf" and customised tax

planning schemes. Intermediaries would need to identify which hallmark, i.e. generic or

specific, the scheme that they operate corresponds to. This is a significant point because

each type of hallmark requires that different criteria be fulfilled for its disclosure.

Generic hallmarks run the risk of being reported twice if almost identical projects were

sold to more than one client. Regarding specific hallmarks, they essentially deal with

customised schemes, which imply that there would be little risk of duplication in the

disclosure.

Taxpayers

Where taxpayers are called on to disclose their cross-border tax planning schemes to the

authorities, they certainly bear a compliance burden.

Schemes falling within the concept of a generic hallmark should be relatively

straightforward to report on. However, specific hallmarks are likely to involve elaborate

structures and taxpayers may need to process the details of these schemes in order to

determine whether they are reportable.

Although this can be a demanding exercise, it should also be considered that more

complex schemes would normally relate to larger taxpayers. For this type of taxpayers,

the compliance cost would remain low because they have the expertise.

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Tax authorities

Tax authorities would be expected to possess the expertise to deal with complex

schemes. In fact, the tax authorities would own the resources to process the disclosed

information match it with the file of the concerned taxpayer and determine whether the

respective scheme actually qualifies as tax avoidance.

Considering that specific schemes are not marketed massively, the tax authorities should

not estimate to receive high numbers of such schemes. On the other hand, generic

schemes are more complicated to investigate the details of. This is because the

disclosure may not give sufficient data on the features of a precise scheme which is

under scrutiny.

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. Although generic hallmarks are sufficiently broad to capture most

potentially aggressive cross-border tax schemes, there are still certain such schemes

which could escape the generic rule because they are structured in a particularly

elaborate fashion. The obligation to disclose schemes that fall within both generic and

specific hallmarks would be in line with the internal market related objective of this

initiative.

Society

The obligation to disclose potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes

which fall within either the generic or specific or both hallmarks is part of an initiative

aimed to respond to the citizens demand for more transparency in tax matters.

With regard to the Public consultation under Section 4.1 respondents were asked how useful a

list of criteria were for classifying tax schemes as potentially aggressive. These criteria

included both generic hallmarks like confidentiality clauses and premium fees, and specific

hallmarks like artificial series of arrangements and schemes designed to circumvent the

Common Reporting Standard. A large majority of respondents considered that these criteria

would be of limited use/very useful. The criteria which was scored highest in the reply Not

useful at all was the inclusion of a confidentiality clause at 15% of respondents. From the

main respondent categories there was limited difference regarding whether this would be not

useful at all: consultancies/tax advisors (25%), private citizens (21%), trade/business

associations (11%), and NGO's (5%).

Member States expressed general support in the meeting of WPIV on 2 March, 2017 on the

proposal for the EU to include a mixture of generic and specific hallmarks.

(iii) Timeframe

(a) Only new schemes

Intermediaries

Intermediaries would be required to disclose only reportable schemes introduced after

the entry into force of the regime on mandatory disclosure.

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This is a clear timeframe which would allow intermediaries to take account of the

content of hallmarks in designing their tax planning schemes.

Older schemes which are still in operation and would potentially fall within the

hallmarks (if disclosed) would continue to apply without disclosure.

Taxpayers

Taxpayers would be required to disclose only the potentially aggressive cross-border tax

planning schemes introduced after the entry into force of the regime on mandatory

disclosure.

Taxpayers would continue, without an obligation to disclose, with the implementation

and/or operation of schemes that pre-date the entry into force of the regime on

mandatory disclosure and that could otherwise have been captured by the hallmarks.

Tax authorities

Although the tax authorities may still benefit from the mandatory disclosure in terms of

access to information relevant to the "new" schemes, they would not have the

opportunity to review older schemes with potentially harmful features which remain in

use within the internal market.

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. Disclosing "new" schemes would provide tax authorities with a good -

although not fully complete - picture of the situation, and allow them to enact a

comprehensive set of counter-measures. The disclosure of solely new schemes would

contribute to the objective aimed to be achieved.

Society

The obligation to disclose potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes,

even where this is limited to exclusively "new" projects, is in line with citizens' demand

for more transparency in tax matters.

(b) New and existing schemes

Intermediaries

Intermediaries would be required to disclose all reportable schemes which are in

operation, including those which pre-date the entry into force of the mandatory

disclosure regime.

Some of the "old" existing schemes could have been modified over time and

consequently certain characteristics of the original scheme would no longer be there.

In addition, it cannot be excluded that the intermediary who designed and sold the

scheme be no longer identifiable.

Taxpayers

If the obligation to disclose reportable schemes shifts to taxpayers, it would be required

to disclose all reportable schemes which are in operation, including those which pre-

date the entry into force of the mandatory disclosure regime.

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Some of the "old" existing schemes could have been modified over time and

consequently certain characteristics of the original scheme would no longer be there.

Taxpayers would always be in a position to track, and report on, "old" schemes which

are still in operation.

Tax authorities

Tax authorities would benefit from the mandatory disclosure in terms of access to

information relevant to "old" and "new" schemes.

However, since some of the "old" schemes may have been modified over time, tax

authorities would need to ensure that the present state of schemes has also been

reviewed.

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. Disclosing both "old" and "new" schemes would provide tax authorities

with a more complete picture of the situation in the market, so that these authorities can

focus on enacting comprehensive counter-measures.

Society

The broader the obligation to disclose potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning

schemes (i.e. it is not limited to "new" schemes but also includes "old" ones that are still

in force), the closer our alignment with citizens' demand for more transparency in tax

matters.

The Public Consultation did not include any question specifically asking about the timeframe

for the proposal.

8.5. Exchange of information

(i) Form and frequency of exchange of information

(a) Spontaneous exchange

Intermediaries

Considering that the disclosure of information on potentially aggressive cross-border tax

planning schemes is distinguished from the exchange of such information, the type of

exchange, i.e. spontaneous, automatic or on request, would not impact on the

intermediaries' obligation for disclosure.

The exchange of information is a responsibility of the tax authorities – not of the

intermediaries. It follows that the exchange of disclosed information and/or the method

used for this exchange does not impact on the intermediaries as such.

Even in the absence of a specific reference to spontaneous exchange in the text on the

mandatory disclosure of reportable schemes, Member States' authorities would still bear

this obligation under the general rules of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation.

Taxpayers

Considering that the disclosure of information on potentially aggressive cross-border tax

planning schemes is distinguished from the exchange of such information, the type of

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exchange, i.e. spontaneous, automatic or on request, would not impact on the taxpayers'

"fall-back" obligation for disclosure.

The exchange of information is a responsibility of the tax authorities – not of the

intermediaries. It follows that the exchange of disclosed information and/or the method

used for this exchange does not impact on the taxpayers as such.

Even in the absence of a specific reference to spontaneous exchange in the text on the

mandatory disclosure of reportable schemes, Member States' authorities would still bear

this obligation under the general rules of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation.

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. The spontaneous exchange of information on disclosed potentially

aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes would contribute to this objective. In fact,

the tax authorities of other Member States would have the opportunity to learn, through

the exchanged information, about distortions in the internal market and to enact

measures to fix them.

Society

The exchange of information about disclosed potentially aggressive cross-border tax

planning schemes, even where this exchange is only spontaneous, is in line with

citizens' demand for more transparency in tax matters.

(b) Automatic exchange

Intermediaries

Considering that the disclosure of information on potentially aggressive cross-border tax

planning schemes is distinguished from the exchange of such information, the type of

exchange, i.e. spontaneous, automatic or on request, would not impact on the

intermediaries' obligation for disclosure.

The exchange of information is a responsibility of the tax authorities – not of the

intermediaries. It follows that the exchange of disclosed information and/or the method

used for this exchange does not impact on the intermediaries as such.

Taxpayers

Considering that the disclosure of information on potentially aggressive cross-border tax

planning schemes is distinguished from the exchange of such information, the type of

exchange, i.e. spontaneous, automatic or on request, would not impact on the taxpayers'

"fall-back" obligation for disclosure.

The exchange of information is a responsibility of the tax authorities – not of the

intermediaries. It follows that the exchange of disclosed information and/or the method

used for this exchange does not impact on the taxpayers as such.

General economic considerations

The overarching objective of this initiative is to ensure the proper functioning of the

internal market. The automatic exchange of information on disclosed potentially

aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes would contribute to this objective. In fact,

the tax authorities of other Member States would have the opportunity to learn, through

56

the exchanged information, about distortions in the internal market and to enact

measures to fix them.

Society

The automatic exchange of information about disclosed potentially aggressive cross-

border tax planning schemes is in line with citizens' demand for more transparency in

tax matters.

None of the options available under Exchange of information could be considered as having a

measurable difference on the administrative burden placed on the taxpayer.

Regarding the Public Consultation there were no questions regarding the form and frequency

of exchange of information. In the meeting of WPIV of 2 March, 2017 Member States

expressed general support for automatic exchange of information as the form of exchange.

(ii) Means for exchange of information

(a) Compulsory publication in the Member State of disclosure

Intermediaries

Intermediaries would be faced with publication of aggressive tax planning schemes.

Such a situation would contribute to establishing a public scrutiny. There would be no

cost involved for the intermediaries.

There would be a reputational risk for the intermediary involved which could serve as a

deterrent to the creation of aggressive tax planning schemes compared to non-

publication.

Taxpayers

Where the obligation to disclose potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning

schemes is shifted to taxpayers, they would also be faced with publication of aggressive

tax planning schemes. There would be no cost involved for the taxpayers.

There is a reputational risk for the taxpayer involved which would serve as a deterrent

to the use of aggressive tax planning schemes compared to non-publication.

Tax authorities

Tax authorities would need to publish aggressive tax planning schemes and this would

require additional resources.

The increased deterrent effect that one hopes to achieve from the "threat" of publication

would mean that taxpayers and intermediaries would be less likely to engage in schemes

that would qualify as tax avoidance and tax evasion.

How useful this information would be to tax authorities would depend on the timeliness

of the publication of the aggressive tax planning schemes – if there is a long time period

for publication after the regime has been notified then other Member States may not be

able to react with counter-measures against such schemes in a timely manner.

General economic considerations

An increase in transparency is expected to gradually change national tax practices;

57

Tax authorities would pay for the publication of aggressive tax planning schemes and

not the economy in general;

The publication of aggressive tax planning schemes may discourage foreign investment by

individuals and/or companies due to the potential harm that publication may do to their

reputation if they used reportable schemes. This said, the publication may also limit situations of

aggressive tax planning.

Society

Publication of aggressive tax planning schemes would lead to greater transparency than

non-publication and contribute to better tax fairness and also contribute to a level

playing field for taxpayers.

Cost for publication of aggressive tax planning schemes would be incurred by the tax

authorities and not society in general.

(b) Direct exchange between Member States (Option 1 Spontaneous exchange and

Option 2 Automatic exchange)

Intermediaries

Intermediaries would not be directly affected by this option as tax authorities of Member

States would exchange the information with each other.

Taxpayers

Taxpayers would not be directly affected by this option as tax authorities of Member States

would exchange the information with each other.

Tax authorities

Regarding spontaneous exchange of information (Option 1) Member States would be required

to send information at their discretion to other Member States which would require additional

resources.

Regarding automatic exchange of information (Option 2) Member States would be required to

send information at fixed intervals to other Member States requiring additional resources.

In terms of comparison of Option 1 and Option 2, costs would be similar but may differ

marginally due to the frequency of exchanges.

Member States would benefit from receiving this information and be able to react in a timely

manner to address aggressive tax planning schemes. Regarding Option 1 (spontaneous

exchange) and Option 2 (automatic exchange) how timely Member States could react depends

on the frequency of sending information under Option 1 compared to Option 2.

A quantification of increased burden under Options 1 and 2 does not exist however current

evaluations of the UK DOTAS schemes does not indicate that the mandatory disclosure

regime has caused concerns about an increase in administrative burden for the UK authorities.

General economic considerations

Exchange of information occurs between the tax authorities of Member States therefore the

means of exchange of information does not affect general economic considerations directly.

Society

Exchange of information occurs between the tax authorities of Member States therefore the

means of exchange of information does not affect society in general directly.

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(c) Indirect exchange through a central directory

Intermediaries

How tax authorities store and provide access to information for other Member States does not

affect intermediaries directly.

Taxpayers

How tax authorities store and provide access to information for other Member States does not

affect taxpayers directly.

Tax authorities

Member States would be required to update a central directory for aggressive tax planning

schemes which would bring similar costs to that for direct exchange of information.

A quantification of increased burden for a central directory does not exist however current

evaluations of the UK DOTAS schemes does not indicate that the mandatory disclosure

regime has caused concerns about an increase in administrative burden for the UK authorities.

Member States would benefit from receiving this information and be able to react in a timely

manner to address aggressive tax planning schemes. As with direct exchange of information,

how timely Member States could react would depend on the frequency of update of the

Directory by the Member State concerned to record aggressive tax planning schemes.

General economic considerations

How tax authorities store and provide access to information for other Member States has no

direct effect on general economic considerations.

Society

How tax authorities store and provide access to information for other Member States has no

direct effect on society.

With regard to the Public Consultation opinions on the extent of the disclosure was asked

under section 7 policy options and their impacts. While the Public Consultation did not

specifically cover the means for exchange of information respondents were asked about

Option D which had a wide range of disclosure including publication which was not included

under the other option categories. Overall 47% of respondents rated Option D as

effective/very effective however there was a wide divergence in the main stakeholder

categories with regard to whether this would be considered as effective/very effective: NGO's

(89%), companies (75%), private citizens (60%), consultancies/tax advisors (25%), and

trade/business associations (19%).

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9. COMPARISON OF OPTIONS

For assessing the policy options, the following criteria are used:

Effectiveness: in terms of achieving the ultimate (indirect) objective of clamping down

on tax evasion and avoidance; the analysis will also consider the direct specific

objectives of creating an environment of transparency and allowing for the timely

access to information as well as of creating a deterrent to the design and use of

aggressive tax planning schemes

Efficiency: the extent to which the objectives can be achieved for a given level of

resources or least cost;

Coherence: the degree to which this option would result in a consistent application

across the EU.

The summary tables indicate how the various alternative features of the policy initiative

compare to the baseline scenario, which is about taking no action and retaining the current

status quo. If no initiative is taken, the current situation will persist. This would imply that tax

authorities will not avail themselves of the opportunity to learn ex ante about potentially

aggressive tax planning arrangements which may be found illegitimate following scrutiny.

The objectives of enhancing transparency and allowing timely access to information by the

authorities as a deterrent to aggressive tax planning practices will also be compromised.

Otherwise, tax authorities will still be in a position to benefit from the results of recently

enacted EU instruments against tax avoidance since these will remain available for Member

States.

9.1. Personal scope

Comparison

9.1.1. Single requirement

(i) Only intermediaries – regardless of whether they qualify as EU or non-EU intermediaries

under section 7.1.3:

Under this option, only intermediaries would bear the burden of the new obligations. Users

would be given a full waiver. Although this option would allow tax authorities to derive the

benefits of ex ante mandatory disclosure, it would run the risk of turning out to be of limited

effectiveness. Namely, although the obligation would equally burden both the EU and non-

EU intermediaries, it would be difficult to enforce compliance against the latter. Considering

that users are given a waiver and so, there would be no fall-back solution to cater for the

absence of an intermediary, it should be expected that those intermediaries who do not wish to

disclose information would organise their business in such a way as to escape the reporting

obligation. Another drawback is that schemes designed solely by taxpayers (in-house),

without the assistance of any intermediary, would also escape the reporting obligation under

this option.

It follows that this option can only partially meet the (direct and indirect) objectives of this

initiative (see chapter 6).

(ii) Only users: although this option would allow tax authorities to derive the benefits of ex

ante mandatory disclosure, it would also run the risk of limited effectiveness. This is because

users may not have the expertise to provide details on how the scheme works. For this reason,

it could be the case that a tax administration receives a larger amount of reports of inferior

quality. Such a prospect would compromise transparency and the timely access to information

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and as a result, would overall not contribute, as it is expected, to the fight against tax

avoidance and evasion.

9.1.2. Double requirement

Intermediaries and users: if both intermediaries and users carry the onus of the disclosure

obligation, the tax authorities should derive the maximum benefits of this exercise in terms of

transparency and information access but the overall burden of compliance should be expected

to increase. This would also be the case for tax administrations because they could receive

information on the same scheme at least twice (one report from the intermediary and another

from the user). In the case of mass-marketed schemes, there would even be a risk of

multiplication. However, Member States may benefit from both intermediaries and users

reporting such schemes as the risk of non-reporting or incomplete reporting would decline

given that both parties would need to report and could act as a control on one another. It may

be worth noting that this was the most favoured option in the responses to the public

consultation with 36% of respondents indicating that both taxpayers and users should report a

scheme.

9.1.3. Primary and secondary requirement

Under this option, the burden would mostly lie with the intermediaries as they would bear

the primary reporting obligation. Users would be involved where there are no intermediaries

or where intermediaries cannot be identified or forced to comply. Although the occasional

involvement of the users (taxpayers) should be expected to add some more compliance

burden, the tax authorities would still benefit from the information received as part of the ex

ante mandatory disclosure. In addition, this option would be likely to generate significant

gains in effectiveness. It thus combines the possibility of having a fall-back rule to cater for

the cases where the intermediary is absent or does not exist with the prevention of duplication

or multiplication of tasks. Therefore, there would be only one person encumbered with

compliance each time.

Options 1(ii) and 2 where users have an obligation to report would mean a higher compliance

burden for taxpayers and, given the complexity of such schemes, could lead to sub-optimal

reporting. Placing the primary reporting obligation on intermediaries would improve the

effectiveness of the rules in terms of enhancing transparency and timely information access

and, in terms of results, further the fight against tax avoidance. This is because the

intermediaries would have the expertise to ensure that the reporting of such schemes be

carried out successfully. Furthermore, the overall burden for intermediaries would be reduced

as they would report on the schemes of multiple clients and so they would be able to benefit

from economies of scale.

Table 3: Comparison – subject of reporting obligation

Specific features

Description of options Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence

Subject of reporting obligation

0. Baseline scenario – no reporting 0 0 0

1. Single requirement (only intermediaries or only users)

+ + +

2. Double requirement (intermediaries and users)

++ + +

3. Primary and secondary requirement (intermediaries or users)

++ ++ ++

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Source: European Commission (2017)

Annotation: The result of the comparison should be understood as relative to the baseline scenario of "doing nothing".

Conclusion:

Option 3 follows the approach used in existing schemes and, if well-designed, it would

provide a balanced solution. It is indeed the intermediary who designs and sells the scheme

that would fulfil the reporting obligations, except in some circumstances where it would fall

on the taxpayers. In addition, if the primary obligation rest with the intermediary, it could also

help avoid multiple reporting of the same scheme if this was implemented by a number of

clients of the same intermediary. Therefore, option 3 would mitigate the risks of non-reporting

whilst also create a contained overall compliance burden.

9.2. Material scope

9.2.1. Types of taxes

Table 4: Comparison – type of taxes covered

Specific features

Description of options Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence

Type of taxes covered

0. Baseline scenario – no coverage 0 0 0

1. All taxes (discarded suboption)

2. Direct taxes only ++ ++ ++

Source: European Commission (2017)

Annotation: The result of the comparison should be understood as relative to the baseline scenario of "doing nothing".

Conclusion:

The option to cover all taxes has been discarded in section 7.2.1. Consequently, option 2,

which covers, only direct taxes, has been chosen for the final design of the mandatory

disclosure regime.

9.2.2. Object of reporting (composition of hallmarks)

Comparison:

The analysis identifies three options for choosing the hallmarks that should be included in the

regime. First, the compilation of a list of hallmarks, as compared to the "status quo", where

hallmarks are missing, is an improvement.

Generic hallmarks are designed to primarily target mass-marketed schemes or standardised

products, provided that the scheme(s) under disclosure potentially promote(s) aggressive tax

planning or award(s) tax benefits. It follows that generic hallmarks can easily capture large

volumes of mainstream off-the-shelf schemes but would risk missing the customised ones

which would be tailor-made to fit either the particular commercial structures of global

multinationals or specific tax-oriented objectives of corporate clients or even of high net

worth individuals. What is more, the effectiveness of generic hallmarks could be undermined

if the additional requirements of potential aggressive tax planning or aim to derive tax

benefits are narrowly construed.

On the other hand, specific hallmarks would be effective in addressing the particular

characteristics of schemes that differ from what is widely marketed as well as in ensuring that

tax planning schemes do not take advantage of certain weak features in a national tax system

such as features resulting in double non-taxation situations. Specific hallmarks cannot by

nature effectively target large volumes of schemes as they are construed to serve a different

62

function. This said, an inherent drawback of specific hallmarks relates to the fact that due to

their narrow scope, intermediaries can usually find ways around these types of hallmarks and

thus avoid reporting.

A combination of generic and specific hallmarks would be expected to capture the large

numbers of mainstream off-the-shelf schemes and also extend to cover (otherwise missing)

bespoke and tailored-made schemes. Intermediaries would be discouraged from designing

their schemes around specific hallmarks because they would still be likely to fall within the

scope of the generic ones. It therefore follows that the best way to create a robust set of rules

that will ensure the widest possible transparency and timely access to information would be to

bring together generic and specific hallmarks in a combined regime. This option would place

a compliance burden on to intermediaries to proof-check their marketed tax planning schemes

against a long list of hallmarks. Yet, in such cases, they would capitalise on increased legal

certainty in operating their businesses.

Table 5: Comparison –composition of hallmarks

Specific

features Description of options Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence

Composition

of hallmarks

0. Baseline scenario – no hallmarks 0 0 0

1. Generic hallmarks + + +

2. Specific hallmarks + + +

3. Generic and specific hallmarks ++ ++ ++

Source: European Commission (2017)

Annotation: The result of the comparison should be understood as relative to the baseline scenario of "doing nothing".

Conclusion:

The preferred option is 3, which consists in a combination of generic and specific hallmark.

This conclusion is also consistent with the OECD report on BEPS Action 12, which

recommends that mandatory disclosure regimes include a combination of generic and specific

hallmarks.

9.2.3. Timeframe for reporting

Comparison:

Under the first option, the compliance burden of intermediaries would be relatively limited

since they would need to report only schemes introduced after the entry into force of the

regime on mandatory disclosure. In such case, although the tax authorities may still benefit

from the mandatory disclosure in terms of access to information, the policy effectiveness of

this option could prove limited. This is because older schemes with potentially harmful

features may go unreported while they remain in use within the internal market. In addition,

the system could prove prone to manipulation in cases where a substantial number of schemes

be introduced between the time that political agreement on the Directive is reached in Council

and the entry into force of the act, in order to escape the new reporting obligation.

The second option requires to additionally report information about schemes that generally

pre-date the introduction of the mandatory disclosure regime. In this regard, it is worth noting

that some of the "old" existing schemes may have been modified over time and consequently

certain characteristics of the original scheme may no longer be there. Considering this, it

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would be necessary to assess schemes against the hallmarks by referring to their features at

present. Accordingly, it would not be excluded that the intermediary who designed and sold

the scheme be no longer identifiable. This is why it may be disproportionate that the

disclosure obligation captures all existing reportable regimes.

Table 6: Comparison - timeframe

Specific features

Description of options Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence

Timeframe

0. Baseline scenario – no schemes covered 0 0 0

1. Only new schemes + ++ +

2. New and existing schemes ++ + ++

Source: European Commission (2017)

Annotation: The result of the comparison should be understood as relative to the baseline scenario of "doing nothing".

Conclusion:

Given that the inclusion of existing arrangements can lead to severe complications, option 1

should be the preferred one as it offers a more proportionate solution towards achieving a high

level of transparency. To reinforce the preferred regime, it should be proposed that the

Directive develop a limited retrospective effect, confined to capturing schemes that were put

in place after political agreement on this Directive in Council.

9.3. Exchange of information

9.3.1. Form and frequency of exchange of information

Comparison:

There are two policy options for shaping the exchange of information: spontaneous and

automatic exchange. Irrespective of which option is taken, the exchange brings forth some

added value, as compared to the "status quo" scenario. It is envisaged to take place

exclusively between national competent authorities.

Already now, tax authorities can exchange information spontaneously. However, spontaneous

exchanges, although they are better than no exchange at all, are often irregular. They leave

Member States with discretion to decide on the content of what they share as well as on the

States that they wish to share the disclosed information with. This could mean that aggressive

tax planning information may not reach all Member States, which would compromise the

effectiveness of the envisaged initiative and its objectives for establishing timely access to

information that would deter future aggressive tax planning schemes. Past experience in a

different tax field shows that the discretionary element was one of the reasons why the

process proved ineffective. It follows that relying exclusively on spontaneous exchanges of

information would not necessarily improve cooperation in the field of tax.

If, under an automatic exchange of information, Member States share data on reported

schemes with all others, more national authorities would benefit from the communicated

information. In addition, there would be no discretion as to whom the information should be

addressed to and therefore States' authorities would not need to invest time in identifying the

appropriate recipients. This approach would therefore provide for a higher degree of

effectiveness and efficiency. It would also be consistent with the current international trends

on the exchange of tax information, which are structured on the assumption that there is

automatic exchange. Even reported information that no scheme was reported in a given period

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would add to transparency.

In all cases, the disclosed information would be shared with other Member States. Yet, the

overall efficiency of the information exchange would also depend on the means used for the

exchange (which are discussed in the next section). During the stakeholder's consultation,

there was no particular preference for any of the specific forms for information exchange.

Table 7: Comparison – form and frequency of exchange of information

Specific features

Description of options Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence

Form and frequency of exchange of information

0. Baseline scenario – No exchange 0 0 0

1. Spontaneous exchange + + +

2. Automatic exchange ++ ++ ++

Source: European Commission (2017)

Annotation: The result of the comparison should be understood as relative to the baseline scenario of "doing nothing".

Conclusion:

Option 2, automatic exchange of information should be the preferred option because it

effectively supports the objective for more extensive transparency and access to information.

9.3.2. Means for exchange of information

Comparison:

Options 2 and 3 only pertain to Member States whilst option 1 also concerns the public and

various groups of stakeholders.

As a matter of principle, Member States can decide whether and in what form they wish to

publish information on a tax planning scheme. Indeed, they sometimes do so with regard to

selected tax schemes, which they treat as aggressive, and explain why they consider this to be

so. Member States may also wish to clarify how they envisage to clamp down on tax planning

schemes or give an outline of the steps towards a necessary regulatory/legislative change in

the tax field. Although the public could generally gain from receiving this information, it is

questionable whether the compulsory publication would contribute to the primary objective of

the present initiative, i.e. giving the tax authorities of Member States timely access to tax-

related information as a deterrent to future aggressive schemes. Preparing material for

publication would also require resources and could lead to delays and/or an inefficient

allocation of capacities.

A straightforward direct exchange between Member States, including with the Commission,

would allow sharing disclosed information among tax authorities but would not address other

functions. The management of this information would be fully left to the recipients.

The use of a central directory by the Member States and the Commission would secure access

to the relevant information and provide for additional management tools. In fact, the option of

a directory would combine the advantages of regular automatic exchange on one side and an

ad hoc early cooperation on the basis of spontaneous exchange on the other. This outcome

clearly points to an improved situation compared to the "status quo". At the same time, the

directory can provide tools for facilitating the follow-up cooperation or coordination between

national authorities and the Commission. This indirect exchange through a central directory

would offer more flexibility and opportunities while maintaining a high overall efficiency.

The involvement of the Commission is crucial for the monitoring of the functioning of the

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exchange of information.

Table 8: Comparison – means for exchange of information

Specific features

Description of options Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence

Means for exchange of information

1. Baseline scenario – No exchange 0 0 0

1. Compulsory publication in the MS of disclosure

+ + +

2. Direct exchange between MSs + + +

3. Indirect exchange through a central directory

++ ++ ++

Source: European Commission (2017)

Annotation: The result of the comparison should be understood as relative to the baseline scenario of "doing nothing".

Conclusion:

Option 3 is the preferred option because it offers tax authorities wider opportunities for an

efficient collaboration.

9.4. The Preferred Option

The preferred option reflects the conclusions arising from the evaluation of the options that

were previously compared in the light of the objectives that this initiative seeks to achieve.

The effectiveness of this option will be assessed by reference to its prospects for creating

successful disincentives, allowing market transparency and an early detection of tax evasion

and avoidance. The elements of the preferred option can be summarised as follows:

Member States undertake to lay down an obligation on intermediaries and, as a

fallback, on taxpayers to disclose potentially aggressive tax planning schemes with a

cross-border element that engages at least two Member States and to automatically

exchange the relevant information with other Member States.

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Table 9: Assessment of all options overview Policy options

concerning disclosure regime Assessment criteria

Specific features

Description of options Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence

Baseline scenario

No action 0 0 0

Personal scope

Subject of reporting obligation

1. Single requirement (only intermediaries or only users)

+ + +

2. Double requirement (intermediaries and users)

++ + +

3. Primary and secondary requirement (intermediaries or users)

++ ++ ++

Material scope

Type of taxes covered

1. All taxes (discarded suboption)

2. Direct taxes only ++ ++ ++

Composition of hallmarks

1. Generic hallmarks + + +

2. Specific hallmarks + + +

3. Generic and specific hallmarks ++ ++ ++

Timeframe 1. Only new schemes + ++ +

2. New and existing schemes ++ + ++

Exchange of information

Form and frequency of exchange of information

1. Spontaneous exchange + + +

2. Automatic exchange ++ ++ ++

Means for exchange of information

1. Compulsory publication in the Member State of disclosure

+ + +

2. Direct exchange between Member States

+ + +

3. Indirect exchange through a central directory

++ ++ ++

Source: European Commission (2017)

Annotation: The result of the comparison should be understood as relative to the baseline scenario of "doing nothing".

Preferred suboptions are marked in bold.

Under this option there would be a requirement for Member States (i) to lay down an explicit

obligation on intermediaries (or, as a fallback, on taxpayers who use the scheme(s)) to

disclose potentially aggressive tax planning schemes with a cross-border element that engages

at least two Member States to their national tax authorities; and (ii) to ensure that their

national tax authorities automatically exchange this information with the tax authorities of

other Member States by using the mechanism (central directory) provided for in the DAC.

The preferred option will consist of the following fundamental features:

Only direct taxes are covered;

67

Intermediaries have the primary reporting obligation and users a secondary;

There is a broad definition of intermediaries;

There is a list of generic and specific hallmarks which act as a gateway for

determining whether or not a scheme shall be reported. The hallmarks primarily

concern features of the (potentially aggressive) tax planning schemes;

Only new schemes and schemes that were put in place after political agreement on this

Directive was reached in Council will have to be reported (limited retrospectively);

Automatic exchange of information will ensure the sharing of information between the

competent national authorities in the Member States;

Exchange of information should make use of a central directory.

Compliance with the principle of proportionality

The preferred option represents a proportionate answer to the identified problem since it does

not exceed what is necessary for achieving the objective of the Treaties for a better

functioning of the internal market without distortions. Thus, the common rules on mandatory

disclosure and the automatic exchange of information are limited to addressing potentially

aggressive tax planning arrangements with a cross-border element within the EU. In this way,

it is ensured that EU-level legislation does not go broader than regulating the aspects that

affect the functioning of the internal market. In addition, the harmonised approach reaches up

to the point that the competent national authorities come to know about the potentially

aggressive arrangements. Thereafter, it is for Member States to decide how they pursue cases

of illegitimate arrangements. This approach is further illustrated in the case of penalties for

non-compliance. In this regard, the national provisions that implement the Directive into

national law will remain under the sovereign control of Member States.

10. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS OF THE PREFERRED POLICY OPTION

The impacts of the preferred policy option are assessed in the light of the objective of creating

an effective rule which should have a deterrent effect, contribute to transparency and support

the possibility of early detection.

As regards intermediaries, the preferred option, which involves the early disclosure of

potentially aggressive cross-border tax planning schemes could have a deterrent effect, as it

would increase the pressure to refrain from the schemes under discussion. As a consequence,

the incentive to design and market new aggressive tax planning schemes would be reduced.

Similarly, the life-cycle of existing schemes would be shortened and therefore ultimately the

corridor for profit margin would become narrower. The burden of cost for intermediaries

should be limited due to the fact that the reportable information would already be available to

intermediaries when the schemes are designed and offered to taxpayers for use, namely,

before they are implemented. Furthermore, ensuring tax compliance is already a main activity

for intermediaries providing tax advice/services. It is therefore envisaged that the burden

should be accommodated by existing compliance obligations of intermediaries. The preferred

option would also allow tax authorities to benefit from an early detection of tax avoidance

and/or evasion in any of the Member States in which the schemes operate. The mandatory

disclosure regime could provide more certainty for intermediaries, to ensure that they are tax

compliant and thus render a higher quality service for clients. The current DOTAS scheme in

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the UK provides a reference number to taxpayers in order to include details of an arrangement

or a series of arrangements in their tax returns although it does not imply acceptance of the

arrangement by the tax authorities.

As regards taxpayers, the preferred option would also work as a deterrence tool. It would thus

increase transparency as to what type of arrangement(s) could be acceptable to the tax

authorities. In this light, taxpayers would be likely to reconsider implementing arrangements

which have been captured by the hallmarks as being potentially aggressive tax planning. In

addition, early disclosure would supply the tax administration with sufficient information for

determining the tax consequences of these (disclosed) arrangements. Another result of the

disclosure could well be greater tax certainty for taxpayers since they would be given an

incentive to remain tax compliant.

Given the nature of cross-border tax planning, individuals who are highly mobile and/or high

net wealth individuals would be mostly affected by the preferred option. In terms of tax

compliance, this type of taxpayer presents risks, as they would have the means to engage in

tax avoidance and also conceal assets/income from their national tax authorities when the

income/assets are located in another jurisdiction. In terms of the compliance burden of the

preferred option on taxpayers, the preferred option would require the taxpayer to report in a

limited number of circumstances i.e. where: (i) a non-EU intermediary without any presence

in the EU has created the scheme; (ii) the scheme has been created in-house; or (iii) the

intermediary is protected by legal professional privilege or secrecy rules.

As regards tax authorities, the preferred option would enhance the effectiveness of their tax

compliance activities, for example for risk assessment and audit purposes. They would be

provided with timely information regarding potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements

and should therefore be in a position to easier identify the intermediaries and users of those

arrangements. On this premise, tax administrations would be able to quickly react, as a result

of the early disclosures, to arrangements which they assess as harmful through operational

measures, legislative or regulatory changes.

Data from national tax authorities in the EU regarding the volume of both tax evasion and tax

avoidance is often not publically available. Therefore, it has not been possible to gauge the

size of the problem and how the preferred option could reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance.

Nevertheless, in 2009, the UK tax authorities estimated that the DOTAS scheme had proved

to be highly successful and the Government had used information from DOTAS to introduce

a range of anti-avoidance measures every year since 2004 – a total of 49 measures, closing off

over GBP 12 billion in avoidance opportunities58

. HMRC noted that there is considerable

anecdotal evidence that DOTAS changed the economics of avoidance.

In the public consultation, the respondents considered that the most likely indirect

consequence of the mandatory disclosure requirements would be an increase in administrative

burden for public authorities although respondents considered that any benefit would

outweigh such costs. In discussions with Member States which currently have an existing

mandatory disclosure regime, increased administrative burden was not cited as a concern.

Rather, the regime provided an additional tool against tax evasion and avoidance and could be

dealt with by departments which are already dedicated to this or a similar function.

It is yet crucial that the design of the regime should be such that the amount of information to

58 See the speech by Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury, David Gauke MP (2012): "Where next for tackling

tax avoidance?"

69

be reported is proportionate and does not create administrative costs that outweigh the

benefits. In this respect the preferred option meets these requirements as it does not require

retrospective reporting of arrangements prior to adoption of the proposal and offers certainty

for all parties to the regime by having clear tests to ensure that only potentially aggressive tax

planning arrangements need to be disclosed.

The overall impact will - to some extent - depend on the capacity of national tax

administrations and the legislature to make use of the early detection and react rapidly in

order to close down loopholes in national tax laws.

As regards the possible impacts on fundamental rights, the preferred policy option for

mandatory disclosure is fully compliant with the Treaties. The envisaged option respects

private data protection rules as the disclosed information will not be made publicly available.

In addition, the right of intermediaries, legal or natural persons, to provide services will not be

impaired. In this context, professional secrecy will be respected (e.g. the legal profession

privilege (LPP)) where this is required by the law. Finally, the preferred option is in line with

the principle of proportionality since it will be limited to schemes of a cross-border dimension

that fulfil certain indications of aggressive tax planning ("hallmarks").

Regarding societal impact, a majority of respondents to the public consultation, in particular

NGO's and private citizens, considered that a mandatory disclosure regime, including the

preferred policy option, would generally provide a better and fairer tax environment, would

increase taxes collected both in and outside the EU, would deter the use of ATP schemes, and

would provide a focus on wealthy taxpayers. The regime would therefore contribute to an

environment of fairer taxation in the EU.

As regards Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), the impact of the preferred policy option

would most possibly be very limited. Thus, only a small number of SMEs make use of

complex cross-border tax planning schemes. As confirmed by respondents to the public

consultation on the indirect impacts of a proposal, the main benefit for SMEs in the longer

term could be to gradually create a level-playing field between themselves and international

groups, as the disclosure regime would reduce the attractiveness of aggressive tax schemes to

the latter.59

In addition, respondents to the public consultation considered that increasing

innovation and competitiveness of SMEs compared to large companies would be two of the

main benefits of a mandatory disclosure regime.

Regarding longer-term economic impacts, an increase in transparency is expected to

gradually change national tax practices. Where tax practices were used in the past to attract or

keep international groups, it may become less attractive for groups to relocate profits on that

basis. In the future, some groups might decide to leave again. This could result in a possible

loss of foreign direct investment or economic activity. On the other hand, Member States that

were negatively impacted in the past by non-transparent practices of other States could expect

a flow back of economic activity and a recovery of their tax base.

Member States which already have mandatory disclosure regimes did not report any negative

effects from such a regime in terms of reducing their attractiveness as a place for investment.

In the public consultation, 37 respondents considered that the introduction of a regime would

not affect the attractiveness of the EU internal market whilst 32 respondents considered that it

59 For details see Annex 4.

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would reduce its attractiveness. In summary, decisions of investment depend on a wide range

of factors other than taxation and the effect of the introduction of such a regime could

potentially increase tax certainty which could be beneficial for companies' investment

decisions.

11. CHOICE OF THE LEGAL INSTRUMENT

The previous chapter assessed various options for the design of a mandatory disclosure

regime for intermediaries resulting in the preferred option. This option can be implemented

via different legal instruments.

11.1. Commission Recommendation (non-binding instrument)

Under this option, the Commission would encourage Member States to introduce a mandatory

disclosure regime for potentially aggressive tax planning schemes and to exchange

information under existing tools for administrative cooperation. The recommendation would

also encourage Member States to refer the reported schemes to the group of the Code of

Conduct on business taxation, which looks at harmful tax practices in the EU60

. This could

ensure a proper follow up of cases by the Member States.

However, a non-binding recommendation would not necessarily ensure a sufficient level of

consistent and coordinated implementation of the measure(s) across the internal market.

Nevertheless, it is of primary importance to build a coordinated practice with the aim to

achieve a coherent outcome in addressing the identified problems. This consistent approach

should also be reflected in the practice of tax administrations, intermediaries and taxpayers.

11.2. EU Code of Conduct for intermediaries (non-binding instrument)

Based on this instrument, the preferred option would be implemented through a European

Code of Conduct for certain regulated professions. The aim would be to discourage members

of certain professions from entering into aggressive tax planning activities. If they did so, they

would be required to report such activities to the tax authorities. This instrument would be

directed to certain professions of intermediaries.

A non-binding solution in the form of a Code of Conduct concerning intermediaries presents

several shortcomings. Since the personal scope of the initiative should be as broad as possible

and thus also cover unregulated or non-organised professions, any Code of Conduct for

regulated professions would be limited to only certain categories thereof. It would therefore

be difficult to ensure a level-playing field across all intermediaries in the internal market. This

could create new loopholes as well as a disadvantageous treatment for some. Notably, new

business opportunities would possibly emerge for certain intermediaries in the field of

aggressive tax planning (as they would not be covered by an EU Code of Conduct), which

would go against the main objective of this assessment. Furthermore, schemes that were

devised without the intervention of an intermediary would not be covered.

Although 45 respondents to the public consultation rated the EU Code of Conduct as

effective/very effective, there was wide divergence between the respondent categories in

terms of how they rated the option: 58% of consultancy/tax advisor companies and 69%

trade/business associations considered it effective/very effective with only 16% of NGO's,

32% of private citizens and 33% of academics sharing the same view. Respondent categories

60 More information can be found here.

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that rated this option as having low effectiveness considered that a Code would be weak in

enforcing the rules and would lack a strong sanction regime. Respondents replying favourably

to the option noted that an effective Code of Conduct existed in their jurisdiction and that

intermediaries already had obligations to act in the public interest and not engage in tax

evasion/avoidance.

11.3. EU Directive (binding instrument)

This instrument would require Member States to introduce a mandatory disclosure regime

combined with exchange of information through the transposition of an EU Directive in

national legislation.

A legislative proposal could either be a stand-alone measure or it could amend Council

Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation between Member States in the field of

taxation (DAC). An advantage of linking this proposal to the DAC would be the opportunity

to use the IT tools and infrastructure which is already in place therein (e-forms, effective

feedback system, etc.). Such a link would also allow the proposal to come within the scope of

the wider rules in DAC dealing with the organisation of information exchange, the use of

standard forms and other technical elements. An amendment to the existing DAC would also

fit into the Commission initiative for better regulation and simplification, by limiting the

number of legislative documents.

As with results of the public consultation on the question regarding an EU Code of Conduct,

there was a divergence of views on whether there was a need to impose mandatory reporting

obligations for aggressive tax planning schemes: while 95% of NGO's and 68% of private

citizens considered that there should be a mandatory disclosure obligation, only 17% of the

consultancy/tax advisors and trade business associations considered that EU mandatory

disclosure obligations were required.

In conclusion, a satisfactory level of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the preferred

option in view of addressing the problem identified can only be achieved with an initiative in

the form of an EU Directive. This would allow for a consistent disclosure of all potentially

aggressive tax planning schemes across the EU.

12. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The Member States shall provide to the Commission data on exchange of information, in line

with the existing guidelines for statistics. Such data will provide basis for an analysis of the

efficiency and transparency of the information exchange. Furthermore, at the end of each year

Member States shall submit to the Commission their assessment of the effectiveness of the

framework for exchange of information as well as the practical results achieved.

Based on the statistical data provided by the Member States and their assessment of the

effectiveness, the Commission will prepare annual monitoring reports. The reports will be

published and made available to the Member States for the purpose of discussion in the Code

of Conduct Group.

Actual information/indicators suggested to be collected depend on the content of the preferred

option, but should include as a minimum the number of disclosure schemes received in total

by broad categories to be defined, the number of schemes exchanged between Member States

(push), and the number of schemes received from other Member States for which they have

requested information (pull). The purpose of the collection of information and of the

monitoring report is to determine whether the framework set up for information exchange is

utilized and to follow the development of the volume of information exchange over time and

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across Member States. The information will furthermore feed the retrospective evaluation and

allow taking lessons learned and identify potential problems to be analysed in more detail in

the evaluation for the design of further initiatives/suggestions for improvements.

In terms of operational objectives the analysis and any potential follow up measure should be

based on the type of schemes reported and the number of reports exchanges. The Commission

will have access to this data and can clearly monitor the developments in this regard. The

initiative foresees the possibility to amend the list of hallmarks in order to update the criteria

that make a scheme reportable.

Member States and the Commission shall examine and evaluate the functioning of the

administrative cooperation provided for in this Directive. To that purpose, Member States

shall communicate to the Commission any relevant information necessary for the evaluation

of the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence with other interventions with similar objectives,

and continued relevance of administrative cooperation in accordance with this Directive. The

Commission will prepare a retrospective evaluation of the functioning of the directive five

years after entry into force.

This monitoring should now be extended to all cases of double taxation disputes in cross-

border situation for companies covered by the new legal instrument and gathered on a yearly

basis. The following information collected will enable the Commission to assess whether the

objectives are met.

number of initiated/ closed/ pending across the EU

duration of DTDRM including the reasons for not adhering to the timelines foreseen

number of instances where access was denied by a MS including justification

amounts of tax involved in cases (in general and for those who go to arbitration)

number of instances of arbitration requested

As statistical data is already collected and should continue to be collected on a yearly basis, it

is expected that the costs of such activity would remain unchanged, for MS and for the

Commission. Annex L offers a template to be used for collection of the above mentioned

monitoring data.

5 years after the implementation of the instrument, the Commission will evaluate the situation

with double taxation resolution in cross-border situations for companies in the EU with

respect to the objectives and the overall impacts on companies and the internal market. In this

context, data will be collected from business on their actual cases of double taxation through

Commission expert groups or similar consultation. The data collected from stakeholders will

be mainly information which is not possible to be collected from MS (e.g. in how many cases

no remedies were taken). The evaluation will consider international multilateral developments

in the area of dispute resolution, for instance at the level of the OECDi or the UN

ii.

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13. GLOSSARY

Advance Pricing Arrangements

An Advance Pricing Arrangement is any agreement, communication or any other instrument

or action with similar effects, including one issued, amended or renewed in the context of a

tax audit, and which meets the following conditions: (a) is issued, amended or renewed by, or

on behalf of, the government or the tax authority of one or more Member States, including

any territorial or administrative subdivision thereof, including local authorities, irrespective of

whether it is effectively used; (b) is issued, amended or renewed, to a particular person or a

group of persons and upon which that person or a group of persons is entitled to rely; and (c)

determines in advance of cross-border transactions between associated enterprises, an

appropriate set of criteria for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions or

determines the attribution of profits to a permanent establishment.

Aggressive tax planning (see also: Tax planning)

In the Commission Recommendation on aggressive tax planning, aggressive tax planning is

defined as “taking advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between

two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing tax liability. Aggressive tax planning can

take a multitude of forms. Its consequences include double deductions (e.g. the same loss is

deducted both in the state of source and residence) and double non-taxation (e.g. income

which is not taxed in the source state is exempt in the state of residence)”.

A distinction should be made between schemes that could be deemed as aggressive tax

planning and ordinary tax planning. Aggressive tax planning results in an abuse of the tax

system while ordinary tax planning allows taxpayers to exercise their legitimate interests to

plan their tax affairs according to the national tax rules of their state of residence. Indeed,

some Member States explicitly permit all taxpayers in a similar situation to use products and

investment vehicles which have tax advantages and as such these are not considered to be

aggressive tax planning schemes as they are not used to circumvent the spirit of the

legislation. The scope of aggressive tax planning should therefore not include such schemes.

Associated Enterprises

Associated enterprises means a taxpayer who is related to another taxpayer in at least one of

the following ways: (a) A taxpayer participates in the management of another taxpayer by

being in a position to exercise a significant influence over the other taxpayer; (b) A taxpayer

participates in the control of another taxpayer through a holding that exceeds 20% of the

voting rights; (c) A taxpayer participates in the capital of another taxpayer through a right of

ownership that, directly or indirectly, exceeds 20% of the capital. If the same taxpayers

participate in the management, control or capital of more than one taxpayer, all taxpayers

concerned shall be regarded as associated enterprises. In indirect participations, the fulfilment

of requirements under points (b) and (c) shall be determined by multiplying the rates of

holding through the successive tiers. A taxpayer holding more than 50% of the voting rights

shall be deemed to hold 100%. An individual, his or her spouse and his or her lineal

ascendants or descendants shall be treated as a single taxpayer.

Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS Project)

Tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift

profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity, resulting in

little or no overall corporate tax being paid. The OECD has developed specific actions to give

countries the tools they need to ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities

generating the profits are performed and where value is created, while at the same time giving

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enterprises greater certainty by reducing disputes over the application of international tax

rules, and standardising requirements. More information on the Base Erosion and Profit

Shifting project can be found here.

Beneficial owner

Defined in Article 3(6) 4AMLD and means any natural person(s) who ultimately owns or

controls the customer and/or the natural person(s) on whose behalf a transaction or activity is

being conducted. It also incorporates those persons who exercise ultimate effective control

over a legal person or arrangement.

Beneficial ownership register

A register where information on beneficial owners are accessible either to public or to

interested parties.

Confidentiality clause

A "confidentiality clause" is a contractual clause that requires the intermediary and/or the

client to keep the scheme confidential.

Cross-border transaction

A transaction or series of transactions where: (a) not all of the parties to the transaction or

series of transactions are resident for tax purposes in one Member State (b) any of the parties

to the transaction or series of transactions is simultaneously resident for tax purposes in more

than one jurisdiction; (c) one of the parties to the transaction or series of transactions carries

on business in another jurisdiction through a permanent establishment and the transaction or

series of transactions forms part or the whole of the business of the permanent establishment.

A cross-border transaction or series of transactions shall also include arrangements made by a

person in respect of business activities in another jurisdiction which that person carries on

through a permanent establishment; or such transactions or series of transactions have a cross

border impact. It includes a transaction or series of transactions involving associated

enterprises which are not all resident for tax purposes in the territory of a single jurisdiction or

a transaction or series of transactions which have a cross border impact.

Hallmarks

In this context, a typical characteristic or feature of an aggressive tax planning scheme. In the

BEPS Report, hallmarks are divided into two categories: generic and specific hallmarks.

Generic hallmarks target features that are common to promoted schemes, such as the

requirement for confidentiality or the payment of a premium fee. Generic hallmarks can also

be used to capture new and innovative tax planning arrangements that may be easily

replicated and sold to a variety of taxpayers. Specific hallmarks are used to target known

vulnerabilities in the tax system and techniques that are commonly used in tax avoidance

arrangements such as the use of losses.

Hybrid structures

Hybrid structures allows taxpayers sometimes to claim a tax deduction for a payment that is

either untaxed in the country of receipt of that payment, or for which a deduction has already

been claimed in another jurisdiction. These structures also called hybrid mismatch

arrangements are in effect structured transactions, whose purpose is to lower the tax burden

on cross-border investments by exploiting differences in the tax treatment of instruments or

entities in different tax jurisdictions.

Intermediaries who assist in potentially aggressive tax planning schemes

For the purpose of the public consultation questionnaire, the term "intermediaries who assist

in potentially aggressive tax planning schemes" refers to any natural or legal person

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responsible for the design, marketing, organization or management of a potentially aggressive

tax planning scheme, or who provides assistance or advice with respect to creating,

developing, planning, organizing, marketing or implementing such a scheme. The term

includes consultants, lawyers, financial (investment) advisors, accountants, solicitors,

insurance intermediaries, financial institutions, and company-formation agents known as

Trust and Company Service Providers.

Non-bank financial corporation

Financial institution, other than a bank, engaged primarily in the provision of financial

services and activities auxiliary to financial intermediation, such as fund management.

Non-bank financial corporations include the following entities: special purpose vehicles,

hedge funds, securities brokers, money market funds, pension funds, insurance companies,

financial leasing corporations, CCPs, unit trusts, other financial auxiliaries and other captive

financial institutions. They also include any public financial institutions such as development

banks and export credit agencies.

Non-financial corporations

Entity, whose principal activity is the production of market goods or non-financial services.

Non-financial corporations include the following entities: legally constituted corporations,

branches of non-resident enterprises, quasi-corporations, notional resident units owning land,

and resident non-profit institutions that are market producers of goods or non-financial

services.

Panama papers

The 'Panama Papers' consists of 11.5 million leaked documents from Panamanian law firm

Mossack Fonesca, detailing how the corporate service provider helped creating 214,488

offshore entities around the world for its clients since the 1970s.

Premium fee

A "premium fee" is a fee payable to the intermediary that is to a significant extent attributable

to the tax advantage, or to any extent contingent upon obtaining that tax advantage.

Tax avoidance

According to the OECD glossary of tax terms, tax avoidance is defined as the arrangement of

a taxpayer’s affairs in a way that is intended to reduce his or her tax liability and that although

the arrangement may be strictly legal is usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it

purports to follow.

Tax evasion

According to the OECD glossary of tax terms, tax evasion is defined as illegal arrangements

where the liability to tax is hidden or ignored. This implies that the taxpayer pays less tax than

he or she is legally obligated to pay by hiding income or information from the tax authorities.

Tax planning (see also: Aggressive tax planning)

According to the OECD glossary of tax terms, tax planning is an arrangement of a person’s

business and/or private affairs in order to minimize tax liability.

Transfer pricing

Transfer pricing refers to the terms and conditions surrounding transactions within a multi-

national company. It concerns the prices charged between associated enterprises established

in different countries for their inter-company transactions, i.e. transfer of goods and services.

Since the prices are set by non-independent associates within the multi-national, it may be that

the prices do not reflect an independent market price. This is a major concern for tax

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authorities who worry that multi-national entities may set transfer prices on cross-border

transactions to reduce taxable profits in their jurisdiction. This has led to the rise of transfer

pricing regulations and enforcement, making transfer pricing a major tax compliance issue.

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PROCEDURAL INFORMATION Annex 1:

1. LEAD DG, AGENDA PLANNING AND WORK PROGRAMME

The proposal for disincentives for intermediaries to engage in potentially aggressive tax

planning schemes was prepared under the lead of Directorate-General for Taxation and

Customs Union. In the Agenda Planning of the European Commission, the project is referred

to under item 2017/TAXUD/003. The Commission Work Programme for 2017 includes this

project under header "1.1. Fight against tax fraud and aggressive tax planning". The project is

based on the OECD BEPS Package Action 12 "Mandatory disclosure rules". .

2. ORGANISATION AND TIMING

Work on the preparation of this policy initiative started in April 2016.

An Inter-services Steering Group assisted DG Taxation and Customs Union in the preparation

of this Impact Assessment report and included colleagues from the following Commission

services:

DG Communication Networks, Content and Technology;

DG Competition;

DG Economic and Financial Affairs;

DG Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union;

DG Grow;

DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs;

DG International Cooperation and Development

DG Justice and Consumers;

DG Taxation and Customs Union;

DG Trade;

the Commission's Legal Service;

and the Commission's Secretariat-General.

The Steering Group met on 7 occasions between May 2016 and May 2017. The last meeting

of the Steering Group took place on 5 May 2017. At each occasion, the members of the

Steering Group were given the opportunity to provide comments orally or in writing on the

draft versions of the documents presented.

3. CONSULTATION OF THE REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD

The impact assessment report was reviewed by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on 27 April

2017. Based on the Board's recommendations, the impact assessment has been revised in

accordance with the following points:

The impact assessment does not clearly explain the context of the initiative, in particular the

elements which are additional to BEPS/OECD commitments. How addressed: Updated in

section 3 Problem definition, drivers and consequences of the impact assessment and, where

appropriate, in sections 5 (Scope of the impact assessment, 7 (Policy options), and 9

(Comparison of options) ;

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The impact assessment needs to sufficiently explain and justify the need to act at an EU level

and EU added value: How addressed: updated urgency to act in section 1 Introduction, new

section 2.3 in Policy context, and reinforced argumentation on why EU action is justified in

section 4 Why the European Union should act;

The report does not clearly present the options and baseline. How addressed: updated section 7

Policy options to justify/clarify the choice of the assessed policy options, including why a

different structure was used from the public consultation. Furthermore section 9 (previously

section 8) on Comparison of options has been revised to clearly explain the comparisons

between each options assessed and the baseline.

The report does not provide a sufficiently detailed analysis of the impacts, including benefits,

administrative burdens, and compliance costs for the stakeholders. How addressed: new

section 8 Analysis of impact added which details impacts of the proposal on key groups

including an analysis of administrative burdens. Furthermore, section 10 (previously section 9)

Preferred option has more extensive analysis of the impacts on the preferred option.

Changes made following the Board's opinion

On the context of the initiative, language has been added to section 1. and new section 2.3.1.

has been included.

The link to the OECD anti-BEPS action 12 has been clarified in the new section 2.3.2. and

with other changes, e.g. in the section 5, 7.1., 7.2.2.1. and 9.2.2.

On the urgency to act, language has been added to section 1.and new section 2.3. has been

included.

On the justification of the EU action and the cross-border relevance, language has been added

to section 4.

On the options, new language has been added in section 7.

A new section 8 – Analysis of impacts has been included.

Section 10 – Analysis of impacts of the preferred policy option has been extended and

clarified.

On the question of (dis)incentives and penalties a new section 2.3.3. has been added and

further clarifications included through the analysis of impacts.

4. EXTERNAL EXPERTISE

Consultation and expertise sought

The Commission has been consulting widely and has received input from various sources on

this impact assessment work.

In November 2016 the Commission launched an Open Public Consultation61

on the internet

"Disincentives for advisors and intermediaries for potentially aggressive tax planning

schemes".

In November 2016 the Commission services also participated in the Confédération Fiscale

Européenne (CFE) conference on mandatory disclosure rules.

61 More information on the Open Public Consultation can be found here.

79

In December 2016, the Public Consultation was presented to the Commission Platform on

Tax Good Governance (PTG).

In March 2017 the Commission consulted Member States in the context of a meeting of

Working Party IV (for details see Annex 2).

According to the OECD BEPS Action 12, not all of the countries with mandatory disclosure

regimes have collected data on the effectiveness of their regime in terms of these objectives.

However, the report concludes that, “even though the available data is not comprehensive or

detailed, the feedback from those with disclosure regimes provides a reasonably consistent

picture that suggests that mandatory disclosure is successful in meeting its objectives.”

In developing BEPS Action 127, the OECD carried out significant research and analysis and

issued several studies and reports:

Study on the Role of Tax Intermediaries (OECD, 2008);

Tackling Aggressive Tax Planning through Improved Transparency and Disclosure,

(OECD, 2011);

Co-operative Compliance: A Framework: From Enhanced Relationship to Co-

Operative Compliance (OECD, 2013).

Stakeholders and Member States, in particular OECD Members, have been consulted

on the issue during the OECD works on BEPS.

The Commission services have taken into account all of above-mentioned observations in the

present impact assessment.

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STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION Annex 2:

The following contributions were received from stakeholders for the proposal.

1. PUBLIC CONSULTATION

On 10 November 2016 the European Commission launched a Public Consultation61

to gather

feedback on the way forward for EU action on advisers and intermediaries who facilitate tax

evasion and tax avoidance. The results of this Consultation are in a separate document to this

Impact Assessment 'Summary Report Responses received on the Commission's consultation

on disincentives for advisors and intermediaries for potentially aggressive tax planning

schemes'.

Overview of responses to the Public Consultation

Breakdown of responses

131 responses were received to the public consultation from a broad variety of stakeholders.

The largest share of replies came from trade/business associations/professional associations

with 27% of the replies and private citizens with 20% of the replies. Geographically speaking,

the largest share of responses came from Germany with 24% of the total responses.

Providing and receiving tax advice

46 respondents replied that they had received professional tax advice with tax advisors being

the largest professional group from which tax advice were received (52%). 30 respondents

replied that they provided tax advice, and 15 of them maintaining contact with the tax

authorities.

Opinions on the objectives of the policy initiative

The following objectives were deemed the most relevant to classify aggressive tax planning

schemes: policy options designed to address artificial arrangements, preferential treatment

under the application of national law, schemes designed to circumvent the Common

Reporting Standard followed by the use of jurisdictions that present difficulties in identifying

the beneficial owner. With regard to the most important objectives to strengthen the fight

against tax evasion and tax avoidance the most favoured option was to facilitate

administrative cooperation between Member States followed by the need to improve

voluntary compliance. 41% of respondents considered that Member States should be made

aware of any ATP scheme while 51% considered they should only be aware of such schemes

if applied within their jurisdiction. Respondents were split evenly between those who

considered that all schemes should be included within the scope of the recommendations and

those who considered that only schemes with a cross-border should be included within the

scope. Only 21% of the respondents considered that the future EU list for third country

jurisdictions that fail to comply with tax good governance standards should be used for

defining ATP schemes due to a wide range of reasons, including other measures would be

more suitable including hallmarks and concern that such a list would be too limited to be

effective.

Tax transparency

For tax transparency 100 respondents agree/agreed very much that the EU should implement

the OECD recommendations at an international level followed by implementation of a

mandatory scheme alongside its global partners (82 respondents agree/agreed very much).

The least popular option was that current legislation related to potential ATP schemes is

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sufficient and should be left to Member States to decide whether or not to implement the

recommendation issued at international level by the OECD. On the direct impact of no action

by the EU, 82% of respondents considered the most likely result would be different

transparency requirements. All stakeholder categories provided high affirmative responses to

this question. Only 30% of the respondents to the public consultation considered that Member

States would be likely/very likely to introduce transparency requirements at all if no EU

action was envisaged. From the main stakeholder groups who replied to this question 38% of

consultancy/tax advisors, 32% of private citizens, and 21% of NGO's thought this would be

the case.. In terms of indirect consequences of mandatory disclosure obligations the most

likely outcome according to respondents would be an increase in administrative burden for

public authorities. The next most likely indirect impacts were that there would be a level

playing between SME's and large companies in terms of competitive ness, and opportunities

would be reduced for large companies to take advantage of ATP schemes

Mandatory disclosure requirements

25% of respondents have mandatory disclosure obligations in their own national legislation

with 69% of respondents stating that such obligations changed ATP schemes whilst 67% of

respondents claimed that the introduction of such obligations would change ATP schemes.

21% of respondents replied that disclosure requirements for intermediaries existed in their

own national legislation with 85% of respondents claiming their introduction changed ATP

schemes whilst 69% indicated that the introduction of such obligations would change ATP

schemes. 43% of respondents indicated that code of conduct/ethic rules existed in their

national legislation for intermediaries with 30% of respondents stating that such arrangements

had changed tax advice practice while 68% believe that their introduction would change tax

advice practice.

Despite the positive effects of mandatory disclosure obligations, only 44% considered that

there was need to impose mandatory disclosure obligations at EU level. There was a wide

divergence between respondent categories on the need to impose obligations: 93% of NGO's

and 68% of private citizens replied yes with only 17% of the consultancy/ tax advisors and

trade business associations considering that mandatory disclosure obligations were required.

A number of contributors noted that any proposal would need to be carefully evaluated in

terms of costs and benefits, have clear definitions and would need to introduced with a

number of other measures at the same time in relation to tax legislation amendments. In terms

of who should be required to follow such obligations, 36% of respondents considered

taxpayers and intermediaries would be required to report whilst 25% of respondents provided

another opinion. From the main stakeholder groups there was a wide range of responses

regarding whether both intermediaries and taxpayers should report: NGO's (84%), private

citizens (54%), consultancy/tax advisors (11%) and Trade/business associations (8%).

In terms of scope of the mandatory disclosure, the following were rated as the most important:

details of potential ATP schemes, details of the provisions/hallmark that qualifies the tax

planning scheme as potentially aggressive, identification of the different jurisdictions used in

the scheme, and description of the tax benefit or advantage.

Policy options and their impacts

Regarding how effective the policy options would be, the following options were considered

almost equally effective: Option C: Disclosure and exchange of information (50%); Option A:

encourage Member States to use current exchange of information mechanisms (49%); Option

D: disclosure (option B) and exchange (Option C) + publication (47%); and Option E: EU

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Code of Conduct (45%).There was a wide divergence in respondent categories regarding

whether Option E: EU Code of Conduct would be effective: 58% of consultancy/tax advisors

and 69% of trade/business associations considered it was effective/very effective with only

16% of NGO's, 32% of private citizens and 33% of academics sharing the same view.

With regard to Option D which had a wide range of disclosure including publication which

was not included under the other option categories there was a wide divergence in the main

stakeholder categories regarding whether this would be considered as effective/very effective:

NGO's (89%), companies (75%), private citizens (60%), consultancies/tax advisors (25%),

and trade/business associations (19%).

2. HOW THE CONCERNS OF STAKEHOLDERS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED IN THE PROPOSAL

The concerns raised on an EU mandatory disclosure regime mainly came from the business

sector and are outlined in Table 3 below together with how the concern has been addressed in

the proposal.

Stakeholder concerns

Stakeholder concerns How taken into account

Tax evasion is a criminal offence and should not be included in an EU mandatory disclosure regime

The proposal does not replace national laws related to tax crime and how this is defined. The Hallmarks are meant to signal a potentially aggressive tax scheme to the authorities and would allow taxpayers to be informed about possible problems related to tax avoidance and tax evasion issues thus providing a safeguard to the users of such schemes.

The proposal would involve being required to define tax avoidance which largely depends on national laws and therefore an EU definition would not be possible.

The proposal includes Generic and Specific Hallmarks to define an aggressive tax planning scheme and thus does not include a definition of tax avoidance which is left to Member States.

Intermediaries would have to observe requirements on legal profession privileges and fundamental rights and thus would be not be able to notify such schemes to the national authorities.

Legal profession privileges would be safeguarded in Member States where legal profession privileges operate as the taxpayer can elect to notify the scheme

The introduction of an EU proposal would lead to an unacceptable administrative burden, in particular for the public authorities, which is not justified by the possible benefits

The Impact Assessment does not quantify the specific costs of an EU mandatory disclosure regime but as outlined below incremental costs would be limited on public authorities as existing resources used to combat tax avoidance and tax evasion could be mobilised. With regard to intermediaries information summaries already prepared for clients could be used for notification

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purposes therefore limited incremental administrative costs. With regard to benefits, the UK scheme national DOTAS scheme raised GBP 12 billion with a total of 49 measures during the period 2004-09.

Due to differences in tax legislation between EU Member States it is not possible to have a set of Hallmarks for aggressive tax planning that would be applicable to all Member States.

The proposal contains Generic Hallmarks which could be applicable to all Member States as it describes general features of an aggressive tax planning scheme. The Specific Hallmarks cover a wide range of possible avoidance/evasion schemes including those relevant to other EU tax instruments in this field. However it is acknowledged that Member States may have legislation that is not covered by these Hallmarks and, where appropriate, can introduce their own Specific Hallmarks according to their national legislation

Source: European Commission (2017)

3. ADDITIONAL STAKEHOLDER CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONSULTATION

The following contributions were received regarding the survey for the public consultation:

the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE), the European Banking Federation

(EBF), the Law Society of England and Wales (LSEW), the Law Society of Ireland (LSI), and

PricewaterhouseCoopers UK – Tax (PwC). The text below is a summary of the contributions

received from these organisations.

3.1. General comments

The CCBE does not believe that the suggested measures in the submission are suitable or

workable at EU level. The CCBE asserts that tax avoidance is different from tax evasion and

should have different remedies. Furthermore, OECD BEPS 12 does not include tax evasion in

its recommendations as these should be addressed by the criminal law and AML legislation.

CCBE indicates that any proposal could potentially violate the European Convention on

Human Rights as tax avoidance by its inherent nature involves a subjective assessment and

does not provide for legal certainty for taxpayers The CCBE does not consider that the EU

has the right to act and the principle of subsidiarity has not been adequately considered. LSI

considers that the public consultation document is lacking neutrality and that the questions are

designed to elicit a certain outcome. Tax advisors play a crucial role in enabling tax

compliance as cited in the OECD report on tax intermediaries. The LSEW considers the

consultation as not conductive to providing a representative response on this topic and does

not adequately take into account the broader impact of the proposal. EBF did not specifically

address the questions in the consultation but emphasised the role of AML legislation both in

the EU and globally in tackling tax evasion. EBF supports the risk based approach, in

particular related to offshore/non-cooperative jurisdictions and PEP, which helps target

information that is actually required for tax evasion purposes rather than mass data. PwC

noted that tax competition plays a role in creating very challenging perceptions and risks

which will not be dealt with by the proposed options. These broader aspects should be dealt

with first. There the proposal may have unhelpful and costly regulation which does not

address the source of the concerns.

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3.2. Objectives of the policy initiative

From the UK perspective, the CCBE questions the evidence that mass marketed ATP

schemes now exist and that there are sufficient measures in the EU to address avoidance like

GAAR's. CCBE considers that the public consultation document does not take into account

the potential impact of the proposal on the taxpayer/ tax adviser relationship. With regard to

hallmarks the current disclosure regimes in UK, IE, and PT refer to national legislation and it

would be impossible to have an EU list of hallmarks that would be capable of being

implemented. CCBE noted that French Constitutional Court rejected the FR proposal because

the tax optimisation definition was too vague. CCBE believes the objectives could be

achieved by better policing of the tax system and for Member States to correctly draft tax

legislation.

LSEW indicates that the 'mass marketed' schemes are now rare and as such the proposal is no

longer relevant. With regard to subsidiarity the proposal does not sufficiently provide

arguments on why the EU should act. Instead it is up to Member States to legislate action in

this field according to their national legislation and information disclosure provisions.

Existing measures under the Directive in Administrative Cooperation in direct taxation may

be sufficient. Indeed there also other transparency and information exchange mechanisms at

the disposal of Member States which may be adequate. The Consultation makes insufficient

distinction between tax evasion which is illegal and tax avoidance, the latter which could

possibly include acceptable tax planning arrangements. Indeed the BEPS 12 initiative only

refers to tax avoidance and not tax evasion - other measures are intended to address tax

evasion like Anti-Money Laundering Legislation.

PwC believes that tax evasion and tax avoidance should not be mixed and although important

subjects for policy debate they require different solutions and the confusion hinders both

clarity and accountability. Regarding tax evasion, amendments to AML legislation are already

under way and other transparency/exchange of information instruments. The new OECD and

EU standards will therefore have an impact already on potential ATP schemes in addition to

forums like the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre. The benefits of these and

other initiatives will take a number of years to come to fruition.

3.3. Tax Transparency

LSI considers that the section on direct and indirect impacts of imposing reporting obligations

on tax advisors and other intermediaries lacks neutrality. The consultation only refers to 4

negative consequences and does not consider the impact that the proposal could have on the

proper functioning of the relationship between tax advisor and the client, in particular with

regard to legal privilege. Legal privilege is not mentioned in the public consultation – it is an

essential element of any developed justice system and allows clients to make full disclosure to

their lawyers so that they can obtain comprehensive legal advice and is not designed to protect

lawyers. Furthermore, this would result in tax advice being treated differently from any other

type of legal advice. Furthermore legal professional privilege is also protected under the

ECHR Convention under Articles 6 and 8 and that legal privilege cannot be used to facilitate

tax evasion. Commission should assess whether existing provisions under the Directive on

Administrative Cooperation in direct taxation are sufficient.

LSEW: legal privilege is designed to the principle of the rule of law, ensure appropriate

access to justice and provide legal certainty to taxpayers. These are also protected under the

European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore appropriate exclusions should be adopted

to safeguard such rights.

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In terms of impact, CCBE considers that it is necessary to have a tax system that is stable,

sufficiently clear and fiscally comparable to its competitors' tax systems. The mandatory

disclosure regime as proposed could result in more aggressive advice being provided by

advisers from outside the EU.

3.4. Mandatory disclosure requirements

LSI: the mandatory disclosure regime was introduced in Ireland in 2010 – the Irish rules do

not seek to override legal professional privilege and are not required to disclose and inform

according to this right. Therefore any EU instrument should provide a carve-out for legally

privileged information. LSI considers that mandatory disclosure requirements would not

affect tax evasion and instead the focus should be tax avoidance. Potentially aggressive tax

planning is not defined in the consultation document and there remains an inherent risk that

all tax planning may be considered as potentially aggressive tax planning. Any proposal needs

to have clear definitions in order to ensure the rule of law is not eroded

CCBE stressed that the purpose of professional secrecy/ legal professional privilege is to

facilitate full and frank disclosure between those who need legal advice and their lawyers and

safeguarding this arrangement in the public interests and also for taxpayers Furthermore

professional secrecy is an obligation that, in many Member States, is protected under

sanctions in the criminal codes, for example Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany and France.

Regarding the national systems, in IE the taxpayer can decide whether to waive LPP, in the

UK LLP can prevent the promotor from providing the information to make a full disclosure,

and in PT mandatory disclosure obligation62

states that lawyers and law firms are not be

considered to be "promotors", and are therefore not subject to disclosure obligations. CCBE

noted that in the UK in the vast majority of cases the principle of legal privilege has been

maintained whilst HMRC has been able to access the desired information through the uses of

the scheme.

3.5. Policy options and their impact

LSI is against the proposal suggesting that taxpayers are required to publish some or all

information to the tax authorities. – European Taxpayer's Code states this is private

information. With reference to an EU Code of Conduct, this was rejected in the discussions

for the Service Directive as the EU has limited competence in the regulation of tax related

services and Member States should regulate their own professions as they see fit. In this case

such a standard would be unenforceable as tax advisors are members of a broad range of

service providers depending on the Member State and as such any standard would be

unenforceable.

PwC provided the following assessment of the options: No action now: unnecessary burden

will be avoided and risks addressed by evaluation of the current measures already in place

when they have had time to take effect. Existing exchange of information mechanisms:

adding other exchange of information measures will be burdensome for national authorities

and agreed measures already in place address intermediaries albeit indirectly through

particular structures and transactions. Mandatory disclosure requirements: Action 12 of

BEPS is sufficient and contains adequate hallmarks. There may be the risk of different

interpretations, inherent vagueness and the risk of over-reporting. Mandatory disclosure

regimes have not been as effective as intended as a disincentive to aggressive tax planning, in

addition to affecting investment. Publication of disclosures: would necessitate changes to

62 Contribution notes that in the first two years 87 communications were made – recent year statistics are not

yet publically available.

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some national laws in the EU to allow this and any public disclosure should only take place

after the proper legal safeguards for the individual have been ensured. PwC supports a

properly drafted Code of Conduct option which is standardised and could be used in all EU

jurisdictions, an advantage being that a rule based system may not be compatible with every

national legislation in the EU. As another option the Commission might encourage Member

States to invest more in tax certainty through ruling and advance pricing agreement APA

programs and cooperative compliance programs.

4. CONSULTATION WITH MEMBER STATES IN COMMISSION EXPERT GROUP WPIV

The Commission held a meeting with Member States on the 2nd

of March in the Commission

expert group WPIV63

to gather views and comments from the national experts on the

objectives, the scope and other elements of a potential EU initiative concerning

intermediaries. Main comments received:

Member States were asked about the need for an EU action and their preferred policy options.

8 Member States clearly supported a mandatory EU initiative and stressed the need for the EU

proposal to address the Panama scandal while other Member States expressed their

willingness for further discussion. 3 Member States did not consider a proposal as a high

priority as they had doubts whether the benefits of any scheme. Some Member States stressed

that an EU proposal should ensure coherence with the OECD BEPS Action 12, which already

provides a minimum standard for OECD members to implement in their jurisdictions, and

should not result in a second layer of legislation. Member States expressed their preferences

for a range of options with a majority being in favour of mandatory reporting including

exchange of information as a general approach.

As regards the policy options, the majority of MS expressed a preference for mandatory

disclosure obligations imposed on intermediaries/taxpayers, coupled with automatic exchange

of information between tax authorities. However, it appears that such option would be

regarded as proportionate only to the extent that it covered aggressive tax planning schemes

having a cross-border element. MS could be interested in receiving information also on purely

domestic schemes but for this information other, less binding, forms of communications

would seem to be more appropriate.

Specific elements of Public consultation were discussed in detail including the scope

(Member States requested a broad scope), definitions, the hallmarks and sanctions. Many

Member States stressed the importance of clearly defining what has to be reported as crucial

for the effectiveness of any proposal. The use of hallmarks (combination of generic and

specific) were confirmed by many Member States as the right approach to take. One Member

State warned there may be items which would prove difficult for Member States to agree on,

for example defining what a low-taxation jurisdiction is, and issues already covered by

ATAD. With regard penalties Member States highlighted the limits of EU law and supported

the approach with the standard article on them.

Member States were asked to provide written contributions by 17 March. To date no

contributions have been received.

63 More information on expert group 953 on direct taxation can be found at the register if Commission expert

groups here.

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CONSULTATION STRATEGY Annex 3:

1. BACKGROUND OF THE INITIATIVE

Introduction and context

Recent public discussions have shown the crucial role that legal and tax advisors and certain

intermediaries play in facilitating tax evasion and tax avoidance.

At international level, the OECD issued last year a set of recommendations as regards the use

and promotion of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes (Final Report on BEPS Action

12).

BEPS Action 12 Report notes the usefulness of disclosure initiatives in addressing the lack of

comprehensive and relevant information, available to tax authorities, on tax planning

strategies. It provides an overview of mandatory disclosure regimes, based on the experiences

of countries that have such regimes, and set out recommendations for a modular design of a

mandatory disclosure regime including recommendations on rules designed to capture

international tax schemes. Furthermore, the report sets out a standard framework for a

mandatory disclosure regime, to ensure some consistency, but also includes options to provide

sufficient flexibility to deal with country specific risks and to allow tax administrations to

control the quantity and type of disclosure.

Stakeholders and Member States, in particular those which are members to the OECD, had

already the opportunity to respond to the OECD’s discussion draft entitled “BEPS Action 12:

Mandatory disclosure rules”. In March 2015, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) of the

OECD invited interested parties to send written comments on the draft. In addition, in

previous years, the OECD carried out significant research and analysis and issued several

studies and reports:

Study on the Role of Tax Intermediaries (OECD, 2008);

Tackling Aggressive Tax Planning through Improved Transparency and Disclosure,

(OECD, 2011);

Co-operative Compliance: A Framework: From Enhanced Relationship to Co-

Operative Compliance (OECD, 2013).

2. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE COMMISSION’S CONSULTATION

The EU is considering action concerning disincentives for advisors and intermediaries dealing

with potentially aggressive tax planning schemes. The Commission carried out consultations

in the context of such a possible initiative. The purpose of these consultations was to gather

views of the different stakeholders on whether there is a need for EU action aimed at

introducing more effective disincentives for intermediaries facilitating tax evasion and tax

avoidance.

The Commission gathered views in particular on the following aspects:

need for EU action;

evidence on the size and impacts of the problem;

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the different options identified, in case EU action is appropriate;

key design features of a possible disclosure regime;

impacts of the policy options;

proportionality aspects.

3. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND CONSULTATION TOOLS

The Commission was interested to collect input from the following stakeholders and intends

to use the following consultation tools:

Table 10: Stakeholder identification and consultation tools

Source: European Commission (2017)

4. CONSULTATION TOOLS AND LANGUAGE REGIMES

Table 11: Consultation tools and language regime

Consultation tool Consultation period Objective Languages covered

Feedback mechanism 4 weeks During a 4-week period, all interested stakeholders will

The inception Impact Assessment is available in

Stakeholder group Method of consultation Consultation period Scope of consultation

Public Authorities in Member States

1) Interviews, committees, working groups

2) Open Public Consultation

1) Q4 2016 – Q2 2017

2) Q4 2016

Need for EU action.

The different options identified, in case EU action is appropriate.

The key design features of the reporting regime.

Data and evidence collection.

Economic operators: Companies receiving tax advice

1) Interviews, committees, working groups

2) Open Public Consultation

1) Q4 2016 – Q2 2017

2) Q4 2016

Intermediaries providing tax advice

Open Public Consultation Q4 2016

Organisations/associations: e.g. EU and national organisations of economic operators

1) Interviews, committees, working groups

2) Open Public Consultation

1) Q4 2016 – Q2 2017

2) Q4 2016

Civil society, NGOs 1) Interviews, committees, working groups

2) Open Public Consultation

1) Q4 2016 – Q2 2017

2) Q4 2016

Citizens Open public consultation Q4 2016

All stakeholders Other tbc

Collect evidence and quantify the problem and the impact of the different options

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Consultation tool Consultation period Objective Languages covered

Q4 2016 be able to provide feedback on the Inception Impact Assessment outlining the initial structure and outline of the project.

English only. Feedback is possible in any of the 24 working languages of the EU

Open Public Consultation 3 months Q4 2016

To ascertain the views of a broad range of stakeholders.

EN.

Targeted consultation: Interviews, committees, working groups

Q4 2016 – Q2 2017 To ascertain views of stakeholders with experience of operating a mandatory disclosure regime or will be directly affected by a mandatory disclosure regime.

EN

Source: European Commission (2017)

The different steps of the consultation process and strategy require different types of

consultation activities.

Depending on the stakeholder group identified, different tools and methods have been used in

order to conduct the consultation.

The information gathered with these consultations has been analyzed to discuss whether an

EU action is needed, and if so, its key features. A synopsis report will be published that

summarises the consultation activities and the responses received, including possible

contributions within the feedback mechanism of the European Commission.

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WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW Annex 4:

The objective of this annex is to set out the practical implications of the initiative for various

parties who will be affected by the proposal

INTERMEDIARIES/ADVISORS FOR AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING SCHEMES

Under the option chosen the intermediary who devised the scheme will have the main

responsibility for reporting the scheme if they are defined as an EU intermediary according to

the proposal. Intermediaries bound with legal privilege or secrecy rules could ask the taxpayer

to waive these duties in order for the intermediary to be able to report the scheme instead of

the user. The mandatory disclosure obligations can be recorded on a standardised form using a

summary of the information prepared for the client. Although some Member States already

have mandatory disclosure schemes (IE, PT and UK) intermediaries in other Member States

will need to create new reporting forms and incur training costs for staff. However, ensuring

tax compliance is already a main activity for intermediaries providing tax advice/services

therefore it is envisaged that the burden could be accommodated by existing compliance

obligations of intermediaries.

USERS OF THE SCHEME – WHEN THE TAXPAYER IS AN INDIVIDUAL

Given the nature of cross-border tax planning individuals who are highly mobile and/or high

wealth individuals will be the most affected by the proposal. The user is obliged to report in

following situations: (i) Non-EU intermediary has created the scheme, (ii) No intermediary

exists for example when the scheme has been created "in-house" and (iii) an intermediary is

bound by legal professional privilege or secrecy rules. Reporting under the mandatory

disclosure obligations may be difficult for most taxpayers as it would require knowledge and

experience in the field of taxation, in particular for the application of hallmarks to the scheme.

However, this burden should be minimal in both scenarios as in (i) the taxpayer could have

the non-EU intermediary prepare the disclosure requirements, although the taxpayer would

remain legally responsible for the reporting of the scheme and for (ii) any individual capable

of creating such a scheme should have the requisite knowledge and expertise to ensure the

scheme is tax compliant.

USERS OF THE SCHEME – WHEN THE TAXPAYER IS A BUSINESS ENTITY

Large companies will be more affected by the proposal than SME's given that they are more

likely to have cross-border activities and will therefore fall under the scope of the scheme.

According to the Public Consultation, one of the most highly indirect impacts from the

proposal expected by respondents would be that there would be a level playing field between

large companies and SME's as large companies, in particular multinationals, were considered

as being the main beneficiaries of aggressive tax planning schemes to the detriment of SME's.

Respondents also noted that the proposal would increase the competitiveness and innovation

of SME's with respect to large companies. In terms of reporting obligations if the user would

need to report the scheme the same considerations will apply to companies as to individuals as

described above in (i), (ii) and (iii).

TAX AUTHORITIES

Tax authorities will incur costs for implementing the new system, notably on staff resource

allocation or hiring and staff training. Discussions with Member States which already have

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national mandatory disclosure obligations (IE/PT and the UK) have indicated that the

increased administrative burden would be minimal and could be accommodated by existing

human and IT resources used to address tax avoidance and tax evasion, in particular using

reporting applications already used for information exchange purposes, for example under

Directive 2011/16/EU18 The main costs for tax authorities would be to assess the schemes

and then process the information to be used for exchange of information with the national

authorities of other Member States. The main benefits of the scheme would be to act as a

deterrent to tax evasion, in addition to risk management and for audit purposes. Although the

assessment indicates that the proposal would incur minimal costs and could be accommodated

by existing report arrangements, respondents to the public consultation considered that an

increase in administrative burden on Public Authorities was the most likely impact of the

proposal while 3 Member States in WPIV (see Annex II to the Impact assessment) cited

cost/benefit as an essential consideration for this proposal.

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DIRECTIVE ON ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF Annex 5:

TAXATION (DAC)

EU Member States have agreed that EU tax authorities have to cooperate more closely so as

to be able to apply their taxes correctly to their taxpayers and combat tax fraud and tax

evasion. The essential piece of legislation in this respect is Council Directive 2011/16/EU on

administrative cooperation in the field of taxation. The 2011 Directive established useful tools

for better cooperation between tax administrations in the European Union - such as exchanges

of information on request; spontaneous exchanges; automatic exchanges; participation in

administrative enquiries; simultaneous controls; and notifications to each other of tax

decisions.

This Directive was recently amended64

by extending the cooperation between tax authorities

to automatic exchange of financial account information (Council Directive 2014/107/EU),

cross-border tax rulings and advance pricing arrangements (Council Directive

2015/2376/EU), and country-by-country reporting by multinationals operating in the EU

(Council Directive 2016/881/EU). Another amendment to ensure access to beneficial

ownership information has been adopted (Council Directive 2016/2258).

The EU has made huge progress on tax transparency in recent years. Existing tax instruments

available at EU level do not contain explicit provisions requiring Member States to

automatically exchange information, where relevant, with other Member States on tax evasion

and tax avoidance schemes that come to their attention. However, the DAC contains a general

obligation for tax authorities of EU Member States to spontaneously communicate

information to the other EU tax authorities in certain circumstances, including the loss of tax

in a Member State or savings of tax resulting from artificial transfers of profits within groups

of companies.65

64 More information on the amendments of Council Directive 2011/16/EU can be found here. 65 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and

repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, Article 9

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MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES: OECD BEPS ACTION 1266

Annex 6:

In July 2013, the OECD started its work on the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit

Shifting (BEPS) directed with the view to ensure the coherence of corporate income taxation

at the international level. In December 2015, the G20/OECD endorsed the 15 point OECD

Action Plan to fight BEPS.

The problem of aggressive tax planning arrangements is directly addressed in BEPS Action

12 “Mandatory Disclosure Requirements” ("BEPS 12"). BEPS 12 recommends that countries

require taxpayers and promoters of tax planning schemes (tax advisors, legal advisors,

financial institutions, etc.) to disclose to tax authorities any potentially aggressive or abusive

tax planning schemes that they use or promote and to identify the users of those schemes. It

notes that to successfully design an effective mandatory disclosure regime, the following

features need to be considered: who reports, what information to report, when the information

has to be reported, and the consequences of non-reporting. For example, in the EU context, if

the promoter is outside the EU, the obligation could then fall to the taxpayer. To date, only a

limited number of Member States (United Kingdom, Ireland and Portugal) have mandatory

disclosure rules in place. However, some member States provide for criminal sanctions for

those facilitating tax crimes.

BEPS 12 makes a series of recommendations about the design of mandatory disclosure

regimes, with a view to encouraging maximum consistency between countries' approaches in

this area. Unlike other BEPS Actions, BEPS 12 is more about best practices and less about

minimum standards. For this reason, it leaves much more room for manoeuvre for countries

when setting up national rules. BEPS 12 makes clear that the mandatory disclosure

recommendations are not a minimum standard and that jurisdictions are free to choose

whether or not to introduce such a regime.

In existing disclosure regimes, disclosure is often triggered by an arrangement that includes

certain features or characteristics (hallmarks). The Action 12 Report recommends that the

existence of a single hallmark in respect of a scheme should be sufficient to give rise to a

disclosure obligation. Hallmarks can either be general or specific, and the BEPS Action 12

Report recommends that each country's hallmarks should include a mixture of both types.

General hallmarks should include a promoter's desire to keep the arrangement confidential or

the requirement of a contingent or premium fee. BEPS 12 indicates that a country may also

want to adopt additional generic hallmarks such as one applying to standardized tax products.

In addition, BEPS 12 recommends that countries use specific hallmarks designed for their

local circumstances. Examples of specific hallmarks include leasing transactions, transactions

similar to those included on a black list, those involving use of losses or income conversion

schemes or transactions with counterparties in low tax jurisdictions. Individual countries are

left to design the specific hallmarks most appropriate to their local circumstances and may

attach a de minimis filter to individual specific hallmarks.

Consultation and research carried out at OECD level

Stakeholders and Member States, in particular OECD Members, had the opportunity to

respond to the OECD’s discussion draft (DD) entitled “BEPS Action 12: Mandatory

66 http://www.oecd.org/tax/mandatory-disclosure-rules-action-12-2015-final-report-9789264241442-en.htm

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disclosure rules”. In March 2015, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) of the OECD

invited interested parties to send written comments on the DD67

.

BEPS 12 notes the usefulness of disclosure initiatives in addressing the lack of comprehensive

and relevant information available to tax authorities on tax planning strategies. The DD

provided an overview of mandatory disclosure regimes, based on the experiences of countries

that have such regimes, and set out recommendations for a modular design of a mandatory

disclosure regime including recommendations on rules designed to capture international tax

schemes.

The DD set out a standard framework for a mandatory disclosure regime, to ensure some

consistency, but also includes options to provide sufficient flexibility to deal with country

specific risks and to allow tax administrations to control the quantity and type of disclosure.

In developing BEPS 12, the OECD carried out significant research and analysis and issued

several studies and reports:

Study on the Role of Tax Intermediaries (OECD, 2008)68

;

Tackling Aggressive Tax Planning through Improved Transparency and Disclosure,

(OECD, 2011)69

;

Co-operative Compliance: A Framework: From Enhanced Relationship to Co-

Operative Compliance (OECD, 2013)70

.

As regards empirical data, according to the OECD Final Report on BEPS Action 12, not all of

the countries with mandatory disclosure regimes have collected data on the effectiveness of

their regime in terms of these objectives. However, the report concludes that, “even though

the available data is not comprehensive or detailed, the feedback from those with disclosure

regimes provides a reasonably consistent picture that suggests that mandatory disclosure is

successful in meeting its objectives.”

67 http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/public-consultation-beps-action-12-mandatory-disclosure-rules.htm 68 http://www.oecd.org/tax/administration/studyintotheroleoftaxintermediaries.htm 69

http://www.oecd.org/tax/administration/tacklingaggressivetaxplanningthroughimprovedtransparencyanddiscl

osure.htm 70 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/administration/co-operative-compliance.htm

95

REGIMES IN PLACE IN IRELAND, PORTUGAL AND THE UNITED Annex 7:

KINGDOM

The existing mandatory disclosure schemes were discussed with officials from IE, PT and the

UK for the preparation of this impact assessment.

1. IRELAND’S MANDATORY DISCLOSURE REGIME

Overview

Ireland’s mandatory disclosure regime was first introduced in 2011 with some amendments

made subsequently.

The regime is intended to act as an early warning mechanism for what the Minister described

at the launch of the regime as “aggressive tax avoidance schemes”.

“By obtaining information on aggressive tax avoidance schemes at an early stage

before a loss of taxation becomes apparent, the Government can decide, if

appropriate, to close them down before they can do significant damage to tax

revenues”71

.

Under the Irish Mandatory Disclosure legislation, any transaction, or proposal for any

transaction, is a disclosable transaction and must, therefore, be disclosed if it meets the

following tests and is not specifically excluded the Regulations or Guidelines,

It will, or might be expected to, enable a person to obtain a tax advantage;

The tax advantage is , or might be expected to be, the main benefit or one of the main benefits

of the transaction, and

It falls within any one of the specified descriptions i.e. classes or transaction, set out in the

legislation.

Who is obliged to report?

In the majority of disclosable schemes, the reporting obligation falls on the promoter who, in

most cases is the tax adviser, accountant or lawyer involved in the provision of tax advice.

The taxpayer is obliged to report the transaction where no promoter exists or where the

promoter is based outside Ireland. “In-house” schemes developed by small or medium sized

companies (SME’s) with no promoter involvement are excluded from the UK regime,

however, there is no such exclusion in Ireland.

Legal Professional Privilege (LLP)

The Irish regime recognises that LPP may prevent information about a taxpayer being

provided to Revenue by a promoter in certain cases where the information would otherwise

require disclosure. In such cases where the taxpayer is entitled to LPP and the promoter

cannot provide the information, the taxpayer is obliged to report the transaction themselves. In

these cases, the promoter must advise the client of their obligation to disclose.

71 Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, 24 March 2010

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With regard to the implementation of the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, in

November 2016 Ireland transposed the first sub-paragraph of Article 30(1) of this Directive

into statutory regulations, recognising the principle of LPP.

“(4) Nothing in this Regulation shall be construed as requiring a person to whom a

notice under it is given to disclose any information in respect of which a claim to legal

professional privilege could be maintained in legal proceedings.”72

Hallmarks

For a transaction to be subject to disclosure under the Irish regime, it must fall within one of

the general or specific hallmarks.

Any transaction will be reportable if it meets one of the following hallmarks:

A promotor may wish to keep the transaction confidential from other promoters or from

Revenue;

A premium or contingent fee could potentially be charged for the transaction;

Standardised documentation is involved, subject to specified exceptions; or

The transaction falls within a “specified type of transaction”.

The specified types of transactions (often referred to as the “specific hallmarks”) included the

following:

The artificial creation of losses

Shifting income into capital

Employment schemes (with certain exclusions)

Income into gift schemes

Specific hallmarks have been chosen based on perceived risks in the Irish tax system and may

not be the appropriate hallmarks for other Member States. For example, in Ireland there is a

significant difference between the top rate of income tax (52%) and the capital gains tax rate

(33%). Flexibility for Member States to identifying the appropriate specific hallmarks that

should apply if they introduce a mandatory reporting regime.

Day-to-Day Tax Advice

The Irish regime does not apply to “ordinary day-to-day tax advice” provided by a tax adviser

to a taxpayer. The scope of exclusion such as this can be unclear and Irish Revenue

subsequently updated its guidance to clarify the meaning. The exclusion essentially allows for

advice to be given on reliefs and exemptions without being reportable if they are used in a

bona fide manner.

Clarity on Scope of Reporting

Ireland believes that any disclosure regime should be as prescriptive as possible as regards its

application so as to provide clarity on when to report and in order to reduce the increasing

administrative burden on taxpayers/advisers and believes that too much information can

actually reduce the effectiveness of the regime.

Timelines for Reporting

In general, disclosures on reportable transactions must be made within 5 working days of the

applicable trigger date. The trigger date differs for marketed and bespoke schemes;

72 SI 560 of 2016 European Union (Anti-Money Laundering: Beneficial Ownership of Corporate Entities)

Regulations 2016

97

For marketed schemes, the trigger date is the date on which a marketing contact is first made

and in which steps are taken to market a scheme.

For bespoke schemes, the trigger date is the date on which the promoter becomes aware that

the transaction has been implemented. Where a scheme is disclosed to Revenue, then within

90 working days, the Revenue must either

i. assign a unique transaction number to the transaction, or

ii. determine that the transaction is not a transaction subject to disclosure.

If the scheme is disclosable by a promoter, then the promoter must, within 5 working days of

receipt of the transaction number, give that number to any person to whom the promoter has

made the scheme available for implementation, or any person who is marketing the scheme on

behalf of the promoter.

In addition, a promoter is required to regularly provide the Irish Revenue with information on

persons (a “client list”) to whom a transaction subject to disclosure has been made available

for implementation, unless the promoter is satisfied that the taxpayer has not actually

implemented the scheme.

Where the scheme is a marketed scheme, the client list must be provided within 30 working

days commencing the day after the promoter first makes the disclosed transaction available to

a person for implementation.

Where the scheme is bespoke, the client list must be provided within 30 working days

commencing the day after the promoter first becomes aware that the scheme has been

implemented.

The number of mass-marketed schemes in Ireland is low.

Non-compliance

Promoters or taxpayers who fail to comply with the mandatory disclosure legislation may be

liable to a civil penalty, the extent of which will depend on the nature of the offence.

For certain specified “lesser” offences, there is an initial civil penalty of up to EUR 4 000,

while a further fixed penalty of EUR 100 per day may also apply.

For more serious compliance failures, there is a flexible initial penalty of up to EUR 500 per

day and where the failure continues after that penalty is imposed, a further penalty of

EUR 500 per day applies for every day that the failure continues. Revenue notes that the

purpose of the flexible daily penalty (over a fixed penalty) is to deter promoters from

deliberately delaying disclosure of a scheme.

As well as these monetary penalties, the prospect of reputation damage for the promoters is

also a major deterrent.

The impact of the disclosure regime in Ireland

Ireland already has a complex General Anti-Avoidance Provision (GAAR) in place when the

mandatory disclosure provisions were introduced. As part of the GAAR regime, taxpayers can

opt to make a “protective notification” to Irish Revenue which can reduce the impact of

interest and penalties in the event that Revenue successfully challenges the transaction under

the GAAR. While the protective notification is a separate requirement from mandatory

disclosure, it is an additional consideration for tax advisers when providing advice.

The main reason for introducing the regime was to encourage further behavioural change. The

Irish Tax Institute does not have data on the number of disclosures that have been made to

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Irish Revenue under the regime. However, while this data may be interesting, Ireland would

caution against over-reliance on the data which cannot be viewed as evidence of the success

or otherwise of the regime, due to the impact of behavioural change. This is particularly true

in the case of countries that have strong pre-existing GAAR or other anti-avoidance regimes.

2. PORTUGAL’S MANDATORY DISCLOSURE REGIME

Overview

The PT tax planning disclosure regime (Decree-law no. 29/2008) entered into force on 15

May 2008. The Decree-Law deems tax planning as any scheme (defined as tacit or explicit

plan, project, proposal, advice instruction or recommendation, materialised or not) or conduct

(contract, arrangement, promise, commitment, corporate structure, transaction or deed) that

leads to or is expected to lead to, exclusively or predominantly, to a tax advantage. Secondly,

one of a number of hallmarks applies – see below. The scope of the PT mandatory disclosure

regime covers corporations and individuals. In the case of individuals it is the user that

usually reports if an off-shore entity is part of the scheme.

All income and expenditure is included within the scope of the proposal including property

taxes, personal and corporate income taxes, value added tax, municipal tax on immovable,

transfer tax on immovable, and stamp duties.

Who is obliged to Report?

The definition of intermediaries (promoters) is broad and covers promotors resident or located

in PT territory including certified auditors, accountants, financial institutions (bank secrecy

does not apply) and company services providers. Lawyers are not liable for disclosure if

rendering advice on a scheme or conduct: (a) when analysing the legal position of a client; (b)

in the context of a legal consultation; (c) when defending or representing a client in a judicial

proceeding, or in relation to judicial proceedings, including advice on how to commence or

prevent them or any other activities exclusive to lawyers. In such a case if the scheme comes

within the scope of the mandatory disclosure regime the taxpayer would need to report it.

However, when a lawyer approaches a person to "sell" a scheme, the lawyer is not considered

as being protected by legal professional privilege.

If no Portuguese intermediary is involved with the scheme then the liability for disclosure

falls with the beneficiary. In such cases the obligation to disclose applies only to schemes

involving the participation of entities located in low-tax jurisdictions.

Hallmarks

For a transaction to be reportable under the PT scheme, one of the following hallmarks should

apply :i) participating entity subject to a special regime or tax exempt, ii) (hybrid) financial

instruments and derivatives, iii) use of tax losses.

What needs to be disclosed?

The information which must be provided to the tax authorities includes the following items:

a detailed description of the scheme, including a description of the agreements, the corporate

structures, the operations and the transactions used, as well as the type of tax advantage;

indication of the applicable law; and

name, domicile, and tax identification number of the promotor of the scheme.

99

Regarding the detailed description of the scheme, the tax authorities can request further

information. Apart from when the user is obliged to report, intermediaries do not need to

reveal the name of the clients to whom the scheme has been proposed.

Non-compliance with disclosure

Fines for non-compliance vary between EUR 1 000-100 000. Furthermore, the loss of tax

benefits and the official publication of the penalty at the expense of the breaching party may

also be imposed. The promotors of the scheme will still continue to be required to disclose the

relevant information whenever possible. The tax authorities can also publish details of the

scheme on the internet.

The impact of the disclosure regime in Portugal

PT authorities received almost 100 reports on tax schemes from intermediaries (promoters)

since the introduction of mandatory disclosure regime until now, with the peak between 2009

and 2011. Around 25% of reports were made by the users. The users are obliged to report in

the following circumstance: when the promoter is not PT resident, is prevented by the rules of

the profession (e.g. lawyers), or is an in-house scheme. Statistics on sanctions are not known.

3. THE UK'S MANDATORY DISCLOSURE REGIME

Table 12: HM Revenue and Customs - Disclosure statistics

Financial year Financial(1)

Employ-

ment(1)

Main

regime

(NI

hallmark)(2)

IHT SDLT(3) AETD

01/08/04 - 31/03/05 340 163 0 (0) 0 0 0

01/04/05 - 31/03/06 94 28 0 (0) 0 485 0

01/04/06 - 31/03/07 29 7 125 (0) 0 185 0

01/04/07 - 31/03/08 2 0 205 (23 N) 0 70 0

01/04/08 - 31/03/09 0 0 102 (Less than 5) 0 28 0

01/04/09 - 31/03/10 0 0 116 (6 N) 0 61 0

01/04/10 - 31/03/11 0 0 97 (11 N) 0 21 0

01/04/11 - 31/03/12 0 0 116 (17 N) Less than 5 13 0

01/04/12 - 31/03/13 0 0 59 (7 N) Less than 5 18 0

01/04/13 - 31/04/14 0 0 28 (7 N) Less than 5 10 0

01/04/14 - 30/09/14(4)

0 0 Less than 5 0 0 Less than 5 Less than 5

Source: HMRC website

Annotations: Data for period from 01/08/2004 to 30/09/2014 (1) Financial and employment categories have been replaced since 01/08/2006 (2) Data for SDLT commenced on 01/08/2005 (3) N = Number of hallmarked disclosures reported under the NIC Regulation (4) Provisional date for period 01/04/2014-30/09/2014

The DOTAS regime introduced in 2004 essentially requires promoters of certain types of tax

avoidance schemes, or in some cases users of the schemes, to disclose them to HMRC. The

regime has been subject to several changes since its introduction. The scope of the regime has

been broadened gradually so it now covers the whole of Income Tax, Corporation Tax,

Capital Gains Tax, and certain arrangements relating to Stamp Duty Land Tax and Inheritance

Tax. The regime also applies, with necessary modifications, to National Insurance

contributions and Value Added Tax. In the March 2015 Budget, the Government announced a

package of measures to ensure that the DOTAS regime keeps pace with the current avoidance

market. As part of this the Government launched a consultation on the detail of changes to

100

strengthen the DOTAS hallmarks and the results were published in February 2016. New

changes are expected in regards to Indirect Tax Avoidance Disclosure Regime and penalties

for enablers of abusive tax planning arrangements in line with measures recently published on

5 December 2016.

There are 2 different disclosure regimes, one for VAT and one for Direct taxes and National

Insurance contributions:

Direct taxes and National Insurance contributions

The disclosure of tax avoidance schemes (DOTAS) regime covers Income Tax, Corporation

Tax, Capital Gains Tax, Stamp Duty Land Tax, Inheritance Tax, and the Annual Tax on

Enveloped Dwellings and National Insurance contributions.

Who has to report?

UK imposes the primary obligation to disclose on the promoter. Who is a promoter? (FA

2004, s. 307)

A person is a promoter if, in the course of a relevant business, they:

are to any extent responsible for the design of a scheme,

make a firm approach to another person with a view to making a scheme available for,

implementation by that person or others,

make a scheme available for implementation by others, or

organise or manage the implementation of a scheme.

However, the scheme user may need to make the disclosure where:

the promoter is based outside the UK,

the promoter is a lawyer and legal professional privilege prevents him from providing

all or part of the prescribed information to HMRC, or

there is no promoter, such as when a person designs and implements their own scheme

or there is an in-house counsel.

Where a lawyer is ‘marketing’ a scheme, as described at paragraph 14.3, the lawyer cannot

assert legal privilege. This means that such marketing is subject to the disclosure obligations

and the lawyer should disclose the scheme (providing the other conditions are met) to the

Counter-Avoidance Directorate in the normal way.

DOTAS addresses many other categories of people involved in the scheme however the

obligation to disclose is not directly imposed on them.

What has to be reported?

The UK adopts a multi-step approach meaning there is a threshold that the scheme needs to

satisfy before it is assessed against the hallmarks. The arrangement only needs to be reported

on if it has an impact on the UK tax base of the taxes included under DOTAS. Therefore

arrangements that affect non-UK tax bases are not included. HMRC has recently launched

initiatives to target offshore tax evasion/avoidance by UK taxpayers73

. A tax arrangement

should be disclosed where:

it will, or might be expected to, enable any person to obtain a tax advantage and

73

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/546589/Strengthening_Tax_A

voidance_Sanctions_and_Deterrents-discussion_document.pdf

101

tax advantage is, or might expected to be, the main benefit or one of the main benefits of the

arrangement.

Transaction needs to be disclosed if it falls within the hallmarks prescribed in the relevant

regulations. The UK targets confidentiality, premium fee, and standardised tax product as a

generic hallmark. As for specific hallmarks there are 8 hallmarks aimed at new and innovative

schemes, marketed schemes and targeting specific schemes, for example loss schemes.

What has to be disclosed?

The name of the promoter, the clients of the promoter, what kind of reportable transaction was

entered into, a description of the transaction, and the expected tax benefits.

Scope of DOTAS

DOTAS applies to both natural and legal persons. In terms of the split between corporate and

individuals, the amount of tax under consideration (in ongoing audits) is one-third corporation

tax, and two-thirds income tax, capital gains tax and property tax (Stamp Duty Land Tax).

Some of the mass-marketed personal tax issues involve many hundreds of users in very

complex schemes which take a long time to investigate and litigate. Corporate tax may

involve higher amounts of tax per user but tend to be more bespoke in nature and, potentially,

quicker to resolve.

It covers different taxes (including VAT, although the name/regime is different).

There is a special regime for SME: they are exempted from reporting obligations when there

is no intermediary and the scheme is developed "in-house".

When is reporting required?

Disclosure is required when the promoter makes a scheme available for implementation. The

promoter must disclose a scheme within five working days of making a scheme available for

implementation by another person.

The due date for making a disclosure, where the user is required to make the disclosure, is by

reference to the first transaction forming part of the scheme. Where there is no promoter

(other than in the case described in paragraph 14.5 of Guidance) the user must disclose within

30 days of the scheme being implemented.

Process

1. Promoter discloses scheme to the UK tax administration, usually within five days of

scheme being made available to clients (see above).

2. The UK tax administration issues a Scheme Reference Number (SRN) to the Promoter.

Issuing an SRN does not mean that HMRC approves the scheme. Disclosure regime is not a

clearance procedure.

3. Promoter must pass the SRN to clients who implement the scheme.

4. Promoter provides quarterly report to the UK tax administration of clients who have

implemented the scheme.

5. Clients must report the SRN on a return affected by the use of the scheme.

Penalties

The penalties for failure to comply with a DOTAS obligation without reasonable excuse fall

into three categories:

102

Disclosure penalties – apply to failure to disclose a scheme.

Information penalties – apply to all other failures to comply with DOTAS except for

some

User penalties – apply to failure by a scheme user to report a scheme reference number

to HMRC.

Disclosure penalties and Information penalties involve an initial penalty and a further penalty

if non-compliance continues. The initial penalty is determined by a Tribunal and is up to

GBP 600 a day. If this is not considered to be sufficient deterrent the penalty may be of up to

GBP 1 million. If the user of a tax avoidance scheme fails to report the scheme reference

number to HMRC the penalty is up to GBP 5 000 the first time the intermediary fails to do

this. If the intermediary fails to report a scheme reference number again the intermediary may

have to pay a penalty of up to GBP 7 500. On the third and future occasions he may have to

pay a penalty of up to GBP 10 000 for each failure. Current initiative in the form of the draft

Finance Bill 2017 contains the proposed new power for HMRC to levy a penalty on those

(referred to as ‘enablers’) who facilitate abusive tax avoidance arrangements.

Evaluation of the scheme

Although there is no publically available evaluation of the scheme, the HMRC stated in 2009

that the DOTAS scheme had proved to be highly successful and the Government had used

information from DOTAS to introduce a range of anti-avoidance measures every year since

2004 – a total of 49 measures, closing off over GBP 12 billion in avoidance opportunities58

HMRC noted that there is considerable anecdotal evidence that DOTAS has changed the

economics of avoidance.

In 2012 the Oxford Centre for Business taxation analysed the DOTAS regime considering its

claims to success in the light of the evidence that was then available74

. The review

acknowledged the difficulties of measuring a scheme like DOTAS in particular due to the

deterrent effect in estimating the tax collected because arrangements were not undertaken

required a number of assumptions to be made. Regarding compliance the review notes the

following:

Of schemes disclosed before May 2005 where no users were known to have reported a

SRN, research has shown that around 25% of those schemes did in fact have users;

By the December 2006 HMRC had identified over 100 entities where here was

evidence of involvement in promoting schemes of a type that it would have expected

to be disclosed but had not been;

Analysis carried out in September 2007 for the tax year 2005/06 in relation to a

sample of Limited Liability Partnerships indicated that around 40% of individual

partners who have been issued with a SRN by the promoter did not report it correctly.

In other cases the number is reported, but not in the specified box on the return or the

number may be transposed. Other analysis indicates that SRN reporting failures are

not confined to individuals but extend to corporate users;

74 The National Audit Office commissioned the Oxford University review the Disclosure of Tax Avoidance

Schemes regime and the tax avoidance landscape. The study is published as Oxford University Centre for

Business Taxation – OUCBT (2012): "The disclosure of tax avoidance schemes regime"

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At April 2008 there were around 12 500 known users of disclosed schemes of whom

around 80% are individuals carrying on a business as sole proprietors or partners. In

2007 between 5 000 and 6 000 of the reported a SRN (with some users reporting two

or more);

In 2008 the compliance rate of scheme users recording their SRNs as required was

estimated at 60%;

As at May 2008, HMRC received disclosures from, and issued SRNs to, a pool of 50

promoters, all of which it described as “businesses”;

Between 01/05/2010 and 19/10/ 2011: 78 promoters disclosed schemes under

DOTAS.

The review concluded that while some figures for the impact of DOTAS could be estimated

others could not unless certain assumptions were made. In order to validate the GBP 12.5

billion collected as a result of DOTAS the assumptions on which this figure were based would

need to be known. However the review noted that estimating the tax collected as a result of

certain interventions, such as challenging schemes on the ground that they fall foul of the law,

should present less difficulties in estimating and would useful to assess the impact of the

regime.

i OECD BEPS Action 14 "Making dispute resolution more effective" and follow up action. ii UN Tax Committee (2015)

#FairTaxation

WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?

HOW WILL THE NEW RULES WORK?

A company which sells cross-border tax schemes bearing tax avoidance hallmarks to its clients must report these arrangements to the tax authorities of its home Member State.

If you are a company or individual and you arrange your tax affairs with techniques bearing one or more tax avoidance features, you must report this information.

The Member State's tax authority exchanges the information it receives with the tax authorities of all the other Member States.

TAX TRANSPARENCY FOR INTERMEDIARIES

‣ Recent scandals show that 'intermediaries' (accountants, advisers, lawyers, banks etc.) play a major part in helping big companies and wealthy individuals escape their fair share of tax in the EU.

‣ The culture of secrecy behind these tax schemes needs to change. The Commission’s proposal for new transparency rules for intermediaries will oblige advisers to notify authorities about cross-border techniques they sell that may help their clients avoid tax.

‣ This information must be shared with the tax authorities of all the other Member States, so that they can better identify the regulatory weaknesses that allow some companies and individuals to substantially lower their tax bill.

‣ The new rules cover any institution, company or individual providing tax advice which results in tax avoidance.

RESULT

✓ Tax authorities have the information they need to clamp down and stop tax avoidance schemes before these can cause serious damage.

✓ Appropriate penalties will be applied to those intermediaries that fail to report potentially harmful tax planning schemes.

When a fixed percentage of the tax avoided is charged as fee, or when a fee is charged explicitly for tax avoidance services

Tax arrangements sold with a confidentiality clause attached

Providing arrangements which use losses to reduce tax liability

Providing tax avoidance advice that has been standardised and made available to more than one taxpayer

The same asset is subject to depreciation in more than one jurisdiction

Use of linked companies or entities with no substance and with circular transactions taking place between them

Converting income into other types of revenue which are taxed at a lower level

Deductible cross-border transactions based on the residency of the taxpayer

When mismatches occur between EU or national law and the taxation applied in a non-EU country

A payment mentioned in an arrangement is given a full or partial tax exemption in the jurisdiction where it should be taxed

Where the transfers of payment across borders do not represent the true value of the assets bought

Use of tax jurisdictions with no or low corporate tax rates, or which find themselves on the upcoming EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions

Arrangements that re-classify income in categories not subject to automatic exchange of information agreements

Relief from double taxation on the same income in different jurisdictions by more than one taxpayer

Use of jurisdictions with inadequate or weak anti-money laundering rules, including those which help to conceal beneficial ownership information

Use of companies and entities not covered by EU rules or other agreements on automatic exchange of information

Arrangements which include reference to cross-border tax rulings that are not already being reported or exchanged

Arrangements that do not conform to the “arms’ length principle” or to OECD transfer pricing guidelines

IF YOU ARE DESIGNING, SELLING OR APPLYING A TAX SCHEME THAT CONTAINS ANY OF THESE FEATURES,

IT NEEDS TO BE NOTIFIED TO TAX AUTHORITIES

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15 STEPS TO A FAIRER AND MORE EFFECTIVE TAX ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE

DATE PROPOSED ACTION STATUS

May 2015 and July 2016

Strengthened measures against money laundering and more transparency around opaque company structures

Under discussion in the European Parliament and the Council

October 2015Transparency rules obliging Member States to share information on cross-border tax rulings

• AGREED• IN FORCE

January 2016 EU tax authorities obliged to exchange information on tax paid by multinationals in their countries (Country by Country Reporting)

• AGREED• IN FORCE

January 2016Binding rules to effectively tackle tax avoidance loopholes (Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive)

• AGREED• IN FORCE from 1 January 2019

January 2016 Strategy to develop a common EU list of tax havens by the end of 2017

Ongoing

April 2016Measures requiring multinational companies to publish the tax they pay in the EU (public CbCR)

Under discussion in the European Parliament and the Council

July 2016Access to anti-money laundering information for tax authorities

• AGREED• IN FORCE from 1 January 2018

2015 - 2016 Historic transparency agreements signed with Switzerland, Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino and Monaco

SIGNED

September 2016

Stronger rules to prevent EU funds from being invested in tax havens

Under discussion in the European Parliament and the Council

October 2016Measures to stop companies exploiting mismatches between the tax systems of Member States and non-EU countries

• AGREED• IN FORCE from 1 January 2019

October 2016 Plans for a fair, growth-friendly and competitive corporate tax system in the EU (CCCTB)

Under discussion in the Council

October 2016New dispute resolution mechanism to resolve double taxation issues quickly and definitively

• AGREED• IN FORCE from 1 January 2019

2016 - 2017 Review of Member States’ Patent Boxes, to ensure they meet fair competition standards

Ongoing

2014 - present Cases against illegal state aid in taxation, to tackle distortions in competition

Ongoing

June 2017 New transparency rules for intermediaries involved in tax planning

Proposed

Kommission schlägt neue Transparenzvorschriften für Intermediäre imBereich der Steuerplanung vor Brüssel, 21. Juni 2017

Europäische Kommission - Pressemitteilung

Kommission schlägt neue Transparenzvorschriften für Intermediäre im Bereich derSteuerplanung vor

TAX IntermediariesDie Europäische Kommission hat heute neue strenge Transparenzvorschriften für Intermediäre wieSteuerberater, Buchhalter, Banken und Anwälte vorgeschlagen, die Steuerplanungsstrategien fürKunden ausarbeiten und empfehlen.

Jüngste Medienenthüllungen wie die „Panama Papers“ haben gezeigt, wie Intermediäre Unternehmenund Einzelpersonen aktiv darin unterstützen, Steuern zu umgehen – meist mithilfe von ausgefeiltengrenzübergreifenden Systemen. Der heute vorgelegte Vorschlag zielt darauf ab, dieser aggressivenSteuerplanung durch eine strengere Überprüfung der bislang im Verborgenen gebliebenenVorgehensweisen von Steuerplanern und -beratern entgegenzuwirken.

Kommissionsvizepräsident Valdis Dombrovskis, zuständig für den Euro und den sozialen Dialog sowiefür Finanzstabilität, Finanzdienstleistungen und die Kapitalmarktunion, erklärte hierzu: „Die EU hat imHinblick auf die Stärkung der Transparenz im Bereich der aggressiven Steuerplanung eine Vorreiterrolleübernommen. Dabei kann sie bereits Ergebnisse vorweisen. Unser heutiger Vorschlag hat zum Ziel,Vermittler zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen, die Steuervermeidungssysteme entwickeln und anbieten. Unterdem Strich werden die Steuereinnahmen der Mitgliedstaaten dadurch steigen."

Pierre Moscovici, Kommissar für Wirtschafts- und Finanzangelegenheiten, Steuern und Zoll, sagtedazu: „Wir treiben unsere Agenda für Steuertransparenz weiter voran. Im Fokus stehen heuteBerufsgruppen, die Steuermissbrauch fördern. Steuerbehörden sollten über die notwendigenInformationen verfügen, um aggressive Steuerplanungsstrategien zu unterbinden. Unser Vorschlagwird denjenigen Intermediären mehr Sicherheit verschaffen, die Geist und Wortlaut unserer Gesetzerespektieren, und allen anderen Einhalt gebieten. Unsere Bemühungen um eine gerechtereBesteuerung in ganz Europa tragen weiterhin Früchte.“

Grenzüberschreitende Steuerplanungsstrategien, die bestimmte Merkmale und Kennzeichen aufweisenund Regierungen Verluste verursachen können, müssen nun Steuerbehörden unaufgefordert gemeldetwerden, bevor sie zum Einsatz kommen. Die Kommission hat mehrere Hauptkennzeichen ermittelt, zudenen auch die Nutzung von Verlusten zur Senkung der Steuerlast, günstige Steuersonderregelungenund Vereinbarungen unter Beteiligung von Ländern gehören, die die internationalen Standards fürverantwortungsvolles Handeln nicht einhalten.

Folgende Personen oder Unternehmen werden der Verpflichtung unterliegen, grenzüberschreitendeSysteme zu melden, die eines oder mehrere dieser Kennzeichen aufweisen:

der Intermediär, der das grenzüberschreitende System zur Umsetzung und Nutzung durch einUnternehmen oder eine Einzelperson anbietet;

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die beratene Person oder das beratene Unternehmen, soweit der Intermediär, der dasgrenzüberschreitende System anbietet, nicht in der EU niedergelassen ist oderVerschwiegenheitspflichten unterliegt;

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die Person oder das Unternehmen, die bzw. das das grenzüberschreitende System umsetzt, soweites von internen Steuerberatern oder Anwälten entwickelt wurde.

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Die Mitgliedstaaten werden Angaben, die sie zu Steuerplanungsstrategien erhalten, über eine zentraleDatenbank automatisch austauschen. Dadurch werden sie frühzeitig vor neuen Risiken im Bereich derSteuervermeidung gewarnt und in die Lage versetzt, Maßnahmen zur Unterbindung von schädlichenVorgehensweisen zu ergreifen. Ein meldepflichtiges System hat nicht zwangsläufig schädlicheAuswirkungen, bedarf jedoch einer genauen Überprüfung durch die Steuerbehörden. DieMitgliedstaaten werden wirksame abschreckende Sanktionen gegen Unternehmen verhängen müssen,die den Transparenzvorschriften nicht nachkommen, damit all diejenigen, die Steuermissbrauchunterstützen und fördern, nachhaltig von ihren Machenschaften abgebracht werden.

IP/17/1663

Die neuen Vorschriften sind umfassend und decken alle Intermediäre, alle potenziell schädlichenSysteme und alle Mitgliedstaaten ab. Jede Steuerstrategie, die eines oder mehrere der erwähntenKennzeichen aufweist, muss in Zukunft innerhalb von fünf Tagen ab Bereitstellung an einen Kundender für den Intermediär zuständigen Steuerbehörde unter Angabe der Einzelheiten gemeldet werden.

HintergrundDie Juncker Kommission hat bereits wichtige Schritte eingeleitet, um mehr Transparenz imSteuerbereich zu erreichen und wirkungsvoller gegen Steuerhinterziehung und -vermeidungvorzugehen. Neue EU-Vorschriften zur Bekämpfung von künstlicher Steuergestaltung sowie überTransparenzanforderungen für Finanzkonten, Steuervorbescheide und Aktivitäten multinationalerUnternehmen wurden bereits beschlossen und treten nun schrittweise in Kraft. Derzeit wird überVorschläge für Rechtsvorschriften zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche, öffentliche länderspezifischeBerichterstattung und strengere Vorschriften für die verantwortungsvolle Verwaltung von EU-Mittelnverhandelt. Darüber hinaus soll noch vor Jahresende eine neue EU-Liste der Länder vorliegen, die sicheiner Zusammenarbeit im Steuerbereich verschließen.

Der heutige Vorschlag wird den EU-Rechtsrahmen für Steuertransparenz weiter stärken, da er Licht indie Tätigkeiten von Intermediären und in die angewandten Steuerplanungsstrategien bringt. DesWeiteren wird sichergestellt, dass die EU die Empfehlung über verpflichtende Offenlegungsregelungenaus dem von der G20 unterstützten BEPS-Projekt der OECD einheitlich umsetzt. Letzten Oktoberbrachten die Mitgliedstaaten ihre Unterstützung für einen Vorschlag der Kommission über dieseMaßnahmen zum Ausdruck.

Weiteres VorgehenDer Vorschlag in Gestalt einer Änderung der Richtlinie über die Verwaltungszusammenarbeit wird nundem Europäischen Parlament zur Konsultation und dem Rat zur Annahme übermittelt. Die neueMeldepflicht soll am 1. Januar 2019 in Kraft treten. Die EU-Mitgliedstaaten wären ab dann verpflichtet,alle drei Monate Informationen auszutauschen.

Weitere Informationen:Fragen und Antworten zu den Transparenzvorschriften für Intermediäre

Informationsblatt

GD TAXUD zu den neuen Transparenzvorschriften für Intermediäre

Video zu den neuen Transparenzvorschriften für Intermediäre

Kontakt für die Medien:Vanessa MOCK (+32 2 295 61 94)Patrick McCullough (+32 229 87183)

Kontakt für die Öffentlichkeit: Europe Direct – telefonisch unter 00 800 67 89 10 11 oder per E-Mail

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EUROPÄISCHE KOMMISSION

Brüssel, den 21.6.2017

COM(2017) 335 final

ANNEX 1

ANHANG

des

Vorschlags für eine Richtlinie des Rates

zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU bezüglich des verpflichtenden automatischen

Informationsaustauschs im Bereich der Besteuerung über meldepflichtige

grenzüberschreitende Modelle

{SWD(2017) 236 final}

{SWD(2017) 237 final}

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„ANHANG IV

KENNZEICHEN („hallmarks“)

Allgemeine und spezifische Kennzeichen gemäß Kategorie B können nur berücksichtigt

werden, wenn sie den „Main benefit“-Test erfüllen.

„Main benefit“-Test

Das Testkriterium gilt als erfüllt, wenn der Hauptvorteil eines Modells bzw. einer Reihe von

Modellen darin besteht, einen Steuervorteil zu erlangen, sofern nachgewiesen werden kann,

dass dieser Vorteil das Ergebnis ist, das von einem derartigen Modell bzw. derartigen

Modellen zu erwarten ist, z. B. durch Nutzung der spezifischen Struktur des Modells oder der

Reihe von Modellen.

A. Allgemeine Kennzeichen

1. Ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen, bei denen Steuerpflichtige sich

verpflichten, eine Vertraulichkeitsklausel einzuhalten, der zufolge sie gegenüber

anderen Intermediären oder den Steuerbehörden nicht offenlegen dürfen, auf welche

Weise aufgrund des Modells ein Steuervorteil erlangt wird.

2. Ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen, bei denen der Intermediär Anspruch auf

eine Gebühr (bzw. Zinsen, Vergütung der Finanzkosten und sonstiger Kosten) für

das Modell oder die Reihe von Modellen hat und diese Gebühr in Bezug auf

Folgendes festgesetzt wird:

(a) Betrag des Steuervorteils aufgrund des Modells oder der Reihe von Modellen;

(b) mit dem Modell oder der Reihe von Modellen tatsächlich verbundener

Steuervorteil. Dies wäre mit der Verpflichtung des Intermediärs verbunden, die

Gebühren ganz oder teilweise zurückzuerstatten, falls der mit dem Modell oder

der Reihe von Modellen beabsichtigte Steuervorteil nicht ganz oder teilweise

erzielt wird.

3. Ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen, die die Verwendung von

Standarddokumentation und Standardformblätter beinhalten. Die Dokumentation

steht normalerweise mehr als einem Steuerpflichtigen zur Verfügung und muss nicht

maßgeschneidert sein, damit ein Steuerpflichtiger das Modell oder die Reihe von

Modellen anwenden kann.

B. Spezifische Kennzeichen, die mit dem „Main benefit“-Test verknüpft werden

können

1. Ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen, bei denen Steuerpflichtige Verluste

nutzen, um ihre Steuerbelastung zu verringern, z. B. durch die Übertragung dieser

Verluste in ein anderes Steuergebiet oder durch die raschere Nutzung dieser

Verluste.

2. Ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen, die sich so auswirken, dass Einkünfte in

Vermögen, Schenkungen oder andere niedriger besteuerte Einnahmenarten

umgewandelt werden.

3. Ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen, die zirkuläre Transaktionen nutzen, die zu

einem Round tripping von Kapital führen, und zwar durch die Einbeziehung

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zwischengeschalteter Unternehmen ohne primäre wirtschaftliche Funktion oder von

Transaktionen, die sich gegenseitig aufheben oder ausgleichen oder die ähnliche

Merkmale aufweisen.

C. Spezifische Kennzeichen im Zusammenhang mit grenzüberschreitenden

Transaktionen

1. Ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen, die abzugsfähige grenzüberschreitende

Zahlungen zwischen zwei oder mehr verbundenen Parteien umfassen und bei denen

mindestens eine der folgenden Bedingungen erfüllt ist:

(a) Der Empfänger ist steuerlich in keinem Steuergebiet ansässig;

(b) der Empfänger ist zwar steuerlich in einem Steuergebiet ansässig, dieses

Gebiet

i) erhebt aber keine Körperschaftsteuer;

ii) hat einen Nullsteuersatz bei der Körperschaftsteuer oder einen

Körperschaftsteuersatz, der am Ende des vorangegangenen

Kalenderjahres weniger als die Hälfte des durchschnittlichen gesetzlichen

Körperschaftsteuersatzes in der Union betrug;

iii) wird in der Liste bestimmter Drittländer geführt, die von den

Mitgliedstaaten gemeinsam oder im Rahmen einer internationalen

Organisation als Länder mit schädlichen Steuerregelungen eingestuft

wurden.

(c) die Zahlung ist im Steuergebiet, in dem der Empfänger steuerlich ansässig ist,

ganz oder teilweise von der Steuer befreit;

(d) die Zahlung kommt im Steuergebiet, in dem der Empfänger steuerlich ansässig

ist, in den Genuss von Steuervergünstigungen;

(e) es liegt eine missbräuchliche Gestaltung im Sinne der Richtlinie des Rates zur

Änderung der Richtlinie (EU) 2016/1164 über hybride Gestaltungen mit

Drittländern vor, die der Rat am 23. Mai 2017 gebilligt hat.

2. Derselbe Vermögenswert wird in mehr als einem Steuergebiet abgeschrieben.

3. Mehr als ein Steuerzahler kann eine Befreiung von der Doppelbesteuerung für

dieselbe Einkunftsart in unterschiedlichen Steuergebieten beantragen.

4. Es liegt ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen vor, die die Übertragung von

Vermögenswerten vorsehen und bei denen es einen wesentlichen Unterschied

hinsichtlich der in diesen beteiligten Steuergebieten für den Vermögenswert zu

zahlenden Betrag gibt.

D. Spezifische Kennzeichen hinsichtlich Vereinbarungen über den automatischen

Informationsaustausch in der Union

Ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen, die Rechtsvorschriften oder Abkommen

der Union über den automatischen Informationsaustausch umgehen, z. B.

Abkommen mit Drittländern, und die dazu führen, dass die Meldung von Einkünften

an den Wohnsitzstaat des Steuerpflichtigen vermieden wird. Diese Modelle können

Folgendes umfassen:

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(a) die Einbeziehung von Steuergebieten, die nicht an die Rechtsvorschriften oder

Abkommen der Union über den automatischen Informationsaustausch

gebunden sind;

(b) die Neueinstufung von Einkunftsarten in Kategorien, die nicht dem

automatischen Informationsaustausch unterliegen;

(c) die Einbeziehung von Rechtspersonen und Strukturen, die weder von den

Rechtsvorschriften der Union noch von den Abkommen über den

automatischen Informationsaustausch erfasst werden;

(d) die Einbeziehung von Steuergebieten mit ungeeigneten oder schwachen

Regelungen für die Durchsetzung von Vorschriften gegen Geldwäsche.

Darunter fallen Länder, in denen es keine Vorschriften für die Feststellung des

wirtschaftlichen Eigentums juristischer Personen, wie Trusts, Stiftungen und

Zweckgesellschaften, gibt, oder die Mittelsmänner oder Vollmachten

einsetzen, um die Identität des wirtschaftlichen Eigentümers zu verschleiern.

E. Spezifische Kennzeichen hinsichtlich der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung

1. Ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen, die nicht dem Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz

oder den OECD-Verrechnungspreisleitlinien entsprechen, wie die Verteilung von

Gewinnen auf verschiedene Mitglieder derselben Unternehmensgruppe.

2. Ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen, die in den Geltungsbereich des

automatischen Informationsaustauschs über grenzüberschreitende Vorbescheide

fallen, aber nicht gemeldet oder ausgetauscht werden.“

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EUROPÄISCHE KOMMISSION

Brüssel, den 21.6.2017

COM(2017) 335 final

2017/0138 (CNS)

Vorschlag für eine

RICHTLINIE DES RATES

zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU bezüglich des verpflichtenden automatischen

Informationsaustauschs im Bereich der Besteuerung über meldepflichtige

grenzüberschreitende Modelle

{SWD(2017) 236 final}

{SWD(2017) 237 final}

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BEGRÜNDUNG

1. KONTEXT DES VORSCHLAGS

• Gründe und Ziele des Vorschlags

Die Bekämpfung von Steuervermeidung und Steuerhinterziehung zählt zu den politischen

Prioritäten der Europäischen Union (EU) im Hinblick auf einen vertieften und faireren

Binnenmarkt. Die Kommission hat in diesem Zusammenhang in den letzten Jahren einige

Initiativen zur Förderung eines faireren Steuersystems vorgelegt. Die Erhöhung der

Transparenz ist einer der Grundpfeiler der Strategie der Kommission zur Bekämpfung von

Steuervermeidung und Steuerhinterziehung. Insbesondere der Austausch von Informationen

zwischen den Steuerverwaltungen ist von entscheidender Bedeutung, damit diese über die

notwendigen Informationen verfügen, um ihre Aufgaben effizient zu erfüllen.

Für die Mitgliedstaaten wird es immer schwieriger, ihre nationalen

Steuerbemessungsgrundlagen gegen Aushöhlung zu schützen, da immer ausgefeiltere

Steuerplanungsstrukturen entwickelt werden, die sich die höhere Mobilität von Kapital und

Personen im Binnenmarkt zunutze machen. Das reibungslose Funktionieren des Marktes wird

so durch Verzerrungen und mangelnde Fairness beeinträchtigt. Diese schädlichen Strukturen

beinhalten normalerweise Modelle, die sich über die Grenzen von Steuergebieten hinweg

erstrecken und steuerpflichtige Gewinne in Staaten mit günstigen Steuerregelungen verlagern

oder eine Verringerung der Gesamtsteuerbelastung der Steuerpflichtigen bewirken.

Infolgedessen kommt es häufig zu einem beträchtlichen Rückgang der Steuereinnahmen in

den Mitgliedstaaten, was diese wiederum daran hindert, eine wachstumsfreundliche

Steuerpolitik zu verfolgen.

Jüngste Enthüllungen wie die Panama Papers haben gezeigt, wie bestimmte Intermediäre

ihren Kunden offensichtlich aktiv dabei geholfen haben, aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle

anzuwenden, um ihre Steuerlast zu verringern und Geld auf Offshore-Konten zu verstecken.

Während einige komplexe Transaktionen und Unternehmensstrukturen durchaus legitimen

Zwecken dienen können, sind andere Aktivitäten, wie Offshore-Strukturen, möglicherweise

nicht ganz legal oder in bestimmten Fällen sogar illegal. Unterschiedliche und komplexe

Strukturen, die oft ein Unternehmen in einem Niedrigsteuergebiet oder in einem nicht

transparenten Steuergebiet umfassen, werden genutzt, um eine Distanz zwischen den

wirtschaftlichen Eigentümern und ihrem Vermögen zu schaffen, eine niedrige oder eine

Nullbesteuerung zu erreichen und/oder die Erlöse aus kriminellen Aktivitäten zu waschen.

Bestimmte Steuerpflichtige nutzen Briefkastenfirmen in Steueroasen/Hoheitsgebieten mit

besonders strengem Bankgeheimnis und ernennen nominelle Vorstände, um ihr Vermögen

und Einkommen, häufig aus illegalen Aktivitäten, zu verstecken, indem die Identität der

tatsächlichen Firmeninhaber (der wirtschaftlichen Eigentümer) verborgen wird.

Darüber hinaus gilt in der EU aufgrund der Richtlinie (EU) 2014/107 des Rates vom

9. Dezember 20141 für Informationen über Besteuerungszeiträume ab 1. Januar 2016 der

Gemeinsame Meldestandard für den Austausch von Informationen über Auslandskonten. Es

ist daher äußerst wichtig, dass Informationen, die möglicherweise nicht in den

Geltungsbereich dieser Richtlinie fallen, dadurch erfasst werden, dass die Intermediäre

verpflichtet werden, potenziell aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle zu melden.

1 Richtlinie (EU) 2014/107 des Rates vom 9. Dezember 2014 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU

bezüglich der Verpflichtung zum automatischen Austausch von Informationen im Bereich der

Besteuerung (ABl. L 359 vom 16.12.2014, S. 1).

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Die vorgeschlagenen Rechtsvorschriften ergänzen andere Vorschriften und Initiativen wie die

vierte (derzeit in Überarbeitung befindliche) Geldwäscherichtlinie2, mit denen der fehlenden

Transparenz bzw. der Unsicherheit hinsichtlich des wirtschaftlichen Eigentums begegnet

wird. Dadurch sollen die Transparenz und der frühzeitige Zugang zu den richtigen

Informationen verbessert werden, da so die Behörden in der Lage wären, ihre

Risikobewertung schneller und genauer durchzuführen und rechtzeitig fundierte

Entscheidungen darüber zu treffen, wie sie ihre Steuereinnahmen schützen. Wenn die

Steuerbehörden nämlich Informationen über potenziell aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle

erhalten, bevor diese umgesetzt werden, dürften sie in der Lage sein, diese Modelle

nachzuvollziehen und auf die damit verbundenen Steuerrisiken zu reagieren, indem sie

entsprechende Gegenmaßnahmen ergreifen. Zu diesem Zweck sollten die Informationen

idealerweise übermittelt werden, bevor ein Modell umgesetzt und/oder angewandt wird, damit

die Behörden im Vorfeld die damit verbundenen Risiken beurteilen und gegebenenfalls

Schlupflöcher schließen und den Verlust von Steuereinnahmen verhindern können. Oberstes

Ziel ist die Entwicklung eines Mechanismus mit abschreckender Wirkung, d. h. eines

Mechanismus, der die Intermediäre davon abhält, derartige Modelle zu konzipieren und zu

vermarkten.

• Kohärenz mit den bestehenden Vorschriften in diesem Bereich

Die EU wurde mehrfach aufgerufen, eine führende Rolle in diesem Bereich zu übernehmen

und die Rolle der Intermediäre genauer zu untersuchen. Insbesondere das Europäische

Parlament rief zu strengeren Maßnahmen gegen Intermediäre auf, die bei der

Steuerhinterziehung behilflich sind3. Die Mitgliedstaaten haben die Kommission auf der

informellen Tagung des Rates „Wirtschaft und Finanzen“ im April 20164 ersucht, Initiativen

für verbindliche Offenlegungsregelungen in Anlehnung an Aktionspunkt 12 der Initiative zur

Bekämpfung der Gewinnverkürzung und Gewinnverlagerung (BEPS)5 der OECD/G20 zu

prüfen, um wirksamere Hindernisse für Intermediäre zu errichten, die an

Steuerhinterziehungsmodellen mitwirken. Im Mai 2016 hat der Rat Schlussfolgerungen zu

einer externen Strategie und zu Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung des Missbrauchs von

Steuerabkommen vorgelegt6. In diesem Zusammenhang ersuchte der Rat „Wirtschaft und

Finanzen“ die Kommission, „Gesetzgebungsinitiativen zu verbindlichen

Offenlegungsregelungen in Anlehnung an Aktionspunkt 12 des BEPS-Projekts der OECD ins

2 Richtlinie (EU) 2015/849 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 20. Mai 2015 zur

Verhinderung der Nutzung des Finanzsystems zum Zwecke der Geldwäsche und der

Terrorismusfinanzierung, zur Änderung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 648/2012 des Europäischen

Parlaments und des Rates und zur Aufhebung der Richtlinie 2005/60/EG des Europäischen Parlaments

und des Rates und der Richtlinie 2006/70/EG der Kommission (ABl. L 141 vom 5.6.2015, S. 73). 3 Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 6. Juli 2016 zu Steuervorbescheiden und anderen

Maßnahmen ähnlicher Art oder Wirkung (2016/2038(INI))

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-

0310+0+DOC+XML+V0//DE 4 Informelle Tagung des Rates „Wirtschaft und Finanzen“ vom 22. April 2016. 5 OECD, Gewinnverkürzung und Gewinnverlagerung – BEPS (2015): „Public Discussion Draft BEPS

Action 12: Mandatory Disclosure Rules“. Weitere Klarstellungen siehe den entsprechenden Eintrag im

Glossar. 6 Rat der Europäischen Union (2016), Schlussfolgerungen zu der „Mitteilung der Kommission über eine

externe Strategie und Empfehlung zur Umsetzung von Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung des Missbrauchs

von Steuerabkommen − Schlussfolgerungen des Rates“, 25.5.2016 (Mai 2016 ECOFIN

Schlussfolgerungen).

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Auge zu fassen, mit dem Ziel, effektivere Hindernisse für Intermediäre zu errichten, die bei

Steuerhinterziehung oder Steuerumgehung Unterstützung leisten“7.

Zur Verbesserung der Transparenz wird in Aktionspunkt 12 der OECD/G20 empfohlen, dass

die Länder eine Regelung für die verbindliche Offenlegung aggressiver

Steuerplanungsmodelle einführen, ohne jedoch einen einzuhaltenden Mindeststandard zu

definieren. Der Abschlussbericht zu Aktionspunkt 12 wurde zusammen mit den

Abschlussberichten zu den anderen BEPS-Aktionen im Oktober 2015 veröffentlicht. Die von

der OECD empfohlenen Anti-BEPS-Maßnahmen wurden von der G20 gebilligt, und die

meisten EU-Mitgliedstaaten haben sich als OECD-Mitglieder verpflichtet, diese umzusetzen.

Deutschland, das derzeit die G20-Präsidentschaft innehat, hat die Rechtssicherheit in der

Besteuerung als einen seiner Schwerpunkte identifiziert8. Die Versorgung der Steuerbehörden

mit zeitnahen Informationen über die Konzeption und Anwendung potenziell aggressiver

Steuerplanungsmodelle würde daher ein zusätzliches Instrument darstellen, das ermöglicht,

geeignete Maßnahmen gegen bestimmte Steuerplanungsmodelle zu ergreifen, was letztlich

zur besseren Rechtssicherheit in der Besteuerung beiträgt und voll und ganz den Prioritäten

der G20 entspricht.

Im Juli 2016 hat die Kommission in der Mitteilung über weitere Maßnahmen zur

Verbesserung der Transparenz und die Bekämpfung von Steuerhinterziehung und -

vermeidung9 ihre Bewertung der vorrangigen Bereiche für Maßnahmen in den kommenden

Monaten auf EU- und auf internationaler Ebene vorgestellt. Mehr Transparenz seitens der

Intermediäre wurde als einer der Bereiche für künftige Maßnahmen festgelegt.

Die vorgeschlagenen Rechtsvorschriften betreffen das vorrangige politische Thema

„Transparenz bei der Besteuerung“, eine Vorbedingung für die effiziente Bekämpfung von

Steuervermeidung, Steuerhinterziehung und aggressiver Steuerplanung. Vor einigen Jahren

haben sich die EU-Mitgliedstaaten auf einige legislative Instrumente im Bereich der

Transparenz geeinigt, die unter anderem vorsehen, dass die nationalen Steuerbehörden beim

Austausch von Informationen eng zusammenarbeiten müssen. Die Richtlinie 2011/16/EU des

Rates10

hat die Richtlinie 77/799/EWG des Rates11

ersetzt und stellt den Beginn der

erweiterten Verwaltungszusammenarbeit zwischen den Steuerbehörden in der EU dar. Durch

die Richtlinie werden nützliche Instrumente für eine bessere Zusammenarbeit in folgenden

Bereichen festgelegt: Informationsaustausch auf Ersuchen; spontaner Austausch;

automatischer Austausch über eine erschöpfende Liste von Informationen; Beteiligung an

behördlichen Ermittlungen; gleichzeitige Prüfungen; Zustellung steuerlicher Entscheidungen

anderer Steuerbehörden.

Der automatische Informationsaustausch ist ein Kernelement der vorgeschlagenen

Rechtsvorschrift, da vorgesehen ist, dass die Informationen, die die Intermediäre gegenüber

den Steuerbehörden offenlegen, automatisch mit anderen Steuerbehörden in der EU

ausgetauscht werden. Die vorliegende Initiative ist die jüngste in einer Reihe von EU-

7 Mai 2016, ECOFIN Schlussfolgerungen, Nummer 12. 8 Prioritäten der G20: https://www.g20.org/Webs/G20/EN/G20/Agenda/agenda_node.html 9 Europäische Kommission, Mitteilung über weitere Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Transparenz und

die Bekämpfung von Steuerhinterziehung und -vermeidung, COM(2016) 451 final, 5.7.2016 (Panama-

Mitteilung). 10 Richtlinie 2011/16/EU des Rates vom 15. Februar 2011 über die Zusammenarbeit der

Verwaltungsbehörden im Bereich der Besteuerung (ABl. L 64 vom 11.3.2011, S. 1). 11 Richtlinie 77/799/EWG des Rates vom 19. Dezember 1977 über die Amtshilfe zwischen den

zuständigen Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich der direkten Steuern und der Steuern auf

Versicherungsprämien (ABl. L 336 vom 27.12.1977, S. 15).

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Initiativen, in denen ein verpflichtender automatischer Austausch von Informationen in

Steuerangelegenheiten vorgeschrieben wird:

Richtlinie 2011/16/EU des Rates vom 15. Februar 2011 über die Zusammenarbeit der

Verwaltungsbehörden im Bereich der Besteuerung (Richtlinie über die Zusammenarbeit

der Verwaltungsbehörden): Die Richtlinie sieht den verpflichtenden automatischen

Austausch verfügbarer Informationen ab 1. Januar 2015 in fünf nichtfinanziellen

Kategorien von Einkünften und Vermögen vor: 1. Vergütungen aus unselbständiger Arbeit,

2. Aufsichts- oder Verwaltungsratsvergütungen, 3. Lebensversicherungsprodukte, die nicht

durch andere Richtlinien abgedeckt sind, 4. Ruhegehälter, 5. Eigentum an unbeweglichem

Vermögen und Einkünfte daraus.

Richtlinie 2014/107/EU des Rates vom 16. Dezember 201412

über den automatischen

Informationsaustausch über Finanzkonten zwischen Mitgliedstaaten auf der Grundlage des

Gemeinsamen Meldestandards der OECD, die den automatischen Austausch von

Informationen über Finanzkonten gebietsfremder Personen vorschreibt.

Richtlinie (EU) 2015/2376 des Rates vom 8. Dezember 201513

bezüglich der Verpflichtung

zum automatischen Austausch von Informationen über grenzüberschreitende

Steuervorbescheide.

Richtlinie (EU) 2016/881 des Rates vom 25. Mai 201614

bezüglich der Verpflichtung zum

automatischen Austausch länderbezogener Berichte zwischen Steuerbehörden.

Vorschlag der Kommission für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates

(2016/0107) vom 12. April 201615

im Hinblick auf die Offenlegung von

Ertragsteuerinformationen durch bestimmte Unternehmen und Zweigniederlassungen. In

den vorgeschlagenen Rechtsvorschriften wird die Veröffentlichung von

Ertragsteuerinformationen vorgeschrieben, was einer größeren Öffentlichkeit Zugang zu

länderbezogenen, steuerlich relevanten Daten multinationaler Unternehmen verschaffen

würde. Dieser Vorschlag wird noch vom Parlament und vom Rat gemäß dem ordentlichen

Gesetzgebungsverfahren erörtert.

Abkommen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten und Drittländern16

bezüglich des automatischen

Informationsaustausch über Finanzkonten auf der Grundlage des Gemeinsamen

Meldestandards der OECD.

Es sollte klargestellt werden, dass die vorhandenen steuerlichen Instrumente auf EU-Ebene

keine expliziten Bestimmungen enthalten, denen zufolge die Mitgliedstaaten Informationen

austauschen müssen, wenn sie von Steuervermeidungs- und/oder

12 Richtlinie (EU) 2014/107 des Rates vom 9. Dezember 2014 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU

bezüglich der Verpflichtung zum automatischen Austausch von Informationen im Bereich der

Besteuerung (ABl. L 359 vom 16.12.2014, S. 1). 13 Richtlinie (EU) 2015/2376 des Rates vom 8. Dezember 2015 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU

bezüglich der Verpflichtung zum automatischen Austausch von Informationen im Bereich der

Besteuerung (ABl. L 332 vom 18.12.2015, S. 1). 14 Richtlinie (EU) 2016/881 des Rates vom 25. Mai 2016 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU

bezüglich der Verpflichtung zum automatischen Austausch von Informationen im Bereich der

Besteuerung (ABl. L 146 vom 3.6.2016, S. 8). 15 Vorschlag der Kommission für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom

12. April 2016 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2013/34/EU im Hinblick auf die Offenlegung von

Ertragsteuerinformationen durch bestimmte Unternehmen und Zweigniederlassungen (2016/0107

(COD)). 16 Einige dieser Abkommen, die bestimmte europäische Drittländer betreffen, werden von der Union

geschlossen.

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Steuerhinterziehungsmodellen erfahren. Die Richtlinie über die Zusammenarbeit der

Verwaltungsbehörden umfasst eine allgemeine Verpflichtung für die nationalen

Steuerbehörden, unter bestimmten Umständen spontan Informationen mit anderen EU-

Steuerbehörden auszutauschen. Hierzu zählen Einbußen bei den Steuereinnahmen in einem

Mitgliedstaat oder Steuerersparnisse aufgrund künstlicher Gewinnverschiebungen innerhalb

von Unternehmensgruppen. Die vorliegende Initiative zielt darauf ab, infolge der Offenlegung

durch Intermediäre potenziell aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle zu erfassen und sie einem

verbindlichen automatischen Informationsaustausch zu unterwerfen.

• Kohärenz mit der Politik der Union in anderen Bereichen (mögliche künftige,

für den Politikbereich relevante Initiativen)

Die abschreckende Wirkung der vorgeschlagenen Vorab-Offenlegung potenziell aggressiver

Steuerplanungsmodelle könnte verstärkt werden, wenn die Verpflichtung zur Offenlegung

von Informationen gegenüber den Steuerbehörden auf Prüfer ausgeweitet würde, die die

Jahresabschlüsse der Steuerpflichtigen abzeichnen. Diese Prüfer haben im Rahmen ihrer

beruflichen Tätigkeit Einsicht in enorme Datenmengen. Dabei könnten sie auf Modelle

stoßen, die als aggressive Steuerplanungspraktiken gelten könnten. Die mit der Offenlegung

dieser Modelle gegenüber den Behörden verbundenen potenziellen Vorteile würden in der Tat

die verbindliche Offenlegung ähnlicher Modelle durch Intermediäre (d. h. Entwickler,

Vertreiber, Berater usw.) ergänzen. Eine derartige Initiative könnte daher in künftigen

Rechtsvorschriften weiterverfolgt werden.

2. RECHTSGRUNDLAGE, SUBSIDIARITÄT UND

VERHÄLTNISMÄSSIGKEIT

• Rechtsgrundlage

Artikel 115 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union (AEUV) ist die

Rechtsgrundlage für Gesetzgebungsinitiativen im Bereich der direkten Steuern. Artikel 115

nimmt zwar nicht unmittelbar auf direkte Steuern Bezug, betrifft jedoch Richtlinien für die

Angleichung nationaler Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften, die sich unmittelbar auf die

Errichtung oder das Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts auswirken. Damit diese Bedingung

erfüllt ist, müssen die vorgeschlagenen EU-Rechtsvorschriften im Bereich der direkten

Steuern darauf abzielen, bestehende Unstimmigkeiten beim Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts

zu berichtigen. In vielen Fällen würde das bedeuten, dass die EU-Maßnahmen ausschließlich

grenzüberschreitende Sachverhalte betreffen.

Die fehlende Transparenz erleichtert die Aktivitäten bestimmter Intermediäre, die an

Vermarktung und Verkauf aggressiver Steuerplanungsmodelle mit grenzüberschreitenden

Auswirkungen beteiligt sind. Infolgedessen kommt es in den Mitgliedstaaten zur Verlagerung

von Gewinnen, die ansonsten in ihrem Hoheitsgebiet erzielt und besteuert würden, in

Niedrigsteuergebiete, und häufig zu einer Aushöhlung ihrer Steuerbemessungsgrundlagen.

Eine solche Situation führt außerdem zu unfairem Steuerwettbewerb gegenüber Unternehmen,

die sich an solchen unrechtmäßigen Aktivitäten nicht beteiligen wollen. Letztendlich kommt

es zu Verzerrungen im Binnenmarkt. Eine derartige Situation kann folglich nur durch ein

einheitliches Vorgehen geregelt werden, das im Einklang mit Artikel 115 AEUV darauf

abzielt, das Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts zu verbessern.

• Subsidiarität

Die Erfahrung zeigt, dass nationale Regelungen zur Bekämpfung der aggressiven

Steuerplanung allein nicht ausreichen. Dies liegt daran, dass ein beträchtlicher Teil der

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Strukturen zur Steuervermeidung eine grenzüberschreitende Dimension aufweist und auch

Kapital und Personen zunehmend mobil sind, vor allem auf einem integrierten Markt wie dem

EU-Binnenmarkt. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass ein gemeinsames Vorgehen auf EU-Ebene

notwendig ist, um die derzeitige Situation zu verbessern; dadurch können bestehende

Initiativen in diesem Bereich, insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit der Richtlinie über die

Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden, ergänzt werden. Dies gilt umso mehr, als sich die

auf nationaler Ebene vorhandenen Instrumente als nur bedingt wirksam für die Erhöhung der

Transparenz erwiesen haben.

Der Binnenmarkt braucht daher einen robusten Mechanismus, mit dem diese Schlupflöcher

auf einheitliche Weise bekämpft und vorhandene Verzerrungen dadurch korrigiert werden,

dass die Steuerbehörden angemessene und zeitnahe Informationen über potenziell aggressive

Steuerplanungsmodelle mit grenzüberschreitenden Auswirkungen erhalten.

Da die verpflichtende Offenlegung zum Ziel hat, die Steuerbehörden über Modelle zu

informieren, die eine über ein einzelnes Hoheitsgebiet hinausgehende Dimension haben, muss

jede derartige Initiative auf EU-Ebene angegangen werden, um eine einheitliche

Vorgehensweise zur Lösung des Problems sicherzustellen. Unkoordinierte, auf eigene

Initiative getroffene Maßnahmen der Mitgliedstaaten würden zu einem Flickwerk von

Regelungen für die Offenlegung von Modellen durch Intermediäre führen. Dies könnte dazu

führen, dass ein unfairer Steuerwettbewerb zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten fortbesteht.

Sogar dort, wo ein einziger Mitgliedstaat an einem potenziell aggressiven

Steuerplanungsmodell oder einer Reihe von Modellen mit Drittländern beteiligt ist, gibt es ein

grenzüberschreitendes Element, das die Gefahr birgt, das Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts zu

verzerren. Die Struktur des Binnenmarkts beruht auf dem Grundsatz des freien Verkehrs von

Personen, Waren, Dienstleistungen und Kapital und ist mit den Vorteilen verknüpft, die sich

aus den Richtlinien zur Körperschaftsteuer ergeben. Daraus folgt, dass das tatsächliche

Schutzniveau des Binnenmarkts insgesamt in Bezug auf den schwächsten Mitgliedstaat

definiert wird. Aus diesem Grund wirkt sich ein potenziell aggressives Steuerplanungsmodell

in einem Mitgliedstaat tatsächlich auf alle Mitgliedstaaten aus.

Überließe man die Entscheidung darüber individuellen nationalen Initiativen, so hieße das,

dass manche sich dafür entscheiden könnten, tätig zu werden, andere hingegen nicht. Dies ist

insbesondere der Fall, da der BEPS-Aktionspunkt 12 keinen Mindeststandard darstellt und die

Umsetzung in der EU daher sehr unterschiedlich ausfallen könnte. So haben 39 von 131

Interessenträgern, die an der öffentlichen Konsultation teilgenommen haben, angegeben, dass

ohne eine EU-Maßnahme keine Transparenzanforderungen festgelegt würden, und 107

Teilnehmer antworteten, dass es wahrscheinlich oder sehr wahrscheinlich sei, dass

unterschiedliche Transparenzanforderungen eingeführt würden. Aus diesen Gründen würde

die Einführung einer Meldepflicht per EU-Rechtsvorschrift in Kombination mit dem

Informationsaustausch die aufgezeigten Probleme lösen und zum besseren Funktionieren des

Binnenmarkts beitragen.

Außerdem ist mit den Offenlegungsmaßnahmen auf EU-Ebene ein Mehrwert im Vergleich zu

einschlägigen Initiativen einzelner Mitgliedstaaten verbunden. Dies liegt daran, dass die

Offenlegung potenziell aggressiver Steuerplanungsmodelle insbesondere in Kombination mit

dem Informationsaustausch den Steuerbehörden ermöglichen wird, ein Gesamtbild der

Auswirkungen grenzüberschreitender Transaktionen auf die gesamte

Steuerbemessungsgrundlage zu erhalten. Die EU ist daher besser als einzelne Mitgliedstaaten

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dazu in der Lage, die Effizienz und Vollständigkeit des Systems für den

Informationsaustausch sicherzustellen.

• Verhältnismäßigkeit

Die vorgeschlagene politische Maßnahme beschränkt sich auf potenziell aggressive

Steuerplanungsmodelle, die eine grenzüberschreitende Komponente aufweisen. Da die

festgestellten Verzerrungen beim Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts in der Regel über die

Grenzen eines einzigen Mitgliedstaats hinausgehen, stellt die Beschränkung der gemeinsamen

Vorschriften auf grenzüberschreitende Sachverhalte in der EU das nötige Mindestmaß dar,

um die Probleme effizient zu bekämpfen. Die vorgeschlagenen Vorschriften sind daher eine

angemessene Reaktion auf das aufgezeigte Problem, da sie nicht über das hinausgehen, was

zur Verwirklichung des im Vertrag verankerten Ziels eines besseren Funktionierens des

Binnenmarkts ohne Verzerrungen erforderlich ist.

• Wahl des Instruments

Die Rechtsgrundlage dieses Vorschlags ist Artikel 115 AEUV, in dem ausdrücklich festgelegt

ist, dass Rechtsvorschriften in diesem Bereich nur in Form von Richtlinien erlassen werden

können. Es ist daher nicht zulässig, für den Erlass verbindlicher Vorschriften im Bereich der

direkten Steuern eine andere Art von EU-Rechtsakten zu verwenden.

Darüber hinaus handelt es sich bei der vorgeschlagenen Richtlinie um die fünfte Änderung

der Richtlinie über die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden seit 2014; sie folgt auf die

Richtlinien 2014/107/EU, (EU) 2015/2376, (EU) 2016/881 und (EU) 2016/2258 des Rates.

3. ERGEBNISSE DER EX-POST-BEWERTUNG, DER KONSULTATION DER

INTERESSENTRÄGER UND DER FOLGENABSCHÄTZUNG

• Evaluierungen

Die vorgeschlagene Rechtsvorschrift umfasst eine Änderung der Richtlinie über die

Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden, um die verpflichtende Offenlegung potenziell

aggressiver Steuerplanungsmodelle einzuführen und den Geltungsbereich des automatischen

Informationsaustauschs zwischen Steuerbehörden auf solche Modelle auszuweiten. Die

Begründung der vorgeschlagenen Änderungen betrifft also ein neues Thema, um die

Bemühungen der Mitgliedstaaten zur Bekämpfung von Steuervermeidung und

Steuerhinterziehung zu stärken. Die vorgeschlagenen Änderungen betreffen nicht die

Berichtigung der festgestellten Mängel des zugrundeliegenden Instruments (d. h. der

Richtlinie über die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden), sondern die Ausweitung

seines Geltungsbereichs auf ein zusätzliches Thema, wobei der Handlungsbedarf mit den

Feststellungen der OECD zu Aktionspunkt 12 und den Konsultationen der Interessenträger

durch die Kommission begründet wird.

Die Richtlinie über die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden wurde bisher nicht

bewertet. Der erste Bewertungsbericht ist am 1. Januar 2018 fällig. Danach muss die

Kommission dem Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat alle fünf Jahre einen Bericht über die

Anwendung der Richtlinie über die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden vorlegen. Zu

diesem Zweck haben die Mitgliedstaaten der Kommission die erforderlichen Informationen

für die Bewertung der Wirksamkeit der Verwaltungszusammenarbeit sowie statistische Daten

übermittelt.

Die vorgeschlagene Rechtsvorschrift wurde möglichst kosteneffizient konzipiert. Der

geplante Rahmen wird daher nach Vornahme der erforderlichen Anpassungen ein

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vorhandenes IT-Instrument für den Informationsaustausch nutzen, das ursprünglich

eingerichtet wurde, um den Austausch grenzüberschreitender Vorbescheide (Richtlinie über

die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden 3) zu ermöglichen.

• Konsultation der Interessenträger

Die Europäische Kommission hat am 10. November 2016 eine öffentliche Konsultation zu der

Frage eingeleitet, wie die EU gegen Berater und Intermediäre vorgehen soll, die potenziell

aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle ermöglichen.

Es wurden einige Optionen vorgestellt, und insgesamt gingen 131 Antworten von

Interessenträgern ein. Der größte Teil der Antworten kam mit 27 % vom Handel und von

Wirtschafts- und Berufsverbänden; Privatpersonen machten 20 % der Antworten aus.

Geografisch gesehen kamen die meisten Antworten aus Deutschland (24 % aller Antworten).

46 Teilnehmer gaben an, dass sie eine professionelle Steuerberatung in Anspruch genommen

hatten, die in mehr als der Hälfte der Fälle durch Steuerberater – mit 52 % die größte

Berufsgruppe – erfolgte. 30 Teilnehmer gaben ferner an, dass sie Steuerberatungsdienste

angeboten hatten, und die Hälfte davon stand in Kontakt mit den Steuerbehörden.

• Mitgliedstaaten

Das der vorgeschlagenen Rechtsvorschrift zugrundeliegende Prinzip entspricht den Trends bei

der internationalen Besteuerung, wie denen im Zusammenhang mit dem OECD/G20-Projekt

gegen BEPS. Die meisten Mitgliedstaaten sind Mitglieder der OECD, die ihrerseits zwischen

2013 und 2015 umfangreiche öffentliche Konsultationen von Interessenträgern zu jedem der

Anti-BEPS-Aktionspunkte durchgeführt hat. Diejenigen Mitgliedstaaten, die Mitglieder der

OECD sind, waren daher innerhalb der OECD an langwierigen und ausführlichen

Diskussionen über die Anti-BEPS-Aktionspunkte beteiligt und dürften somit ausreichend zu

der Initiative konsultiert worden sein.

Am 2. März 2017 organisierte die GD TAXUD eine Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe IV, und die

Mitgliedstaaten hatte Gelegenheit, über die Offenlegung potenziell aggressiver

Steuerplanungsmodelle durch Intermediäre, gefolgt von einem automatischen

Informationsaustausch zwischen Steuerbehörden, zu diskutieren.

Die Kommission hat darüber hinaus gezielte Diskussionen mit Vertretern der Mitgliedstaaten

geführt, die bereits praktische Erfahrungen mit der verpflichtenden Offenlegung auf

nationaler Ebene haben.

• Folgenabschätzung

Die Kommission führte eine Folgenabschätzung von Strategiealternativen durch, zu der der

Ausschuss für Regulierungskontrolle am 24. Mai 2017 eine befürwortende Stellungnahme

abgab (SEC(2017) 307)17

. Der Ausschuss für Regulierungskontrolle machte eine Reihe von

Verbesserungsvorschlägen, die in der endgültigen Folgenabschätzung berücksichtigt wurden

(SWD(2017) 236)18

.

Die folgenden Politikoptionen wurden anhand der Kriterien der Wirksamkeit, Effizienz und

Kohärenz im Vergleich zum Basisszenario geprüft. Die Herausforderung bestand darin, ein

17 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=ia 18 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=ia

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ausgewogenes System zur Bekämpfung der aggressivsten Formen der Steuerplanung zu

konzipieren. Der OECD-Bericht zum BEPS-Aktionspunkt 12 enthält Beispiele für die

Vorgehensweisen der Steuerbehörden in verschiedenen Steuergebieten weltweit, darunter

auch die drei bestehenden nationalen verpflichtenden Offenlegungsregelungen in der EU

(Irland, Portugal und Vereinigtes Königreich).

In der öffentlichen Konsultation wurde eine Liste Optionen für die Interessenträger dargelegt.

Einige dieser Optionen betreffen die Art des Rechtsinstruments für die vorgeschlagene

Initiative, d. h. die Frage, ob Rechtsvorschriften oder nichtlegislative Maßnahmen wie eine

Empfehlung oder ein Verhaltenskodex die beste Lösung darstellen. Bei den Optionen, die auf

verbindlichen Regelungen aufbauen, wurden die Interessenträger gebeten, hauptsächlich die

Möglichkeit in Erwägung zu ziehen, einen gemeinsamen Rahmen für die Offenlegung von

Informationen gegenüber den Steuerbehörden zu vereinbaren, oder alternativ dazu die

Offenlegung mit einem automatischen Austausch der offengelegten Daten zwischen allen

Steuerbehörden in der EU zu verknüpfen.

Aus den Konsultationen der Interessenträger ging hervor, dass alle verfügbaren

Politikoptionen mit verpflichtenden Regelungen zu einem ähnlichen Ergebnis führen würden.

Eine (verpflichtende) Offenlegung von Daten gegenüber den Steuerbehörden ermöglicht

daher immer eine Form des Informationsaustauschs. Das liegt daran, dass der spontane

Austausch Bestandteil des allgemeinen Rahmens der Richtlinie über die

Verwaltungszusammenarbeit ist. Der Informationsaustausch ist daher in unterschiedlicher

Form bei allen Politikoptionen gegeben, die die Offenlegung von Daten einschließen.

Ferner wurde die Ansicht geäußert, dass es in der Praxis eigentlich nur darum gehen kann,

einen Kontext, in dem die Verpflichtung zur Offenlegung von Informationen über potenziell

aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle (verknüpft mit einem Informationsaustausch) besteht, mit

einem Kontext zu vergleichen, in dem es keine solche Verpflichtung gibt, d. h. dem

sogenannten Status quo. Darüber hinaus würde die Beschränkung des Informationsaustauschs

auf den spontanen Austausch nicht den verschiedenen Initiativen entsprechen, die die

Kommission in jüngster Zeit im Bereich der Transparenz unternommen hat. Daher umfasst

der Rahmen für den Informationsaustausch sowohl bei den Regelungen zur Umsetzung des

Gemeinsamen Meldestandards in der EU als auch bei grenzüberschreitenden Vorbescheiden

den automatischen Austausch.

Bevorzugte Option

Die bevorzugte Option besteht darin, den Mitgliedstaaten vorzuschreiben, i) ihre nationalen

Steuerbehörden ausdrücklich zu verpflichten, potenziell aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle

mit grenzüberschreitender Komponente offenzulegen, und ii) sicherzustellen, dass ihre

nationalen Steuerbehörden diese Informationen automatisch mit den Steuerbehörden der

anderen Mitgliedstaaten mittels des in der Richtlinie über die Zusammenarbeit der

Verwaltungsbehörden festgelegten Mechanismus austauschen.

Vorteile der bevorzugten Option

Die Pflicht zur Berichterstattung im Rahmen einer verpflichtenden Offenlegungsregelung

wird den Druck auf die Intermediäre erhöhen, keine aggressiven Steuerplanungsmodelle zu

konzipieren, zu vermarkten und anzuwenden. Gleichzeitig werden die Steuerpflichtigen

weniger geneigt sein, derartige Modelle zu entwickeln oder anzuwenden, wenn sie wissen,

dass diese Modelle im Rahmen einer verpflichtenden Offenlegungsregelung gemeldet werden

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müssten. Derzeit haben die Steuerbehörden nur eingeschränkte Kenntnis ausländischer

Steuerplanungsmodelle; durch die Offenlegung würden sie zeitnah informiert, so dass sie

rasch operative Maßnahmen treffen und legislative und/oder regulatorische Änderungen

vornehmen könnten. Die Daten könnten darüber hinaus auch für Risikobewertung und

Prüfzwecke verwendet werden. Dies wird den Mitgliedstaaten dabei helfen, ihre direkten

Steuerbemessungsgrundlagen zu schützen und ihre Steuereinnahmen zu erhöhen/einzutreiben.

Eine verpflichtende Offenlegungsregelung trägt außerdem zur Schaffung einheitlicher

Wettbewerbsbedingungen für Unternehmen bei, da größere Unternehmen eher derartige

Systeme grenzüberschreitend zum Zweck der Steuervermeidung einsetzen als KMU. Aus

Sicht der Gesellschaft wird eine verpflichtende Offenlegungsregelung aus den vorstehend

genannten Gründen ein gerechteres Steuerumfeld schaffen.

Kosten der bevorzugten Option

Die Kosten des Vorschlags in Bezug auf das nationale Steueraufkommen hängen davon ab,

wie die Mitgliedstaaten ihre Rechtsvorschriften anpassen und Mittel für die Einhaltung ihrer

Offenlegungspflichten bereitstellen. Es ist jedoch geplant, dass die vorhandenen Berichts- und

Informationsaustauschsysteme wie das Zentralverzeichnis für Steuervorbescheide einen

Rahmen bilden, in den der automatische Informationsaustausch über meldepflichtige

Steuerplanungsmodelle zwischen nationalen Behörden integriert werden kann.

Die Kosten für die Intermediäre dürften sich in Grenzen halten, da die zu meldenden

Informationen bereits in den Kurzbeschreibungen vorhanden sein müssten, mit denen ein

Modell bei den Steuerpflichtigen beworben wird. Nur unter ganz bestimmten Umständen

müssten die Steuerpflichtigen selbst derartige Modelle melden und Kosten im Zusammenhang

mit den Meldepflichten tragen.

Effizienz der Rechtsetzung

Der Vorschlag wurde so konzipiert, dass der Verwaltungsaufwand für Intermediäre,

Steuerpflichtige und öffentliche Verwaltungen auf ein Minimum beschränkt ist. Die

bevorzugte Politikoption stellt eine angemessene Reaktion auf das festgestellte Problem dar,

da sie nicht über das hinausgeht, was zur Verwirklichung des im Vertrag verankerten Ziels

eines besseren Funktionierens des Binnenmarkts ohne Verzerrungen erforderlich ist. Die

gemeinsamen Vorschriften beschränken sich auf die Schaffung des erforderlichen

gemeinsamen Mindestrahmens für die Offenlegung potenziell schädlicher Modelle: Zum

Beispiel:

i) Die Vorschriften enthalten klare Berichterstattungspflichten, um eine doppelte

Berichterstattung zu vermeiden.

ii) Die gemeinsamen Vorschriften beschränken sich auf potenziell aggressive

Steuerplanungsmodelle mit grenzüberschreitender Komponente innerhalb der EU.

iii) Es gibt keine Veröffentlichungspflicht für die gemeldeten Steuermodelle, lediglich

einen automatischen Austausch zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten.

iv) Die Verhängung von Sanktionen bei Nichteinhaltung der nationalen Vorschriften zur

Umsetzung der Richtlinie in nationales Recht unterliegt weiterhin der hoheitlichen

Kontrolle der Mitgliedstaaten.

Das harmonisierte Konzept beinhaltet die Information der zuständigen nationalen Behörden

über die potenziell aggressiven Modelle. Danach bleibt es den Mitgliedstaaten überlassen, wie

sie im Fall unrechtmäßiger Modelle weiter vorgehen.

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Rechtsinstrument

Die folgenden drei Legislativoptionen wurden in Betracht gezogen:

i) eine Empfehlung der Kommission (nicht verbindliches Instrument), um die

Mitgliedstaaten zu ersuchen, eine verpflichtende Offenlegungsregelung

einzuführen, und die Befassung der Gruppe „Verhaltenskodex“

(Unternehmensbesteuerung);

ii) ein EU-Verhaltenskodex für Intermediäre (nicht verbindliches Instrument) für

bestimmte reglementierte Berufe;

iii) eine EU-Richtlinie (verbindliches Instrument), um die Mitgliedstaaten zu

verpflichten, eine verpflichtende Offenlegungsregelung in Kombination mit

dem Informationsaustausch einzuführen.

Die Abwägung der verschiedenen Optionen hat als bevorzugte Option die Form einer

Richtlinie ergeben. Die Analyse zeigt, dass diese Option deutliche Vorteile hinsichtlich

Wirksamkeit, Effizienz und Kohärenz hat, da damit die aufgezeigten Probleme zu geringen

Kosten angegangen werden könnten. Darüber hinaus ist die Option einer Richtlinie

vorteilhafter als die Alternative, keine Maßnahmen zu ergreifen.

4. AUSWIRKUNGEN AUF DEN HAUSHALT

Siehe Finanzbogen zu Rechtsakten

5. WEITERE ANGABEN

• Durchführungspläne sowie Monitoring-, Bewertungs- und

Berichterstattungsmodalitäten

Die Mitgliedstaaten übermitteln der Kommission eine jährliche Bewertung der Wirksamkeit

des automatischen Informationsaustauschs sowie der in der Praxis erzielten Ergebnisse. Die

Mitgliedstaaten übermitteln außerdem relevante Informationen und eine Liste statistischer

Daten, die von der Kommission nach dem Verfahren des Artikels 26 Absatz 2

(Umsetzungsmaßnahmen) für die Bewertung der vorliegenden Richtlinie festgelegt werden.

Alle fünf Jahre nach dem 1. Januar 2013 legt die Kommission dem Europäischen Parlament

und dem Rat einen Bericht über die Anwendung dieser Richtlinie vor. Die Ergebnisse dieses

Vorschlags (mit dem die Richtlinie über die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden

geändert wird) werden in den Bewertungsbericht an das Europäische Parlament und den Rat

aufgenommen, der am 1. Januar 2023 veröffentlicht wird.

• Erläuternde Dokumente (bei Richtlinien)

nicht zutreffend

• Ausführliche Erläuterung einzelner Bestimmungen des Vorschlags

Die vorgeschlagene Rechtsvorschrift umfasst hauptsächlich die folgenden Elemente:

Offenlegung gegenüber den Steuerbehörden, verknüpft mit einem

automatischen Informationsaustausch

Die vorgeschlagene Richtlinie verpflichtet Intermediäre dazu, potenziell aggressive

Steuerplanungsmodelle gegenüber den Steuerbehörden offenzulegen, wenn sie

beruflich – hinsichtlich Konzeption und Vermarktung – an solchen Modellen

DE 13 DE

beteiligt sind. Diese Verpflichtung beschränkt sich auf grenzüberschreitende

Sachverhalte, d. h. Sachverhalte, an denen entweder mehr als ein Mitgliedstaat oder

ein Mitgliedstaat und ein Drittland beteiligt sind. Nur bei solchen Sachverhalten kann

aufgrund der potenziellen Auswirkung auf das Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts die

Notwendigkeit, gemeinsame Regelungen zu erlassen, gerechtfertigt werden, anstatt

die Angelegenheit auf nationaler Ebene zu regeln. Um angesichts der

grenzüberschreitenden Dimension der meldepflichtigen Modelle die größtmögliche

Wirksamkeit der vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen sicherzustellen, müssen die

offengelegten Informationen automatisch zwischen den nationalen Steuerbehörden

ausgetauscht werden. In der Praxis sehen die Vorschriften vor, dass der Austausch

durch Übermittlung der offengelegten Modelle an ein Zentralverzeichnis erfolgt, auf

das alle Mitgliedstaaten zugreifen können.

Auch die Kommission wird eingeschränkten Zugang zu den ausgetauschten

Informationen haben (d. h., soweit sie im Hinblick auf grenzüberschreitende

Vorbescheide dazu berechtigt ist), um das reibungslose Funktionieren der Richtlinie

zu überwachen.

Wer trägt den mit der Offenlegung verbundenen Aufwand?

Die Verpflichtung zur Offenlegung betrifft diejenigen „Personen“ (d. h. natürliche

oder juristische Personen oder Einrichtungen ohne Rechtspersönlichkeit), die als

Intermediäre ermittelt werden.

Fehlen eines Intermediärs im Sinne der Richtlinie

Die Offenlegungspflicht eines Intermediärs kann unter Umständen aufgrund der

Privilegien der Angehörigen von Rechtsberufen oder nicht vorhandener

Niederlassung des Intermediärs in der Union nicht durchgesetzt werden. Es kann

auch vorkommen, dass es keinen Intermediär gibt, weil ein Steuerpflichtiger sein

Steuerplanungsmodell selbst konzipiert und umsetzt. In diesen Fällen haben die

Steuerbehörden weiterhin die Möglichkeit, Informationen über Steuermodelle zu

erhalten, die potenziell mit aggressiven Strukturen zusammenhängen, da die

Offenlegungspflicht dann auf den Steuerpflichtigen übergeht, der das Modell

anwendet.

Mehr als eine Person kommt als Intermediär oder Steuerpflichtiger in Frage

Es ist nicht ungewöhnlich, dass ein Intermediär über Büros, Unternehmen usw. in

mehreren Staaten vertreten ist und er auch andere lokale unabhängige Akteure im

Rahmen der Steuerberatung zu bestimmten Modellen einbezieht. In solchen Fällen

muss nur der Intermediär, der gegenüber dem (den) Steuerpflichtigen die

Verantwortung für die Konzeption und Umsetzung des Modells (der Modelle)

übernimmt, den Steuerbehörden die verlangten Informationen übermitteln.

Ist die Pflicht zur Übermittlung von Informationen auf den Steuerpflichtigen

übergegangen und soll mehr als eine verbundene Partei dasselbe meldepflichtige

grenzüberschreitende Steuermodell nutzen, so muss nur der Steuerpflichtige, der für

die Vereinbarung des Modells (der Modelle) mit dem Intermediär verantwortlich

war, Informationen übermitteln.

Zeitplan für die Offenlegung und den automatischen Informationsaustausch

Da die Aussichten, dass die Offenlegung ihre abschreckende Wirkung entfaltet,

größer sind, wenn die relevanten Informationen die Steuerbehörden frühzeitig

erreichen, wird in der vorgeschlagenen Rechtsvorschrift vorgeschrieben, dass die

DE 14 DE

meldepflichtigen grenzüberschreitenden Modelle offengelegt werden müssen, bevor

sie tatsächlich angewandt werden. Ausgehend von dieser Annahme müssen die

Intermediäre die meldepflichtigen Modelle innerhalb von fünf Tagen ab dem Tag,

nach dem diese Modelle einem Steuerpflichtigen zur Umsetzung zur Verfügung

gestellt wurden, offenlegen.

Wenn die Offenlegung den Steuerpflichtigen übertragen wird, da kein

verantwortlicher Intermediär vorhanden ist, erfolgt die Offenlegung etwas später,

d. h. innerhalb von fünf Tagen ab dem Tag, nach dem das meldepflichtige

grenzüberschreitende Modell oder die erste Stufe in einer Reihe derartiger Modelle

umgesetzt wurde.

Der anschließende automatische Informationsaustausch über diese Modelle erfolgt

vierteljährlich. Aufgrund der frühzeitigen Offenlegung dieser Informationen erhalten

die Steuerbehörden, die am engsten mit dem Modell befasst sind, ausreichende

Anhaltspunkte für eine frühzeitige Bekämpfung der Steuervermeidung.

Liste von Kennzeichen anstelle einer Definition aggressiver Steuerplanung

Der Versuch, den Begriff der aggressiven Steuerplanung zu definieren, könnte ein

vergebliches Unterfangen sein, weil aggressive Steuerplanungsstrukturen sich über

Jahre hinweg entwickelt haben, besonders komplex sind und ständigen Änderungen

und Anpassungen unterliegen, mit denen auf Gegenmaßnahmen der Steuerbehörden

reagiert wird. Aus diesen Gründen umfasst die vorgeschlagene Rechtsvorschrift eine

Zusammenstellung der Merkmale und Elemente von Transaktionen, die stark auf

Steuervermeidung oder Steuermissbrauch hindeuten. Diese Merkmale und Elemente

werden als „Kennzeichen“ („hallmarks“) bezeichnet, und es reicht aus, dass ein

Modell eines dieser Kennzeichen aufweist, damit es den Steuerbehörden gemeldet

werden muss.

Automatischer Informationsaustausch über das Gemeinsame

Kommunikationsnetz (common communication network – CCN) der EU

In Bezug auf die operativen Aspekte des verpflichtenden automatischen

Informationsaustauschs nimmt die vorgeschlagene Richtlinie Bezug auf den durch

die Richtlinie (EU) 2015/2376 des Rates eingeführten Mechanismus, d. h. das

Gemeinsame Kommunikationsnetz (common communication network – CCN).

Dieses Netz wird als gemeinsamer Rahmen für den Austausch dienen, und sein

Geltungsbereich wird daher ausgeweitet.

Die Informationen werden in einem sicheren Zentralverzeichnis für die

Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden im Bereich der Besteuerung gespeichert.

Die Mitgliedstaaten werden außerdem eine Reihe praktischer Regelungen treffen,

wie die Erstellung eines Standardformulars zur Vereinheitlichung der Übermittlung

der geforderten Informationen. Hierfür muss die Sprachenregelung für den geplanten

Informationsaustausch festgelegt und das CCN entsprechend aktualisiert werden.

Wirksame Sanktionen bei Nichteinhaltung auf nationaler Ebene

Die vorgeschlagene Rechtsvorschrift überlässt es den Mitgliedstaaten, Sanktionen

bei Verstößen gegen die nationalen Vorschriften zur Umsetzung der vorliegenden

Richtlinie im nationalen Recht festzulegen. Die Mitgliedstaaten ergreifen alle

erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um sicherzustellen, dass der gemeinsame Rahmen

umgesetzt wird. Die Sanktionen müssen wirksam, verhältnismäßig und abschreckend

sein.

DE 15 DE

Durchführungsmaßnahmen

Um einheitliche Bedingungen für die Durchführung der vorgeschlagenen Richtlinie

und insbesondere des verpflichtenden automatischen Informationsaustauschs

zwischen Steuerbehörden zu gewährleisten, sollten der Kommission folgende

Durchführungsbefugnisse übertragen werden:

i) Annahme eines Standardformulars mit einer beschränkten Anzahl von

Bestandteilen, einschließlich der Sprachenregelung;

ii) Annahme der erforderlichen praktischen Regelungen für die Aktualisierung des

Zentralverzeichnisses über die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden im

Bereich der Besteuerung.

Diese Befugnisse werden im Einklang mit der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 182/2011 des

Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates ausgeübt.

Delegierte Rechtsakte

Im Hinblick auf die möglicherweise erforderliche Aktualisierung der Merkmale, die

auf Informationen beruhen, die aus offengelegten Modellen stammen, wird der

Kommission im Einklang mit Artikel 290 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der

Europäischen Union die Befugnis zum Erlass delegierter Rechtsakte übertragen.

DE 16 DE

2017/0138 (CNS)

Vorschlag für eine

RICHTLINIE DES RATES

zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU bezüglich des verpflichtenden automatischen

Informationsaustauschs im Bereich der Besteuerung über meldepflichtige

grenzüberschreitende Modelle

DER RAT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION —

gestützt auf den Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union, insbesondere auf die

Artikel 113 und 115,

auf Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission,

nach Zuleitung des Entwurfs des Gesetzgebungsakts an die nationalen Parlamente,

nach Stellungnahme des Europäischen Parlaments1,

nach Stellungnahme des Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses2,

gemäß einem besonderen Gesetzgebungsverfahren,

in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe:

(1) Um neue Initiativen im Bereich der Steuertransparenz auf Unionsebene zu

berücksichtigen, wurde die Richtlinie 2011/16/EU des Rates3 in den vergangenen

Jahren mehrfach geändert. So wurde mit der Richtlinie (EU) 2014/107 des Rates4 ein

Gemeinsamer Meldestandard für Informationen über Finanzkonten innerhalb der

Union eingeführt. Der innerhalb des Globalen Forums der OECD entwickelte

Standard schreibt den automatischen Informationsaustausch über Finanzkonten von

steuerlich nicht ansässigen Personen vor und errichtet einen Rahmen für diesen

weltweiten Austausch. Die Richtlinie 2011/16/EU wurde durch die Richtlinie (EU)

2015/2376 des Rates5 geändert, in der der automatische Informationsaustausch über

grenzüberschreitende Vorbescheide festgelegt wurde, sowie durch die Richtlinie (EU)

2016/881 des Rates6 zur Offenlegung und zum verpflichtenden Informationsaustausch

über die länderbezogene Berichterstattung multinationaler Unternehmen zwischen

Steuerbehörden. Angesichts des Nutzens, den Informationen über Geldwäsche für

1 ABl. C vom , S. . 2 ABl. C vom , S. . 3 Richtlinie 2011/16/EU des Rates vom 15. Februar 2011 über die Zusammenarbeit der

Verwaltungsbehörden im Bereich der Besteuerung (ABl. L 64 vom 11.3.2011, S. 1). 4 Richtlinie (EU) 2014/107 des Rates vom 9. Dezember 2014 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU

bezüglich der Verpflichtung zum automatischen Austausch von Informationen im Bereich der

Besteuerung (ABl. L 359 vom 16.12.2014, S. 1). 5 Richtlinie (EU) 2015/2376 des Rates vom 8. Dezember 2015 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU

bezüglich der Verpflichtung zum automatischen Austausch von Informationen im Bereich der

Besteuerung (ABl. L 332 vom 18.12.2015, S. 1). 6 Richtlinie (EU) 2016/881 des Rates vom 25. Mai 2016 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU

bezüglich der Verpflichtung zum automatischen Austausch von Informationen im Bereich der

Besteuerung (ABl. L 146 vom 3.6.2016, S. 8).

DE 17 DE

Steuerbehörden haben können, wurde mit der Richtlinie (EU) 2016/2258 des Rates7

die Verpflichtung für die Mitgliedstaaten eingeführt, den Steuerbehörden Zugang zu

den Verfahren zur Erfüllung der Sorgfaltspflichten der Finanzinstitute gemäß der

Richtlinie (EU) 2015/849 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates8 zu gewähren.

Obwohl die Richtlinie 2011/16/EU mehrfach geändert wurde, um die Mittel der

Steuerbehörden zur Bekämpfung von Steuervermeidung und Steuerhinterziehung

auszuweiten, müssen bestimmte Transparenzaspekte des bestehenden Rahmens für die

Besteuerung noch verstärkt werden.

(2) Für die Mitgliedstaaten wird es immer schwieriger, ihre nationalen

Steuerbemessungsgrundlagen gegen Aushöhlung zu schützen, da die

Steuerplanungsstrukturen immer ausgefeilter werden und sich häufig die höhere

Mobilität von Kapital und Personen im Binnenmarkt zunutze machen. Diese

Strukturen umfassen häufig Modelle, die länderüberschreitend entwickelt werden und

durch die steuerpflichtige Gewinne in Staaten mit vorteilhafteren Steuersystemen

verlagert werden oder die eine Verringerung der Gesamtsteuerbelastung der

Steuerpflichtigen bewirken. Infolgedessen kommt es häufig zu einem beträchtlichen

Rückgang der Steuereinnahmen in den Mitgliedstaaten, was diese wiederum daran

hindert, eine wachstumsfreundliche Steuerpolitik zu verfolgen. Es ist daher von

entscheidender Bedeutung, dass die Steuerbehörden der Mitgliedstaaten umfassende

und relevante Informationen über potenziell aggressive Steuermodelle erhalten. Diese

Informationen würden die Behörden in die Lage versetzen, zeitnah gegen schädliche

Steuerpraktiken vorzugehen und Schlupflöcher durch Rechtsvorschriften oder durch

geeignete Risikoabschätzungen und die Durchführung von Steuerprüfungen zu

schließen.

(3) Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die meisten potenziell aggressiven

Steuerplanungsmodelle mehr als ein Steuergebiet betreffen, würde die Offenlegung

von Informationen über derartige Modelle weitere positive Ergebnisse erbringen,

wenn diese Informationen außerdem zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten ausgetauscht

würden. Der automatische Informationsaustausch zwischen Steuerverwaltungen ist

von entscheidender Bedeutung, um diese Behörden mit den erforderlichen

Informationen zu versorgen, damit sie Maßnahmen ergreifen können, wenn sie

aggressive Steuerpraktiken feststellen.

(4) In Anerkennung der Tatsache, dass ein transparenter Rahmen für die Entwicklung

unternehmerischer Tätigkeit zur Bekämpfung von Steuervermeidung und

Steuerhinterziehung im Binnenmarkt beitragen kann, wurde die Kommission ersucht,

Initiativen zur verpflichtenden Offenlegung potenziell aggressiver

Steuerplanungsmodelle entsprechend dem Aktionspunkt 12 des OECD-Projekts zu

Gewinnverkürzung und Gewinnverlagerung (BEPS) einzuleiten. In diesem

Zusammenhang hat das Europäische Parlament zu strengeren Maßnahmen gegen

Intermediäre aufgerufen, die an Modellen mitwirken, die zu Steuervermeidung und

Steuerhinterziehung führen können.

7 Richtlinie (EU) 2016/2258 des Rates vom 6. Dezember 2016 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU

bezüglich des Zugangs von Steuerbehörden zu Informationen zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche (ABl.

L 342 vom 16.12.2016, S. 1). 8 Richtlinie (EU) 2015/849 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 20. Mai 2015 zur

Verhinderung der Nutzung des Finanzsystems zum Zwecke der Geldwäsche und der

Terrorismusfinanzierung, zur Änderung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 648/2012 des Europäischen

Parlaments und des Rates und zur Aufhebung der Richtlinie 2005/60/EG des Europäischen Parlaments

und des Rates und der Richtlinie 2006/70/EG der Kommission (ABl. L 141 vom 5.6.2015, S. 73).

DE 18 DE

(5) Es sei erneut darauf hingewiesen, wie bestimmte Finanzintermediäre und andere

Steuerberater ihren Kunden offensichtlich aktiv dabei geholfen haben, Geld auf

Offshore-Konten zu verstecken. Obwohl die Einführung des Gemeinsamen

Meldestandards durch die Richtlinie (EU) 2014/107 des Rates9 zumindest in Bezug

auf Informationen über Finanzkonten einen wichtigen Fortschritt im Hinblick auf die

Schaffung eines transparenten Rahmens innerhalb der Union darstellt, sind weitere

Verbesserungen möglich.

(6) Die Offenlegung potenziell aggressiver Steuerplanungsmodelle mit

grenzüberschreitender Dimension kann die Bemühungen zur Schaffung einer

gerechten Besteuerung im Binnenmarkt nachhaltig unterstützen. Hier würde die

Verpflichtung der Intermediäre, die Steuerbehörden über bestimmte

grenzüberschreitende Modelle zu informieren, die möglicherweise zum Zweck der

Steuervermeidung genutzt werden könnten, einen Schritt in die richtige Richtung

darstellen. Im Hinblick auf umfassendere politische Maßnahmen wäre es in einem

zweiten Schritt außerdem wichtig, dass die Steuerbehörden nach der Offenlegung die

Informationen mit ihren Amtskollegen in anderen Mitgliedstaaten teilen. Dadurch

dürfte auch die Wirksamkeit des Gemeinsamen Meldestandards erhöht werden.

Weiterhin wäre es wichtig, der Kommission ausreichenden Zugang zu Informationen

zu gewähren, damit sie das reibungslose Funktionieren der vorliegenden Richtlinie

überwachen kann. Eine solcher Zugang zu Informationen entbindet einen

Mitgliedstaat nicht von seiner Verpflichtung, etwaige staatliche Beihilfen bei der

Kommission anzumelden.

(7) Es steht außer Frage, dass die Offenlegung potenziell aggressiver

grenzüberschreitender Steuerplanungsmodelle bessere Aussichten hätte, ihre

abschreckende Wirkung zu entfalten, wenn die entsprechenden Informationen die

Steuerbehörden frühzeitig erreichten, d. h., bevor die offengelegten Modelle

tatsächlich angewandt werden. Wenn die Offenlegungspflicht auf die Steuerpflichtigen

übertragen wird, wäre es aus praktischen Gründen sinnvoller, die Offenlegung

potenziell aggressiver grenzüberschreitender Steuerplanungsmodelle zu einem

geringfügig späteren Zeitpunkt vorzuschreiben, da sich die Steuerpflichtigen zu

Beginn vielleicht nicht über die Art des Modells im Klaren sind. Im Hinblick auf eine

einfachere Verwaltung durch die Mitgliedstaaten könnte der anschließende

Informationsaustausch über diese Modelle vierteljährlich erfolgen.

(8) Um das reibungslose Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts zu gewährleisten und

Schlupflöcher in den vorgeschlagenen Rahmenvorschriften zu vermeiden, sollten alle

Akteure, die normalerweise an der Konzeption, Vermarktung, Organisation oder

Verwaltung der Durchführung einer meldepflichtigen grenzüberschreitenden

Transaktion oder einer Reihe solcher Transaktionen beteiligt sind, sowie alle, die

Unterstützung oder Beratung leisten, zur Offenlegung verpflichtet sein. Es darf auch

nicht außer Acht gelassen werden, dass in bestimmten Fällen die Offenlegungspflicht

eines Intermediärs aufgrund von Privilegien der Angehörigen von Rechtsberufen nicht

durchsetzbar ist oder gar kein Intermediär vorhanden ist, weil z. B. der

Steuerpflichtige ein Steuerplanungsmodell selbst konzipiert und umsetzt. Es wäre

äußerst wichtig, dass die Steuerbehörden in solchen Fällen weiterhin die Möglichkeit

haben, Informationen über Steuermodelle zu erhalten, die potenziell mit aggressiver

9 Richtlinie (EU) 2014/107 des Rates vom 9. Dezember 2014 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU

bezüglich der Verpflichtung zum automatischen Austausch von Informationen im Bereich der

Besteuerung (ABl. L 359 vom 16.12.2014, S. 1).

DE 19 DE

Steuerplanung verbunden sind. Hierfür müsste die Offenlegungspflicht auf den

Steuerpflichtigen verlagert werden, der in diesen Fällen von dem Modell profitiert.

(9) Aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle haben sich über Jahre hinweg entwickelt, sind

immer komplexer geworden und unterliegen ständigen Änderungen und Anpassungen,

mit denen auf Gegenmaßnahmen der Steuerbehörden reagiert wird. Angesichts dessen

wäre es effizienter, potenziell aggressive Steuermodelle durch die Zusammenstellung

einer Liste von Merkmalen und Elementen von Transaktionen zu erfassen, die stark

auf Steuervermeidung oder Steuermissbrauch hindeuten, anstatt den Begriff der

aggressiven Steuerplanung zu definieren. Diese Merkmale werden als „Kennzeichen“

(„hallmarks“) bezeichnet.

(10) Da das oberste Ziel solcher Rechtsvorschriften darin bestehen sollte, das reibungslose

Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts sicherzustellen, wäre es wichtig, auf Unionsebene

nur das zu regeln, was erforderlich ist, um die angestrebten Ziele zu erreichen. Daher

muss jede gemeinsame Offenlegungsregelung auf grenzüberschreitende Sachverhalte

beschränkt werden, d. h. Sachverhalte, an denen entweder mehr als ein Mitgliedstaat

oder ein Mitgliedstaat und ein Drittland beteiligt sind. Bei solchen Sachverhalten kann

es aufgrund der potenziellen Auswirkungen auf das Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts

gerechtfertigt sein, gemeinsame Regelungen zu erlassen, anstatt die Angelegenheit auf

nationaler Ebene zu regeln.

(11) Da die offengelegten Modelle eine grenzüberschreitende Dimension aufweisen sollten,

wäre es wichtig, diese Informationen mit den Steuerbehörden anderer Mitgliedstaaten

zu teilen, damit die Richtlinie ihre abschreckende Wirkung im Hinblick auf aggressive

Steuerplanungspraktiken voll entfalten kann. Der Mechanismus für den

Informationsaustausch im Zusammenhang mit grenzüberschreitenden Vorbescheiden

und Vorabverständigungen über die Verrechnungspreisgestaltung sollte ebenfalls für

den verpflichtenden und automatischen Austausch offengelegter Informationen über

potenziell aggressive grenzüberschreitende Steuerplanungsmodelle zwischen den

Steuerbehörden in der Union genutzt werden.

(12) Um den automatischen Informationsaustausch zu erleichtern und die Ressourcen

effizienter zu nutzen, sollte der Austausch über das Gemeinsame Kommunikationsnetz

(common communication network – CCN) der Union erfolgen. In diesem

Zusammenhang würden Informationen in einem sicheren Zentralverzeichnis für die

Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden im Bereich der Besteuerung gespeichert.

Die Mitgliedstaaten sollten außerdem eine Reihe praktischer Regelungen treffen

müssen, wie die Erstellung eines Standardformulars für die einheitliche Übermittlung

der geforderten Informationen. Dabei sollte auch die Sprachenregelung für den

geplanten Informationsaustausch festgelegt und das CCN entsprechend aktualisiert

werden.

(13) Um die Erfolgsaussichten der vorliegenden Richtlinie zu verbessern, sollten die

Mitgliedstaaten Sanktionen bei Verstößen gegen die nationalen Vorschriften zur

Umsetzung der Richtlinie festlegen und gewährleisten, dass diese Sanktionen in der

Praxis auch angewandt werden, angemessen sind und abschreckende Wirkung haben.

(14) Um bestimmte nicht wesentliche Elemente der vorliegenden Richtlinie zu ergänzen

oder zu ändern, sollte der Kommission im Einklang mit Artikel 290 des Vertrags über

die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union die Befugnis übertragen werden, Rechtsakte

im Zusammenhang mit der Aktualisierung der Kennzeichen zu erlassen, damit sie in

die Liste der Kennzeichen für potenziell aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle oder

Reihen potenziell aggressiver Steuerplanungsmodelle aktualisierte Informationen über

DE 20 DE

Modelle oder Reihen von Modellen aufnehmen kann, die aus der verpflichtenden

Offenlegung derartiger Modelle hervorgehen.

(15) Zur Gewährleistung einheitlicher Bedingungen für die Umsetzung der vorliegenden

Richtlinie und insbesondere für den automatischen Informationsaustausch zwischen

Steuerbehörden sollten der Kommission Durchführungsbefugnisse zur Festlegung

eines Standardformulars mit einer beschränkten Anzahl von Bestandteilen,

einschließlich der Sprachenregelung, übertragen werden. Aus demselben Grund

sollten der Kommission auch Durchführungsbefugnisse zur Festlegung der

notwendigen praktischen Regelungen für die Aktualisierung des Zentralverzeichnisses

über die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden im Bereich der Besteuerung

übertragen werden. Diese Befugnisse sollten im Einklang mit der Verordnung (EU)

Nr. 182/2011 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates10

ausgeübt werden.

(16) Der Europäische Datenschutzbeauftragte wurde gemäß Artikel 28 Absatz 2 der

Verordnung (EG) Nr. 45/2001 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates angehört11

.

Die im Rahmen dieser Richtlinie vorgenommene Verarbeitung personenbezogener

Daten muss im Einklang mit der Richtlinie 95/46/EG des Europäischen Parlaments

und des Rates12

und der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 45/2001 erfolgen.

(17) Diese Richtlinie steht im Einklang mit den Grundrechten und Grundsätzen, die

insbesondere mit der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union anerkannt

wurden.

(18) Da das Ziel der vorliegenden Richtlinie – das bessere Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts

durch Verhinderung der Anwendung grenzüberschreitender aggressiver

Steuerplanungsmodelle – auf Ebene von einzeln und unkoordiniert agierenden

Mitgliedstaaten nicht ausreichend verwirklicht werden kann, sondern aufgrund der

Tatsache, dass es um Modelle geht, die entwickelt werden, um potenziell

Marktineffizienzen auszunutzen, die auf die Interaktion unterschiedlicher nationaler

Steuervorschriften zurückgehen, besser auf Unionsebene zu verwirklichen ist, kann die

Union im Einklang mit dem in Artikel 5 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union

niedergelegten Subsidiaritätsprinzip tätig werden. Nach dem im selben Artikel

dargelegten Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit geht diese Richtlinie nicht über das für

die Verwirklichung dieser Ziele erforderliche Maß hinaus, insbesondere, da sie auf

Modelle mit grenzüberschreitender Dimension beschränkt ist, die entweder mehr als

einen Mitgliedstaat oder einen Mitgliedstaat und ein Drittland umfassen.

(19) Die Richtlinie 2011/16/EU sollte daher entsprechend geändert werden —

10 Verordnung (EU) Nr. 182/2011 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 16. Februar 2011 zur

Festlegung der allgemeinen Regeln und Grundsätze, nach denen die Mitgliedstaaten die Wahrnehmung

der Durchführungsbefugnisse durch die Kommission kontrollieren (ABl. L 55 vom 28.2.2011, S. 13). 11 Verordnung (EG) Nr. 45/2001 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 18. Dezember 2000

zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten durch die Organe und

Einrichtungen der Gemeinschaft und zum freien Datenverkehr (ABL. L 8 vom 12.1.2001, S. 1). 12 Richtlinie 95/46/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 24. Oktober 1995 zum Schutz

natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten und zum freien Datenverkehr

(ABl. L 281 vom 23.11.1995, S. 31).

DE 21 DE

HAT FOLGENDE RICHTLINIE ERLASSEN:

Artikel 1

Die Richtlinie 2011/16/EU wird wie folgt geändert:

(1) Artikel 3 wird wie folgt geändert:

(a) Nummer 9 wird wie folgt geändert:

i) Buchstabe a erhält folgende Fassung:

„a) für die Zwecke des Artikels 8 Absatz 1 und der Artikel 8a, 8aa und 8aaa

die systematische Übermittlung zuvor festgelegter Informationen an

einen anderen Mitgliedstaat ohne dessen vorheriges Ersuchen in

regelmäßigen, im Voraus bestimmten Abständen. Für die Zwecke des

Artikels 8 Absatz 1 sind verfügbare Informationen solche, die in den

Steuerakten des die Informationen übermittelnden Mitgliedstaats

enthalten sind und die im Einklang mit den Verfahren für die Erhebung

und Verarbeitung von Informationen des betreffenden Mitgliedstaats

abgerufen werden können;“.

ii) Buchstabe c erhält folgende Fassung:

„c) für die Zwecke anderer Bestimmungen dieser Richtlinie als Artikel 8

Absätze 1 und 3a sowie Artikel 8a, 8aa und 8aaa die systematische

Übermittlung zuvor festgelegter Informationen gemäß den Buchstaben a

und b dieser Nummer.“

(b) Folgende Nummern werden angefügt:

„18. „grenzüberschreitendes Modell“ ein Modell oder eine Reihe von Modellen in

mehr als einem Mitgliedstaat oder in einem Mitgliedstaat und einem Drittland,

wobei mindestens eine der folgenden Bedingungen erfüllt ist:

a) Nicht alle an dem Modell oder der Reihe von Modellen beteiligten

Parteien sind im selben Rechtsraum steuerlich ansässig;

b) eine oder mehrere der an dem Modell oder der Reihe von Modellen

beteiligen Parteien ist/sind gleichzeitig in mehreren Rechtsräumen

steuerlich ansässig;

c) eine oder mehrere der an dem Modell oder der Reihe von Modellen

beteiligten Parteien geht/gehen in einem anderen Rechtsraum über eine in

diesem Rechtsraum ansässige Betriebsstätte Geschäftstätigkeiten nach,

und das Modell oder die Reihe von Modellen ist Teil der

Geschäftstätigkeiten der Betriebsstätte oder macht deren gesamte

Geschäftstätigkeiten aus;

d) eine oder mehrere der an dem Modell oder der Reihe von Modellen

beteiligten Parteien geht/gehen in einem anderen Rechtsraum über eine

nicht in diesem Rechtsraum ansässige Betriebsstätte Geschäftstätigkeiten

nach, und das Modell oder die Reihe von Modellen ist Teil der

Geschäftstätigkeiten der Betriebsstätte oder macht deren gesamte

Geschäftstätigkeiten aus;

DE 22 DE

e) ein solches Modell oder eine Reihe solcher Modelle hat auf mindestens

zwei Rechtsräume steuerliche Auswirkungen;

19. „meldepflichtiges grenzüberschreitendes Modell“ jedes grenzüberschreitende

Modell oder jede Reihe grenzüberschreitender Modelle, das/die mindestens

eines der in Anhang IV aufgeführten Kennzeichen aufweist;

20. „Kennzeichen“ ein typisches Merkmal oder eine typische Eigenschaft eines

Modells oder einer Reihe von Modellen, das/die in Anhang IV aufgeführt ist;

21. „Intermediär“ jede Person, die während der Erbringung von Leistungen im

Zusammenhang mit der Besteuerung gegenüber dem Steuerpflichtigen die

Verantwortung für Konzeption, Vermarktung, Organisation oder Management

der Umsetzung der steuerlichen Aspekte eines meldepflichtigen

grenzüberschreitenden Modells oder einer Reihe solcher Modelle trägt.

„Intermediär“ bezeichnet darüber hinaus jede solche Person, die – unmittelbar

oder über Dritte, mit denen sie verbunden ist, – materielle Hilfe, Unterstützung

oder Beratung im Hinblick auf Konzeption, Vermarktung, Organisation oder

Management der Umsetzung der steuerlichen Aspekte eines meldepflichtigen

grenzüberschreitenden Modells leistet.

Damit eine Person als Intermediär fungieren kann, muss sie mindestens eine

der folgenden zusätzlichen Bedingungen erfüllen:

a) Sie ist nach dem Recht eines Mitgliedstaats eingetragen und/oder

unterliegt dem Recht eines Mitgliedstaats;

b) sie ist in einem Mitgliedstaat steuerlich ansässig;

c) sie ist in mindestens einem Mitgliedstaat bei einem Berufsverband für

juristische, steuerliche oder beratende Dienstleistungen registriert;

d) sie ist in mindestens einem Mitgliedstaat ansässig, von dem aus sie ihre

Tätigkeit ausübt oder juristische, steuerliche oder beratende

Dienstleistungen erbringt;

22. „Steuerpflichtiger“ jede Person, die ein meldepflichtiges grenzüberschreitendes

Modell oder eine Reihe solcher Modelle nutzt, um ihre steuerliche Situation

nach Möglichkeit zu optimieren;

23. „verbundenes Unternehmen“ einen Steuerpflichtigen, der mit einem anderen

Steuerpflichtigen auf mindestens eine der folgenden Arten verbunden ist:

a) Ein Steuerpflichtiger ist an der Verwaltung eines anderen

Steuerpflichtigen insofern beteiligt, als er erheblichen Einfluss auf diesen

ausüben kann;

b) ein Steuerpflichtiger ist über eine Holdinggesellschaft, die über mehr als

20 % der Stimmrechte verfügt, an der Kontrolle eines anderen

Steuerpflichtigen beteiligt;

c) ein Steuerpflichtiger ist über ein Eigentumsrecht, das – mittelbar oder

unmittelbar – mehr als 20 % des Kapitals ausmacht, am Kapital eines

anderen Steuerpflichtigen beteiligt.

Falls dieselben Steuerpflichtigen an der Verwaltung, der Kontrolle oder dem

Kapital von mehr als einem Steuerpflichtigen beteiligt sind, gelten alle

betroffenen Steuerpflichtigen als verbundene Unternehmen.

DE 23 DE

Bei mittelbaren Beteiligungen wird die Erfüllung der Anforderungen gemäß

den Buchstaben b und c durch Multiplikation der Beteiligungsquoten an den

nachgeordneten Unternehmen ermittelt. Ein Steuerpflichtiger mit einer

Stimmrechtsbeteiligung von mehr als 50 % gilt als Halter von 100 % der

Stimmrechte.

Eine natürliche Person, ihr Ehepartner und Verwandte in aufsteigender oder

absteigender gerader Linie werden als ein einziger Steuerpflichtiger behandelt.

(2) In Kapitel II Abschnitt II wird folgender Artikel angefügt:

„Artikel 8aaa

Umfang und Voraussetzungen des verpflichtenden automatischen

Informationsaustauschs über meldepflichtige grenzüberschreitende Modelle

1. Jeder Mitgliedstaat ergreift die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um die Intermediäre zur

Vorlage von Informationen bei den zuständigen Steuerbehörden zu verpflichten, und

zwar innerhalb von fünf Arbeitstagen, beginnend an dem Tag, nach dem der

Intermediär das meldepflichtige grenzüberschreitende Modell oder eine Reihe

solcher Modelle einem oder mehreren Steuerpflichtigen – nachdem er sich mit

diesem bzw. diesen in Verbindung gesetzt hat – zur Nutzung bereitgestellt hat, oder

wenn der erste Schritt in einer Reihe von Modellen bereits umgesetzt wurde.

2. Jeder Mitgliedstaat ergreift die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um den Intermediären

das Recht auf Befreiung von der Pflicht zu gewähren, Informationen über ein

meldepflichtiges grenzüberschreitendes Modell oder eine Reihe solcher Modelle

vorzulegen, wenn die Intermediäre nach dem nationalen Recht dieses Mitgliedstaats

über die Privilegien der Angehörigen von Rechtsberufen verfügen. In solchen Fällen

obliegt die Pflicht zur Vorlage von Informationen über ein solches Modell oder eine

Reihe solcher Modelle dem Steuerpflichtigen; die Intermediäre informieren die

Steuerpflichtigen über diese Pflicht, die sich aus den Privilegien ergibt.

Intermediäre können die in Unterabsatz 1 genannte Befreiung nur insoweit in

Anspruch nehmen, als sie ihre Tätigkeit im Rahmen der für ihren Beruf relevanten

nationalen Rechtsvorschriften ausüben.

Jeder Mitgliedstaat ergreift die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um sicherzustellen, dass

die Pflicht zur Vorlage von Informationen über ein meldepflichtiges

grenzüberschreitendes Modell oder eine Reihe solcher Modelle dem

Steuerpflichtigen obliegt, falls kein Intermediär im Sinne des Artikels 3 Nummer 21

existiert. Der Steuerpflichtige legt die Informationen innerhalb von fünf Arbeitstagen

ab dem Tag vor, nach dem das meldepflichtige grenzüberschreitende Modell oder

eine Reihe solcher Modelle oder der erste Schritt in einer Reihe solcher Modelle

umgesetzt wurde.

3. Jeder Mitgliedstaat ergreift die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um sicherzustellen, dass

nur derjenige Intermediär Informationen gemäß Absatz 1 vorlegt, der gegenüber dem

Steuerpflichtigen die Verantwortung für die Konzeption und die Umsetzung des

Modells oder der Reihe von Modellen trägt, falls an einem meldepflichtigen

grenzüberschreitenden Modell oder einer Reihe solcher Modelle mehrere

Intermediäre beteiligt sind.

DE 24 DE

Jeder Mitgliedstaat ergreift die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um sicherzustellen, dass

nur derjenige Steuerpflichtige Informationen gemäß Absatz 1 vorlegt, der für die

Vereinbarung des Modells oder der Reihe von Modellen mit dem Intermediär

verantwortlich war, falls die Pflicht zur Vorlage von Informationen über ein

meldepflichtiges grenzüberschreitendes Modell oder eine Reihe solcher Modelle dem

Steuerpflichtigen obliegt und ein einzelnes derartiges Modell oder eine Reihe

derartiger Modelle von mehreren Steuerpflichtigen, bei denen es sich um verbundene

Unternehmen handelt, genutzt wird.

4. Jeder Mitgliedstaat ergreift die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um Intermediäre und

Steuerpflichtige zur Vorlage von Informationen über meldepflichtige

grenzüberschreitende Modelle zu verpflichten, die während des Zeitraums vom

[Datum der politischen Einigung] bis zum 31. Dezember 2018 umgesetzt wurden.

Die Intermediäre und die Steuerpflichtigen legen gegebenenfalls bis zum 31. März

2019 Informationen über diese meldepflichtigen grenzüberschreitenden Modelle vor.

5. Die zuständige Behörde eines Mitgliedstaats, der die in Absatz 1 genannten

Informationen vorgelegt wurden, übermittelt die in Absatz 6 aufgeführten

Informationen im Wege eines automatischen Austauschs gemäß den praktischen

Regelungen nach Artikel 21 Absatz 1 an die zuständigen Behörden aller anderen

Mitgliedstaaten.

6. Die von einem Mitgliedstaat gemäß Absatz 5 zu übermittelnden Informationen

umfassen Folgendes:

(a) die Angaben zu den Intermediären und Steuerpflichtigen, einschließlich des

Namens, der Steueransässigkeit und der Steueridentifikationsnummer (TIN)

sowie gegebenenfalls der Personen, die als verbundene Unternehmen des

Intermediärs oder des Steuerpflichtigen gelten;

(b) Einzelheiten zu den in Anhang IV aufgeführten Kennzeichen, die bewirken,

dass das grenzüberschreitende Modell oder die Reihe solcher Modelle

meldepflichtig ist;

(c) eine Zusammenfassung des Inhalts des meldepflichtigen grenzüberschreitenden

Modells oder der Reihe solcher Modelle, einschließlich eines Verweises auf

die Bezeichnung, unter der es/sie allgemein bekannt ist (soweit vorhanden),

und einer kurzen Beschreibung der relevanten Geschäftstätigkeiten oder

Modelle, ohne Preisgabe eines Handels-, Gewerbe- oder Berufsgeheimnisses

oder eines Geschäftsverfahrens oder von Informationen, deren Preisgabe die

öffentliche Ordnung verletzen würde;

(d) das Datum, an dem mit der Umsetzung des meldepflichtigen

grenzüberschreitenden Modells oder des ersten Schritts in einer Reihe solcher

Modelle begonnen werden soll oder begonnen wurde;

(e) Einzelheiten zu den nationalen Steuervorschriften, deren Anwendung einen

Steuervorteil verschafft (falls zutreffend);

(f) den Wert der Transaktion oder der Reihe von Transaktionen innerhalb eines

meldepflichtigen grenzüberschreitenden Modells oder einer Reihe solcher

Modelle;

(g) die Angabe der anderen Mitgliedstaaten, die an dem meldepflichtigen

grenzüberschreitenden Modell oder der Reihe solcher Modelle beteiligt oder

wahrscheinlich davon betroffen sind;

DE 25 DE

(h) gegebenenfalls Angaben zu allen Personen in den anderen Mitgliedstaaten, die

wahrscheinlich von dem meldepflichtigen grenzüberschreitenden Modell oder

der Reihe solcher Modelle betroffen sind, einschließlich Angaben darüber, zu

welchen Mitgliedstaaten die betroffenen Intermediäre oder Steuerpflichtigen in

Beziehung stehen.

7. Zur Erleichterung des Austauschs der in Absatz 5 genannten Informationen nimmt

die Kommission die zur Umsetzung dieses Artikels erforderlichen praktischen

Regelungen an; hierzu zählen auch Maßnahmen zur standardisierten Übermittlung

der in Absatz 6 genannten Informationen als Teil des Verfahrens zur Festlegung des

gemäß Artikel 20 Absatz 5 vorgesehenen Standardformblatts.

8. Die Kommission hat keinen Zugang zu Informationen im Sinne von Absatz 6

Buchstaben a, c und h.

9. Der automatische Informationsaustausch erfolgt innerhalb eines Monats nach Ablauf

des Quartals, in dem die Informationen vorgelegt wurden. Die ersten Informationen

werden bis Ende des ersten Quartals 2019 übermittelt.“

(3) Artikel 20 Absatz 5 erhält folgende Fassung:

„5. Für folgende Fälle nimmt die Kommission nach dem in Artikel 26 Absatz 2

genannten Verfahren Standardformblätter, einschließlich der

Sprachenregelung, an:

a) für den automatischen Informationsaustausch über grenzüberschreitende

Vorbescheide und Vorabverständigungen über die

Verrechnungspreisgestaltung gemäß Artikel 8a vor dem 1. Januar 2017;

b) für den automatischen Informationsaustausch über meldepflichtige

grenzüberschreitende Modelle gemäß Artikel 8aaa vor dem 1. Januar

2019.

Diese Standardformblätter dürfen nicht über die in Artikel 8a Absatz 6 und

Artikel 8aaa Absatz 6 aufgelisteten Elemente des Informationsaustauschs und

andere mit diesen Elementen zusammenhängende Felder hinausgehen, die zur

Erreichung der in den Artikeln 8a und 8aaa genannten Ziele erforderlich sind.

Die in Unterabsatz 1 genannte Sprachenregelung hindert die Mitgliedstaaten

nicht daran, die Informationen nach den Artikeln 8a und 8aaa in einer

beliebigen Amtssprache der Union zu übermitteln. In dieser Sprachenregelung

kann jedoch vorgesehen werden, dass die Schlüsselelemente dieser

Informationen auch in einer anderen Amtssprache der Union zu übermitteln

sind.“

(4) Artikel 21 Absatz 5 erhält folgende Fassung:

„5. Die Kommission richtet bis zum 31. Dezember 2017 ein sicheres

Zentralverzeichnis der Mitgliedstaaten über die Zusammenarbeit der

Verwaltungsbehörden im Bereich der Besteuerung ein, in dem die gemäß

Artikel 8a Absätze 1 und 2 zu übermittelnden Informationen erfasst werden

können, um das Erfordernis des automatischen Austausch gemäß dieser

Absätze zu erfüllen, und stellt die entsprechende technische und logistische

Unterstützung bereit.

DE 26 DE

Die Kommission richtet bis zum 31. Dezember 2018 ein sicheres

Zentralverzeichnis der Mitgliedstaaten über die Zusammenarbeit der

Verwaltungsbehörden im Bereich der Besteuerung ein, in dem die gemäß

Artikel 8aaa Absätze 5, 6 und 7 zu übermittelnden Informationen erfasst

werden können, um das Erfordernis des automatischen Austausch gemäß dieser

Absätze zu erfüllen, und stellt die entsprechende technische und logistische

Unterstützung bereit.

Die zuständigen Behörden aller Mitgliedstaaten haben Zugang zu den in

diesem Verzeichnis erfassten Informationen. Auch die Kommission hat

Zugang zu den in diesem Verzeichnis erfassten Informationen, allerdings

innerhalb der in Artikel 8a Absatz 8 und Artikel 8aaa Absatz 8 festgelegten

Grenzen. Die nötigen praktischen Regelungen werden von der Kommission

nach dem in Artikel 26 Absatz 2 aufgeführten Verfahren festgelegt.

Bis dieses sichere Zentralverzeichnis funktionsfähig ist, erfolgt der in

Artikel 8a Absätze 1 und 2 sowie Artikel 8aaa Absätze 5, 6 und 7 genannte

automatische Informationsaustausch gemäß Absatz 1 dieses Artikels und

gemäß den einschlägigen praktischen Regelungen.“

(5) Artikel 23 Absatz 3 erhält folgende Fassung:

„3. Die Mitgliedstaaten übermitteln der Kommission eine jährliche Bewertung der

Wirksamkeit des automatischen Informationsaustauschs gemäß den Artikeln 8,

8a, 8aa und 8aaa sowie einen Überblick über die erreichten praktischen

Ergebnisse. Die Kommission legt im Wege von Durchführungsrechtsakten die

Form und die Bedingungen für die Übermittlung dieser jährlichen Bewertung

fest. Diese Durchführungsrechtsakte werden gemäß dem in Artikel 26 Absatz 2

genannten Verfahren erlassen.“

(6) In Kapitel V wird folgender Artikel angefügt:

„Artikel 23aa

Änderung des Anhangs IV

Der Kommission wird die Befugnis übertragen, gemäß Artikel 26a delegierte Rechtsakte zur

Änderung des Anhangs IV zu erlassen, um potenziell aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle oder

Reihen solcher Modelle in die Liste der Kennzeichen aufzunehmen, gestützt auf aktualisierte

Informationen über solche Modelle oder Reihen von Modellen, die sich aus der

verpflichtenden Offenlegung derartiger Modelle ergeben.“

(7) Artikel 25a erhält folgende Fassung:

„Artikel 25a

Sanktionen

Die Mitgliedstaaten legen für Verstöße gegen die gemäß dieser Richtlinie erlassenen und

deren Artikel 8aa und 8aaa betreffenden nationalen Vorschriften Sanktionen fest und treffen

DE 27 DE

die zu ihrer Anwendung erforderlichen Maßnahmen. Die vorgesehenen Sanktionen müssen

wirksam, verhältnismäßig und abschreckend sein.“

(8) In Kapitel VII werden folgende Artikel angefügt:

„Artikel 26a

Ausübung der Befugnisübertragung

1. Die Befugnis zum Erlass delegierter Rechtsakte wird der Kommission unter den in

diesem Artikel festgelegten Bedingungen übertragen.

2. Die Befugnis zum Erlass delegierter Rechtsakte gemäß Artikel 23aa wird der

Kommission auf unbestimmte Zeit ab dem Datum des Inkrafttretens dieser Richtlinie

übertragen.

3. Die Befugnisübertragung gemäß Artikel 23aa kann vom Rat jederzeit widerrufen

werden. Der Beschluss über den Widerruf beendet die Übertragung der in diesem

Beschluss angegebenen Befugnis. Er wird am Tag nach seiner Veröffentlichung im

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union oder zu einem im Beschluss über den Widerruf

angegebenen späteren Zeitpunkt wirksam. Die Gültigkeit delegierter Rechtsakte, die

bereits in Kraft sind, wird von dem Beschluss über den Widerruf nicht berührt.

4. Sobald die Kommission einen delegierten Rechtsakt erlässt, übermittelt sie ihn dem

Rat.

5. Ein delegierter Rechtsakt, der gemäß Artikel 23aa erlassen wurde, tritt nur in Kraft,

wenn der Rat innerhalb einer Frist von zwei Monaten nach Übermittlung dieses

Rechtsakts an den Rat keine Einwände erhoben hat oder wenn der Rat der

Kommission vor Ablauf dieser Frist mitgeteilt hat, dass er keine Einwände erheben

wird. Auf Initiative des Rates wird diese Frist um zwei Monate verlängert.

Artikel 26aa

Unterrichtung des Europäischen Parlaments

Das Europäische Parlament wird von der Annahme eines delegierten Rechtsakts durch die

Kommission, von gegen diesen vorgebrachten Einwänden oder von dem Widerruf der

Befugnisübertragung durch den Rat in Kenntnis gesetzt.“

(9) Anhang IV, dessen Wortlaut im Anhang der vorliegenden Richtlinie wiedergegeben

ist, wird angefügt.

Artikel 2

1. Die Mitgliedstaaten erlassen und veröffentlichen spätestens am 31. Dezember 2018

die Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften, die erforderlich sind, um dieser Richtlinie

nachzukommen. Sie teilen der Kommission unverzüglich den Wortlaut dieser

Vorschriften mit.

DE 28 DE

Sie wenden diese Vorschriften ab dem 1. Januar 2019 an.

Bei Erlass dieser Vorschriften nehmen die Mitgliedstaaten in den Vorschriften selbst

oder durch einen Hinweis bei der amtlichen Veröffentlichung auf die vorliegende

Richtlinie Bezug. Die Mitgliedstaaten regeln die Einzelheiten dieser Bezugnahme.

2. Die Mitgliedstaaten teilen der Kommission den Wortlaut der wichtigsten nationalen

Vorschriften mit, die sie auf dem unter diese Richtlinie fallenden Gebiet erlassen.

Artikel 3

Diese Richtlinie tritt am zwanzigsten Tag nach ihrer Veröffentlichung im Amtsblatt der

Europäischen Union in Kraft.

Artikel 4

Diese Richtlinie ist an die Mitgliedstaaten gerichtet.

Geschehen zu Brüssel am

Im Namen des Rates

Der Präsident

DE 29 DE

FINANZBOGEN ZU RECHTSAKTEN

1. RAHMEN DES VORSCHLAGS/DER INITIATIVE

1.1 Bezeichnung des Vorschlags/der Initiative

1.2 Politikbereich(e) in der ABM/ABB-Struktur

1.3 Art des Vorschlags/der Initiative

1.4 Ziel(e)

1.5 Begründung des Vorschlags/der Initiative

1.6 Laufzeit der Maßnahme und Dauer ihrer finanziellen Auswirkungen

1.7 Vorgeschlagene Methode(n) der Mittelverwaltung

2. VERWALTUNGSMASSNAHMEN

2.1 Monitoring und Berichterstattung

2.2 Verwaltungs-und Kontrollsystem

2.3 Prävention von Betrug und Unregelmäßigkeiten

3. GESCHÄTZTE FINANZIELLE AUSWIRKUNGEN DES

VORSCHLAGS/DER INITIATIVE

3.1 Betroffene Rubrik(en) des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens und Ausgabenlinie(n)

3.2 Geschätzte Auswirkungen auf die Ausgaben

3.2.1 Übersicht

3.2.2 Geschätzte Auswirkungen auf die operativen Mittel

3.2.3 Geschätzte Auswirkungen auf die Verwaltungsmittel

3.2.4 Vereinbarkeit mit dem mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen

3.2.5 Finanzierungsbeteiligung Dritter

3.3 Geschätzte Auswirkungen auf die Einnahmen

DE 30 DE

FINANZBOGEN ZU RECHTSAKTEN

1. RAHMEN DES VORSCHLAGS/DER INITIATIVE

1.1. Bezeichnung des Vorschlags/der Initiative

Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Rates zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU

bezüglich des verpflichtenden automatischen Informationsaustauschs im Bereich der

Besteuerung über meldepflichtige grenzüberschreitende Modelle

1.2. Politikbereich(e) in der ABM/ABB-Struktur31

14

14.03

1.3. Art des Vorschlags/der Initiative

Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative betrifft eine neue Maßnahme.

Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative betrifft eine neue Maßnahme im Anschluss an ein

Pilotprojekt/eine vorbereitende Maßnahme.32

Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative betrifft die Verlängerung einer bestehenden

Maßnahme.

Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative betrifft eine neu ausgerichtete Maßnahme.

1.4. Ziel(e)

1.4.1. Mit dem Vorschlag/der Initiative verfolgte mehrjährige strategische Ziele der

Kommission

Im Arbeitsprogramm der Kommission für 2017 ist eine gerechtere

Unternehmensbesteuerung als eine ihrer Prioritäten ausgewiesen. Einer der Aspekte,

die unter diese Priorität fallen, ist die Umsetzung des internationalen Abkommens zu

Gewinnverkürzung und Gewinnverlagerung (BEPS) in EU-Recht (legislativ/nicht

legislativ, einschließlich Folgenabschätzung). Der vorliegende Vorschlag zur

verpflichtenden Offenlegung von Informationen über potenziell aggressive

Steuerplanungsmodelle stützt sich weitgehend auf die Ergebnisse und Daten des

Aktionspunktes 12 des BEPS-Projekts der OECD zur verpflichtenden Offenlegung.

1.4.2. Einzelziel(e) und ABM/ABB-Tätigkeit(en)

Einzelziel

Durch die vorgeschlagenen Rechtsvorschriften sollen die Transparenz und der

frühzeitige Zugang zu Informationen verbessert werden, da die Behörden so in der

Lage wären, ihre Risikobewertung schneller und präziser durchzuführen und

rechtzeitig fundierte Entscheidungen darüber zu treffen, wie sie ihre

Steuereinnahmen schützen können. Wenn nämlich die Steuerbehörden Informationen

über potenziell aggressive Steuerplanungsmodelle erhalten, bevor diese umgesetzt

werden, dürften sie in der Lage sein, diese Modelle nachzuvollziehen und auf die

damit verbundenen Steuerrisiken zu reagieren, indem sie entsprechende

Gegenmaßnahmen ergreifen. Zu diesem Zweck sollten die Informationen

31 ABM: Activity-Based Management – maßnahmenbezogenes Management; ABB: Activity-Based

Budgeting – maßnahmenbezogene Budgetierung. 32 Im Sinne des Artikels 54 Absatz 2 Buchstabe a oder b der Haushaltsordnung.

DE 31 DE

idealerweise vorab übermittelt werden, also bevor ein Modell umgesetzt und/oder

angewandt wird. Dies würde es den Behörden ermöglichen, frühzeitig das Risiko

dieser Modelle zu beurteilen und gegebenenfalls Schlupflöcher zu schließen und den

Verlust von Steuereinnahmen zu verhindern. Wichtigstes Ziel ist die Entwicklung

eines Mechanismus mit abschreckender Wirkung, d. h. eines Mechanismus, der die

Intermediäre davon abbringt, solche Modelle zu konzipieren und zu vermarkten.

ABM/ABB-Tätigkeit(en)

ABB 3

DE 32 DE

1.4.3. Erwartete Ergebnisse und Auswirkungen

Bitte geben Sie an, wie sich der Vorschlag/die Initiative auf die Begünstigten/Zielgruppen auswirken

dürfte.

Erstens würde ein zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten erfolgender automatischer

Austausch offengelegter Informationen über potenziell aggressive

Steuerplanungsmodelle jeden Mitgliedstaat in die Lage versetzen, korrekt zu

beurteilen, ob ein bestimmtes Modell oder eine Reihe bestimmter Modelle

Auswirkungen (selbst unbeabsichtigt) auf den eigenen Staat hat, und zu entscheiden,

ob er entsprechende Vorkehrungen treffen möchte.

Zweitens dürfte die Tatsache, dass in Bezug auf potenziell aggressive Modelle mehr

Transparenz herrscht, auch einen stärkeren Anreiz schaffen, für mehr Fairness im

Steuerwettbewerb zu sorgen. Darüber hinaus dürften die verpflichtende Offenlegung

und der automatische Informationsaustausch in Bezug auf potenziell aggressive

Steuerplanungsmodelle Intermediäre und Steuerpflichtige davon abhalten, für

aggressive Steuerplanung zu werben bzw. diese zu betreiben, da nunmehr die

Steuerbehörden mehrerer Mitgliedstaaten über die Informationen verfügen, die ihnen

die Aufdeckung solcher Steuerplanungspraktiken und eine entsprechende Reaktion

darauf ermöglichen.

1.4.4. Leistungs- und Erfolgsindikatoren

Bitte geben Sie an, anhand welcher Indikatoren sich die Realisierung des Vorschlags/der Initiative

verfolgen lässt.

Der Vorschlag übernimmt die Anforderungen der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU, die er in

Bezug auf Folgendes ändert: i) die jährliche Übermittlung von Statistiken zum

Informationsaustausch durch die Mitgliedstaaten und ii) die Vorlage eines Berichts

der Kommission über die Grundlage dieser Statistiken, einschließlich der

Wirksamkeit des automatischen Informationsaustauschs.

1.5. Begründung des Vorschlags/der Initiative

1.5.1. Kurz- oder langfristige Anforderungen

Die Richtlinie 2011/16/EU über die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden wird

dahingehend geändert, dass die Intermediäre und – gegebenenfalls im Rückgriff –

die Steuerpflichtigen primär dazu verpflichtet werden, potenziell aggressive

grenzüberschreitende Steuerplanungsmodelle gegenüber ihren Steuerbehörden

offenzulegen. Diese Behörden teilen diese Informationen dann über ein System des

verpflichtenden und automatischen Informationsaustauschs mit anderen

Mitgliedstaaten. In diesem Zusammenhang müssen die Behörden die offengelegten

Informationen in ein Zentralverzeichnis einspeisen, zu dem alle Mitgliedstaaten

umfassenden Zugang haben werden. Die Kommission wird beschränkten Zugang zu

dem Verzeichnis erhalten, damit gewährleistet ist, dass sie über ausreichende

Informationen verfügt, um das reibungslose Funktionieren der Richtlinie überwachen

zu können.

1.5.2. Mehrwert aufgrund des Tätigwerdens der EU

Das Tätigwerden der EU im Hinblick auf die Offenlegung ist im Vergleich zu

Initiativen einzelner Mitgliedstaaten in diesem Bereich mit einem Mehrwert

verbunden. Dies liegt daran, dass die Offenlegung potenziell aggressiver

grenzüberschreitender Steuerplanungsmodelle – insbesondere in Kombination mit

dem Informationsaustausch – die Steuerbehörden in die Lage versetzen wird, ein

DE 33 DE

Gesamtbild der Auswirkungen grenzüberschreitender Transaktionen auf die gesamte

Steuerbemessungsgrundlage zu erhalten. Die EU kann daher besser als einzelne

Mitgliedstaaten die Wirksamkeit und Vollständigkeit des Systems für den

Informationsaustausch sicherstellen.

1.5.3. Aus früheren ähnlichen Maßnahmen gewonnene Erkenntnisse

Regelungen zur verpflichtenden Offenlegung potenziell aggressiver

Steuerplanungsmodelle gibt es in Irland, Portugal und dem Vereinigten Königreich.

Aus den vom Vereinigten Königreich veröffentlichten Daten geht hervor, dass die

Regierung die so gewonnenen Informationen dazu genutzt hat, jedes Jahr eine Reihe

von Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Steuervermeidung einzuführen. Seit 2004

wurden insgesamt 49 Maßnahmen erlassen, durch die im gesamten Vereinigten

Königreich Steuervermeidungsmöglichkeiten im Wert von 12 Milliarden

unterbunden wurden. Laut der Königlichen Steuer- und Zollbehörde (Her Majesty’s

Revenue and Customs) gibt es zahlreiche Belege dafür, dass DOTAS einen Wandel

der Steuervermeidungsbranche bewirkt hat.

1.5.4. Vereinbarkeit mit anderen Finanzierungsinstrumenten sowie mögliche

Synergieeffekte

Da mit dem Vorschlag die Richtlinie 2011/16/EU über die Zusammenarbeit der

Verwaltungsbehörden geändert werden soll, werden die Verfahren, Regelungen und

IT-Anwendungen, die bereits im Rahmen der genannten Richtlinie eingerichtet

wurden oder entwickelt werden, auch für die Zwecke dieser nun vorgeschlagenen

Richtlinie verfügbar sein.

DE 34 DE

1.6. Laufzeit der Maßnahme und Dauer ihrer finanziellen Auswirkungen

Vorschlag/Initiative mit befristeter Laufzeit

– Laufzeit: [TT.MM.]JJJJ bis [TT.MM.]JJJJ

– Finanzielle Auswirkungen: JJJJ bis JJJJ

Vorschlag/Initiative mit unbefristeter Laufzeit

– Anlaufphase von 2017 bis 2021,

– anschließend reguläre Umsetzung.

1.7. Vorgeschlagene Methode(n) der Mittelverwaltung33

Direkte Verwaltung durch die Kommission

– durch ihre Dienststellen, einschließlich ihres Personals in den Delegationen der

Union;

– durch Exekutivagenturen.

Geteilte Verwaltung mit Mitgliedstaaten

Indirekte Verwaltung durch Übertragung von Haushaltsvollzugsaufgaben an:

– Drittländer oder die von ihnen benannten Einrichtungen;

– internationale Einrichtungen und deren Agenturen (bitte angeben);

– die EIB und den Europäischen Investitionsfonds;

– Einrichtungen im Sinne der Artikel 208 und 209 der Haushaltsordnung;

– öffentlich-rechtliche Körperschaften;

– privatrechtliche Einrichtungen, die im öffentlichen Auftrag tätig werden, sofern

sie ausreichende Finanzsicherheiten bieten;

– privatrechtliche Einrichtungen eines Mitgliedstaats, die mit der Einrichtung

einer öffentlich-privaten Partnerschaft betraut werden und die ausreichende

Finanzsicherheiten bieten;

– Personen, die mit der Durchführung bestimmter Maßnahmen im Bereich der

GASP im Rahmen des Titels V EUV betraut und in dem maßgeblichen

Basisrechtsakt benannt sind.

– Falls mehrere Methoden der Mittelverwaltung angegeben werden, ist dies unter „Bemerkungen“ näher zu

erläutern.

Bemerkungen

Dieser Vorschlag stützt sich auf den bestehenden Rahmen und die bestehenden Systeme für

den automatischen Informationsaustausch über grenzüberschreitende Vorbescheide, der

gemäß Artikel 21 der Richtlinie 2011/16/EU im Rahmen einer früheren Änderung

eingerichtet wurde. Die Kommission entwickelt mittels Durchführungsmaßnahmen in

Rücksprache mit den Mitgliedstaaten Standardformblätter und -formate für den

Informationsaustausch. Was das CCN-Netz betrifft, das den Informationsaustausch zwischen

Mitgliedstaaten ermöglichen wird, so ist die Kommission für die Entwicklung eines solchen

33 Erläuterungen zu den Methoden der Mittelverwaltung und Verweise auf die Haushaltsordnung enthält

die Website BudgWeb (in französischer und englischer Sprache): http://www.cc.cec/budg/man/budgmanag/budgmanag_en.html

DE 35 DE

Netzes zuständig, und die Mitgliedstaaten verpflichten sich dazu, die entsprechende nationale

Infrastruktur zu schaffen, die den Informationsaustausch über das CCN-Netz ermöglicht.

DE 36 DE

2. VERWALTUNGSMASSNAHMEN

2.1. Monitoring und Berichterstattung

Bitte geben Sie an, wie oft und unter welchen Bedingungen diese Tätigkeiten erfolgen.

Die Mitgliedstaaten verpflichten sich,

- der Kommission eine jährliche Bewertung der Wirksamkeit des automatischen

Informationsaustauschs gemäß den Artikeln 8, 8a, 8aa (und dem vorgeschlagenen

Artikel 8aaa) sowie einen Überblick über die erreichten praktischen Ergebnisse zu

übermitteln;

- eine Liste statistischer Angaben zu übermitteln, die von der Kommission nach dem

in Artikel 26 Absatz 2 genannten Verfahren (Durchführungsmaßnahmen) zur

Bewertung dieser Richtlinie festgelegt wird.

In Artikel 27 der Richtlinie über die Zusammenarbeit der Verwaltungsbehörden hat

sich die Kommission verpflichtet, alle fünf Jahre, beginnend nach dem 1. Januar

2013, einen Bericht über die Anwendung der genannten Richtlinie vorzulegen. Die

Ergebnisse dieses Vorschlags (mit dem die Richtlinie über die Zusammenarbeit der

Verwaltungsbehörden geändert wird) werden in den Bericht an das Europäische

Parlament und den Rat aufgenommen, der bis zum 1. Januar 2023 veröffentlicht

wird.

2.2. Verwaltungs-und Kontrollsystem

2.2.1. Ermittelte Risiken

Folgende potenzielle Risiken wurden ermittelt:

- Da sich Struktur und Merkmale von Steuerplanungsmodellen ständig

weiterentwickeln, was dazu führen kann, dass einige der Kennzeichen in den

nächsten Jahren überholt sein werden, wird die Kommission durch die Richtlinie

ermächtigt, die Liste der Kennzeichen durch die Aufnahme potenziell aggressiver

grenzüberschreitender Steuerplanungsmodelle zu aktualisieren, gestützt auf neue

Informationen, die sich aus der verpflichtenden Offenlegung derartiger Modelle

ergeben. Zu diesem Zweck erlässt die Kommission gemäß Artikel 26a delegierte

Rechtsakte zur Änderung des Anhangs.

- Die Mitgliedstaaten verpflichten sich, der Kommission statistische Angaben zu

übermitteln, die anschließend in die Bewertung der Richtlinie einfließen werden. Die

Kommission verpflichtet sich, alle fünf Jahre einen auf diese Daten gestützten

Bericht vorzulegen.

- Speziell in Bezug auf den automatischen Informationsaustausch verpflichten sich

die Mitgliedstaaten, der Kommission eine jährliche Bewertung der Wirksamkeit

dieses Austauschs zu übermitteln.

2.2.2. Angaben zum Aufbau des Systems der internen Kontrolle

Damit die Kommission die ordnungsgemäße Anwendung der Richtlinie überwachen

kann, wird sie über einen beschränkten Zugang zum Zentralverzeichnis verfügen, in

DE 37 DE

das die Mitgliedstaaten Informationen über potenziell aggressive

grenzüberschreitende Steuerplanungsmodelle einspeisen.

Gemäß der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1286/2013 vom 11. Dezember 2013 wird Fiscalis

das interne Kontrollsystem durch die Bereitstellung von Mitteln für Folgendes

unterstützen:

- gemeinsame Maßnahmen (z. B. in Form von Projektgruppen);

- den Aufbau europäischer Informationssysteme.

Die wesentlichen Elemente der Kontrollstrategie sind:

Beschaffungsaufträge

Die in der Haushaltsordnung festgelegten Kontrollverfahren für

Beschaffungsaufträge: Die Beschaffungsaufträge werden erteilt, nachdem die

Kommissionsdienststellen sie dem üblichen Überprüfungsverfahren für

Auszahlungen unterzogen haben; dabei wird den vertraglichen Verpflichtungen und

den Anforderungen einer wirtschaftlichen Haushaltsführung und ordnungsgemäßen

allgemeinen Verwaltung Rechnung getragen. In allen Aufträgen zwischen der

Kommission und den Begünstigten sind Betrugsbekämpfungsmaßnahmen

(Prüfungen, Berichterstattung usw.) vorgesehen. Es werden ausführliche

Leistungsbeschreibungen erstellt; sie bilden die Grundlage für jeden einzelnen

Auftrag. Das Abnahmeverfahren richtet sich streng nach der TEMPO-Methodik der

GD TAXUD: Die Leistungen werden geprüft, gegebenenfalls geändert und

letztendlich ausdrücklich angenommen (oder abgelehnt). Keine Rechnung kann ohne

eine „Abnahmebestätigung“ beglichen werden.

Technische Überprüfung bei Beschaffungsaufträgen

Die GD TAXUD kontrolliert die erbrachten Leistungen und überwacht die

Arbeitsweise und die Dienstleistungen der Auftragnehmer. Sie führt zudem

regelmäßig Qualitäts- und Sicherheitsprüfungen ihrer Auftragnehmer durch. Durch

Qualitätsprüfungen soll kontrolliert werden, ob die Auftragnehmer in ihrer

tatsächlichen Arbeitsweise die in ihren Qualitätsplänen festgelegten Regeln und

Verfahren einhalten. Bei den Sicherheitsprüfungen liegt der Schwerpunkt auf

bestimmten Vorgängen, Verfahren und Einrichtungen.

Zusätzlich zu den oben genannten Kontrollen führt die GD TAXUD die

traditionellen Finanzkontrollen durch:

Ex-ante-Überprüfung der Verpflichtungen

Alle Verpflichtungen werden in der GD TAXUD vom Leiter des Referats HR und

Finanzen überprüft. Demzufolge werden also 100 % der gebundenen Beträge durch

die Ex-ante-Überprüfung abgedeckt. Dieses Verfahren bietet in Bezug auf die

Rechtmäßigkeit und Ordnungsmäßigkeit der Transaktionen ein hohes Maß an

Sicherheit.

Ex-ante-Überprüfung der Zahlungen

100 % der Zahlungen werden ex ante überprüft. Ferner wird jede Woche mindestens

eine Zahlung (aus allen Ausgabenkategorien) nach dem Zufallsprinzip für eine

zusätzliche Ex-ante-Überprüfung ausgewählt, die der Leiter des Referats HR und

Finanzen durchführt. Es gibt keine Zielvorgabe bezüglich der Abdeckung, da der

DE 38 DE

Zweck dieser Überprüfung darin besteht, Zahlungen nach dem Zufallsprinzip zu

überprüfen, um festzustellen, ob alle Zahlungen gemäß den Anforderungen

vorbereitet wurden. Die restlichen Zahlungen werden täglich gemäß den geltenden

Regeln bearbeitet.

Erklärungen der nachgeordnet bevollmächtigten Anweisungsbefugten

Alle nachgeordnet bevollmächtigten Anweisungsbefugten unterzeichnen

Erklärungen zugunsten des Tätigkeitsberichts für das betreffende Jahr. Diese

Erklärungen decken die Maßnahmen im Rahmen des Programms ab. Die

nachgeordnet bevollmächtigten Anweisungsbefugten erklären, dass die mit der

Ausführung des Haushaltsplans verbundenen Maßnahmen im Einklang mit dem

Grundsatz der wirtschaftlichen Haushaltsführung durchgeführt wurden, die

bestehenden Verwaltungs- und Kontrollsysteme in Bezug auf die Rechtmäßigkeit

und Ordnungsmäßigkeit der Transaktionen eine zufriedenstellende Sicherheit

geboten haben und die mit diesen Maßnahmen verbundenen Risiken ordnungsgemäß

ermittelt und gemeldet sowie entsprechende Abhilfemaßnahmen ergriffen wurden.

2.2.3. Abschätzung der Kosten und des Nutzens der Kontrollen sowie Bewertung des

voraussichtlichen Fehlerrisikos

Durch die Kontrollen wird sichergestellt, dass das Risiko der Nichteinhaltung der

Bestimmungen verringert wird und die GD TAXUD ausreichende Gewissheit über

die Rechtmäßigkeit und Ordnungsmäßigkeit der Ausgaben hat. Die genannten

Kontrollstrategiemaßnahmen verringern die potenziellen Risiken auf unter das Ziel

von 2 % und erreichen alle Begünstigten. Zusätzliche Maßnahmen zur weiteren

Risikoverringerung würden zu unverhältnismäßig hohen Kosten führen und sind

daher nicht vorgesehen.

Die insgesamt im Zusammenhang mit der Durchführung der vorgenannten

Kontrollstrategie anfallenden Kosten – für alle Ausgaben im Rahmen des Programms

Fiscalis 2020 – sind auf 1,6 % der insgesamt geleisteten Zahlungen begrenzt. Für

diese Initiative wird dieselbe Quote angestrebt.

Die Kontrollstrategie des Programms verringert das Risiko einer Nichteinhaltung von

Bestimmungen praktisch auf null und steht in einem angemessenen Verhältnis zu den

mit dem Programm verbundenen Risiken.

2.3. Prävention von Betrug und Unregelmäßigkeiten

Bitte geben Sie an, welche Präventions- und Schutzmaßnahmen vorhanden oder vorgesehen sind.

Das Europäische Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung (OLAF) kann gemäß den

Bestimmungen und Verfahren der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1073/1999 des

Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates34

und der Verordnung (Euratom, EG)

Nr. 2185/96 des Rates35

Ermittlungen, einschließlich Kontrollen und Überprüfungen

vor Ort durchführen, um festzustellen, ob im Zusammenhang mit einer

34 Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1073/1999 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 25. Mai 1999 über

die Untersuchungen des Europäischen Amtes für Betrugsbekämpfung (OLAF) (ABl. L 136 vom

31.5.1999, S. 1).

35 Verordnung (Euratom, EG) Nr. 2185/96 des Rates vom 11. November 1996 betreffend die Kontrollen

und Überprüfungen vor Ort durch die Kommission zum Schutz der finanziellen Interessen der

Europäischen Gemeinschaften vor Betrug und anderen Unregelmäßigkeiten (ABl. L 292 vom

15.11.1996, S. 2).

DE 39 DE

Finanzhilfevereinbarung, einem Finanzhilfebeschluss oder einem Vertrag, die/der im

Rahmen dieser Verordnung finanziert wurde, ein Betrugs- oder Korruptionsdelikt

oder eine sonstige rechtswidrige Handlung zum Nachteil der finanziellen Interessen

der Union vorliegt.

DE 40 DE

3. GESCHÄTZTE FINANZIELLE AUSWIRKUNGEN DES

VORSCHLAGS/DER INITIATIVE

3.1. Betroffene Rubrik(en) des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens und Ausgabenlinie(n)

Bestehende Haushaltslinien

In der Reihenfolge der Rubriken des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens und der

Haushaltslinien.

Rubrik des

mehrjährigen

Finanzrahmens

Haushaltslinie Art der

Ausgaben Finanzierungsbeiträge

14 03 01 GM/NGM36

von

EFTA-

Ländern37

von

Kandidate

nländern38

von

Drittlände

rn

nach Artikel 21

Absatz 2

Buchstabe b der

Haushaltsordnung

1A –

Wettbewerbsfähi

gkeit für

Wachstum und

Beschäftigung

Verbesserung der Funktionsweise

der Steuersysteme

GM NEIN NEIN NEIN NEIN

Neu zu schaffende Haushaltslinien

In der Reihenfolge der Rubriken des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens und der

Haushaltslinien.

Rubrik des

mehrjährig

en

Finanzrahm

ens

Haushaltslinie Art der Ausgaben

Finanzierungsbeiträge

Nummer [Bezeichnung

………………………………………] GM/NGM

von

EFTA-

Ländern

von

Kandidaten

ländern

von

Drittlände

rn

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Absatz 2

Buchstabe b der

Haushaltsordnung

[XX.YY.YY.YY]

JA/NEI

N JA/NEIN

JA/NEI

N JA/NEIN

36 GM = Getrennte Mittel / NGM = Nichtgetrennte Mittel. 37 EFTA: Europäische Freihandelsassoziation. 38 Kandidatenländer und gegebenenfalls potenzielle Kandidatenländer des Westbalkans.

DE 41 DE

3.2. Geschätzte Auswirkungen auf die Ausgaben

[Zum Ausfüllen dieses Teils ist die Tabelle für Verwaltungsausgaben zu verwenden (zweites Dokument im Anhang dieses

Finanzbogens), die für die dienststellenübergreifende Konsultation in CISNET hochgeladen wird.]

3.2.1. Übersicht

in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)

Rubrik des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens

1A Wettbewerbsfähigkeit für Wachstum und Beschäftigung

GD TAXUD Jahr

N39

Jahr

N+1

Jahr

N+2

Jahr

N+3

Jahr

N+4

Jahr

N+5 INSGESAMT

Operative Mittel

Nummer der Haushaltslinie: 14 03 01 Verpflichtungen (1) 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

Zahlungen (2) 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

Nummer der Haushaltslinie Verpflichtungen (1a)

Zahlungen (2a)

Aus der Dotation bestimmter spezifischer Programme finanzierte

Verwaltungsausgaben40

Nummer der Haushaltslinie (3)

Mittel INSGESAMT für die GD TAXUD

Verpflichtungen =1+1a

+3 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

Zahlungen =2+2a

+3 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

39 Das Jahr N ist das Jahr, in dem mit der Umsetzung des Vorschlags/der Initiative begonnen wird. 40 Technische und/oder administrative Unterstützung und Ausgaben zur Unterstützung der Umsetzung von Programmen bzw. Maßnahmen der EU (vormalige BA-

Linien), indirekte Forschung, direkte Forschung.

DE 42 DE

Operative Mittel INSGESAMT Verpflichtungen (4) 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

Zahlungen (5) 0,000 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

Aus der Dotation bestimmter spezifischer Programme

finanzierte Verwaltungsausgaben INSGESAMT (6)

Mittel INSGESAMT unter der

RUBRIK 1A des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens

Verpflichtungen =4+6 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

Zahlungen =5+6 0,000 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

Wenn der Vorschlag/die Initiative mehrere Rubriken betrifft:

Operative Mittel INSGESAMT Verpflichtungen (4) 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

Zahlungen (5) 0,000 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

Aus der Dotation bestimmter spezifischer Programme

finanzierte Verwaltungsausgaben INSGESAMT (6)

Mittel INSGESAMT unter den

RUBRIKEN 1 bis 4 des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens

(Referenzbetrag)

Verpflichtungen =4+6 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

Zahlungen =5+6 0,000 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

DE 43 DE

Rubrik des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens 5 Verwaltungsausgaben insgesamt

in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)

Jahr N Jahr

N+1

Jahr

N+2

Jahr

N+3

Jahr

N+4 INSGESAMT

GD TAXUD

Personalausgaben 0,069 0,069 0,028 0,014 0,014 0,194

Sonstige Verwaltungsausgaben 0,004 0,004 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,012

GD TAXUD INSGESAMT Mittel 0,073 0,073 0,030 0,015 0,015 0,206

Mittel INSGESAMT unter der

RUBRIK 5 des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens

(Verpflichtungen insges.

= Zahlungen insges.) 0,073 0,073 0,030 0,015 0,015 0,206

in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)

Jahr

N41

Jahr

N+1

Jahr

N+2

Jahr

N+3

Jahr

N+4

Jahr

N+5 INSGESAMT

Mittel INSGESAMT unter den

RUBRIKEN 1 bis 5des mehrjährigen

Finanzrahmens

Verpflichtungen 0,133 0,333 0,090 0,065 0,065 0,686

Zahlungen 0,073 0,133 0,290 0,075 0,065 0,050 0,686

41 Das Jahr N ist das Jahr, in dem mit der Umsetzung des Vorschlags/der Initiative begonnen wird.

DE 44 DE

3.2.2. Geschätzte Auswirkungen auf die operativen Mittel

– Für den Vorschlag/die Initiative werden keine operativen Mittel benötigt.

– Für den Vorschlag/die Initiative werden die folgenden operativen Mittel benötigt:

Mittel für Verpflichtungen in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)

Ziele und

Ergebnisse

angeben

Jahr N Jahr N+1 Jahr N+2 Jahr N+3 Jahr

N+4 INSGESAMT

ERGEBNISSE

Art42

Durch

schnitt

skoste

n

Anza

hl

Kosten

Anza

hl

Kosten

Anza

hl

Kosten

Anza

hl

Kosten

Anza

hl

Kosten

Ge

sa

mt

za

hl

Gesamtkosten

EINZELZIEL Nr. 143…

Spezifikationen 0,060 0,060 0,120

Entwicklung 0,140 0,140

Wartung 0,020 0,010 0,010 0,040

Support 0,020 0,020 0,020 0,020 0,080

Schulungen -

ITSM

(Infrastruktur,

Hosting,

Lizenzen usw.)

0,040 0,020 0,020 0,020 0,100

Zwischensumme für Einzelziel Nr. 1 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

EINZELZIEL Nr. 2 ...

- Ergebnis

42 Ergebnisse sind Produkte, die geliefert werden, und Dienstleistungen, die erbracht werden (z. B. Zahl der Austauschstudenten, gebaute Straßenkilometer). 43 Wie unter 1.4.2 („Einzelziel(e)…“) beschrieben.

DE 45 DE

Zwischensumme für Einzelziel

Nr. 2

GESAMTKOSTEN 0,060 0,260 0,060 0,050 0,050 0,480

DE 46 DE

3.2.3. Geschätzte Auswirkungen auf die Verwaltungsmittel

3.2.3.1. Übersicht

– Für den Vorschlag/die Initiative werden keine Verwaltungsmittel benötigt.

– Für den Vorschlag/die Initiative werden die folgenden Verwaltungsmittel

benötigt:

in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)

Jahr N 44 Jahr N+1 Jahr N+2 Jahr N+3 Jahr N+4 INSGESAMT

RUBRIK 5 des mehrjährigen

Finanzrahmens

Personalausgaben 0,069 0,069 0,028 0,014 0,014 0,194

Sonstige

Verwaltungsausgaben 0,004 0,004 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,012

Zwischensumme

RUBRIK 5 des mehrjährigen

Finanzrahmens

0,073 0,073 0,030 0,015 0,015 0,206

Außerhalb der RUBRIK

545 des mehrjährigen

Finanzrahmens

Personalausgaben

Sonstige Verwaltungsausgaben

Zwischensumme außerhalb der RUBRIK

5 des mehrjährigen

Finanzrahmens

INSGESAMT 0,073 0,073 0,030 0,015 0,015 0,206

Der Mittelbedarf für Personal- und sonstige Verwaltungsausgaben wird durch der Verwaltung der Maßnahme zugeordnete

Mittel der GD oder GD-interne Personalumsetzung gedeckt. Hinzu kommen etwaige zusätzliche Mittel, die der für die

Verwaltung der Maßnahme zuständigen GD nach Maßgabe der verfügbaren Mittel im Rahmen der jährlichen

Mittelzuweisung zugeteilt werden.

44 Das Jahr N ist das Jahr, in dem mit der Umsetzung des Vorschlags/der Initiative begonnen wird. 45 Technische und/oder administrative Unterstützung und Ausgaben zur Unterstützung der Umsetzung

von Programmen bzw. Maßnahmen der EU (vormalige BA-Linien), indirekte Forschung, direkte

Forschung.

DE 47 DE

3.2.3.2. Geschätzter Personalbedarf

– Für den Vorschlag/die Initiative wird kein Personal benötigt.

– Für den Vorschlag/die Initiative wird das folgende Personal benötigt:

Schätzung in Vollzeitäquivalenten

Jahr

N

Jahr

N+1 Jahr N+2 Jahr N+3 Jahr N+4

Im Stellenplan vorgesehene Planstellen (Beamte und Bedienstete auf Zeit)

XX 01 01 01 (am Sitz und in den Vertretungen der Kommission) 0,5 0,5 0,2 0,1 0,1

XX 01 01 02 (in den Delegationen)

XX 01 05 01 (indirekte Forschung)

10 01 05 01 (direkte Forschung)

Externes Personal (in Vollzeitäquivalenten: VZÄ)46

XX 01 02 01 (VB, ANS und LAK der Globaldotation)

XX 01 02 02 (VB, ÖB, ANS, LAK und JSD in den Delegationen)

XX 01 04 yy 47

- am Sitz

- in den Delegationen

XX 01 05 02 (VB, ANS und LAK der indirekten Forschung)

10 01 05 02 (VB, ANS und LAK der direkten Forschung)

Sonstige Haushaltslinien (bitte angeben)

INSGESAMT 0,5 0,5 0,2 0,1 0,1

XX steht für den jeweiligen Politikbereich bzw. Haushaltstitel.

Der Personalbedarf wird durch der Verwaltung der Maßnahme zugeordnetes Personal der GD oder GD-interne

Personalumsetzung gedeckt. Hinzu kommen etwaige zusätzliche Mittel, die der für die Verwaltung der

Maßnahme zuständigen GD nach Maßgabe der verfügbaren Mittel im Rahmen der jährlichen Mittelzuweisung

zugeteilt werden.

Beschreibung der auszuführenden Aufgaben:

Beamte und Zeitbedienstete Vorbereitung von Treffen und Schriftwechsel mit Mitgliedstaaten; Arbeiten an

Formblättern, IT-Formaten und Zentralverzeichnis;

Beauftragung externer Auftragnehmer mit Arbeiten am IT-System.

Externes Personal Entfällt.

46 VB = Vertragsbedienstete, ÖB = örtliche Bedienstete, ANS = abgeordnete nationale Sachverständige,

LAK = Leiharbeitskräfte, JSD = junge Sachverständige in Delegationen. 47 Teilobergrenze für aus operativen Mitteln finanziertes externes Personal (vormalige BA-Linien).

DE 48 DE

3.2.4. Vereinbarkeit mit dem mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen

– Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative ist mit dem mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen

vereinbar.

– Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative erfordert eine Anpassung der betreffenden Rubrik

des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens.

Bitte erläutern Sie die erforderliche Anpassung unter Angabe der betreffenden Haushaltslinien und der

entsprechenden Beträge.

– Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative erfordert eine Inanspruchnahme des

Flexibilitätsinstruments oder eine Änderung des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens.

Bitte erläutern Sie den Bedarf unter Angabe der betreffenden Rubriken und Haushaltslinien sowie der

entsprechenden Beträge.

3.2.5. Finanzierungsbeteiligung Dritter

– Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative sieht keine Kofinanzierung durch Dritte vor.

– Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative sieht folgende Kofinanzierung vor:

Mittel in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)

Jahr N Jahr N+1 Jahr N+2 Jahr N+3

Bei länger andauernden

Auswirkungen (siehe 1.6) bitte

weitere Spalten einfügen

Insgesamt

Geldgeber/kofinanzierend

e Einrichtung

Kofinanzierung

INSGESAMT

DE 49 DE

3.3. Geschätzte Auswirkungen auf die Einnahmen

– Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative wirkt sich nicht auf die Einnahmen aus.

– Der Vorschlag/Die Initiative wirkt sich auf die Einnahmen aus, und zwar

– auf die Eigenmittel

– auf die sonstigen Einnahmen

in Mio. EUR (3 Dezimalstellen)

Einnahmenlinie:

Für das

laufende

Haushaltsjahr

zur Verfügung

stehende

Mittel

Auswirkungen des Vorschlags/der Initiative1

Jahr N Jahr N+1 Jahr N+2 Jahr N+3 Bei länger andauernden Auswirkungen

(siehe 1.6) bitte weitere Spalten einfügen

Artikel …............

Bitte geben Sie für die sonstigen zweckgebundenen Einnahmen die betreffende(n) Ausgabenlinie(n)

an.

Bitte geben Sie an, wie die Auswirkungen auf die Einnahmen berechnet werden.

1 Bei den traditionellen Eigenmitteln (Zölle, Zuckerabgaben) sind die Beträge netto, d. h. abzüglich 25 %

für Erhebungskosten, anzugeben.