ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/documents/static/20121017_naumann... · 2020. 7. 2. · Dr. Lee resides in...

OPENING SESSION

Su-Hoon LEE received his PhD in Comparative International Development and Sociology from Johns Hopkins University in 1986 In 1986 Dr Lee joined the faculty of Sociology at Kyungnam University in Korea and simultaneously assumed the position of the Associate Director at the Institute for Far East Asian Studies in Seoul From 2000 he joined the faculty of the School for North Korean Studies in Seoul From Feb 2009 he serves as the Director of IFES Kyungnam University His academic activities include serving as the President of the Korean Association of Comparative Sociology Editor of Asian Perspective Vice President of Korea Sociological Association and Executive Member of International Sociological Associ-ation (2002-2006) His monographs include State-Building in the Contemporary Third World(Westview Press 1989) World-System Analysis (in Korean 1993) For a Humane World-System (in Korean 1999) Crisis and Capitalism of East Asia (in Korean 2001) and World- System Northeast Asia Korean Peninsula (in Korean 2004) He has also published numerous articles and book chapters on the world order Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula He has served on various advisory committees of the ROK government Since August 2005 he has assumed the Chair (Ministerial level position) of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Initiative one of the key foreign policy advisory organs for the President Roh Moo -hyun He accompanied President Roh Moo-hyun for the 2007 inter-Korean summit held in Pyongyang as one of the special delegation After the summit he served as a special envoy to the United States and Japan to explain the summit for opinion leaders in both countries

Lars-Andreacute RICHTER is the Resident Representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Korea since June 2012 He studied amongst others German Literature Philosophy and History in Tuumlbingen Leipzig Paris (Paris Ⅲ - Sorbonne Nouvelle) and Berlin He earned his PhD from Humboldt University in Berlin in 2008 with doctoral dissertation on the Weimar Republic He has been working for the FNF since 2008 he served as Press Officer and Deputy Spokesman at the Foundationrsquos headquarters in Potsdam before the current post Prior to joining FNF he also worked for the DAAD (Deutscher Akademische AustauschdienstGerman Academic Exchange Service) amongst others in Mexico-City and later for WELT ONLINE the online edition of the German daily newspaper rdquoDie Weltrdquo

Tomohiro INAGAKI is Currently Associate Professor at Information Media Center in Hiroshima University His research centers on nuclear physics and ICT based education He received his PhD from Hiroshima University at 1995 After the experience of a postdoctoral fellow at Institute for Cosmic Pay Research in University of Tokyo and Faculty of Science in Kobe University he joined as Information Processing Center in Hiroshima University as a research associate

CHAIRS

Hochul LEE is a Professor of China and International Studies at Department of Political Science University of Incheon He is also Director of the Universityrsquos Institute of China Studies (ICS) He teaches courses on Chinese politics and foreign affairs and on East Asian international rela-tions He served for the University as Dean of College of Social Sciences and Dean of Student Affairs Dr Lee is the President-elect of the Korean Association of International Studies (KAIS) He also serves the Ministry of National Reunification as Advisor He served the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative as an Advisor on Foreign and National Security Affairs Dr Lee has completed a number of research papers on Chinese politics and East Asian affairs including ldquoChina in North Korean Nuclear Crises lsquoInterestrsquo and lsquoIdentityrsquo in Foreign Behaviorrdquo Journal of Contemporary China (2013) ldquoChinarsquos Rise and East Asian Securityrdquo in New Dynamics in East Asian Politics (Continuum International 2012) ldquoChinarsquos Foreign Policy-Making in post- Cold War East Asiardquo in Regionalism Economic Integration and Security in Asia (Edward Elgar 2011) ldquoPolitical Institutionalization as Political Devel-opment in Chinardquo Journal of Contemporary China (2010) ldquoReforming Chinarsquos State-Owned Commercial Banks A lsquoDouble Gamersquo between lsquoMarketrsquo and lsquoPlanrsquordquo(2006) and so on He visited Peking University in Beijing and Fudan University in Shanghai several times as visiting pro-fessor to conduct researches Dr Lee earned his BA from Seoul National University (1981) and his MA and PhD in political science at Rutgers University (1993) in New Brunswick NJ USA During his graduate studies at Rutgers he worked as Research Assistant at the Center for Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies (1989-1993) and was awarded the Walter C Russell Scholarship (1988-1992) Dr Lee resides in Bundang Sungnam City Gyeonggi-do Korea

Kyung-Jin BOO is a Visiting Professor at Seoul National University College of Engineeringrsquos Technology Management Economics and Policy Program (TEMEP) Prior to this position Dr Boo had been a researcher at a government sponsored institute Korea Energy Economic Institute (KEEI) for over 30 years and had served as the head of New amp Renewable Energy Div-ision from 2002 to 2008 He was also a formal member of the Advisory Group to the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy (MKE) and Korean Representative for the ISO Strategic Advisory Group on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Sources (SAGE) Dr Boo received his BS in Mining and Petroleum Engineering and MBA in International Business at Seoul National University and PhD at the University of Delaware in Public Economics and Policy

PRESENTERS

Dean J OUELLETTE is assistant professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies Kyungnam University Korea He also serves as the assistant editor of Asian Perspective and as assistant to the university president on external affairs He received his PhD from the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul Korea

Eckehard BUumlSCHER is director of the IGO (the international geothermal office of Germany) at the International Geothermal Center in Bochum Germany Since 5 years he is assistant professor at Bochum University of applied science From 2005 to 2011 he was managing director of a public utility company responsible for the electricity gas heat and water supply with a turnover of 50 Mio euro From 1996 to 2005 he was managing director of the management consultancy DeWa in Duumlsseldorf Before he worked as a consultant and as marketing manager of an international water and energy supplier Dr Buumlscher studied civil engineering at the RWTH Aachen He is member of different advisory boards of congresses and fairs and member of the strategic board of the renewable energy initiative of the ministry of economics in Berlin

Seongwhun CHEON graduated from Department of Industrial Engineering at the Korea University and received his PhD in Management Sciences from the University of Waterloo Canada He is a senior research fellow and the director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) Seoul South Korea Currently he is a member of Policy Advisory Committees for the Ministry of National Defense the Ministry of Unification and the Crisis Management the Office of the President He is also an Editorial Consultant for the Radio Free Asia (RFA) He was formerly a member of Foreign Affairs and Security Bureau Pres-idential Council for Future amp Vision He is the recipient of Commendation of President of the Republic of Korea in 2003 and awards for excellent research from the Korea Research Council for Humanities amp Social Sciences in 2001 2002 and 2003 He is the author of numerous books and reports including ldquoChanging dynamics of US extended nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsulardquo Pacific Focus VolXXVI No1 (April 2011) Center for International Studies Inha University ROK-US Strategic Cooperation for Denuclearizing North Korea (Seoul Korea Insti-tute for National Unification 2009) (in Korean) PSI and the South Korean Position (Seoul Korea Institute for National Unification 2008) (in Korean) ldquoNorth Korea and the ROK-US security alliancerdquo Armed Forces amp Society Vol34 No1 (October 2007)

Pil Ryul LEE is currently a professor at Korea National Open University Dr Lee served as a Chairman of a Korean Civil Organization ldquoCentre for Energy Alternativerdquo (2003-2007) He is a formal member of the Presidential Commission for Sustainable Development (2004-2006) and

a formal member of the Korean National Commission for UNESCO (2003-2008) He has also served as a member of the Energy Watch Group (2005-present)

Volkhard RIECHMANN studied law and political science at the Free University of Berlin (FUB) He received his law degrees in 1971 and 1974 and graduated in political science at the FUB Otto Suhr Institute in 1973 For the juris doctor`s degree (1977) he wrote a study on interstate cooper-ation in legislation in the United States In 1975 he joined the legal department of the Federal Cartel Office (the German Antitrust Authority) in Berlin Since 1978 he worked for the Ministry of Economics of the State of North Rhine Westphalia in several positions (antitrust political plan-ning electricity tariffs authority energy regulation) He was Chairman of the Energy Task Force of the National Conference of State Ministers of Economics in the years 1996 until 1998 In 1999 Dr Riechmann was appointed Director General of the Department of Energy Climate Protection and Mining in the State Ministry of Economics He was deeply involved in the transition process of the energy market towards liberalization in the European Union and Germany Up to his retire-ment in 2008 he helped to build up close relations between Korean government institutions and the State Government of North Rhine Westphalia in the area of energy policy

DISCUSSANTS

Bong-Jun KO is an assistant professor at Chungnam National University Korea Previously he worked for the Jeju Peace Institute Korea as an associate research fellow He earned his PhD from the University of Notre Dame USA His dissertation examines the history of US missile defense and analyzes the international and domestic political factors that affected the deployment of the current US missile defense system Dr Korsquos main research area is inter-national security with emphasis on US foreignsecurity policy His recent publications include ldquoNon-proliferation and Network Politics Theory and Practicerdquo (in Korean 2011) ldquoDeterminants of US Security Policy International Environment and Domestic Policy Consensusrdquo (in Korean 2010) The Current Economic Crisis and Prospects for Changes in US Foreign Policy Paradigm A Realist Perspectiverdquo (in Korean 2009) and ldquoMissile Defense of the United States Contending Arguments Feasibility and a Question Remainingrdquo (2007) among others He received his MA in Political Science from Kent State University USA and his BA in Political Science from Seoul National University Korea

Jae-Seung LEE is Professor of international studies at Korea University During the year of 2011-2012 Professor Lee also joined Walter H Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and Center for East Asian Studies of Stanford University as a visiting scholar As a scholar in inter-national political economy Professor Lee authored a number of books and articles on Korea East Asia and Europe His current research also includes energy security of Korea and regional energy cooperation among others Professor Lee is currently an editor-in-chief of Korea Review of International Studies and serves as a Member of Policy Advisory Board of the Presidential Secretariat (Foreign and Security Affairs) and Vice Director of Ilmin International Relations Institute (IIRI) and Institute for Sustainable Development (ISD) He was selected as an Asia Society Young Leader in 2006 and as a Young Leader by the InterAction Council a group of former head of states and governments in 2008 He has contributed op-ed articles to major Korean newspapers and has commented on international affairs for BBC CNN and Korean broadcast stations Professor Lee holds a BA in political science from Seoul National University and an MAPhD in political science from Yale University He has previously taught at Yale University Seoul National University and the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Jihwan HWANG is an assistant professor of International Relations at University of Seoul Seoul Korea He was also an assistant professor of North Korean studies at Myongji University from 2008 to 2011 His research and policy interests include international relations of East Asia and international security focusing on the North Korean nuclear issue He published numerous

articles and his recent publications include ldquoInternational Relations Theory and the North Korean Nuclear Crisisrdquo ldquoOffensive Realism Weaker States and Windows of Opportunity The Soviet Union and North Korea in Comparative Perspectiverdquo ldquoThe Second Nuclear Crisis and US Foreign Policyrdquo and ldquoRethinking the East Asian Balance of Powerrdquo Professor Hwang gradu-ated from Seoul National University and received his PhD in political science from the University of Colorado at Boulder

Jinhee PARK is an Associate Professor at Dongguk University Center of General Education Dr Park has served as an Executive Board Member of the Korean Association of Science amp Tech-nology Studies from 2005 to present She is an editor of journal ldquoECOrdquo Korean Society of Envir-onmental Sociology and is also the president of NGO Energy Transition She received her BA in Physics from Seoul National University and MA and PhD from the Technical University of Berlin Institute of Philosophy and History of Science and Technology Dr Parkrsquos research inter-ests area covers various fields including history and sociology of technology women in science and technology energy policy and renewable energy policy

Yeon-Mi JUNG received her PhD in Environmental Politics from Environmental Policy Research Centre (FFU) Otto-Suhr-Institute of the faculty of Political and Social Sciences Free University Berlin in 2007 Her doctoral dissertation in field of Comparative Energy and Environmental Politics was supported by scholarship from German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and Heinrich Boell Foundation the green political foundation of the German Green Party From 2008 to 2010 she worked as team head for climate change strategy in Eco-Frontier co and developed her capacity for climate change and energy issues at the forefront of the carbon business field of a local consulting company From 2011 she has joined the post-doctoral course at the Graduate School of Environmental Studies of Seoul National University in South Korea and has worked as research fellow in Environmental Planning Institute Concurrently she has also lectured Envir-onmental Economics at Sookmyung Woomenrsquos University and Resource Recycling Management at Korea University She has also published numerous articles and books on environmental energy and climate change policy politics and political economics in South Korea Germany and EU Her book about energy efficiency politics in Germany and South Korea was published by the German publisher VS-Research in Climate and Energy Politics series She wrote articles about nuclear policy and ecological modernization in Germany policy for combined heat and power and exploring for nuclear phase out scenarios for energy transition in South Korea

Opening Remarks

Su-Hoon Lee Director IFES Kyungnam University

Distinguished guests and participants ladies and gentlemen

I am pleased to see everyone here today

Todayrsquos event marks another chapter in the growing partnership between the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Korea Office (FNF) and the Institute for Far Eastern Studies Kyungnam University

Itrsquos also the first opportunity for me to publically welcome the Friedrich Naumann Foundationrsquos new Resident Representative who was instrumental in the planning of todayrsquos event Dr Lars-Andreacute Richtermdashwelcome to Korea and I look forward to devel-oping the partnership with you

Todayrsquos conference brings together scholars and experts to discuss issues of vital import-ance Energy Cooperation and Building Peace on the Korean Peninsula

The Korean Peninsula continues to be a source of instability in Northeast Asia and beyond This is partly due to the problem of North Korea Multilateral dialogue and political pressure in the form of international sanctions have failed to curb North Korearsquos nuclear ambitions the motivation for which appears to be twofold economic decline and security crisis

Indeed North Korea has suffered a declining economy and other effects due to the countryrsquos decades-long energy crisis Underinvestment and chronic shortages have left the countryrsquos industry in bad condition Prioritization of the military has taken resources needed for investment and civilian consumption The international community continues to provide humanitarian assistancemdashmainly food aidmdashto the most vulnerable of the popu-lation Helping North Korea find a safer and more viable solution to its energy shortages via cooperation could go a long way to alleviate the countryrsquos economic problems establish political trust between North Korea and the international community and thereby build peace in the region

Such cooperation will have to consider the direction of energy competition and cooperation among the nations of Northeast Asia Prominent in this debate is the future of nuclear power for energy production versus the renewed call for renewable energy after the nuclear disaster at Fukushima Japanmdashwhich distinguished Professor Tomohiro Inagaki will no doubt speak about in his keynote speech and I look forward to hearing that very much

I hope todayrsquos conference will shed some light on these and other energy-related issues that concern the peninsula the region and our peace and stability in the years ahead I look forward to hearing the participantsrsquo insights and to everyonersquos constructive participation

Thank you

Welcoming Remarks

Lars-Andreacute RichterResident Representative FNF Korea Office

Ladies and Gentlemen dear Director Lee

On behalf of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (FNF) I would like to welcome you to todayrsquos International Conference on Engery Cooperation the Foundation hosts together with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)

First of all I would like to express my gratitude to IFES and Director Lee Soo Hun for giving us the opportunity to hold our joint conference especially here at the institute Itrsquos a pleasure to be here again

Furthermore I would like to thank Director Lee for his warm welcome I represent the FNF Korea office since last June and therefore I am quite new here However I am fully aware how successful and fruitful the cooperation with the IFES has been so far I would definitively continue to pursue our common path Irsquom sure we are not running out of topics for futures events

Allow me some remarks on what FNF stands for The foundation is a German inde-pendent non-profit organisation established in 1958 by then Federal President Theodor Heuss Its philosophy is to promote the ideas of individual freedom and responsibility market economy the Rule of Law and human rights The Foundation spreads its liberal political mindset through seminars conferences special lectures workshops and publications

FNF has offices in nearly sixty countries worldwide The one in Korea was opened in 1987 which means 25 years ago The focus of our engagement here in your country is promoting local autonomy and supporting Korean unification by assisting economic modernisation and development in North Korea

I grew up in Europe in the second half of the 1980s The two events had a special effect on my generation the Chernobyl Disaster in 1986 and three years later the Fall of Iron Curtain which divided Europe for more than 4 decades Chernobyl was one of the reasons

why at least the Germans became skeptical towards nuclear energy and started to think about alternative energy sources The Fall of Iron Curtain and its consequences opened new prospects of cooperation between the European countries amongst others cooperation in the energy sector

IFES and FNF are very pleased to have prominent experts from Korea and abroad to discuss the crucial aspects of energy cooperation in Europe and to elaborate the oppor-tunities of energy cooperation in East Asia For some of our guests taking part in this seminar meant to have a long trip form Japan and even from Germany Special thanks to them for coming

Last not least I would like to thank IFESrsquo and FNFrsquos staff who organised todayrsquos event I know the last weeks were extremely busy for all of them

Thank you very much for your attention

Keynote Speech

Steep Road to Reduce Dependence on Nuclear Energy in Japan

Introduction

The great east Japan earthquake took place on 11 March 2011 It was magnitude of 9 the largest earthquake observed in Japan Nuclear power plants were immediately shut down around the disaster stricken area After the shutdown the fuel rods must be cooled down to avoid the melt down Tsunami wave broke the cooling down system at TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Then the radioactive material leaked out and the people faced the serious nuclear threat The disaster was rated level 7 in the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) of IAEA

Much international support and assistance have helped Japan recover from the huge damage from the earthquake and Tsunami It has been more than one and a half years since the earthquake and Japan is on the road to recovery Reconstruction agency reported that the number of evacuees is 329777 on September 2012 [1] The current status of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant remains very serious Because of the high level radiation it is not clearly understood the situation inside the reactors

After the experience of the nuclear disaster Japan cannot avoid to reconsider the strategies with respect to the nuclear energy projects New plan for energy and environ-ment has been discussed at the energy and environment council in the national policy unit Three options for energy and environment were presented at the end of June 2012 Based on these options the council conducted the national discussions and compiled ldquoInnovative Strategy for Energy and the Environmentrdquo The strategy mentions to realize a society not dependent on nuclear power in earliest possible future The Cabinet of Japan approved the strategy at 19 September 2012

Here the current situation of Japan is briefly reviewed with respect to the nuclear disaster The sharp decline of the nuclear energy dependence is observed after the disaster One presents the result of the national discussion The result shows the voice of Japanese people who wish zero nuclear energy dependence Finally one will give some concluding remarks

Fukushima Accident

Before the great east Japan earthquake it was planed to construct fourteen new nuclear plants by 2030 to keep stable energy supply and reduce CO2 emissions Most of Japanese people had felt that the nuclear energy is environment-friendly Much attention had not paid to the risk of the nuclear disaster

Fig 1 Monthly Deposition of 137Cs in Tokyo (log scale)

Fig 2 Monthly Deposition of 137Cs in Tokyo (linear scale)

Expanding serious damage has been observed after Fukushima nuclear accident The people have faced the thread of the severe nuclear disaster Monthly deposition of 137Cs in Tokyo is plotted in Figs 1 and 2 [2] Two peaks are found at 1986 and 2010 in Fig1 The peak at 1986 corresponds to the Chernobyl nuclear accident The maximum deposition was observed at March 2011 In Fig2 one rewrite the same data in a linear scale The largeness of the peak can be clearly understood Larger radioactive fallout contaminates near the area around the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant

The nuclear disaster had huge impact for Japanese people It is understood that the nuclear energy is not environment-friendly The nuclear disaster can induce sustain damage for a wide area It will take a long-term to clean up the contaminated area A wide area soil analysis was executed under Ministry of Education Culture Sports Science and Technology (MEXT) and Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) A project to clean up some areas is running based on the analysis However it is not easy to prepare radioactive disaster waste disposal site

In Japan all the nuclear reactors have to close for the periodic inspection every thirteen months　Permission from the local government is necessary to restart the nuclear reactor Now the fear of the nuclear accident is not negligible for the local people Most local government claimed that the safety of the nuclear reactors should be seriously reconsidered Only Fukui prefecture permitted to restart two nuclear reactors

The capacity factors of the nuclear power plants are plotted in Fig3 [3] The factor in Japan is lower than other countries after 1999 because of the some troubles and the periodic inspection It is 237 at 2011 since most of reactors cannot obtain the per-mission to restart The fuel for electricity production has shifted from nuclear to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil

Fig 3 Capacity factors of the nuclear power plants The data is plotted for only Japan at 2011

New Energy Plan of Japan

The great east Japan earthquake damaged not only nuclear power plants but also other types of plants Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) scheduled the rolling blackout on March 2011 in Kanto area The blackout has not been planed after 28 March 2011 However the energy saving and peak shift operation are necessary to avoid the black-out because of the power shortage The energy demand decreases after the earthquake in Japan

In such a situation the energy and environment council was established in the Na-tional Policy Unit (NPU) with the purpose of formulating innovative energy and environ-mental strategies on June 2011 The council presented four perspectives in choosing energy options

1 Securing nuclear safety and reducing future risks2 Strengthening energy security3 Contributing to the solution of global warming4 Restraining costs and preventing hollowing-out of industry

Based on these perspectives three scenarios were prepared for energy and the envir-onment that can reduce dependence on nuclear energy as well as on fossil fuels and reduce CO2 emissions at the end of June 2012 [4]

The first scenario is ldquo0 scenariordquo in which the dependence on nuclear energy will be reduced to 0 by 2030 To achieve the goal of no nuclear energy dependence our burden is not light It is indispensable to shift the energy sources to renewable energy dramatically It is estimated that the green house gas emission can reduce about 23 and the price for electricity will rise about 65 yen kWh In this case the nuclear fuel reprocessing has no sense with respect to energy and environment The spent nuclear energy should be directly disposed

The second scenario ldquo15 scenariordquo recommends that the dependence on nuclear energy will be reduced to around 15 by 2030 After the periodic inspection most of the nuclear reactors could not restart Hence the nuclear energy dependence was about 10 for the total electricity production in 2011 The scenario seems not so hard and possible to flexibly respond to environmental changes To reduce the green house gas emission about 26 it is estimated that the price for electricity will rise about 55 yen kWh In this case the nuclear fuel reprocessing should be carefully compared with the direct disposal

The final scenario ldquo20-25 scenariordquo attempts to keep a level of the dependence on nuclear energy around 20-25 It is necessary to construct new nuclear plants and replace of existing old plants It is also estimated that he price for electricity will rise about 55 yen kWh to reduce the green house gas emission about 26

Japanese people should select the energy option The energy and environment council conducted three types of national discussion deliberative polling public hearing and public comments from July to August in 2012 The results are illustrated in Fig4

Fig 4 Results of the national discussions conducted by Japan government and public opinion survey by NHK Japan broadcasting cooperation

It is found that the public opinions change to support the ldquo0 scenariordquo through the deliberation [5] In the public hearing a small number of people selected the scenario to remain the dependence on nuclear energy 87 of public comments support the zero nuclear energy dependence It should be noted that the public opinion survey by NHK shows a little bit different result About 40 of people favored the ldquo15 scenariordquo

The energy and environment council has reflected these results and formulated ldquoInnovative Strategy for Energy and the Environmentalrdquo at 14 September 2012 [6] The strategy upholds the following three pillars

1 Realization of a society not dependent on nuclear power in earliest possible future

2 Realization of a green energy revolution3 Stable supply of energy

To realize a society not dependent on nuclear power three guiding principles have been suggested

1 To strictly apply the stipulated rules regarding forty-year limitation of the operation

2 To restart the operation of nuclear power plants once the Nuclear Regulation Authority gives safety assurance

3 Not to plan the new and additional construction of a nuclear power plant are the guiding principles

The strategy has proposed to abandon the nuclear energy dependence However the nuclear reprocessing has not been abandoned concerning a local government It is doubtful weather a plutonium stockpile can be safely used without producing additional one in Japan

The Cabinet of Japan made the decision to take into account of the strategy by con-stantly reviewing and reexamining policies with flexibility at 19 September 2012 [7]

Concluding remarks

The great east Japan earthquake is predictable disaster in the present knowledge of earth science Because of the low-probability it was very slow to seriously discuss the high- consequence risk and improve the emergency response measures Most of Japanese people believed a smallness of the risk for the serious nuclear disaster without enough inspections The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent In-vestigation Commission (NAIIC) concludes that the Fukushima nuclear accident was clearly manmade [8]

After the disaster Japan has changed the policy to consider the earthquakes with a longer interval and discussed new emergency response measures Strategies for energy and the environment have been also discussed in parallel Based on the national dis-cussions ldquoInnovative Strategy for Energy and the Environmentalrdquo was formulated One of the pillars of the strategy proposes to realize a society not dependent on nuclear power in earliest possible future The Cabinet of Japan was not formally approved the strategy However the nuclear energy dependence was already about 10 for the total electricity production in 2011 Now Japanese people stand on a steep road to reduce dependence on nuclear energy

In this paper one does not touch any security issue A serious damage for a nuclear power plant can induce huge consequences Thus the vulnerability of the nuclear plant should be included in the discussions The nuclear fuel cycle contain sensitive nuclear technologies uranium enrichment reprocessing and a fast breeder reactor These tech-nologies can be applied to develop a nuclear weapon though Japanrsquos three non-nuclear principles prohibit it One expects that international discussions and cooperation assist to solve these problems

References

[1] Reconstruction Agency ldquoCurrent status of recovery (in Japanese)rdquo September 2012 httpwww reconstructiongojptopics20120914_sankousiryoupdf

[2] MEXT ldquoEnvironmental radioactivity databaserdquo (Ref October 2012) httpsearchkankyo- hoshanogojpservletsearchtop

[3] Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization ldquoOperational Status of Nuclear Facilities in JAPANrdquo October 2011 httpwwwjnesgojpenglishactivityunkane-unkanhp2e-unkanhp2-2011 book1

[4] Energy and environment council in NPU ldquoOptions for Energy and the Environmentrdquo June 2012 http wwwnpugojppolicypolicy09pdf2012072020120720_enpdf

[5] Center for Deliberative Democracy ldquoDeliberative Polls Japanrdquo (Ref October 2012) httpcdd stanfordedupollsjapan

[6] Energy and environment council in NPU ldquoInnovative Strategy for Energy and the Environmentrdquo September 2012 httpwwwnpugojpenpolicypolicy06indexhtml

[7] Energy and environment council in NPU ldquoFuture Policies for Energy and the Environment (Cabinet Decision)rdquo September 2012 httpwwwnpugojpenpolicypolicy06indexhtm

[8] NAIIC ldquoThe official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commissionrdquo July 2012 httpnaiicgojpen

Tomohiro InagakiInformation Media Center Hiroshima University

Higashi-Hiroshima Hiroshima 739-8521 JAPAN

CONTENTS

SESSION 1 Energy Crisis What D oes It Mean for Politics and Security

Energy Crisis and Its Impact on North Korea Economy Security and Military middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot 3

Dean J Ouellette (Professor Kyungnam University)

EUrsquos Energy Policy amp External Relations middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot 31

Eckehard Buumlscher (Director International Geothermal Office Germany)

SESSION 2 From N uclear Competition to Renew able Energy Cooperation in N ortheast Asia

An Assessment of the Current Reality of Nuclear Competition in Northeast Asia middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot 67

Seongwhun Cheon (Director Center for North Korean Studies

Korea Institute for National Unification)

Regional Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot 87

Pil-ryul Lee (Professor Korea National Open University)

Germanyrsquos Transformation of the Energy Supply System after Fukushima - Current Status Implications and Future Prospects middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot 97

Volkhard Riechmann (Former Director-General Ministry of Economy and

Energy in the State of North-Rhine Westphalia Germany)

5-----

한반도 에너지 협력과 평화구축

국문초록

에너지 위기와 북한에 미치는 영향

경제 안보 그리고 군사

북한은 지난 수십년 동안 에너지난을 겪

어왔다 본고에서는 북한의 에너지 현황을

짚어보고 북한의 에너지 위기가 북한의 경

제 군사 사회 안보에 어떠한 영향을 미쳤

는지에 대한 전반적인 논의를 한다 또한 북

한의 새로운 체제에서 그 동안 대두되었던

북한과의 갈등을 어떻게 풀어나갈 수 있는

지 정부 비 정부 차원에서의 대처방안에

대하여도 검토한다 김정은 체제 등장 이후

북한에서는 새로운 움직임들이 포착되고 있

다 이는 북한의 긍정적인 변화의 시작이라

고 볼 수 있다 국제사회는 북한의 환경을 변

화시키기 위하여 이러한 기회를 활용할 준

비를 해야만 한다 이러한 노력의 일환으로

북한의 지속 가능한 에너지 발전을 위한 국

제사회의 인도적 차원의 에너지 지원 및 원

조가 필요하다

6-----


Abstract

Energy Crisis and Its Impact on North Korea Economy Security and Military

North Korea has faced a decades-long energy crisis This paper provides a descrip-tive overview of the energy situation in North Korea painting a general picture of the impact the energy crisis has had on the North Korean economy military and society and its rela-tionship to security The paper also provides recommendations for the international com-munity as governmental and nongovernmental actors contemplate how to deal with the on-going problem of North Korea especially since the completion of its hereditary lead-

ership succession Since the advent of the Kim Jong Un leadership significant changes can be seen taking place in North Korea A window for positive engagement appears to be opening The international community should prepare to capitalize on this opportun-ity by working to change the environment North Korea faces Part of this effort should include the provision of humanitarian energy aid and development assistance to improve North Korearsquos energy sector leading it toward sustainability

7-----


I Introduction

The Democratic Peoplersquos Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has suffered a severe energy crisis for decades Its economy remains moribund due to its lack of reliable energy supplies The countryrsquos domestic energy situation is dire in the important dimensions of basic energy supply electric power generation electric-power trans-mission and secondary energy usage apart from electric power The energy sector is as one scholar described it ldquoNorth Korearsquos Achilles Heel Neither its military nor its organized civilian economy can function effectively without adequate energy suppliesrdquo1) Despite muddling through until now the year 2012mdashthe centenary of founding leader Kim Il Sungrsquos birth and the year proclaimed to be when the DPRK would become a ldquostrong and prosperous nationrdquomdashmoving forward North Korea cannot achieve much prosperity unless it can resuscitate its economy which will require it to find a reliable source of energy supplies and a complete make-over of its energy sector infrastructure

Indeed North Korearsquos energy problem is one of the core causes of the countryrsquos economic crisis and thus a contributing factor to the regimersquos insecurity Hence a fundamental aspect of North Korearsquos nuclear program is the countryrsquos energy insecurity The new regime in Pyongyang is unlikely to negotiate away its nuclear program unless it receives crucial energy assistance from the international community (as well as nor-malization of relations with the United States) including considerable support to rebuild its dilapidated energy infrastructure

Time is ripening for action In North Korea the scepter passed from father to son last December when Kim Jong Il died and Kim Jong Un took the throne as supreme leader So far the young Kim Jong Un seems to have consolidated its power with the help of a senior mentors group and assumed a leadership style characterized by greater openness2) Economic recovery and social stability appear to be his regimersquos major

1) Kent Calder ldquoThe Geopolitics of Energy in Northeast Asiardquo paper presented at the Korean Institute for Energy Economics Seoul Korea March 16ndash17 2004

2) Haksoon Paik ldquoPower Transition in North Korea and Kim Jong Unrsquos Leadership Style Prospects for Reform and Openingrdquo Nautilus Institute NAPSNet Policy Forum July 3 2012 at www nautilusorg

8-----


concerns So far in the ten months of his reign the mood among the citizenry of North Korea has changed as people seem more spirited curious approachable and upbeat3) Their lives are more connected than ever to the burgeoning markets which the regime cannot totally suppress Kimrsquos mid-April promise to his people has become his mantra over the last few months that people will not have to tighten their belts again4) Kim Jong Unrsquos court seems on the verge of initiating economic measures to improve the lives of North Koreans and not just concerned with praising the guards and redecorating the castle (although Pyongyang has been getting a makeover and the army-first politics of Kim Jong Il has been lauded by the son and is likely to be a mainstay of his rule)

In the capitals of the countries most central in Pyongyangrsquos eyemdashChina the United States South Korea and Japanmdashleadership transitions are on the horizon Presidential elections are set to take place in the United States and South Korea in early November and mid December respectively China is scheduled to go ahead with its leadership transition in November as well and Japan a general election in early 2013

On the eve of these leadership transitions this paper gives a descriptive overview of the energy situation in North Korea providing a picture of the general impact the energy crisis has had on the North Korean economy military and society so as to highlight an important area that potential new administrations in these most relevant countries should examine carefully when (re)shaping their North Korea policies Overall con-tainment policy including sanctions has neither curbed the regimersquos seemingly unswerving pursuit of nuclear programs nor improved our security in the region So what can be done Generally speaking we cannot change the regime in the DPRKmdashalthough in our minds many would like to What we can change however is the external environment that North Korea faces To paraphrase what William J Perry said over a decade ago our policy and approach must deal with North Korea as it is not as we might wish it to be That means creating a less threatening environment for the regime to reduce its

3) Personal observations of August 2012 Ruediger Frank ldquoAn Atmosphere of Departure and Two Speeds Korean Style Where is North Korea Headingrdquo 38 North October 12 2012 38northorg

4) ldquoKim Jong Unrsquos Speech at the Kim Il Sung Centennial Celebrationrdquo unofficial English transcript at httpwwwncnkorgresourcesnews-itemskim-jong-uns-speeches-and-public-statements-1 kim-jong-uns-speech-at-the-kim-il-sung-centennial-celebration

9-----


insecurity so that it may begin to engage the international community and gain the confidence to refrain from provocative behavior that threatens the peace in the region refrain from illicit activities to gain foreign currency choose to ldquodenuclearizerdquo and embark upon policies that will improve the countryrsquos economy and most importantly the lives of the North Korean people Engagement with North Korea in the energy sector is one area in which the international community can and should begin to work toward changing that environment so that North Korea can meet its domestic challenges

Ⅱ The Never Ending Energy Crisis Overview of the Declining DPRK Energy Sector

The energy shortages that North Korea has experienced over the last few decades have inhibited economic growth and contributed to the suffering of the North Korean people Shortages have complicated rail and automobile transportation hurt industrial production and contributed to the chronic food shortages due to the shortagesrsquo impact on fertilizer production

For the most part North Korea has been dependent on its foreignersmdashnamely Russia and Chinamdashfor key energy-sector infrastructure and fuel supplies After the Korean War (1950ndash1953) the Soviets were heavily involved in the planning and construction of North Korearsquos power plants and major factories creating in North Korea a reliance on oil imports from Russia to operate this infrastructure After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990 energy assistance from Russia essentially stopped forcing Pyongyang to find suppliers from other countries and to ration energy With a lack of fuel and loss of Socialist bloc markets to sell its products North Korea experienced a steep drop in energy demand5) Oil shortages alone have immobilized important industries such as fertilizer factories and important operations such as tractor and irrigation

5) Peter Hayes David von Hippel and Scott Bruce ldquoThe DPRK Energy Sector Current Status and Future Engagementrdquo The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis vol 23 no 2 (June 2011) pp 161-165

10-----


operations which in turn precipitated low agricultural production thus intensifying the food shortages6)

Since 1990 energy consumption has declined by more than halfmdashfrom 1300 petajoules in 1990 to just over 500 petajoules7) According to recent reports North Korearsquos power consumption remains at 1970s levels which indicates that the economic hardships have not abated North Korearsquos per capita electricity consumption was estimated at 819 kilowatt hours in 2008 which is below the annual average of 919 kilowatt hours in 1971 While power consumption had risen until the early 1990smdashfrom 1114 kilowatt hours per person in 1980 to 1247 in 1990mdashthe trend was reversed in the mid-1990s In 1995 the yearly per capita consumption fell to 912 kilowatt hours in 1995 and then to 712 kilowatt hours in 2000 Power consumption fluctuated over the last decade hitting a peak of 817 kilowatt hours in 2005 Such a level however suggests that power use by the average North Korean is minimal The total amount of North Korearsquos annual electricity consumption amounted to 13463 gigawatt hours in 1971 19201 in 1980 25111 in 1990 and 16334 in 2000 19292 in 2005 and 18121 in 2008 It is believed that as of 2009 only about 26 percent of North Korean households have access to electricity8) Those that do get power often experience extended blackouts and power cuts due to the electricity shortage9)

Many factors attribute for the decline in energy Lack of markets lack of spare parts and lack of fuels have meant a drastic decrease in industrial production and energy- use The decrease in electricity production because of the decaying electricity transmission and distribution grid has meant a decrease in electricity use in the residential sector and problems with getting coal out of the coal mines many of which have been flooded After the public distribution system collapsed in the mid-1990s limitations in the

6) Kent Calder op cit pp 7 ndash 87) Hayes David von Hippel and Scott Bruce ldquoThe DPRK Energy Sector Current Status and Future

Engagementrdquo The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis vol 23 no 2 (June 2011) p 161 8) ldquoNKorearsquos Power Consumption per Capita at 1970s Levelsrdquo Yonhap August 6 2012 at httpenglish

yonhapnewscokrnorthkorea20120806290401000000AEN20120806003300315FHTML9) ldquoHuichon Power Station Starts Partial Test Operatio After 11 Yearsrdquo Yonhap News Agency North

Korea Newsletter No 198 (February 23 2012) ldquoNorth Korea Power Cut Pyongyang Diplomat Says Capital Faces Worst Electricity Shortages in Yearsrdquo Huffington Post February 1 2012

11-----


supply of coal and other fuels to the population have also reduced fuel use The reduction in coal production has caused a reduction in coal supplies for power production This further exacerbates electricity shortagesmdasha vicious cycle As of 2009 North Korearsquos primary source of energy supply was domestic coal (more than 50 of the total supply) followed by biomass (firewood and crop byproducts) at 27 hydropower at 7 and refined petroleum products at about 710)

Today as it was in the past North Korea is dependent on external powers for key energy infrastructure and fuel supplies Since the collapse of the Socialist bloc in the early 1990s and the end of preferential barter trade with the Soviet Union oil has come from a variety of countries changing from year to year In particular North Korea has depended on China for the majority of its imports of energy in particular crude oil and oil products It is estimated that China provides North Korea with about 500000 tons of crude oil annually via a cross-border pipeline to a North Korean refinery near Sinuiju As far as refined petroleum production is concerned it remains very low in the DPRK

Even the capital of Pyongyang an area of highest priority to the regime suffers reduced quality and availability of electric power due to the electricity infrastructure problems The situation outside the capital is often worse as access to power is limited often available only seasonally It is said that in the rural areas many households use car batteries to store electricity for use during frequent outages The poor power quality and high power losses are also attributable to the antiquated transmission and distribution network Maintenance of power generation equipment and transmission lines is inadequate Transmitting electricity over distances remains a major problem11)

The entire country continues to experience chronic electricity shortages For most of its electricity production North Korea relies on its domestic sources of coal and hydropower But the coal-fired thermal plants have run under capacity due partly to problems in the transportation of coal to the plants Digging up coal and transporting

10) Peter Hayes David von Hippel and Scott Bruce op cit 11) Jae-Young Yoon ldquoThe DPRK Power Sector Data amp Interconnection Optionsrdquo The Korean Journal

of Defense Analysis vol 23 no 2 (June 2011) pp 176 ndash 177

12-----


it to the countryrsquos thermal plants remains a challenge With reduced coal production come reduced quality coal supplies for the production of power further worsening the electricity shortages12) The hydropower plants in the country operate below capacity due to the accumulation of sediment in water storage facilities (a result of flooding in the 1990s and thereafter) The electricity generation infrastructure has been deteriorating since the 1990s due to lack of spare parts poor maintenance and use of improper (ie high sulfur) fuels Power generation continues to decrease due to the aging and strained power gen-eration systems13)

The DPRK has attempted to secure help from other countries to repair some of its thermal power plants with lackluster results North Korea has also demonstrated a concentrated effort to expand hydroelectric capacity mainly focused on domestically- built hydroelectric plants of small capacity The results have shown a modest increased in supply especially in local areas near new plants but the additional hydroelectric capacity has said to have had limited impact compared to the countryrsquos overall electricity demand14)

With dwindling supplies of electricity and quality coal over the last twenty years North Koreans have turned to biomass Since 1990 the biomass component in the energy mix has doubled This is said to be due to the decline in the supply and use of non-biomass fuels Wood use has grown as a source of heat energy supplementing for the reduced supplies of electricity and coal Energy deliveries of coal and electricity from the public distribution system became increasingly sporadic forcing the population to shift to biomass fuels use This massive shift has contributed to deforestation in parts of the country with the results being that these areas are more vulnerable to mudslides and other natural disasters that the forests offer some protection from Increased vulnerability to natural disasters places prospects for economic recovery at risk and

12) Electricity shortages also led to a reduction in coal production because of lack of available power to many coal mines and have been compounded by the countrywide flooding in the mid-1990s which damaged many coal mining facilities Peter Hayes David von Hippel and Scott Bruce op cit

13) Peter Hayes David von Hippel and Scott Bruce op cit 14) Ibid

13-----


perpetuates the countryrsquos economic stagnation15) As mentioned to deal with its widespread lack of electricity the government

turned more toward hydroelectric power to supplement the countryrsquos diminishing coal supplies Former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il seemed to have had a keen interest in hydropower based on his numerous trips in 2010 to the Huichon power station itself16) While North Korea authorities still seem to advocate the building of medium- sized and large hydropower plants North Korearsquos mid-1990srsquo policy of building small hydro plants nationwide (more than 7000 were constructed) has been discontinued due to the overall low inefficiency and low rates of operation of the plants that were constructed17)

Over the last ten to twelve years there also seems a move toward small-scale renewable energy projects via NGO involvement18) These projects however are still few and limited

Ⅲ Impact of the Energy Crisis

In this section I shall highlight some of the direct and indirect impacts the ongoing energy crisis has had on the North Korean economy military and society in general

15) Ibid16) Choseonjungangnyeongam (North Korea Almanac) (Pyongyang Choseonjungangtongsinsa

2011) Kim Jong Il the Great Man (Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House 2012) pp 34ndash35

17) Jae-Young Yoon ldquoThe DPRK Power Sector Data amp Interconnection Optionsrdquo The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis vol 23 no 2 (June 2011) p 183

18) For example see the World Vision International solar energy project and biogas project providing solar powered generators to the school and clinic and an alternative source of heating to the farming community of Dochi-ri Yongtan County North Hwanghae Province ldquoRenewable Energy in the DPRKrdquo NCNK Newsletter vol 2 issue 1 January 13 2009 and ldquoNorth Korea The old people danced all nightrdquo World Vision International website October 4 2011 at httpwww wviorgwviwviwebnsfwebmaindocs50013A02A5DA56D08825791F00526218OpenDocument

14-----


a Economy

Energy shortages have had a direct impact on North Korearsquos economy Over the last two decades degradation and damage to buildings and equipment in factories from poor-quality electricity have caused a decrease in industrial production Decreases in many others can be attributed to fuel shortages Such industrial decline has affected things like cement and steel production The lack of energy also has severely complicated rail and motor transport

Overall the industrial sector has declined and lost its position as the largest consumer of energy in North Korea by 2009 that distinction belonged to the residential sector at an estimated 40 of energy consumption in the country (with biomass making up over half of this sectorrsquos total energy use) with the industrial sector consuming about 35 of the energy the military 10 agricultural 5 commercial sector 4 and transport sector 319)

Over the last decade North Korearsquos trade has shifted because of the lack of energy supply Energy-intensive industries have given way to an economy largely focused on less-energy-intensive industries These include trade in raw materials (in particular mineral sales to China20)) and textiles There are more small markets and shops because these too are non-energy intensive and they have been permitted somewhat by the government

North Korearsquos chronic energy and food shortages and its economic problems are the result of poor policy choices on the part of Pyongyang The civilian economy has long been sacrificed at the expense of the military North Korea has not seriously addressed its energy sector problems in a pragmatic way

And clearly overall energy shortages have inhibited economic growth Looking at the last two decades one can see that North Korean gross domestic production has

19) Peter Hayes David von Hippel and Scott Bruce op cit p 16520) Leonid Petrov ldquoRare Earths Nakroll Northrsquo Futurerdquo Asian Times August 8 2012 Nathaniel

Aden ldquoNorth Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics 1995ndash2009 Energy and Minerals Trends and Implicationsrdquo Korean Journal of Defense Analysis vol 23 no 2 (June 2011) pp 231ndash255

15-----


been pitiable 21)

North Korean GDP Growth

1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-43 -44 04 38 12 18 21 38 -10 -12 31 -09 -05 08(93) (89) (88) (40) (72) (28) (46) (40) (52) (51) (23) (03) (63) (36)

Note Figures in parentheses represent South Korearsquos GDP growth ratesSource ldquoGross Domestic Production Estimates for North Korea for 2011rdquo News Release Bank of

Korea July 9 2012

Another major shift has been the economic reliance on China22) According to South Korean statistics in 2010 North Korearsquos bilateral trade with China surged to nearly $35 billion However with Russia it was only $110 million Some say Chinarsquos share of North Korean trade now amounts to 80 others say itrsquos closer to 3023) Regardless China is playing and will continue to play a big role in North Korearsquos economic future in particular as a supplier of much needed oil imports as North Korea is without any indigenous sources for petroleum Petroleum imports increased from $295 million in 2000 to $18 billion in 2008 and then declined to $757 million in 2009 It is speculated that the sharp reduction from 2008 to 2009 was due to Chinarsquos reduction in subsidized oil exports to North Korea and Russiarsquos demand for payment for oil in hard currency rather than kind24)

Based on direct observation the energy and food shortages in North Korea continue to affect small business operations and public safety For example hotel roomsmdash

21) One thing to keep in mind is that North Korea publishes few statistics on its energy sector and most quantitative estimates by South Korean and other organizations that describe the North Korean energy sector activities are guesstimates

22) Geopolitics is also a main reason for this shift 23) ldquoS Korea IMF Differ over Volume of NK Traderdquo Yonhap June 17 2011 at httpenglish

yonhapnewscokrnorthkorea20110617810401000000AEN20110617003700315FHTML Marcus Noland ldquoJust How Big Are Those Lips and Teethrdquo North Korea Witness to Transformation at httpwwwpiiecomblogsnkp=281

24) Sungwoo Kim ldquoPatterns of North Korearsquos Foreign Trades Between 2000 and 2001rdquo Vantage Point vol 35 no 10 (October 2012) pp 52-53

16-----


especially in the provincial citiesmdashseem to lack running water and electricity for lights and air conditioning at certain times during the day elevators in the hotels are sometimes nonoperational Buildings look to be in need of more than just cosmetic repair Long tunnels on highways fog up because of a lack of proper ventilation systems making driving through them rather hazardous Trucks still lack fuel and the highly inefficient wood-stove method of powering trucks is still being used especially in the rural regions

b The Military Prioritized but Not Immune to the Impacts of the Energy Crisis

Prioritization of the Army and Adjustment to the Pursuit of Asymmetric Military Capabilities

Under Kim Jong Ilrsquos leadership North Korea was a garrison state practicing guerrilla-like policies25) perceiving the external environment to have remained hostile toward the DPRK and the countryrsquos economic situation woeful

North Korea has maintained that to guarantee its sovereignty and prevent the country from being dominated by other states it must possess strong self-defensive military capabilities Historically in times of hardship and increasing threats to the regime North Korea has prioritized the military at the expense of its people and the civilian economy This includes Kim Jong Ilrsquos hard shift to prioritize military affairs amidst the countryrsquos rapidly growing energy-crisis induced economic hardships making the army the main force of North Korearsquos (socialist) revolution beginning in the mid-1990s with the advent of songun politics

Over the last two decades of energy crisis and economic hardship North Korearsquos conventional forces have been in slow decline Energy crisis since the 1990s have exacerbated this situation For example the Korean Peoplersquos Army (KPA) is said to lack fuel for its equipment Estimates suggest that the KPA has only enough fuel to support

25) In the supposed words of Kim Jong Il in 2003 ldquoAs written in the poem last year really can be said to be a year of guerrilla in which I led the Songun revolution in a guerrilla way This year is also to be a year of guerrilla a year of bold offensive like the previous yearrdquo Kim Jong Il the Great Man (Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House 2012) p 230

17-----


its military equipment for one month in a wartime setting26) Such can only make the regime in Pyongyang feel more insecure

In response to the energy and overall resource constraints Pyongyang has made a focused transition to building a three-headed asymmetric military forces capability whose main components include long-range artillery Special Operations Forces and ballistic missiles27) Accordingly North Korea has also seriously pursued development of a nuclear deterrent capability (ie nuclear weapons) for possibly the last two decades28) This reveals the regimersquos intrinsic perception of external threat and insecurity

This insecurity remains Going forward we can expect that North Korea will continue to bolster its ldquomilitary musclerdquo29) by augmenting its asymmetric military (threat) capabilities and continue to prioritize the military30) albeit to somewhat of a lesser degree now that Pyongyang has its ldquonuclear deterrentrdquo and must focus more intently on fixing the economy to prevent discontentment from increasing in society on account of the chronic resource constraints due to energy shortages and food insecurity

26) Peter Hayes and David F von Hippel ldquoDPRK lsquoCollapsersquo Pathways Implications for the Energy Sector and for Strategies RedevelopmentSupportrdquo NAPSNet Special Report January 18 2011 at wwwnautilusorg

27) Bruce E Bechtol Jr ldquoMaintaining a Rogue Regime North Korearsquos Military Capabilities and Strategy at the End of the Kim Jong-il Erardquo International Journal of Korean Studies vol 16 no 1 (Spring 2012) pp 160ndash191

28) According to one scholar Pyongyang has used its post-Cold War nuclear diplomacy with the United States and other parties not to negotiate a settlement that would see North Korearsquos denuclearization but rather used diplomacy as an instrument of statecraft to manage the threat of preemption until North Korea had completed its nuclear weapons program Matthias Maass ldquoNorth Korearsquos Instrumentalization of Diplomacy Passing Through the lsquoDanger Zonersquo of Its Nuclear Weapons Programrdquo The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis vol 24 no 3 (September 2012) pp 303ndash320 The fact that the bilateral Geneva Agreed Framework signed in 1994 included the provision of LWRs that could not possibly have been of any immediate use to solve North Korearsquos immediate and severe energy problemsmdashwhich Pyongyang knewmdashand the fact that North Korea did not have the capacity to use all annual provisions of HFO provided under the agreementmdashwhich Pyongyang also knew before signing the Agreed Frameworkmdashmay give credence to this argument

29) ldquoOnly the self-defensive military capabilities not a word can reliably protect the sovereignty and right to existencerdquo ldquoMilitary Capabilities Guarantee Sovereignty to Existence Rodong Sinmunrdquo KCNA May 30 2012

30) As Kim Jong Unrsquos praising of the army and military-first politics in his April 15 2012 speech at the centennial of Kim Il Sungrsquos birthday would suggest

18-----


The new leadership in Pyongyang seems to be wrestling away the enhanced power of decision making that the military enjoyed under Kim Jong Ilrsquos songun leadership Signs indicate that Kim Jong Un is putting economic matters back in the hands of the Cabinet and technocrats However songun or giving priority to the military will still be an important aspect of the Kim Jong Un regime for the time being31) including in the realm of electricity production agriculture and overall economic construction32) since the military does provide an abundant source of youthful (and if well-fed able) labor force

Move that Stone Pick up That Shovel Military Personnel in Energy Construction Projects Agriculture

The energy crisis has also affected the average soldier in the KPA Without fuel and replacement parts to power and maintain machine tools and heavy equipment more manpower was channeled to building hydroelectric plants Reports suggest that due to the shortages in fuel and equipment many have of these plants have been built by hand During these decades of energy crisis manpower for such projects has come in the form of ldquosoldier-buildersrdquo as the army has played ldquoa leading role in the difficult and labour-consuming sectors of socialist construction while discharging its mission

31) ldquoToday Songun politics of Korea provides substantial guarantee to the efforts to achieve its independence prosperity and peaceful reunification The Korean army and the people entrusted their destiny and future entirely to and faithfully support Kim Jong Ilrsquos Songun politics Today they support the Songun-based leadership of Kim Jong Un Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoplersquos Army (KPA) and Kim Jong Ilrsquos heir Politics with strong support from the people is always just and will surely emerge victoriousrdquo Ri Jong Chol Songun Politics in Korea (Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House 2012) p 2

32) ldquoWhile enhancing its political and military strength recognized by the world Korea is today conducting a dynamic struggle to build it into an economic giant All efforts are directed to economic construction in a peaceful environment guaranteed by a high level of political stability and powerful defence capabilities Economic construction is being conducted in line with the requirements of Songun politics with the army as the core and main force [with] the service personnel play[ing] the lead role in economic construction They made a great contribution to pulling through the economic crisis when the Korean people were on the lsquoArduous Marchrsquo They went to the power stations to increase the electric-power generation when electricity was in short supply they dug coal mines when coal was not supplied in time they helped peasants in farming so as to solve the food problemrdquo Ibid p 49

19-----


of national defencerdquo33) The military has been active in the energy sector both in the construction and

operation of small and medium-sized power plants34) including the April 5 Power Station and dam along the Imjin River the Anbyon Youth Power Station and Huichon dam and hydroelectric power stations35) Soldiers have also been dispatched to farms Without fuel to power agriculture equipment more manpower was mobilized to work on farms Soldiers themselves were said to have built (and operate) the Taedonggang Combined Fruit Farm (which in a way resembles a type of agro-military policy of feudal kingdoms of old) The North Korean propaganda still sings the praises of these efforts of the soldiers

ldquoThe revolutionary soldier spirit was created during the construction of the Anbyon Youth Power Station which was completed by the KPA in the grimmest days of the lsquoArduous Marchrsquo which was the hardest period in the history of the country This project was a gigantic one the amount of construction work was twice of the West Sea Barrage which was estimated to have cost USD 4 billion They built dams and dug waterway tunnels through the rugged mountains even unhesitatingly sacrificing their livesrdquo36)

When the public distribution system was shut down in the mid-1990s soldiers were dispatched to state farms and collectives to work on them and supposedly ldquoprotectrdquo harvests from diversion by famers and thieves It has been widely believed that food has been diverted to the military This might have been important for the regime to

33) As one North Korean scholar has rationalized the use of soldiers in these projects ldquoNothing is more ideal for an army than to contribute to creation and construction in peacetimerdquo Ri Jong Chol Songun Politics in Korea (Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House 2012) p 36

34) Yonhap News Agency North Korea Handbook trans by Monterey Interpretation and Translation Services (Armonk NY M E Sharpe 2003) pp 688ndash689

35) Ibid p 49 Yonhap News Agency op cit Recently it has been reported that drought has left the river above the Huichon dam too low for the new power plant to reach full capacity ldquoNorth Korea Power Plant Huichon No 2 Power Station Can Power Half of Pyongyang Say Officialsrdquo Huffington Post September 17 2012 at wwwhuffingtonpostcom

36) Ri Jong Chol Songun Politics in Korea (Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House 2012) p 34

20-----


prevent breakdown in military authority once starving soldiers began to raid government food supplies during the famine years of the mid-1990s37) Recently North Korea reduced the minimum height of soldiers to 145 meters (4 feet 9 inches)38) mdashan example of the legacy of chronic food shortage on the population and thus the army

The problems that these food and energy shortages have created between the military and society are still prevalent For example these days it has been reported that there is a popular term going around among the ranks of soldiers ldquoyeomjeon sasangrdquo According to the North Korean dictionary this term means something to the effect that soldiers are becoming less willing to fight Not surprisingly the government is wary of this However the soldiers use this jargon in another way with the same pronunciation but a different meaning ldquocollection of money and materials by soldiersrdquo The use of this term reportedly comes from the situations where common soldiers repeatedly confiscate food and supplies from civilians in the area where they are stationed as a way to deal with their lack of food and their military assignments Reportedly the army is still having difficulties obtaining foodmdasha direct result of the prolonged economic stagnation In essence soldiers are said to see this criminal activity as a way to avoid malnutrition and to complete their army service successfully39) It would seem that Pyongyang takes somewhat of a blind-eye approach in dealing with this

However if this is true then it would seem a bit risky for the regime to continue to celebrate and promote songun and the ldquorevolutionary soldier spiritrdquo among the people Without economic improvementmdashwhich heavily depends on providing adequate energy suppliesmdashsuch criminal behavior perpetrated by soldiers against civilians is likely to continue creating further discontentment in society

37) Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland Famine in North Korea Markets Aid and Reform (New York Columbia University Press 2007) pp 110ndash112

38) ldquoNorth Korearsquos $850 million Rocket Failurerdquo CNNcom April 13 201239) ldquolsquoAccomplishment of Yeomjeon Idearsquo Is Getting Popularrdquo North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity

June 18 2012 at httpnkiskrboardphpboard=ennkisb201ampsort=wdateampcommand=bodyampno= 419

21-----


c Society

The CIA World Factbook estimates North Korearsquos population to be 24589122 (July 2012)mdashabout half that of South Korea Forecasts estimate it to grow to 262 million by 203040) However many hundreds of thousands of North Koreans died during the famine period of the mid-1990s a tragedy in part due to the energy shortages exacerbated by natural disasters41)

A recent study in population trends in North Korea suggests that the living conditions for the average person in North Korea continue to deteriorate42) UN food agencies estimates for this year indicate that nearly 3 million North Koreans will require food assistance in 2012 indicating that the food shortage is far from being resolved

Indeed many North Koreans still face the problems of hunger It is believed that North Korea has suffered a deficit of 400000 tons of food annually for a number of years The UN estimates North Korearsquos entire 2011 harvest at 54 million tons The UN World Food Program estimates that one in three North Korean children remains chronically malnourished or ldquostuntedrdquo North Korearsquos has a far lower quality of life as shown by life expectancy 12 years less than in the ROK43)

Unfortunately Pyongyang continues to put money into programs that do not

40) According to the CIA World Factbook North Korearsquos age structure is as follows 0-14 years224 (male 2766006female 2700378) 15-64 years686 (male 8345737female 8423482) 65 years and over 91 (male 738693female 1483196) (2011 est) It also reveals that North Korea has a more favorable age distribution compared to South Korea and is predicted to carry that into the future The median age in North Korea is only 33 by 2030 it will climb only to 36 or 37 Despite having a total population half that of South Korea North Korea has 6 million in the 10ndash24 age cohort compared with 95 million in the ROK North Korearsquos demographic change has been much more gradual and even now its fertility rate is 19 which is slightly under replacement yet the highest in East Asia with the exception of Mongolia ldquoSouth Korearsquos Population Vacuumrdquo The Irrawaddy July 9 2012 at httpwwwirrawaddyorgarchives8570

41) Recent Counterfactual population projects put the number of lives lost during the famine to be in the range of 240000 and 420000 people Estimated figures also suggest that the number of deaths attributable to the deterioration in living conditions in North Korea in the ten years following the famine is as high as the number of deaths attributable to the famine Thomas Spoorenberg and Daniel Schwekendiek ldquoDemographic Changes in North Korea 1993ndash2008rdquo Population and Development Review vol 38 no 1 (March 2012) pp 154ndash155

42) Ibid p 15643) CIA World Factbook

22-----


improve the livelihoods of the North Korean people For example last Aprilrsquos rocket launch was estimated to cost around $850 million which is enough to buy 25 million tons of corn and 14 million tons of rice on the international market The rocket launch subjected North Korea to more international sanctions and resulted in the halting of planned US shipments of 240000 metric tons of food aid to the DPRK44) (The one positive thing that did come out of the launch was the North Korean leaderrsquos admitting that it was a failure)

The energy crisis has affected people in many other ways For example recent typhoons hit in the fall of 2012 resulting in a cave in at the 16 km-long Ryongha Tunnel in Unheung County Yangkang Province This not only crippled rail service but forced rail workers and soldiers stationed nearby to be mobilized to frantically repair the tunnel Much of this repair work is said to be done by hand Poor quality construction materials lack of mechanization and haste in construction of the tunnel are cited as the causes of the tunnels collapse45)

In the construction of hydroelectric dams the conditions in which the people sometime work are arcane and bizarre For example dams are being built and tunnels dug by hand46) This is the case for the hydroelectric plants being built under the frame-work of the ldquoClean Development Mechanismrdquo (CDM) and projects registered with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)47) One can assume that proper machine equipment is either unavailable or without fuel to run

Some Observations

In the rural areas farmers do not seem to have enough fuel or equipment People are mobilized to work in the fields to stop floods waters by heightening soil embankments However in some cases they do this work without backhoes or shovels They just used

44) ldquoNorth Korearsquos $850 million Rocket Failurerdquo CNNcom April 13 2012 45) ldquoChaos as Key Railroad Tunnel Collapsesrdquo Daily NK September 21 2012 at wwwdailynkcom46) ldquoKnowledge Transfer and Training in a Difficult ClimatemdashCooperation with North Korea in the

Areas of Climate Change and Green Developmentrdquo Hanns Seidel Foundation at wwwhssor krA1250Englishhtml

47) For more on these CDM projects and North Korea see ibid

23-----


their handsIn August 2012 more cars seemed to be on the roads in Pyongyang but the highways

seem empty with very few cars Highways were in poor condition due to heavy rains and lack of repair Some are riddled with pot holes across nearly six lanes Middle-aged and older women could be seen sweeping the loose gravel off of the less damaged slabs of concrete There did not seem to be enough work crews and the few there seem not to have proper equipment (ie even shovels) or materials to fix the roads Some machinery (ie excavators) could be seen but not in operation Many large container and flatbed trucks could also be seen parked on the shoulder of highways either out of gas or in need of repair One of the main roads in Wonsan was under major construction When it rained in some places it was completely flooded

Ⅳ Shaking in Onersquos Boots Too Cold and Too Insecure

Threatening External Environment

Some things to think aboutbull North Korea fears becoming too economically dependent on China and thereby

its puppet Yet China has recently decided to supply power to the Rason SEZ This is an encouraging sign that Beijing is at least willing to support an economic project that Pyongyang is trying make viable

bull A hard-line administration in Seoul that Pyongyang has been unwilling to deal with for the last four-plus years is on its way out but not before it is able to agree with Washington on allowing the South to extend the range of its ballistic missiles (from 300 km to 800 km) and payload of certain missiles the goal of which was said to be to ldquodeter armed provocation from North Koreardquo48)

bull Pyongyang does not trust Washington one iota It still sees the US as its enemy and insists on signing a peace treaty and normalization of US-DPRK relations

48) ldquoSouth Korea says US agrees to extend Seoulrsquos ballistic missile rangerdquo CNN October 7 2012 at httpeditioncnncom20121007worldasiasouth-korea-us-announcementindexhtml

24-----


bull Major international sanctions continue to be in force against North Korea for its nuclear and ballistic missile activities and suspected human rights violations including UN Us and Japanese sanctions (The effects of these sanctions however are mixed)

bull Pyongyang is turning slightly again toward Moscow so as to relieve itself of past debt and induce Russian investment in North Korearsquos SEZs (ie Rason)

The above gives a glimpse at the current relations between North Korea and its neighbors in Northeast Asia There has long been talk of addressing North Korearsquos energy problems through regional cooperation such as through the construction of natural-gas and pipelines and electric power grids and diversifying North Korearsquos energy supply away from oil and toward natural gas49) North Korea is even reportedly more interested than in the past to being involved in the construction of a gas pipeline linking South Korea and Russia by traversing North Korea territory50) Discussion on such a project however remains difficult51) The bottom line is that North Korea has failed to embrace international efforts at such large-scale investment-intensive regional cooperation that could supply the DPRK with fuel and funding and rebuild needed energy sector infrastructure In the long-term these projects could be needed not just to help North Korea but improve security and stability in the region because of the cooperation such projects would require More must be done to encourage Pyongyang that such cooperation is beneficial non-threatening and needed

49) For some discussion on these see Kent Calder op cit Keun-wook Paik ldquoPipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsulardquo Report to Korea Foundation Project lsquoEnergy and Environmental Cooper-ation in the Korean Peninsula Chatham House January 2005 Su-Hoon Lee and Dean Ouellette ldquoTackling DPRKrsquos Nuclear Issue through Multilateral Cooperation in the Energy Sectorrdquo Nautilus Institute PFO 03-33 May 27 2003

50) ldquoNorth Korean Leader Kim Backs Natural-Gas Pipeline Russia Saysrdquo Bloomberg February 3 2012 at httpwwwbloombergcomnews2012-02-03north-korean-leader-kim-backs-natural-gas- pipeline-russia-sayshtml

51) ldquoN Korea Demands lsquoRip-off Feersquo for Gas Pipelinerdquo Chosun Ilbo October 4 2012

25-----


Changes in Society and Domestic Challenges The Internal Environment

The ongoing energy crisis has led to a continual decline in the North Korean economy creating various domestic challenges that pressure the regime in Pyongyang and thus add to its insecurity Under the former leader Kim Jong Il North Korea made choices that are in large part responsible for the pressure that the regime must be feeling today its prioritization of the military over the civilian economy is one of them and unswerving pursuit of nuclear weapons another

But any perceived external threats now must give way to the growing internal challenges and domestic changes For one the regime cannot completely stop the flow of information coming from the outside into the DPRK The regime cannot keep the North Korean population completely insulated from outside information The Korean Wave seems to be penetrating the North shattering false paradigms of a poor South that the North Korean government has propagated for decades The government is now forced to slightly alter its propaganda Many if not most North Koreans now know that South Korea is not the bastion of hunger misery unemployment and homelessness that the North Korean media and education system has portrayed it to be As the people receive more information about the outside world the more the regime will have to change its tune as the peoplersquos distrust of the government will only increase if it doesnrsquot

Other changes are also notable Markets and moneymdashthe evils of capitalismmdashare playing bigger roles in the daily lives of the people Cellphones have become a common form of communication and mobile communications appear to be rapidly expanding52) There are signs that a middle class is developing53) and the institution of ldquoorganizational liferdquo seems to be on the decline54) So far under the new Kim Jong Un leadership signs of relaxation and change are in the air As an example private markets appear to have more flexible opening hours and more imported clothing can be found there and is becoming popular

52) Alexander Y Mansourov ldquoNorth Korea on the Cusp of Digital Transformationrdquo Nautilus Institute Special Report (November 1 2011) at wwwnautilusorg

53) Katharina Zellweger ldquoAid and Development Co-operation and North Korea A Window of Opportunities or Pushing at a Closed Doorrdquo March 2012

54) Andrei Lankov ldquoNorth Korearsquos lsquoOrganizational Lifersquo in Declinerdquo Asia Times May 22 2012

26-----


But the food and energy shortages are still chromic problems A population without reliable heat this freezing winter due to power shortages is not something that can continue The regime must realize that it has to focus on the economy to improve the livelihoods of the people or face rising discontentment If the regime is unable to convince the people that changes are being made that will improve their lives then the new Kim leadership may face greater pressure internally

Irsquom guardedly optimistic that the Kim Jong Un regime will move forward with some economic adjustment measures to deal with the hardships that the countryrsquos population face However I anticipate moves will be made cautiously and changes to come slowly The regime will assess each possibly moversquos ldquothreat potentialrdquo to its regime survivability and security However with this focus on the economy the Kim regime might also be more willing to deal with the outside world to address the countryrsquos energy sector problems

I also believe the Kim Jong Un leadership will mainly follow the path set by Kim Jong Ilmdashat least in the short to medium terms That means it is highly unlikely that the leadership will abandon juche (ldquoself-reliancerdquo) or songun (ldquomilitary-firstrdquo) politics55) Rather it will stay the course for some time At this time I am quite pessimistic that the regime will be tempted to abandon its nuclear programs via external pressure including sanctions or even through US-DPRK or multilateral negotiations With the external environment being as it ismdashthat is with sanctions against the country and political situations of neighboring countries up in the air due to leadership transitions and electionsmdashI find it highly improbably that the regime will give up its so-called nuclear ldquodeterrentrdquo anytime soon56) But for North Korea its conventional forces are more crucial to its

55) ldquoToday Kim Jong Un continues his tour of on-site guidance for the happiness of the people on the field car like Kim Jong Il rode all his life Kim Jong Un has been on the continuous tour of Songun leadership since he inspected the Seoul Ryi Kyong Su 105 Guards Tank Division of the KPA This is a clear expression of his unshakable will to carry on and accomplish the Songun revolution associated with the whole life of Kim Jong Il without failrdquo Kim Jong Il the Great Man (Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House 2012) p 235

56) Abandoning its nuclear weapons programs may be incompatible with North Korearsquos system of hereditary succession Seongwhun Cheon ldquoThe Rise and Demise of North Korean Nuclear Agreements and the 2012 Leap Day Dealrdquo IFANS Review vol 20 no 1 (June 2012) pp 1ndash27 North Korea may have actually engaged in nuclear diplomacy for the last twenty years with no

27-----


security than its nuclear weapons programs Keeping the soldiers loyal to the regime also means keeping them relatively well-fed

Ⅴ Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on personal observations made last August and recent observations of others57) there are noticeable differences in North Korea of today compared to North Korea of even last year Various small vendorsstalls and shops have multiplied especially in Pyongyang In the capital one can see more cars on the streets including taxis Teenage girls are wearing fashionable sandals and colorful brand-named clothes High-rise apartments entertain Pyongyangrsquos skyline New slogans on public signs raise Kim Jong Unrsquos status to that of his father At this yearrsquos Arirang Mass Games the messages seemed less aggressive in nature the more memorable sections were not those that glorified the history of anti-imperialist struggle and military-first politics but the ones that celebrated North Korearsquos youth pursuit of science and technology construction and the growing Sino-DPRK economic relationship In the cities and along the train route into Pyongyang smiles and waves from foreign visitors are more readily reciprocated by local citizens The average person seems more curious than suspicious and more willing to talkmdash

especially the youth These are all positive signs The new leadership too is sending out some positive signs It was heard that

Kim Jong Un ordered North Korean officials to change the economic system and learn more about market economies Various laws dealing with opening in particular ones dealing with foreign investment foreign investment banks labor conditions taxation and so forth have been revised The government also has been sending more and more technocrats middle-ranking executives and specialists abroad for overseas training and field trips to obtain technical skills and expertise in a wide range of fields including

intention of bargaining away its nuclear programs Maass op cit57) Ruediger Frank ldquoAn Atmosphere of Departure and Two Speeds Korean Style Where is North

Korea Headingrdquo 38 North at http38northorg201210rfrank100212

28-----


finance economic development trade railway works international business law among others More foreign experts and educators are also being allowed into Pyongyang to deliver on-site training and lectures58) These increased exchanges with the international community are positive and should be encouraged

The international community should prepare to capitalize on these gentle winds of change The North Korea regime seems to be indicating its willingness to experiment with economic reforms but cautiously and with preparation59) There seems a cautious relaxation toward society In this light a window for engagement seems to be opening

What the international community should work toward is building a common understanding of the situation in North Korea and allow for multiple approaches that are complementary Considering that North Korea remains highly energy-insecure with its energy-sector problems and shortages crippling the countryrsquos economic develop-ment one of those approaches should be directed at improving North Korearsquos energy sector by moving it toward sustainable development For one experts have noted the financial feasibility of rehabilitating North Korearsquos rural energy sector through inter-national assistance60) To work toward solving North Korearsquos energy crisis and thereby hopefully improve the security situation by decreasing North Korearsquos insecurity I would like to make the following recommendations

bull Think small not big ndash Large-scale energy projects have symbolic value if they involve Washington and lock the United States into an arrangement that forces Washington to demonstrate the political will to remain committed to solving the problems of North Korea providing the regime with its ldquosecurity guaranteesrdquo However as the KEDO project demonstrated such white elephants are unfeasible and impracticalmdashthey cannot solve North Korearsquos immediate or medium-term energy needs A LWR is impractical and a grave safety risk

58) ldquoKim Min Gi ldquoMoves Toward Change Under the Kim Jong-Un Regimerdquo Vantage Point vol 35 no 8 (August 2012) p 24

59) The government seems poised to implement the new ldquoeconomic management systemrdquo that was announced on June 28 this year

60) James H Williams David Von Hippel and Nautilus Team ldquoFuel and Famine Rural Energy Crisis in the DPRKrdquo Asian Perspective vol 26 no 1 (Spring 2001) pp 132ndash137

29-----


A gas pipeline from Russia to South Korea as well would not solve the energy issues entirely but only line the pockets of the leadership in Pyongyang and give the Kim regime a card to use as leverage against South Korea over the long-term Cooperation on these projects will take much more discussion and trust among actors and much more time to realize In the meantime it would be more practical less risky and of greater immediate impact value to start with small-scale projects directed at improving the rural populationrsquos livelihoods projects that can be implemented and completed quickly such as the donation of diesel and solar generators for humanitarian purposes to farming villages and small towns61)

bull Change the environment not the regimendash External pressure and sanctions will not collapse the regime nor prevent it from getting the resources it needs from China We cannot change the regime but we can change the environment it faces Our approach must deal with North Korea as it is not as we might wish it to be That means creating a less threatening international environment for the regime so that it may seek to increase its positive engagement and exchanges with the international community that will help the country address the insecurities created by its chromic energy crisis This means continuing to provide humanitarian food aid (with monitoring) It also means that we should wait to see Kim Jong Unrsquos direction with economic (market) reform measures and outreach to the international community over the next twelve months Once it is seen as positive move forward with by providing energy aid and promoting development assistance in the energy sector In the meantime prepare to open funding for this

bull Think people not politics ndash Offer to expand the programs Pyongyang is already interested in such as those where officials partake in training programs abroad including capacity-building and knowledge sharing in the areas of economic

61) For the benefits of these see Peter Hayes David von Hippel and Scott Bruce op cit p 166ndash167 ldquoRenewable Energy in the DPRKrdquo op cit

30-----


development energy efficiency renewable energy energy markets railroad work etc62) Positive engagement here can help influence North Korearsquos internal choices encouraging it to make meaningful and positive economic and other reforms We should also take the Nautilus Institutersquos approach which is to start with small-scale energy projects and energy efficiency training and technologies sharing projects63) Energy efficiency technologies and practices needs to be promoted Governments should provide more funding for NGOs and private-sector professionals to get involved in such engagement We need to think about the provision of humanitarian energy assistance and development capacity-building through exchanges and training etc We should also just simply increase academic cultural and sports exchanges as more interaction will be needed to build relationships with the North Koreans over the long-term Better start now

bull Think multilateralminilateralndash Actors in the region need to embrace the principle of multilateralism if there is to be long-term security in Northeast Asia North Korea is no exception Pyongyang too must become more com-fortable with and engage in multilateral activities and efforts Somehow we must encourage Pyongyang not to pull away from regional multilateral dialogues and projectsmdashas it has done in the past (with the Six Party Talks and the Greater Tumen Initiative) when it has experienced increased internal insecuritymdash

and instead see such networks as helpful rather than harmful to its survival and security Tri-lateral energy cooperation projects should be further studied and if truly feasible promoted There are several medium- and long-term energy sector projects in North Korea alone that will require multilateral cooperation to realize64)

62) See Peter Hayes David von Hippel and Scott Bruce op cit p 167 63) Arabella Imhoff and Scott Bruce ldquoIntroduction energy and Mineral resources in North Korean

Security and Sustainabilityrdquo Korean Journal of Defense Analysis vol 23 no 2 (June 2011) pp 155ndash156

64) Again for more details on what those projects entail see See Peter Hayes David von Hippel and Scott Bruce op cit p 167 ndash 168

33-----


국문초록

EU의 에너지 정책 및 대외관계

유럽식 에너지 로드맵은 재생가능한 에

너지에 초점을 둔다 독일을 비롯한 여러 나

라에서는 원자력 에너지를 폐기하고 있는

추세이다 유럽국가들은 2050년까지 총 에

너지 공급량의 80를 재생가능한 에너지로

전환시키려는 방침을 가지고 있다 이러한

야심찬 목표를 달성하기 위해서 EU의 27여

개 국가들은 다양한 전략을 펼치고 있다 지

열에너지 연구소 소장으로서 저자는 본고에

서 지열 에너지의 이용가능성에 대한 전망

을 논의한다

34-----


Abstract

EUrsquos Energy Policy amp External Relations

The european energy roadmap focusses on renewable energy Many countries espe-cially Germany will abandon nuclear power Until 2050 80 of the energy supply in europe shall be renewable Different strat-

egies in the 27 countries of the EU will try to reach this ambitious target As the author is director of an geothermal institute there wil lbe a shourt outlook on the possible role of geothermal power as well

35-----


36-----


37-----


38-----


39-----


40-----


41-----


42-----


43-----


44-----


45-----


46-----


47-----


48-----


49-----


50-----


51-----


52-----


53-----


54-----


55-----


56-----


57-----


58-----


59-----


60-----


61-----


62-----


63-----


64-----


69-----


국문초록

동북아시아의 핵 경쟁에 대한 현실적 평가

동북아의 핵질서는 국제적인 ldquo핵비확산

체제rdquo(nuclear nonproliferation regime)

의 틀 속에서 형성되어 왔다 NPT를 기반으

로 하는 핵비확산 체제의 원칙은 국제평화

와 안보에 위협이 되는 핵무기의 수평적 수

직적 확산을 규제해야 한다는 것이다 NPT

가 핵확산을 막는 데 기여했지만 냉전 종식

이후 ldquo제2차 핵시대rdquo (Second Nuclear Age)

의 도래를 우려하는 의견이 점증하고 있다

북한 핵문제가 공론화 된 1990년대 초

이후 지금까지 북한의 핵능력은 지속적으로

확대되어왔다 한국은 노태우 정부 이후

네 번의 정권교체를 거치면서 ldquo북핵 불용rdquo

을 대북정책의 기본 원칙으로 삼고 북한 정

권에 대해 지속적으로 핵개발 포기를 종용

해왔지만 실패하고 말았다 ldquo핵무기를 만들

의사도 능력도 없다rdquo는 김일성을 말을 전면

에 내세우고 자신들의 핵 프로그램을 평화

적인 이용이라고 둘러대던 북한은 2005년

2월 10일 핵무기를 만들었고 앞으로 더 만

들어나가겠다고 공식 선언했다 그리고 핵

능력을 ldquo물리적으로rdquo 입증하기 위해서

2006년 10월과 2009년 5월 두 차례의 핵실

험을 단행했다

북한이 2013년 상반기까지 3차 핵실험을

실시할 가능성이 크다 북한정권은 2006년

10월 9일 첫 번째 실험을 실시했고 유엔안

보리결의안 1718호가 가동 중인데도 불구

하고 2009년 5월 26일 2차 핵실험을 단행

한 바 있다 2012년은 한국 미국 중국 러

시아가 모두 정권교체 시기로서 동북아의

정세가 불안정할 수 있는 안보적 취약기이

기 때문에 북한 지도부는 이 틈을 놓치지 않

을 것이다

지난 2년 동안 한반도에서 발생한 가장

큰 사건은 역시 김정일의 사망이다 37년간

현대사에서 유례를 찾기 어려운 철권통치

를 해온 김정일의 사망은 그 자체로 역사적

인 사건이다 특히 통일을 달성해야 하는 우

리의 입장에서 볼 때 그의 사망은 한반도 통

일과정의 문을 여는 단초이자 북한 내부에서

급격한 현상변경을 야기할 수 있는 촉매제이

다 동아시아의 핵질서 역시 장기적으로 북

한의 변화 내지는 한반도의 통일 과정에 의

해 크게 영향을 받게 될 것이다 lsquo비핵화된 통

일한국rsquo이 우리가 지향하는 목표이다

70-----


Abstract

An Assessment of the Current Reality of Nuclear Competition in Northeast Asia

The East Asian nuclear order has been shaped within the framework of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime The main prin-ciple of the NPT-centered nuclear nonprolifer-ation regime has been to regulate both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons which endanger international peace and security The NPT has contributed to preventing the pro-liferation of nuclear weapons but after the end of the Cold War there has been increasing con-cern over the rise of a so-called ldquoSecond Nuclear Agerdquo

North Korean nuclear capabilities have continued to expand since the North Korean nu-clear weapons program became an issue in the early 1990s The North Korea policies of four consecutive South Korean governments since the Roh Tae-woo administration have placed the halt of the Northrsquos nuclear weapons devel-opment as a top priority However continuous South Korean calls for North Korea to halt its nuclear program have failed to have any effect

On February 10 2005 North Korea an-nounced that it had built a nuclear weapon and would continue to build more This announce-ment came in stark contrast with past North Korean claims that its nuclear program was for peaceful use and the statement by Kim Il-Sung that the country had ldquono intention or ability to build nuclear weaponsrdquo After the announce-

ment North Korea then moved to ldquophysicallyrdquo prove its nuclear capability by conducting two nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009

It is very likely that North Korea will con-duct a third nuclear test in early 2013 The North Korean regime conducted its first nuclear test on October 9 2006 and followed through with another nuclear test on May 26 2009 despite the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1718

The political situation in Northeast Asia during 2012 is unstable due to changes of power in South Korea the US China and Russia and North Korean leaders will likely take advantage of this situation

The main event to occur on the Korean Peninsula over the past two years was the death of Kim Jong-Il The death of the North Korean leader who had ruled the country with a histor-ically unparalleled iron-fist for 37 years was by itself a historical event From the standpoint of our imperative to attain Korean unification his death represents both a step towards opening the door to the unification process and the po-tential for rapid change in North Korearsquos status quo The East Asian nuclear order will also be deeply impacted by change in North Korea and the unification process on the Korean Peninsula We are setting our sights on achieving a ldquodenu-clearized unified Koreardquo

71-----


Ⅰ 동북아의 핵질서

동북아의 핵질서는 국제적인 ldquo핵비확산 체제rdquo(nuclear nonproliferation regime)의

틀 속에서 형성되어 왔다65) 핵비확산 체제란 핵무기확산을 막기 위한 일련의 국제적 합의

와 제도 및 기구를 말한다 남극에서 핵폭발이나 방사능 물질의 처리를 금지하기 위해서

1959년에 체결된 남극조약을 시작으로 지금까지 많은 합의와 기구가 만들어졌다 이 가

운데 1968년에 체결된 ldquo핵무기확산금지조약rdquo(Treaty on the Nonproliferation of

Nuclear Weapons NPT)은 핵비확산 체제의 꽃이자 토대라고 할 수 있다

NPT를 기반으로 하는 핵비확산 체제의 원칙은 국제평화와 안보에 위협이 되는 핵무기

의 수평적 수직적 확산을 규제해야 한다는 것이다 통상 lsquo수평적 확산rsquo을 핵확산이라 부르

고 lsquo수직적 확산rsquo을 핵무기 증강으로 본다 핵비확산 체제에 나타난 대강의 규범은 참가국

들이 핵확산을 촉진하는 모든 행위를 해서는 안된다는 것으로 규정할 수 있으며 보다 구체

적인 규범으로는 다음을 들 수 있다 ①핵국은 타국이 핵무장능력을 보유하도록 도움을 주

지 말 것 ②비핵국은 핵보유 노력을 포기할 것 ③원자력의 평화적 이용을 위한 협력을 계

속할 것 ④평화적 목적의 원자력 이용이 군사적으로 전용되는 것을 막기 위해 적절한 검증

을 실시할 것 ⑤핵국들은 핵군축을 단행해서 핵무기없는 세계를 실현할 것

이상의 원칙과 규범은 핵비확산 체제를 구성하는 핵심조약이자 모조약인 NPT에 자세

하게 조문화되어있다 NPT는 국제사회에서 전면적으로 수용되고 있는 현행 핵비확산 체

제를 태동시킨 실질적인 계기이자 시발점이다 1970년에 발효된 이후 5년에 한 번씩 전체

회원국들이 모여서 조약의 이행상황을 평가하고 문제점을 파악해서 개선방안을 마련실

천하는 평가회의를 개최해오고 있다 평가회의는 핵국과 비핵국 서방선진국과 비동맹국

등 각국의 실정과 정치적 색채에 따라서 다양한 의견이 활발하고 진솔하게 교환되는 대화

의 마당으로 그 위상을 굳혀왔으며 제8차 평가회의가 2010년 5월 뉴욕에서 개최되었다

1995년 제5차 평가회의에서는 조약의 유효기간을 무기한으로 하는 데 합의하기도 했다

NPT가 체결되기 5년 전인 1963년 미국의 케네디 대통령은 1975년까지 전 세계의 핵국

이 15~20개국은 될 것이라고 예상했지만 결과적으로 그의 예상은 크게 빗나갔다 1970년

대 후반까지 핵국은 기존의 P5외에 이스라엘이 추가되었을 뿐이다 2009년 말 현재 이상의

6개국과 인도와 파키스탄 및 북한을 합쳐서 모두 9개국이 핵을 보유한 상태이다 동북아의

경우 P5 가운데 미국 러시아 중국이 영향력을 행사하고 있고 북한이 가장 최근에 핵보유

65) 이 절은 해성국제문제윤리연구소 후원으로 작성된 필자의 다음 논문의 관련 부분을 발췌보완한 것이다 전성훈 ldquo핵비확산 체제의 개편과 한국의 원자력 외교rdquo 2009년 12월

72-----


국으로 등장했다 한국과 국경을 접하고 있는 중국 러시아 북한은 모두 자국 영토에 핵무

기를 배치하고 있지만 미국은 1991년 해외에 배치한 전술핵무기를 본토로 철수한다는 방

침에 따라 한국에 배치했던 모든 전술핵무기를 철수시켰다

NPT 체제가 출범한 이후에 여러 나라들이 핵무기 개발을 시도했었다 그러나 NPT에 근

거한 다양한 제도와 국제적 노력을 통해서 비핵국들의 이러한 시도가 여러 번 좌절되거나 봉

쇄되었다 한 연구에 따르면 앞으로 2025년까지 핵무기를 개발할 가능성이 있는 나라들과

그 동기를 lt표 1gt에서와 같이 파악할 수 있다66) 이 연구에서는 한국과 일본이 북한과 중국

을 상대로 안보적 이유에서 핵개발에 나설 수 있는 나라로 분류되었다

lt표 1gt 2025년까지 잠재적으로 핵무기를 개발할 수 있는 나라

Country Driver

Iran Security status and regime psychology shah to today

Gulf countries Security fear of Iran

Egypt Security and status cannot be left behind Iran and Turkey

Turkey Security NATO guarantee no longer seen as credible

Greece Security and states cannot be left behind Turkey

Iraq Security and states cannot be left behind Iran

Japan Security vs China North Korea US loses credibility

South Korea Security vs North Korea Japan break with United States

Poland Security US-NATO guarantee loses credibility

Czech Republic Security US-NATO guarantee loses credibility

Ukraine Security keeping out of Russiarsquos grasp

1963년에 케네디 대통령이 했던 예상이 크게 빗나갔다는 것은 그만큼 NPT가 핵확산을

막는 데 기여했다는 것을 의미한다 따라서 핵무기가 확산되기 시작한 초기에 있었던 ldquo제1차

핵확산 우려rdquo(first wave of proliferation fear) 즉 냉전이 심화되면서 신생 핵보유국들이

늘어날 것이라는 우려는 NPT에 의해서 상당부분 해소되었다고 할 수 있다 그러나 냉전 종

식 이후 소련의 붕괴로 인한 핵기술 확산 인도파키스탄의 핵경쟁 파키스탄 칸 박사의 핵

밀거래 네트워크 북한처럼 NPT 체제 내에서 국제사회를 기만하며 핵을 개발한 ldquo영리한 확

66) Lewis Dunn ldquoThe NPT assessing the past building the futurerdquo Nonproliferation Review Vol16 No2 July 2009 p 162

73-----


산자rdquo(smart proliferator)의 등장과 같은 요인들로 인해서 ldquo연쇄 핵확산rdquo(cascading of

nuclear proliferation)에 의한 ldquo제2차 핵시대rdquo(Second Nuclear Age)의 도래를 우려하

는 의견이 점증하고 있다67)

Ⅱ 북한 핵문제68)

북한 핵문제가 공론화 된 1990년대 초 이후 지금까지 북한의 핵능력은 지속적으로 확대

되어왔다 한국은 노태우 정부 이후 네 번의 정권교체를 거치면서 ldquo북핵 불용rdquo을 대북정책의

기본 원칙으로 삼고 북한 정권에 대해 지속적으로 핵개발 포기를 종용해왔지만 실패하고

말았다 ldquo핵무기를 만들 의사도 능력도 없다rdquo는 김일성을 말을 전면에 내세우고 자신들의 핵

프로그램을 평화적인 이용이라고 둘러대던 북한은 2005년 2월 10일 핵무기를 만들었고

앞으로 더 만들어나가겠다고 공식 선언했다 그리고 핵능력을 ldquo물리적으로rdquo 입증하기 위

해서 2006년 10월과 2009년 5월 두 차례의 핵실험을 단행했다

북한이 핵보유 사실을 공개하기 전인 2004년 가을 필자는 북한이 이미 핵보유국이며 국

가의 안위를 위해서 새로운 대북전략 기조를 수립하고 압박과 유화를 병해해서 북한 핵을

폐기시켜야 한다고 주장한 바 있다 당시 논문의 다음과 같은 논지는 2012년 가을 현시점

에서도 그대로 유효하다69)

북핵문제는 한국전쟁 이후 대한민국이 당면한 최대 안보위협이자 한반도 현상변경의

기폭제가 될 수 있는 중대한 사안이다 북한이 핵개발에 성공해서 복수의 핵탄두를 보유

하고 있다는 데에 큰 이견이 없는 만큼 오늘의 북핵문제는 단순한 외교 통일문제가 아니

라 국가안보적인 위기로 보는 것이 적절하다 북핵문제가 공론화된 1990년대 초 이후 처

음에는 비핵화 공동선언이라는 남북간 합의 이후에는 제네바 기본합의에 기초한 북미

간 합의를 통한 문제해결 노력이 있었다 그러나 북한이 집요한 기만과 비밀 핵개발을 통해

핵보유에 성공했다는 사실은 결국 이런 노력들이 실패했음을 의미한다 제네바 합의로 대

67) 제2차 핵시대란 보유한 핵전력의 규모는 작지만 새롭게 핵국으로 등장한 국가들 사이의 핵무기 개발 경쟁이 전개되는 국제안보 질서를 지칭하는 말이다 Colin Gray The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder Lynne Reinner Publishers 1999)

68) 이 절은 현재 출판작업이 진행중인 필자의 다음 연구에서 관련 부분을 발췌요약한 것이다 전성훈 ｢미국의 對韓 핵우산정책에 관한 연구｣ (서울 통일연구원 2012)

69) 전성훈 ldquo핵보유국 북한과 한국의 선택rdquo ｢국가전략｣ 제10권 3호 2004년 가을 pp 5~6

74-----


표되는 클린턴 행정부의 대북 연계정책과 615 공동선언으로 상징되는 김대중 정부의 햇

볕정책에 의해 무시되고 가려졌던 북핵문제가 결국 새로운 ldquo북핵위기rdquo(North Korea

nuclear crisis)로 비화되어 우리 앞에 등장한 것이다

핵능력을 구성하는 4대 요소는 ① 핵물질 ② 핵탄두의 설계middot제조 및 고폭실험 ③ 핵실

험 ④ 핵탄두의 소형화middot경량화이다 이 가운데 핵물질을 제외한 나머지 세 요소는 기술

적으로 대동소이하고 초보적인 기술들은 이미 공개되어 있기 때문에 북한의 핵능력을

결정하는 관건은 핵물질의 확보에 있다 2012년 6월 현재 북한의 예상 핵능력은 lt표 2gt에

서와 같이 추정할 수 있다70) 플루토늄 능력은 동결된 상태이나 ldquo고농축우라늄rdquo(Highly

Enriched Uranium HEU) 능력은 새로운 사항들이 많이 밝혀졌다 북한의 핵확산은 한

국안보에 대한 직접적인 위협은 아니지만 2007년 9월 6일 이스라엘의 시리아 핵시설 폭

격으로 북한에 의한 핵확산의 실체가 확인되었고 이런 행위가 국제평화를 저해하는 중

대한 도발이기 때문에 핵확산도 북한의 핵능력을 구성하는 요소로 포함했다

70) lt표 2gt와 이 표를 설명한 아래의 내용은 2009말 시점의 북핵능력을 평가한 다음 글의 관련 부분을 수정보완한 것이다 전성훈「북한의 WMD 위협 평가와 우리의 대응」(서울 한국전략문제연구소 2009년 12월 21일) pp 32sim73 1990년대 중반과 2009년 말 북한의 핵능력을 비교한 자료는 다음 저서의 내용을 참조하기 바란다 전성훈 ｢북한 비핵화를 위한 한미 전략적 협력에 관한 연구｣ (서울 통일연구원 2009) pp 40~43

75-----


lt표 2gt 주요 요소별 북한의 예상 핵능력(2012년 10월 현재)

핵물질 (kg) 무기화

북한의 핵확산플루토늄 HEU

설계middot제조middot고폭실험

핵실험소형화middot경량화

IRT-2000 원자로 2~4

2010년11월

2000개의 첨단

원심분리기 시설 공개 경수로용 LEU 생산

주장 제3의 장소에 HEU

프로그램 가동중으로

추정

제1기

(1983~199410)와

제2기

(1997~ 20029)에

각각 70여 회 등 모두

140여 회의 고폭실험

실시

내폭형 핵탄두

설계제조

2006년 10월 9일

함북 길주군 풍계리

지하갱도에서 제1차 핵실험

중국에 통보한 1차

핵실험 규모는 4kt 실제 규모는

1kt 추정

2009년 5월 25일 같은 장소에서

제2차 핵실험

2차 핵실험의 추정규모는

2~4 kt

위력을 낮춘 소형화 가능함

경량화에는 기술적인 장애가

있겠지만 극복 가능할 것으로 예상

2000년 대 초부터

시리아에 핵물질과

핵기술을 이전 2003년 경부터

원자로 건설 착수

2007년 9월 6일

이스라엘이 시리아에 건설된

원자로를 폭격하여 제거

5MWe원자로

19861~19894

5~85

1989 여름~ 19944

175~27

20032~20053

8~12

20056~20077

8~12

생산재처리된 플루토늄의 총량

405~635

2006109 핵실험 사용량

(추정) -25~4


(추정)-25~4

983099핵무기 제조에 사용 가능한

플루토늄 총량 325~585

2011년부터 연간 최소

20kg의 HEU 생산 가능

HEU를 이용한 내폭형

핵탄두 설계 제조

가능

3차 핵실험은 HEU를

이용한 실험일 것으로 예상

HEU에 내폭형 설계를 적용할 경우

핵탄두의 소형화경량화 실현

1 플루토늄 생산능력

북한이 자체적으로 플루토늄을 생산할 수 있는 방법은 소련의 지원 하에 1965년에 완

공된 IRT-2000 연구용원자로와 1986년에 북한이 자체적으로 건설한 5MWe 원자로에

서 사용후핵연료를 추출해서 재처리하는 것이다 북한이 외부로부터 플루토늄을 수입했을

76-----


가능성도 배제할 수 없으나71) 이에 대한 신빙성 있는 자료가 공개된 바 없기 때문에 분석

대상에서 제외한다 주로 영국의 ldquo국제전략문제연구소rdquo(The International Institute

for Strategic Studies IISS)가 제시한 가정과 수치를 기준으로 삼아 분석했는데72) 자세

한 사항은 위에서 언급한 보고서를 참조하기 바란다73)

분석 내용을 정리하면 북한이 현재 보유하고 있는 플루토늄의 총량은 325~585kg 정도

이다 IRT-2000 원자로에서 추출한 양 1980년 대 후반에 생산한 양 1989년 여름부터 제

네바 기본합의 체결 전인 1994년 4월까지 생산한 양 2002년 10월 제2차 북핵위기가 발생한

후 2003년 2월부터 약 2년간 생산한 양 그리고 2005년 6월부터 2middot13 합의에 의거해서

5MWe 원자로의 가동을 중단한 2007년 7월까지 생산한 양을 모두 합한 총량은 405~635kg

이다 북한이 생산한 플루토늄은 모두 재처리되었는데 이 가운데 두 차례의 핵실험에서 사용

된 것으로 추정되는 5~8kg을 제외한 나머지 즉 325~585kg이 북한이 이미 핵무기 제조에

사용했거나 앞으로 사용할 수 있는 플루토늄의 양이다74)

2 플루토늄 핵탄두 보유수

핵탄두 제조능력은 편의상 초급 중급 및 고급으로 구분할 수 있다 초급기술은 1945년 일

본에 투하된 제1세대 형 핵탄두를 제조할 수 있는 정도의 능력이고 고급기술은 미국과 러

시아가 보유한 것과 같이 오랜 경험과 최신기술을 바탕으로 설계와 제조기법을 개량해서

핵탄두의 첨단화 경량화에 성공한 능력을 말한다 중급기술은 초급과 고급의 중간단계의

능력으로 볼 수 있다

북한의 경우 초급기술을 보유하고 있다는 점에는 논란의 여지가 있을 수 없으며 중급

기술까지도 보유 가능한 것으로 추정된다 우선 핵물질 즉 플루토늄과 HEU만 확보하면

핵탄두를 제조하는 데 아무런 문제가 없다는 것이 국제사회의 상식이다75) 또한 영변 핵시

71) 한 예로서 북한이 2003년 4월 북경 3자회담에서 8000여 개의 사용후 핵연료에 대한 재처리를 거의 완료했다고 통보한 이후 CIA가 북한의 핵활동에 대한 정보평가를 전면 재검토 했다 이 과정에서 북한이 1990년대에 구소련과 러시아로부터 플루토늄을 비밀리에 들여왔다는 정보도 평가대상에 포함되었다 Bill Gertz ldquoCIA shifts on North Korean nukesrdquo Washington Times July 4 2003

72) North Korearsquos Weapons Programmes A Net Assessment (London The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2004)

73) 전성훈「북한의 WMD 위협 평가와 우리의 대응」 pp 33sim41

74) 참고로 국제핵물질위원회는 북한이 5MWe 원자로에서 총 46~58kg의 플루토늄을 생산했고 현재 34kg 정도를 재처리해서 보유하고 있는 것으로 추정했다 International Panel on Fissile Materials Global Fissile Material Report 2009 A Path to Nuclear Disarmament Program on Science and Global Security Princeton University October 2009 pp 17 51

75) 한 예로서 케리(John Kerry) 민주당 대통령 후보에 따르면 상원의원 바이든(Joseph Biden)이 미국의

77-----


설에 대한 방문결과와76) 북한당국의 주장77) 등을 감안할 때 북한의 기술수준이 60년 전

의 초급기술은 능가한 것으로 보이며 미국의 NRDC(Natural Resources Defense

Council)는 중급정도의 기술을 보유하는 것도 가능하다고 평가한다78) 북한이 현재 보

유하고 있는 것으로 추정되는 플루토늄(325~585kg)으로 제조할 수 있는 핵탄두의 개

수는 북한의 기술수준과 핵탄두의 파괴력에 따라 달라진다 NRDC가 발표한 핵물질과 핵

탄두 제조 기술수준 및 파괴력의 상관관계를 기준으로 삼고79) 북한의 기술수준을 초급

과 중급으로 나누어 보유 가능한 핵탄두의 종류와 수를 추정하면 다음과 같다

가 북한의 기술수준이 초급인 경우

북한이 보유 가능한 핵탄두의 파괴력을 5kt 10kt 및 20kt로 가정했을 때 초급기술 수

준의 북한이 보유할 수 있는 플루토늄 핵탄두의 종류와 수는 아래 lt표 3gt에서 보는 바와

같다 초급기술 수준의 경우 5kt 10kt 및 20kt 핵탄두를 만드는데 필요한 플루토늄의 양

은 각각 4kg 5kg 및 6kg이다

핵무기 관련 연구소 소장들에게 테러집단의 핵탄두 제조 가능성을 문의한 결과 핵물질만 확보되면 기존의 어떠한 법률도 위반하지 않고서 핵탄두를 제조할 수 있다는 답변을 들었다고 한다 Remarks of Senator John Kerry on New Strategies to Meet New Threats June 1 2004 httpwwwjohnkerrycom pressroomspeechesspc_2004_0601html

76) 헤커 박사는 재처리시설은 공장규모이고 양호한 상태였으며 실무자들도 기술적 질문에 매우 유능하게 답변했다고 증언했다 Siegfried Hecker 2004 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on ldquoVisit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Koreardquo January 21 2004 p 7

77) 예를 들어 해리슨(Selig Harrison)은 김계관 외무성 부상이 핵 억지력과 관련해서 다음과 같이 말했다고 밝혔다 ldquo미국이 나가사키에 떨어뜨린 핵폭탄이 준비 4개월 만에 만들어졌음을 기억해라 지금은 반세기가 지났으며 우리는 보다 현대적인 기술을 갖고 있다 따라서 이 문제에 대해서 당신 스스로 결론에 도달할 수 있을 것이다rdquo Selig Harrison ldquoInside North Korea leaders open to ending nuclear crisisrdquo Financial Times May 4 2004 한편 북한 외무성 대변인은 조선중앙통신 기자의 질문에 다음과 같이 반문하면서 북한이 핵개발을 위해 엄청난 재원을 투자했음을 시사했다 ldquo사실 조미 사이에 지금 같은 적대관계가 없다면 무엇 때문에 경제형편도 어려운 때에 그처럼 많은 품을 들여가며 방위력 강화에 힘을 넣고 특수무기까지 만들겠는가rdquo ｢조선중앙방송｣ 2002년 11월 3일

78) NRDC ldquoNorth Korearsquos nuclear program 2003rdquo Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists MarchApril 2003 p 76

79) Ibid

78-----


lt표 3gt 초급기술 수준의 북한이 보유 가능한 플루토늄 핵탄두(2012년 10월 현재)

파괴력필요한 Pu양 5kt4kg 10kt5kg 20kt6kg

보유 가능한 핵탄두의 수

(개)

8 ~ 15 7 ~ 12 5 ~ 10

5 ~ 12 1 1

6 ~ 12 2

4 ~ 9 2

5 ~ 12 2

세 가지 핵탄두(5kt 10kt 20kt) 가운데 한 종류만을 갖는다고 가정할 때 북한은 각각

8~15개 7~12개 5~10개를 보유할 수 있다 세 가지 핵탄두를 골고루 갖는다고 가정할 경

우 가능한 보유형태의 하나는 5kt 핵탄두를 5~12개 10kt과 20kt 핵탄두를 각각 1개씩 보

유하는 것이다 세 가지 핵탄두 가운데 두 가지만 보유한다고 가정하면 다음과 같은 보유상

황이 가능할 것이다 ①5kt 핵탄두 6~12개 10kt 핵탄두 2개 ②10kt 핵탄두 4~9개 20kt

핵탄두 2개 ③5kt 핵탄두 5~12개 20kt 핵탄두 2개 참고로 국제핵물질위원회는 북한이

5개미만의 핵탄두를 보유하고 있는 것으로 추정했다80)

나 북한의 기술수준이 중급인 경우

북한이 보유 가능한 핵탄두의 파괴력을 5kt 10kt 및 20kt로 가정했을 때 중급기술 수


같다 중급기술 수준의 경우 5kt 10kt 및 20kt 핵탄두를 만드는데 필요한 플루토늄의 양


lt표 4gt 중급기술 수준의 북한이 보유 가능한 플루토늄 핵탄두(2012년 10월 현재)



(개)

13 ~ 23 11 ~ 20 9 ~ 17

8 ~ 18 2 2

8 ~ 19 4

6 ~ 15 4

7 ~ 18 4

80) International Panel on Fissile Materials Global Fissile Material Report 2009 A Path to Nuclear Disarmament p 9

79-----



13~23개 11~20개 9~17개를 보유할 수 있다 세 가지 핵탄두를 골고루 갖는다고 가정할

경우 가능한 보유형태의 하나는 5kt 핵탄두를 8~18개 10kt과 20kt 핵탄두를 각각 2개씩

보유하는 것이다 세 가지 핵탄두 가운데 두 가지만 보유한다고 가정하면 다음과 같은 보유

상황이 가능하다 ①5kt 핵탄두 8~19개 10kt 핵탄두 4개 ②10kt 핵탄두 6~15개 20kt

핵탄두 4개 ③5kt 핵탄두 7~18개 20kt 핵탄두 4개

3 HEU 생산능력

북한이 2010년 11월 영변의 원심분리기 시설을 공개하기 전에는 북한의 HEU 생산 능

력이 플루토늄에 비해 훨씬 작고 생산된 양도 많지 않을 것이라는 것이 일반적인 추측이었

다 하지만 2010년 가을 이후 국제사회는 북한의 HEU 능력을 보다 심각하게 받아들이기

시작했다 우라늄 농축에 대해 북한이 표명한 입장과 2010년 이후 북한의 능력에 대해 새

로이 공개된 정보와 자료를 정리하면 다음과 같다81)

북한의 우라늄농축 프로그램의 역사는 1990년대 초로 거슬러 올라간다 1993년 3월

12일 북한의 NPT 탈퇴선언에 놀란 클린턴 행정부가 휴전협정 체결 이후 미국 외교정책의

핵심요소였던 lsquo북미 직접대화 불가rsquo 입장을 바꿔 핵문제 해결을 위한 북미 직접 협상이

한창 진행중일때 북한은 이미 핵무기의 또 다른 원료인 고농축우라늄을 확보하려는 움직

임을 시작했다 플루토늄을 생산하는 영변의 핵활동 차단을 목표로 하는 북미 협상이 타

결될 경우에 대비해서 새로운 핵무기 개발 루트를 확보하려 한 것이다82)

2002년 10월 켈리 동아태차관보가 부시 대통령의 특사 자격으로 평양을 방문해서 우

라늄농축 문제를 제기하자 강석주가 ldquo그 보다 더 한 것도 가지게 되어 있다rdquo면서 사실상 농

축우라늄 프로그램의 존재를 시인한 바 있다 강석주의 lsquo사실상 시인 발언rsquo에도 불구하고

북한정권은 우라늄농축 프로그램의 존재 자체를 부인해왔다 우라늄농축에 관련된 시설

도 장비도 인력도 없다는 것이 북한 당국의 일관된 입장이었다 한미일 등은 6자회담

에서 합의된 신고의 대상에 우라늄농축 프로그램이 포함되어야 한다는 입장이었지만 북

한은 한사코 그 존재를 부인하며 신고를 거부했다

81) 2009년까지 공개된 자료와 정보에 대해서는 다음 보고서를 참조하기 바란다 전성훈「북한의 WMD 위협 평가와 우리의 대응」 pp 42sim55

82) 북한이 우라늄농축 프로그램을 공개한 의도와 배경에 대해서는 다음을 참조하기 바한다 전성훈 ldquo북한의 우라늄 농축시설 공개 의도와 대응방안rdquo ｢북한｣ 2011년 1월호 pp 95sim102

80-----


북한의 일관된 거부 입장이 바뀐 것은 2009년 4월 29일 외무성 대변인 성명이다 성명

은 제3차 장거리미사일 발사에 대한 대응으로 유엔안보리가 채택한 의장성명에 대해서

ldquo유엔안전보장리사회가 미국의 책동에 추종하여 주권국가의 자주권을 난폭하게 침해하고

도 모자라 이제는 우리 공화국의 최고이익인 나라와 민족의 안전을 직접 침해하는 길에 들

어섰다rdquo고 비판하면서 다음과 같이 선언했다83)

유엔안전보장이사회가 즉시 사죄하지 않는 경우 우리는 첫째로 공화국의 최고이익을 지

키기 위하여 부득불 추가적인 자위적조치들을 취하지 않을 수 없게 될 것이다 여기에는 핵

시험과 대륙간탄도미싸일발사시험들이 포함되게 될 것이다 둘째로 경수로발전소건설을

결정하고 그 첫 공정으로서 핵연료를 자체로 생산보장하기 위한 기술개발을 지체 없이 시작

할 것이다

유엔안보리가 3차 장거리미사일 발사를 비판하는 의장성명을 채택하자 북한은 이를 구

실로 치고 나오는 전략을 구사하면서 슬그머니 우라늄농축 프로그램을 공개하고 기정사실

화하기 시작한 것이다 lsquo핵무기를 만들 의사도 능력도 없다rsquo는 김일성의 유훈을 토대로 원자

력은 평화적으로만 이용하겠다는 입장이 2005년 2월 10일의 lsquo핵보유 선언rsquo으로 바뀐 뒤 미

국의 핵위협 때문에 핵을 가질 수밖에 없다고 주장했던 것과 유사한 대응방식이다 핵기술

개발 단계에서는 그 존재를 부인으로 일관하다가 개발이 완료되면 외부의 위협을 핑계로 핵

기술의 존재를 기정사실화하고 합리화하는 북한판 이중전략의 재판인 셈이다

제2차 핵실험에 대응해서 유엔안보리가 2009년 6월 13일 결의안 1874호를 채택하자

북한 외무성은 성명을 발표하고 다음과 같이 주장했다84)

조선민주주의인민공화국 외무성은 위임에 의하여 유엔안전보장리 사회 결의 1874호를

단호히 규탄배격하며 미국과의 전면대결이 시작된 현 단계에서 민족의 존엄과 나라의 자주

권을 지키기 위하여 다음과 같은 대응조치를 취한다는 것을 선언한다 첫째 새로 추출되는

플루토니움 전량을 무기화한다 현재 페연료봉은 총량의 3분의 1이상이 재처리되었다 둘

째 우라니움농축작업에 착수한다 자체의 경수로건설이 결정된데 따라 핵연료보장을 위한

우라니움농축 기술개발이 성과적으로 진행되어 시험단계에 들어섰다

2009년 9월 3일에는 유엔주재 북한대표가 유엔안보리 의장에게 안보리결의안 1874호

를 배격한다는 내용의 서한을 보내면서 ldquo페연료봉의 재처리가 마감단계에서 마무리되고

있으며 추출된 플루토니움이 무기화되고 있다 우라니움농축시험이 성공적으로 진행되어

결속단계에 들어섰다rdquo고 밝히기도 했다85)

83) ｢조선중앙방송｣ 2009년 4월 29일

84) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 6월 13일

81-----


2010년 들어서는 우라늄농축 프로그램의 존재를 합리화하기 위해서 경수로 건설과 우

라늄농축을 구체적으로 연계시키기 시작했다 4월 9일자 조선신보는 우라늄농축이 전력

증산을 위해 건설될 경수로를 위한 것이라면서 다음과 같이 주장했다86)

경수로건설을 위한 우라니움농축기술의 개발이다 전력증산은 경제부흥을 위한 중심

고리의 하나이며 조선은 작년 유엔안보리가 인공지구위성발사를 문제시한 직후에 이미

자체의 경수로발전소건설에 대하여 천명했었다 조선의 핵무기는 녕변 핵시설에서 나온

플루토니움을 원료로 만든 것이다 조선의 국산경수로건설은 종래의 비핵화협상에 새로

운 요소를 추가할 수 있다

북한은 2010년 11월 9~13일 방북했던 해커(Siegfried Hecker) 박사를 통해 그동안

존재 자체를 부인했던 우라늄농축 프로그램의 실체를 공개했다 2009년 4월 29일 유엔안

보리의 의장성명을 구실로 서서히 우라늄농축 프로그램의 존재를 암시하기 시작한 이래 1

년 반 정도 분위기를 조성한 다음 전격적으로 그 실체를 공개한 것이다 해커 박사가 11월 12

일 영변을 방문해서 2000 여개가 넘는 원심분리기가 가동되는 것을 목격했다는 장소는

5MWe 흑연감속로의 핵연료를 생산하던 핵연료제조공장이다 북한은 이 시설의 내부를 걷

어내고 원심분리기와 ldquo초현대식 통제실rdquo(ultra-modern control room)을 설치했다 북한

이 발전용량 25~30MWe 규모의 중소형 경수로를 건설한다는 사실도 공개하면서 완공에

몇 년은 걸릴 것이라는 해석까지 덧붙였다87) 해커 박사보다 일주일 앞선 11월 2~6일 영

변을 방문한 프리처드 소장도 북한이 100MWt 규모의 실험용 경수로를 지을 예정이라는

건설책임자의 말을 전하면서 영변단지 내 냉각탑이 있던 지역에 콘크리트를 붓고 철근을

세우는 기초공사가 진행중이라고 밝혔다88)

영변의 원심분리기 시설을 목격한 해커박사의 소감을 정리하면 아래와 같다89)

- 핵연료제조공장으로 쓰이던 건물에 두 개의 cascade에 설치된 최첨단 우라늄 원심

분리기 2000대와 초현대식 통제실을 보고 깜짝 놀람

- 현대식 원심분리기들이 완전히 가동중인 것을 목격함

85) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 9월 4일

86) ｢조선신보｣ 2010년 4월 9일

87) ｢동아일보｣ 2010년 11월 15일

88) ｢연합뉴스｣ 2010년 11월 17일 프리처드 소장이 밝힌 100MWt 규모는 열출력을 표시하는 것으로서 이 규모의 열출력이면 전기출력 25~30MWe에 해당한다

89) Siegfried Hecker ldquoWhat I Found in North Korea Pyongyangrsquos Plutonium is No Longer the Only Problemrdquo Foreign Affairs Snapshot (December 9 2010) httpwwwforeignaffairscomprint66970

82-----


- 원심분리기 시설의 정교함과 규모에 놀람

- 북한은 충분한 재료와 부품을 획득해서 원심분리기를 제작조립할 능력을 갖췄고 비

밀시설에서 가동한 후에 짧은 시간 안에 영변의 공개된 시설에 설치할 수 있었을 것임

- 북한 내 제3의 장소에 영변의 시설과 유사한 능력을 가진 HEU 생산시설이 존재할 가

능성이 매우 큼

- 북한이 핵물질이나 원심분리기술을 포함한 생산수단을 해외로 확산할 수 있다는 것이

북한의 핵능력 확대보다 더 큰 문제임

- 북한은 전력생산을 위한 시험용 경수로 건설을 전면에 내세우고 우라늄농축 프로그램

을 합리화하고 있음

- 북한 관리들은 이 우라늄 농축시설을 새로운 경수로의 연료로 사용될 저농축 우라늄을

생산하는 곳이며 우라늄 농축시설은 지난해 4월 설비 구축이 시작됐고 수일 전 완성

했다고 설명했음 북한 측은 이 시설들은 자체적인 설비와 능력으로 만들어져 운영되

고 있다고 밝힘

2009년 4월 미국 전문가들이 영변을 방문했을 때 없던 원심분리기 시설이 1년 반 만에

들어섰다는 것은 북한이 기존의 핵연료제조공장을 매우 신속하고 비밀스럽게 원심분리기

시설로 전환할 능력을 갖췄다는 것을 의미한다 또한 시설의 규모와 건설 속도를 감안할 때

외국의 지원이 있었을 가능성이 크다90) 제3의 장소에 존재하는 원심분리기 설비의 일부를

영변으로 옮겨왔거나 해당 설비를 기준으로 만들어졌을 가능성도 있다91) 북한과 현대적인

원심분리기 기술을 교류했을 가능성이 큰 나라는 이란이다 영변 원심분리기 시설의 통제실

설비는 외국에서 습득했을 것이며 현재 이란이 같은 종류의 설비를 사용하고 있는 것으로

알려지고 있다92)

90) David Sanger ldquoNorth Koreans Unveil Vast New Plant for Nuclear Userdquo New York Times November 20 2010

91) David Albright and Paul Brannan ldquoSatellite Image Shows Building Containing Centrifuges in North Koreardquo ISIS Report Institute for Science and International Security (November 21 2010) p 1

92) Ibid p 2

83-----


Ⅲ 북한의 3차 핵실험과 남북관계 전망93)

1 3차 핵실험 가능성

북한이 2013년 상반기까지 3차 핵실험을 실시할 가능성이 크다 북한정권은 2006년

10월 9일 첫 번째 실험을 실시했고 유엔안보리결의안 1718호가 가동 중인데도 불구하

고 2009년 5월 26일 2차 핵실험을 단행한 바 있다 국제사회의 만류와 경고는 아랑곳하

지 않고 오로지 정권의 명운을 걸고 핵을 손에 쥐기 위해 모험적인 무리수를 두어온 것이

다 2012년은 한국 미국 중국 러시아가 모두 정권교체 시기로서 동북아의 정세가 불안

정할 수 있는 안보적 취약기이기 때문에 북한 지도부는 이 틈을 놓치지 않을 것이다 2차

핵실험 이후 채택된 강력한 안보리결의안 1874호 역시 북한의 추가 핵실험 욕구를 저지

하지는 못할 것으로 보인다

북한이 3차 핵실험을 실시할 것이라는 징후도 계속 드러나고 있다 2010년 2월 2일 블

레어 DNI 국장은 연례위협평가보고서에서 북한의 1차 핵실험은 규모가 1kt도 안되는 부

분성공이지만 북한이 핵장치를 만들었다는 미국의 오랜 평가와 일치했고 수 kt의 파괴력

을 보여준 2차 핵실험은 2006년 때보다 더 성공적이었으며 3차 핵실험을 할 능력을 갖추

고 있다고 밝혔다94) 2010년 11월 16일 함경북도 길주군 풍계리 지하 핵실험장 주변에서

차량의 이동과 시설의 변화 등을 보여주는 모습과 갱도를 파면서 나온 토석류가 폭 12ｍ

에 걸쳐 쌓여있는 것도 확인되었다95) 2011년 들어서는 북한이 풍계리 핵실험장에서 여

러 개의 지하갱도를 추가로 굴착했고 추가 갱도는 500sim1000m 깊이의 L자 형 모양으

로 추정된다는 보도도 있었다96) 미국 브루킹스연구소의 조너선 폴락 연구원도 제10차

샹그릴라 대화에서 북한은 고농축우라늄 핵폭탄을 이용해 제3차 핵실험을 감행할 가능

성이 높으며 중국이나 미국은 이런 북한의 핵개발을 결코 저지하지 못할 것이고 북한은

절대 핵개발을 포기하지 않을 것이라고 밝힌 바 있다97) 2012년 초에는 우리 군 당국이

함경북도 풍계리 핵실험장 주변에서 새로운 남쪽 갱도 인근에 외부에서 반입한 토사를 관

측했고98) 4월 20일에는 일본 후지TV의 온라인 뉴스가 일본 정부관계자의 말을 인용해

93) 전성훈 ldquo북한의 제3차 핵실험과 국제정세남북관계 전망rdquo ｢정세와 정책｣ 세종연구소 2012년 5월호 pp 10~12

94) Dennis Blair Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 2 2010

95) ｢연합뉴스｣ 2010년 11월 17일

96) ｢동아일보｣ 2011년 2월 21일

97) ｢국민일보｣ 2011년 6월 7일

84-----


서 북한이 3차 핵실험 준비를 완료했다고 보도했다99)

2 3차 핵실험의 여파

북한이 3차 핵실험을 감행한다면 국내외적으로 엄청난 여파를 몰고 올 것으로 예상되

는데 적어도 다음과 같은 방향으로 의견이 모아질 것으로 보인다

첫째 북한 정권의 핵보유 의지가 최종 확인되는 것이다 3차 핵실험을 통해서 북한의

핵개발 의도에 대해서 그동안 존재했던 불확실성이 완전히 사라지고 더 나아가 대화를

통한 핵문제 해결이 가능하다는 희망이 좌절을 넘어서 절망으로 바뀌게 될 것이다 아울

러 북한 핵은 체제유지를 위한 대미 협상용이라는 인식도 사라지게 될 것이다 김정은 정

권의 핵보유 의지가 분명하게 확인된 만큼 추가 핵개발과 핵확산을 막는데 중점을 두고 실

제 핵폐기는 김정은 이후로 미루는 것이 현실적인 방안이라는 견해가 국제사회에서 확산

될 것이다 이와 동시에 김정은 정권교체를 통해서 북핵폐기를 신속하게 달성해야 한다

는 의견도 다시 부상할 것이다

둘째 지금까지 한미 양국이 추진해 온 대북정책이 실패한 것으로 입증될 것이다

1990년 이후 양국의 역대 정부가 견지해 온 대북정책의 기조 즉 북한이 원하는 정치경

제안보적 보상을 해주면 핵을 포기할 것이라는 전제가 잘못되었다는 사실이 확실하게

드러났기 때문이다 따라서 과거 정책에 반성을 토대로 새로운 대북정책의 틀과 방안을 모

색하기 위한 논의가 활성화될 것으로 전망될 것으로 전망된다 같은 맥락에서 지금까지의

대북정책이 북한의 나쁜 행동에 보상만 해왔다는 자성의 목소리가 높아지면서 앞으로는

이런 식의 구태에서 벗어나야 한다는 주장도 강력히 제기될 것이다

셋째 중국에 대한 의존과 기대가 사라질 것이다 6자회담의 주최국인 중국의 역할에 대

한 과도한 기대를 접고 한middot일middot호주middotEU 등 미국의 우방을 중심으로 대북제재를 강화하면서

중국 의존도에서 탈피하려는 움직임이 일어날 것이다 아울러 한middot미middot일 3국을 중심으로

ldquo미사일방어망rdquo(Missile Defense MD)을 강화해서 중국을 자극하고 이를 통해서 중국

으로 하여금 북한에 압력을 행사하도록 하는 등 보다 적극적인 대중국 압력조치도 강구될

수 있을 것이다

넷째 미국의 핵우산에 대한 불신이 더욱 높아질 것이다 2009년 2차 핵실험 이후에도

한국 사회에서는 명목상의 핵우산을 실질적으로 담보할 수 있는 구체적인 lsquo실행조치rsquo의

필요성이 제기된 바 있다 그러나 북한의 장거리미사일 능력이 개선되고 핵과 미사일의

98) ｢한국일보｣ 2012년 4월 9일

99) ｢서울신문｣ 2012년 4월 21일

85-----


결합이라는 최악의 시나리오의 실현 가능성이 높아지면서 핵우산에 대한 불신은 더욱 가

중될 것이다 미국이 과연 부산이나 서울을 보호하기 위해서 뉴욕이나 워싱턴을 희생할

수 있을까 하는 지극히 현실적인 문제에 대한 해답을 요구하는 것이다 기존의 핵우산 공

약이 북한의 핵실험을 막지 못했다는 비판이 높아지면서 선언적 차원의 핵우산을 구체적

으로 뒷받침할 수 있는 구체적이고 실질적 조치를 취해야 한다는 요구가 강해질 것이다

다섯째 전시작전권 전환 일정을 다시 연기하자는 요구가 등장할 것이다 2015년 12월

1일을 목표로 추진 중인 전시작전권 전환을 아예 유보하거나 그 시기를 더 연기해야 한다

는 의견이 확산될 것이다 양국 정상 간의 합의로 한 번 연기한 사안을 다시 연기하는 것은

나라의 위신을 훼손하는 처사라는 비판도 있을 수 있다 하지만 3차 핵실험이 성공적으로

단행되는 경우 한미 양국에서 전작권 전환에 대한 우려의 목소리가 높아질 것이다 아울

러 전작권 일정은 그대로 따르더라도 lsquo연합사 해체rsquo는 유보해야 한다는 주장이 제기될 수

도 있다

여섯째 한국 내에서 자체 핵무장을 하거나 주한미군의 전술핵을 한시적으로 들여와야 한

다는 주장이 광범위하게 확산될 것이다 즉 북한의 3차 핵실험과 미국의 핵우산에 대한 불

신이 한국의 자체 핵무장 논의에 불을 지필 것이고 ldquo북한 핵에 맞대응하기 위해서는 우리도

핵을 가질 수밖에 없다rdquo는 논리 하에 자체 핵무장을 해야 한다는 여론이 거세어질 것이다

반면에 자체 핵무장은 전체적인 국익을 고려할 때 바람직한 대안이 될 수 없다고 판단하는

측에서는 1991년 철수했던 주한미군의 전술핵을 한시적으로 다시 반입해야 한다는 주장을

펼칠 것이다 다시 말해서 전작권 전환시점인 2015년 12월까지 북핵폐기 협상이 타결되지

않으면 주한미군의 전술핵을 한시적으로 재반입해서 북한 핵에 대한 대응수단으로 구축하

자는 주장이 강력한 설득력을 갖게 될 것이다

3 남북관계 전망

북한이 국제사회의 만류에도 불구하고 4월 13일 평안북도 동창리 미사일발사기지에서

장거리미사일을 발사했다 이번 발사는 1998년 이후 네 번째 장거리미사일로서 한반도

와 동북아의 안전은 물론 세계평화를 위협하는 중대한 도발이다 아울러 유엔안보리결의

안 1718호와 1874호의 명백한 위반이며 지난 2월 29일 미북 합의에도 배치되는 것이

다 북한은 우주의 평화적 이용은 주권국가의 합법적 권리이므로 부당한 이중기준을 적용

해서 자기들의 위성발사를 문제 삼지 말라고 주장하지만 국제사회는 북한에 대해 군사용

미사일은 물론 위성발사용 로켓까지 강력하게 반대하고 있다

이명박 정부에 대한 북한 당국의 부정적인 인식을 고려할 때 남한의 차기정부가 출범

86-----


하기 전까지 남북관계에 어떤 돌파구가 마련될 것으로 보이지는 않는다 오히려 북한은

장거리미사일 발사와 더불어 추가 핵실험으로 긴장을 고조시키면서 남한 선거에 개입해

서 자기들의 입맛에 맞는 정치세력이 등장하도록 노력할 것이다

지난 2년 동안 한반도에서 발생한 가장 큰 사건은 역시 김정일의 사망이다 37년간 현

대사에서 유례를 찾기 어려운 철권통치를 해온 김정일의 사망은 그 자체로 역사적인 사건

이다 특히 통일을 달성해야 하는 우리의 입장에서 볼 때 그의 사망은 한반도 통일과정의

문을 여는 단초이자 북한 내부에서 급격한 현상변경을 야기할 수 있는 촉매제이다 즉 우리

에게 통일을 달성할 수 있는 절호의 기회가 온 셈이다 동아시아의 핵질서 역시 장기적으로

북한의 변화 내지는 한반도의 통일 과정에 의해 크게 영향을 받게 될 것이다

김정일의 사망은 주변4강을 포함한 동북아와 국제사회의 큰 도전이기도 하다 625

전쟁 이후 한반도를 지배했던 분단구조의 해체를 가져오는 기폭제가 될 수 있기 때문이다

따라서 주변국들도 김정일 사후의 한반도를 예의 주시하고 있다

김정일 사망을 계기로 정부는 통일과정을 우리 주도로 추진하기 위한 범정부차원의 준

비태세를 갖춰야 한다 정부의 국정철학은 평화통일에 토대를 두어야 하며 모든 주요정

책도 그 지향점을 평화통일에 맞춰야 한다 정부의 정책 입안과 집행 행위 자체가 lsquo한국주

도에 의한 한반도 평화통일rsquo이란 철학과 신념으로 무장하고 전개되어야 한다 이를 위해

한반도 통일의 불가피성과 남한주도 통일의 당위성을 대내외적으로 널리 홍보하고 통일

한국이 지향하는 가치middot목표middot비전을 명확하게 제시하면서 한반도 통일에 대한 국내외적인

담론을 정부가 주도해나갈 수 있는 체계와 역량을 갖춰야 한다 lsquo비핵화된 통일한국rsquo이 우

리가 지향하는 목표이다

89-----


국문초록

동북아시아의 지역 에너지 협력

동북아 국가들에게 에너지의 안정적인

수급은 국가적 안정과 직결된 문제이다

그들중 한중일 3국은 화석에너지 확보를

위해 해외에서 에너지원을 직접 개발하

는 사업을 다른 어떤 국가보다 활발하게

벌이고 있고 후쿠시마 사고가 나기 전의

일본까지 포함해서 원자력발전의 대대적

인 확대를 추진해왔다 그러나 lsquo자주개발rsquo

이라는 이름의 에너지원 직접개발은 국가

간의 경쟁 갈등 분쟁을 낳는다 원자력

발전의 확대는 lsquo자주개발rsquo보다 더 크게 동

북아의 안정과 평화를 위협한다 원자력

의 지속적인 확대는 필연적으로 원전 연

료를 안정적으로 확보하기 위해서라는 명

목으로 사용후 핵연료의 재처리로 나아

가게 만들고 재처리를 통해 플루토늄을

확보할 수 있게 된 국가는 마음만 먹으면

핵무기를 제조할 수 있는 잠재적 핵무기 보

유국이 되기 때문이다 일본은 오래 전부

터 재처리를 하고 있고 곧 한국이 가세하

면 동북아는 2개의 핵보유국과 2개의 잠재

적 핵보유국으로 이루어진 위험 지역이

될 것이다 원자력발전의 확대는 후쿠시

마 원전사고와 같은 대형사고의 위험으로

높임으로써 동북아의 안정을 위협한다

그러므로 동북아의 에너지 협력은 원자력

과 화석연료로부터 벗어나려는 노력 대

안적 에너지시스템의 추구를 통해서만 성

사될 수 있다 기후파괴를 일으키지 않으

면서도 동북아의 평화로운 공존에 기여하

는 에너지원을 개발하고 사용할 때 진정한

협력이 이루어질 수 있는 것이다 북한의

핵포기도 마찬가지로 중유나 경수로의 지

원이 아니라 태양광 풍력 수력발전의 지

원을 통해서 끌어내는 것이 올바른 방향

이 될 것이다

90-----


Abstract

Regional Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia

The stable supply of energy is direct connected with the national stability of North-east Asian countries South Korea China and Japan in particular are actively conducting projects overseas to secure fossil fuels for energy production and before the Fukushima incident Japan even promoted the large-scale expansion of nuclear energy development However the direct exploitation of energy resources under the name of ldquoself-sufficient developmentrdquo causes competition conflict and disputes among countries The expansion of nuclear energy development in particular threatens the stability and peace of Northeast Asia more so than ldquoself-sufficient develop-mentrdquo This is because the ongoing expansion of nuclear energy leads countries to reprocess spent nuclear fuel under the pretext of their need to maintain a steady supply of nuclear fuel and those countries that obtain pluto-nium through reprocessing gain the potential to possess nuclear weapons if they so wish Japan has been conducting reprocessing ac-tivities for some time now and if South Korea

is added to the list Northeast Asia will be-come a dangerous region home to two nuclear powers and two other countries with the po-tential to arm themselves with nuclear wea-pons Furthermore the expansion of nuclear energy development threatens the stability of Northeast Asia because it raises the dan-ger of more large-scale incidents like the Fukushima incident to occur Consequently energy cooperation in Northeast Asia will only be feasible if efforts are begun to move away from nuclear energy and fossil fuels and pursue other forms of energy production Genuine cooperation can occur with the de-velopment and use of energy sources that have both a minimal effect on climate change and contribute to peaceful coexistence among Northeast Asian countries Therefore along with North Korean abandonment of its nu-clear program efforts need to be taken to move away from energy production based on crude oil and heavy water and move to-ward energy sources like sun power wind power and hydroelectric power

91-----


Concerning energy demand and supply the circumstances in Northeast Asian region is very unique Compared to any other region of the world itrsquos energy demand has been rapidly growing it highly depends on fossil energy and except China it imports most of energy from abroad In the case of South Korea its energy self-sufficiency is only 3 and imported energy accounts for 97 Even with nuclear power considered as semi- domestic energy source the rate is less than 20 Japan is no difference Its energy self- sufficiency in 2010 was about 16 when considered nuclear power whose imported fuel ratio is very low as its own source The rate would be almost mere 4 in 2012 when almost all nuclear power plants were closed

Compared to South Korea and Japan China is much better at least in terms of energy self-sufficiencymdashits imported energy accounts for less than 10 of the total energy con-sumption Nonetheless China is the worldrsquos second largest oil importermdashin 2010 for example it imported about 5 million bbl of crude oil a day By 2030 Chinarsquos oil consumption will have increased twice as much as in 2010 Its domestic oil production will be decreased so oil import will be increased much more than oil consumption increase North Korearsquos status of energy supply and demand is so much deteriorated that it defies any comparison with other northeast Asian countries After the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991 energy supply for North Korea has so reduced that it could threaten the very survival of the society

Given these circumstances it would be only too natural that securing energy supply gained very high importance in Northeast Asian countries The task of energy supply and demand is considered as a matter of national security in Northeast Asia where conflicts and disputes instead of cooperation and coexistence have been more persistent than any other places in the world However any attempt to ensure national security through establishing stable energy supply with conventional energy like oil coal and nuclear may trigger a struggle over limited fossil energy resources on earth and thus aggravating ironically such conflicts and disputes which in turn lead to even more unstable national security The three countries in the region are more committed than other nations in their effort to directly develop foreign energy sources in order to secure fossil energy resources South Korea under the name of ldquoself developmentrdquo has been very active in exploring

92-----


energy sources and securing its share in any regions where energy resources are abundant Public or large commercial companies work with business projects to secure energy sources not just in the disputed areas in the Middle East and Africa but even in infamously au-tocratic nations Thanks to this effort the self developed fossil fuel ratio climbed to 14 in 2011 and it should become about 30 in 2030

China is very eager to secure petroleum even creating conflicts which is clearly shown in Chinarsquos involvement in the South-North Sudanese disputes Japan was the first among the trio that initiated ldquoself developmentrdquo and it has achieved in 2010 26 of self developed fossil energy supply ratio Japan set doubling this ratio until 2030 as its goal In self developing fossil energy there is no cooperation between the three countries only harsh competition prevails

Korea announced in 2008 to enhance the nuclear electricity share among total ele-ctricity generation from 34 in 2006 to 59 the project that even more seriously threatens the regional stability and peace than ldquoautonomous developmentrdquo is the expansion of nu-clear power generation in Northeast Asia

To enhance energy self-sufficiency the Northeast Asian countries has been vig-orously expanding nuclear power However increased use in nuclear power inevitably necessitates nuclear spent fuel reprocessingmdashunder the pretext of stable fuel supply for nuclear power plants Once obtained plutonium through the reprocessing the country will be a potential nuclear weapon state that is capable of manufacturing nuclear bombs if needed Any neighboring country that possesses nuclear weapons in stockpile or is suspected to manufacture nuclear arms would trigger a sensitive battle of nerves con-flicting each other

North Korea seems to be the most adventurous country that has engaged in securing energy resources in Northeast Asia In the early 1990s North Korea built a small graphite- moderated reactor as an excuse that it needs more electricity in order to take up ever- insufficient electricity And the international community considered it as a pre-stage to develop nuclear arms Consequently conflicts between the US and North Korea and South and North Korea were created and a negotiation process was initiated to diffuse the conflicts At the negotiation table North Korea demanded to construct a large-scale

93-----


pressurized light water reactor (PWR) and to supply heavy fuel oil until the completion of the reactor in return for abandoning its graphite reactor and attempt to develop nuclear weapons The US accepted it and then the deal was made

However the US and South Korea did not implement the agreement that they would construct a PWR for North Korea and hand it over in 10 years Under the pretext of this North Korea re-commissioned the small nuclear reactor and extracted plutonium that eventually enabled Pyongyang to produce nuclear weapons North Korearsquos such move may be interpreted as a calculated tactic to maintain its regime However North Korearsquos audacious movemdasheven threatening to develop nuclear arms in order to secure energy resourcesmdashclearly shows how desperately the regime needs energy to sustain the society

For most Northeast Asian countries expanding nuclear power is one of the top pri-ority projects to achieve stable energy supply Before the 2011 Fukushima nuclear reactor accidents Japan had mapped out a strategy to enhance its energy self-sufficiency by raising the ratio of nuclear power in the electricity from 29 to 53 by 2030 Since 1977 Japan had been reprocessing nuclear spent fuel and extracting plutonium It had also carried out a project to develop a fast-breeder reactor that uses plutonium as its fuel

Due to Fukushima reactor accident and strong demand of nuclear phasing out among people Japan seems to have discarded its nuclear power expansion plan Yet un-daunted South Korea and China are still pursuing construction of more nuclear power plants South Korea plans to double the 2010 nuclear power capacity by 2030 and to have nuclear electricity generation to take up 59 of total electricity or 28 of primary energy If things go as planned the nationrsquos energy self-sufficiency will be raised to 30 As in the case of Japan South Korea also plans to re-process spent fuel to ensure a stable supply of fuel for light water nuclear reactors and to prepare plutonium indispensable to fast- breeder reactors True it requires Washingtonrsquos consent for Seoul to reprocess but the South Korean government presses the US to amend the nuclear energy contract between the US and South Korea which expires in 2014

China has been working on diversifying its power generation plants to meet the nationrsquos sharply increasing electricity demand Among them nuclear power plants draw

94-----


its most acute attention Chinarsquos nuclear power generation began back in 1991 and over the past two decades a total of 16 reactors were built Currently 26 sets of reactors are on construction Yet nuclear power generation takes up less than 2 of the nationrsquos total electricity output However nuclear power generation according to the Chinese gov-ernment will be increased to 3 by 2015 and further up to 5 by 2020 Thatrsquos why the government is so eager to push forward with constructing nuclear power plants including some 50 sets of nuclear reactors that are currently in preparation to be built With these reactors completed China will have nearly 100 sets of reactors to generate electricity As in the case of South Korea or Japan China too announced in early 2011 that it will reproc-ess spent fuel to secure a stable nuclear fuel supply

As referred earlier reprocessing procedure of spent fuel produces plutonium and thus enabling to build nuclear weapons Japan began the reprocessing procedure long ago and it now possesses more than 40 tons of plutonium With this amount about 500 nuclear warheads can be manufactured South Korea can obtain more than 100 tons of plutoniummdashan equivalent of over 10000 nuclear warheads if it reprocesses 13000 tons of spent fuel that has been stored at the local nuclear power plants Now if the US agrees with South Korea to reprocess spent fuel it means that among four Northeast Asian countries two are nuclear weapon states and the rest two are potential nuclear weapon states

The proliferation of nuclear power increases the risk of Fukushima-like disaster Such an accident could damage not only the country it originated but entire Northeast Asia All the Chinese nuclear plants are located on the eastern part of mainland China and its southern coast In case of any nuclear accident breaks out in China radioactive ma-terials are carried over to the Korean Peninsula and Japan Again any such accident in South Korea means serious radioactive damage onto Japan In addition to these direct impact indirect damages through agricultural and fishery products or even with processed foods are also feared to take place

Energy self-sufficiency that is pursued by the Northeast Asian countries through the proliferation of nuclear power and ldquoself developmentrdquo of fossil fuels could hardly to energy cooperation On the contrary ldquoautonomous developmentrdquo for petroleum or natural

95-----


gas will create international disputes and eventually the burning of fossil fuels ends up in destroying the ecosystem of our planet earth

The regional energy cooperation in Northeast Asia can only be established when people develop and use energy resources that do not cause international conflicts and do not exacerbate climate change but can contribute a peaceful coexistence in Northeast Asia Such energy resources include solar energy wind power geothermal power and other renewable energy sources These energy sources do not create any inter-country disputes in the process of development Rather they make cooperation all the more inevitable

After Fukushima there have been a number of very active movements among Japanese citizens that urge a policy turnabout to such a direction IT business entrepreneur Masayoshi Son has made himself busy in the business to manufacture a solar power generation complex belt that will be linked to cover the entire Japanmdashinstead of nuclear power generation Local autonomous governments in the eastern Japan and on the northwestern Japanese coastal areas have declared to participate in the project Masayoshi Son further pro-posed to construct a super-grid in East Asia It is an electric power grid with renewable energy sources that connects Japan the Korean Peninsula China Mongolia and other Asian countries

For the successful establishment of the East Asian Super-grid and of peaceful and stable energy supply through renewable energy sources it seems that the inter-governmental cooperation will be indispensable In the case of Japan its natural energy resources such as solar power wind power hydropower and geothermal power are relatively abundant But according to Son these natural sources alone will not be sufficient to meet electricity demand that varies every minute and every second The conditions in South Korea could be even worse than those in Japan In calculation with solar power plants that have cov-erage of 25 of the whole land surface self-sufficient power supply is possible However unless it could exchange electric power with other countries it would become extremely difficult to achieve energy self-sufficiency by using renewable energy resources And here could become the super-grid that connects from Japan to the Korean Peninsula and to Gobi desert in outer Mongolia a rescue Once such a massive power grid is con-

96-----


structed electric power exchange among partner regions will be made easy and a heavy fluctuation in power demand in a short time span at one region does not affect the power supply system as a whole Japanrsquos evening means a sunny afternoon in Mongolia Hence Japanrsquos surge in power demand during evening hours can be addressed with Mongolian electric power generated at a solar power plant and transmitted via the super-grid

When it agreed to offer a PWR and heavy oil in exchange of North Korearsquos aban-doning its nuclear programmdashthe very cause of the dispute the failure was almost inevitable because it attempted to solve the nuclear issue with the same nuclear power If it had agreed to supply solar power plants and wind power plants with as much cost as it needed for a PWR instead North Korea could probably have produced within shorter times than ten years necessary electricity without further outside energy aids and without further bul-lying the international community That in turn would have made it much easier for North Korea to take open-up policy and to cooperate with its neighbors and even it would have been possible for the regime to truly scrap the nuclear ambition once and for good Un-fortunately the Northeast Asian countries as well as the US obsessed with old-fashioned ideology that grasping fossil fuels and nuclear power can only guarantee energy securitymdashno better than the attitude of North Korea blew the golden opportunity to bring a lasting cooperation in Northeast Asia

99-----


국문초록

후쿠시마 사태 이후 독일 에너지 공급 시스템의 변화-현황

함의 및 전망

독일은 EU의 2050년까지의 목표인 온실

가스 배출물을 80-95 감소하여 1990년도

기준으로 내리도록 하고 늦어도 2022년도

까지 핵 에너지를 단계적으로 폐지하기로

결정하고 이행하고 있는 유일한 산업발전국

가이다

이는 재생가능한 에너지 에너지 절약 에

너지 효율성 등이 2050년의 목표를 달성하

기 위한 핵심임을 시사한다 그러나 독일에

게는 더욱 중요한 핵심과제가 있다 독일 에

너지 생산의 약 20를 차지했던 원자력 에

너지를 대체할 방안을 2022년까지 찾아야

만 한다는 것이다 본고는 지난 15년간 독일

정부 의 이러한 정책과 정책의 발전 그리고

원자력발전 폐지 정책 등에 대하여 논의한

다 또한 ldquoEnergiewenderdquo 라고 일컬어 지

는 독일의 에너지 변화 정책 을 세밀하게 논

의하고 2050 년 에너지 시스템을 달성하기

위한 이행과정에서 발생할 수 있는 문제점

등을 토론한다

끝으로 한반도에서 에너지 공급 시스템을

발전시키기 위한 세부적인 방안에 대해 검

토한다

100-----


Abstract

Germanyrsquos Transformation of the Energy Supply System after Fukushima

- Current Status Implications and Future Prospects

Germany is the only highly industri-alized nation which has dared not only to work seriously on the implementation of the European Union objective for 2050 ie to bring greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions down to 80-95 below 1990 levels It has also de-cided to phase out nuclear energy until 2022 at the latest This means that renewable en-ergies energy saving and energy efficiency are the key drivers to reach the target by 2050 but more than that Germany must compen-sate around 20 of its electricity production - based so far on nuclear energy - by the year

2022 This paper describes the origin and the development of this policy as well as the phasing-out policy of the various German governments in the last 1 frac12 decades It names the goals of the German transformation policy (the so-called ldquoEnergiewenderdquo) in detail and also discusses possible implementation obs-tacles on the road to the energy system in 2050 Finally the paper offers some cautious deliberations as to the approach to develop a modern energy supply system for the Korean peninsula

101-----


1 Introduction

This Conference deals with important questions concerning the future living together of the people on the Korean peninsula In this context one aspect is the security of the energy supply for the population and the economy The southern part of the peninsula has a solid energy system while the North not only seems to lack energy but also appears to have a very instable supply system According to an analysis by David von Hippel Peter Hayes in 2010 for an IFES Conference North Korearsquos energy demand completely broke down after 1990 and has not recovered yet Moreover the DPRK still strives for an electricity production based on nuclear power This threatens the South since nuclear energy might also be used for military purposes

In Germany we donrsquot suffer such a military threat since the breakdown of the socialist system in Eastern Europe more than 20 years ago However the structures of energy supply and electricity production are quite different in EU member states as well These differences make it difficult eg to find a joint solution how to fight global warm-ing which is absolutely necessary after the Kyoto Protocol is running out

My contribution to todayrsquos conference deals with the German energy policy as it has developed since about 15years During this period the German government was formed by very different coalitions - after Chancellor Kohlrsquos time German citizens voted for redgreen (Social DemocratsEnvironmental Party - SPDBuumlndnis 90-Die Gruumlnen -) in 1998 and 2002 later on in 2005 for a ldquogreat coalitionrdquo (Christian DemocratsSocial Democrats - CDUSPD -) and then in 2009 for a coalition of Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party - CDUFDP - Of course each government followed its own energy policy but we have found common basic attitudes regarding the need for a transform-ation of our energy system

Mainly I would like to discuss the perspectives of this transformation policy which has been called Energiewende - a high flying and popular German term - since springtime last year when the Fukushima catastrophe took place This means that we talk about the expectations regarding such an energy turnaround but also about the stumbling blocks that might happen to be on the road to the year 2050 when - according to the road map - we have done everything at least with respect to the energy system to cope with climate

102-----


change Perhaps the presentation of the German deliberations and decisions concerning

energy policy is of particular interest because for the first time a big and economically strong global player country is attempting to restructure its energy system within 4 decades in the electricity generation as well as in the use of energy

This restructuring process is founded on two important political decisions the one decision is the phasing-out of the nuclear-based electricity production in Germany The other decision concerns the forced extension of renewable energies which means that on the long run fossil primary energies like oil coal and natural gas shall be restricted to a relatively unimportant share These fossil energies shall be replaced by renewables In line with this replacement the political focus is on energy saving strategies and on the permanent increase of energy efficiency in all relevant sectors (like mobility or heating)

In the meantime both political decisions are widely accepted Of course there is scepticism as well whether such policy may be too costly for the consumer and whether the implemen-tation may do harm to the German economy if the steps planned are a unilateral national action instead of a combined global or EU-approach

2 The Roots of the New German Energy Policy

If Energiewende means a decisive change of direction the discussion leads back to a political debate around the year 2000 when the Kyoto Protocol was ratified by enough nations to take action for a common approach against climate change and green-house gas emissions At the same time in Germany the coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party came into power which had postulated the end of nuclear energy use since the catastrophe of Tschernobyl in 1986

This coalition now was able to limit nuclear electricity production in Germany In the year 2000 the Federal government worked out an agreement with the ldquoBig Fourrdquo ie the utilities running nuclear power plants on a phase-out of the 19 existing power stations This agreement was based on fixing a theoretical amount of electricity gener-

103-----


ation which each power station could reach within 32 years Ironically this agreement was called nuclear consensus though the power plant owners as well as the opposition (CDU FDP) in the German Bundestag fought fiercely against it The phase-out deal became law in the year 2002

At the same time the implementation of the Kyoto targets were highly discussed not so much on the national level but on the European level In this context renewable energies which had been of marginal importance in Germany so far reached a new sig-nificance They received massive financial support when the Renewable Energy Act 2000 set up the feed-in tariff system At the same time heavy discussions took place about the European Unionrsquos Emissions Trading Directive because the owners of coal- fired power plants - the most important companies owned nuclear power plants as well - were very much afraid that the emissions certificate trading system would be too costly in a competitive electricity market Moreover the companies came under pressure by the liberalization of the European energy market

Thus the big power companies were affected threefold by the new German- European policy

- They lost the nuclear perspective- Their market position as provider of coal-based electricity was influenced by

the emissions trading scheme - They had to act in a liberalized market in energy generation trade distribution

even to a certain extent in transmission

3 Elements and Framing Conditions of the ldquoEnergiewenderdquo

Based on this development of the new energy policy since the turn of the millenium we can state three decisive elements

- A critical discussion on the usage of nuclear energy for the German electricity production (31)

- An increasing integration of the national energy policy into the energy and

104-----


climate protection policy of the European Union (32) - A forced rerouting in the use of energy sources via regulation and funding (33)

31 The Nuclear Power Policy in Germany

After the nuclear exit was initiated in 2002 when the ldquoAtomkonsensrdquo was put into law the practical processing started According to the initial operation date of the 19 existing power plants it was expected that their generation period would end between 2010 and 2022 unless individual power plants were closed down earlier and the potential generation amount was transferred to another power plant

When in 2005 the ldquoGreat Coalitionrdquo with Chancellor Angela Merkel came into power nothing changed because the Social Democrats were not ready to give up their phasing-out policy So until 2009 we had a ldquoDonrsquot touch the subjectrdquo-policy because there was no majority for a re-turn

When in 2009 the new conservative-liberal Government under Angela Merkels leadership came into power this was the opportunity for such a roll-back policy Never-theless the government decided not to go back to the initial status of the Atomic Law but simply prolonged the time period for running nuclear power plants Of the remaining 17 power stations the 7 older ones received 8 more years and the 10 younger ones were allowed to run 14 more years So instead of phasing out between 2010 until 2022 the power plants could run at least until 2019 and 2036 at the latest This prolongation was justified by a different definition of potential electricity generation of each power station

Nevertheless nuclear power was expressively named a transition technology (ldquoBruumlckentechnologierdquo) which factually excluded the construction of new nuclear power stations also because of possible harsh citizen protests

The opportunity to use nuclear power longer was legally enacted at the end of 2010 However granting this business opportunity was not free of charge for the oper-ating companies They rather were supposed to pay a large amount of money into a special Energy and Climate Fund - EKFG- annually resulting from the additional profits due to the prolongation More than that a new nuclear fuel tax was ldquoinventedrdquo So the con-sumption of the nuclear primary energy - uranium and plutonium - was taxed for the

105-----


first time in Germany Thus the granted runningtime extension for nuclear power plants was closely

connected with the goal of a longterm transformation of the German energy supply system Another advantage for the government was that it could not only generate add-itional money but also additional time to replace around 25 of the German nuclear (CO2-emissions-free) electricity production Critics however complained that this decision caused a time delay in the process of building up dezentralized power gener-ation structures

Just three months later immediately after the Fukushima catastrophe on March 11 2011 the Federal government changed its nuclear policy drastically As immediate action the govern-ment forced the operators to accept a three-months moratorium for the power generation of the 7 oldest power plants The next decision was that these power plants were shut down ultimately and they are off the grid since summer 2011 The third government decision was that the remaining 9 younger stations are supposed to phase out between 2015 and 2022 The governmental decision-making process was accom-panied by recommendations of a reactor safety commission and an ethics commission

Due to this new policy change the power companies could not be forced to con-tribute to the recently established Energy and Climate Fund because their payment was closely related to use nuclear power longer than before However the government sticks to the nuclear fuel tax which also was established at the end of 2010 This claim is not accepted by the three remaining nuclear power operators and is presently under judicial review of the German Supreme Court

32 The Increasing Influence of the EU Energy and Climate Protection Policy on the National Policy

The EU and among its member states above all Germany have proved to be the drivers to a consistent global climate protection policy Already in the year 2000 the EU Commission had laid down a European Climate Change Programme which should help to implement the Kyoto Protocol obligations and initiated the discussion on a European Emissions Trading Scheme

106-----


The Emissions Trading Directive was enacted late in 2003 In its first stage the member states could test the system voluntarily In the meantime participation is man-datory for all member states and the relevant industries

Decisive for the following energy policy also in the member states was the Com-missionrsquos presentation of the so-called ldquo1 Energy Packagerdquo titled ldquoAn Energy Policy for Europerdquoin January 2007 which was published together with a Communication titled ldquoLimiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius - The way ahead for 2020 and beyondrdquo This was the moment when energy policy factually was subordinated to the climate protection targets

On the European level the package set the targets ldquo20-20-20-10 in 2020rdquo which means Until the year 2020 the EU must reach a 20 reduction of GHG emissions a 20 -share of renewable energies in the energy mix a 20-reduction in the consumption of primary energies by raising energy efficiency and an increase of biofuels to a 10- share

One year later in January 2008 a ldquo2 Energy Packagerdquo followed dealing with an extension of the Emissions Trading system with the CCS-technology and also with a suggestion which share of renewables each member state should contribute to the overall European goal

In 2010 and 2011 further directives and communication papers followed such as the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (Mai 2010) the Communication ldquoA Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050rdquo (March 2011) and the Communication ldquoThe Energy Road Map 2050rdquo Based on the analysis of a set of scenarios (decarboni-zation paths) the document describes the consequences of a carbon free energy system and the policy framework needed This should allow member states to make the required energy choices and create a stable business climate for private investment especially until 2030 The EU Commission so far leaves it up to the member states which decarbonization path they would like to follow concentrating on energy efficiency renewable energies nuclear energy or CCS-technology

33 The German Policy to Actively Transform the Energy System by Means

107-----


of Regulation and Financial Support

In general Germany has supported the EU approach in its climate protection pol-icy and thus the ldquoGerman wayrdquo is in line with the EU policy Germany is more or less a frontrunner among the big industrial member states in finding the right path of decarbonization

In summer 2007 ie a few months after the publication of the 1 Energy Package the German government at that time formed by the Great Coalition formulated the key points of an Integrated Energie- and Climate Protection Programme which is known in Germany as the ldquoMeseberger Beschluumlsserdquo These key points deal almost exclusively with energy And though since 2009 the Federal government is constituted by the conser-vatives and liberals the Meseberger Beschluumlsse remained the basis for the ambitious Energy Concept of September 2010 This concept was revised after Fukushima (because of the different approach towards nuclear energy) and published in June 2011 as a key point paper for the transformation of the energy system

According to this paper the goals of Germanyrsquos energy and climate policy are the following

Climate-damaging greenhouse gas emissions are to be reduced by 40 by 2020 55 by 2030 70 by 2040 and by 80 to 95 by 2050 compared to reference year 1990

Primary energy consumption is to fall by 20 by 2020 and by 50 by 2050 Energy productivity is to rise by 21 per year compared to final energy

consumption Electricity consumption is to fall by 10 by 2020 and by 25 by 2050 compared

to 2008 Compared to 2008 heat demand in buildings is to be reduced by 20 by 2020

while primary energy demand is to fall by 80 by 2050 Renewable energies are to achieve an 18 share of gross final energy con-

sumption by 2020 a 30 share by 2030 45 by 2040 and 60 by 2050 By 2020 renewables are to have a share of at least 35 in gross electricity

consumption a 50 share by 2030 65 by 2040 and 80 by 2050

108-----


It is obvious that according to this concept energy policy has to follow the targets and presettings of the climate protection policy The reduction of GHG emissions has absolute priority The very ambitious goals mentioned above shall be reached by a bunch of activities in different energy-relevant sectors

The central component of the energy supply of the future will be the rapid expansion of renewable energies This calls for optimised coordination of conventional power plants with electricity generation from renewables (market and system integration)

The concept says that renewable energies can make a growing contribution to the security of supply By speeding up grid expansion improving market and system inte-gration and increasing the use of storage facilities it is planned to gradually bring renewable electricity production more in line with demand

There are several amendments to the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) The basic principles of the EEG among them the feed-in tariff system are retained thus creating planning and investment security The amended EEG improves tariffs that are currently inadequate for example those for offshore wind power hdyropower and geothermal energy At the same time excessive support (eg for PV) and windfall profits are restricted

Central concept component is the wind energy According to the relevant scenarios in 2050 wind power will contribute more than 40 to the power generation

A specific ldquoOffshore Wind Power Programmerdquo supports the establishment of the first 10 offshore wind farms with a total of 5 billion euros in order to gain valuable ex-perience in the field A huge cost reduction potential is expected

Amending construction planning legislation shall improve the options for ex-changing old wind installations with new more efficient turbines (repowering)

The designation of suitable sites is particularly important for onshore wind energy The German government will cooperate closely with the Laumlnder on this issue Also general ldquorigidrdquo limitations on proximity and height of wind turbines are to be replaced with national criteria developed jointly by the Federal government and the Laumlnder

Electricitv grid expansion is of central importance for the expansion of renewable energies The amendment to the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) has

109-----


created the first mandatory and coordinated grid expansion plan for the main electricity transmission grids and long-distance gas lines (10-year grid development plans) The aim of such plans is to facilitate the necessary level of grid expansion and raise public acceptance for line construction through comprehensive consultations with stakeholders

With the Grid Expansion Acceleration Act (Netzausbaubeschleunigungsgesetz NABEG) the German government has created the conditions for swifter expansion in particular of elec-tricity transmission grids which essentially deliver the wind-generated electricity of the North to the consumption centres of the South The public is ensured broad participation rights from an early stage

The connection of offshore wind farms to the grid has been made easier by allowing cluster connections to be used instead of costly individual connections

The incentive regulation allows municipalities to agree financial compensation with grid operators for long-distance power lines running through their territory

The concept puts another focus on smart grids and storage facilities since they are vital for the expansion and system integration of renewable energies Developing and using new storage technologies shall help to stabilise fluctuating energy generation from renewable energies According to the Energy Industry Act (EnWG) new storage facilities are exempt from the usual grid charges

The concept also suggests the restructuring of the fossil power plant park The large coal and gas-fired power stations are still needed in a transition period but no longer than that Around 2030 these power plants may produce only 20 of the electricity needed

On the other hand the German government is setting up a new funding programme for power plants to promote the necessary construction of highly efficient and flexible power plants run by smaller providers This shall help improve supply security and meet the climate protection targets A special focus is on the combined heat and power tech-nology (CHP)

The energy concept of the German government keeps energy efficient buildings in focus If we look at the energy consumption we can easily find out that the heating and hot water sector is rather essential for saving energy and the use of renewables as well

110-----


So in the building sector economic incentives and the requirements of energy saving legislation will remain key elements of the strategy Ambitious standards aim to raise effi-ciency in buildings In particular the Energy Saving Ordinance (EnEV) stipulates that from 2012 to 2020 standards for new buildings are to be gradually brought into line with the future European standards for nearly zero-energy buildings as long as this is economically accep-table based on a balanced consideration of the burdens for owners and tenants From 2012 to 2014 funding for the CO2 Building Rehabiliation Programme will be raised to 15 billion euros per year (2011 close to 1 billion euros)

The landmark decisions on energy policy provide the frame for restructuring the German energy supply until 2050 The German government will monitor this process annually to ensure that the energy policy goals of supply security economic efficiency and environmental compatibility are met without the decision to phase-out nuclear power being called into question

4 Present Transformation Status Success and Implementation Problems

41 Nuclear Phase-out

If we look at the first main pillar of the ldquoEnergiewenderdquo - the nuclear abandonment - we can summarize that there is a large consensus among political parties and the population that the steps taken by the German Government are acceptable and - what is more important - irreversable

This is reality notwithstanding the fact that a catastrophe as it happened in Japan - earth-quake plus Tsunami - is absolutely unlikely in Germany Maybe terrorists are willing and able to attack nuclear power stations maybe an airplane crash might happen and destroy a power station These threats are wellknown risks since a long time but have not been the justification for the faster phase-out so far

Under the impression of Fukushima the government has made a radical decision not a deci-sion into a completely new direction but a decision to speed up the exit

The nuclear power companies have accepted that they cannot act in this field

111-----


against political will Of course they have to put forward their legal claims where they believe property oder other economic rights are affected or expropriated or disowned and they do this

There is a general public consensus to give up nuclear energy production Never-theless there are uncertainties as to the question how more than 20 domestic electricity generation from nuclear power stations can be replaced by other primary energies until 2022 The Federal government claims that the replacement can happen by coal and gas-fired power stations combined with the extension of electricity production from renewables plus energy savings due to an increase of energy efficiency Maybe this compensation works Nevertheless the Federal Net Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) has revealed weak spots in the electricity supply in wintertime and suggested that one or two nuclear power stations should form a cold stand-by reserve At any rate it seems to be counterproductive if the electricity production compensation came from nuclear power stations in neighbouring countries like France Switzerland or the Czech Republic

42 Restructuring the Energy System

The Federal government follows a broad approach to reach the goals of its energy policy As shown above the actions to be taken are in the field of electricity generation in the heating and building sector as well as in the mobility sector

We have made enormous progress in the electricity generation based on renewables The Fe-deral government is convinced that Germany will achieve a 20 share of gross final energy consumption by 2020 easily because the renewablesrsquo share of the electricity production has already reached 20 in 2012 Just recently on September 14 electricity production based on wind and solar for the first time reached more than 45 of the total power plant capacity in Germany

Some corrections have been made as to the PV-feed-in tariff which turned out to be too costly for the consumer and the economy This caused various public debates The solar industry believes that the new aid system will have a negative effect on the industry itself because not so many PV-collectors will be installed by private persons any more apart from the effect that the price for solar modules has gone down due to

112-----


Chinese competitors who are booming the global PV-market Consumers argue that the highly electricity-intensive industry like the aluminum in-dustry should be included in the burdensharing of the feed-in costs So the Federal Government is confronted with the problem of adjusting the PV-aid system in a way that does a minimum of harm to the consumer as well as to the economy

In contrast to the PV development in the offshore wind business we have to state some delay in the implementation of planned activities The offshore electricity produc-tion is expected to develop the most important increase among the renewables The governmentrsquos energy concept has set a goal of 10000 MW offshore power capacity for 2020 and 25000 MW until 2030 So far however there is only one German offshore wind park with a capacity of 60 MW active Offshore wind power production is a lot more advanced in Great Britain or Denmark Nevertheless quite a number of German wind parks are authorized by the German authorities so that we can expect a fast develop-ment for the future

Generally speaking the offshore power production had to cope with more diffi-culties than expected At first the windparks had technical installation problems Bigger problems arose from the net connection between the windparks and the onshore grid It obviously is difficult to find investors who take the liability risk when there are connection delays The Federal government has recently recognized this problem and decided that the consumers have to bear part of the economic damage costs which are caused when an existing windpark has no opportunity to feed its electricity production into the grid This liability regulation is accom-panied with a binding offshore net extension plan

Possibly the most difficult problem to enlarge electricity generation from renew-ables is the expansion of the German transmission grid As mentioned before this grid expansion is necessary to safeguard electricity distribution from thousands of small dezentralized power stations There are four transmission system operating companies which are responsible for the actual net extention They have recently published their options to expand the net which are under public discussion now It is clear however that the transmission net has be exten-ded from existing 1900km to 7900km within

113-----


the next decade This is a difficult process because many citizens donrsquot like power lines which

run nearby their homes They claim value losses for their houses and property or they are afraid of electricity smog or other inconveniences by power poles in the direct neigh-borhood That is why the government wants an extended public discussion on the precise route of wires on the possibilities to plan underground cable etc Thus the government wants to induce and reach a broad public consent

Another difficulty is that in a market economy private companies - such as the transmission system operators - look at their return-on-investment when they plan an investment like the grid extension The government might come into a situation that building the precise route which is publicly accepted is more expensive than another possible but less accepted route So who garantees for a reasonable RoI

A very recent government initiative of september 2012 says that citizens - above all those who are affected by grid extensions - may invest in the project themselves receiving a fixed return rate of 5 guaranteed by the government Thus the government says 15 of the total investment capital needed could be generated

Another important field of action is the building and heating sector This is an area where energy saving can play an important part via an increase of energy efficiency and where renewables can be used (solar for hot water production geothermal power for heat pump systems etc) The potential is enormous especially with regard to older buildings but the implementation is difficult because of legal questions

It is relatively easy for the government to prescribe energy saving standards for new buildings eg no installation of an electric heating system unless the heating source comes from renewables For older buildings regulation of an energetic modernization is more compli-cated Prescribed energy saving activities are acceptable for the landlord if he can allocate such costs at least partly to his tenants They enjoy the effect of modernization by paying less for heating or hot water energy This cost allocation trans-fer should be regulated by law If the government prefers not to change the law it may help setting incentives via financial aid pronotgrammes for the building owners or specific tax reductions So far these questions are still unanswered

114-----


On the EU level in September the European Parliament has passed the Energy Efficiency Directive which sets the framing conditions for a 20-increase of energy efficiency until 2020 On average the energy consumption of the consumers shall de-crease annually by 15 This law has to be put into force by the member states within 18 months via their own natio-nal legislation

In this directive it is said that the energy utilities mainly the distributors are responsible for the fulfillment of the annual energy saving aim This will be an interesting legal question in the future whether energy suppliers can be made responsible for the energy saving progress of their customers

Another area which is in the energy saving focus in an industrialized country is the fuel for vehicles It is clear that we all need unlimited mobility Public transportation is not able to reach every spot in the country Of course there should be incentives to use the public transportation system whereever this is feasible But we need as well motor engines using energy saving technology Gasoline will become more expensive Experts see the mobility future in fuel cell cars or electrically powered cars The Federal Goverment has set the target for 1 Million e-cars in 2020 The German automobile in-dustry however has serious doubts that this target can be met without public funding for electric auto buyers This is under discussion now but not decided yet

5 Prospects for a Successful Achievement in Germany

What are the prospects for Germanyrsquos forced energy transformation policy I believe that the aims to be reached - be it the year 2020 or even the year 2050 - are very ambitious I think it is absolutely correct to design a short term mid term and long term time corridor since energy policy needs to be reliable durable and solid The provision of energy is most fundamental for each citizen and each market economy So there must be a consensus about the long term policy in this field

It is maybe relatively simple to reach this public consensus if we talk about the year 2050 when future generations will have to explain to society why a specific way

115-----


of reaching a goal has not been successful Future generations can always argue that it has not been their decision which was made in the year 2012 So what is needed is a very serious and accurate monitoring on the road Dates facts and figures are indis-pensable not just political statements

In Germany the Federal government has decided to do this monitoring each year The monitors will soon find out what the weak spots of the longterm energy planning are

To identify these weak spots we need parameters In my opinion the most important parameter is the degree of public consensus The higher the degree of consensus among people and politicians is the more probable is the success of the action to be taken So carried over to the German energy policy it is relatively clear that the nuclear electricity production in Germany will be terminated by or around the year 2022 as planned ndash

unless there will be any absolutely outstanding barrier such as economic desasters not just a crisis

This general public consensus seems to exist too for a fast switch to an electricity production on the basis of renewables At least the majority of Parlamentarians believes in this How-ever in these days discussions arose when it was published that in 2013 the feed-in system will cost the consumer more than 5 euroct which is 50 more than the cost burden in 2012 So far this is still a discussion about the definition of energy intensive industries which should be exempted However within a few years the wind in public opinion may change when the cost burden continues to grow

Another parameter is how dependent on or how independent from the European energy policy the German ldquoway to energy happinessrdquo can be The European institutions are happy with the Germans as long as they are frontrunners in trying to achieve European goals But does it make sense to close down nuclear power plants in Germany as soon as possible because of safety reasons if other member states follow a sometimes dia-metrically opposite nuclear policy 15EU member states run 68 nuclear power plants consisting of 134 reactors Three additional EU countries have decided to build new nuclear power plants Among the big industrial nations only Germany is phasing out

Another example for the EU energy policy dominance How long can we afford the differences in supporting renewable energies in the various member states Do we

116-----


need a coordinated support system In Germany a discussion about this has started in the European Commission as well

The political choice between funding or regulation or better regulation including funding or regulation without financial incentives can be regarded a crucial point as well Examples in the building and mobility sector show that simply enacting and enforcing the law may not be sufficient to receive positive results in energy saving ac-tivities Sometimes people need (financial) incentives to follow the political will If it is the target that in 2020 1 Million electri-city- driven cars will run on Germanyrsquos roads but the price for the cars is not competitive the consumer will not buy such a car So the government has to think about intelligent funding for the producer or for the potential buyer

Finally an important parameter may be the stability of friendly international relations to potential cooperation partners Egon the basis of scenarios the Federal gov-ernment has come to the conclusion that on the long run Germany will have to import electricity from renewables to a substantial extent Having phased out nuclear power and fossil power within the next decades it does not make sense that imported electricity comes from these sources let us say from coal-fired power plants in Poland or nuclear power plants in France An alternative may be the import of sun power from North Africa Many experts and companies work on the DESERTEC project The big question is however whether such theoretically absolutely convincing solution can safely be im-plemented having in mind the recent political developments in North Africa and in the Islamic world

The above-mentioned list of possible weak spots is not exclusive There may be other stumble stones To name them does not mean that the political approach is wrong It shall simply draw attention so that corrections can be made on time

6 Elements of Transferability to a Future Korean Peninsula Energy Policy

Are any of the energy experiences we have made in Germany - presently or in the past - transferable to the Korean Peninsula We all know that there is an enormous gap

117-----


between the South Korean and North Korean energy situation - as to energy security and safety of power installations as to the standard of climate protection as to competi-tiveness of the system So as a German I was reminded very much of the state of energy supply which we had to start out with when Germany was reunited in 19891990

I know that quite a number of experts and scientists in South Korea and in other parts of the western world continously do in-depth research work on the energy situation in the North They have stated that it makes sense to develop and discuss a basic plan to solve the energy crisis in the DPRK Please allow me a few annotations in this context - not more than that - what energy cooperation on the peninsula might take into account I would like to limit and derive my deliberations from the topics in this paper

I have learned that the DPRKrsquos power generation is almost totally based on (residential) coal and hydro power Hydro power covers more than half of the capacity used The installed capacities seem to be sufficient but they cannot be used because of a bunch of circumstances such as outdated technology lack of repair materials flooding of coal mines no foreign support etc North Korea still wants to produce electricity from nuclear power and the govern-ment plans the installation of 5200MW nuclear capacity by the year 2020

1 Keeping all this in mind I believe that North Korearsquos energy system cannot be rescued without substantial foreign support (from South Korea United Nations other nations) The country does not have sufficient human resources nor suffi-cient knowhow nor sufficient means

2 It is urgent to install interconnections between the electricity supply systems of the South and the North so that transmission of electricity is secured (at least on a minimum level) when the power supply system in the North will be restructured

3 Though the most important target must be to secure the needed minimum supply of electricity for the DPRK population and the economy it makes sense to ob-serve climate protection as well This means that the hydro power plants should be modernized with priority

118-----


4 It makes sense to install small and medium-sized modern coal-fired power plants - if possible combined heat and power (CHP) technology - immediately This technology facilitates district heating and thus avoids using residential coal directly for heating purposes

5 CHP technology also will help to avoid the further deforestation in the North for heating purposes

6 The efficient use of coal for the power production makes the restructering and modernization of residential coal mines - also for safety reasons - indispensable

7 It cannot be discussed if it makes sense to finish the construction of the existing nuclear light water project This depends on the technology used and the develop-ment status To build a completely new nuclear power plant will be too expen-sive for the economy of a developing country like the DPRK Early installation of interconnections between the South and the North will help to avoid such project

8 Other renewables besides hydro DPRK has coast areas It may be suitable to establish offshore windparks This will afford international support but it may be an interesting project under the CDM regime of the Kyoto Protocol This may be true for onshore wind power projects as well

9 Whether biomass (which renewable resources as basis) is an option is difficult to say It depends on the agricultural and forest conditions

10 Natural gas and LNG may be used for electricity generation and produce less GHG than coal However these primary energies have to be imported

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PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 000000 000000 000000 000000 ] PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 000000 000000 000000 000000 ] PDFXOutputIntentProfile () PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () PDFXOutputCondition () PDFXRegistryName () PDFXTrapped False CreateJDFFile false Description ltlt ARA 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 CHS ltFEFF4f7f75288fd94e9b8bbe5b9a521b5efa7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065876863900275284e8e9ad88d2891cf76845370524d53705237300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c676562535f00521b5efa768400200050004400460020658768633002gt CHT ltFEFF4f7f752890194e9b8a2d7f6e5efa7acb7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065874ef69069752865bc9ad854c18cea76845370524d5370523786557406300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c4f86958b555f5df25efa7acb76840020005000440046002065874ef63002gt CZE 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 DAN ltFEFF004200720075006700200069006e0064007300740069006c006c0069006e006700650072006e0065002000740069006c0020006100740020006f007000720065007400740065002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002d0064006f006b0075006d0065006e007400650072002c0020006400650072002000620065006400730074002000650067006e006500720020007300690067002000740069006c002000700072006500700072006500730073002d007500640073006b007200690076006e0069006e00670020006100660020006800f8006a0020006b00760061006c0069007400650074002e0020004400650020006f007000720065007400740065006400650020005000440046002d0064006f006b0075006d0065006e0074006500720020006b0061006e002000e50062006e00650073002000690020004100630072006f00620061007400200065006c006c006500720020004100630072006f006200610074002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020006f00670020006e0079006500720065002egt DEU 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 ESP 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 ETI 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 FRA 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 GRE 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 HEB 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 HRV (Za stvaranje Adobe PDF dokumenata najpogodnijih za visokokvalitetni ispis prije tiskanja koristite ove postavke Stvoreni PDF dokumenti mogu se otvoriti Acrobat i Adobe Reader 50 i kasnijim verzijama) HUN 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 ITA 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 JPN ltFEFF9ad854c18cea306a30d730ea30d730ec30b951fa529b7528002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020658766f8306e4f5c6210306b4f7f75283057307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a30674f5c62103055308c305f0020005000440046002030d530a130a430eb306f3001004100630072006f0062006100740020304a30883073002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee5964d3067958b304f30533068304c3067304d307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a306b306f30d530a930f330c8306e57cb30818fbc307f304c5fc59808306730593002gt KOR ltFEFFc7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020ace0d488c9c80020c2dcd5d80020c778c1c4c5d00020ac00c7a50020c801d569d55c002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020c791c131d569b2c8b2e4002e0020c774b807ac8c0020c791c131b41c00200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002egt LTH 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 LVI 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 NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken die zijn geoptimaliseerd voor prepress-afdrukken van hoge kwaliteit De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 50 en hoger) NOR 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 POL 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 PTB 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 RUM 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 RUS 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 SKY ltFEFF0054006900650074006f0020006e006100730074006100760065006e0069006100200070006f0075017e0069007400650020006e00610020007600790074007600e100720061006e0069006500200064006f006b0075006d0065006e0074006f0076002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002c0020006b0074006f007200e90020007300610020006e0061006a006c0065007001610069006500200068006f0064006900610020006e00610020006b00760061006c00690074006e00fa00200074006c0061010d00200061002000700072006500700072006500730073002e00200056007900740076006f00720065006e00e900200064006f006b0075006d0065006e007400790020005000440046002000620075006400650020006d006f017e006e00e90020006f00740076006f00720069016500200076002000700072006f006700720061006d006f006300680020004100630072006f00620061007400200061002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e0030002000610020006e006f0076016100ed00630068002egt SLV 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 SUO 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 TUR 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 UKR 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 ENU (Use these settings to create Adobe PDF documents best suited for high-quality prepress printing Created PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Adobe Reader 50 and later) gtgt Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (10) ] OtherNamespaces [ ltlt AsReaderSpreads false CropImagesToFrames true ErrorControl WarnAndContinue FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false IncludeGuidesGrids false IncludeNonPrinting false IncludeSlug false Namespace [ (Adobe) (InDesign) (40) ] OmitPlacedBitmaps false OmitPlacedEPS false OmitPlacedPDF false SimulateOverprint Legacy gtgt ltlt AddBleedMarks false AddColorBars false AddCropMarks false AddPageInfo false AddRegMarks false ConvertColors ConvertToCMYK DestinationProfileName () DestinationProfileSelector DocumentCMYK Downsample16BitImages true FlattenerPreset ltlt PresetSelector MediumResolution gtgt FormElements false GenerateStructure false IncludeBookmarks false IncludeHyperlinks false IncludeInteractive false IncludeLayers false IncludeProfiles false MultimediaHandling UseObjectSettings Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (20) ] PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector DocumentCMYK 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CHAIRS

Hochul LEE is a Professor of China and International Studies at Department of Political Science University of Incheon He is also Director of the Universityrsquos Institute of China Studies (ICS) He teaches courses on Chinese politics and foreign affairs and on East Asian international rela-tions He served for the University as Dean of College of Social Sciences and Dean of Student Affairs Dr Lee is the President-elect of the Korean Association of International Studies (KAIS) He also serves the Ministry of National Reunification as Advisor He served the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative as an Advisor on Foreign and National Security Affairs Dr Lee has completed a number of research papers on Chinese politics and East Asian affairs including ldquoChina in North Korean Nuclear Crises lsquoInterestrsquo and lsquoIdentityrsquo in Foreign Behaviorrdquo Journal of Contemporary China (2013) ldquoChinarsquos Rise and East Asian Securityrdquo in New Dynamics in East Asian Politics (Continuum International 2012) ldquoChinarsquos Foreign Policy-Making in post- Cold War East Asiardquo in Regionalism Economic Integration and Security in Asia (Edward Elgar 2011) ldquoPolitical Institutionalization as Political Devel-opment in Chinardquo Journal of Contemporary China (2010) ldquoReforming Chinarsquos State-Owned Commercial Banks A lsquoDouble Gamersquo between lsquoMarketrsquo and lsquoPlanrsquordquo(2006) and so on He visited Peking University in Beijing and Fudan University in Shanghai several times as visiting pro-fessor to conduct researches Dr Lee earned his BA from Seoul National University (1981) and his MA and PhD in political science at Rutgers University (1993) in New Brunswick NJ USA During his graduate studies at Rutgers he worked as Research Assistant at the Center for Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies (1989-1993) and was awarded the Walter C Russell Scholarship (1988-1992) Dr Lee resides in Bundang Sungnam City Gyeonggi-do Korea

Kyung-Jin BOO is a Visiting Professor at Seoul National University College of Engineeringrsquos Technology Management Economics and Policy Program (TEMEP) Prior to this position Dr Boo had been a researcher at a government sponsored institute Korea Energy Economic Institute (KEEI) for over 30 years and had served as the head of New amp Renewable Energy Div-ision from 2002 to 2008 He was also a formal member of the Advisory Group to the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy (MKE) and Korean Representative for the ISO Strategic Advisory Group on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Sources (SAGE) Dr Boo received his BS in Mining and Petroleum Engineering and MBA in International Business at Seoul National University and PhD at the University of Delaware in Public Economics and Policy

PRESENTERS







DISCUSSANTS







Opening Remarks











Thank you

Welcoming Remarks













Keynote Speech


Introduction





Fukushima Accident





























Concluding remarks




References











CONTENTS















5-----


국문초록



















조가 필요하다

6-----


Abstract




7-----


I Introduction






8-----







9-----







10-----









11-----








12-----







13-----











14-----


a Economy








15-----


been pitiable 21)


1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-43 -44 04 38 12 18 21 38 -10 -12 31 -09 -05 08(93) (89) (88) (40) (72) (28) (46) (40) (52) (51) (23) (03) (63) (36)


Korea July 9 2012







16-----









17-----










18-----







19-----










20-----








21-----


c Society








22-----





Some Observations





23-----











24-----








25-----









26-----







27-----









28-----









29-----






30-----








33-----


국문초록












을 논의한다

34-----


Abstract




35-----


36-----


37-----


38-----


39-----


40-----


41-----


42-----


43-----


44-----


45-----


46-----


47-----


48-----


49-----


50-----


51-----


52-----


53-----


54-----


55-----


56-----


57-----


58-----


59-----


60-----


61-----


62-----


63-----


64-----


69-----


국문초록
























2006년 10월과 2009년 5월 두 차례의 핵실

험을 단행했다










을 것이다













70-----


Abstract









71-----































72-----











Country Driver



















73-----



























74-----















75-----







IRT-2000 원자로 2~4

2010년11월

2000개의 첨단




추정

제1기

(1983~199410)와

제2기

(1997~ 20029)에



실시

내폭형 핵탄두

설계제조

2006년 10월 9일





1kt 추정


제2차 핵실험


2~4 kt








2007년 9월 6일



5MWe원자로

19861~19894

5~85

1989 여름~ 19944

175~27

20032~20053

8~12

20056~20077

8~12


405~635


(추정) -25~4


(추정)-25~4







가능









76-----




























77-----


















79) Ibid

78-----





(개)

8 ~ 15 7 ~ 12 5 ~ 10

5 ~ 12 1 1

6 ~ 12 2

4 ~ 9 2

5 ~ 12 2
















(개)

13 ~ 23 11 ~ 20 9 ~ 17

8 ~ 18 2 2

8 ~ 19 4

6 ~ 15 4

7 ~ 18 4


79-----








3 HEU 생산능력





















80-----











할 것이다




















83) ｢조선중앙방송｣ 2009년 4월 29일

84) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 6월 13일

81-----


























85) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 9월 4일

86) ｢조선신보｣ 2010년 4월 9일

87) ｢동아일보｣ 2010년 11월 15일



82-----

























92) Ibid p 2

83-----




























95) ｢연합뉴스｣ 2010년 11월 17일

96) ｢동아일보｣ 2011년 2월 21일

97) ｢국민일보｣ 2011년 6월 7일

84-----






























98) ｢한국일보｣ 2012년 4월 9일

99) ｢서울신문｣ 2012년 4월 21일

85-----













도 있다



















86-----






















89-----


국문초록





































이 될 것이다

90-----


Abstract




91-----





92-----







93-----







94-----






95-----






96-----




99-----


국문초록


함의 및 전망






가이다














등을 토론한다



토한다

100-----


Abstract





101-----


1 Introduction





102-----









103-----












104-----









105-----








106-----








107-----













108-----











109-----










110-----










111-----








112-----






113-----








114-----








115-----









116-----








117-----








118-----









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 DAN 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 DEU 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 ESP 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 ETI 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 FRA ltFEFF005500740069006c006900730065007a00200063006500730020006f007000740069006f006e00730020006100660069006e00200064006500200063007200e900650072002000640065007300200064006f00630075006d0065006e00740073002000410064006f00620065002000500044004600200070006f0075007200200075006e00650020007100750061006c0069007400e90020006400270069006d007000720065007300730069006f006e00200070007200e9007000720065007300730065002e0020004c0065007300200064006f00630075006d0065006e00740073002000500044004600200063007200e900e90073002000700065007500760065006e0074002000ea0074007200650020006f007500760065007200740073002000640061006e00730020004100630072006f006200610074002c002000610069006e00730069002000710075002700410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e0030002000650074002000760065007200730069006f006e007300200075006c007400e90072006900650075007200650073002egt GRE 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 HEB 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 HRV (Za stvaranje Adobe PDF dokumenata najpogodnijih za visokokvalitetni ispis prije tiskanja koristite ove postavke Stvoreni PDF dokumenti mogu se otvoriti Acrobat i Adobe Reader 50 i kasnijim verzijama) HUN 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 ITA 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 JPN ltFEFF9ad854c18cea306a30d730ea30d730ec30b951fa529b7528002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020658766f8306e4f5c6210306b4f7f75283057307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a30674f5c62103055308c305f0020005000440046002030d530a130a430eb306f3001004100630072006f0062006100740020304a30883073002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee5964d3067958b304f30533068304c3067304d307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a306b306f30d530a930f330c8306e57cb30818fbc307f304c5fc59808306730593002gt KOR ltFEFFc7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020ace0d488c9c80020c2dcd5d80020c778c1c4c5d00020ac00c7a50020c801d569d55c002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020c791c131d569b2c8b2e4002e0020c774b807ac8c0020c791c131b41c00200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002egt LTH 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 LVI 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 NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken die zijn geoptimaliseerd voor prepress-afdrukken van hoge kwaliteit De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 50 en hoger) NOR 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 POL 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 PTB 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 RUM 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 RUS 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 SKY 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 SLV 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 SUO 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 SVE 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 TUR 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 UKR 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 ENU (Use these settings to create Adobe PDF documents best suited for high-quality prepress printing Created PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Adobe Reader 50 and later) gtgt Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (10) ] OtherNamespaces [ ltlt AsReaderSpreads false CropImagesToFrames true ErrorControl WarnAndContinue FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false IncludeGuidesGrids false IncludeNonPrinting false IncludeSlug false Namespace [ (Adobe) (InDesign) (40) ] OmitPlacedBitmaps false OmitPlacedEPS false OmitPlacedPDF false SimulateOverprint Legacy gtgt ltlt AddBleedMarks false AddColorBars false AddCropMarks false AddPageInfo false AddRegMarks false ConvertColors ConvertToCMYK DestinationProfileName () DestinationProfileSelector DocumentCMYK Downsample16BitImages true FlattenerPreset ltlt PresetSelector MediumResolution gtgt FormElements false GenerateStructure false IncludeBookmarks false IncludeHyperlinks false IncludeInteractive false IncludeLayers false IncludeProfiles false MultimediaHandling UseObjectSettings Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (20) ] PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector DocumentCMYK PreserveEditing true UntaggedCMYKHandling LeaveUntagged UntaggedRGBHandling UseDocumentProfile UseDocumentBleed false gtgt ]gtgt setdistillerparamsltlt HWResolution [2400 2400] PageSize [612000 792000]gtgt setpagedevice

PRESENTERS







DISCUSSANTS







Opening Remarks











Thank you

Welcoming Remarks













Keynote Speech


Introduction





Fukushima Accident





























Concluding remarks




References











CONTENTS















5-----


국문초록



















조가 필요하다

6-----


Abstract




7-----


I Introduction






8-----







9-----







10-----









11-----








12-----







13-----











14-----


a Economy








15-----


been pitiable 21)


1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-43 -44 04 38 12 18 21 38 -10 -12 31 -09 -05 08(93) (89) (88) (40) (72) (28) (46) (40) (52) (51) (23) (03) (63) (36)


Korea July 9 2012







16-----









17-----










18-----







19-----










20-----








21-----


c Society








22-----





Some Observations





23-----











24-----








25-----









26-----







27-----









28-----









29-----






30-----








33-----


국문초록












을 논의한다

34-----


Abstract




35-----


36-----


37-----


38-----


39-----


40-----


41-----


42-----


43-----


44-----


45-----


46-----


47-----


48-----


49-----


50-----


51-----


52-----


53-----


54-----


55-----


56-----


57-----


58-----


59-----


60-----


61-----


62-----


63-----


64-----


69-----


국문초록
























2006년 10월과 2009년 5월 두 차례의 핵실

험을 단행했다










을 것이다













70-----


Abstract









71-----































72-----











Country Driver



















73-----



























74-----















75-----







IRT-2000 원자로 2~4

2010년11월

2000개의 첨단




추정

제1기

(1983~199410)와

제2기

(1997~ 20029)에



실시

내폭형 핵탄두

설계제조

2006년 10월 9일





1kt 추정


제2차 핵실험


2~4 kt








2007년 9월 6일



5MWe원자로

19861~19894

5~85

1989 여름~ 19944

175~27

20032~20053

8~12

20056~20077

8~12


405~635


(추정) -25~4


(추정)-25~4







가능









76-----




























77-----


















79) Ibid

78-----





(개)

8 ~ 15 7 ~ 12 5 ~ 10

5 ~ 12 1 1

6 ~ 12 2

4 ~ 9 2

5 ~ 12 2
















(개)

13 ~ 23 11 ~ 20 9 ~ 17

8 ~ 18 2 2

8 ~ 19 4

6 ~ 15 4

7 ~ 18 4


79-----








3 HEU 생산능력





















80-----











할 것이다




















83) ｢조선중앙방송｣ 2009년 4월 29일

84) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 6월 13일

81-----


























85) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 9월 4일

86) ｢조선신보｣ 2010년 4월 9일

87) ｢동아일보｣ 2010년 11월 15일



82-----

























92) Ibid p 2

83-----




























95) ｢연합뉴스｣ 2010년 11월 17일

96) ｢동아일보｣ 2011년 2월 21일

97) ｢국민일보｣ 2011년 6월 7일

84-----






























98) ｢한국일보｣ 2012년 4월 9일

99) ｢서울신문｣ 2012년 4월 21일

85-----













도 있다



















86-----






















89-----


국문초록





































이 될 것이다

90-----


Abstract




91-----





92-----







93-----







94-----






95-----






96-----




99-----


국문초록


함의 및 전망






가이다














등을 토론한다



토한다

100-----


Abstract





101-----


1 Introduction





102-----









103-----












104-----









105-----








106-----








107-----













108-----











109-----










110-----










111-----








112-----






113-----








114-----








115-----









116-----








117-----








118-----












DISCUSSANTS







Opening Remarks











Thank you

Welcoming Remarks













Keynote Speech


Introduction





Fukushima Accident





























Concluding remarks




References











CONTENTS















5-----


국문초록



















조가 필요하다

6-----


Abstract




7-----


I Introduction






8-----







9-----







10-----









11-----








12-----







13-----











14-----


a Economy








15-----


been pitiable 21)


1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-43 -44 04 38 12 18 21 38 -10 -12 31 -09 -05 08(93) (89) (88) (40) (72) (28) (46) (40) (52) (51) (23) (03) (63) (36)


Korea July 9 2012







16-----









17-----










18-----







19-----










20-----








21-----


c Society








22-----





Some Observations





23-----











24-----








25-----









26-----







27-----









28-----









29-----






30-----








33-----


국문초록












을 논의한다

34-----


Abstract




35-----


36-----


37-----


38-----


39-----


40-----


41-----


42-----


43-----


44-----


45-----


46-----


47-----


48-----


49-----


50-----


51-----


52-----


53-----


54-----


55-----


56-----


57-----


58-----


59-----


60-----


61-----


62-----


63-----


64-----


69-----


국문초록
























2006년 10월과 2009년 5월 두 차례의 핵실

험을 단행했다










을 것이다













70-----


Abstract









71-----































72-----











Country Driver



















73-----



























74-----















75-----







IRT-2000 원자로 2~4

2010년11월

2000개의 첨단




추정

제1기

(1983~199410)와

제2기

(1997~ 20029)에



실시

내폭형 핵탄두

설계제조

2006년 10월 9일





1kt 추정


제2차 핵실험


2~4 kt








2007년 9월 6일



5MWe원자로

19861~19894

5~85

1989 여름~ 19944

175~27

20032~20053

8~12

20056~20077

8~12


405~635


(추정) -25~4


(추정)-25~4







가능









76-----




























77-----


















79) Ibid

78-----





(개)

8 ~ 15 7 ~ 12 5 ~ 10

5 ~ 12 1 1

6 ~ 12 2

4 ~ 9 2

5 ~ 12 2
















(개)

13 ~ 23 11 ~ 20 9 ~ 17

8 ~ 18 2 2

8 ~ 19 4

6 ~ 15 4

7 ~ 18 4


79-----








3 HEU 생산능력





















80-----











할 것이다




















83) ｢조선중앙방송｣ 2009년 4월 29일

84) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 6월 13일

81-----


























85) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 9월 4일

86) ｢조선신보｣ 2010년 4월 9일

87) ｢동아일보｣ 2010년 11월 15일



82-----

























92) Ibid p 2

83-----




























95) ｢연합뉴스｣ 2010년 11월 17일

96) ｢동아일보｣ 2011년 2월 21일

97) ｢국민일보｣ 2011년 6월 7일

84-----






























98) ｢한국일보｣ 2012년 4월 9일

99) ｢서울신문｣ 2012년 4월 21일

85-----













도 있다



















86-----






















89-----


국문초록





































이 될 것이다

90-----


Abstract




91-----





92-----







93-----







94-----






95-----






96-----




99-----


국문초록


함의 및 전망






가이다














등을 토론한다



토한다

100-----


Abstract





101-----


1 Introduction





102-----









103-----












104-----









105-----








106-----








107-----













108-----











109-----










110-----










111-----








112-----






113-----








114-----








115-----









116-----








117-----








118-----













Opening Remarks











Thank you

Welcoming Remarks













Keynote Speech


Introduction





Fukushima Accident





























Concluding remarks




References











CONTENTS















5-----


국문초록



















조가 필요하다

6-----


Abstract




7-----


I Introduction






8-----







9-----







10-----









11-----








12-----







13-----











14-----


a Economy








15-----


been pitiable 21)


1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-43 -44 04 38 12 18 21 38 -10 -12 31 -09 -05 08(93) (89) (88) (40) (72) (28) (46) (40) (52) (51) (23) (03) (63) (36)


Korea July 9 2012







16-----









17-----










18-----







19-----










20-----








21-----


c Society








22-----





Some Observations





23-----











24-----








25-----









26-----







27-----









28-----









29-----






30-----








33-----


국문초록












을 논의한다

34-----


Abstract




35-----


36-----


37-----


38-----


39-----


40-----


41-----


42-----


43-----


44-----


45-----


46-----


47-----


48-----


49-----


50-----


51-----


52-----


53-----


54-----


55-----


56-----


57-----


58-----


59-----


60-----


61-----


62-----


63-----


64-----


69-----


국문초록
























2006년 10월과 2009년 5월 두 차례의 핵실

험을 단행했다










을 것이다













70-----


Abstract









71-----































72-----











Country Driver



















73-----



























74-----















75-----







IRT-2000 원자로 2~4

2010년11월

2000개의 첨단




추정

제1기

(1983~199410)와

제2기

(1997~ 20029)에



실시

내폭형 핵탄두

설계제조

2006년 10월 9일





1kt 추정


제2차 핵실험


2~4 kt








2007년 9월 6일



5MWe원자로

19861~19894

5~85

1989 여름~ 19944

175~27

20032~20053

8~12

20056~20077

8~12


405~635


(추정) -25~4


(추정)-25~4







가능









76-----




























77-----


















79) Ibid

78-----





(개)

8 ~ 15 7 ~ 12 5 ~ 10

5 ~ 12 1 1

6 ~ 12 2

4 ~ 9 2

5 ~ 12 2
















(개)

13 ~ 23 11 ~ 20 9 ~ 17

8 ~ 18 2 2

8 ~ 19 4

6 ~ 15 4

7 ~ 18 4


79-----








3 HEU 생산능력





















80-----











할 것이다




















83) ｢조선중앙방송｣ 2009년 4월 29일

84) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 6월 13일

81-----


























85) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 9월 4일

86) ｢조선신보｣ 2010년 4월 9일

87) ｢동아일보｣ 2010년 11월 15일



82-----

























92) Ibid p 2

83-----




























95) ｢연합뉴스｣ 2010년 11월 17일

96) ｢동아일보｣ 2011년 2월 21일

97) ｢국민일보｣ 2011년 6월 7일

84-----






























98) ｢한국일보｣ 2012년 4월 9일

99) ｢서울신문｣ 2012년 4월 21일

85-----













도 있다



















86-----






















89-----


국문초록





































이 될 것이다

90-----


Abstract




91-----





92-----







93-----







94-----






95-----






96-----




99-----


국문초록


함의 및 전망






가이다














등을 토론한다



토한다

100-----


Abstract





101-----


1 Introduction





102-----









103-----












104-----









105-----








106-----








107-----













108-----











109-----










110-----










111-----








112-----






113-----








114-----








115-----









116-----








117-----








118-----












Thank you

Welcoming Remarks













Keynote Speech


Introduction





Fukushima Accident





























Concluding remarks




References











CONTENTS















5-----


국문초록



















조가 필요하다

6-----


Abstract




7-----


I Introduction






8-----







9-----







10-----









11-----








12-----







13-----











14-----


a Economy








15-----


been pitiable 21)


1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-43 -44 04 38 12 18 21 38 -10 -12 31 -09 -05 08(93) (89) (88) (40) (72) (28) (46) (40) (52) (51) (23) (03) (63) (36)


Korea July 9 2012







16-----









17-----










18-----







19-----










20-----








21-----


c Society








22-----





Some Observations





23-----











24-----








25-----









26-----







27-----









28-----









29-----






30-----








33-----


국문초록












을 논의한다

34-----


Abstract




35-----


36-----


37-----


38-----


39-----


40-----


41-----


42-----


43-----


44-----


45-----


46-----


47-----


48-----


49-----


50-----


51-----


52-----


53-----


54-----


55-----


56-----


57-----


58-----


59-----


60-----


61-----


62-----


63-----


64-----


69-----


국문초록
























2006년 10월과 2009년 5월 두 차례의 핵실

험을 단행했다










을 것이다













70-----


Abstract









71-----































72-----











Country Driver



















73-----



























74-----















75-----







IRT-2000 원자로 2~4

2010년11월

2000개의 첨단




추정

제1기

(1983~199410)와

제2기

(1997~ 20029)에



실시

내폭형 핵탄두

설계제조

2006년 10월 9일





1kt 추정


제2차 핵실험


2~4 kt








2007년 9월 6일



5MWe원자로

19861~19894

5~85

1989 여름~ 19944

175~27

20032~20053

8~12

20056~20077

8~12


405~635


(추정) -25~4


(추정)-25~4







가능









76-----




























77-----


















79) Ibid

78-----





(개)

8 ~ 15 7 ~ 12 5 ~ 10

5 ~ 12 1 1

6 ~ 12 2

4 ~ 9 2

5 ~ 12 2
















(개)

13 ~ 23 11 ~ 20 9 ~ 17

8 ~ 18 2 2

8 ~ 19 4

6 ~ 15 4

7 ~ 18 4


79-----








3 HEU 생산능력





















80-----











할 것이다




















83) ｢조선중앙방송｣ 2009년 4월 29일

84) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 6월 13일

81-----


























85) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 9월 4일

86) ｢조선신보｣ 2010년 4월 9일

87) ｢동아일보｣ 2010년 11월 15일



82-----

























92) Ibid p 2

83-----




























95) ｢연합뉴스｣ 2010년 11월 17일

96) ｢동아일보｣ 2011년 2월 21일

97) ｢국민일보｣ 2011년 6월 7일

84-----






























98) ｢한국일보｣ 2012년 4월 9일

99) ｢서울신문｣ 2012년 4월 21일

85-----













도 있다



















86-----






















89-----


국문초록





































이 될 것이다

90-----


Abstract




91-----





92-----







93-----







94-----






95-----






96-----




99-----


국문초록


함의 및 전망






가이다














등을 토론한다



토한다

100-----


Abstract





101-----


1 Introduction





102-----









103-----












104-----









105-----








106-----








107-----













108-----











109-----










110-----










111-----








112-----






113-----








114-----








115-----









116-----








117-----








118-----










Welcoming Remarks













Keynote Speech


Introduction





Fukushima Accident





























Concluding remarks




References











CONTENTS















5-----


국문초록



















조가 필요하다

6-----


Abstract




7-----


I Introduction






8-----







9-----







10-----









11-----








12-----







13-----











14-----


a Economy








15-----


been pitiable 21)


1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-43 -44 04 38 12 18 21 38 -10 -12 31 -09 -05 08(93) (89) (88) (40) (72) (28) (46) (40) (52) (51) (23) (03) (63) (36)


Korea July 9 2012







16-----









17-----










18-----







19-----










20-----








21-----


c Society








22-----





Some Observations





23-----











24-----








25-----









26-----







27-----









28-----









29-----






30-----








33-----


국문초록












을 논의한다

34-----


Abstract




35-----


36-----


37-----


38-----


39-----


40-----


41-----


42-----


43-----


44-----


45-----


46-----


47-----


48-----


49-----


50-----


51-----


52-----


53-----


54-----


55-----


56-----


57-----


58-----


59-----


60-----


61-----


62-----


63-----


64-----


69-----


국문초록
























2006년 10월과 2009년 5월 두 차례의 핵실

험을 단행했다










을 것이다













70-----


Abstract









71-----































72-----











Country Driver



















73-----



























74-----















75-----







IRT-2000 원자로 2~4

2010년11월

2000개의 첨단




추정

제1기

(1983~199410)와

제2기

(1997~ 20029)에



실시

내폭형 핵탄두

설계제조

2006년 10월 9일





1kt 추정


제2차 핵실험


2~4 kt








2007년 9월 6일



5MWe원자로

19861~19894

5~85

1989 여름~ 19944

175~27

20032~20053

8~12

20056~20077

8~12


405~635


(추정) -25~4


(추정)-25~4







가능









76-----




























77-----


















79) Ibid

78-----





(개)

8 ~ 15 7 ~ 12 5 ~ 10

5 ~ 12 1 1

6 ~ 12 2

4 ~ 9 2

5 ~ 12 2
















(개)

13 ~ 23 11 ~ 20 9 ~ 17

8 ~ 18 2 2

8 ~ 19 4

6 ~ 15 4

7 ~ 18 4


79-----








3 HEU 생산능력





















80-----











할 것이다




















83) ｢조선중앙방송｣ 2009년 4월 29일

84) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 6월 13일

81-----


























85) ｢조선중앙통신｣ 2009년 9월 4일

86) ｢조선신보｣ 2010년 4월 9일

87) ｢동아일보｣ 2010년 11월 15일



82-----

























92) Ibid p 2

83-----




























95) ｢연합뉴스｣ 2010년 11월 17일

96) ｢동아일보｣ 2011년 2월 21일

97) ｢국민일보｣ 2011년 6월 7일

84-----






























98) ｢한국일보｣ 2012년 4월 9일

99) ｢서울신문｣ 2012년 4월 21일

85-----













도 있다



















86-----






















89-----


국문초록





































이 될 것이다

90-----


Abstract




91-----





92-----







93-----







94-----






95-----






96-----




99-----


국문초록


함의 및 전망






가이다














등을 토론한다



토한다

100-----


Abstract





101-----


1 Introduction





102-----









103-----












104-----









105-----








106-----








107-----













108-----











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110-----










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113-----








114-----








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118-----










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