II. INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 5 III. …
Transcript of II. INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 5 III. …
DETECTING DECEPTION IN CONVERSATION:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION THEORIES
by
Chad C. Edwards
A SENIOR THESIS
in
GENERAL STUDIES
Submitted to the General Studies Council in the College of Arts and Sciences
at Texas Tech University in Partial fulfillment of
the Degree of
BACHELOR OF GENERAL STUDIES
Approved
MAY 1997
ni^'6'X(^i^D
i I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In preparing this work, I have received help from
numerous sources. Many of these have been noted on the
reference page. I would like to thank Dr. Charlotte Dunham
of the Sociology Department and Dr. David Williams of the
Communication Studies Department for serving on my
committee. I would also like to thank Dr. Jim Sahlman from
Angelo State University for his help. Additionally, I would
like to thank my wife and daughter—Autumn and America
Edwards—for their support. Without the help of the people
above, this project would have never been completed.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii
CHAPTER
I. EARLY DECEPTION THEORIES 1
Origin 2
Coding 3
Usage 3
II. INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 5
Conversational Implicature 5
Information Manipulation Theory 9
III. INTERPERSONAL DECEPTION THEORY 15
Strategic Communication 15
Nonstratgic Communication 21
IV. THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION THEORIES 24
REFERENCES 2 6
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CHAPTER I
EARLY DECEPTION THEORIES
Deceit and lying can be found in many aspects of our
society. Falsehoods can have important consequences for
both the deceiver and the one being deceived (Hocking,
Bauchner, Kaminski, & Miller, 1979). The study of deception
is probably as old as the study of communication itself. As
early as 900 B.C. in literature and historical accounts,
people were describing the "liar" (Hocking et al., 1979).
In the late 1800's, researchers were trying to identify
physiological differences (e.g. eye movements, etc.) between
lying and truth-telling individuals (Hocking et al., 1979).
Although, this type of research had obvious limitations (in
not considering the verbal dimension) it did lead to more
scientific types of research. This paper will examine one
of the earlier modern scientific deception theories and then
proceed to examine the two main present theories.
Ekman and Friesen (1969) were two notable pioneers in
the emergence of modern deception theories. They maintained
that people will "leak" emotional (nonverbal) behaviors when
being deceitful. They proposed that micromonentary
behaviors (e.g., knitted brow) are behaviors that are leaked
when deception occurs. They suggested that the leakage cues
occur in a "leakage hierarchy"; however, there was dispute
as to the order of the leaks: that is, whether shifty eyes,
say, preceded twitching fingers. Ekman and Friesen (1969)
also suggested that it is difficult for the deception to
occur when the deceiver thinks that negative consequences
will occur.
However, their main concept, "leakage," refers to the
nonverbal behaviors which are shown by the deceiver that
express his or her true emotion (Ekman & Friesen, 1969).
Ekman & Friesen (1969) established the difference between
"leakage accuracy" (being able to identify the true affect)
and "deception accuracy" (recognizing whether deception is
occurring)--a distinction which would help future
researchers (Hurd & Noller, 1988). Furthermore, Ekman and
Friesen (1969) argued that there are three types of
nonverbal activities that can help one detect deception:
origin, coding, and usage (Littlejohn, 1996).
Origin
Origin refers to the source of an act (Littlejohn,
1996). For example, the deceiver is the origin. A nonverbal
behavior can be innate (built into the nervous system),
species-constant (universal behavior required for survival),
or variant across groups and sub-groups (Littlejohn, 1996).
By examining the type of origin framework, one can have a
better understanding of whether deception is happening.
Coding
Coding is indicative of the relationship of the act to
its meaning (Littlejohn, 1996). There are three types of
coding: arbitrary, iconic, and intrinsic (Littlejohn, 1996).
Arbitrary indicates that no meaning is inherent in the sign
or behavior itself. For example, in our society, we agree
that a head nod sideways is the "no" symbol. Iconic signs
resemble things being signified. For example, obscene
gestures (e.g., giving the bird) are iconic signs
(Littlejohn, 1996). Intrinsic coded cues are part of the
signified and hold their meaning (Littlejohn, 1996). Crying
is an example of intrinsic coding. It is a sign of emotion,
but it is also a part of the emotion as well.
Usage
Usage refers to the degree to which a nonverbal
behavior conveys information to the receiver (Littlejohn,
1996). There are two types of usage: communicative and
interactive. A communicative act is used to deliberately
convey a message to the receiver (telling someone a
statement); while a interactive act indirectly influences
the receiver (demonstrating a behavior) (Littlejohn, 1996).
Some behaviors are not intended to be informative; rather
these acts are perceived by the receiver and provide
information in spite of the intent of the communication
(Littlejohn, 1996). For example, a friend sees you in the
hall, but you duck into a room to avoid being detected.
However, the friend sees this action and attributes meaning
to it no matter what the communicative intent of his/her
friend.
Although Ekman and Freisen attracted attention to
deceitful behavior as a communication phenomena, their
research was limited in that it was only interested in the
micro level behaviors that are exhibited during deception
(Ekman & Freisen, 1969). This type of research ignored all
other types of possible deceptive cues. Nevertheless, Ekman
and Friesen (1969) provided the necessary framework for
various deception theories that were to follow. Among their
contributions, Ekman and Friesen (1969) demonstrated that
deception could occur on two levels: strategic and
nonstrategic. Strategic is purposeful manipulation of
deceptive cues, and the nonstrategic level involves cues
that are "leaked". Their concept of the usage dimension
allows for both strategic and nonstrategic deception. Their
usage element would later influence the work of Buller and
Burgoon (1994;1996). Furthermore, Ekman and Friesen's three
elements (origin, coding, and usage) were built on by the
later work on deception by Grice (1989) and McCornack
(1992), which will be explored in the next chapter.
CHAPTER II
INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY
After the work of Ekman and Friesen, other researchers
studies deception and developed alternative theories. For
instance. Information Manipulation Theory was first
developed by Steven McCornack. His theory is an extension of
the work of Paul Grice (who had built on the foundation of
Ekman and Friesen). Grice (1989) proposes four
conversational maxims that form the cooperative principle.
Collectively, these maxims are labeled the Conversational
Implicature. This chapter will first examine the
Conversational Implicature as developed by Grice and then
examine how Grice's work influenced Information Manipulation
Theory.
Conversational Implicature
Paul Grice devised a theory of language use that now
has become known as the conversational implicature
(McCornack, 1992). Grice (1989) maintained that people
involved in any interaction follow a general principle of
cooperation. The cooperative principle defines when and how
a person is required to contribute to a conversation.
In order for a mutually satisfying conversation to take
place, the contributors must follow and adhere to the
cooperative principle. The cooperative principle allows for
each person to reach an agreement for the conversation.
Each individual has the expectation that the conversation
will be relevant, rational, and have a common purpose. For
example, when a person answers the telephone, s/he expects
there to be a certain order for the greeting to take place.
Without this agreement, the conversation would not take
place nor be mutually satisfying.
Grice (1989) notes that people's conversations do not
develop from irrational statements. Conversations must
develop from rational thought patterns, or the discourse
will be irrational. Moreover, conversations are cooperative
efforts of discourse that have a common purpose. For
example, a person would not want a conversation to take
place in which each person had contradictory goals. This
action would not be mutually satisfying. People expect the
conversation to be relevant or have this common purpose.
The cooperative principle includes four maxims (quantity,
quality, manner, and relation) that cannot be violated in
order to have a mutually beneficial conversation. They are
necessary for the a successful, efficient conversation.
McCornack (1992) realized the need for a new deception
model. Through his readings of Grice (1989), he recognized
that the conversation implicature could be applied to
deception research. The four maxims would serve as the
areas in which a person would covertly violate in order to
be deceptive. The following example will discuss each maxim
and the cooperative principle.
Sahlman and Canary (1996) gave an example based on the
Information Manipulation Theory (IMT) to demonstrate the
cooperative principle and the four maxims. One day a son
attends a basketball game instead of doing his homework. The
son comes home late, which has become a repeated event. The
father will probably ground the son for many weeks. IMT
argues that the son's response will vary among the five
response modes to the father's question: "Where have you
been? You're late again and you had better have a good
excuse!" The first option for the son is tell the truth and
live up to the expectations of the cooperative principle.
The other four modes of responses will vary or violate
according to the four maxims (which will be applied to the
example in the next section).
Cooperative Principle
The cooperative principle is the idea that a person is
to answer or disclose all relevant information to another
person's inquiry (Sahlman & Canary, 1996) The son would
tell the father all relevant information in order to be
truthful. Deviant statements that covertly violate these
expectations are not part of the cooperative principle.
Quantity. Quantity refers to the amount of information
given in any conversation. It is assumed that the
information given will be as informative as required by the
other's discourse (McCornack, 1992). However, if he chose
to be deceptive, the son could be uncooperative and leave
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out critical information. "Hey, Dad, I'm sorry. I was at
the school with the guys" (Sahlman & Canary, 1996). The
son's response is truthful at some level; however, the son
left out the critical information of being at the basketball
game. The omission of information demonstrates a deceptive
intent (McCornack, 1992).
Ouality. Quality refers to the integrity of the
information presented in any given conversation (Grice,
1989). Individuals are expected, according to the
cooperative principle, not to make claims that are false or
claims which lack evidence (McCornack, 1992). This maxim
refers to the essence of what most people believe is
deceptive communication (Sahlman & Canary, 1996). The son
might respond "Hey, Dad, sorry I'm late. I was at the
library working on school work" (Sahlman & Canary, 1996).
This response reflects a complete fabrication that obviously
violates the cooperative principle (McCornack, 1992). An
absolute fabrication (e.g., boldface lie) would be the
extreme end of the quality maxim.
Manner. Manner refers to clarity and directness of
the information (McCornack, 1992). The maxim manner
includes the expectation that individuals will avoid vague
and obscure statements and deliver the information in a
direct and clear way (McCornack, 1992). The son could be
noncooperative by responding, "I know I'm late. Dad.
Things are very busy right now. I was doing a whole bunch
of stuff and lost track of time. All of a sudden I was
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late" (Sahlman & Canary, 1996). In this mode, the son gives
the information, but he gives it in a vague and unclear way.
Relation. Relation indicates that an individual acting
in a cooperative way will make statements as relevant as
possible to the conversation (McCornack, 1992). If the son
responded "Sorry, I'm late. I bet you are upset with me.
Danny got in trouble with his Dad, too. Danny took his
dad's car key without asking. If I did that you would get
real mad" (Sahlman & Canary, 1996). A person who is
behaving noncooperativly will try to switch the conversation
to a different topic.
People unconsciously assume or take for granted the
cooperative principle, which allows them to make sense of
their conversations. Grice (1989) believed that the four
maxims provide the framework for conversations to take
place. The deceptive statements leave an impression of
coming clean. They manipulate the relation, manner, and
quantity in various ways to give the impression of being
truthful to the receiver. Each one gives some of the
information, but does so in a limited or distorted way to
give the impression of truthfulness while being deliberately
deceptive.
Information Manipulation Theory
Most research on deceptive communication has generally
concentrated on nonverbal behaviors rather than on verbal
statements (Sahlman & Canary, 1996). Yet, some research has
been done on verbal deception (deTurk & Miller, 1985;
Sahlman & Canary, 1996; Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, Afif &
Feldman, 1996). We do know that the verbal content of a
deception is considered less consistent (Kraut, 1978).
Furthermore, denials and falsification are used by deceivers
(Metts, 1989). Verbal messages make up what is thought of
as deceptive (Sahlman & Canary, 1996) . Verbal statement are
more reliable cues of deception than nonverbal behaviors
(Miller & Stiff, 1993). Deceived people are deceived
because of the verbal statements rather than the nonverbal
behaviors.
Until McCornack (1992), deception research had been
deficient. Research relied on the recall method to examine
deception. Through its use of narratives, IMT clearly shows
it is possible to test deceptive messages without using the
recall method, and without violating ethics in the process
(McCornack Levine, Solowczuk, Torres, & Campbell, 1992 ).
McCornack (1992) provides justification for applying the
cooperative principle to deception communication:
Deceptive messages are unique from other forms of discourse in that they involve deviations from what can be considered rational and cooperative conversational behavior. When presented within ongoing conversations, deceptive messages mislead listeners through covertly violating the principles that underlie and guide conversational understanding, (p. 2, emphasis added)
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Typings of Deception
Current researchers have been using "typing" to
evaluate deception (McCornack, 1992). However, typing
limits the generalizations and validity of the taxonomies
often because the researcher may be tempted to create the
types to fit the research (McCornack, 1992). Therefore, a
fundamental idea of IMT is that the coding of deceptive
messages as a type (e.g. fabrications, half-truths, etc.) is
limiting to research. Types present a finite number of the
kinds of deceptions that can occur. If a new type is
discovered a new category must be made. Eventually there
could be thousands of types. IMT does not allow for types
and maintains that the maxims can blend to allow for new
discoveries. The four maxims allow one to mix and cross
maxims much as one blends the primary colors to create
secondary colors. Types force an idea into one category,
regardless of the validity of the placement. For example,
various researchers might type messages fundamentally
different as identical. For example, a boldface lie and a
half-truth could be put in the same category (McCornack,
1992).
Attributions
Additionally, IMT provides for both the sender and the
receiver perspectives. IMT exists as a receiver-based model
of deception, ignoring whether or not deception was
successful(Sahlman & Canary, 1996). For example, suppose a
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politician were asked the question: Did you smoke pot? The
politician answers that s/he did but did not inhale. It
would be up to the receiver to perceive any violation of the
quantity maxim. McCornack (1992) says that deception
involves the perception of the receiver as to whether the
information is being manipulated or not. Yet at the same
time, it is a quasi-source oriented model because of the
covert violation. The sender has to covertly violate one of
the maxims to be deceptive. The sender strategically makes
the choice of which one.
Violations
McCornack's work takes Grice's theory to a new level
and extends it to deceptive communication. IMT argues that
"in ordinary conversations, individuals monitor the
information that they disclose along four different primary
dimensions: amount, veracity, relevance, and clarity"
(McCornack et al.,1992, pp. 17-18). Only one maxim needs to
be violated in order to be considered deceptive (Sahlman &
Canary, 1996). However, the dimensions can overlap each
other (McCornack, 1992). The son could violate two of the
maxims at once. For example, the son could respond, "Dad,
sorry I'm late. I was hanging out with the guys. Did you
hang with the guys when you were young?" The son, in a
noncooperative way, violated relation and quantity. Any
combination of the maxims can be used to deceive (Sahlman &
Canary, 1996).
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However, Jacobs, Dawson & Brashers (1996) argue that
deception does not necessarily occur only with the maxims,
but instead deception may also be generated through false
implicatures. For Jacobs et al. (1996), quality exists as
the main maxim and all other maxims fall into the subsets
(i.e. quantity, relation, and manner) of quality. For
example, the son's violation of relation is really a quality
violation with the subset of relation. According to Jacobs
et al. (1996), implicatures can be created even when no
maxim is violated. Rule conforming implicatures are
generated on the assumption that what was said directly and
literally conforms to the maxims (Jacobs et al., 1996).
McCornack, Levine, Morrison, and Lapinski (1996)
respond to this criticism of the theory by arguing that
quantity, relation, or manner must generate erroneous
quality violations. Quantity, relation, and manner give the
impression of "coming clean" while actually being deceptive,
hence the generation of erroneous quality maxims.
Covert versus Overt
Sahlman & Canary (1996) made a positive contribution by
pointing out that Information Manipulation Theory requires
that the-violation be covert to the deceiver. McCornack
(1992) states: "Deceptive messages are "deceptive' in that,
while they constitute deviations from the principles
underlying conversational understanding, they remain covert
deviations" (p. 6, emphasis in original). The person who is
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being deceived cannot know that the information is being
manipulated. "From the perceiver's perspective, covert
violations of these maxims are probably attributed when
perceivers become suspicious" (Sahlman & Canary, 1996, p.
5). Overt violations do not make up deceptive communication
(e.g., sarcasm) (McCornack, 1992). For example, in an
interchange between two friends that are making sarcastic
statements to one another during playful conversations, one
might say, "Oh THAT was real smart!" This example would not
be considered deceptive because the violation of the quality
maxim was overtly made.
Information Manipulation Theory made advances in
the deception field of research. It stresses the verbal
dimension of deception, which no other previous research had
looked at. IMT is a major improvement over other attempts
to help explain deception.
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CHAPTER III
INTERPERSONAL DECEPTION THEORY
Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) is an alternative
to IMT, developed by David Buller and Judee Burgoon
(1994;1996). Their theory emphasizes strategic moves and
counter moves by the deceived and the deceivers (Burgoon et
al., 1996; Buller, Burgoon, White & Ebesu, 1994). The most
fundamental aspect of Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT)
is that of strategy and choice. When a person is deceiving,
s/he strategically controls the information in the
discourse. This information co-occurs with unintentional
nonverbal behavior that detract from the person's
credibility. Furthermore, the deceiver has inadvertent
behavior that signals deceptive motives (Buller et al.,
1994). In order to better understand IDT, it is important
to divide IDT into two categories: strategic and
nonstrategic communication.
Strategic Communication
Strategic communication includes uncertainty/vagueness
cues, nonimmediacy/disassociation cues, and image
protection cues(Ebesu & Miller, 1994; Koper & Sahlman,
1996). Any effort on the part of the deceiver to reduce the
possibility of being detected is thought of as strategic
(Koper & Sahlman, 1996). Strategic communication is
intentional by the deceiver.
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Uncertainty and Vagueness
Uncertainty and vagueness cues refer to the clarity of
the statements. For example, an ambiguous statement would
leave the feeling of uncertainty and vagueness. It is not
entirely clear why one would strategically be uncertain in
order to be deceptive (Koper & Sahlman, 1996). However,
uncertainty could provide the deceiver with a potential
explanation (e.g., misunderstanding) when probed about the
lie (Koper & Sahlman, 1996). On the other hand, vagueness
has been well documented in the research (Koper & Sahlman,
1996; Burgoon et al., 1996; Buller & Burgoon, 1994).
Information management (or manipulation) is an easy way to
create uncertainty or vagueness for the receiver.
Information management is the manipulation of deceptive
messages to disassociate the deceiver from the message,
portray uncertainty or vagueness, or withhold information
from the receiver (Buller et al., 1994). For example, one
would see a sender who is vague in the discourse, or one who
withholds critical information from the receiver.
Furthermore, one could distance her/himself from the message
entirely, hence completely disassociating from the message
(e.g., using the statement "people say"). IDT proposes five
dimensions along which deceivers manipulate information:
veridicality, completeness, directness, clarity, and
personalization.
Veridicality. Veridicality refers to the
"truthfulness, honesty, veracity, or message fidelity"
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(Burgoon et al., 1996, p. 53). This dimension involves the
very essence of what most people think of as deceptive
communication. Grice's (1989) maxim of quality is the basis
for this dimension veridicality. A deceiver who is
successful in the deception must give the appearance of
truth (Burgoon, et al., 1996). However, it is important to
clarify the difference between actual veridicality and
apparent veridicality. Actual veridicality examines the
objective truth value of the message, while apparent
veridicality refers to the believability of the verbal
discourse in relation to the social context (Burgoon et al.,
1996). Information Manipulation Theory does not recognize
the difference between apparent truth and actual truth
(Burgoon et al., 1996). For example, using the scenario
from IMT, one would find the son's response the same;
however, with the IDT theory ,one would examine the response
on two levels: apparent truth and actual truth.
Completeness. Completeness refers to the idea that
a speaker provide as much information as required by the
conversation (Burgoon et al., 1996). Completeness is
basically the same as the quantity maxim of Grice (1989).
Yet, Burgoon et al. (1996) argue that there are two types of
completeness: informational completeness and conversational
completeness.
Informational completeness refers to the delivery of
all important and relevant information. Informational
completeness can only be determined by the reality of the
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sender (Burgoon et al., 1996). Conversational completeness
refers to the "apparent sufficiency of an utterance in
satisfying current conversation demands" (Burgoon et al.,
1996, p. 53). Conversational completeness is what is judged
true by the receiver (Burgoon et al., 1996). For example,
suppose the son said something (based in his reality) that
was cooperative. The son could say, "I was at the game with
my friends." This would be an example of informational
completeness. However, the dad's judgment of this statement
would determine its conversational completeness.
Directness/re1evance. Directness/relevance refers to
the degree in which a statement is directly related to other
statements (Burgoon et al., 1996). Directness/relevance is
equal to Grice's (1989) maxim of relevance. There are two
types of directness/relevance: pragmatically or
syntactically direct and semantically direct (Burgoon et
al., 1996).
Pragmatically or syntactically direct statements appear
to be grammatically coherent in relation to the previous
statements. To be semantically direct implies that the
statements are related to the previous statements or the
topic of discourse (Burgoon et al., 1996). For example, a
hedge might satisfy syntactic directness, but it would not
satisfy semantic relevance (Burgoon et al., 1996).
Clarity. Clarity refers to the idea that the sender
should be direct and avoid ambiguous and vague statements
(Burgoon et al., 1996). This dimension correlates to
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Grice's (1989) maxim of manner. For example, the son would
avoid unclear and vague statements to be cooperative.
Doublespeak is a violation of the dimension of clarity
(Burgoon et al., 1996).
Personalization. The last dimension for Burgoon et al.
(1996) is personalization. Personalization refers to the
disassociation or verbal nonimmediacy of a deceiver. Grice
(1989) does not provide a maxim for personalization, but
Grice (1989) does say that a person has a sense of ownership
over statements. "Personalization captures the extent to
which the information presented conveys the speaker's own
thoughts, opinions, and feelings" (Burgoon et al., 1996, p.
55). Nonimmediacy refers to the relationship between the
sender and receiver (Koper & Sahlman, 1996). Nonimmediate
language severs the relationship by adding descriptions of
events from the present to more distant places (Burgoon et
al., 1996). Descriptions can be modified by adding
modifiers, substitution generalizations for concrete
details, or by obscuring the agent of the action (e.g.,
"experts say"). For example, suppose a mother (Debbie) told
her two sons to be careful on the trampoline because experts
say it is the leading cause of death among teenage boys.
However, Debbie is being deceitful to protect her boys. The
use of "experts say" demonstrates her disassociation from
the actual discourse or text.
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Nonimmediacy/disassociation
As a result of the negative affect that deceptive
messages create, deceivers distance themselves from the
receiver (Koper & Sahlman, 1996). Affect displays refer to
emotional displays that are intentional or unintentional
(Burgoon, Buller, & Woodall, 1994). This distancing occurs
with words and nonverbal behaviors (Buller & Burgoon, 1994;
Buller et al., 1996; Koper & Sahlman, 1996). Verbal
nonimmdiacy reduces insecurity by distancing oneself from
the text of the deceptive message (Buller & Burgoon, 1994).
Behavior management is one such way to distance one's self
from the receiver (e.g., avoid nonverbal leakage).
Behavior management. Behavior management attempts to
use nonimmediacy and withdrawal as ways to avoid leakage
cues (Buller et al., 1994). Leakage refers to behaviors
which are shown by the deceiver that express true emotions
(Burgoon et al., 1994). For example, a person trying to
deceive would suppress nonverbal cues and activity. Suppose
a child is lying to you. The child would try to act very
calm, but would not have any normal expressions (be
"stonefaced") that one would expect from a child.
Image Protection
Image management tries to project a credible image and
deny any responsibility for the deceptive message (Buller et
al., 1994). For example, a person will pretend to be
knowledgeable in the area of discourse to portray a credible
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image. However, it is not clear what deceivers do to
protect their image (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). Image
protection can be evidenced by cues related to credibility,
security, and honesty (Koper & Sahlman, 1996). For example,
a deceiver may want to lower eye contact during the
deception; however, the deceiver may try to increase eye
contact in order to seem more credible (Koper & Sahlman,
1996).
Nonstrategic Communication
Nonstrategic communication involves signals of arousal
and nervousness, incompetent communication, and damped
affect (Buller et al., 1994).
Arousal and nervousness cues. Arousal and nervousness
cues usually occur because of the person's guilt, the
consequences of getting detected, the preparation, and the
anxiety about the deception (Buller et al., 1994). For
example, a person who is deceiving might act out an
unintentional nonverbal behavior like tapping a foot (Buller
& Burgoon, 1994). Arousal can vary dramatically depending
on four factors: how serious the lie is, how motivated the
deceiver is to avoid detection, how serious the consequences
are of being found out, and whether the actor has had time
to rehearse the lie beforehand (Buller & Burgoon, 1994),
When someone lies under low arousal rates, the leakage will
be less apparent, and the deception will draw less suspicion
(Buller & Burgoon, 1994).
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Much research has been done to determine the
differences between the arousal rates of deceivers and
nondeceivers. deTurk and Miller (1985) found six cues that
distinguish deceivers from receivers: increased adaptor
behaviors (e.g., positioning of the body), increased hand
gesturing, increased speech errors, longer within-turn
pauses, longer response latencies, and shorter message
duration. Kraut (1980) found that deceivers blink with
greater frequency than nondeceivers.
Incompetent Communication
Incompetent communication refers to the increase in
speech errors, hesitation, word repetitions, postural
rigidity, random movement, inconsistency with verbal and
nonverbal behaviors, and kinesic behaviors that are out of
sync (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). For example, when a person
creates a fiction, it creates a greater number of
constraints on the deceiver, and the communication will be
less fluent and competent (Koper & Sahlman, 1996).
Deceivers' communication will become inconsistent and
awkward (deTurck & Miller, 1985). For example, a deceiver's
discourse would become inconsistent with the information
that s/he is giving.
Damped Affect
Deception creates an unpleasant experience for most
people (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Koper & Sahlman, 1996). One
of the main cues of deception is the negative affect leaked
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in an otherwise pleasant conversation even when the deceiver
is trying to hide his or her true feelings (i.e., to dampen
the affect). Ekman and Friesen (1969) proposed that
micromomentary expressions leak out during times of
unpleasantness. For example, a person for a brief moment
would leak out a negative emotion by showing an unpleasant
demeanor. Hocking and Leathers (1980) contributed to IDT by
developing three categories for nonverbal behaviors. Class
I consists of typically controllable behaviors. Class II
are behaviors which are more difficult to control but not
impossible (e.g., facial expressions). Class III are
behaviors that are typically impossible to control (e.g.,
sweating). Few studies have directly studied negative or
damped affect (Buller & Burgoon, 1994).
Interpersonal Deception Theory is a very good
comprehensive theory to cover allot of ground in the
deception field. It is very well organized and explains
numerous behaviors. IDT is probably a better overall theory
than IMT. However, IDT has not been fully tested in all
areas.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION THEORIES
Deception research has gained complexity throughout the
years. Ekman & Freisen (1969) provided the basis for both
IMT and IDT. These two theories currently seem to be very
good theoretical frameworks to study deception. However,
where do deception researchers go from here?
IMT can possibly be explored using a nonverbal
approach. One would apply the four maxims to nonverbal
behaviors. There is no reason why IMT cannot be made to be
a more comprehensive theory. The empirical findings suggest
that IMT is a very good theory for research into the verbal
usages of deception; however, IDT is a more comprehensive
theory.
IDT allows for both the receiver and the sender, and
IDT uses nonverbal and verbal to determine deception. IDT
is still very young, and not much empirical research has
been done. IDT needs to be further explored by other
researchers. The dance between receiver and sender in IDT
is a possible research question. Why does this dance occur?
Attribution probably plays an important part. The receiver
determines which direction the sender takes in the
deception.
Deception research has come a long way since the early
days. Furthermore, the complexity of deception research
grows everyday. These new theories need more research, but
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the new theories can help lead to new ideas. IMT and IDT
provide a good jumping off point for future theories and
research to emerge.
However, IMT and IDT only use United States studies to
determine an effect. Deception detection could possibly be
different in other cultures (Olaniran & Williams, 1995).
Cultural deception research could enhance the field of
deception literature.
IMT and IDT clearly demonstrate that research on
deception is not dead. Possibly in the near future, a
central theory may synthesize many of the various
contributions in a single, more comprehensive framework to
accommodate the findings of further research into the
process of deception.
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