Illinois Judge Charles Reynard screwed Alan Beaman and Donna Gaston Pt. 2
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Transcript of Illinois Judge Charles Reynard screwed Alan Beaman and Donna Gaston Pt. 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION ALAN BEAMAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) Case No. 10 CV 1019 JAMES SOUK, Former Assistant State’s Attorney, ) CHARLES REYNARD, Former McLean County ) The Hon. Joe Billy McDade State’s Attorney, JOHN BROWN, Former McLean ) County Deputy Sheriff, TIM FREESMEYER, ) Magistrate Judge Byron G. Cudmore Former Normal Police Detective, ROB ) HOSPELHORN, Former Normal Police Detective, ) DAVE WARNER, Former Normal Police ) Detective, FRANK ZAYAS, Former Normal Police ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Lieutenant, COUNTY OF McLEAN, ILLINOIS, ) and TOWN OF NORMAL, ILLINOIS, ) ) Defendants. )
PLAINTIFF’S CORRECTED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiff, ALAN BEAMAN, by his undersigned attorneys, for his complaint against
Defendants JAMES SOUK, Former Assistant State’s Attorney, CHARLES REYNARD, Former
McLean County State’s Attorney, JOHN BROWN, Former McLean County Deputy Sheriff,
TIM FREESMEYER, Former Normal Police Detective, ROB HOSPELHORN, Former Normal
Police Detective, DAVE WARNER, Former Normal Police Detective, FRANK ZAYAS, Former
Normal Police Lieutenant, COUNTY OF McLEAN, ILLINOIS, and TOWN OF NORMAL,
ILLINOIS, alleges as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This suit is brought to redress the enormous injury inflicted upon Plaintiff by
those individuals responsible for the investigation and prosecution of the August 1993 murder of
Jennifer Lockmiller. The above-named individual Defendants and other unknown co-
E-FILED Friday, 13 May, 2011 09:58:37 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
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conspirators, individually and in conspiracy, caused Plaintiff to be convicted of Lockmiller’s
murder a crime he did not commit and to spend over thirteen years of his life in prison.
2. The Defendants caused material exculpatory evidence to be concealed from
Plaintiff and his defense counsel, in violation of Plaintiff’s right to a fair trial under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the Defendants
developed evidence showing that Plaintiff did not have the opportunity to commit the murder
and that there was a viable alternative suspect in the murder. They caused this evidence to be
concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel. Had this exculpatory evidence been disclosed
to Plaintiff, Plaintiff would not have been convicted.1
3. The Defendants also caused the prosecution of Plaintiff with knowledge that there
was no probable cause to do so. The Defendants concealed material exculpatory evidence as
described above and Defendant Freesmeyer gave false and misleading testimony, causing
Plaintiff to be wrongfully indicted and convicted without probable cause.
4. The Defendants’ unconstitutional, malicious, and fraudulent conduct resulted in
Plaintiff’s wrongful conviction and incarceration for Lockmiller’s murder. As a direct result of
the Defendants’ misconduct, Plaintiff has unnecessarily endured extraordinary hardship and
suffered incalculable pain, for which he seeks redress in this suit.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the deprivation
under color of law of Plaintiff’s rights as secured by the United States Constitution as well as
deprivation of rights under state law.
6. This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.
1 The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s due process claim concerning the concealment of evidence related to the alternative “bypass route.” Plaintiff re-alleges these facts solely to preserve the issue for appellate review.
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7. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The parties reside, or,
at the time the events took place, formerly resided in this judicial district, and the events giving
rise to the claims asserted herein occurred here as well.
8. This action is properly filed in the Peoria Division of this District pursuant to
Local Rule 40.1(A) because the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in
McLean County, Illinois.
PARTIES
9. Plaintiff Alan Beaman, 38, currently resides in Rockford, Illinois. At the time of
his wrongful prosecution for the murder of Jennifer Lockmiller, Plaintiff was a 22-year-old
theater major attending Illinois Wesleyan University in Bloomington, Illinois.
10. Defendant James Souk was at all times relevant to this action employed as an
Assistant State’s Attorney by the McLean County State’s Attorney’s Office. Defendant Souk
participated in, supervised, and directed the Lockmiller murder investigation and also acted as
the primary prosecutor throughout Plaintiff’s criminal trial.
11. Defendant Charles Reynard was at all times relevant to this action employed as
the McLean County State’s Attorney. Defendant Reynard participated in, supervised, and
directed the Lockmiller murder investigation and also supervised the criminal prosecution of
Plaintiff.
12. Defendant John Brown was at all times relevant to this action employed as a
McLean County Deputy Sheriff. Defendant Brown participated in, supervised, and ratified the
decisions taken in the course of the Lockmiller murder investigation.
13. Defendant Timothy Freesmeyer was at all times relevant to this action employed
as a Detective in the Normal Police Department. Defendant Freesmeyer participated in the
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Lockmiller murder investigation. In or around October 1993, Defendant Freesmeyer was
appointed the lead investigator in the Lockmiller murder investigation.
14. Defendant Rob Hospelhorn was at all times relevant to this action employed as a
Detective in the Normal Police Department. Defendant Hospelhorn participated in the
Lockmiller murder investigation.
15. Defendant Dave Warner was at all times relevant to this action employed as a
Detective in the Normal Police Department. Defendant Warner participated in the Lockmiller
murder investigation.
16. Defendant Frank Zayas was at all times relevant to this action employed as a
Lieutenant in the Normal Police Department. Defendant Zayas participated in, supervised, and
ratified the decisions taken in the course of the Lockmiller murder investigation.
17. Defendant County of McLean is a political subdivision of the State of Illinois. At
all times relevant to this action, the County of McLean was the employer and principal of
Defendants Souk, Reynard, and Brown.
18. Defendant Town of Normal is a political subdivision of the State of Illinois. At
all times relevant to this action, the Town of Normal was the employer and principal of
Defendants Freesmeyer, Hospelhorn, Warner, and Zayas.
19. All of the individual Defendants are sued in their individual capacities. Each of
the individual Defendants acted within the scope of his employment and under color of state law
while engaging in the actions alleged in this complaint and at all times relevant to this action.
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT
The Murder of Jennifer Lockmiller
20. On Saturday, August 28, 1993, shortly after 2:00 p.m., Normal police officers,
including Defendants Hospelhorn and Warner, responded to the apartment of Jennifer
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Lockmiller, a 21-year-old Illinois State University student who resided near the university’s
campus in Normal, Illinois. The officers discovered Lockmiller’s severely decomposed and
partially unclothed body on the floor of her bedroom, with an electrical cord from an alarm
clock wrapped around her throat and a box fan lying across her face. Lockmiller had also been
stabbed with a pair of scissors, which were buried in her chest up to the handles. The autopsy,
conducted the next morning, indicated that Lockmiller had died of ligature strangulation with
the electrical cord from the alarm clock.
21. The bizarre murder of a young college student in her apartment quickly became a
high profile story in the “twin” college towns of Normal and Bloomington, Illinois. The
impending start of the school year and return of the students to both ISU in Normal and IWU in
Bloomington placed extreme pressure on the Defendants to solve the murder.
22. Because of the high-profile nature of the case, Defendants Souk and Reynard
were actively involved in the Lockmiller murder investigation from day one. They remained
intimately involved throughout the course of the investigation so much so that in or around
late September or early October 1993, the individual Normal police officer Defendants began
conducting their investigation of the Lockmiller murder out of a work space at the McLean
County State’s Attorney’s Office. In addition, Reynard and Souk both approved a series of
“consensual overhear” requests, taped conversations that were later used as evidence against
Plaintiff at trial. Souk and Reynard also participated in the daily “investigators’ meetings” held
at the Normal Police Department, during which the State’s Attorneys and detectives planned
strategy, discussed the available evidence, and developed potential suspects. It was during one
or more of these meetings that the investigative team, which included defendants Zayas,
Hospelhorn, Brown, Warner, Freesmeyer, Souk, and Reynard, made the decision not to disclose
evidence to the defense concerning the existence of John Doe as an alternative suspect. During
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another such meeting, in May 1994, the team decided to arrest Plaintiff for the murder of
Lockmiller.
23. Defendant Freesmeyer, who in or around October 1993 became the lead detective
in the Lockmiller murder investigation, had never managed a murder investigation before. He
had a strong incentive to solve the murder to establish his reputation as an effective investigator.
The pressures of Freesmeyer’s career, coupled with his inexperience, compromised his ability to
conduct a fair investigation.
Tunnel Vision: Immediate Focus on Plaintiff
24. Because there were no signs of forced entry or a struggle at the crime scene, the
Defendants immediately assumed that Lockmiller was murdered by an acquaintance. They
focused their investigation entirely on Lockmiller’s romantic interests, making no effort to
investigate any alternative scenarios for her death.
25. Within hours of the discovery of Lockmiller’s body, Plaintiff was the prime
suspect in her murder. He and Lockmiller had begun dating in or around July 1992 and had
broken off their relationship approximately one month prior to the murder. At the time of the
murder, however, Plaintiff was living at his parents’ home in Rockford, Illinois approximately
140 miles away from Normal. In fact, Plaintiff was completely innocent of any involvement
whatsoever in Lockmiller’s murder and he had no knowledge of who had committed the crime.
26. Plaintiff remained the main suspect throughout the investigation, despite the fact
that the Defendants were unable to locate any physical evidence definitively linking him to the
crime scene.
27. Further, although the decomposed state of the body made it impossible to pinpoint
the exact time or date of Lockmiller’s death, the Defendants tailored their theory of the crime to
fit Plaintiff’s schedule. They theorized that the murder had occurred close to 12:00 p.m. on
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Wednesday, August 25, 1993 the only time that day at which Plaintiff could have even
conceivably had the chance to drive the two hours to and from Normal. The State maintained
this theory of the time of the murder at Plaintiff’s trial.
28. Focusing solely on Plaintiff, Defendants Zayas, Hospelhorn, Warner, Brown, and
Freesmeyer conducted superficial investigations of the following other potential suspects:
(a) Michael Swaine, who was Lockmiller’s current boyfriend and was living
with her at the time of her murder, was eliminated as a suspect and began
actively cooperating in the investigation of Plaintiff a mere four days after
the body was discovered, even though several of Lockmiller’s neighbors
reported seeing a car fitting the description of Swaine’s in the parking lot
of Lockmiller’s apartment complex on the afternoon of Wednesday,
August 25; four of Swaine’s fingerprints were lifted from the alarm clock
used to strangle Lockmiller; and Swaine’s DNA profile was found on
Lockmiller’s bedsheet. Despite the fact that this evidence was nearly
identical to the evidence developed against Plaintiff, Defendant
Freesmeyer relied upon Swain to help inculpate Plaintiff, requesting that
Swain conduct consensual overhears with Plaintiff, both in person and
over the telephone, though Swain himself was still a suspect. Other
individual Defendants, including Hospelhorn, Warner, and Reynard,
supported Freesmeyer’s use of Swain in the investigation.
(b) Stacy “Bubba” Gates, who, like Plaintiff, was one of Lockmiller’s former
boyfriends, was eliminated as a suspect despite the fact that he had
recently moved to Peoria to be closer to Lockmiller and that he and
Lockmiller had plans to see each other on the Saturday after the murder.
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(c) John Doe, another ex-boyfriend of Lockmiller’s, was never eliminated as a
suspect and had both the motive and opportunity to commit the murder, as
is more fully described below.2
Withholding of Material Exculpatory Evidence
29. Throughout the investigation, the individual Defendants developed exculpatory
evidence suggesting that Plaintiff did not have the opportunity to commit the murder and that
John Doe was a viable alternative suspect in the murder. The Defendants caused this evidence
to be concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel. Had the evidence been disclosed,
Plaintiff would not have been convicted.
Plaintiff’s Opportunity to Commit the Murder3
30. The Defendants concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel the fact that
their own investigation had confirmed Plaintiff’s alibi and essentially eliminated his opportunity
to commit the murder.
31. Plaintiff was videotaped leaving Bell Federal Savings & Loan in Rockford at
10:11:43 a.m. on the day of the murder. Phone records also showed that at 10:37 a.m. that day,
a two-minute phone call was placed from Plaintiff’s residence to his church. At 10:39 a.m., a
one-minute phone call was placed from Plaintiff’s residence to the home of Mitchell Olson, the
church’s director of youth ministries and music.
32. The State’s case against Plaintiff heavily relied upon the theory that Plaintiff did
not make the phone calls from his residence on the day of the murder. Plaintiff’s mother, Carol
Beaman, testified that when she returned home at approximately 2:16 p.m. that afternoon,
Plaintiff was in his room and his car was in the driveway. If Plaintiff made the phone calls at
2 To protect his identity and to promote continued investigation, John Doe’s actual name is not being released into the public record at this time. 3 See fn. 1.
1:10-cv-01019-JBM-BGC # 63 Page 8 of 27
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10:37 a.m. and 10:39 a.m., it would have been practically impossible for him to drive the 140
miles to Normal, commit the murder, and drive back to Rockford in time to be home before his
mother arrived.
33. It was undisputed that only Plaintiff or Mrs. Beaman could have made the phone
calls. At trial, Mrs. Beaman testified that she did not make the phone calls.
34. Prior to trial, Defendant Freesmeyer and other unknown individuals conducted a
number of time trials between Bell Federal and Plaintiff’s residence to determine whether
Plaintiff had enough time to leave Bell Federal at 10:11 a.m. and arrive home in time to make
the first phone call at 10:37 a.m. Defendants Souk and/or Reynard were directly and actively
involved in the planning of these time trials. On information and belief, Defendant Souk also
participated in and was physically present with Defendant Freesmeyer on at least one of these
time trials.
35. On or around June 22, 1994, Defendant Freesmeyer recorded that the drive from
Bell Federal to Plaintiff’s residence, observing all speed limits, was 31 minutes. At trial,
Defendant Freesmeyer testified that this route went through downtown Rockford and was the
“most direct” route from Bell Federal to Plaintiff’s residence. Based upon this time trial
which was the only time trial presented to the jury Plaintiff would have arrived home at 10:42
a.m. The State highlighted the importance of this time trial to the jury, arguing that Plaintiff
could not have driven home from Bell Federal in time to make the phone calls. The evidence
regarding this time trial thus substantially bolstered the State’s theory that Plaintiff must have
driven from Bell Federal to Normal, committed the murder, and returned to his residence in
Rockford in the early afternoon.
36. Without documenting it in any report, Defendant Freesmeyer and other unknown
individuals had timed an alternate route from Bell Federal to Plaintiff’s residence at least once
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prior to trial. This alternate route (hereinafter referred to as the “bypass route”) bypassed
downtown Rockford by way of U.S. Route 20. Defendant Freesmeyer completed his drive from
Bell Federal to Plaintiff’s residence using the bypass route in 25 minutes more than enough
time for Plaintiff to have made it home by 10:37 a.m. to make the phone calls.
37. Defendant Freesmeyer omitted any mention of his time trial of the bypass route in
any written report or memorandum documenting the investigation. If a report of this or any
subsequent time trials of the bypass route ever existed, it was never disclosed. The reports that
were disclosed included only the time trials that supported the prosecution’s theory that Plaintiff
had taken the slower route home and thus did not make the phone calls, and omitted the time
trial that bolstered Plaintiff’s alibi the day of the murder. Defendant Souk testified in the post-
conviction proceedings that he did not feel he was obligated to tender the bypass timing results
to the defense.
38. At Plaintiff’s trial, Defendant Freesmeyer did not testify as to any time trial he
conducted using the bypass route.
39. Acting individually and in conspiracy with each other and other unknown co-
conspirators, the Defendants caused this exculpatory time trial evidence to be concealed from
Plaintiff and his defense counsel.
40. Had this evidence been disclosed to Plaintiff and his defense counsel, Plaintiff
would have shown that he made the phone calls from his residence at 10:37 a.m. and 10:39 am
and therefore did not have the opportunity to commit the murder.
John Doe as an Alternative Suspect
41. The Defendants also developed and concealed important evidence suggesting that
John Doe had both the opportunity and motive to commit the murder and was therefore a viable
alternative suspect. Throughout the investigation, each of the officers named in this suit (Zayas,
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Brown, Warner, Hospelhorn, and Freesmeyer) either interviewed John Doe himself, as
described below, or collected information about John Doe and his relationship with Lockmiller.
Detective Tony Daniels, who is not a defendant here, has stated that Doe was never cleared as a
potential suspect and that he was in fact a “stronger” suspect than Plaintiff. As detailed in
paragraph 44, below, the Defendants never informed either Plaintiff or his defense counsel of
exculpatory information regarding Doe that their investigation had uncovered. Had the
Defendants turned over all of the evidence they possessed regarding John Doe, Plaintiff would
have been permitted to present Doe as an alternative suspect to the jury and Plaintiff would not
have been convicted of the murder.
42. During their investigation of the Lockmiller murder in September 1993, Normal
Police Detective Tony Daniels and Defendant Hospelhorn conducted two interviews with John
Doe. Doe admitted that he was one of Lockmiller’s former boyfriends and that he and
Lockmiller had been about to rekindle their romantic relationship just before her death. He said
that Lockmiller and her new boyfriend, Michael Swaine, had stopped by Doe’s apartment a few
days before the murder. Doe also admitted that he had sold drugs to Lockmiller in the past and
that, at the time of her death, Lockmiller owed Doe money for marijuana.
43. Doe appeared to be evasive and very nervous during his interviews with the
police. In fact, he initially gave a false alibi for the day of the murder. During his first
interview, Doe claimed that he went out of town on August 24, 1993 the day before the
murder. At his second interview, Doe admitted that he did not leave his apartment in
Bloomington until 4:00 p.m. on August 25. Doe’s girlfriend informed police that on August
25th she was only with Doe from 2:00 p.m. until approximately 4:20 p.m. Doe therefore had no
alibi for the suspected time of Lockmiller’s murder.
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44. In addition to this evidence, the Defendants were in possession of the following
information, which was concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel:
(a) On September 30, 1993, Doe submitted to a polygraph examination at the
Illinois State Police Bureau of Forensic Sciences in Morton, Illinois.
Throughout the course of the examination, Doe did not follow specific
directions necessary for the proper completion of a polygraph examination
and ultimately informed the polygraph examiner that he was unable to
comply. The record of Doe’s polygraph examination is documented in a
report authored by Terrence McCann and addressed to Defendant Warner.
Tellingly, the report designates Doe as a “suspect.”
(b) In October 1994, Doe was arrested and charged with domestic battery
against his girlfriend and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.
Doe’s girlfriend told police that she was the victim of physical abuse on a
continual basis and that on that particular day, Doe had pinned her down
on the floor and elbowed her repeatedly in the chest.
(c) After his arrest, Doe’s girlfriend filed a petition for order of protection
against Doe. She stated that Doe had physically abused her on numerous
prior occasions. Additionally, she stated that Doe was taking injections of
street steroids, which caused him to act erratically.
Plaintiff did not become aware of this additional evidence regarding John Doe until his post-
conviction proceeding, at which time he promptly alleged that he had been prejudiced by the
failure to disclose it.
45. Acting individually and in conspiracy with each other and with other unknown
co-conspirators, the Defendants caused the information about Doe’s incomplete polygraph
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examination, drug and domestic violence charges, petition for order of protection, and steroid
use to be concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel.
46. In fact, Defendants Freesmeyer and Souk affirmatively represented that there was
no evidence implicating anyone else in Lockmiller’s murder. At the grand jury proceeding,
Defendant Freesmeyer falsely testified that he was unable to locate any other person who had
any conceivable motive to commit the murder. At a pretrial hearing, Souk told Plaintiff,
defense counsel, and the court that he knew of “no such evidence” with which the defense could
argue that any other party “might be found responsible” for the murder. At a subsequent pretrial
discussion, Souk argued that Doe was “six months removed” from the case and again
represented that there was no evidence suggesting that Doe was a viable alternative suspect.
47. Had the evidence regarding Doe been disclosed to Plaintiff and his defense
counsel, Plaintiff would have been permitted to present Doe as an alternative suspect at trial.
This evidence was highly material. Indeed, one of the State’s themes at trial was “[s]uspect
everyone in turn and then wipe him or her off the list.” The prosecutors also argued that the
State had “proved up everybody else’s” alibi but Plaintiff’s. The concealment of the evidence
regarding Doe’s motive and opportunity to commit the murder left Plaintiff without the means
to challenge these false assertions.
48. Had Plaintiff been permitted to present Doe as an alternative suspect, Plaintiff
would not have been convicted of the murder of Jennifer Lockmiller.
The Malicious Prosecution
49. On May 16, 1994, Defendants Reynard, Souk, Zayas, Brown, and Freesmeyer,
and potentially unknown others, met to review the facts of the case. According to Freesmeyer’s
police reports, during this meeting the Defendants decided to “effect the arrest of [Plaintiff] for
the homicide of Jennifer Lockmiller.”
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50. Plaintiff was arrested for the murder of Jennifer Lockmiller the very next day, on
May 17, 1994. In July 1994, a grand jury returned indictments against Plaintiff for two counts
of first degree murder. In March 1995, Plaintiff stood trial in the Circuit Court of McLean
County.
51. At trial, the only evidence the State presented to link Plaintiff to the murder was
wholly circumstantial. Specifically, the State’s theory relied upon 1) very questionable and
incomplete evidence that Plaintiff had only a tiny window of opportunity to drive 140 miles to
and from Normal to commit the murder on August 25, 1993, and 2) the false assertions that
there was no viable alternative suspect in Lockmiller’s murder. In reversing Plaintiff’s
conviction, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the State’s case was founded solely upon
“tenuous circumstantial evidence” of Plaintiff’s guilt.
52. The initiation and continuation of the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff were
the result of improper conduct by the Defendants. All of the individual Defendants caused
material exculpatory evidence to be withheld as is more fully described above. Defendant
Freesmeyer gave false and misleading testimony during the criminal proceedings as is more
fully described above.
53. As a proximate result of the Defendants’ misconduct described above, Plaintiff
was wrongfully indicted, convicted, and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois
Department of Corrections.
Conspiracy to Violate Plaintiff’s Rights Under Federal and State Law, and Failure to Intervene to Prevent Such Violations
54. The individual named Defendants engaged, and continue to engage, in a
conspiracy to conceal material and exculpatory evidence from Plaintiff and his defense counsel
concerning an alternative suspect, John Doe; to maliciously prosecute Plaintiff for the murder of
Jennifer Lockmiller; and to intentionally cause Plaintiff severe and lasting emotional
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distress. Because the individual Defendants made an express agreement to conceal all
information related to the existence of John Doe, and because each Defendant committed one or
more overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy, each is individually liable for conspiring to
violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right to due process and to maliciously prosecute Plaintiff and
intentionally inflict emotional distress upon him.
55. Defendants Freesmeyer, Hospelhorn, Warner, Brown, Zayas, Souk, and Reynard
entered into a voluntary agreement that they would not disclose to Plaintiff any information
concerning John Doe, and thereby insured that Plaintiff was wrongfully prosecuted for
Lockmiller’s murder. The individual Defendants held daily meetings during the course of the
investigation in which they discussed, among other things, the viability of potential
suspects. During one or more such meetings, the individual Defendants made an agreement or
series of agreements that they would not disclose the existence of an alternative suspect, John
Doe, to Plaintiff or his criminal defense counsel.
56. Pursuant to this agreement or agreements, the named officer Defendants
(Freesmeyer, Hospelhorn, Warner, Brown, and Zayas) purposefully omitted any significant
mention of Doe from police reports and any other records turned over to the defense. The
Defendants continued to conceal information about Doe after Plaintiff’s arrest, throughout the
pendency of his criminal trial, and after he was wrongly convicted for first-degree murder.
57. Each of the individual police Defendants committed one or more overt acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy to conceal this exculpatory evidence:
(a) Defendant Hospelhorn interviewed John Doe and John Doe’s girlfriend on
multiple occasions. During each interview, Doe gave different accounts of
his whereabouts in the days before Lockmiller’s murder, and it was John
Doe’s girlfriend who in fact informed police that Doe had previously lied
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about where he was when Lockmiller was killed. Hospelhorn, on
information and belief, was also present when Doe obtained an
inconclusive polygraph, after he attempted to “manipulate” the
examination.
(b) The other individual officers, Freesmeyer, Warner, Brown, and Zayas,
were also involved in developing information about Doe’s background
and obtaining evidence concerning his relationship with
Lockmiller. Though each of the individual detectives gathered evidence
that was indicative of Doe’s guilt, they continued their efforts to inculpate
Plaintiff for the murder and failed to document evidence relating to Doe.
(c) Defendant Zayas signed and approved his inferior officers’ police reports,
though they purposefully omitted mention of Doe as a suspect. Zayas also
participated in the consensual overhears that were used to further inculpate
Plaintiff in Lockmiller’s murder.
(d) Defendant Freesmeyer, as the lead detective on the case, made every effort
throughout the investigation to ensure that Plaintiff was found guilty of
Lockmiller’s murder, going so far as to lie about the existence of other
suspects at trial.
58. In the course of their participation in the investigators’ meetings, Souk and
Reynard learned about Doe’s existence and the circumstantial evidence suggesting his guilt.
Souk and Reynard agreed with the individual police Defendants that information about Doe
should be concealed. They also committed one or more overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy:
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(a) Souk and Reynard approved the overhear requests used to attempt to
develop evidence against Plaintiff.
(b) Souk signed the warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest.
(c) In a pre-trial conference, Souk intentionally and falsely stated that the
police had no other suspects, other than Plaintiff, for Lockmiller’s
murder.
(d) Throughout the investigation, Souk was in “daily contact” with
Freesmeyer, the lead investigator in the case; Souk reviewed all of
Freesmeyer’s police reports (both those that became part of the official
investigation record and those that did not); Souk “knew what was
important” in the investigation “and what wasn’t”; and Freesmeyer looked
to Souk for direction in handling the investigation.
59. Each of the individual Defendants knew that a constitutional violation, i.e., the
suppression of material and exculpatory evidence, had been and was being committed by other
named Defendants in this suit, and each had a realistic opportunity to intervene in order to
prevent harm to Plaintiff. Yet, none of the individual Defendants disclosed the concealed
information concerning John Doe, and thus each failed to intervene to prevent the violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiff’s Exoneration
60. On May 22, 2008, after a lengthy appellate and post-conviction process, the
Illinois Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts
upholding Plaintiff’s conviction. People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56 (2008). The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the suppression of material exculpatory information relating to John
Doe violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
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83 (1963). Accordingly, it vacated Plaintiff’s conviction and remanded to the circuit court for a
new trial.
61. After spending over thirteen years in prison, Plaintiff was released on bond on
June 26, 2008.
62. On January 29, 2009, the State chose not to initiate a new trial and dismissed all
charges against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s Damages
63. Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer enormous injury as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendants’ misconduct. Plaintiff spent more than thirteen years of his
life imprisoned for a crime of which he was completely innocent. He woke up each day with
this reality, not knowing whether he would ever succeed in proving the wrongfulness of his
conviction and incarceration.
64. During this time, Plaintiff was separated from his family and friends. He was also
deprived of the opportunity to continue his education, engage in productive labor, pursue a
career, and start a family.
65. Following his exoneration and release from custody, Plaintiff suffers from lasting
psychological damage, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. His reputation in his home
town of Rockford, Illinois, has also been irreparably tarnished. People in Plaintiff’s community
still believe that he murdered Jennifer Lockmiller, making it incredibly difficult for Plaintiff to
move on with his life. In addition to causing psychological damage, this has caused Plaintiff
extreme hardship, resulting, among other things, in Plaintiff’s loss of gainful employment.
COUNT I 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Due Process
66. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 65 as if fully set forth herein.
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67. As described more fully above, the individual Defendants,4 while acting
individually, jointly, and in conspiracy, as well as under color of law and within the scope of
their employment, deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
68. The individual Defendants, acting in conspiracy, withheld the exculpatory
material described in the preceding paragraphs from Plaintiff after his arrest and during the
pendency of the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff at all times, up to and including the time
of Plaintiff’s conviction.
69. In the manner described more fully above, the Defendants deliberately caused
material exculpatory evidence to be withheld from Plaintiff and his defense counsel, thereby
misleading and misdirecting the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff. The exculpatory evidence
concealed from Plaintiff and his defense counsel includes but is not limited to the following:
(a) reports of Defendant Freesmeyer’s time trial(s) from Bell Federal to
Plaintiff’s residence using the bypass route;
(b) the report of the polygraph examination administered to John Doe on
September 30, 1993;
(c) the police reports documenting John Doe’s arrest for domestic assault;
(d) the petition for an order of protection filed against Doe by his girlfriend
and the statements contained therein; and
(e) further and additional exculpatory evidence not yet known to Plaintiff.
Absent the Defendants’ misconduct, the prosecution of Plaintiff could not
and would not have been pursued.
4 The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants Souk and Reynard on the grounds of absolute immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. Plaintiff repleads the allegations against these Defendants for the purposes of preserving the issue for review on appeal.
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70. The Defendants’ misconduct directly resulted in the unjust criminal conviction of
Plaintiff, thereby denying him his constitutional right to a fair trial and a fair appeal thereof.
71. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was
undertaken intentionally with willful indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
72. As a direct and proximate result of this deprivation of his constitutional right to a
fair trial, Plaintiff suffered injuries, including, but not limited to, emotional distress, as is more
fully alleged above.
COUNT II 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Conspiracy
73. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 72 as if fully alleged herein.
74. All of the individual Defendants5 and other co-conspirators not yet known to
Plaintiff reached an agreement amongst themselves to deprive Plaintiff of material exculpatory
evidence and information related to the existence of John Doe as an alternative and viable
suspect, information to which he was lawfully entitled and which would have led to his more
timely exoneration of the false changes, all in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as
described above.
75. In this manner, the Defendants, acting in concert with other unknown co-
conspirators, have conspired by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose by an
unlawful means.
76. In furtherance of the conspiracy, each of the co-conspirators committed overt acts
and was an otherwise willful participant in joint activity.
77. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was
undertaken intentionally with willful indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 5 The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants Souk and Reynard on the grounds of absolute immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. Plaintiff repleads the allegations against these Defendants for the purposes of preserving the issue for review on appeal.
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78. As a direct and proximate result of the illicit prior agreement referenced above,
Plaintiff’s rights were violated. He suffered injuries, including, but not limited to, emotional
distress, as is more fully alleged above.
COUNT III 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Failure to Intervene
79. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 78 as if fully alleged herein.
80. In the manner described above, during the constitutional violations described
above, one or more of the individual Defendants,6 and other unknown individuals, stood by
without intervening to prevent the misconduct.
81. None of the Defendants took any steps to disclose to Plaintiff or his defense
counsel exculpatory evidence and information concerning John Doe, either during Plaintiff’s
criminal proceedings or anytime in the sixteen years since Plaintiff was convicted.
82. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was
undertaken intentionally with willful indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
83. As a direct and proximate result of this failure to intervene to prevent the violation
of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff suffered injuries, including, but not limited to,
emotional distress, as is more fully alleged above.
COUNT IV State Law Claim – Malicious Prosecution
84. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 83 as if fully alleged herein.
85. All of the individual Defendants caused Plaintiff to be improperly subjected to
judicial proceedings for which there was no probable cause. These judicial proceedings were
6 The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants Souk and Reynard on the grounds of absolute immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. Plaintiff repleads the allegations against these Defendants for the purposes of preserving the issue for review on appeal.
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instituted and continued maliciously, resulting in injury to Plaintiff. All such proceedings were
ultimately terminated in Plaintiff’s favor in a manner indicative of innocence.
86. The Defendants identified above accused Plaintiff of murdering Lockmiller
knowing those accusations to be without probable cause. The individual Normal police officer
Defendants made statements to prosecutors with the intent of exerting influence to institute and
continue judicial proceedings against Plaintiff.
87. The initiation and continuation of the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff were
the result of improper conduct by the Defendants. All of the individual Defendants withheld
material exculpatory evidence as is more fully alleged above. Defendant Freesmeyer gave
knowingly false and misleading testimony as is more fully alleged above.
88. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness,
and reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s rights.
89. As a direct and proximate result of this misconduct, Plaintiff suffered injuries,
including, but not limited to, emotional distress, as is more fully alleged above.
COUNT V State Law Claim – Civil Conspiracy
90. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 89 as if fully alleged herein.
91. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, all of the individual
Defendants, acting in concert with other known and unknown co-conspirators, conspired by
concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose by unlawful means.
92. In furtherance of the conspiracy, the Defendants identified above committed overt
acts and were otherwise willful participants in joint activity.
93. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness
and reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s rights.
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94. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ conspiracy, Plaintiff suffered
injuries, including, but not limited to, emotional distress, as is more fully alleged above.
COUNT VI State Law Claim – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
95. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 94 as if fully alleged herein.
96. The acts and conduct of the individual Defendants as set forth above were
extreme and outrageous. The Defendants intended to cause or were in reckless disregard of the
probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress to Plaintiff, as is more fully
alleged above.
97. The individual Defendants’ actions and conduct did directly and proximately
cause severe emotional distress to Plaintiff, and thereby constituted intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
98. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness
and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
99. As a proximate result of the Defendants’ wrongful acts, Plaintiff suffered injuries,
including, but not limited to, emotional distress, as is more fully alleged above.
COUNT VII State Law Claim – Respondeat Superior
100. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 99 as if fully alleged herein.
101. In committing the acts alleged in the preceding paragraphs, the individual Normal
police officer Defendants were members of, and agents of, the Normal Police Department,
acting at all relevant times within the scope of their employment and under color of law.
102. Defendant Town of Normal is liable as principal for all torts committed by its
agents.
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COUNT VIII State Law Claim – Indemnification
103. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 102 as if fully alleged herein.
104. Illinois law provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgment for
compensatory damages for which employees are liable within the scope of their employment
activities.
105. Defendants Souk and Reynard were employees of the McLean County State’s
Attorney’s Office who acted within the scope of their employment in committing the
misconduct described herein.
106. Defendant Brown was an employee of the McLean County Sheriff’s Department
who acted within the scope of his employment in committing the misconduct described herein.
107. The individual Normal police officer Defendants are or were employees of the
Normal Police Department who acted within the scope of their employment in committing the
misconduct described herein.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Alan Beaman prays that this Court enter judgment in his favor
and against Defendants James Souk, Former Assistant State’s Attorney, Charles Reynard,
Former McLean County State’s Attorney, John Brown, Former McLean County Deputy Sheriff,
Tim Freesmeyer, Former Normal Police Detective, Rob Hospelhorn, Former Normal Police
Detective, Dave Warner, Former Normal Police Detective, Frank Zayas, Former Normal Police
Lieutenant, the County of McLean, Illinois, and the Town of Normal, Illinois, awarding
compensatory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages against each of the
individual Defendants in their individual capacities; and for such further and additional relief as
this Court may deem appropriate and just.
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JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands trial by jury.
Respectfully submitted,
ALAN BEAMAN
By: /s/ Locke E. Bowman
One of his attorneys
Locke E. Bowman Alexa Van Brunt Roderick MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-0844 Jeffrey Urdangen Bluhm Legal Clinic Northwestern University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-7413
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, an attorney, certifies that he electronically filed the foregoing document
using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which automatically served copies upon all parties listed on
the attached Service List on May 11, 2011.
/s/ Locke E. Bowman _
Locke E. Bowman
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SERVICE LIST Beaman v. Souk et al.
No. 10 CV 1019 Jeffrey Urdangen Bluhm Legal Clinic Northwestern University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-7413; (312) 503-2704 (Fax) Attorney for Plaintiff James G. Sotos Elizabeth A. Ekl Elizabeth K. Barton James G. Sotos & Associates, Ltd. 550 East Devon, Suite 150 Itasca, Illinois 60143 (630) 735-3300; (630) 773-0980 (Fax) Attorneys for Defendants James Souk, Charles Reynard, John Brown, and County of McLean, Illinois Thomas G. DiCianni Lucy B. Fadel Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C. 140 South Dearborn Street, Suite 600 Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 782-7606; (312) 782-0943 (Fax) Attorneys for Defendants Tim Freesmeyer, Rob Hospelhorn, Dave Warner, Frank Zayas, and Town of Normal, Illinois
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