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International Journal of Sh Studies () C by Global Scholarly Publications

A Foundation for Sh Metaphysics:Sayh

Ah.mad al-Ah. sa and the Meaning

of aD idris samawi hamid

Colorado State UniversityFort Collins, CO 80523

Starting from the time of Amru al-Muminn (A), andbased on his teachings and those of his descendants(the Imams of the Household of the Prophet (S. ), hisfollowers, the Sh ah, attached much importance to issuesof metaphysics. In addition, they practiced a pristine (i.e.,pre-Sufi) mysticism. At the earliest stages neither thepristine metaphysics nor mysticism of the Imams was trulysystematized, except in the form of collections of traditions.

About the time of the Abbas caliph Mamun, twoprocesses emerge. First, the outward presence of the Imamsamongst their followers begins to fade after the death ofthe Eighth Imam Al al-Rid. a (A) (d. ce), culminatingin the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam (). At thesame time, the heritage of Hellenic metaphysics and itsrationalist methodology begins to make a profound impacton Muslim civilization and the ways of thinking of itsscholars. These two processes, combined with the absence

For the use-mention distinction, we use a single-quote name of a given

expression to mention that expression, and we use a double-quotename of a given proposition or concept to mention that propositionor concept.

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of a systematic metaphysics and epistemology, led to apartial imposition of Hellenic rationalism upon pristineSh thought. This imposition of an alien system of thoughtin turn appears to have inadvertently yet profoundlyled to the obscuring of much of the foundation of thepristine metaphysical and epistemological teachings of theImams (A).

To expand: The dicta and teachings of the Imams (A)come in the form of aphorisms, short treatises, speeches andlectures, and supplications. Many of these were written ortranscribed under difficult circumstances. Partly in orderto preserve themselves, their teachings, and their followersfrom extinction by the so-called orthodox authorities, theImams (A) employed at least two techniques:

They practiced, and insisted that their followers practice,something they expressed by the word Ke , meaningdissimulation or to use Corbins interpretation, thediscipline of the arcane (Corbin , p. ).

They also practiced the art of dispersion of knowledge(Haq , pp. ). As opposed to laying out a completeand systematic exposition of philosophical doctrine andmethodology, the Imams would mention a metaphysicalissue while discussing a legal issue, or discuss a point ofdoctrine in a lecture, whose deeper implications may onlybe gathered by meditating upon a particular supplication,whose understanding in turn depends on a verse of theQuran, the understanding of which depends on otherverses including a verse which can only be understood inlight of that original point of doctrine, and so forth.

Thus the Sh system is a very organic and holisticbody of teachings. This raises serious problems for

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a foundation for sh metaphysics

both the philosophical hermeneuticist and the would-be systematizer, not only because the corpus of Imamiteachings is so hugemany tens of volumes in factbut because of the use of the techniques of dispersal ofinformation and dissimulation to protect their school fromthe attacks of the authorities.

Although the Imams were largely successful inprotecting their teachings, after the disappearance in of the Twelfth Imam we see the mainstream scholarsof the Sh community gradually placing increasinglygreater emphasis and reliance upon the methods of rationaltheology, many of which were derived from Hellenicthought. Amir-Moezzi (, Ch. ) and Modarressi (,Ch. ) each has a good description of this trend. Due to theneed to defend their faith in polemics with the Mutazilsand Asars, they soon produced great figures in this field.Unfortunately, when looked at through the eyes of Hellenicrationalist technique, a significant number of the traditionsof their Imams appeared to be quite irrational. Latertheologians generally bracketed these and focused on thoseof the Imams traditions which gave support to a systemof rational dU . This process reached a high point with theschool of systematic theology of Sayh

Mufd (d. ) and

his student al-Sarf al-Murtad. a (d. ).

Amir-Moezzi and Modarressi approach this problem from entirely

different angles (theosophical and legal respectively); nevertheless,their conclusions are basically the same.The degree to which major (though by no means all) segments of Sh

scholarship was won over by Hellenic rationalist methods can be partlygauged from the fact that Farab and Ibn Sna both had Sh kingsor princes for benefactors, and Corbin and others have argued thatthese two philosophers, while by no means theologians, were themselvesSh. It is interesting to note that al-Kind (d. ) knew the Eleventh

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An example of the subversion of pristine Imamimetaphysics by rationalism can be found in the concept R?KT . When the sources of Greek philosophy weretranslated into Arabic, a word was needed to expressthe Aristotelian notion of the nous (reason, intellect).Unfortunately, the Arabic term R?KT was chosen for thejob. I say unfortunate because as time passed, virtuallyevery school of thought in Muslim civilization, whetheror not it was sympathetic or hostile to Greek philosophy,eventually came to understand R?KT , a gerund signifyingan activity, as a substantive meaning the substancereason or intellect. Later Sh thinkers, when readingthe works of the Imams on R?KT , tended to interpret it as apurely rational faculty. Most translators, when translatingthe traditions of the Imams on the subject of R?KT translate it by intellect or reason.

Although pristine Sh thought remained on thesidelines of mainstream Sh scholasticism, it never diedout. Figures like Ibn T. awus (d. ) and Nimatullahal-Jazair (d. ) kept the tradition alive in a purely Shdoctrinal context, while others like H. aydar al-Amul (diedafter ) and Ibn Ab Jumhur al-Ah. sa (d. ) andothers sought the integration of pristine Sh thought withthe theosophy of Ibn Arab, a project just as fraught withdifficulties as that of its integration with rationalism.

The subversion of the thought of the Imams throughGreek rationalism as well as Sufism was a key concern ofa later thinker, Sayh

Ah.mad al-Ah. sa (d. ). It is our

Imam, H. asan al-Askar (d. ).For some details about the impact the rationalist, Neoplatonic

interpretation of R?KT had on the later development of Sh theology,see The Divine Guide in Early Sh ism (Amir-Moezzi , Ch. ).

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contention that Sayh

Ah.mads work represents the mostsophisticated attempt to realize a systematic account of thephilosophy and mysticism of pristine Tashayyu.

sayh

ah.mad al-ah. sa and aDSayh

Ah.mad al-Ah. sa was a marja

, scientist, mystic,and important philosopher of the early nineteenth century.With Sayh

Ah.mad ended the cycle of the great and

profoundly original philosophers of traditional Muslimcivilization, a cycle that began with al-Kind (d. ). Sayh

Ah.mad belonged to the period of Muslim scholasticismthat stemmed from the work of both the kalam theologianFakhru al-Dn Raz (d. ) and the last great philosopherin the post-Hellenic tradition, Nas.ru al-Dn T. us (d. ).In particular, Sayh

Ah.mad worked two centuries after

Mulla S. adra (d. ). The latter was both a mysticand a systematic rationalist whose influence is to be felt inEastern Islam up to this day.

Sayh

Ah.mad was not formally trained in the school ofMulla S. adra, nor did he adhere to it. Of course, duringthe lifetime of Sayh

Ah.mad the school of Mulla S. adra was

the predominant school of philosophy in the Sh worldand Sayh

Ah.mad certainly interacted with it. He wrote

extended studies (misleadingly called commentaries) on

Historians have estimated that, at the time of his death, fully one

fourth of Iran followed Sayh

Ah.mad as its source of emulation (marja )in matters of ritual and practical law (sar at) (Ah. sa , p ).Of course the philosophical tradition remains alive in the lands of

Eastern Islam, and continues to produce outstanding exponents; yetthey virtually all operate in the context of one of the traditionalmetaphysical systems. The same is largely true in the West as well:Whitehead, for example, is still the last major original metaphysicianof Western philosophy.

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a number of works of both Mulla S. adra and those of thelatters son-in-law, Mulla Muh. sin Fayd. Kashan. Yet hisconception and practice of philosophy or aD was in manyways incongruous with those of the official peripateticand ishraq schools. This has led to sometimes bittermisunderstandings of Sayh

Ah.mad on the part of much

of the traditional scholastic establishment.For example, instead of subverting the language of

the Quran and the Imams (A) to fit rationalist firstprinciples, Sayh

Ah.mad would do the opposite. His method

consisted in part of approaching the teachings of the Imamsphenomenologically, then applying the first principles andmethodology so discovered to the problems of traditionalphilosophy. This led to the accusation that Sayh

Ah.mad

did not understand traditional philosophy. In fact, SayhAh.mad understood traditional philosophy very well but to

some degree ingeniously and creatively subverted it (a` laHegel). This was with a view to providing a systematic yetauthentic foundation for pristine Sh thought.

In this article we will discuss Sayh

Ah.mads approachto a foundation for pristine Sh thought through hisdefinition of the concept aD or metaphysics. Wehope this article serves to pave the way for more thanthe superficial analyses of his thought to which academia,both East and West, has been subject up to now.Our primary source for this discussion is al-Fawa id al-H. ikmiyyat (The Wisdom Observations), Sayh

Ah.mads

With one exception, in the course of many years of research I have

not found a single modern Eastern or Western scholar give anythingapproaching a profound discussion of the philosophy of Sayh

Ah.mad.

That exception is Henry Corbin.

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philosophical epitome which we have critically edited andtranslated.

At the outset of the Fawa id, Sayh

Ah.mad expresseshis dissatisfaction with the then prevalent modes ofinvestigation in the sciences that pertain to cognizance of theDivine ( ?!E/=e ), inclusive of philosophy ( RGS'G ) andtheology ( ReU ). In particular, al-Ah. sa takes issue withthe methods of rational analysis employed by these schoolsto reach their goal i.e., cognizance of God and reality. Asan alternative and replacement of pure rational analysis,Sayh

Ah.mad proposes what he calls the proof of Wisdom

( ReTaD ). In this article we will explore this conceptand try to find out exactly what Sayh

Ah.mad means by

wisdom and by the proof of Wisdom.Upon preliminary observation, we see that the very

expression, proof of Wisdom, invites a number ofquestions, including the following:

What is Wisdom ( aD )? What is a proof ( ReT )? By the expression proof of Wisdom, does the author

mean there is a science called Wisdom, and that thereis a method of proof specific to it; or does he mean thatWisdom is the name of a kind of proof?

Based on the authors own commentary on the Fawa id andother statements of the author, it appears that sometimes

To be published soon. A preliminary version, with some commentary

and analysis, is available (Hamid, ). References to Sayh

Ah.madsown commentary on the Fawa id are based on the Tabriz edition(Ah. sa, ).

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he uses the word aD in the sense of method andsometimes in the sense of a science.

For example, immediately upon the authors first use ofthe expression ReTaD in the main text, he says in thecommentary: (Ah. sa , p. )

I said: [We will accomplish] this [task] through theproof of Wisdom.I now say: Sometimes, by aD is meanttheoretical wisdom ( aDR?SWe ), and sometimes,practical wisdom ( aDR?WSe ). Now we meanby aD that Wisdom which is, at once, boththeoretical and practical. . . .

From this passage in the commentary, it appears that, inthis case, aD is used, not for the method, but for thatscience to which the method applies.

One of the most common uses of aD among thelearned was as a synonym for RGS'G (philosophy ). Inthis regard, it was also used as an ellipsis for aD/=e i.e., that branch of philosophy that pertains to divinity i.e.,metaphysics. In the First Observation of the Fawa id, theauthor says that the proof of Wisdom

. . . is an instrument of the sciences pertaining to thereal. By means of it one becomes cognizant of Allahas well as cognizant of that which is there besidesHim.

JSadObYRPReTROWJbQROWJ7SLad"_ROWR?SWeaJd"_ROWR?WSeaZ\Z"d_ROWR?SWeaR?WSeV?

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This statement can be placed into one-to-one correspon-dence with the traditional division of metaphysics into gen-eral ( VV ) and specific ( V. ). General metaphysicsdeals with the problem of determining what there is (thatwhich is there besides Him) and with the classification ofwhat there is i.e., what is real. Specific metaphysics dealswith the problem of God and theology. So it is plausibleto suggest that the proof of Wisdom is a tool of meta-physics. In the course of a treatise, Commentary on theHadith of Kumayl, Sayh

Ah.mad is more explicit: (,

vol. , p. )

. . . it has been firmly established in meta-physics ( aD/=e ), through the proof of Wisdom( ReTaD ), that all of the motes of existence, ofboth the invisible and invisible realms, including[what are traditionally classified as] substances andaccidents, are [actually] correlational accidents. . . .

Here we see a more explicit connection between theproof of Wisdom and metaphysics. Yet we cannot simplyidentify Sayh

Ah.mads science of Wisdom with the

traditional scholastic science of metaphysics that goesunder the same name. Traditional metaphysics ( aD/=e )is a branch of philosophy ( RGS'G ) that comes under thePeripatetic category of theoretical wisdom ( aDR?SWe ).Our author has something else in mind, something whichdoes not fit exactly into this categorical scheme. For heclearly states that what he means by aD is somethingthat cannot be classified as only theoretical or only

!ROW%R_eReTROWYWe@!RbbV\>RRCeaR+_V\Rba!h1h12Fe

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idris samawi hamid

practical, but not both. Yet there can be little doubt thatwhat the author has in mind is in fact a metaphysics ofsome sort.

The foregoing preliminary observations indicate thefollowing:

Sayh

Ah.mad does have in mind a science called Wisdomto which the proof of Wisdom applies;

The proof of Wisdom deals with topics which are clearlymetaphysical;

The science of Wisdom is not identical to metaphysics inthe traditional scholastic sense.

On the basis of the foregoing, we will approach thequestion, What is the proof of Wisdom, withinthe context of a larger question, What is Wisdom?Determining the intension of Wisdom will involveanswering the following:

What is the aim of Wisdom?

What is the object of Wisdom?

What is the method of Wisdom? Under this heading wewill discuss the proof of Wisdom proper;

What kind(s) of proposition is (are) the subject of Wisdom?

What are the first principles of Wisdom?

the ambiguity of aD As we indicated above, the word aD is very ambiguous.In early Arabic, aD appears to have been a close

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synonym of R?SX , which means knowledge. According toLane, the Taju al-Urus defines aD to primarily mean,What prevents, [or] restrains, from ignorant behavior. TheS. ih. ah. , one of the earliest authorities, defines it as simplyknowledge ( R?SX ).

The word aD is also used in the Quran and insayings of the Prophet (S. )and Imams of his family (A).When asked about the meaning of the verse, Andsurely, We gave Luqman Wisdom. . . (Q :), theseventh Imam Musa al-Kaz.im said that what is meantis that he was given consciousness-awareness ( R?KT ) andunderstanding ( RG_X ) (Bah. ran n.d., Vol ., p. ).Another verse which speaks of aD is ::

He grants Wisdom to whomsoever He wills.Whomsoever has been granted Wisdom hassurely been granted abundant goodness. Andnone are mindful except those who possesskernels of consciousness.

According to Imam S. adiq, the D referred to here iscognizance of the Imam and obedience to God. Here theImam is to be understood as the logos through whichcognizance of God is obtained.

As Hellenic literature was translated into Arabic,Aristotles sophia was translated by aD . So as atechnical term, aD became synonymous with RGS'G .In the category of practical wisdom ( aDR?WSe ), the word aD also came to be synonymous with medicine ( R7 ),

aRK[RKW\ROW dROWV\+aV\dROWFKaNaVd N"iaRb

!R

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a usage which is common in Muslim lands up to the presentday.

the aim of aDWhat is the aim of Wisdom, and what benefit is it supposedto provide? In the Fawa id, there are clear indications thatthe aim and benefit of aD is the cognizance ( ViF ) ofGod and of the realities of things. At the beginning of thePrologue of Fawa id, Sayh

Ah.mad states:

After I noticed many of the seekers penetratingdeeply into the divine sciences, and supposing thatthey have penetrated deeply into the[ir] intendedmeaningbut which is only a deep penetration intosemantics ( RG9 ), nothing else. . .

In the commentary (Ah. sa , p. ), Sayh

Ah.mad saysthat the intended meaning ( ?!K/b ) is the cognizanceof God. . . . In the main text, he goes on to claim thatrational analysis is an inappropriate tool for the cognizanceof things, and that only the proof of wisdom can lead oneto that goal. In the commentary he clarifies what he meansby the cognizance of things: (Ah. sa , p. )

I said: It [rational analysis] does not lead one tothe cognizance of things as they are, as he (uponhim and his family be the communion of Allah andpeace) said:

O Allah, make us see things as they are!

RW!dNV\R7Sd?WKbYRW?!E%R_eadb^WbYZ_X?WKbRW?!RWK/ba^b?WL!RG9iB

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I now say: The proof of Wisdom leads the onewho uses it to the cognizance of the realities( aK@L ) of things ( *e ) in the state in whichthey really are. This cognizance is what he (uponhim and his family be the blessings of Allah andpeace) asked of his Lord, that He show him thosevery realities. This is because things, when youcontemplate them qua themselves, and cut off anycontemplation of those factors which individuatethem and distinguish them, are then abstractedfrom everything besides their quintessences. A giventhing, when you contemplate it, and cut off anycontemplation of those factors which individuateit and distinguish it, [you see it] purified ofall aspects, modalities, and relations. When it ispurified of all of these, it has become abstracted fromall indications, configurations, and positions. It isneither an [intelligible] meaning ( V?! ) or a [psychic]image ( . ), since both of the latter entail [somekind of] indication ( *! ).

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">\%*!a=eQa!a2=FjdObYV?!ai.b!%&S$V_W%*!

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idris samawi hamid

What Sayh

Ah.mad appears to be saying is that psychicand intellectual grasping and perception involve makingdistinctions by means of which one can point to orindicate (from indication *! ). What one points to orindicates in the course of intellectual or psychic graspingis either a psychic image ( . ) of the mundus imaginalis( GQ ) or an intelligible meaning ( V?! ) of the mundusintelligibilis ( GR?KT ). But seeing a thing in its deepeststate, contemplating it in its reality, in that wherebyit acquires its realization, involves bracketing all of itsindividuating and distinguishing factors so that one can nolonger indicate it or point at it. Once one has accomplishedthis, one can be said to have true cognizance of it. Thiscognizance I call ousiological intuition and the processby which one arrives at it I term ousiological reduction.As we shall see, Sayh

Ah.mad considers this reality of

which one obtains cognizance as the ousia or ground ofall created things. This ousia turns out to be coextensivewith existence ( ab ) as well as matter ( V ) and hyle( ^ebi ), leading to a reversal of traditional hylomorphism .

It appears that for Sayh

Ah.mad, aD contains amajor phenomenological component. This phenomenologyis a reversal of Husserls essentialistic method, wherebyone seeks to bracket existence (eidetic reduction) of a

That is, in the metaphysics of Sayh

Ah.mad, matter constitutes the

active principle of a given created thing, while form constitutes thereceptive principle. This is exactly the opposite of the situation intraditional Peripateticism, including that of Muslim scholasticism,where matter per se is nothing but potential. But it allows a trulyingenious application on the part of Sayh

Ah.mad of Occams razor:

namely, the identification of matter with existence, something thatcould not work in traditional hylomorphism. We will explore thisfurther elsewhere, in sa a Allah.

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given thing and intuit its essence (eidetic intuition). Bybracketing, if not denying, the reality of existence, Husserl,following Kants lead (for whom existence was nothingbut a secondary intelligible), is left with nothing butempty structural phenomena. Being empty, they cannotlead to any reality outside of his mind. Interestingly, Sayh

Ah.mads commitment to uncovering ousia is in consonancewith Aristotles own claim that the fundamental quest ofmetaphysics is the grasping of what exactly ousia is. So inone sense the aim of Wisdom is analogous to the aim ofmetaphysics in Aristotles view: the cognizance of ousia.

It turns out that cognizance of God and cognizanceof ousia amount to the same thing. However, this doesnot mean, as the Sayh

goes to pains to point out, that

there is any identity whatsoever between God and ousia.There is also something of a dialectic involved here, forcognizance of God is achieved through cognizance of therealities of things, that is, cognizance of the ground or ousiaof things. After cognizance of God has been achieved, onecan look at the essences of things through the eye ofthat very ousia, for it is through ousia that essences arerealized and interconnected, while it is through essencesthat ousia is manifested. That is, what we call eideticintuition, for Sayh

Ah.mad, can be accomplished only by

seeing through the eye of ousia. It turns out that this resultsin, by Muslim scholastic standards, a very unconventionalview of essence that we cannot elaborate here. In the FirstObservation, Sayh

Ah.mad quotes one of the Imams as

saying, Beware of the penetration of the faithful; for hecontemplates through the light of Allah i.e., through ousia,not through bracketing ousia. Eidetic intuition can onlycome about through ousiological intuition.

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In the Eighteenth Observation, Sayh

Ah.mad says thatthe cognizance of God is the final cause ( >S @e ) of allcreation, and constitutes the purpose of creation. In a sense,this doctrine lies at the heart of philosophical speculationin Muslim civilization in general, and Sh thought inparticular. In a famous sermon, the first Imam Al ibn AbT. alib states, the first part of the way ( dn) is cognizance ofHim. . . [sermon ].

the object of aDGiven the foregoing, the object or subject matter ofWisdom should not be too difficult to discern. However,there is an important subtlety involved. Given that the aimof Wisdom is the cognizance of God and the cognizance ofthings, it may appear to follow that the object of Wisdomcomprises God and everything else. Such a judgementwould be hasty.

With respect to God, Sayh

Ah.mad emphasizes,especially in the Second and Twelfth Observations, thatcognizance of God is not cognizance of His Quintessence( ). God qua God is unknowable and incomparable.Following the lead of the Imams, the Sayh

adheres to

the strictest possible negative theology. Even the Oneof the Neoplatonists is not equivalent to the God ofSayh

Ah.mad, for the One shares the ontological rank of

mundus intelligibilis with at least two others, nous andsoul. Nothing shares in rank with the God of Tashayyu.

aQRd\ViF?` . The most important and authoritative collection of thesermons, letters, and aphorisms of Imam Al is the Nahjul Balaghah,compiled by Sayyid al-Rad. . The number of editions of this work arecountless. For ease of reference, we refer to it by sermon, letter, oraphorism number.

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Indeed, it is not even a rank in the strictest sense of theterm. It is beyond categories, classification, and ontology.It is the Deus Absconditus, hyperousia, the coincidentiaoppositorum, beyond the beyond and yet present, theUnnamable, the Indescribable, the Ultimate ?.

In Muslim scholasticism, the subject matter ( Vb2b= )of a science was defined as that whose quintessentialaffections [i.e., essential aspects] are discussed in thatscience (Jurjan , p. ). Jurjan, who gives thisdefinition in his Kitabu al-Ta rfat (Book of Definitions),goes on to give two examples. The subject of the science ofmedicine ( R7 ) is the human body. The essential aspectsof the human body at issue in this science are its statesof health and illness. The subject matter of syntax ( R[b )comprises words ( Rb; ). The essential aspects of wordsat issue in this science are their declension (taking on thesigns of the nominative, accusative, or genitive case) andindeclension.

At the end of the Second Observation, the Sayh

Ah.madsays in his commentary:

The subject of the science of the profession ofunity ( Rbe ) [i.e., theology] is not the Quintessenceof God (Exalted is He!), as the theologiansclaim. This is because [of the following:] TheQuintessence of Allah cannot be grasped, so howcan its quintessential affections be discussed whenHe (Exalted is He!) has no affections other thanqualities which are either,

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from every consideration, His very own Quintes-sence;

or concomitants (ah.kam) pertaining to thoseStations which comprise His Designation [and notHis Quintessence].

We will discuss what he means by Stations andDesignation momentarily. The main point to be notedhere is that not only is God unknowable, but He is alsonot the subject of Wisdom. This leads to what appearsat first glance to be a paradox: The aim of Wisdom,nay, of creation itself, is cognizance of God. Yet He isUnknowable: Every proposition about His Quintessencequa Quintessence is a tautology and thus devoid of anyinformation whatsoever. So how can one have cognizanceof Him at all? This question constitutes the fundamentalproblem of philosophical Tashayyu .

This problem is not as crucial for, e.g., the Asars,because they affirm that His Attributes are distinct fromHis Quintessence and coeternal with his Quintessence.Therefore, propositions pertaining to God are nottautologous. Since they are not tautologous, they give usinformation about Gods Quintessence.

Though Sayh

Ah.mads full solution to the problem ofreconciling Gods unknowability with cognizance of Himis original and ingenious, we cannot give the details inthis article. Fundamental to his solution is his breaking

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up of this issue into two problems: a phenomenologicalproblem and an ontological one. We will consider thephenomenological problem first.

Consider the proposition, There is nothing like It.The statement of this proposition occurs in the Quran,(Q :). God describes Himself by this proposition, soone should be able to have cognizance of Him throughit. The method by which one obtains cognizance of Godthrough this proposition is that of ousiological reduction,which we will discuss in more detail in the next section.Briefly, it involves a series of meditations on the signs ( d )and impressions ( ! ) of God around us and in ones ownself. When one reaches that state mentioned by the authorwhere one has transcended both psychic and intelligibleindication, one has what mystics generally hold to be anindescribable or ineffable experience. Upon return to thereality of essences and distinctions, the mystic can onlydescribe this experience in negative terms. He may say, e.g.,there is nothing like it, where it covers every possiblesubject of human grasping, be it psychic or intelligible.

Imam Al is famous for the dictum, Whoever hascognizance of his self ( ZG( ), surely has cognizance of hisLord. According to Sayh

Ah.mad, ones experience of the

cognizance of the self ( ZG( ) as There is nothing like itconstitutes ones very cognizance of God: (Ah. sa ,p. )

When you abstract ( Q" ) your self ( ZG( ) fromevery thing, including resemblance to anythingwhatsoever, and so that self comes to be so thatthere is nothing like it, then your self has come

R(NWS>`

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idris samawi hamid

to be a sign ( d ) of cognizance of Him. So whenyou have achieved cognizance of Allah through yourself, you have achieved cognizance of the fact thatThere is nothing like It. Understand this, and donot understand from this discourse what the Sufisunderstand. For the Sufis say that when you abstractyour self this way, then it is Allah. Due to this, oneof their representatives proclaims, I am God; indeedI am. This is a clear covering of the truth ( N ). Thefact of the matter is that when you abstract yourself, it becomes a sign of Allah and a mark ( >jV )of his cognizance. This is as He has said (Exalted isHe!):

We will show them Our signs in thehorizons and in their selves until itbecomes clear to them that He is theReal.

And He did not say, We will show them ourQuintessence, so understand and think about it!

The category of experience referred to in the above quoteis called by Sayh

Ah.mad RbbaL Real Existence. In

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this phenomenological category, the realization of thepropositions of negative theology is achieved. But thiscategory must not in any way be confused with experienceof God qua God. Yes, we may say of God that Thereis nothing like It. But the proposition relates to Himonly in a metaphorical sense because to posit a relationbetween God and a proposition in itself compromises hisIndescribability. This proposition relates to something else,namely, this category of experience which Sayh

Ah.mad calls

the Designation ( R?[bY ) of God and the Stations ( KV )of God. It is this Designation and these Stations whichconstitute the object of Wisdom, as the author makes clearat the end of the Second Observation.

If it is not God that one experiences in the category ofRbbaL , then what exactly is the object of experience,

and where does it fit in the ontological scheme of things?It turns out that for Sayh

Ah.mad, the ontological category

corresponding, but not identical, to the phenomenologicalcategory of Real Existence is that of existence quaexistence. It is the ousia from which everything was made.It is also an acting, but in a secondary sense.

We see that this ousia is related to both the Acting ofGod and to all created things. On this basis we may nowintroduce the three most fundamental divisions of existencein Sayh

Ah.mads system:

Real Existence ( RbbaL ). It is a phenomenologicalcategory;

Absolute Existence ( Rbb7SL ), the Acting ( RG?T ), or theCommanding that is the Acting ( RG? ) of God. It is

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existence totally unconditioned ( RbbRj5 ). This is thefirst ousia;

Delimited existence ( RbbKe ). It is the Commanding thatis the outcome of the Acting ( G?b ) and the secondousia. It may be considered from two angles:

It may be considered qua itself. That is, delimitedexistence may be considered qua delimited existence. Thisis existence negatively conditioned ( Rbb5i ). It is adynamic intermediary between the Acting of God andthe particularized outcomes of that Acting, outcomesconditioned by essence;

It may be considered as determined or particularized bysomething other than itself. This is existence conditioned bysomething else ( Rbb5 ). This division comprises allof the outcomes of Gods Acting conditioned by somethingother than existence alone.

For Sayh

Ah.mad, the object of Wisdom consists of thecontents of these three categories. The cognizance of Godand of the realities of things depends on an understandingof the relations between these three divisions of existencei.e., the phenomenological category of Real Existenceand the ontological categories of Absolute Existence anddelimited existence.

the method of aDOusiological reduction and intuition, as well as discoveringtrue propositions about those things that constitute theobject of Wisdom, is achieved through the proof ofWisdom. In the First Observation, which is devoted tothe proof of Wisdom and its distinction from rational

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demonstration and moral exhortation, is discussed thesupport ( V'[ ) of Wisdom and the condition ( 5 ) ofWisdom. In the commentary (Ah. sa , p. ), Sayh

Ah.mad defines the support of the proof of Wisdom to bethat source from which it [i.e., Wisdom] is obtained. Thecondition of the proof of Wisdom is defined to be thatthrough which it is realized according to the perfection ofwhat ought to be i.e., that through which it is a cogentproof. Sayh

Ah.mad postulates two sources or supports

of the proof of Wisdom and three conditions. The twosources of the proof of Wisdom are the the heart-flux ( RG )and the tradition ( R[KT ).

The FThe term F , although a fairly common Arabic word,does not appear to have had any major technical usagein Muslim scholasticism before Sayh

Ah.mad. It figures

in neither Jurjans dictionary of technical terms, Ah.madNagaris, nor even Ibn Arabs glossary of Sufi technicalterms. It does occur in the Quran and in the ah.adt

of theImams. In the Quran it is mentioned sixteen times. Onseven occasions it is mentioned along with the faculties ofhearing ( R@ ) and seeing ( R ), and once with just thefaculty of seeing. So the ancient Arabs surely saw it as afaculty of some sort. The first eighteen verses of sura fifty-three give a description of the Prophets own witnessing ofGod. In verse eleven we find, And the fuad did not lieabout what it saw. Here, the F is treated as a facultyof vision. Imam S. adiq is reported to have said, Whenthe light of cognizance becomes revealed in the F (of theservant), then he loves. And when he loves, that which is

VN RGV!g

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besides Allah will not occasion any impression upon him

(Ah. sa , vol. , pt. , p. ).There is no word in English which exactly corresponds

to F . Lane (in his Lexicon, under E ), quotes earlierArabic authorities in lexicography to the effect that theF is so-called because of its G . Now G , from the

same root, means burning brightly or fiercely, blazing,flaming, ardour, or, according to some, being in astate of motion. The primary meaning of the gerundmost immediately related to F , F , is, according tosome authorities, motion or putting into motion. Thisprimitive significance of F is consistent with the dynamicrole it plays in the metaphysics of Sayh

Ah.mad.

In ancient Arabic, there was a close connection betweenthe F and the JS heart, so much so that sometimes thewords F and JS are frequently treated as synonymous.However, as Lane points out, the two are generallydistinguished. There appears to be no general agreementon the precise relationship between JS and F . The Fis variously considered to be a covering ( B+ or a ) ofthe heart, the middle of the heart, or the interior of theheart. According to T. urayh. , whose dictionary Majma u al-Bah.rayn was in large part based on the traditions of theSh Imams, There is nothing in the human body moresubtle than the F , nor which suffers damage as easily.

Lane quotes the Taju al-Urus to the effect that theheart ( RKS ) is the &bd or (core or kernel) of theF . Now under the article , Lane quotes the Tajual-Urus to the effect that is used in the expression,

aZSh2eRWiFRGaRXd"V&bg>Se` aiY%'YR7HV\RGai*dV[`

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RKS , meaning, the hearts core, or the black, orinner part of the heart. Under the article %a , Lanequotes the same source to the effect that &bd signifiesthe hearts core; the black, or inner part of the heart. Thepoint I want to make is that the author of the Taj al-Urushas been somewhat inconsistent. First, under the discussionof F , he says that the heart ( JS ) is both the &bd andthe of the F . Then, under the discussion of the formertwo, he describes the &bd and the as each signifyingthe innermost part of the heart ( JS ). So by describing the

JS as the &bd and the of the F , he has, in effect,said that the JS is the innermost part of the JS of theF , which seems ridiculous. If we follow the opinion that

the F is actually the interior of the heart, instead of itsexterior, then the inconsistency disappears and we see that F is coextensive with both &bd and .

Based on the foregoing, we have translated F asheart-flux. This is meant to connote that the F is morespecialized than the heart itself, and that a notion of motionor flux is fundamental to its meaning. This interpretationis also consistent with Sayh

Ah.mads use of F , which

is definitely consistent with the view that the F is morespecialized than the JS .

Sayh

Ah.mad calls the heart-flux the highest of all ofmans loci of sensation ( V+h , s. V+i ). Not counting thefive senses, the Sayh

says that there are three V+h : the

bosom ( R/! ), the heart ( RKS ), and the heart-flux ( RG ).To each of these there corresponds a mode of cognition,an ontological rank in the Neoplatonic hierarchy, a set ofobjects of cognition, and a set of sciences to which thatmode of cognition is appropriate. Sayh

Ah.mad works out

some of these correspondences in the course of his sectionon epistemology in his Observations on the Philosophy of

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Law, during the course of an attempt to define knowledge.Briefly, the bosom corresponds to knowledge ( R?SX ), whichconsists of images or forms ( R/ ) in the universal soul( R[G(Rbe ), mirrored by the imaginal faculty ( beQ ). Theheart corresponds to certainty ( ReK ), which consists ofintelligibles ( ?Kbi ) or intelligible meanings ( ?R?KSe )in the intellect or nous ( R?KT ). The F corresponds tocognizance ( iF ), which consists of that which cannotbe intellected or perceived by intellectual or psychicdifferentiation or discrimination. The accompanying tablesummarizes the relations between these three organs andfaculties. We will discuss the corresponding sciences later.

mode of locus of objects of ontologicalcognition cognition cognition rank of

objects ofcognition

knowledge bosom forms or the universal

images soul

certainty heart meanings/ the universal

intelligibles nous

cognizance heart-flux light of existence quacognizance negatively

conditioned

Table 4.1 The three types of cognition.

Tradition

The other support or source of Wisdom is the tradition( R[KT ). For Sayh

Ah.mad, the tradition consists of the

Quran and the Sunnah i.e., the word of God and thesayings and practice of Prophet Muh. ammad, his daughterFat.imat, and the Twelve Imams from his household.

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Placed in a larger context, what Sayh

Ah.mad isattempting is an integration of the sapientia of therepresentatives of revelation with philosophical speculationand mystical experience. In principle, tradition couldmean the scholastic tradition, the Sufi theosophicaltradition, or any other transmitted body expressive ofteachings or doctrines which constitute a philosophy ora set of related philosophies. In the West, India, China,and other civilizations, there exist bodies of transmittedliterature which express, whether potentially or in actuality,philosophies or sets of philosophies. Individual philosophersare interested in studying a given body of literature so asto either systematically express the philosophy or set ofphilosophies latent in that body of literature, or else todevelop a systematic philosophy of their own, but buildingupon that which is latent in that body of literature.Frequently, a given philosopher is engaged in both activitiesat once.

Given a body of literature potentially expressive ofa philosophy or a set of philosophies, how does oneapproach this body of literature in order to expressits philosophical content? One may simply read a bodyof literature and not try to systematize anything. If abody of religious literature is at issue, one may simplyaccept everything one reads on faith, ignore apparentcontradictions or paradoxes, and simply act out whateverdoctrinal, moral, or legalistic demands he finds. Similar

For purposes of this discussion, we accept Jorge Gracias definition of

philosophy as a view of the world, or any of its parts, which seeksto be accurate, consistent, comprehensive, and for which evidence isgiven as support(Gracia , p. ).

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scenarios may obtain with a reader of the transmittedteachings of, say, Plato or Confucius.

Another way to approach a given body of literatureis to apply some degree or other of rational analysis toboth the goal of determining the propositions expressedby the body of literature and to those very propositionsthemselves. Given those propositions, the investigator triesto express, in a systematic way, the philosophy latent in thebody of literature under investigation. In the tradition ofMuslim civilization, this method is the preferred method ofthe philosophers ( RGj&G ) and the theologians ( bWbY ). The

Fj&G were, by and large, pure rationalists, investigatingwhatever they put their hands on, be it Hellenic orIslamic, through the method of demonstration through firstpremises. The VbWbY , especially the later ones, acceptedcertain doctrines on faith but still used rational analysis tosystematize the philosophy they considered to be latent in,e.g., the body of Islamic religious literature. In both cases,with the exception of some of the earlier VbWbY , rationalanalysis constituted the primary tool of investigation.One could say that for post-T. us scholasticism, as wellas most Western philosophy, the sources of philosophicalspeculation are the rational intellect and the philosophicaltradition. In the case of the Muslim scholastic theologians,one must add the body of purely Islamic literature, namely,the Quran and the Sunnah.

A third way to approach a given body of literaturepotentially expressive of a philosophy or set of philosophiesis to approach it through some form of intuition thatis supra-rational. This was the approach of the Sufitheosophists to revelation and prophetic traditions, whileSuhraward and his followers applied this approach to the

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Hellenic tradition, while keeping the intellect or nous in itsprivileged position.

Sayh

Ah.mad was, of course, keenly aware of theattempts of his predecessors to integrate the traditionsof RGS'G with that of the sapientia of the Imams. Heapproaches the problem by replacing the twin sourcesof RGS'G , intellect or nous and the Hellenic tradition(inclusive of its Muslim representatives), with the Fand the Islamic twin sources of revelation and thetraditions of the Prophet, Fat.imat, and the Imams.He justifies this in part by appealing to the legend,propagated by the Fj&G themselves, that Plato derivedhis philosophy from Pythagoras, who in turn learned itfrom the Prophet Solomon, who in turn transmitted itfrom the earlier prophets. Sayh

Ah.mad claims that then

philosophy became corrupted because Plato, Aristotle, andother philosophers added things of their own to the pristinewisdom they inherited from the prophets. So the division ofthe philosophers into Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoicsoccurred. Furthermore, the translators from Greek andSyriac made mistakes on account of which the philosophersof Islam compounded upon the mistakes of the earlierphilosophers. Now all of the prophets, according to Sayh

Ah.mad, received their Wisdom through the intermediaryof the Logos, which manifests in this world as the ProphetMuh. ammad, Fat.imat, and the Imams. Since that is thecase, it must also be the case that their teachings representthe pinnacles of Wisdom. Philosophical speculation andexposition must therefore begin with them and not withthe corrupted baggage left behind by the Greeks. Thehermeneutic process is now put in reverse: instead ofapplying RGS'G to the interpretation and clarification ofreligious texts, one first seeks to draw the principles of

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Wisdom out of the divine sources and then apply theseprinciples to finding solutions to the problems of RGS'G .This at least partially explains why, although the authorsays in the First Observation that the sources of Wisdomare the Islamic tradition and the F , he makes full useof the terminology of RGS'G throughout the Fawa id, andmodifies it to suit his objectives.

The Conditions of the Proof of Wisdom

For the proof of wisdom to be realized, it is not enoughsimply to have these sources. After all, the Quran andSunnah are accessible to everyone, and mystical experiencewas nothing new. The use of these sources depends uponthree conditions, conditions which he outlines in the FirstObservation.

The first condition for the cogency of the proof ofWisdom is that you give your Lord what is His duebecause, when you contemplate by the proof of Wisdom,you are summoning your Lord and He is summoning you toyour heart-flux. . . . According to the commentary (Ah. sa, p. ), in order for the gates to light to beopened in the F , one must first respond to the calling ofones Lord. This requires one to give up all preconceptionsand principles and approach the Lord with an empty mind.Then one will discover tidbits of truth in ones self thatmay be either accepted or rejected. If one refuses to changeaccordingly and continues to blindly follow preconceptionsand preconceived principles, then the door will not openand the heart-flux will remain closed to one. If oneaccepts and follows that light, then the gate will open andcognizance will be attained. In another place (Ah. sa ,p. ), the author points out that approaching God with a

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mind empty of preconceptions and preconceived principlesis the condition of theoretical Wisdom.

Later we read in the text, Then your Lord contendswith and overcomes you, so weigh with an even balance.That is better for you and best in respect of theoutcomes [of your deeds] (Q :). According to thecommentary, this means that your Lord shows you theproof of Himself in your innermost self and that if thisproof is accepted, and if your actions, discourse, and beliefsmanifest this acceptance, then one can begin to employthe proof of Wisdom and to discover many hidden things.By weigh with an even balance, the author (Ah. sa, p. ) is saying that one must exert all ones effort,through the proof of Wisdom, to contemplating the signsof God in the horizons and in ones self, that is, in themacrocosm and in the microcosm. At the same time, onemust equally exert oneself in the purification and sincerityof ones intention so that the only goal whatsoever that onehas at all times is to please God. In another place (Ah. sa, p. ), the author points out that the latter is thecondition of practical Wisdom (remember that our authorhas said that Wisdom is at once theoretical and practical).Both theoretical and practical Wisdom must be in balancefor the proof of Wisdom to be sound.

The second condition for the soundness of the proof ofWisdom is that one never, in ones beliefs, investigations,and proclamation, go beyond what one has knowledgeof. Arrogance and boldness are grave dangers, even formystics. According to the Quran (Q :), even the Fof an individual will be questioned about on the Day ofJudgement.

The last condition is that one cultivate ones visionthrough the F until, with respect to all of the above

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mentioned matters, one sees through the eye of Godi.e., the F . Sayh

Ah.mad then quotes the verse, Do not

walk exultantly upon the Earth. Surely you willnever rend the Earth asunder; nor will you eversurpass the mountains in height (Q :). Accordingto the commentary (Ah. sa , p. ), the Earthis symbolic of essence ( ^e ). Every individual has twoeyes: the eye of essence and the eye of existence. Theeye of essence can only see tangible, ephemeral, being. Theeye of God i.e., the heart-flux i.e, the eye of existencequa negatively conditioned, can see the psychically andintelligibly intangible realities of things. The ultimate goalis that one be guided at all times by the heart-flux and notby essence, for it is prideful to think that one can operate orwalk without the guidance of God as manifested throughthe heart-flux. Without His aid, without existence, onecannot conquer the mountains or obstacles present in theself, in ones essence. Almost paradoxically, the power ofGods eye is only available to those who worship him intotal humility. Sayh

Ah.mads entire approach is also very

reminiscient of Zen Buddhism and Taoism.One wishes that Sayh

Ah.mad would have given more

details of the process through which the vision of the Fis attained. That is, Sayh

Ah.mad has described the sources

and conditions of ousiological intuition or vision, but hasnot provide many details of the process of ousiologicalreduction. Many details may be found by combing throughsome of his other works. To pull all of this together here isbeyond our scope. A good summary though may be foundin the authors Risalah Ja fariyyat or Treatise in Response

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to Questions of Mrza Ja far .The process of ousiological reduction the author

calls N+H (uncovering). Basically, it involves thepiercing ( "I ) of a total of nine veils ( 0 ) of essence.These veils roughly correspond to the vertical hierarchy ofexistence qua conditioned-by-something. One pierces theseveils through a discipline that involves a series of forty-daycycles of intense meditation and worship. In this vein, Sayh

quotes an interesting h. adtof Imam Al, one reminiscent

of a very Socratic approach to knowledge, and which mayserve to summarize the Sayh

s approach:

Knowledge is not in the Firmament, so that it maydescend down towards you. Nor is knowledge inthe Earth, so that it may rise up towards you.Rather, knowledge is created as a disposition withinyour hearts. Become imbued with the temperamentsof spiritual individuals, and it will self-manifest toyou.

See al-Ah. sa (, vol. , pt. , p. ). A printed edition (not

critical) of this treatise may be found in Rasailu al-H. ikmat (Ah. sa, p. ). Be warned that the editors of this recent collection of someof the authors works accidentally placed the first fourteen lines of thistreatise at the beginning of the immediately preceding treatise. Thefirst fourteen and one half lines (ending in the word a ) have beentaken from the beginning of the immediately preceding treatise andplaced at the beginning of the Risalah Ja fariyyat. The names of thetwo treatises are also reversed. Such sloppiness is really unforgivable.

R(R?SXR'WFeQReOXaR(R?SX!!1/?ReOXaRO\R?SXVbQJSbOXSKbjIR"aZed;_"ROX

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the nature of the proof of aDSayh

Ah.mad considers there to be three kinds of proof

( RReT ), each corresponding to one of the three typesand loci of cognition. From the proof of Wisdom oneacquires cognizance ( iF ) and Wisdom; from the proofof good exhortation ( b>;a'[ ) one acquires certainty( ReK ); from the proof of argumentation in the bestway ( cRR'\ ) one acquires knowledge ( R?SX ),but neither certainty or cognizance. In the commentary(Ah. sa , p. ), the author gives examples of thesethree proofs, pointing out the differences between them.Examining this may help to clarify the nature of the proofof Wisdom.

The goal of Wisdom is the cognizance of God. Ifone tries to reach this by means of the proof of goodexhortation, then one goes about it something like this(Ah. sa , pp. ):

If you believe that you have a creator, then you canbe sure that you will remain free of His wrath. If,however, you choose not to believe in Him, then youhave no way of being sure that, if you are wrong, youwill be free of His wrath. Rather, He may very wellpunish you. The only way to be assured of salvationis to believe in God.

Note that Sayh

Ah.mad uses R?SX in two different ways: when usedalongside ReK and iF , it has the particular definition we discussedin the previous section. In other places, his use of the term is moregeneral, covering both this sense of R?SX as well as that of iF .

Y>KYRP.?Fj*PNbZPZeV\>Kb>`aYRX?KRX

K7@[PV\>Kb>`Tdb#Y? PFjd/TRPRK7@R[iV@

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Although one may obtain salvation by submitting to theproof of good exhortation, it will not give you cognizanceof God.

An example of the use of the proof of argumentation inthe best way is as follows (Ah. sa , p. ):

If it is the case that among existents there isa preeternal creator that is uncreated, then thatestablishes the existence of the Necessary Existent(Exalted is He!). If not, then the existents [asa whole] must have a Fashioner because it isimpossible:

that they bring themselves into existence;

that they exist without something to bring them intoexistence.

Both alternatives are absurd.

This is a very abbreviated version of a popular proofof the existence of God based on contingency and theimpossibility of an infinite regress or circle of causes.According to our author, one does not obtain realcognizance from this kind of proof; it is designed only tosilence an opponent. It does not create certainty, and aningenious enough opponent can probably find a way towiggle himself out of any rational proof of the existence ofGod. Rational proofs of Gods existence have been offered

>Kab]>?Rh YNYRWbbJdXRLaR(WSbIRb?RhaiFj

R_V\.@'eTYbZG'_abCVbR_aNjRb_VQ

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by major philosophers from Plato to Godel, yet the equallyrationalist skeptics never seem to go away.

As an example of the proof of Wisdom, Sayh

Ah.madoffers the following. It makes use of his unique theory ofsubsistence which we will not discuss in detail here:

Every impression resembles the actional qualityof its agent; it subsists through its agent, thatis, through its acting, by means of processionalsubsistence ( JeU. ). This is like the case ofspeech: it subsists through the speaker by means ofprocessional subsistence. Similar is the subsistenceof rays through sources of light, and images inmirrors. Thus, things constitute a self-manifestingof the Necessary to them and through them. Thisis because He (Exalted is He!) does not self-manifestthrough His essence. Otherwise, He would differ fromstate to state.

Now nothing is more intense in self-manifesting,presence, or evidentness than that which self-manifests with respect to the act of its self-manifesting. This is because that which self-manifests is more manifest than its act of self-manifesting, even though it is not possible to reachcognizance of it except through its act of self-manifesting. Consider the acts of standing andsitting. The stander is more manifest, in the very actof standing, than the act of standing itself, althoughit is not possible to reach [cognizance of] him exceptthrough the act of standing. So you may say: Ostander!, or O sitter!. You are only referring tothe stander, not the act of standing. This is because,through his act of self-manifesting to you through

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the act of standing, he [in effect] prevents you,initially, from witnessing the act of standing [itself].[This is the case] unless you focus on the act ofstanding itself, in which case the stander throughthe act of standing becomes hidden from you.

So by means of this inference, which is from theproof of Wisdom, He (Glorified is He!) is, for the onewho has cognizance, more manifest than anything.This is like what the Chief of the Martyrs [ImamHusayn] (upon whom be peace) has said [in thecourse of a supplication]: Can something other thanYou have an act of self-manifesting which You do nothave, so that it comes to be that which manifestsYou? So through it [i.e., this type of inference],cognizance [of Allah] occurs, and it cannot occurthrough [a proof] other than this at all.

YNT"+`.GV"]>aZ?`JEX>`cG?S>`JeU.a!NROjFZ?`JEXRWOSJeU.a!aN!*?RW[aR/b!RW"dF!*e:_b!Rb_R_!Z?`?Rhid;_" >àiSGR]aidObY*:_b!a3b!aeZV\R;:_b!]>!YR;:_"V\:_b!]>aYNYidWO\Rb.TRhViF>ì;_b!]>VTRKeaRK?bFYRKEX:_"RKeV\RKeaYNYidWO\Rb.TReìRKeFKbQdJEXadJ>FZZW?RKEXiRKe!Z?`;_b!]>RPRKeBe>[PV+^RKe.jiYSGRhZG(RKeFe>[PRKEXRKeF_ %&iQR c^bV\ReTROWdObY&Z?`>[R?!E:_"V\NT

NWJQ&eR+_>Se`R'jdObYRCMV\R;_b!VR(RPzh

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The crux of all this is that, through the proof of Wisdom,the existence of God is no less obvious to the heart-fluxthan the existence of someone standing is to the eye. Infact it is more obvious, for the heart-flux is the highestof all loci of cognition. One has cognizance of a standingperson not through his quintessence, but through the fieldof activity that constitutes his act of standing by which thestander manifests himself to one. Similarly, the heart-fluxhas cognizance of God, not through His Quintessence, butthrough a field of activity or act of self-manifesting whichreveals His presence. The object of the proof of Wisdomis not to silence the opponent but to see the realities ofthings with the heart-flux just as one sees the appearancesof things through the five senses as well as psychic andintelligible grasping. If someone argues with one who hasachieved cognizance of God or something else through thisproof, then he or she is no different from any of the blindmen arguing about the elephant, or whether there is such athing as sight.

The mystical experience which constitutes one of thegrounds of the proof of Wisdom is, of course, not uniqueto Sayh

Ah.mad or to Muslim mystics for that matter. For

Sayh

Ah.mad, however, this experience must be groundedin the fountain of revelation and in purity of intention,otherwise one may follow that of which one has noknowledge, in contravention to the Quranic verse whichcommands the opposite and which threatens to hold evenones vision through the heart-flux to account. Withoutproper grounding, someone may come up with the notionthat all is God, that he or she is God, or other pantheist

dObY^bRW;_"RPa/T>`RWiFRKai/TC]>.j

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notions. Because revelation is Gods Word, grounding theexperience of cognizance in His Word will help shield themystic from antinomian behavior and from describing Godand His relationship to the world in ways which contradicthow He Himself has described Himself.

The question of metamystical expression and interpre-tation is important here. The example Sayh

Ah.mad gives

above as a proof of Wisdom is, in fact, a metamysticalinterpretation of the vision of the heart-flux. So we must becareful to distinguish the proof of Wisdom proper from itspropositional expression.

Of course, this is also true of a logical proof: itsexpression must be distinguished from the epistemic actinvolved in a proof. A logical proof is communicableonly to those capable of the epistemic act of reasoning.Although probably few of us could have come up withGodels incompleteness theorem on our own, given theproper tools many of us could follow his proof to theend and rationally concur with its cogency. Similarly,not just any mystical philosopher could come up withSayh

Ah.mads metamystical interpretation of cognizance

through the heart-flux, but other mystics could learn fromit and would-be mystics could be given some idea of whatto look for as they pursue the goal of Wisdom.

Sayh

Ah.mads metamystical interpretation of the proofof Wisdom is propositional. In the example given above onesees both the statement and application of first principles.One principle he states is that every impression resemblesthe actional quality of its agent. A principle that heapplies but does not state is what I call the cosmologicalcorrespondence principle: the cognizance of a higher level ofexistence can only be accomplished through the cognizanceof a lower level. He applies this in his correspondence of,

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on the one hand, the act of witnessing God through thefield of activity that constitutes His act of self-manifesting,with the act of witnessing a standing person through thefield of activity that constitutes his act of standing. Onenotices upon reading the Fawa id a plethora of paradigms( VS , s. VQ ) proffered to serve the purpose of metamysticalmodeling.

In view of the above, one may interpret the proofof Wisdom as a tool for the discovery of metaphysicaland cosmological first principles. Given these generalprinciples, one may rationally deduce other propositions.But, one may ask, doesnt that turn the proof of Wisdominto a propaedeutic to rational analysis, analogous toSuhrawardis program of grounding rationalism in mysticalexperience?

Indeed, one definition the author gives of the proof ofWisdom is that it is an experiential ( a ), visionary ( >e )proof which entails necessary and immediate knowledge ofthat which is inferred (Ah. sa , p. ). In traditionalphilosophy, propositions of which one has necessary( c ) or immediate ( d_f ) knowledge constitute firstprinciples, which may be used to deduce other propositions.Yet Sayh

Ah.mad appears to go further than Suhraward

in his deemphasis of the role of Peripatetic rationaldemonstration. This issue must be studied further, however.For example, in the Sarh.u al-Masa ir (Ah. sa a,p. ), he tries to show the inadequacies of the logicaltheory of predication when applied to the interpretationsof the paradigms of the proof of Wisdom. Our authordoes, on occasion, apply some degree of rational analysisto the application of his metaphysical and cosmologicalprinciples to the solution of problems in RGS'G . He alsoapplies rational analysis to the answering of objections

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to some of his positions. On some occasions, he saysthat an objection has two answers, one outward ( : )and one inward ( 6\ ). By an outward answer the authormeans a response based on rational demonstration frompropositional principles derived from or consistent with theproof of Wisdom. By an inward answer, the author appearsto mean a deeper application of the proof of Wisdom. Here,the proof of Wisdom is still modelled in a rational manner,but the principles applied require greater philosophical andexperiential depth on the part of reader to be understood.These degrees of outwardness and inwardness give the proofof Wisdom a certain openness and flexibility, an abilityto accommodate various levels of phenomenological andphilosophical preparedness. One is not trapped within theconfines of any one particular axiomatic system. Rather,repeated application of the proof of Wisdom opens newvistas and horizons to those who continually persist in itsapplication. As Inada would put it, it points towards adynamic, open ontology (Inada, ).

Another possible way of characterizing the differencebetween Peripatetic metaphysical principles and those ofpropositional models of the proof of Wisdom is to say thatthe former constitute synthetic a priori principles and thatthe latter constitute synthetic a posteriori principles. Nowa synthetic a priori principle is a proposition whose truthvalue

does not depend on the respective meanings of the terms ofthe proposition;

is known independently of experience.

A synthetic a posteriori first principle is a propositionwhose truth value

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does not depend on the respective meanings of the terms ofthe proposition;

is not known independently of experience.

Consider the proposition, God exists. The truth valueof this proposition depends neither on the meaning ofGod nor on the meaning of exists. So it is synthetic.In an example like the rational proof of Gods existencegiven above by Sayh

Ah.mad, the proposition is also a

priori, for one seeks to discover its truth value throughrational deduction, not experience. In the metamysticalpropositional model of the proof of Wisdom, the knowledgeof the truth value of the proposition that God exists is justas dependent on experience as the knowledge of the truthvalue of, say, John is standing. For Sayh

Ah.mad then, the

proposition is synthetic a posteriori. The only difference isthe organ of experience involved.

Most philosophers today, presumably inclusive ofrational metaphysicians, reject the notion of a synthetica priori proposition. Sayh

Ah.mad would probably reject it

also, for at least two reasons:

The whole thrust of Sayh

Ah.mads program is todiscover the truth values of certain metaphysical principlesthrough ousiological intuition grounded in revelation; toacknowledge the existence of synthetic a priori propositionswould probably defeat, or at least undermine, his purpose;

In Sayh

Ah.mads psychology, knowledge ( R?SX ), certainty( ReK ), and cognizance ( iF ) are all rooted in experience.The notion of an a priori proposition is thus difficult tohold, and the definition of an a posteriori proposition is

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vague because it does not distinguish between knowledge,certainty, and cognizance;

Our author would probably define a synthetic a prioriproposition as something like a synthetic propositionwhose truth value is both only thought to be known ingeneral, as well as thought to be known independentlyof experience. For a precondition of the knowledgeand cognizance obtained through the proof of Wisdomis the emptying of ones self of all preconceptions andpreconceived notions. Until one sees through the proofof Wisdom, ones metaphysical principles remain purelysuppositional.

the principles of aDBased on my perusal of the Fawa id, its commentary, andother writings of Sayh

Ah.mad, I have come across a set

of nine general principles that appear to include the mostfundamental philosophical commitments of the author. Wewill not give a detailed analysis of those commitmentshere. We will restrict ourselves to mentioning some of themost immediate consequences of these propositions. Theauthor summarizes these principles in the form of formulae.These formulae are repeated over and over again, especiallythroughout the authors later works (See, e.g., the end ofthe Thirteenth Observation). Most of them are in the formof verses of the Quran or traditions; as is his wont, heprefers to speak his mind through the Islamic sources ofrevelation and the traditions of the Sh Imams wheneverhe can.

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. The principle of ousiological reduction and ousiologicalintuition.

According to this principle, the cognizance of God dependson the cognizance of the realities of things, and thecognizance of the realities of things depends on thecognizance of God. This is illustrated by the following verseof the Quran:

We will show them Our signs in the horizonsand in their selves until it becomes clear tothem that He is the Real30. [:]

For Sayh

Ah.mad, this meditation upon the signs of Godincludes meditation upon the objects of the macrocosm( R?GRO ) and the astronomical sciences, as well as thoseof the microcosm ( R?GR/C ) and the natural sciences;

. The topological principle.

This is the ontological principle that functorial relation-ships obtain between realms in the ontological hierarchy.That is, each realm shares characteristics that belong to therealm beneath it, but in a more sublime way ( >VbE ).For example, the dualism between intelligible and corpo-real, between ideal and material, disappears. Whatever iscorporeal has an intelligible aspect; whatever is intelligiblehas a corporeal aspect. As one climbs the ladder of exis-tence qua conditioned-by-something, in ascent towards theDivine Will, the corporeal aspect becomes more and moresubtle, while the intelligible aspect becomes more intense.Similarly, as one descends from the Nous, the intelligible

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aspect decreases in intensity while the corporeal aspect in-creases. Nothing is absolutely incorporeal except God, andsince all propositions about Him are tautologous, no onecan know what this incorporeality means. Sayh

Ah.mad us-

es the following statement of Imam S. adiq as a formula toillustrate this state of affairs:

Servitude is a jewel whose ultimate reality islordship. So what is missing ( FK ) in servitude isfound ( a ) in lordship; what is hidden in lordshipis attained in servitude;

. The codependent origination principle.

This is an ontological principle that states that whatever ishigher in the hierarchy of conditioned existence depends onthat which is lower for manifestation ( :_ ); that which islower depends on that which is higher for realization ( WKL );and finally, that neither can exist without the other. Thisis illustrated by the same saying of Imam S. adiq as theprevious principle;

. The cosmological correspondence principle.

This is an epistemic principle, according to which theinference of truths about realms higher in the verticalhierarchy of conditioned existence can not be attainedwithout a knowledge of the state of affairs of the sensiblerealm. This may at first glance appear to contradict whatwas said above to the effect that the proof of Wisdom

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requires an emptying of the self of all preconceptionsand preconceived notions. This is not the case. If I amunderstanding Sayh

Ah.mad correctly, the cosmological

principle is applicable primarily to the metamystical,quasi-rational modeling of the experience of cognizance.Presumably, the one exercising this principle should alreadybe able to see with the heart-flux. So as one applies thisprinciple he should be under the guidance of the light ofthe heart-flux. This principle is represented by the sayingof Imam Rid. a:

Surely those who possess the kernels of conscious-ness-awareness know that the way of guidance towhat is there cannot be known except by what ishere!32

This principle leads to a very interesting dialecticalnaturalism which no category of metaphysics, not eventhe world of the nous and the intelligible, can escape. Italso has important consequences for Neoplatonic types ofphilosophy. Neoplatonists, and Platonists in general, saw inthe science of mathematics the ideal paradigm upon whichan understanding of reality must be based. Based uponthe supposedly a priori and ideal objects of arithmetic andgeometry, Neoplatonists (like Proclus) tried to constructdeductive metaphysical systems. Sensible reality, containingonly imperfect representations of these mathematical andother ideal objects, was thus considered to be somehowunreal, and the locus of reality was determined to be in theimmaterial, atemporal, and intelligible realm.

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This is reversed in Sayh

Ah.mad. For our author,there are two sciences most important to the developmentof metaphysical and cosmological models based on theproof of Wisdom. These are chemistry (or alchemy) andastronomy. In the traditional civilization to which Sayh

Ah.mad belonged, astronomy was considered as one ofthe mathematical sciences. But our author shows littleinterest in the structures of astronomical models qua idealstructures. Rather, he tries to apply the principles of post-Ptolemaic celestial physics to the processes of becomingwhich he calls essences. And the interplay of essence andexistence at every rank of both conditioned existence andAbsolute Existence is modeled on principles of physicalscience, including alchemy. For Sayh

Ah.mad, astronomy

is the science of the macrocosm ( R?GRO ) and alchemy isthe science of the microcosm ( iGR/C ).

The use of physical science in metaphysics is notaltogether new. And Sayh

Ah.mad would find partial

justification for such a use of physical science in thelegendary words of Imam Al to the effect that alchemy( ROeWe ) is the sister of prophecy (Ah. sa b, p. ).This emphasis by our author on physical science in theFawa id and in other works of his points to a verynaturalistic approach to metaphysics. His proof of the

According to some (Swerdlow and Neugebauer , p. ), one of the

distinguishing features of the Maraghah school of astronomy, initiatedby T. us and studied by Sayh

Ah.mad, is an emphasis on the physical

problems of Ptolemys models. T. us, following Aristotle, says that theprinciples of astronomy are derived from metaphysics, geometry, andphysical science (Ragep , pp. and ).Naturalism holds that the best methods of inquiry in the social

sciences or philosophy are, or are to be modelled on, those of thenatural sciences (Schmitt, ).

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dual principality of essence and existence rests on whatare fundamentally naturalistic principles. Moreover, Sayh

Ah.mad makes the fateful move of reversing the order oftraditional hylomorphism, through his theory of the active,dynamic nature of matter, and the receptive, becomingnature of form;

. The causal principle.

This principle states that every impression ( ) resemblesthe actional quality ( .G ) of its proximate agent( V]Rd ). The words and V are basicallycoextensive with effect ( V?SbQ ) and cause ( >S )respectively. The Latins translated with impressio,and V with agens and imprimens (see FreytagsLexicon Arabico-Latinum, under ! ). The word V literally means that which occasions an impression. Thecorresponding gerund is , meaning, the occasioningof an impression. Muslim scholastics frequently definedthe concepts action ( RG?T ) and passion ( /ZG?Q )in terms of . This principle expresses at least twoideas:

That actions are real. On this point, Sayh

Ah.mad is insharp disagreement with Ibn Sina, al-T. us, Suhraward, andMr Damad, even Mulla S. adra, all of whom denied theexternal reality of qua , and hence, of both actionand passion. They claimed that admitting the ontic statusof would result in circularity or infinite regress. Thisis because a given would need its own to come

NT"+`.GV]RdSayh

Ah.mad, on the other hand, prefers to define these in terms of

motion ( a"N ).

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into being. But then that other would need its own,and so forth. With respect to God, this meant denyingthat there was such a thing as a distinct Willing ( V+e ) orActing ( F?T ) distinct from God Himself and the outcomesof His action. Mulla S. adra, while more lenient on theissue of the reality of action and passion, sides with hispredecessors on the issue of a separate Willing of God.We have given Sayh

Ah.mads response to this elsewhere

(Hamid , part , ..). We should add that thereare few issues over which he takes such strong issue withhis fellow philosophers and theologians as this one. He ventsparticular anger at Mr Damad (as in, e.g., his Treatise onKnowledge) and Mulla S. adra (as in, e.g., his On Matters ofSubjective Signification), because, as Sh theologians, theywere definitely aware that their Imams were unequivocalabout the separate and distinct reality of actions in generaland Gods Action in particular. Instead, as Sayh

Ah.mad

sees it, they twist the intentions of the Imams to fit therequisites of Peripatetic method (as in Mr Damads case)and of both Peripatetic method and Sufism (as in MullaS. adras case);

That whatever characteristics which are manifest in a givenoutcome of acting ( VG?bQ ) are latent in the acting ( F?T )from which the outcome of acting originated. For example,the configuration of a sample of writing may be eithersmooth or crooked. For Sayh

Ah.mad, this smoothness or

crookedness of the writing sample is a manifestation ofsomething latent within the field of activity from whichthe sample of writing originated. In the Third Observationof Fawa id, the author uses this principle in an attempt toresolve the dichotomy between unity and multiplicity.

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While I have not come across a particular reference inthis vein, it appears that this principle is a manifestationof the aforementioned formula

Servitude is a jewel whose ultimate reality islordship. So what is missing ( FK ) in servitude isfound ( a ) in lordship; what is hidden in lordshipis attained in servitude.

So this principle appears to be very closely related to thetopological principle;

. The realist principle.

This is basically equivalent to Meinongs thesis to theeffect that to every thought there corresponds a real object.Sayh

Ah.mad uses the following tradition of Imam S. adiq as

his formula of epistemological realism:

Anything that you discriminate through your minds,in its deepest meanings, is created like you are, andis reverted to you.

This formula contains information beyond that which isindicative of Meinongian realism. For it also ties in to Sayh

Ah.mads strict negative theology. Any concept, notion, orterm that the human mind can imagine or devise denotesa created thing and only a created thing. In reality, noneof these things denote God qua God, and no propositional

Alexius Meinong (). Important metaphysician and ontologist

who helped pave the way for the modern analytical philosophymovement.

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combination of them will give any information whatsoeverabout His Quintessence;

. The ontological polarity principle.

This principle states that every created, contingent thingis a complex of acting ( F?T ) and becoming-in-yielding-to-acting ( ZG?Q ). That is, everything is composed of anact of existence and an act of becoming or essence.Assuming the ontological import of the essence-existencedistinction, this principle takes both existence and essenceas coprincipal, coterminous, and coincident, althoughexistence is ontologically prior to essence. Both originateand subsist codependently. A polar dialectic obtainsbetween them so that there can be no question of aseparate entity called existence and a separate entitycalled essence. Existence is the all-pervasive and unitaryactive matter and ousia which constitutes the necessaryand sufficient condition for the generation or becoming-generated ( ObY ) and the realization or becoming-realized( WKL ) of essences, while essences are the individuatedacts of becoming which constitute the necessary andsufficient condition for the manifestation of existence.Another implication of this principle is the denialof certain presuppositions underlying Peripatetic andscholastic conceptions of substance. The authors formulacorresponding to the polarity principle is the followingsaying of Imam Rid. a:

Allah definitely did not create any single thingsubsisting through itself and without something else.[This is a point] for whoever desires an indication ofHim and the affirmation of His existence ;

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. The principle of the relation between quality and qualified.

This principle has two parts, an ontic and an epistemicpart. The ontic part Sayh

Ah.mad states as follows: the

existence of a given qualified subject is a condition of theexistence of the quality. The epistemic part states this:the existence of any given quality, in the condition ( Q )of being a quality, prior to the existence of the qualifiedsubject is neither intelligible nor conceptualizable (as inthe Seventeenth Observation);

. The creation principle.

According to this principle, God created everything in thebest possible way, and in accordance with the exigencies ofHis own Wisdom, a Wisdom that is latent within the realmof His Acting-Possibility. The formula the author uses toexpress this is the following verse of the Quran:

And if the Real chose to follow their passions,the Heavens, the Earth, and whoever is inthem would have been corrupted. Rather,we have presented them with their presence;and from their presence do they turn away40.[:]

The implications the author draws out of this principle andthe accompanying formula are among the most profound

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and also most difficult to follow. He tries to explainthat God is present to His creatures through the verybounds of their acts of becoming, and yet that past,present and future are all identical for Him. He is alsoat pains to show that Gods Wisdom in the orderingof the world does not entail determinism. Rather, theActing of God and the set of acts of becoming thatconstitute His creatures are engaged in a continuousdynamic interplay wherein each one operates only throughthe other. Unfortunately, the author left no commentaryon the Eighteenth Observation, where these themes arelaid out in most detail. Written later than the twelveobservations that constitute the original Fawa id, theEighteenth Observation, proceeding from this principle,contains some of the highest philosophical speculations ofthe author.

It appears to be the case that some of these principlesare reducible to others. It is a task for further researchto determine the smallest, irreducible set of principles uponwhich Sayh

Ah.mads system is based. The above list should

not be considered as constituting a mutually exclusive orjointly exhaustive set. I am sure that I have left a fewthings out, especially in the area of epistemology (such as

Some Arabic scholars may question my translation of N" with presence. The word N" commonly means reminder ormentioning. Its literal meaning, however, is presence in the mind(See Lanes Lexicon, under M! ). Based on Sayh

Ah.mads use of the

term, it is clear to me that he is interpreting N" , as used in the Quranand some of the traditions of the Imams (as in the beginning of theFourth Observation) to signify that through which a given thing ispresent to something else. Both the remembering and mentioning ofa given thing presume some kind of presence of that thing to the onementioning or remembering.

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his theory, apparently not explicitly articulated until latein his career, of the identity of knowledge with the objectof knowledge).

towards a definition of aD Let us return to Sayh

Ah.mads division of cognition and

organs of cognition. Knowledge ( R?SX ) proper has its locusin the soul and the imaginal faculty; true certainty ( ReK )has its locus in the nous, and cognizance ( iF ) has its locusin the heart-flux. To each of these types of cognition therecorresponds a method of proof ( RReT ) appropriate to it. Toknowledge there corresponds the proof of argumentationin the best way ( cRR'\ ), or logical analysis; tocertainty there corresponds the proof of good exhortation( b>;a'[ ); to cognizance there corresponds the proof ofWisdom ( aD ). These three types of proof are referred toin the Quran:

Call to the path of your Lord with Wisdomand good exhortation. And argue with themthrough that which is best42. [:]

Given a method of proof, there should be a set of sciencesto which that proof is applied. Sayh

Ah.mad finds the key to

this question to lie in a tradition of the Prophet to the effectthat there are only three useful branches of knowledge:the firm sign ( iddD ), the just duty ( R3R?R ), andthe established Sunnah ( R'[RKq ) (Ah. sa , p. ).According to Sayh

Ah.mad, the firm sign corresponds to

the science of Wisdom, the just duty to the science ofethics and purification of the soul, and the established

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Sunnah corresponds to the science of the Law ( R? ). Theaccompanying table summarizes the relations between thesesciences and the types of cognition. Although he does notsay so explicitly, this does not mean that he rejects othersciences. It is just a matter of appropriately fitting themsomehow into these categories. The usefulness of othersciences, regardless of the type of proof appropriate toit, is to be measured in accordance with how it relatesto the sciences mentioned by the Prophet. For example,medicine can come under the category of Sunnah becausethe Prophet encouraged his followers to learn it; it iscovered by the just duty because spiritual developmentis assisted by corporal soundness; and it is covered byWisdom because it gives some knowledge of the humanmicrocosm, meditation upon which is a requisite of theproof of Wisdom.

mode of corresponding science sciencecognition type of mentioned by mentioned by

proof the Prophet Sayh

Ah.mad

knowledge logical the established the Law

argumentation Sunnah

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