Immigrants Human Rights Participation

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Migration, International Telecommunications, and

Human Rights1

Rob Clark, and Jason Hall2

World polity embeddedness has traditionally been measured by state and civil participation in formal

venues, including international organizations, multilateral agreements, and world conferences. In this

study, we highlight an alternative form of embeddedness found in cross-national social relations and

apply this framework to the human rights sector of the world polity. Specifically, we propose that

the international migrant community diffuses human rights values and practices via (1) local

performance and (2) cross-national communication. Using data from the World Values Survey, we

first show that immigrants are more likely to embrace, and actively participate in, the human rights

movement. Next, using network data that report country-to-country bilateral flows, we observe ahigh degree of correspondence between international migration and telecommunications, confirming

previous studies that trace telephone traffic to the flow of people. Finally, analyzing a balanced data

set of 333 observations across 111 countries spanning the 19752000 period, we use ordered probit

regression to assess the local and cross-national effects of migrants on a states human rights record.

We find that a countrys immigration level and its in-degree centrality in international telecommuni-

cations both positively affect its Amnesty International rating, and that these effects are robust to a

number of alternative specifications.

KEY WORDS: human rights; international telecommunications; migration; social networks;world polity.

INTRODUCTION

The postWorld War II era has been characterized as a period of global-

ization, in which national societies have become increasingly integrated across

economic, political, and cultural lines. One manifestation of this global era has

been the formal organization of individual and state actors in public space. In

particular, the creation of the United Nations after World War II marked a

transition toward international governance, as a Westphalian conception of

1 W th k E ili H f B t f ki dl h i h d t Edit t Thi ti l i t

Sociological Forum, Vol. 26, No. 4, December 2011

DOI: 10.1111/j.1573-7861.2011.01288.x


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state sovereignty began to attenuate, and states began to formally recognize

international standards. The number of international governmental organiza-

tions (IGOs) has doubled during the second half of the twentieth century,while international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have increased

even more dramatically during this time, rising almost fivefold (Lechner and

Boli, 2005:130).

One consequence of this organizational emergence, according to neoinsti-

tutionalists, has been the mass diffusion of cultural models emanating from a

stateless world society (Meyer et al., 1997a), composed not only of interna-

tional organizations, but multilateral agreements and world conferences as

well. These world polity institutions have become renowned for spreading

cultural scripts to their constituent members and participants. In particular,international organizations have helped foster democracy (Paxton, 2002),

human rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005), same-sex rights (Frank and

Mceneaney, 1999), gender equity (Paxton et al., 2006), and environmentalism

(Schofer and Hironaka, 2005), as well as science (Schofer, 2004) and education

(Schofer and Meyer, 2005).

However, neoinstitutionalists do not typically examine alternative mecha-

nisms of diffusion that may operate in less conspicuous settings. In particular,

some scholars have begun to draw attention to the role of social networks in

diffusing cultural models (Koster, 2007; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Sun and

Barnett, 1994; Tsutsui and Wotipka, 2004; Wotipka and Tsutsui, 2008). We

build on this recent turn in the literature by examining the role of interna-

tional migration and telecommunications in spreading world polity scripts.

World polity institutions operate on a higher, symbolic level, disseminating

messages through official statements and evoking powerful images via public

ceremony and ritual, thereby shaping the hearts and minds of the world

citizenry in a highly abstract fashion. However, social relations may be criti-

cally important for translating these celebrated scripts into concepts that are

meaningful in local context, as well as sustaining their legitimacy in between

the many speeches, handshakes, and treaty ratifications that comprise the

world politys ritual enactments.

In this study, we examine the effect of international migration and tele-

communications on human rights, an important sector of the world polity that

has increasingly drawn attention from scholars adopting a neoinstitutional

approach (Cole, 2005, 2006, 2009; Hafner-Burton, 2005; Hafner-Burton and

Tsutsui, 2005, 2007). We first propose that members of the international

migrant community are more likely to embrace, and participate in, the human

rights movement. Using data from several waves of the World Values Survey,

we show that migrants are more likely to join human rights organizations,

volunteer to do human rights work and approve of the human rights move-

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are empowered with certain rights and protections that are applied equally

and universally. Our data from the World Values Survey show that immi-

grants are more likely to prioritize the preservation of individual freedom.Moreover, immigrants are less likely to express national pride and are more

likely to embrace a global identity, rather than express belonging to a more

restricted geographic territory (e.g., continent, country, region, locality). In

addition, human rights may be important to immigrants because, lacking the

full legal protection afforded to citizens, immigrants are perhaps more vulnera-

ble to human rights abuses themselves. Accordingly, we find that immigrants

rate the human rights performance of the country in which they reside more

negatively than do natives.

Second, we propose that migrants diffuse human rights values and prac-tices through (1) local performance and (2) cross-national communication. We

capture local diffusion using each states migration level, hypothesizing that

countries with larger immigrant populations improve their human rights

record significantly more than countries with smaller immigrant populations.

We capture cross-national diffusion using each states level of centrality in

international telecommunications. Past research indicates that international

telephone traffic closely mirrors the cross-national flow of people (Kellerman,

1990, 1992; Palm, 2002; Tang, 2003; Vertovec, 2004). Using network data that

report country-to-country bilateral flows, we examine this social dimension of

telecommunications, comparing bilateral flows in migration to that of tele-

phone traffic. We generally observe a high degree of correspondence, but with

significant regional variation. We also find that migrant inflows correspond

with outbound telephone traffic more so than inbound traffic, suggesting that

migrants tend to initiate calls and that the diffusion of human rights scripts is

best captured using a countrys level of in-degree centrality, as this indicates

the extent to which countries receive world polity scripts from migrants.

Next, we present results from our main analyses. Using a balanced sample

of 333 observations across 111 states spanning the 19752000 period, we use

ordered probit regression to estimate the impact of international migration

and telecommunications on a countrys Amnesty International rating, net of a

broad set of controls typically used in human rights research. We find that a

countrys level of migration (i.e., a states foreign-born population as a share

of the total) and its in-degree centrality in telecommunications (i.e., the num-

ber of minutes of inbound international telephone calls that a state receives)

both positively affect its Amnesty rating, producing effects that are robust to

a number of alternative specifications. We also show that a states out-degree

centrality in international telecommunications has no substantial impact on its

human rights performance, suggesting that the hypothesized causal mechanism

(i e receiving human rights scripts) is indeed operative Finally we show that

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WORLD POLITY DIFFUSION

Neoinstitutionalists studying the world polity propose that a world soci-ety has emerged, generating organizational models that nation-states adopt

for themselves (Meyer et al., 1997a). Traditionally, scholars from the world

polity school have noted the widespread adoption of formal scripts, resulting

in the institutional homogenization of nation-states. World polity researchers

point to the diffusion of a diverse set of models, including womens suffrage

(Ramirez et al. 1997), liberalized same-sex policies (Frank and Mceneaney,

1999), environmentalism (Frank, 1997; Frank et al., 2000; Meyer et al.,

1997b), science (Drori et al., 2003; Schofer, 2003), and formal schooling

(Meyer et al., 1992; Schofer and Meyer, 2005).More recently, however, world polity scholars have nuanced this position

and have shown that states that are highly embedded in world polity institu-

tions tend to adopt cultural scripts more quickly than those states that are

less centrally integrated. While previous studies have featured a number of

different indicators to represent world polity institutions, scholars most

commonly use some measure of international nongovernmental organizations

(INGOs) (Drori et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2007; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui,

2005, 2007; Paxton et al., 2006; Schafer, 1999; Schofer and Meyer, 2005;

Swiss, 2009), as they are widely considered to be the primary carriers of world

culture, setting global standards and principles (Boli and Thomas, 1997). More

generally, researchers frequently use both governmental and nongovernmental

organizations (IGOs and INGOs) to represent linkages to the world polity

(Beckfield, 2003; Boli et al., 1999; Frank et al., 2000; Sandholtz and Gray,

2003; Schofer, 2004). In addition, scholars have occasionally supplemented

IGO and INGO indicators with some measure of international treaties (Frank,

1997; Frank and McEneaney, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997b; Schofer and

Hironaka, 2005), as well as participation in world conferences (Cole, 2005,

2006). In short, world polity scholars have traditionally linked the spread of

cultural models to mechanisms associated with state and civil participation in

formal venues.

Nevertheless, there is good reason to suspect that cross-border social

relations may also play an important role in diffusing cultural models. For

example, simulation research shows that the expansion of communication

accelerates cultural change and produces cultural isomorphism across actors

(Greig, 2002). Indeed, scholars have begun proposing that social ties are

relevant for understanding cultural diffusion (Schofer and Hironaka, 2005:

3031). Moreover, studies have begun to provide empirical support for the

idea that cross-border social ties are an important set of relations for under-

standing cultural diffusion For example Sandholtz and Gray (2003) create a



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expose people to human rights norms. Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004) argue that

tourist flows create human networks that link people to global civil society.

They find that a countrys level of incoming tourism positively predicts itsmembership level in human rights INGOs, net of its total international organi-

zation memberships. Koster (2007) finds that a countrys level of social open-

ness, a composite measure that includes items such as outgoing telephone

traffic, average cost of telephone calls to the United States, international

tourism, foreign population, and Internet hosts and users, significantly predicts

its citizens level of willingness to help immigrants. Finally, past research has

linked a states position in the international telecommunications network to its

level of democracy, showing that central states are significantly more demo-

cratic than peripheral states (Sun and Barnett, 1994). In sum, these studiessuggest that, above and beyond the work accomplished by traditional world

polity institutions, cross-border social ties also represent an important set of

mechanisms for diffusing cultural scripts.

THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT COMMUNITY AND LOCAL

PERFORMANCE

In this study, we propose that the international migrant community

diffuses human rights values and practices via two mechanisms: (1) local

performance and (2) cross-national communication. To demonstrate the first

mechanism, it is important to establish how migrants differ from natives with

respect to attitudes and behaviors regarding human rights. Thus, in this sec-

tion, we draw from data covering several waves of the World Values Survey

(2006) to examine whether migrants are more likely than natives to endorse

human rights principles and actively participate in human rights institutions.

Table I presents seven questionnaire items and the responses to each item,

organized by nativity. The first two items are behavioral questions, asking

respondents to indicate (1) whether they are members of a human rights orga-

nization and (2) whether they participate in unpaid human rights work. In this

survey wave (19992004), nativity is indicated by whether respondents are citi-

zens in the country in which they currently reside. While 3.04% of citizens

indicate that they are members of a human rights organization, 4.36% of

noncitizens indicate that they are members. Likewise, while 1.39% of citizens

indicate that they participate in unpaid human rights work, twice as many

noncitizens (2.78%) indicate that they participate. The third survey item is an

attitudinal question asking respondents to indicate their level of approval for

the human rights movement. In this survey wave (19891993), nativity is indi-

cated by whether respondents were born in the country in which they currently

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immigrants on this item (3.73) is higher than that of natives (3.58), indicating

that, on the whole, immigrants express greater approval for the human rights

movement. In sum, these results suggest that migrants more actively embracehuman rights principles and participate in human rights activities.

Table I. Human Rights Practices and Attitudes, by Nativity

(1) Membership in human rights

organizations (19992004)

Noncitizens

(N = 1,653)

Citizens

(N = 39,264)0 = no 95.64% 96.96%1 = yes 4.36% 3.04%

(2) Participation in unpaid humanrights work (1999 2004)

Noncitizens(N = 1,653)

Citizens(N = 39,264)

0 = no 97.22% 98.61%1 = yes 2.78% 1.39%

(3) Approval of human rights movement(home or abroad) (19891993)

Not born incountry

(N = 97)

Born incountry(N = 10,615)

1 = strongly disapprove 2.06% 2.06%2 = somewhat disapprove 4.12% 4.54%

3 = somewhat approve 12.37% 27.10%4 = strongly approve 81.44% 66.29%Mean 3.73 3.58

(4) Human rights rating incountry (19941999)

Not born incountry

(N = 1,694)


1 = there is a lot of respect for individual human rights 1.89% 4.08%2 = there is some respect for individual human rights 23.61% 29.09%3 = there is not much respect for individual human rights 42.50% 44.50%4 = there is no respect at all for individual human rights 32.00% 22.32%Mean 3.05 2.85

(5) Maintain social order vs. respect individual

freedom (19941999)

Not born in

country(N = 3,702)

Born in

country(N = 55,515)0 = maintain order in society 50.22% 57.98%1 = respect the freedom of individuals 49.78% 42.02%

(6) World identity (19941999) Not born incountry

(N = 3,779)


0 = no 79.60% 91.02%1 = yes 20.40% 8.98%

(7) National pride (19941999) Not born incountry

(N = 2,901)


1 = very proud 37.54% 55.28%2 = quite proud 37.02% 31.24%3 = not very proud 17.10% 10.55%4 = not at all proud 8.34% 2.93%Mean 1.96 1.61

Source: World Values Survey (2006).



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rights practices in their country. While 4.08% of natives feel that there is a

lot of respect for individual human rights in their country, less than half as

many immigrants (1.89%) feel this way. Conversely, almost a third of immi-grants (32.00%) feel that there is no respect at all for human rights in their

country, while less than a quarter of natives (22.32%) feel this way. Accord-

ingly, the mean score for immigrants on this item (3.05) is greater than that of

natives (2.85), indicating that immigrants, on the whole, are more critical of

their governments human rights record than natives.

Another reason why human rights may be more salient and important for

migrants is that they embrace certain world cultural principles, such as indi-

vidualism and world citizenship. The fifth survey item asks respondents which

is the most important responsibility of the government: (1) to maintain orderin society or (2) to respect the freedom of individuals. Although immigrants

are almost evenly split on this issue (50.22% to 49.78%), natives prioritize

social order by a fairly wide margin (57.98% to 42.02%). Thus, consistent

with their attitudes and behaviors regarding human rights, migrants are more

likely to support norms that preserve the integrity of the individual vis-a` -vis

the state.

Migrants may also see themselves as world citizens who share a kinship

with all people, rather than as members of a particular race, ethnicity, or

nationality. In this way, transgressions committed against others are more

likely to be seen as a violation of human rights, rather than as justified on the

basis of some particularist ideology. Responses to the sixth and seventh items

suggest that migrants do adopt a more global identity. The sixth item asks

respondents to indicate which geographic group they belong to most: locality,

region, country, continent, or the world. We dichotomize this item into world

vs. other (world = 1). While less than 10% of natives (8.98%) express a

world identity, more than 20% of immigrants do so (20.40%). Finally, the

seventh item asks respondents how proud they are of their nationality. Over

half of natives indicate that they are very proud of their nationality

(55.28%), while less than 40% of immigrants feel this way (37.54%). Con-

versely, while over 25% of immigrants feel not very proud or not at all

proud (25.44%), about half as many natives feel this way (13.48%). Accord-

ingly, the mean score for immigrants on this item (1.96) is greater than that of

natives (1.61), indicating that immigrants, on the whole, feel less national

pride.

In Table II, we explore whether these differences between natives and

immigrants are statistically significant, net of controls, using a set of probit

and ordered probit models. We present results from seven models (one for

each survey item). Each cell reports the unstandardized coefficient with the

robust standard error in parentheses We control for each respondents coun-

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due to missing data for six of the nine countries included in the model. The

overall conclusion we draw from these models is that nativity is a significant

predictor of human rights attitudes and practices. The probit models for Items

1 and 2 reveal that citizens less actively participate in human rights institutions

than noncitizens, while the ordered probit model for Item 3 indicates that

natives express less approval towards the human rights movement.

The remaining items provide a clue as to why human rights are more

salient and important to immigrants. The ordered probit model for Item 4

indicates that natives are less likely to be critical of their governments human

Table II. Probit and Ordered Probit Models of Human Rights Attitudes and Practicesa

Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 7

Citizenship(0 = no; 1 = yes)

).130(.069)

).226**(.081)

Born in country(0 = no; 1 = yes)

).339*(.160)

).231***(.030)

).219***(.023)

).509***(.027)

).448***(.023)

Country 103 ).094(.056)

).192*(.076)

).086(.067)

.772***(.037)

.061**(.021)

).033(.028)

).338***(.018)

Gender(0 = male;1 = female)

.074**(.028)

.072(.037)

).022(.024)

.024(.018)

.001(.012)

).021(.015)

.054***(.010)

Age(15101 years)

.015**(.005)

).004(.007)

).004***(.001)

.001(.001)

).006***(.000)

).006***(.001)

).001(.000)

Age(squared) 103)

.123*(.054) .037(.070)Education level

(ordinal).382***

(.022).292***

(.029)).008(.015)

.089***(.009)

.149***(.011)

.140***(.008)

Income level(ordinal)

.027(.019)

).019(.025)

.040**(.015)

).036**(.012)

.017*(.008)

.051***(.010)

.001(.007)

States 33 33 9 10 39 40 41Observations 34,363 34,363 10,234 14,927 47,054 50,328 49,386Pseudo R2 .049 .032 .002 .016 .009 .026 .012

p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (twotailed tests).Notes: Each cell reports the unstandardized coefficient with the robust standard error in parentheses.a

Models for Items 1 and 2 include the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus,Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland,Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and theUnited Kingdom; model for Item 3 includes the following countries: Brazil, Chile, China, theCzech Republic, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, and Slovakia; model for Item 4 includes the fol-lowing countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania,Moldova, and Ukraine; models for Items 5, 6, and 7 consist of the following countries:Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Belarus, Chile,China (Items 6 and 7 only), the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland,Georgia, Germany, India, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, New Zealand,Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan (Item 7 only), Peru, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South

Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States, Uruguay, andVenezuela.



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express a world identity, while the ordered probit model for Item 7 shows that

natives are more likely to feel national pride. In short, the descriptive patterns

identified in Table I hold up in a multivariate context, as revealed by the anal-yses presented in Table II.

THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT COMMUNITY AND

CROSS-NATIONAL COMMUNICATION

To reiterate our core argument, we propose that the international migrant

community can significantly improve a countrys human rights performance

by diffusing values and practices that are consistent with the human rightsmovement. Locally, we capture the influence of migrants through the percent-

age of a countrys population that is foreign born. Cross-nationally, we sug-

gest that migrants diffuse human rights scripts when interacting with friends

and family via international telecommunications. In this way, migrants are

able to impact their society of origin, as well as their society of residence.

Contrary to the idea that international telecommunications are used

primarily to facilitate or conduct financial transactions, there is considerable evi-

dence that international telephone calls are predominantly social in nature. Past

research has shown the importance of migration and tourism in shaping interna-

tional telephone traffic (Kellerman, 1990, 1992; Palm, 2002; Tang, 2003; Verto-

vec, 2004). For example, the presence of immigrant populations within the

United States plays a significant role in determining telephone traffic flows to

and from the United States and the home country (Tang, 2003). Telephone calls

represent the social glue that connects migrant communities around the world

(Vertovec, 2004). While international telephone traffic has surged in recent

years, the increase among countries with strong migrant connections has been

especially pronounced (Vertovec, 2004). One factor contributing to the increase

in international telephone traffic, especially among migrants, has been the emer-

gence of prepaid telephone cards. Half of all telephone traffic accounted for by

prepaid cards is international, and they are primarily used by first-generation

immigrants. In fact, phone card distributors specifically target immigrant com-

munities within the United States (Vertovec, 2004). This suggests that, not only

do migrant flows drive international telephone traffic, but that migrants are the

ones that tend to initiate, rather than receive, these phone calls.

In this section, we examine these propositions more closely by comparing

bilateral migrant flows to bilateral flows in telecommunications. Our migrant

data come from the recent pioneering work done by the World Bank (Parsons

et al., 2007), whose network covers 226 countries circa 2000. Our telecommu-

nications data come from the ITU TGIs Direction of Traffic Database (Inter-

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ple. In doing so, we address the following questions: (1) Are migrant flows

correlated with telecommunications flows? (2) Do the data provide any indica-

tion as to whether migrants initiate or receive telephone calls? and (3) Is theresubstantial regional variation in these patterns?

Table III reports correlation coefficients for all 111 countries in our sam-

ple. For each country, we calculated the level of correspondence between that

countrys set of migrant outflows (i.e., migrants leaving that country for

another destination) and its inbound traffic in telecommunications (i.e., the

number of minutes of inbound international telephone calls that it receives

from each country partner), as well as its outbound traffic (i.e., the number of

minutes of outbound international telephone calls that it sends to each country

partner). We then replicated these correlations with each countrys set ofmigrant inflows. Each cell reports the average coefficient for all countries in

that region, and the final row reports the overall averages.

First, there does appear to be a positive association between migration

and international telecommunications. The data on migrant outflows suggest

that the correspondence is fairly high, ranging from .387 in Africa (inbound

traffic) to .896 in Latin America (outbound traffic), and the overall average

Table III. Correlations Between Migrant Flows and Telecommunications Traffic, by Region

Migrant Outflows Migrant Inflows

Inbound Traffic Outbound Traffic Outbound Traffic Inbound Traffic

Latin America & theCaribbean (N = 22)

.867 .896 .494 .365

Europe & the West(N = 23)

.849 .843 .554 .498

North Africa & theMiddle East (N = 15)

.710 .687 .354 .198

East Asia & the Pacific(N = 15)

.608 .628 .307 .262

Central & Sub-SaharanAfrica (N = 36)

.387 .510 .235 .225

Overall (N = 111) .651 .695 .378 .311

Notes: Latin America & the Caribbean (N = 22): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay,and Venezuela; Europe & the West (N = 23): Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and theUnited States; North Africa & the Middle East (N = 15): Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel,Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the UnitedArab Emirates; East Asia & the Pacific (N = 15): Bangladesh, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia,Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, the Solomon Islands, SouthKorea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand; Central & Sub-Saharan Africa (N = 36): Angola, Benin,B t B ki F B di C th C t l Af i R bli Ch d C



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ranges from .651 to .695. The data on migrant inflows suggest a smaller degree

of correspondence, ranging from .198 in the Middle East (inbound traffic) to

.554 in the West (outbound traffic), with the overall average ranging from .311to .378. Clearly, in some cases, migrant flows mirror telecommunication flows

quite closely (e.g., Latin America and the West), while in other cases, the cor-

respondence drops off noticeably (e.g., Africa). Thus, we conclude that the

ability of telecommunications to capture the diffusion of world polity scripts

by migrants will vary considerably. Specifically, we hypothesize that the effect

of telecommunications on human rights will be weaker in those regions of the

world where the correspondence between migrant flows and telecommunica-

tions is weakest. In particular, we are most interested in the regional ordering

of the migrant outflow correlations (as we are more interested in a states abil-ity to receive human rights scripts from emigrants than in its ability to send

human rights scripts via immigrants), with Latin America ranked highest

(.867.896), followed by the West (.843.849), the Middle East (.687.710),

East Asia (.608.628), and Africa (.387.510). In sum, the propensity for emi-

grants to diffuse cultural scripts back to their country of origin would seem to

vary widely based on these correlations.

Finally, we use these data to examine whether or not migrants tend to ini-

tiate international calls. We are principally interested in this question in order

to learn how to best operationalize the diffusion of world polity scripts from

migrants. Our data suggest that migrants do tend to initiate contact. When

examining the migrant inflow correlations in Table III, we see that inflows are

more highly associated with outbound telephone traffic than inbound traffic

across all five regions. In separate analyses, our data show that a majority of

countries in all five regions feature higher correlations between migrant inflows

and outbound traffic than migrant inflows and inbound traffic. Almost every

country in Latin America (95.45%) and the West (95.65%) reports a stronger

outbound correlation, followed by the Middle East (80.00%), East Asia

(73.33%), and Africa (52.78%). The overall percentage of 76.58% indicates

that more than three-quarters of all states feature patterns where migrants

initiate telephone communication.

By contrast, the correlations for migrant outflows show no clear trend,

with Latin America, East Asia, and Africa featuring higher correlations with

outbound telephone traffic, and the West and the Middle East featuring higher

correlations with inbound telephone traffic. In separate analyses, our data

show that a majority of countries in Latin America (54.55%) and the West

(65.22%) feature higher correlations between migrant outflows and inbound

traffic, while the other three regions show a greater correspondence between

migrant outflows and outbound traffic (from 36.11% to 46.67%), and the

overall percentage is just below half (47 75%) In sum the lack of a clear

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TableIV.OrderedProbitModelsofAmnestyRating,

N=

333(111States)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

1.011***

(.107)

.915***

(.105)

.639***

(.131)

.993***

(.102)

.854***

(.111)

.633***

(.132)

1.067***

(.104)

.969***

(.105)

.674***

(.133)

.590***

(.136)

.601***

(.133)

.047

(.057)

).031(.079)

).038

(.068)

).096

(.075)

.032(.066)

).018

(.082)

).103

(.071)

).109

(.075)

).277***

(.072)

).081(.134)

).064

(.096)

.080

(.125)

).258***

(.072)

).046

(.123)

.118

(.124)

.042

(.136)

.513***

(.093)

.545***

(.131)

.535***

(.091)

.626***

(.130)

.506***

(.093)

.533***

(.126)

.590***

(.119)

.636***

(.136)

C

.105(.161)

).093

(.177)

.159

(.156)

.025

(.194)

).141

(.189)

).066(.184)

).141

(.187)

.013

(.188)

).182

(.185)

).215

(.186)

.039(.097)

.023

(.094)

).020

(.095)

.006

(.095)

.078

(.096)

ss

.123(.094)

).006

(.099)

.134

(.093)

.001

(.098)

).012

(.097)

on

.223

(.114)

.202

(.113)

.174

(.116)

.207

(.114)

.250*

(.112)

).424***

(.096)

).443***

(.094)

).407***

(.095)

).466***

(.097)

).459***

(.094)



13/28

TableIV.

(Continued)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

.187*

(.077)

.191*

(.074)

.204

*

(.087)

.196*

(.084)

.365***

(.075)

.343**

(.107)

.540**

(.181)

.567**

(.195)

.526**

(.178)

.174**

(.057)

.054

(.068)

.008

(.079)

).211*

(.096)

1.18

(1.18)

1.56

(1.25)

5.62

(2.63)

1.18

(1.18)

2.56

(1.81)

8.26

(3.56)

1.01

(1.01)

1.48

(1.29)

5.56

(2.64)

8.30

(3.49)

8.29

(3.44)

.122

.161

.183

.134

.163

.184

.122

.157

.178

.187

.188

2010

1947

1937

1985

1942

1935

2010

19

56

1946

1935

1933

.05;*

*p

Immigrants Human Rights Participation

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