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tO

fficeof

JusticeProgram

s

National Institute

ofJustice

/IS

I1(’.Sal?(1

Natio

nal

Itistituteof

Justic

e/J)J

.(j.j)

LC)LC)

cY

,

N

Street-Level

Drug

Enforcem

ent:E

xamining

theIssues

If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov.

U.S.

Dep

artmen

tof

Justice

1/

Natio

nal

Institu

teof

Justice

Office

of

Com

munication

and

Research

Utilization

Street-L

evelD

rugE

nforcement:

Exam

iningthe

Issues

Contributors:

Mark

A.R

.K

leiman

Arnold

Barnett

Anthony

V.

Bouza

Kevin

M.

Burke

Editor:

Marcia

R.

Chaiken

Septem

ber1988

Issuesan

dP

racticesin

Crim

inalJustice

isa

publicationof

theN

ationalInstitute

ofJustice.

Designed

forthe

criminaljustice

professional,eac’h

Issuesand

Practicesreport

presentsthe

programoptions

andm

anagement

issuesin

atopic

area,based

ona

reviewof

researchand

evaluationfindings,

op

etational

experience,and

expertopinion

inthe

subject.T

heintent

isto

providecrim

inaljustice

managers

andadm

inistratorsw

iththe

information

tom

akeinform

edchoices

inplanning,

implem

entingand

improving

programs

andpractice.

Prepared

forthe

National

Instituteof

Justice,U

.S.

Departm

entof

Justice,by

Abt

Associates

Inc.,under

contract#O

JP-86-C

-002.P

ointsof

viewor

opinionsstated

inthis

document

arethose

of

theauthors

anddo

notnecessarily

representthe

officialposition

orpolicies

of

theU

.S.

Departm

ento

fJustice

notthe

organizationsw

ithw

hichthe

authorsare

affiliated.T

heauthors

areM

arkA

.R.

Kleim

an,L

ecturerin

Public

Policy,

Research

Fellow

inC

riminal

JusticeP

olicyand

Managem

ent,John

F.K

ennedySchool

ofG

overmuent,

Harvard

University;

Arnold

Barnett,

The

Sloan

School

of

Managem

ent,M

assachusettsInstitute

ofT

echnology;A

nthonyB

ouza,C

hiefof

Police

inM

inneapolis;K

evinB

urke,D

istrictA

ttorneyin

Essex

County,

Massachusetts;

andM

arciaC

haiken,S

eniorS

ocialS

cientist,A

btA

ssociatesInc.

National

Instituteof

Justice

James

K.

Stew

art

Director

Program

Monitor

Jonath

anB

udd

National

Instituteof

Justice

Washington,

D.C

.

The

Assistant

Attorney

General,

Office

ofJustice

Program

s,

coordinatesthe

activitiesof

thefollow

ingprogram

Offices

andB

ureaus:N

ationalInstitute

ofJustice,

Bureau

ofJustice

Statistics,

Bureau

ofJustice

Assistance,

Office

ofJuvenile

Justiceand

Delinquency

Prevention,

andO

fficefor

Victim

s

ofC

rime.

Contents

Forew

ordv

James

K.

Stew

artD

irectorN

ationalInstitute

of

Justice

Chapter

1S

treet-Level

Drug

Enforcem

ent:In

troductio

nto

theIssues

1M

arciaR

.C

haikenS

eniorS

ocialS

cientistA

btA

ssociatesInc.

Chapter

2C

rackdowns:

The

Effects

ofIntensive

Enforcem

enton

Retail

Heroin

Dealing

3M

arkA

.R.

Kleim

anL

ecturerin

Public

Policy

Research

Fellow

inC

riminal

JusticeP

olicyand

Managem

entJo

hn

F.K

ennedyS

choolof

Governm

entH

arvardU

niversity

Chapter

3D

rugC

rackdowns

andC

rime

Rates:

AC

omm

entof

theK

leiman

Report

35P

rofessorA

rnoldB

arnettS

loanS

choolof

Managem

entM


of

Technology

Chapter

4E

valuatingS

treet-Level

Drug

Enforcem

ent43

Anthony

V.

Bouza

Chief

of

Police

Minneapolis,

Minnesota

Chapter

5C

omm

entson

Street-L

evelD

rugE

nforcement

49K

evinM

.B

urkeD

istrictA

ttorneyE

ssexC

ounty,M

assachusetts

Bibliography

53

‘‘I

Forew

ord

No

singleagency

canfulfill,

throughits

own

efforts,the

public’sjustifiable

Bdem

andthat

we

ridour

comm

unitiesof

drugabuse

andthe

crime

andviolence

itfosters.

Interagencycooperation

atall

levelso

fgovernm

entis

anessential

ingredientof

successfuldrug

law-enforcem

entstrategies.

One

suchstrategy

—intensive

street-leveldrug

enforcement

—attracts

widespread

interestam

ongpolice

andsheriffs

departments.

Crackdow

nsare

afavored

tacticfrequently

calledfor

bypolitical

leadersand

concernedcitizens

andcom

munity

groups.To

determine

theeffects

of

suchcrackdow

nson

usersand

dealersw

hotransform

citystreets

intodrug

bazaars,research

reportedin

thispublication

analyzeddata

fromareas

thathad

carriedout

intensiveenforcem

entof

druglaw

s.

As

thisreport

indicates,there

iscom

pellingevidence

that,under

some

cir

cumstances,

street-leveldrug

enforcement

canrid

citystreets

of

drugdealers

andusers.

Other

kindsof

predatorycrim

eth

atthe

publicfears

alsom

aybe

reducedin

thecrackdow

narea.

Yet,

analysisof

some

crime

datafrom

areasthat

intensifystreet-level

enforcement

shows

thattaking

dealersand

usersoff

thestreets

of

onearea

isnot

enough.W

ithoutcooperation

between

neighboringareas,

thedrug

market

may

notbe

destroyedbut

merely

displacedto

anotherneighborhood.

Other

researchby

theN

ationalInstitute

of

Justiceshow

sthat

reducingsupply

and

demand

fordrugs

isbest

accomplished

bya

cooperativeeffort

among

criminal

justice,education,

healthpractitioners,

andyouth

leaders.S

imilarly,

aconcerted

effortis

requiredam

onglocal,

State

andF

ederallaw

enforcement

agencies.A

ndw

ithineach

jurisdiction,drug

involvedoffenders

canbest

bem

anagedby

closecoordination

among

police,prosecutors,

andcorrectional

officers.

Given

theanalyses

of

street-leveldrug

enforcement

presentedin

thisreport,

criminal

justiceagencies

will

findthe

lessonsin

planningand

cooperationit

presentsa

usefulguide

foraction.

The

researchstrongly

suggeststhat

criminal

justiceagencies

thatare

willing

tow

orktogether

will

findthey

canrid

theirstreets

of

drugusers

anddealers

alikeand

make

inroadsagainst

otherpredatory

crime

atthe

same

time.

James

K.

Stew

art,D

irectorN

ationalInstitute

of

Justice

Forew

ordv

Chapter

1

ST

RE

ET

-LE

VE

LD

RU

GE

NF

OR

CE

ME

NT

:IN

TR

OD

UC

TIO

NT

OT

HE

ISS

UE

S

Marcia

R.

Chaiken

Mounting

nationalconcern

overillicit

druguse

—and

theim

pactof

opendrug

markets

onthe

neighborhoodsin

which

theyoperate—

hasspurred

renewed

interestin

street-leveldrug

enforcement.

The

effectivenessof

crackdowns

asa

lawenforcem

enttactic,

however,

remains

asubject

of

debate.T

hisreport

examines

thedebated

issues.It

isone

of

aseries

of

publicationsthat

providereview

sof

researchon

drug-involvedoffenders

andstrategies

fordealing

with

them.

Ihave

hadthe

pleasureo

fediting

thisseries.

This

volume

presentsa

studyth

atadvocates

street-levelcrackdow

nson

heroinm

arketsand

suggeststhey

may

reducenon-drug

crime

asw

ell;it

alsoincludes

threecritical

reviews

of

thestudy

andthe

recomm

endedpolicy.

Together,

thepaper

andreview

saddress

theconcerns

of

criminal

justicepractitioners

who

arecurrently

implem

entingthis

formof

policing,those

consideringinstituting

sucha

practice,and

thosew

hoare

opposed.L

egislatorsand

citizensw

how

antto

knowm

oreabout

specificform

sof

lawenforcem

entefforts

forcontrolling

thesales

of

illicitdrugs

will

alsofind

thesem

aterialsinform

ative.

None

of

theauthors

viewcrack-dow

nsas

apanacea.

Nor

doany

of

themsuggest

thatstreet-level

drugenforcem

entby

itselfcan

eliminate

theuse

of

illicitdrugs.

Rather,

thefocal

questionaddressed

bythis

setof

papersis:

What

effectsreasonably

canbe

expectedfrom

streetlevel

drugenforcem

ent?

These

paperspresent

fourdifferent

perspectiveson

theansw

erto

thatq

ues

tion.T

heprim

arypaper,

authoredby

Mark

Kleim

an,a

policyanalyst

atthe

Kennedy

School

of

Governm

ent,H

arvardU

niversity,presents

atheory

onthe

potentialbenefits

andcosts

of

street-leveldrug

enforcement.

His

centralhypothesis

assertsthat

crackdowns

onstreet-level

heroindealers

and

buyersincrease

thenon-m

oneycosts

ofdrug

use(the

riskof

arrestand

the

time

requiredto

findnew

sourcesof

drugs)and

reduceconsum

ption.H

e

arguesthat

thecom

binationof

increasedrisk

andtim

edrives

some

usersto

desist:he

alsosuggests

thatthose

who

continueto

usedrugs

can“score”

lessfrequently.

Additionally,

hecontends

that,since

offendersw

hocom

mit

robberyand

burglaryoften

doso

toget

money

fordrugs,

crackdowns

—by

reducingdrug

consumption

without

increasingthe

drugprice—

canalso

reducethe

numbers

ofstreet

crimes.

Based

onanalysis

of

datacollected

in

severalareas

which

haveexperienced

crackdowns

onstreet

drugm

arkets,

Kleim

anconcludes

that“street-level

heroincrackdow

ns,under

some

cir

cumstances,

producegreat

benefitsat

modest

costs.”H

echallenges

practi

tionersto

“tryit

andsee.”

The

reviews

arew

rittenby

Professor

Arnold

Barnett,

theS

loanS

choolof

Managem

ent,M


ofT

echnology;A

nthonyB

ouza,C

hief

of

Police

inM

inneapolis;and

Kevin

Burke,

District

Attorney

inE

ssex

County,

Massachusetts.

Each,

drawing

onhis

own

richbasis

of

experience

andexpertise,

reactsto

Kleim

an’spaper

andpolicy

recomm

endationsin

a

differentw

ay.

District

Attorney

Burke

stronglyendorses

thepolicy,

buthe

takesissue

with

some

of

Kleim

an’sreservations.

Mr.

Burke’s

primary

goalin

instituting

street-leveldrug

enforcement

inhis

districtw

asto

improve

thequality

of

lifein

areasdom

inatedby

dealersand

addicts.B

ecausethese

peopleleft

the

targetareas

following

crackdowns,

heheartily

endorsesthe

practice.

The

two

otherreview

ersare

lessoptim

isticthan

Kleim

anabout

theresults

of

crackdowns.

Chief

Bouza

hasseen

street-leveldrug

enforcement

merely

shiftthe

localeof

dealing.H

ehas

watched

arresteddealers

quicklysh

unt

edback

onthe

streetsbecause

of

overcrowded

courtsand

prisons.H

ede

ploresthe

waste

of

resourcesand

concludesthat,

althougha

crackdown

temporarily

providesgood

publicity,“T

heonly

problemis

thatit

doesn’t

work.”

Professor

Barnett

reviews

theanalysis

thatled

toK

leiman’s

conclusionthat

undersom

ecircum

stancescrackdow

nshelp

reducestreet

crime.

Innon

technicalterm

s,he

shows

howthe

numbers

usedby

Kleim

anto

dem

on

stratesuccess

canbe

misleading.

He

ism

orepessim

isticthan

Kleim

an

aboutthe

negativeand

positiveconsequences

of

crackdowns.

How

everhe

agreesw

iththe

Kleim

anconclusion

to“try

itand

see.”“O

nlythrough

an

extensiveprocess

of

trialand

error,”he

suggests,“can

we

learnthe

circum

stancesunder

which

crackdowns

producem

orebeneficial

thanharm

fulef

fects.”It

isin

thisspirit

of

learningthat

theN

ationalInstitute

of

Justice

presentsthese

papers.

2C

haiken

Chapter

2

CR

AC

KD

OW

NS

:T

HE

EF

FE

CT

SO

FIN

TE

NS

IVE

EN

FO

RC

EM

EN

TO

NR

ET

AIL

HE

RO

IND

EA

LIN

G

Mark

A.R

.K

leiman

Introduction

In1985,

more

than800,000

citizensw

erearrested

fordrug

lawviolations.

The

Anti-D

rugA

buseA

ctof

1986[P.L

.99-570]

provided$230

million

tostate

andlocal

enforcement

agenciesfor

enhanceddrug

enforcement

ac

tivities.Y

etthe

valueof

suchpolice

enforcement

haslong

beendebated.

Part

of

thisdebate

concernsthe

purposesand

justificationsfor

suchef

forts.S

ome

arguethat

theenforcem

entactivity

isjustified

simply

becauselaw

sagainst

druguse

exist,and

itis

theclear

obligationof

theS

tateto

en

forcethe

laws.

Others

seethe

laws

andim

provedenforcem

entas

justifiedby

theirim

pacton

levelsof

illicitdrug

use.’Still

otherssee

drugen

force

ment

asa

potentiallyuseful

approachto

controlling“street

crimes”

suchas

robberyand

burglary.2

The

debatealso

concernsthe

practicaleffect

ofenforcem

entefforts

onthese

objectives.T

hereare

conflictingtheories

aboutthe

causalm

echanisms

thatlink

localdrug

enforcement

effortsto

theobjectives

of

controllingdrug

useand

streetcrim

e.A

ndthere

isonly

alim

itedam

ountof

empirical3

evidenceto

testour

theoriesor

evaluatethe

resultsof

localen

forcem

ent.

4

Recent

evidenceand

reasoningabout

oneform

of

localdrug

enfo

rcem

ent—crackdow

nson

retailheroin

markets—

suggestthat

suchcrackdow

nsm

aybe

onew

ayto

uselocal

drugenforcem

entefforts

toproduce

valuableresults.

The

Effects

of

IntensiveE

nforcement

onR

etailH

eroinD

ealing

The

Lynn

Drug

Task

Force

The

Progm

m

Inearly

1983,the

Massachusetts

State

policenarcotics

unithad

decen

tral

ized.Its

agentsw

eredispersed

intocounty

drugtask

forcesunder

thed

i

rectionof

theelected

District

Attorneys.

The

District

Attorney

forE

ssex

County,

Kevin

Burke,

foundhim

selfw

ithsix

narcoticsofficers

athis

disposal.

Burke

decidedthat

spreadingsix

drugofficers

overa

countyw

itha

pop

ula

tionof

750,000w

asunlikely

toproduce

substantialresults.

Chronic

com

plaintsfrom

residentsand

merchants

inL

ynn,M

assachusetts,about

open

heroindealing

inthe

High

Rock

neighborhood,just

fourblocks

fromthe

centralbusiness

district,suggested

atarget

form

oreconcentrated

efforts.

Lynn

hadthe

secondhighest

crime

rateof

allM

assachusettscities

anda

policedepartm

entw

hosesw

ornstrength

hadfallen

byabout

one-third

(from180

to120)

dueto

fiscalpressures.

Burke

electedto

concentratehis

entireT

askForce

onstreet-level

heroindealing

inL

ynnto,

ashe

described

it,“im

provethe

qualityof

life.’”

The

Lynn

Drug

Task

Force

beganoperations

inS

eptember

1983w

ithsix

State

troopersand

onedetective

fromthe

Lynn

Police

Departm

ent.O

ver

thefirst

10m

onthsof

itsexistence,

thetask

forceaveraged

6full-tim

e-

equivalentpolice

plusI

part-time

civilianclerk.

This

representedabout

5

percentof

thetotal

sworn

policeforces

availablein

Lynn,

andcost

app

rox

imately

$20,000per

month,

or25

centsa

month

perresident.

Subsequently,

theS

tatetroopers

were

slowly

shiftedaw

ayfrom

Lynn

andtow

ardthe

largerm

arketin

Law

rence,at

theother

endof

thecounty,

butthe

Lynn

Police

Departm

entadded

more

of

itsow

nofficers

tothe

Task

Force.C

ur

rentstrength

(fouryears

later)varies

fromfour

tosix

sworn

oficers.6

The

strategyof

theT

askForce

was

tom

akeit

difficultfor

dealersto

make

salesand

forheroin

buyersto

“score”in

thestreets

of

Lynn.

Itsofficers

watched

known

dealinglocations

andquestioned

suspectedbuyers

and

sellers,m

adearrests

forpossession

afterobserving

transactions,used

info

r

mants

tom

akesm

all-scalepurchases,

andexecuted

searchw

arrantson

premises

usedfor

dealing.Tw

oofficers

spentseveral

weeks

inone

conven

tionalundercover

operation.A

“Hot

Line”

foranonym

oustips

was

established,m

aintained,and

heavilypublicized;

information

fromH

otL

ine

callscontributed

tom

anyarrests

andsearches.

Inits

first10

months,

theL

ynnD

rugT

askForce

made

140arrests;

these

representedbetw

een5

percentand

10percent

of

theL

ynnP

oliceD

epart

ment’s

arrestactivity

overthat

period.E

levenarrests

were

forpossession

of

heroinw

ithintent

todistribute.

Sixtym

orew

erefor

otherheroin-related

charges:sim

plepossession

orpossession

of

injectionequipm

ent.T

herew

ere

20arrests

forpossession

ofcocaine

with

intentto

distributeand

12for

simple

possessionof

cocaine.O

therarrestees

were

chargedw

itha

4K

leiman

miscellany

of

drugand

non-drugoffenses

ortaken

onoutstanding

arrestand

fugitivew

arrants.N

inety-sixdefendants

were

convictedor

pleadedguil

ty,including

10on

felonyheroin

charges.N

ominal

minim

umsentences

onall

chargestotaled

110years.

Arrests

havecontinued

since,but

ata

much

lower

rate.

The

Results

Burke’s

goalfor

theprogram

—”to

improve

thequality

of

lifein

Lynn”—

was

abroad

one.A

ta

minim

um,

itm

eanthalting

theopen

dealingof

Bheroin

andstilling

thecom

plaintsof

citizensoffended

andfrightened

bythe

openheroin

market.

More

ambitiously,

itm

eantreducing

thelevel

ofheroin

usein

Lynn

(andperhaps

elsewhere

ifL

ynndrug

dealingw

assu

pporting

consumption

inother

areas)by

making

itdifficult

forexperim

entaldrug

usersto

haveaccess

toheroin

andby

givingcurrent

usersincentives

toabandon

theiruse.

Even

more

ambitiously,

itm

eantreducing

streetcrim

essuch

asrobbery

andburglary

inL

ynn—

eitherby

incapacitatinghero

inusing

offendersthrough

incarceration,or

byreducing

theirpredatory

activi

tyas

aside-effect

of

reducingtheir

heroinconsum

ption.T

heresults

were

unexpectedlygratifying.

Disorder

Reduction

andQ

ualityof

Life

The

preliminary

resultsof

theoperation

includeda

marked

decreasein

thevolum

eand

flagrancyof

theL

ynnheroin

market.

Avisitor

walking

throughthe

High

Rock

areaon

asum

mer

afternoonsees

aplacid,

rathersuburban

neighborhood,not

thedrug

bazaarthat

reportedlyused

toexist.

Interviewed

ninem

onthsafter

theinception

of

theT

askForce,

High

Rock

residents,their

electedrepresentatives,

andm

erchantsin

thenearby

businessdistrict,

describedthem

selvesas

pleasedw

iththe

changes.M

oresurprisingly,

othersin

theC

ityappeared

tonotice

andappreciate

theeffects

of

theT

askForce:

37percent

of

therespondents

ina

city-wide

surveyconducted

inthe

sum

mer

of

1984thought

thatpolice

andprosecutors

were

doinga

betterjob

inenforcing

thedrug

laws

thana

yearpreviously;

only12

percentthought

thatthey

were

doinga

worse

job.

Heroin

Consum

ption

Of

allthe

effectsof

drugenforcem

ent,the

impact

ondrug

consumption

isam

ongthe

hardestto

measure.

Most

of

theevidence

available,how

ever,suggests

thatheroin

consumption

inL

ynndeclined

substantiallyafter

theinception

of

theT

askForce.

Drug

treatment

workers

inL

ynnbelieve

thatthe

easyavailability

of

heroinin

theearly

1980’shad

resultedin

there-addiction

of

many

heroinusers

who

hadbeen

abstinentduring

thelate

1970’s.T

heyreport

that,as

aresult

of

theT

askForce,

heroinusers

inL

ynnfound

itharder

tobuy

drugsand

were

worried

aboutbeing

arrestedfor

possessionof

narcoticsif

theydid

succeedin

buying.A

sa

result,som

eof

themw

entinto

drugtreatm

ent.

8

The

Effects

of

IntensiveE

nforcement

onR

etailH

eroin

fl1in

c

Interviews

with

drugusers

intreatm

entconfirm

edthis

account.

9O

fcourse,

usersin

treatment

donot

constitutean

unbiasedsam

pleof

allusers.

The

impression

thatincreased

enforcement

pressuretended

todecrease

heroinuse

isconfirm

edby

thepattern

ofdem

andfor

drugtreatm

entser

vicesin

Lynn.

Unlike

treatment

facilitieselsew

herein

Massachusetts,

the

programin

Lynn

experiencedm

orethan

an85

percentincrease

indem

and

forservice

overthe

10m

onthsstarting

inS

eptember

of1983.

By

that

point,w

aitinglists

hadstarted

todevelop

andfurther

changesin

treatment

demand

became

hardto

measure.°

Lynn-area

heroinusers

whose

consumption

of

heroindecreased

orceased

asa

resultof

thetask

forcem

ayw

ellhave

increasedtheir

consumption

of

otherdrugs,

particularlyother

depressantsincluding

syntheticopiates

and

opioids,barbiturates,

andalcohol.

These

may

actas

substitutes—in

both

thepsychological

andeconom

icsenses

ofthat

term—

forheroin.

The

extent

of

thateffect

was

notm

easured.

Property

andV

iolentC

rime

Perhaps

them

ostsurprising

resultof

theL

ynnD

rugT

askForce

was

itsim

pacton

streetcrim

es:specifically,

robbery,burglary,

andcrim

esagainst

the

person(hom

icide,forcible

rape,and

aggravatedassault).

Com

paringthe

12

months

startingS

eptember,

1983,w

iththe

previous12

months,

reported

robberiesw

eredow

n18.5

percent,reported

burglariesw

eredow

n37.5

per

cent,and

reportedcrim

esagainst

theperson

were

down

afull

66percent.’

Inthe

following

12m

onths,the

reportedburglaries

remained

attheir

new,

lower

level,and

reportedrobberies

declinedstill

further,to

alevel

30per

centbelow

thebase

year(see

Figures

1,2,

and3

fora

graphicalrep

resenta

tionof

thesechanges;

seethe

section,“P

ossibleE

xplanationsfor

Decreases

inC

rime,”

below,

fora

statisticalanalysis).

This

apparentdecrease

incrim

e,

ifvalid

(asw

ellas

statisticallysignificant)

representsa

large,and

largely

unexpected,benefit

of

theprogram

.Indeed,

itm

akesit

seemthat

cracking

down

onstreet-level

heroindealing

might

bea

cost-effectiveapproach

to

crime

controlas

well

asan

instrument

ofdrug

abusecontrol

policy.

Before

decidingthat

thiskind

of

programw

ouldbe

usefulacross

theco

un

try,how

ever,it

isnecessary

toplace

thisexperience

ina

broadercontext:

to

identifythe

fullrange

of

effectsrelevant

tothe

evaluationof

street-level

drugenforcem

entprogram

s,to

supplement

theresults

fromL

ynnw

ith

reportsof

lessw

ell-documented

effortselsew

here,to

considerhow

some

of

theeffects

ofsuch

programs

come

about,and

toconsider

what

enviro

n

mental

featuresof

agiven

siteaffect

theprospects

of

success.M

uchof

this

paperis

guidedby

inferencesfrom

generalprinciples

asw

ellas

bydirect

evidence.T

heaim

istherefore

notto

establishdefinitively

what

istrue

but

toim

proveour

understandingof

theprobability,

conditions,and

mechanism

sof

successfulretail

heroincrackdow

ns.

IcV

b.im

n

r 0

1980 JANFEB

MARAPRMAYJUNJUL

AUGSEPOCTNOVDEC

1981 JANFEB

MARAPRMAYJUNJUL

AUGSEPOCTNOVDEC

1982 JANFEB

MARAPRMAYJUNJUL

AUGSEPOCTNOVDEC

1983 JANFEB

MARAPRMAYJUNJUL

—4 IAUGZTS SEP

OCTNOVDEC

1984 JANFEB

MARAPRMAYJUNJULAUGSEPOCTNOVDEC

1985 JANFEB

MARAPRMAYJUNJUL

AUGSEPOCTNOVDEC

ROBBERIESmean, JaY 1980-DeC 1985

z-.4z 10 —J

0a.a.-‘

m0

-nC,r c

8<

9

U’

FIGU

RE

2

Burglaries

inL

ynn:1980-1985

357

339

321

303

285

267

249W

a,

231

2202

213

‘aE195

177

159

141

123

110

MO

NT

H

9LD

TF9

99

99

BE

GIN

S9

9

8K

leiman

127

118

108

99908172

443526176

MO

NT

H

00

LD

TF

00

0600IN

S0

0

FIGU

RE

3C

rimes

Against

the

Perso

nin

Lynn:

1980-1985

z0(I)

I-6

0—

Z62854

The

Effects

of

IntensiveE

nforcement

onR

etailH

eroinD

ealing9

Evaluating

Street-L

evelH

eroinE

nforcement

Efforts

The

aboveaccount

of

theL

ynnprogram

suggeststhe

wide

rangeof

effects—beneficial

andotherw

ise—such

activitiesm

ayhave.

This

sectiono

f

fersa

more

systematic

catalogueof

benefitsand

coststo

providea

struc

turefor

theevaluation

of

pastefforts

andfor

decidingw

hetherfuture

ones

arelikely

tobe

justified.W

ebegin

with

benefitsthat

aredirectly

andim

mediately

produced,proceed

tobenefits

thatare

more

remote,

andthen

ad

dressthe

issueof

costsincurred

instreet-level

heroinenforcem

ent.

Benefits

Neighborhood

Conditions

Open

drugdealing

isbad

forthe

neighborhoodsw

ithinw

hichit

occu

rs.2

In

additionto

theproblem

sof

trafficand

noisethat

accompany

anystreet-

cornercom

mercial

activity,drug

dealingposes

two

specialthreats:

that

some

neighborhoodresidents,

particularlychildren,

may

become

users;and

that

thebehavior

of

buyersand

sellersw

illbe

disruptiveor

worse.

Inpoor

neighborhoods,the

opportunityfor

quickm

oneyoffered

bythe

illicit

market

may

compete

with

entry-levellicit

jobsand

divertlabor-m

arketen

trantsfrom

legitimate

careers.3

When

thedrug

soldis

heroin,residents

are

likelyto

bebothered

byusers

“nodding”in

doorways

andheroin-using

pro

stitutessoliciting,

andeven

carryingon,

businessin

ways

thatdisturb

neighborsand

passers-by.

Reducing

thevolum

e,or

atleast

theflagrancy,

of

streetheroin

dealing

shouldtherefore

becounted

asa

benefitseparate

fromthe

reductionin

heroinconsum

ption.T

hisbenefit

canbe

detectedby

simple

inspectionof

thearea,

beforeand

after;by

formal

orinform

alsurveys

of

residents;or

indirectlythrough

suchm

easuresas

realestate

values.

Controlling

Heroin

Use

The

laws

againstthe

possessionand

saleo

fheroin

reflecta

socialjudgm

ent

thatthe

useof

thedrug

ispernicious.

The

ethnographicliterature

onheroin

addictsprovides

ample

supportfor

thatview

,w

hichappears

tobe

shared

bym

any,if

notm

ost,heroin

usersthem

selves.14

Inthinking

aboutthe

effectsof

street-levelenforcem

enton

heroincon

sumption,

itis

usefulto

distinguishthe

effectson

peoplew

hoare

already

drug-dependentfrom

theeffects

onthose

who

arebeginning

toexperim

ent

orthinking

aboutexperim

enting.T

heeffects,

andthe

mechanism

sth

atpro

ducethe

effects,w

illbe

quitedifferent

onthe

two

classesof

users,because

experiencedusers

arelikely

tohave

bothm

ore“connections”

(sources)and

more

resourcefulnessand

determination

about“scoring.”

Even

forsom

eex

10K

leiman

periencedusers,

however,


entis

likelyto

reducecon

sumption.

The

effectw

illoccur

throughseveral

mechanism

s.

First,

inthe

courseof

acrackdow

n,m

anyexperienced

heroinusers

will

bearrested

forsale

orpossession.

Their

arrest,and

thedisposition

of

theircases,

will

tendto

reducetheir

consumption

throughthe

familiar

mechanism

sof

specificdeterrence,

incapacitation,and

rehabilitation.S

ucheffects

arelikely

tobe

particularlystrong

when

thecrackdow

nsare

accom

paniedby

urinetesting

atthe

time

of

arrest,and

mandated

urinescreening

asa

conditionof

bail,probation,

orp

arole.

5

Second,

anexperienced

userw

hois

notarrested

may,

inthe

faceof

increas

edpressure

onthe

streets,decide

thatnow

isa

usefultim

eto

reduceor

abandonheroin

use.H

em

aybe

deterredby

theprospect

of

arrest.H

em

aybe

inconveniencedby

thearrest

of

hisregular

“connection”and

thedif

ficulty(increased

byenforcem

ent)of

findinga

newone.

Or,

more

likely,the

increaseddaily

inconvenienceand

anxietyof

“copping”w

illcum

ulateto

theextent

that“drying

out”w

illappear

relativelyattractive.

The

likelihoodof

addicts’m

akingthis

choicecan

beincreased,

iftreatm

entservices

arereadily

availableto

thoseheroin

usersw

how

antit.

The

impact

of

street-levelheroin

enforcement

onnew

usersis

potentiallylarger,

andover

thelong

run,m

oresignificant.

Itis

largerbecause

experim

entalusers

arem

uchless

comm

ittedto

usingheroin

thanestablished

addicts,and

much

lessresourceful

in“copping.”

They

arealso

harderfor

streetsellers

todistinguish

forundercover

narcoticsofficers,

andare

thuslikely

toencounter

particularlygreat

difficultiesw

hen“the

heatis

on.”

6

Ifstreet-level

enforcement

raisesthe

averagetim

erequired

to“score”

from5

minutes

to2

hoursand

forcesdealing

eitherindoors

orto

more

dangerousparts

of

town,

noviceusers

will

bem

orelikely

thanexperienced

addictsto

gow

ithoutheroin.

The

same

isprobably

trueof

thefear

of

ar

restfor

possession.’7

Effects

onthe

initiationof

heroinuse

orthe

progressfrom

initiationto

regularuse

areparticularly

worth

achieving,because

theresult

isthe

elimination

of

anentire

addictcareer

ratherthan

simply

shorteningone.

With

respectto

adolescents,parents

havethe

primary

responsibilityfor

preventingheroin

initiation.Street-level

enforcement

canhelp

restoretheir

capacityto

accomplish

thattask.

All

parents,regardless

ofeconom

iclevel

orethnicity,

areeager

toprotect

theirchildren

fromthe

effectsof

heroinuse.

As

longas

thestreets

areopen

drugm

arkets,very

highlevels

of

paren

talsupervision

may

beneeded

tobe

effective.O

nthe

otherhand,

ifthe

streetsare

relativelysafe

orclear

of

drugdealing,

thenparental

adm

oni

tionsagainst

druguse

areless

likelyto

beignored.

Another

potentialbenefit

of

street-levelheroin

crackdowns

isits

potentialcontribution

tothe

broader,higher-level

effortto

minim

izethe

supplyof

drugsthrough

theim

mobilization

of

traffickingorganizations.

Street-levelenforcem

entcontributes

tothis

effortw

heneverit

turnsup

apiece

ofin

telligencethat

canbe

usedin

anongoing

federalinvestigation

ora

defen

The

Effects

ofIntensive

Enforcem

enton

Retail

Heroin

Dealing

11

dantw

how

ouldbe

willing

tobecom

ean

informant.

Street-level

heroinen

forcement

may

alsouncover

traffickingorganizations

andnetw

orksth

at

were

previouslyunknow

nto

thehigher-level

investigators.B

ecausestreet-

levelenforcem

entefforts

arenot

guidedby

intelligenceinform

ationbut

at

tackw

hatis

rightin

fronto

fthem

,they

may

serveas

“earlyw

arningnet

works”

forthe

growth

of

newtrafficking

organizations.O

neshould

notex

pectthese

discoveriesoften.

But

when

suchdiscoveries

dooccur,

theyw

ill

beextrem

elyim

portantcontributions

tothe

overalleffectiveness

ofsupply

reductionefforts.

Reducing

“StreetC

rimes”

Athird

potentialbenefit

of

street-levelheroin

crackdowns

isthe

prevention

ofproperty

andviolent

crimes.

The

impact

onthese

crimes

isim

portantin

evaluatingstreet-level

heroinenforcem

entfor

severalreasons.

First,

itis

possiblethat

thesecrim

esw

illincrease

asa

resultof

street-leveldrug

en

forcement,

andthus

must

becounted

asa

costof


ent

ratherthan

abenefit.

Ifstreet-level

enforcement

increasesthe

priceof

heroinbut

failsto

decreaseconsum

ption,addicts

will

haveto

stealm

ore.

Thus,

theold

saw,

“thedrug

squadm

akesw

orkfor

theburglary

squad.”If

thatanticipated

effectdoes

notoccur,

thenone

potentialcost

of

street-level

enforcement

will

beelim

inated.

Second,

theintrinsic

importance

of

thesecrim

es—

particularlyin

poor

comm

unities—

makes

anyeffect

onthem

veryim

portant.S

mall

increases

(severalpercent)

inLevels

ofrobbery

andburglary

would

besufficiently

im

portantto

cancelout

benefitsm

easuredin

terms

of

theelim

inationof

drug

markets

orthe

encouragement

of

drugusers

toseek

treatment.

On

the

otherhand,

small

reductionsin

levelsof

robberyand

burglaryw

ouldcon

stitutean

important

justificationfor


enteven

ifit

pro

ducedno

otherbenefits.

Third,

controllingrobbery

andburglary

iscentral

tothe

mission

of

criminal

justiceagencies.

Ifthese

crimes

increasedas

aresult

ofheroin

crackdowns,

policeand

prosecutingorganizations

would

notbe

enthusiasticabout

them

evenif

therew

eresubstantial

benefitsgained

inthe

comm

unity’ssense

of

orderand

reductionin

druguse.

Fourth,

thefact

thatthese

effectsare

relativelyeasy

tom

easurem

akesthem

inexpensiveindicators

ofw

hethera

programis

“working.”

With

alltheir

well-know

nfoibles,

countsof

crimes

reportedto

thepolice

areat

leastcol

lectedm

onth-by-month,

andcan

thereforebe

manipulated

statistically,

while

otherbenefit

measures

arefar

harderto

quantify.T

hus,effects

on

streetcrim

esare

aninevitable

andim

portantdim

ensionto

beused

in

evaluatingstreet-level

enforcement

efforts.

Costs

The

costsof


entregister

inthree

areas:1)

thedirect

financialcost

of

mounting

theoperations;

2)the

valueof

policeresources

1?

VIp

im,n

comm

ittedto


entin

alternativeuses;

and3)

thep

oten

tialthreat

tocivil

libertiesassociated

with

more

extensiveand

aggressivestreet-level

enforcement.

Moreover,

itis

important

torecognize

thatthese

costsregister

acrossthe

criminal

justicesystem

—not

simply

within

thepolice

organizationsthat

initiatethe

operations.

Financial

Costs

of

Street-L

evelH

eroinC

rackdowns

The

directpayroll

costsof

policeem

ployedin

heroincrackdow

nsare

notthe

onlyfinancial

coststo

beconsidered

inevaluating

suchprogram

s.B

enefitpackages

(includingretirem

ent)need

tobe

takeninto

account.So

do“overhead”

costs:buildings,

vehicles,adm

inistration,supervision.

At

leastin

thecase

of

Operation

Pressure

Point

Iin

New

York,

concernsabout

thepotential

forcorruption

andother

misconduct

ledto

aheavier-

than-normal

ratioof

supervisorsto

patrolofficers

andline

detectives.’8

The

otherm

ajorcost

implicit

inthe

establishment

of

suchoperations

isthe

needto

maintain

themover

time.

This

needm

aybe

more

politicalthan

operational,but

itis

nonethelessreal.

New

York

Police

Com

missioner

Ben

jamin

Ward

reportsthat

Pressure

Point

Iand

otherstreet-level

anti-narcotics

activitiesgenerated

som

uchneighborhood

supportthat

anyattem

ptto

phasethem

down

afteronce

flagrantdealing

haddeclined

met

with

vigorouslocal

resistance.’9

Thus

adecision

tostart

acrackdow

nm

ayinvolve

along-term

resourcecom

mitm

ent.

Alternative

Uses

of

Enforcem

entR

esourcesP

oliceobserving

heroinsales

arenot

answering

callsfor

serviceor

decoyingrobbers.

Prosecutors

tryingstreet

salecases

arenot

tryingburglary

orpro

stitutioncases.

Aprison

bedfilled

bya

heroindealer

might

holdan

autothief

instead.D

etectivesassigned

toa

taskforce

directedat

retailheroin

dealingare

nottapping

cocainew

holesalers’telephones.

Urban

lawenforcem

entis

nota

world

ofslack

resources.B

enefitsw

ouldhave

beenobtained

fromthe

work

ofthe

peopleinvolved

with

aretail

heroincrackdow

n,had

theybeen

assignedto

dosom

ethingelse

instead.T

hese“lost”

benefitsshould

becounted

asa

costof

thecrackdow

n.

Determ

iningin

detailthe

resultsof

“onem

ore”arrest,

conviction,or

month

of

incarcerationin

varioususes

islargely

beyondthe

stretchof

theavailable

lawenforcem

entliterature.

The

“opportunitycost”

of

theresources

employed

incrackdow

nscannot,

therefore,be

measured

with

anyprecision.

The

alternativew

ouldbe

toadd

resourcesto

thesystem

tocarry

outcrackdow

ns,and

thenm

easurethe

benefitsof

thecrackdow

nsagainst

thedollar

costsof

thenew

resources.In

practice,how

ever,new

dollarsm

aynot

beavailable.

Effects

onO

therA

gencyO

perationsC

rackdowns

canhave

avariety

of

effectson

theother

operationsof

theagencies

involvedbeyond

thesheer

useof

resources.

The

Effects

of

IntensiveE

nforcement

onR

etailH

eroinD

ealing13

They

canbe

more

orless

professionallyrew

ardingand

interestingfor

thepersonnel

involvedthan

alternativeassignm

ents,and

thusim

proveor

worsen

morale.

No

formal

studyhas

beendone,

butit

appearsthat

only

am

inorityof

policefind

retailheroin

enforcement

aprofessionally

stim

ulatingactivity.

Their

boredomneeds

tobe

countedon

thecost

sideof

theledger.

Prosecutors’

lackof

interestin

suchcases

may

beeven

more

marked.

Crackdow

nscan

strengthenor

weaken

policeknow

ledgeof,

andrelations

with,

neighborhoodsand

theircitizens.

The

directionand

magnitude

of

sucheffects

will

varyw

ithcircum

stancesand

tactics.P

riorconsultation

with

localleaders,

publicrelations

efforts,and

thelike

may

make

adif

ference.

Finally,

corruption,corruption

scandals,and

corruption-controlm

easures

needto

beconsidered.

These

canbe

enormously

expensivein

terms

of

theability

of

policeforces

toexecute

anyof

theirduties.

None

ofthe

street-

levelefforts

discussedhere

hasrun

intocorruption

problems,

andit

isdif

ficultin

theabstract

tojudge

whether

crackdowns

arem

oreor

lesslikely

to

breedcorruption

thanother

policeactivities.

Retail

crackdowns

involvefar

lesslong-term

undercoverw

orkthan

investigationsof

high-leveldealers.

It

issuch

long-termundercover

work

thathas

spawned

many

ofthe

spec

tacularcorruption

casesof

thepast.

Enforcem

entIntrusiveness

andA

buseo

fA

uthority

Indrug

cases,as

inother

casesinvolving

consensualcrim

es,the

absenceof

complainants

complicates

enforcement

efforts.D

ruginvestigations

involve

deceitby

thepolice,

theextensive

useof

criminal

informants,

andclose

questionsabout

searchand

seizure.S

treetenforcem

entm

ayinvolve

the

stoppingand

questioningof

many

citizensw

ithoutany

basisfor

arrest.T

he

difficultyof

making

narcoticscases

thatw

illstand

upin

courthas

evendriven

some

narcoticsofficers

tom

anufactureevidence

andto

perjurethem

selves.

There

aretw

oseparate

questionshere:

theintrusiveness

of

lawful

tacticsus

edin

crackdowns

intocitizens’

affairsand

thestrain

theym

ayput

onthe

toleranceof

thecom

munity

fordistasteful

policetactics,

andthe

temp

ta

tionthey

createfor

unlawful

behaviorby

police.B

othm

ustbe

reckonedas

costsof


ent.

14K

leiman

Other

Street-L

evelC

rackdowns

The

Lynn

Task

Force

was

thefirst

street-leveldrug

crackdown

toreceive

aform

alevaluation,

butother

areashave

mounted


entef

forts.T

heirexperience

isinstructive.

Manhattan,

Low

erE

astSide

(Operation

Pressure

Point

I)If

theheroin

tradein

Lynn

in1983

representedone

extreme

among

drugm

arkets—

small,

concentrated,isolated

—the

tradein

Manhattan’s

“Alphabet

City”

onthe

Low

erE

astSide

representedthe

other:big,

cosmopolitan,

andin

acity

with

thrivingdrug

markets

inseveral

otherneighborhoods.

The

Low

erE

astSide

was

alsothe

siteof

am

ajorcrackdow

n,an

apparentsu

ccess

interm

sof

itseffects

onlocal

streetdealing,

druguse,

andcrim

e.

As

of

January1984,

thearea

around2nd

Street

andA

venueB

was

acenter

)of

well-organized

retaildrug

dealing.D

rugbuyers

crowded

aroundsellers;

atsom

elocations,

theyw

aitedin

orderlydouble

lines.

20

Many

storesand

apartment

buildingsin

thearea

were

abandoned;drug

dealingappeared

tohave

replacedvirtually

everyother

economic

activity.A

mong

thearea’s

at

tractionsfor

drugsellers

was

itsdivision

among

threepolice

precincts(5th,

7th,and

9th).T

hethree

were

noteven

within

thesam

epatrol

zone.A

sa

result,it

was

almost

impossible

tofocus

enforcement

attentionon

thedrug

market

without

creatingan

organizationalunit

which

couldspan

existingboundaries.

Benjam

inW

ard,sw

ornin

asP

oliceC

omm

issioneron

January1,

1984,gave

priorityto

anim

mediate

crackdown

ondrug

dealing.P

ressureP

ointI

was

initiallyconceived

asa

60-daycrash

project.It

beganJanuary

19,1984,

andtw

oyears

laterw

asstill

runningat

veryclose

toits

originalresource

levels.T

hecosts

of

Pressure

Point

I,in

salaryalone,

were

approximately

$12m

illionper

yearfor

itsfirst

two

yearsof

operatio

ns.

2’

This

isabout

25tim

esthe

costof

theL

ynnT

askForce.

New

York

City

asa

whole

hasabout

100tim

esthe

populationof

Lynn;

theP

ressureP

ointtarget

areahoused

onlya

tinyfraction

of

that,but

itscustom

erscam

efrom

allover

thecity

andnorthern

New

Jersey.

Inthe

beginning,P

ressureP

ointI

reliedon

massive

numbers

ofarrests.

For

thefirst

fourw

eeks,it

averagedsom

e65

arrestsper

day,of

which

more

thanone-third

were

onfelony

narcoticscharges.

Then,

asm

arketpar

ticipantsbecam

em

orew

ary,the

number

of

arrestsfell

tofew

erthan

20per

day,and

felonydrug

chargesbecam

era

rer.

12

Som

eof

thetactics

employed

inthis

programw

ere:“observation

sales”;undercover

buys;raids

ondealing

locations;use

of

ananonym

ous“H

otL

ine”;arrests

fora

wide

rangeof

misdem

eanorsand

violations,such

asdisorderly

conductand

loitering;and

aggressivetraffic

andparking

enforcement,

includingtow

ing.C

asesw

heredealers

were

usingjuveniles

asrunners

were

handledby

takingthe

kidsback

totheir

parentsand

warning

thatanother

arrestof

thechild

fordrug

The

Effects

of

IntensiveE

nforcement

onR

etailH

eroinD

elinQ

1 c

dealingw

ouldresult

incharges

of

abuseand

neglectagainst

theparents.

Vehicles

usedto

transp

ort

drugs,including

carsdriven

bydrug

buyers,w

ereseized

andforfeited

underF

ederaldrug

laws.

Pressure

Point

I,like

theL

ynnT

askForce,

haddram

aticeffects

ondrug

markets,

crime,

andneighborhood

welfare.

Although

dealinghas

notbeen

eliminated,

Alphabet

City

hasseen

asubstantial

reductionin

heroinstreet

activity,so

much

sothat

policeofficials

havebeen

criticizedfor

con

tributingto

the“gentrification”

of

apreviously

low-rent

area.L

ower

East

Sidedrug

treatment

programs,

alreadycrow

deddue

tofunding

cutbacksand

increasingfear

of

AID

Sam

ongheroin

users,have

seena

newinflux

of

clientsdue

toP

ressureP

oint.

Reported

crime

ofm

anykinds

hasbeen

drasticallyreduced

inthe

Pressure

Point

“Target

Area,”

hardlya

surprisingresult

giventhe

sheervolum

eof

policepresence

ina

limited

area.In

thetarget

area(com

posedof

partso

fthree

precincts),betw

een1983

and1984,

robberiesfell

47percent,

burglaries37

percent,grand

larcenies32

percent,and

homicides

62percent

(13co

m

paredto

34).T

heparts

of

thethree

precinctsoutside

thetarget

areaalso

showed

decreasesin

crime;

crime

inthe

adjacentprecincts

was

unch

anged

.23

One

possibleresult

of

alocal

drugcrackdow

nis

tocreate

anew

market

justoutside

thearea

of

heavyenforcem

ent,“displacing”

them

arketfrom

onestreet

cornerto

another.N

osuch

market

arosenear

theP

ressureP

oint

Itarget

area.T

herew

ere,how

ever,reports

ofdealers

andusers

relocatingto

other,already

establisheddrug

markets

within

thecity;

thereare

severalin

Manhattan

andin

nearbyparts

of

Brooklyn.

Whether

thedisplaced

activityw

asa

largefraction

ofthe

previousL

ower

East

Side

tradeis

unknown.

By

thesam

etoken,

thefact

thatstreet

crime

didnot

risein

theareas

aroundP

ressureP

ointdoes

notconclusively

demonstrate

thatit

was

notdisplaced

elsewhere

inthe

city.A

seriousinvestigation

of

thisquestion

would

requirea

carefulstudy

ofindividual-level

criminal-history

files;otherw

ise,it

isvirtually

impossible

totell

whether

some

personsw

hohad

beencom

mitting

crimes

inthe

Pressure

Point

areabefore

thecrackdow

n

begancom

mitting

themelsew

herelater.

There

were

noobvious

crime

“bulges”in

otherareas,

butthere

isno

way

toknow

what

crime

ratesw

ouldhave

beenin

otherdrug-dealing

areasin

theabsence

of

theP

ressureP

ointoperation.

Pressure

Point

I,then,

clearlyim

provedlocal

conditions,but

itseffects

elsewhere,

bothin

terms

ofdisplacing

druguse

andcrim

eand

interm

sof

crowding

outother

policeand

courtactivity,

areopen

toquestion.

Law

rence,M

assachusetts

The

Lynn

experiencedem

onstratesthe

possiblesuccess

of

street-leveldrug

enforcement

incontrolling

othercrim

es.L

awrence

demonstrates

itspossible

failure.A

fterthe

firstnine

months

of

theL

ynnoperation,

thestate

policeassigned

toL

ynnw

erem

ovedslow

lyto

Law

rence.T

heL

awrence

Task

Force

appearedto

succeedin

suppressingheroin

dealingin

theone

housingpro—

jectw

hereit

hadbeen

most

flagrant,and

drugusers

interviewed

reportedfinding

heroinsom

ewhat

harderto

buyin

Law

renceafter

thecrackdow

nsta

rted.

24

How

ever,overall

trafficdid

notseem

toshrink

nearlyas

much

inL

awrence

asit

hadin

Lynn

oron

theL

ower

East

Side.In

addition,the

cityC

of

Low

ell,a

fewm

ilesaw

aybut

acrossthe

countyline,

remained

largelyw

ideopen

forheroin

dealing,thus

givingL

awrence

heroinusers

analter

natesource

ofsupply.

The

resultsin

terms

ofpersonal

andproperty

crimes

were

discouraging.W

hilecrim

eagainst

theperson

inthe

28m

onthsafter

theinception

ofthe

taskforce

were

down

37percent

compared

toprevious

rates,robberies,

êburglaries,

andlarcenies

allincreased

noticeably(albeit

notto

astatistically

significantdegree)

(SeeT

able1).

Table1:

Com

pariso

nof

Month

lyC

rimes

Before

and

After

Interv

entio

nin

Law

rencefo

rL

awren

ce

Before

InterventionA

fterIntervention

Difference

Significant

Crim

eM

eanSt.

Dcv.

Months

Mean

St.D

ev.M

onthsat

p=

.01A

gainstT

hePerson

26.612.8

5616.5

5.428

YES

Robbery

12.96.3

5618.8

5.228

NO

Burglary

125.729.7

56163.0

65.328

NO

Larceny

142.773.0

56198.4

58.228

NO

Police

involvedw

ithboth

theL

ynnand

Law

renceoperations

citedseveral

differencesto

explainthe

apparentfailure

of

theL

awrence

Task

Forceto

reduceproperty

crimes:

alarger

andm

oregeographically

dispersedheroin

market;

lessvigorous

supportfrom

citizens,com

munity

institutions,and

localpolice;

diversionof

policeattention

toL

awrence’s

flourishingw

hole

salecocaine

trade;tactical

decisionsthat

putless

emphasis

onobservation

salearrests

andm

oreem

phasison

searchw

arrants;and

thepresence

ofthe

Low

ellm

arkets.’

Other

Instances

Norfolk

(Virginia),

Seattle

(Washington),

andSydney

(Australia)

havereportedly

succeededin

reducingdrug

dealingand

othercrim

eby

crackingdow

non

concentratedareas

of

streetlevel

drugdealing.

On

theother

hand,P

hiladelphia’s“O

perationC

oldT

urkey”w

as,by

allaccounts,

adisaster.

Instead

of

concentratingresources

onone

ora

fewareas

with

major

dealing

The

Effects

of

IntensiveE

nforcement

onR

etailH

eroinD

ealing17

problems,

Cold

Turkey

chosetw

o“drug

corners”from

eachof

thecity’s

23

policeprecincts.

Of

the1,000

personsstopped

andsearched

byC

old

Turkey’s

450officers

overfour

days,only

80w

erearrested

onnarcotics

charges,and

150m

orefor

disorderlyconduct.

Public

protestand

alaw

suit

broughtthe

operationto

anend

afterfour

days,w

ithno

measurable

result

exceptfor

citizenhostility.

Washington

(D.C

.)has

substantiallyincreased

its

effortsagainst

retaildrug-dealing

(notjust

heroindealing)

ina

varietyof

forms,

apparentlyw

ithouteffect

oncom

mon

crimes.

Miam

i(F

lorida)has

alsoreportedly

mounted

aprogram

of

enhancedstreet-level

drugen

force

ment;

itseffects

oncrim

eare

unknown.

Inaddition,

sixcities

havereceived

discretionaryfunds

fromthe

Bureau

of

JusticeA

ssistancefor

street-level

drugenforcem

ent;their

programs

arestill

toonew

toev

aluate.

26

18K

leiman

Possible

Explanations

forD

ecreasesin

Crim

e

No

elaboratetheory

isrequired

toexplain

theobservation

thatenhanced

street-leveldrug

enforcement

makes

drugsharder

tobuy,

reducesdisorder,

andim

provesconditions

forresidents

andm

erchantsin

itsim

mediate

area.It

takesa

littlem

oresophistication

toanalyze

andm

easurethe

effectson

levelsof

druguse.

But

thehardest

resultsto

understandfrom

bothL

ynnand

Pressure

Point

arethe

dramatic

decreasesin

reportednon-drug

crimes.

This

sectionw

illreview

severalm

echanisms

thatm

ightlink

crime

decreasesw

ithstreet-level

drugcrackdow

ns—

some

implying

realsocial

benefitsand

some

not—and

examine

theevidence

fromL

ynnand

elsewhere

thatm

ighthelp

distinguishvalid

explanationsfrom

invalidones.

Statistical

Artifact

The

simplest

way

toexplain

theL

ynnresults

isto

denythat

anyreal

effectoccurred.

Measurem

entm

ighthave

beenflaw

ed,or

areal

decreasem

ightbc

attributableto

something

otherthan

theprogram

.A

nyintervention

that

startsafter

aperiod

of

more-than-usual

problems

startsw

itha

favorablebasis

forcom

parison;if

conditionssim

plyreturn

tonorm

alon

theirow

n,the

interventionw

illappear

tobe

effective.T

hisphenom

enon—

“regressionto

them

ean”—is

afam

iliartrap

forevaluators.

Table

2is

acom

parisonof

mean

monthly

reportedcrim

esin

Lynn

beforeand

afterthe

inceptionof

theT

askForce.

Robberies

declinedby

28percent,

burglariesby

36percent,

andcrim

esagainst

theperson

by75

percent.F

igures1,

2,and

3display

thesam

einform

ationgraphically;

theblack

horizontallines

throughthe

middle

of

thegraphs

representthe

means

forthe

entireperiod

(pre-and

post-intervention);the

verticalslashed

linesrepresent

thestart

of

theT

askForce

operations.

Table2:

Co

mp

arison

of

Month

lyC

rimes

Before

and

After

Interv

entio

nin

Lynn

for

LynnB

eforeIntervention

After

InterventionD

ifferenceS

ignificanC

rime

Mean

St.D

ev.M

onthsM

eanS

t.D

ev.M

onthsat

p=

.01A

gainstT

heP

erson88.6

21.144

22.221.7

28Y

ES

Robbery

21.86.1

4416.4

6.528

YE

SB

urglary255.6

45.744

164.639.0

28Y

ES

Larceny

215.754.2

44207.1

26.828

NO

The

Effects

of

IntensiveE

nforcement

onR

etailH

eroinD

ealing19

Atim

e-seriesanalysis

designedto

detectboth

seasonaleffects

andreg

res

siontow

ardthe

mean

confirmed

thatthe

interventionw

assignificant

(the

nullhypothesis,

thatthe

post-interventionm

odelw

asthe

same

asthe

pre

interventionm

odelw

asrejected

atthe

.01level)

forall

threecrim

e

categories.

Tocontrol

statisticallyfor

theeffects

of

broadersocial

andeconom

ic

changesaffecting

Massachusetts

comm

unitiesgenerally,

Lynn

crimes

in

eachcategory

were

computed

asa

percentageof

allcrim

esin

that

category

forM

assachusettscities

of

comparable

size.F

orburglary,

theL

ynn-to-

Massachusetts

ratiofell

by13

percentafter

theinception

of

theT

askForce.

The

ratiofor

robberyfell

25.1percent.

The

ratiofor

crimes

againstthe

per

sonfell

by77

percent.A

llthree

changesw

erestatistically

significantat

the

.01level

(SeeT

able3)27

Table3:

Crim

esin

Lynn

asa

Pro

portio

nof

Crim

esin

All

Massachusetts

Cities:

Before

and

After

theIn

terven

tion

Before

After

InterventionIntervention

Difference

St.

St.

Percent

Significant

Crim

eM

eanD

ev.M

onthsM

eanD

ev.M

onthsD

ifferenceat

p=

.01

Against

The

Person.2227

.041544

.0501.0392

28-77.5o

YES

Robbery

.1724.0537

44.1291

.042228

-25.1°oY

ES

Burglary

.1671.0281

44.1454

.029428

-13.0°oY

ES

Thus

therate

of

burglaries,robberies,

andcrim

esagainst

theperson

fellby

largeram

ountsthan

canbe

explainedby

chance,by

seasonality,by

regres

siontow

ardthe

mean,

orby

variationselsew

here.T

heeffect

ofthe

Lynn

Task

Forceon

reportedcrim

esin

Lynn

appearsto

bereal.

Displacem

ent

The

dro

pin

crime

ratesin

Lynn

was

nota

resultof

crine

moving

outof

Lynn

andinto

thesurrounding

area.M

eanm

onthlyreports

of

crimes

againstthe

personin

surroundingcities

went

upslightly

butinsignificantly

afterstreet-level

enforcement

began.M

eanm

onthlyreports

ofrobberies

and

burglariesin

surroundingcities

actuallydeclined

significantly,though

not

nearlyas

precipitouslyas

inL

ynn.M

eanm

onthlyreports

of

larcenies

declined,but

notsignificantly

(SeeT

able4).

20K

leiman

Table

4:

Com

pariso

nof

Month

lyC

rimes

Before

and

After

Interv

entio

nin

Lynn

foreig

hborin

gT

owns

Before

InterventionA

fterIntervention

Difference

Significant

Crim

eM

eanS

t.D

ev.M

onthsM

eanS

t.D

cv.M

onthsat

p=

.01A

gainstT

heP

erson31.5

13.044

34.011.9

28N

OR

obbery16.0

4.344

12.44.0

28Y

ES

Burglary

236.934.6

44207.4

35.928

YE

SL

arceny338.9

74.944

308.143.1

26N

O

Decreased

Crim

eD

ueto

Decreased

Heroin

Consum

ptionTo

unsophisticatedeyes,

theL

ynncrim

eresults

areutterly

unsurprising.A

fterall,

“everybodyknow

s”that

druguse

causescrim

e.W

hatcould

bem

orenatural

thanthe

findingthat

enforcement

designedto

decreasedrug

usedecreases

propertyand

violentcrim

eas

well?

On

reflection,how

ever,the

secondproposition

doesnot

appearto

imm

ediatelyfollow

fromthe

first.T

hatheroin

usersare

over-representedam

ongoffen

ders,

28

thatheroin-using

offenderstend

tohave

higheroffense

ratesthan

otheroffen

ders

29

andthat

heroin-usingoffenders’

crimes

arecon

centratedinto

periodsalso

characterizedby

heavyheroin

use

30

—all

of

thisdoes

notdirectly

imply

thatinterventions

inthe

heroinm

arketw

illsuppress

comm

oncrim

e.Indeed,

insofaras

theheroin

crime-link

isforged

byheroin

users’need

form

oneyto

buydru

gs

3and

insofaras

enforcement,

byim

po

sing

costson

heroindealers,

tendsto

increasethe

priceof

thedrug,

enfo

rcem

entcould

plausiblylead

toincreases

inproperty

crime.

Toillustrate

thispoint,

considera

hypotheticalexam

ple.A

heroinuser

who

injects10

milligram

s(pure)

perday,

about2

streetbags,

andpays

thena

tionalaverage

retailprice

of

$2.50per

purem

illigram,

spends$25

perday

onheroin.

Ifim

provedenforcem

entcaused

aprice

increaseto

$3per

purem

illigram,

which

might

takethe

formof

adecrease

inpurity

from5

per

centto

4percent,

andif

thatuser

maintained

a10-m

illigram-per-day

con

sumption

level,the

resultw

ouldbe

anincrease

indaily

heroinspending

from$25

to$30,

anincrease

thatm

ightbe

reflectedin

increasedproperty-

crime

activity.

Of

course,not

allusers

would

maintain

previousconsum

ptionlevels

inth

eface

of

aprice

increase.S

ome

would

cutback

ontheir

heroinconsum

ption;som

em

ightquit

altogether.D

ependingon

users’responses,

aprice

increasefor

heroinm

ightlead

toan

increaseor

adecrease

inm

oneyspent

onthe

drug.T

heone

empirical

studyaddressing

thisquestion

suggeststh

atin

creasingheroin

pricestend

togenerate

increasesin

propertycrim

e,but

thequestion

isfar

fromsettled

.32

The

Effects

ofIntensive

Enforcem

enton

Retail

Heroin

Dealing

21

But

money

pricefails

totell

thew

holestory.

Buying

heroinis

notlike

buy

ingcigarettes.

Finding

aw

illingand

reliableseller

may

bea

substantialp

ro

blemfor

aw

ould-beheroin

buyer,requiring

notonly

cashbut

alsoco

nnec

tions,skill,

andtim

e.It

isas

ifthere

were

two

distinctprices

tobe

paidfor

heroin,one

inm

oneyand

theother

intim

e,risk,

andag

grav

ation

.33

Enforcem

entcan

increaseboth

kindsof

price.E

itherhaving

tospend

more

money

orhaving

toendure

more

hasslein

orderto

acquireheroin

may

causesom

eusers

toreduce

theirdrug

consumption.

The

relativeeffec

tivenesso

flonger

searchtim

eversus

higherm

oneyprice

indiscouraging

heroinuse

isa

matter

of

conjecture.

The

money-price

of

heroindepends

largelyon

therisks

facedby

high-level

drugdealers.

Ifenforcem

entcan

increasethose

risks,the

pricew

illrise

and

some

usersw

illrefuse

topay

it.T

henon-m

oneyprice

of

heroindepends

on

howm

anystreet

dealersthere

are,w

hothey

are,w

herethey

are,and

how

aggressivelythey

lookfor

newcustom

ers.If


entcan

shrinktheir

numbers,

restricttheir

location,and

make

themm

orecautious,

itcan

influencedrug

consumption

evenif

them

oneyprice

ofheroin

re

mains

unchanged.

Street-level

drugenforcem

entdoes

nothave

asits

primary

effectan

increase

inheroin

prices.Indeed,

itm

aynot

increasethe

costof

abag

of

heroinat

all.

34

Rather,

itm

ayincrease

thetim

e,inconvenience,

andrisk

involvedin

making

retailheroin

purchases,and

doso

ina

way

with

anunam

biguously

beneficialeffect

oncrim

erates.

Ifconsum

ptionfalls

asa

result,w

hile

money

pricedoes

notrise,

thetotal

number

of

dollarsspent

onheroin

must

decrease.

This

analysishelps

make

senseof

theL

ynnand

Pressure

Point

results.If

street-levelheroin

enforcement

canincrease

thedifficulty

of

buyingheroin

atretail,

we

shouldexpect

itto

decreasethe

number

ofincom

e-producing

crimes.

Incapacitationof

High-R

ateO

ffenders

Heroin

dealersand

heroinusers

includem

anyvery

activeproperty

offenders.T

heirarrest

andincarceration

asa

resultof

street-leveldrug

enforcement

will

thushave

adirect

effecton

propertycrim

e.F

orthis

pur

pose,the

precisenature

of

therelation

between

druguse

andcrim

eis

ir

relevant;the

simple

correlationbetw

eenheroin

useand

heroindealing

on

theone

handand

propertyand

violentoffenses

onthe

otherm

eansthat

drugenforcem

entarrestees

arelikely

tobe

worth

incapacitatingfrom

the

viewpoint

of

propertycrim

econtrol.

The

valueof

lockingthem

upw

illbe

thesam

ew

hetherthey

arearrested

ondrug

chargesor

pickedup

on

outstandingw

arrantsdue

tothe

concentrationof

policein

drug-buying

areas.

Given

theextrem

elyhigh

crime

ratescharacteristic

of

some

heroinusers,

theincarceration

of

relativelysm

allnum

bersof

themm

ightbe

responsible

forsubstantial

changesin

crime

ratesin

acity

suchas

Lynn.

Adetailed

22K

leiman

analysisof

individual-levelcrim

inalhistories

might

helpillum

inatethe

extent

tow

hichthis

effectw

asat

work

inL

ynnand

theL

ower

East

Side.

Disruption

ofS

tolen-Goods

Markets

Som

edrug

dealersalso

actas

fences,bartering

heroinfor

stolenproperty.

Police

believethis

tohave

beenthe

casein

Lynn

.3

5W

heredealers

arealso

fences,drug

enforcement

canhelp

disruptthe

stolengoods

markets

asw

ellas

thedrug

markets.

Itseem

splausible

thatm

akingstolen

goodsharder

tosell

might

make

theftless

attractive,but

thereis

littleem

piricalw

orkabout

anysuch

effect.

Dispersal

ofC

oncentrationsof

Predators

andV

ictims

Both

thedecrease

inheroin

expendituresand

thedisruption

ofstolen

goodsm

arketshelp

toexplain

thedecreases

inincom

e-producingcrim

es.B

uthow

shouldw

eunderstand

theapparent

effectivenessof

crackdowns

inL

ynn,L

ower

Manhattan,

andL

awrence

inreducing

thefrequency

of

homicides,

rapes,and

aggravatedassaults?

Aplausible

explanationw

ouldbe

thatstreet

drugm

arketsinvolve

concentrationsof

bothlikely

aggressorsand

attractivevictim

s:attractive

bothbecause

theyhave

money

anddrugs

worth

stealingand

becausethey

areless

likelythan

averageto

complain

tothe

police.In

addition,business

disputesam

ongdrug

dealersand

between

drugdealers

anddrug

customers

may

resultin

violencerather

thanlitigation.

Breaking

upthe

drugm

arketdisperses

potentialvictim

sand

offenders,m

akingit

lesslikely

thatthey

will

come

intocontact

with

oneanother.

Reducing

thefrequency

of

drugtransactions

reducesthe

frequencyof

disputesabout

themthat

may

leadto

violence.

PerceivedP

oliceP

resence

Ifproperty

criminals

tendto

stealless

when

theythink

thatrisks

frompolice

arehigh,

andif

theytend

tospend

much

oftheir

time

indrug-

dealingareas,

thenthe

concentrationof

policein

thoseareas

forstreet-level

drugenforcem

entm

ayhave

auseful

“advertising”effect.

An

increasein

policepresence

where

propertycrim

inalshang

outm

aypersuade

some

of

themto

cutback

ontheir

propertycrim

eactivity

bygiving

themthe

(pro

bablyincorrect)

impression

thatthe

risksof

arrestfor

thefthave

goneup.

While

itseem

sreasonable

toexpect

thatany

sucheffect

would

betem

porary,very

littleis

known

abouthow

criminals

evaluaterisks.

Reduced

Tolerance

ofD

isorder

The

“Broken

Window

s”hyp

oth

esis56

assertsthat

toleranceby

thepolice

andcitizens

of

low-level

lawbreaking

ina

givenarea

givesa

signalto

potentialcrim

inalsthat

theareas

areopen

tothe

comm

issiono

fm

oreserious

crimes.

When

thereare

clearsigns

thatsuch

tolerancehas

come

toan

end,it

can

The

Effects

of

IntensiveE

nforcement

onR

etailH

rnin

flp1

in,

beexpected

that

thenew

perceptionof

orderw

illspread

toaffect

other,

more

serioustypes

of

crime.

Open

streetdrug

dealingm

aycreate

sucha

“Broken

Window

s”effect;

ifso,

breakingup

suchm

arketsw

illreduce

the

frequencyof

seriouscrim

esnearby.

24K

leiman

Crackdow

nsvs.

theO

verallIntensity

ofR

etailE

nforcement

While

itm

akessense

thatstreet-level

enforcement

shouldtend

toreduce

thefrequency

ofproperty

crimes,

thereis

noreason

tobelieve

thatsm

allin

creasesor

decreasesin

suchenforcem

enthave

largeeffects

oncrim

erates.

Nor

hasanyone

demonstrated

statisticallya

consistentrelationship

between,

forexam

ple,narcotics

arrestsand

reportedburglary

rates.T

herefore,the

mere

factof

street-levelarrests

andprosecutions

isnot

sufficientto

explainU

theL

ynnresults.

Moreover,

thedifference

between

theeffects

of

increasedstreet-level

enforcement

inL

ynnand

itseffects

inL

awrence

areinconsistent

with

theidea

thata

littlestreet-level

enforcement

isgood

forreducing

burglaries,and

alittle

more

isa

littlebetter.

Som

ethingseem

sto

havehap

penedin

Lynn

thatsim

plydid

nothappen

inL

awrence.

Itis

possibleto

frame

atheory

toaccount

bothfor

thedram

aticsuccess

of

theL

ynneffort

andthe

failurein

Law

rence,though

carefulevaluations

of

many

more

casesw

ouldbe

requiredto

definehow

closelythe

theoryfits

thefacts.

The

basicidea

isth

atconcentration

(geographicallyand

bydrug

type)and

persistenceof

street-leveldrug

enforcement

effortscan

createresults

fundamentally

differentfrom

thoseachieved

bym

oresporadic

andunfocused

effo

rts.3’

Itseem

splausible

that

therisk

of

apprehensionfor

anyone

drugbuyer

ordrug

sellershould

increasew

iththe

number

of

officersassigned

todrug

en

forcement

anddecrease

with

thenum

berof

otherbuyers

andsellers,

simply

becausepolice

can’tpay

attentionto

everybodyat

once.W

henbuyers

andsellers

congregatein

largenum

bers,they

tendto

“screen”each

otherby

“swam

ping”police

attention.

Asm

allincrease

instreet-level

enforcement

activityw

illhave

littleeffect

onthe

number

of

buyersor

sellers.B

uta

largeincrease

may

havea

substantialeffect.

Som

ew

illbe

injail.

Others,

facingcharges,

will

worry

aboutthe

consequencesof

rearrestw

hileon

bail.Still

othersw

illw

antto

lielow

untilstreet

conditionsreturn

to“norm

al.”

Ifconditions

doreturn

tothe

previousnorm

atthe

endof

ashort

burstof

increasedenforcem

entactivity,

buyersand

sellersw

illreturn

tothe

market

andthings

will

bem

uchas

theyw

erebefore.

How

ever,if

alevel

of

enfo

rcem

entactivity

greatenough

tocause

them

arketto

shrinktem

porarilyis

maintained,

thenthe

arithmetic

of

copsand

robbershas

moved

ina

way

unfavorableto

thecontinued

operationof

them

arket.If

increaseden

force

ment

shrinksthe

market,

eachrem

ainingm

arketparticipant

will

facetw

osources

of

increasedrisk:

more

police,and

fewer

drugbuyers

andsellers.

The

riskof

apprehensionw

illincrease

againas

thenum

berof

dealersdecreases,

leavingm

orepolice

pertransaction.

Thus

anenforcem

enteffort

largeenough

tostart

ageneral

shrinkageof

them

arketm

ay,if

itis

maintained,

startto

feedon

itsow

nsuccess;

bystarting

The

Effects

of

IntensiveE

nfnrcement

nn

Pt1

-

abend

towards

greaterand

greaterrisk

andefibrt

pertransaction.

Ifthis

accountis

correct,then

aconcentrated,

persistentstreet-level

crackdown

representsa

differentstrategy

fromthe

business-as-usualoflocal

drugenforcem

ent.

The

Cost

Side:

System

Impacts

andC

ivilL

iberties

Resources

andSystem

Impacts

The

successfulcrackdow

nefforts

we

havediscussed

hereall

involvedre-allocations

of

lawenforcem

entresources

fromother

programs.

Crack-

downs

make

inroadsinto

theprosecutors,

courttim

e,jail

space,and

policeforces

availablefor

acom

munity’s

otherlaw

enforcement

need

s.38

Furtherm

ore,once

acrackdow

ngets

started,it

may

bepolitically

hardto

stop.A

sin

thecase

of

Operation

Pressure

Point,

itis

likelythat

neig

hborhood

demand

will

placeconsiderable

politicalpressure

onlocal

officialsto

continuea

programat

fullstrength,

well

beyondthe

persistencerequired

tom

akea

crackdown

work.

This

may

beconsidered

acom

pliment

tothe

localeffectiveness

of

suchprogram

s,and

anim

portantaspect

of

goodpublic

relations.H

owever,

itm

ayalso

presenta

resourceallocation

problem,

when

resourcesused

forthe

crackdown

aretaken

away

fromother

partsof

thelaw

enforcement

system,

anda

morale

problem,

when

officersassigned

toarrest

street-leveldrug

dealersfind

thatthere

arefew

erand

fewer

suchpersons

toarrest.

The

floodof

narcoticscases

arisingout

of

Operation

Pressure

Point

clearlytended

to“crow

dout”

othernarcotics

casesin

Manhattan;

theoverall

number

of

narcoticsfelony

convictionsborough-w

idein

Pressure

Point’s

firstyear

was

virtuallyunchanged

fromthe

yearbefore.

The

casesforegone

needto

becounted

ascosts

of

theprogram

;the

same

istrue

forim

pactson

jailsand

prisons.A

comprehensive

evaluationof

drugcrackdow

nsw

ouldrequire

notonly

am

easurement

of

theireffects,

butan

estimate

of

theeffects

of

theother

activitiesdisplaced

bythem

.

Intrusivenessand

Abuses

ofA

uthority

The

Philadelphia

experienceshow

sthat


entefforts

canbe

designedand

executedin

ways

thatcreate

unnecessaryintrusion

intocitizens’

rightsto

goabout

theirlaw

fulbusiness.

Som

eof

thetactics

usedin

Operation

Pressure

Point

I,in

particularthe

largenum

berof

“Disorderly

Conduct”

arrests,m

aybe

closeto

theline.

The

historyof

retail-leveldrug

enforcement

inN

ewY

orkin

thelate

1960’s,and

inparticular

thenotorious

“dropsy”cases

(where

some

policeap

paren

tly

routinelyperjured

themselves

toconceal

theirequally

routineuse

of

un

warranted

personalsearches

of

drugdealers)

illustratesthe

riskthat

retaillevel

drugenforcem

entcan

leadto

abusesof

authority.T

hepotential

forfinancial

corruptionneeds

nocom

ment.

The

absenceof

anycorruption

orabuse

scandalsarising

outof

theL

ynn,L

awrence,

andP

ressureP

ointI

operationsis

reassuringto

some

extent.

The

Effects

of

IntensiveE

nforcement

onR

etailH

eroinD

ealing27

How

ever,it

shouldbe

notedboth

thatthe

effortsare

stillrelatively

new,

andth

atthe

Pressure

Point

staffingplan

calledfor

veryheavy

useof

sergeantsand

lieutenantsspecifically

tom

inimize

thepossibility

of

misconduct.

Rk

’ipim

n

Open

Questions

CK

eyR

atiosand

How

They

Vary

Across

Circum

stancesIf

concentrationand

persistencem

akethe

differencebetw

eenlow

-impact

routineheroin

enforcement

operationsand

high-impact

crackdowns,

them

ostim

portantquestion

facinga

localdecision-m

akerbecom

es:how

much

isenough?

Given

thecharacteristics

of

adrug

market,

howm

anyofficers,

working

forhow

long,w

illbe

requiredto

make

itcollapse?

That

may

dependon

many

factors:num

berof

users,num

berof

dealers,num

berof

transactions,w

hethercurrent

transactionsare

indooror

outdoor,the

geographicarea,

ethnicdiversity,

climate,

thelevel

of

neighborhoodcooperation,

andthe

performance

of

prosecutors,courts,

andprobation,

parole,and

correctionsagencies.

One,

necessarilycrude,

way

tothink

aboutthe

problemis

toim

aginethat

thereis

some

baselinecritical

ratioof

policeto

thenum

berof

usersa

market

supportsabove

which

them

arketw

illstart

tocontract.

The

actualcritical

ratioin

areal

situationm

aybe

higheror

lower

thanthe

baseline,depending

ongeography,

ethnicity,and

othersim

ilarfactors.

That

would

varyw

iththe

otherfactors

cited.T

heL

ynnand

Pressure

Point

operationsappear

tohave

involvedabout

oneofficer

forevery

75users;

Law

rence,allow

ingfor

thepolice

time

spenton

cocainew

holesalingoperations,

hadabout

oneofficer

foreach

150users.

Itis

tooearly

tosay

thatthe

differencein

ratiosw

asthe

differencebetw

eensuccess

andfailure.

Displacem

entW

ithinB

igC

ities

As

notedabove,

thereis

noevidence

thatthe

Lynn

projectdisplaced

sign

ificant

amounts

ofeither

drugdealing

orcrim

e,but

theevidence

aboutP

ressureP

ointI

isfar

lessclear.

The

valueof

heroin-market

crackdowns

ascrim

econtrol

inbig

citiesis

thereforestill

tobe

shown.

That

showing

would

requirea

city-wide

crackdown

somew

here,probably

involvingthe

diversiono

fofficers

frompatrol

functionsinto

street-leveldrug

enforcement.

The

Effects

of

Inten

civF

nfnrm

nt

D+

n;1

..-....

i-..1:.-

-i

Conclusion

Itis

possibleto

sayw

ithconfidence,

basedupon

theL

ynnresults,

that

street-levelheroin

crackdowns,

undersom

ecircum

stances,produce

great

benefitsat

modest

costs.It

iseven

possibleto

givean

accountof

why

that

shouldbe

true.It

isnot

yetpossible

tom

easureall

of

thecosts

ofsuch

ac

tivitiesin

theform

ofother

criminal-justice

activitiesnot

undertaken,

morale,

intrusiveness,abuse,

andcorruption

(thoughit

isreasonably

clear

thatin

Lynn

evena

fullcost

accountingw

ouldstill

leavea

healthysurplus

of

benefits).M

oreseriously,

itis

notyet

possibleto

defineunder

what

cir

cumstances

retailheroin

crackdowns

will

proveto

besuch

low-cost,

high-

benefitventures.

But

anargum

entcan

bem

adefor

tryinga

crackdown

wherever

alarge

retailheroin

market

exists.T

heL

ynnand

Manhattan

resultssuggest

that

thetraditional

ascriptionof

alarge

fractionof

violentand

propertycrim

e

toheroin

can,under

some

circumstances,

betranslated

intoeffective

action.

Moreover,

therisks

involvedare

limited

bytw

ofactors.

First,

ifa

crackdown

failsto

decreaseproperty

andviolent

crime,

thefailure

may

not

distinguishthis

policetactic

fromother

possiblepolice

activities.T

he

criminal-justice

evaluationliterature

includesm

anyexam

plesof

lawen

force

ment

strategiesthat

faile

d.

39

Second,

drugcrackdow

nsare

notlong-term

in

vestments;

theanti-crim

eeffects

of

thetw

osuccessful

programs

studiedso

far—L

ynnand

Pressure

Point

I—becam

eapparent

within

afew

months.

Where

thepotential

gainsare

largeand

therisks

limited,

“tryit

andsee”

may

bea

more

usefulguide

toaction

thanany

elaboratecalculation.

Notes

1.See

Mark

H.

Moore,

“Lim

itingS

uppliesof

Drugs

toIllicit

Markets,”

Journalof

Drug

Issues,V

olume

9,(S

pring1979)

p.291;

Mark

H.

Moore,

Buy

and

Bust:

The

Effective

Reg

ula

tionof

anIllicit

Mark

etin

Heroin

(Lexington,

MA

:D

.C.

Heath

&C

o.,1976),

p.248.

2.Jam

esA

.Inciardi,

“Exploring

theD

rugs/C

rime

Connectio

n,”

unpublishedpaper,

Division

of

Crim

inalJustice,

University

of

Delaw

are,1987.

3.M

arkK

leiman

andC

hristo

pher

Putala,

“State

andL

ocalD

rugL

awE

nforcement:

Issuesand

Practices,”

Working

Paper,

no.87-01-06,

Program

inC

riminal

JusticeP

olicyand

Managem

ent,John

EK

ennedyS

choolof

Governm

ent,H

arvardU

niv

ersity,

Cam

bridge,M

A,

1987;R

obertL

.D

upontand

Mark

H.

Greene,

“The

Dynam

icsof

aH

eroinA

ddictionE

pidemic,”

Science,

Volum

e181,

(August,

1973):p.

715.

4.John

Kaplan,

The

Hardest

Drug:

Heroin

and

Public

Policy

(Chicago,

IL:

The

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1983).

5.K

evinB

urkeinterview

,A

ugust1984.

6.M

arkK

leiman,

William

Holland,

andC

hristo

pher

Hayes,

“Report

tothe

District

Attorney

of

Essex

County:

Evaluation

of

theL

ynnD

rugT

askF

orce,”W

orkingP

aper;no.

87-01-03,P

rogramin

Crim

inalJustice

Policy

andM

anagement,

JohnF.

Kennedy

School

of

Governm

ent,H

arvardU

niv

ersity,

Cam

bridge,M

A,

1987,p.

5.7.

Ibid.,p.

11.T

hreeyears

later,the

same

surveyinstrum

entw

asadm

inisteredto

residentsof

Lynn

andL

awrence,

which

atthe

time

was

thefocus

of

adrug

crackdown

concentratedon

“indoor”dealing,

andin

a“co

ntrol”

cityw

hichhad

experienced

noextraordinary

drugen

force

ment

activity.In

eachcase,

respondentsw

ereab

out

equallydivided

between

“better”and

“worse.”

8.T

reatment

professionals’view

s:Interview

sconducted

byW

illiamE

.H

ollandw

ithtre

at

ment

workers

atP

rojectC

OP

E,

Lynn,

MA

,A

ugust,1984.

9.Interview

sconducted

byC

hristo

pher

Putala

with

heroinaddicts,

Septem

ber1986

thro

ugh

August

1987.R

eportson

thoseinterview

sw

illbe

included

ina

reportto

besu

bm

itted

tothe

Natio

nal

Instituteof

Justiceby

theD

istrictA

ttorneyunder

agrant

toevaluate

theL

ynnand

Law

renceefforts.

10.K

leiman,

Holland,

andH

ayes,p.

8and

Figure

1.T

hecom

parisonis

between

theP

rojectC

OP

Eunit

inL

ynnand

unitsof

thesam

eorganization

elsewhere

inthe

state.T

reatment-dem

andfigures

forM

assachusettsas

aw

holedo

notap

pear

tobe

available.

11.Ibid.,

p.8,

Table

2,and

Figures

2and

3.See

alsoD

avidC

avanagh,“E

ffectsof

Drug

Task

Forces

inL

ynnand

Law

renceon

Com

mon

Crim

esR

eportedto

theP

olice,”(P

rovidence,

RI:

Applied

Social

Research,

1987).“C

rimes

againstthe

person”w

erelum

pedtogether

becausehom

icidesand

rapesw

eretoo

infrequentto

make

monthly

measurem

entsm

eaningful.12.

Tw

oreports

byP

eterK

errin

theN

ewY

orkT

imes

(“AP

or

traitof

Washington

Square

Park:

Insidea

Drug

Bazaar,”

January

12,1987,

B1:2,

and“C

rushingthe

Drug

Dealers

ofW

ashingtonS

quare,”9

Novem

ber1987,

Al:3)

givean

accountof

theim

pactof

openm

arijuan

aand

cocainedealing

onthe

neig

hborh

ood

around

Washington

Square

Park

in

L.ower

Manhattan,

andof

theeffectiveness

ofconcentrated

en

forcement

indispersing

them

arketand

improving

neighborhoodconditions.

Ap

parently,neither

thepossible

ef

fectof

them

arketon

druguse

byresidents

norits

connectionw

ithproperty

andviolent

crime

was

asalient

issuefor

theneighbors;

theyseem

edto

regardthe

market

asa

neighborhooddisam

enity,like

agarbage

dump

ora

noisybar.

13.R

onaldFerguson,

“The

Drug

Problem

inB

lackC

om

munities,”

Working

Paper

no.87-01-01,

Program

inC

riminal

JusticePolicy

andM

anagement,

JohnF.

Kennedy

School

ofG

overnment,

Harvard

Universi

ty,C

ambridge,

MA

,1987,

p.9.

14.P

hilipB

aridon,A

ddiction,C

rime,

andS

ocialPolicy

(Lex

ington,M

A:

Lexington

Books,

1976);See

alsoB

ruceD

.Johnson

etal,

Taking

Care

of

Business:

The

Econom

icsof

Crim

eby

Heroin

Abusers

(Lex

ington,M

A:

Lexington

Books,

1985).

15.“R

educingthe

Risk

Through

Testing,”

NJJ

Reports

(Washington,

DC

:N

ationalIn

stituteof

Justice,S

eptember/O

ctober1986).

Carver

discussesa

programin

Washington,

D.C

.set

upto

testthe

hypothesisthat

closem

onitoringof

adefendant’s

druguse

coupledw

ithquick

sanctionsfor

violatorsw

oulddeter

druguse

andreduce

criminal

activity;E

ricW

ish,M

aryT

oborgand

JohnB

ellassai,“Identifying

Drug

Users

andM

onitoringT

hemD

uringC

onditionalR

elease,”N

ationalInstitute

ofJustice

andN

arcoticand

Drug

Research,

Inc.,and

Toborg

Associates,

Decem

ber1987.

16.M

arkH

.M

oore,“Policies

toA

chieveD

iscrimination

inthe

Effective

Priceof

Heroin,”

Am

ericanE

conomic

Review

,V

olume

63(M

ay1973):

p.926.

17.For

adiscussion

ofarrests

foruse

offensesas

deterrents,see

JohnK

aplan,T

heH

ardestD

rug:H

eroinand

Public

Policy

(Chicago,

IL:

The

University

ofC

hicagoPress,

1983),chapter

5.

18.Interview

with

New

York

City

Assistant

Chief

Arthur

J.M

cNevin,

conductedby

Mark

Kleim

an,S

eptember

15,1986.

19.Interview

with

New

York

City

PoliceC

omm

issionerB

enjamin

Ward,

Septem

ber12,

1987.

20.N

ewY

orkPolice

Departm

entvideo

tape:Interview

with

Lieutenant

Phillip

McG

uire,N

ewY

orkC

ityPolice

Dep

artm

ent,S

eptember

15,1986.

21.N

ewY

orkPolice

Departm

entinternal

documents;

intervieww

ithM

cGuire,

Septem

ber15,

1986.

22.A

uthurJ.

McN

evin,“S

tatusR

eport-

6W

eeks”(internal

New

York

PoliceD

epartment

mem

orandum),

March

1,1984

(PBM

S#0010-9);

McN

evin,“1984

Status

Report”

(internalN

ewY

orkPolice

Departm

entm

emorandum

),January

4,1988

(PB

MS

#0010-28).

23.P

ressureP

ointA

reaFigures

fromM

cNevin,

“1984S

tatusR

eport”;other

figuresfrom

New

York

City

PoliceD

epart

ment

Crim

eA

nalysisU

nit,“C

omplaints

andA

rrests,”m

on

thlystatistical

report,1985.

There

isa

somew

hatm

oredetailed

descriptionof

Pressure

Point

Iin

Kleim

an,“B

ringingB

ackStreet-L

evelH

eroinE

nforcem

ent,”W

orkingP

apersSeries,

no.86-01-08,

Program

inC

riminal

JusticePolicy

andM

anagement,

JohnF

Kennedy

School

ofG

overnment,

Harvard

University;

Seealso

thediscu

ssion

ofP

ressurePoint

op

erations

andresults

inL.

Zim

mer,

“Operation

Pressure

Point:

The

Disruption

ofStreet-L

evelD

rugT

radeon

New

York’s

Low

erE

astSide,”

Occasional

Papers

fromT

heC

enterfor

Research

inC

rime

andJustice,

New

York

2’

k’lp

im9n

University

Schoolof

Law,

New

York,

1987.

24.Interview

sw

ithaddicts,

con

ductedby

Christopher

Putala,

Septem

ber1986

throughA

ugust1987.

25.Interview

sw

ithL

awrence

Police,conducted

byC

hristopherP

utala.

26.N

orfolk:reported

verballyby

William

Spelm

an,Police

Ex

ecutiveR

esearchF

orum;

Sydney:reported

verballyby

Inspector

Christine

Nixon,

N.SW

.Police;

Seattle:reported

verballyby

Ricardo

Martinez,

SpecialD

eputyP

rosecutingA

ttorney,K

ingC

ounty;P

hiladelphia:new

spaperaccounts,

not-for-attribution

verbalreports

ofa

rankingP

hiladelphiaP.D

.of

ficial;W

ashingtonD

C:

un

publishedreports

bythe

Rand

Corporation.

As

ofthis

writing,

nopublished

evaluationsexist

ofany

ofthese

efforts.27.

This

analysisis

recountedin

detailin

David

Cavanagh,

“Ef

fectsof

Drug

Task

Forcesin

Lynn

andL

awrence

onC

om

mon

Crim

esR

eportedto

thePolice,”

(Providence,R

I:A

pplied

SocialR

esearch,1987).

28.E

ricW

ish,E

lizabethB

rady,and

Mary

Cuadrado,

“Drug

Use

andC

rime

inA

rresteesin

Manhattan,”

apaper

presentedto

am

eetingof

The

Com

mittee

onP

roblems

ofD

rugD

ependence,June

1985.29.

JanC

haikenand

Marcia

Chaiken

Varieties

of

Crim

inalB

ehavior(S

antaM

onica,C

A:

Rand

Corporation,

1982).30.

M.

Douglas

Anglin

andG

eorgeSteckert,

“Narcotics

useand

Crim

e:a

Multi-S

ample

Multi-

Method

Analysis,”

Crim

inologyS

pring1988;

Seealso

George

Steckertand

M.

Douglas

Anglin,

“Narcotics

Use

andC

rime:

AC

ausalM

odelingA

pproach,”

Journalof

Quan

titativeC

riminology

2(1986):

3-28;See

alsoJ.C

.B

all,L.

Rosen,

J.A.

Flueck,

andD

.N.

Nurco,

“The

Crim

inalityof

Heroin

Addicts:

When

Addicted

andW

henoff

Opiates,”

inJ.A

.Inciardi,

ed.,T

heD

rugC

rime

Connection

(Beverly

Hills,

CA

:Sage,

1981),pp.

39-65.31.

Bruce

D.

Johnson,“Street-L

evelH

eroinM

arkets:T

heC

opingB

ehaviorof

Addicts,”

inPaul

Goldstein,

Edw

ardPreble,

James

Schmeidler,

Douglas

S.L

ipton,B

arryS

punt,and

Thom

asM

iller,T

akingC

areof

Business:

The

Econom

icsof

Crim

eby

Heroin

Abusers

(Lex

ington,M

A:

Lexington

Books,

1985).

32.G

eorgeF.

Brow

nand

Lester

P.Silverm

an,“T

heR

etailPrice

ofH

eroin:E

stimation

andA

pplications,”

Journalof

theA

merican

Statistical

Asso

ciation,

Volum

e69

(Septem

ber1974).

33.M

arkH

.M

oore,“Policies

toA

chieveD

iscrimination

inthe

Effective

Priceof

Heroin,”

p.926.

34.R

euterand

Kleim

an,“R

isksand

Prices,”

pp.328-329.

35.K

leiman,

Holland,

andH

ayes,p.

4.

36.G

eorgeK

ellingand

James

Wilson,

“Broken

Window

s:T

hePolice

andN

eighborhoodS

afety,”

The

Atlantic

Monthly,

Volum

e249

(March

1982):31—

“Socialpsychologists

andpolice

officerstend

toagree

thatif

aw

indowin

abuilding

isbroken

andleft

unrepaired,all

therest

ofthe

window

sw

illsoon

bebroken.”

One

unrepairedbroken

window

signalsthat

noone

caresand

will

perpetuateneighborhood

decayand

minor

infractionsof

thelaw

,p.

3.37.

Reuter

andK

leiman,

“Risks

andPrices,”

p.330.

38.For

adram

aticaccount

ofthe

responseof

New

York

City’s

prosecutors,courts,

andco

rrections

facilitiesto

aflood

ofdrug

arrests,see

Aric

Press,“P

iecingT

ogetherN

ewY

ork’sC

riminal

JusticeSystem

:the

“

Response

toC

rack,”A

ssocia

tionof

theB

arof

theC

ityof

New

York,

4(D

ecember

1987);See

alsoSteve

Belenko

andJe

ffrey

Fagan,“C

rackand

theC

riminal

JusticeSystem

,”N

ewY

orkC

ity:N

ewY

orkC

ityC

riminal

JusticeA

gency,N

ovember

1987.

39.G

.L.

Kelling,

T.Pate,

D.

Dieckm

anand

C.E

.B

rown,

“The

Kansas

City

PreventiveP

atrolE

xperiment:

asum

mary

report,”in

G.V

.G

lass,ed.,

Evaluation

Studies

Review

An

nual,V

olume

1(B

everlyH

ills,C

A:

Sage,1976),

pp.605-657.

)At’

1.,.,...,,,

Chapter

3

DR

UG

CR

AC

KD

OW

NS

AN

DC

RIM

ER

AT

ES

:A

CO

MM

EN

TO

NT

HE

KL

EIM

AN

PA

PE

R

Arnold

Barnett

Igreatly

enjoyedreading

Professor

Kleim

an’spaper

(andthe

backupstatistical

analysisby

Cavanagh

[1987]).T

hepaper

was

lucid,honest,

painstaking,and

thoughtful.P

rofessorK

leiman

didnot

simply

dwell

onfavorable

findings:H

em

adeclear

thatthe

crime

reductionsw

itnessedin

Lynn

were

notreally

replicatedin

Law

rence,any

more

thana

similar

suc

cessin

New

York

was

replicatedin

Philadelphia

orW

ashington.A

ndhe

recognizedthe

needto

considerpotential

reasonsthat

theapparent

achievem

entsin

Lynn

couldbe

theresult

of

astatistical

artifact.C

learly,this

isnot

someone

who

would

scream“E

ureka!”at

thevery

firstshred

ofen

couragingevidence.

But

despitehis

caution(or

perhapsbecause

ofit),

Professor

Kleim

anis

highlyenthusiastic

aboutthe

outcome

of

theL

ynnheroin

crackdown.

“Itis

possibleto

sayw

ithconfidence,”

heasserts,

thatcircum

stancesexist

inw

hichstreet-level

heroinenforcem

entcan

“producegreat

benefitsat

modest

costs.”F

utureexperim

entscan

assume

theefficacy

of

thepolicy

andgo

onto

investigatethe

conditionsin

which

thebenefit/cost

ratioreaches

itspeak.

My

own

assessment

of

theevidence,

unfortunately,is

somew

hatless

op

timistic

thanP

rofessorK

leiman’s.

This

ispartially

becauseof

certainpat

ternsin

thedata,

andpartially

becauseof

thestrong

limits

Isee

onany

inferences

drawn

fromaggregate

statistics.L

etm

edevote

therem

ainderof

thispiece

toexplaining

my

comparatively-subdued

reaction.

Law

rence

Professor

Kleim

anfocuses

ontw

oheroin

crackdowns

inM

assachusetts,one

thatstarted

inS

eptember

1983in

Lynn

andanother

thatbegan

inL

awrence

oneyear

later.T

he“experim

entalconditions”

were

apparentlydifferent

inthe

two

cities,as

were

theobserved

changesin

crime

levelsafter

thecrackdow

ns.In

Lynn,

crimes

againstthe

personfell

drastically,robbery

andburglary

droppedsignificantly,

andlarceny

was

essentiallyunchanged.

InL

awrence,

crimes

againstthe

persondropped

considerably—although

notnearly

sosteeply

asin

Lynn—

while

robbery,burglary,

andlarceny

allin

creased“albeit

notto

astatistically

significantdegree.”

The

readerthus

getsthe

impression

that,in

terms

of

crime

reduction,the

two

Massachusetts

experim

entsproduced

onew

inand

onedraw

.

One

couldplausibly

contend,how

ever,that

theoutcom

ein

Law

rencew

ascloser

toa

lossthan

adraw

.A

sT

able1

reminds

us,the

post-interventiongrow

thin

Law

rence’srobberies,

burglaries,and

larceniesw

asquite

sizable,especially

inrelation

toconcurrent

declinesin

thesecrim

esin

comparable

Massachusetts

cities.

Table1:

Changes

inA

verageM

onthlyF

requenciesof

Three

Inco

me-P

rod

ucin

gC

rimes

After

aD

rugC

rackdown

inL

awrence,

Massachusetts

MO

NT

HL

YA

VE

RA

GE

PercentageC

hangeC

ompared

toB

eforeA

fterP

ercentageS

imilar

Offense

Crackdow

nC

rackdown

Change

Mass.

Cities

Robbery

12.918.8

+4

5.7

%+

52.3

%

Burglary

125.7163.0

+29.7

%+

71.5

%

Larceny

142.7198.4

+3

9.0

%+

55.1%

Note:

This

tablearises

fromdata

inT

ables4

and6

ofC

avanagh(1987),

which

compare

apre

interventionperiod

1/80-8/84w

iththe

post-interventionperiod

9/84-12/86

As

we

will

discuss,assessing

thestatistical

significanceof

suchchanges

istrickier

thanit

might

atfirst

seem.

But

asT

able2

illustratesfor

thecrim

erobbery,

itw

ouldbe

hardto

arguethat

Lynn’s

dropw

assignificant

while

Law

rence’sincrease

was

not.In

absoluteterm

s,in

percentageterm

s,and

inrelation

tothe

statewide

trend,the

robberygrow

thin

Law

rencew

asgreater

thanthe

declinein

Lynn.

And

thereare

notechnical

reasons(e.g.,

ashorter

observationperiod)

fortreating

theL

awrence

numbers

asless

reliablethan

theirL

ynncounterparts.

(Analyses

forthe

crimes

burglaryand

larcenyyield

similar

conclusions.)

16B

arn

ett

Table

2:A

verageM

onthlyR

obberyL.evels

inT

wo

Massachusetts

Cities,

Before

andA

fterH

eroinC

rackdowns

BE

FO

RE

AF

TE

RP

ER

CE

NT

AG

EC

HA

NG

E

Com

paredto

Similar

Actual

Mass.

Cities

Lynn

21.816.4

—24.8%

—21.4%

Law

rence

12.918.8

+45

.7%

+52

.3%

Tw

o-City

Total

34.735.2

+1.4

%+

4.5

%

Note:

These

dataarise

fromT

ables1,

4,and

6of

Cavanagh

(1987).T

he“before”

periodw

as1/80-8/83

inL

ynnand

1/80-8/84in

Law

rence;the

“after”periods

inL

ynnand

Law

rencew

ere,respectively,

9/83-12/85and

9/84-12/86.T

hedata

forcom

parableM

assachusettscities

pertainsto

9/84-12/85,the

16m

onthsfor

which

thepost-

interventionperiods

ofthe

two

citiesoverlap.

The

bottomline

ofthe

tablereveals

thatthe

netoutcom

eof

thetw

oex

periments

was

am

odestincrease

inrobbery.

One

couldm

akethe

case,therefore,

thatthe

badnew

sfrom

Law

renceabout

thisoffense

more

thancancelled

thegood

news

fromL

ynn.

Professor

Kleim

anprovided

atheoretical

explanationof

howa

drugcrackdow

ncould

causean

increasein

income-producing

crimes.

Although

hedoes

notsay

so,the

adversepattern

observedin

Law

rencecould

reflectthe

realizationof

thispossibility.

Certainly,

theresult

underscoresan

imp

or

tantpoint:

therange

of

possibleeffects

of

adrug

crackdown

isnot

merely

fromsuccess

toineffectuality,

butfrom

lessenedrisk

tothe

citizenryto

aperceptible

increasein

danger.

Lynn

Actually,

notall

crimes

declinedin

Lynn

inthe

aftermath

of

itsheroin

crackdown.

Burglary

andlarceny—

thetw

ononviolent

crimes

inthe

Kleim

an/Cavanagh

analysis—w

ereessentially

constantin

9/83-12/85relative

tothe

Massachusetts

trend.(B

urglariesfell

12%in

comparison

with

similar

Massachusetts

cities,w

hilethe

about-equally-numerous

larceniesrose

12%.)

But,

asT

able3

makes

clear,violence

was

farlow

erin

Lynn

during1984-85

thanduring

1980-82.

As

Professor

Kleim

anacknow

ledges,how

ever,T

able3

doesnot

provethat

theprogram

was

beneficial.P

ossibleexplanations

forthe

observeddrop

include

some

kindof

statisticalfluctuation

orthe

geographic“export”

of

crimes

fromL

ynnas

opposedto

theirprevention.

But

Professor

Kleim

anargues

thatsuch

perverseexplanations

arenot

credible.

Table

3:

Reported

Violent

Crim

esin

Lynn

inthe

Years

1980-1985

CR

IME

19801981

19821984

1985

Murder

24

51

4

Rape

914

346

27

Robbery

235312

254163

183

Aggravated

Assault

1054998

978192

150

Note:

1983is

excludedfrom

thistable

becausep

arto

fth

atyear

precededthe

crackdown

andp

artfollow

edit.

These

data

generallycam

efrom

thean

nual

UN

IFO

RM

CR

IME

RE

PO

RT

S.

Incertain

years,L

yn&s

crime

statisticsdid

notap

pear

inthe

UC

R’s;

the

Crim

eA

nalysisB

ureauo

fthe

Com

monw

ealthof

Massach

usetts

was

kindenough

to

supplythe

missing

numbers.

Kleim

anand

Cavanagh

offerserious

evidencethat

Lynn’s

successin

reduc

ingviolence

was

real.B

utsom

efurther

issuesare

worth

bearingin

mind.

One

was

indirectlyraised

byP

rofessorK

leiman’s

statement

that“given

the

extremely

highcrim

erates

of

some

heroinusers,

theincarceration

ofsm

all

numbers

of

themm

ightbe

responsiblefor

substantialchanges

incrim

e

ratesin

acity

suchas

Lynn.”

The

more

generalpoint

hereis

that,if

acity’s

crime

problemis

largelythe

work

ofa

fewindividuals,

avery

small

number

ofarrivals

ordepartures

canabruptly

changethe

prevailinglevel

of

offenses.T

hereis

adanger

thatsuch

suddenshifts

cancause

standardfo

r

mulas

todescribe

asstatistically

significantchanges

incrim

erates

thatare

notat

allso.

Acontrived

example

makes

thepoint

clearer.C

onsidera

small

comm

unity

inw

hich:

(i)A

llburglaries

arecom

mitted

bychronic

offendersw

hoalw

aysavoid

arrest.

(ii)T

henum

berof

suchburglars

oscillatesinfrequently

between

oneand

two.

(iii)E

achactive

burglarcom

mits

anaverage

of

onecrim

eper

week.

Inthis

unrealisticsetting,

thecom

munity’s

annualburglary

levelw

illvary

asdepicted

inF

igure1.

Som

eonew

hoanalyzed

with

usualm

ethodsthe

datafrom

periodA

would

attachgreat

statisticalsignificance

tothe

decline

att.

But

giventhe

abruptups

anddow

nsthat

arepart

of

theexisting

pat

tern,any

conclusionth

atthe

patternhad

dramatically

changedw

ouldbe

unwarranted.

Figure1:

Burg

laryL

evelsin

aS

mall

Co

mm

un

ityw

ithO

neor

Tw

oB

urglars

100

AN

NU

AL

BU

RG

LA

RIE

S

50

TIM

EA

Having

saidthis,

Iw

ouldnot

suggestthat

Lynn’s

reductionin

crime

—

which

soclosely

correspondedw

iththe

startof

itsheroin

crackdown—

was

solelythe

resultof

chance.W

hatI

would

suggestis

thatw

ebe

cautiousin

interpretingboth

them

agnitudeof

thedrop

andits

apparentdurability.

That

pointis

reinforcedby

Table

4,w

hichpresents

dataabout

Lynn

vio

lencefor

thetw

oyears

afterthose

thatK

leiman

andC

avanaghanalyzed.

(For

easeof

comparison,

we

alsopresent

datafor

1985,the

lastyear

inthe

Kleim

an/Cavanagh

studyperiod.)

Table4:

Reported

Violent

Crim

esin

Lynn

inT

hreeS

uccessiveY

ears

CR

IME

19851986

1987M

urder4

17

Rap

e27

2340

Aggravated

Assault

150185

346R

obbery183

252315

Note:

The

1985and

1986data

come

fromthe

Uniform

Crim

eR

eports;

thosefor

1987w

erekindly

providedby

theL

ynnP

oliceD

epartm

ent.

Table

4reveals

anupw

ardtendency

inthe

lasttw

oyears

thatw

asespecially

pronouncedin

1987.A

ndfurther

perspectiveis

providedby

Table

5,w

hichcom

paresaverage

crime

ratesfor

1980-82—the

threefull

yearsin

thepre

interventionperiod—

with

thosefor

1986-87.A

sw

esee,

murder,

rape,and

robberyw

erehigher

inthe

latterperiod

thanin

theyears

rightbefore

thecrackdow

n.(Indeed,

the1987

levelsof

murder

androbbery

were

thehighest

of

thisdecade,

while

therape

levelw

asthe

secondhighest.)

The

onlyv

isi

Drug

Crackdow

nsand

Crim

eR

ates39

bleenduring

consequenceof

thecrackdow

nw

asa

sharpdecline

inag

gravatedassaults;

giventhe

near-doublingof

thiscrim

ein

1987,how

ever,

eventhat

achievement

couldprove

short-lived.

Table5:

Average

Annual

Levels

ofV

iolencein

Lynn

inTw

oD

ifferentP

eriodsin

the1980’s

CR

IME

1980-821986-87

Murder

3.674.0

Rape

19.0031.5

Aggravated

Assault

1010.00265.5

Robbery

267.00283.5

Looking

backfrom

1988,therefore,

Lynn’s

long-termcrim

ereduction

associatedw

ithits

crackdown

seems

ratherlim

ited.It

isconceivable,

of

course,that

thecrackdow

nw

asvirtually

abandonedby

1986.B

utP

rofessor

Kleim

anhas

notprepared

usto

expectsuch

adevelopm

ent:he

recounted

thepopularity

of

them

easuresin

Lynn

andtold

usthat

“oncea

crackdown

getsstarted,

itm

aybe

politicallyhard

tostop”

because“neighborhood

demands

will

placeconsiderable

politicalpressure

onlocal

officialsto

co

n

tinuethe

programat

fullstrength.”

At

am

inimum

,the

jarringL

ynndata

from1987

would

seemto

requirean

explanation.

Displacem

ent

As

Professor

Kleim

annoted,

crimes

might

diminish

ina

cityafter

acrackdow

nnot

becausethey

havebeen

averted,but

ratherbecause

theyhave

beenshifted

elsewhere.

Such

displacement

couldnot

beexcluded

after

the“P

ressureP

oint”crackdow

nin

Manhattan

thatdram

aticallycut

local

crime

rates.D

rugdealers

andusers

may

simply

haverelocated

theirtran

s

actions(and

accompanying

crimes)

toother

drugm

arketsin

Brooklyn

and

Manhattan.

Professor

Kleim

anseem

sconfident,

however,

thatsuch

displacement

did

notattenuate

theobserved

improvem

entsin

Lynn.

The

primary

reasonfor

hisoptim

ismis

thatcrim

edid

notgrow

inthe

post-crackdown

yearsin

comm

unitiesadjacent

toL

ynn.S

econdarily,he

pointsto

growing

enro

ll

ments

inL

ynn’sdrug-treatm

entprogram

safter

them

easurestook

effect.

These

lastobservations

arenot

irrelevant,but

Iquestion

theprem

iseo

fthe

Kleim

an/Cavanagh

searchfor

displacement

effects.T

heassum

ptionseem

s

tobe

thatno

addictsw

ouldactually

move

outof

Lynn,

andthus

thatany

crimes

displacedfrom

thecity

would

reappearin

itsim

mediate

surro

und

ings.B

utif

buyingheroin

inL

ynngot

bothriskier

andm

oreinconvenient,

might

notsom

eusers

decideto

takeup

residencein

Low

ellor

Boston

or

(forthat

matter)

New

York?

Heroin

addicts,after

all,m

ightnot

haveespecially

strongcom

munity

ties;in

anycase,

Lynn

isno

furtherfrom

Boston

thanm

idtown

Manhattan

fromB

rooklyn.

BA

sthe

searchfor

displacedcrim

esgets

wider,

though,it

becomes

increas

inglyfutile.

The

activitiesof

Lynn’s

transplantsw

ouldscarcely

seemvisible

inthe

crime

statisticsof

New

York

orB

oston.A

more

promising

detectionm

ethod(m

entionedby

Professor

Kleim

anin

anothercontext)

would

involvean

all-pointssearch

forpost-crackdow

narrests

among

offendersw

ithlong

previousrecords

inL

ynn.Such

asearch

couldobviously

runinto

problems

(e.g.,aliases)

but,in

anera

of

precisephysical

testsand

ubiquitouscorn-

Bputers,

suchtroubles

might

notbe

insurmountable.

As

of

now,

though,w

ecan’t

reallybe

surethat

theforces

thatcut

Lynn’s

crime

in1984-85

didn’tlead

toincreases

elsewhere.

And

unanswered

qu

estions

aboutdisplacem

enthave

unnervingpolicy

implications.

Conceivably,

displacement

reflectsthe

presenceof

a“safety

valve”through

which

addictsescape

crackdowns

andreach

unfettereddrug

markets.

But

ifm

anyco

mm

unitiesim

posedsim

ultaneouscrackdow

ns,such

addictsm

ightfind

theyhave

nowhere

torun,

andtheir

attempts

tofinance

much

costlierdrug

pu

rchases

couldlead

toan

upsurgein

crime.

Measures

thatm

ightappear

suc

cessfulin

isolation,therefore,

couldbe

terriblycounterproductive

were

theyto

proliferate.

Sum

mary

The

main

pointsof

thisreview

are:

(1)In

theafterm

athof

itsdrug

crackdown,

Law

renceexperienced

arise

inrobbery,

burglary,and

larcenythat

was

bothsu

bstantial

andlarger

thanthe

correspondingdecline

inL

ynn.T

hus,the

Law

renceoutcom

ew

asin

some

respectsas

troublingas

theL

ynnresults

were

encouraging.

(2)T

hecrim

ereductions

inL

ynnafter

itscrackdow

nw

erelargely

transient.T

herew

asno

meaningful

declinein

nonviolentp

rop

ertycrim

e,and

onlytem

porarydrops

inm

urder,rape,

androbbery.

Aggravated

assaultsdid

fallenorm

ously,but

eventhey

increasedby

90percent

from1986

to1987.

(3)T

heK

leiman-C

avanaghanalysis

didnot

(and,w

ithaggregate

statistics,largely

couldnot)

verifythat

crimes

absentfrom

Lynn

shortlyafter

itscrackdow

ndid

notreappear

beyondits

imm

ediatesurroundings.

Under

thecircum

stances,I

amm

orepessim

isticthan

Professor

Kleim

anabout

what

happenedin

Law

rence,and

more

tentativein

describingw

hathappened

inL

ynnas

asuccess.

Istrongly

agreew

ithP

rofessorK

leiman,

however,

thatthe

experiments

per

formed

thusfar

were

of

veryhigh

caliberand

justifym

anym

oreendeavors.

Only

byan

extensiveprocess

of

trial-and-errorcan

we

hopeto

understandw

hencrackdow

nsclearly

engenderm

oregood

thanharm

.

Acknow

ledgements

Iam

gratefulto

theP

oliceD

epartment

of

Lynn,

Massachusetts

forp

ro

vidingm

ethe

city’s1987

crime

statistics,and

tothe

Crim

eA

nalysis

Bureau,

Com

monw

ealtho

fM

assachusetts,for

providingm

eL

ynn’scrim

e

datafor

severalyears

inthe

early1980’s

when

theyw

erenot

includedin

the

Uniform

Crim

eR

eports.

Chapter

4

EV

AL

UA

TIN

GS

TR

EE

T-L

EV

EL

DR

UG

EN

FO

RC

EM

EN

T

Anthony

V.

Bouza

Does

streetlevel

drugenforcem

entby

thecops

reducecrim

eand

drugabuse?

That

isthe

questionaddressed

byM

arkA

.R

.K

leiman

in“C

rackdow

n:T

heE

ffectsof

IntensiveE

nforcement

onR

etailH

eroinD

ealing.”H

ereview

spolice

saturationefforts

inL

ynnand

Law

rence,M

assachusetts,as

well

as“O

perationP

ressureP

ointI,”

inM

anhattan,and

“Operation

Cold

Turkey”

inP

hiladelphia.T

heseoperations

narrowly

focusedon

interruptingthe

connectionbetw

eenseller

anduser—

arguablythe

lowest

rungin

thegrow

er-importer-distributor-w

holesaler-cutter-sellerdrug

tradeorganizational

ladder.

Other

recentstudies

havedem

onstratedin

dramatic

fashionthe

unsuspectedconnection

between

drugsand

seriouscrim

e.Tw

othirds,

orm

ore,of

suspectsarrested

forrobberies

orother

seriousstreet

crimes

havedrugs

intheir

systemw

henthey’re

pickedup

bythe

cops.T

hereis

aconnection

bet

ween

druguse

andbeing

partof

thesm

allpopulation

ofoffenders

who

repeatedlycom

mit

many

andvaried

streetcrim

es.T

heconnection

isstrong.

But

thereasons

forthe

connectionare

notas

clearas

itsexistence

oras

easyto

seeas

itseffects.

Street

conditions—peddling

inneighborhoods

andnear

schools;huddled

knotsof

usersand

hurrieddealing;

occasionalviolence;

radiatingburglaries;

ageneral

senseof

decay—

theseare

what

thepublic

sees,feels,

andresents.

Suchconditions

conveyan

“anythinggoes,

nothingis

barred”atm

ospherethat

sapsa

neighborhood’senergy

anddrains

itsm

orale.T

hepeople

findit

hardto

understandw

hythe

copsdon’t

“dosom

ethingabout

it,and

fast.”A

fterall,

ifthey

cansee

it.w

hycan’t

thecops?

Most

practitionersknow

theansw

er.To

alarge

degreea

freesociety

must

policeitself.

Com

munity

crime

preventionefforts,

neighborhoodpatrols,

andother

cooperativeprogram

sare

partof

thesocial

gluethat

keepsour

societysafe.

Itis

theanom

icsense

thatno

onecares,

thatno

onew

illhelp,

thatkeeps

everyone’seyes

avertedw

henbad

thingshappen

oncrow

dedstreets

inN

ewY

ork.

One

of

them

ajorfunctions

of

thecops

isto

supporta

society’sw

illto

policeitself—

toinsure

cohesionand

peace.A

sgovernm

entrepresentatives

itis

important

forus

topreserve

thesocial

fabricby

providinga

senseof

structure,m

aintainingstandards

anddiscipline,

andattending

toother

qualityof

lifeissues.

Cosm

eticscan

beim

portant.Signs

of

decay—graffiti,

brokenw

indow,

andhuddled

knotso

fdrug

users—

suggesta

dissolutionof

valuesand

increasesocial

breakdown.

But

isstreet

levelenforcem

enta

goodsolution?

Can

itjustify

reversingthe

tideof

technologicaladvancem

entsw

e’vem

ade?S

houldw

escrap

rapidresponse

tovictim

sof

violentcrim

esand

putthe

copback

onthe

beat?

Street

levelenforcem

entis

sexy,visible,

andpopular—

butis

iteffective?

Mr.

Kleim

an’sstudies

appearto

suggestyes

...

with

sensiblecaveats.

But,

fromm

yperspective,

theansw

eris

closerto

no.A

sa

responsibleofficial,

Im

ustexplain

some

harshtruths.

Street-level

enforcement

hasfew

goodeffects

First

let’slook

atthe

goodeffects

Kleim

ansays

street-leveldrug

enfo

rcem

entcan

have.M

uch,for

example,

ism

adeof

thereduction

inhom

icidesunder

operationP

ressureP

ointI.

But

didit

actuallyreduce

murders?

Pres

sureP

ointI

startedin

January1984.

The

numbers

of

murders

allover

New

York

City

starteddropping

yearsbefore;

1800m

urdersin

‘81,1700

in‘82,

1600in

‘83,1500

in‘84,

1400in

‘85,(and

backup

to1600

in‘86).

Kleim

analso

saysthat

Pressure

Point

Ireduced

robberiesand

burglariesin

thetarget

area.B

utthe

operationtook

placeduring

thesam

etim

ethat

robberiesand

burglariesstopped

increasingall

overthe

city.W

hatcan

we

concludefrom

thosetrends?

Itappears

that

itw

asnot

Pressure

Point

Ithat

hada

noticeableim

pacton

othercrim

es.

Now

let’slook

atdrug

arrests.W

asconsum

ptionor

dealingreduced?

Did

availabilityof

drugsdecline

anddid

theirprice

rise?T

heansw

eris,

pro

bably

no.

Short

circuitingthe

connectionsbetw

eendrug

buyerand

seller,through

policesaturations

andconcentrated

streetenforcem

ent,can

onlyserve

asa

temporary

palliative.T

headdict

isnot,

afterall,

acustom

erw

ithm

anyo

ptions

andchoices.

He’s

hooked.H

ehas

tofind

asource

and,judging

bythe

admitted

availabilityand

pricestability

of

drugs,he

does.

Iam

reminded

ofa

cynicalpractice

theN

YP

Dused

toem

ployto

confusecorrupt

plainclothescops

inthe

viceunits.

The

entireorganization

would,

AA

Rn

nv

onesurprising

day,be

shippedout

—“back

tothe

bag”(returned

touniform

duty)—and

anew

bunch—probably

unsulliednew

ertroops

fromuniform

edassignm

ents—

poppedin.

The

corruptconnections

were

notinterrupted

orconfused

forlong.

What

man

hadinvented,

cannym

ancircum

vented.S

oonall

was

restoredas

beforeand

thepads

andscores

flowed

uninterruptedly—or

atleast

untilthe

temporary

dislocationof

thenext

massive

shifts.

Putting

acop

onthe

Streetin

frontof

yourhouse

will

certainlyresult

temporarily

ina

more

peacefuland

betterordered

nearbyenvironm

ent—

butis

thisthe

bestuse

of

theresource?

The

factsare

thatthis

isgood

publicity,but

othervirtues

arehard

tosee.

Street-level

enforcement

hasm

anybad

effects

For

theprofessional

who

hasbeen

pushedtim

eand

time

againby

aspooked

publicto

resortto

procrusteansim

pleand

simplistic

solutions,the

disabilitieso

fstreet-level

enforcement

areobvious.

Such

focused,co

ncen

tratedefforts

asthose

inL

ynn,L

awrence,

Philadelphia,

andM

anhattan,bear

thecharacteristics

of

sweeps

andindiscrim

inateround-ups

thathave

beendiscredited.

They

uselim

itedenergy

againstthe

lowest-level

operators.T

heyresult

inm

anyarrests

thatflood,

overwhelm

,and

defeata

systemalready

undersevere

strain.Instead

of

more

goingto

jail,few

erdo.

As

theagencies

tryto

decongest,they

areunable

todistinguish

between

biggerfish

andm

innows.

All

getthrough

thenecessarily

stretchednet.

The

criminal

justicesystem

hasfinite

resourcesw

ithw

hichto

dealw

iththe

tremendous

problems

of

violenceand

crime.

There

were

800,000drug

arrestsin

1985and

justabout

500,000persons

inour

overcrowded

prisons.T

heconclusion

isobvious.

There

ain’troom

atthe

inn.

When

Governor

Rockefeller

andthe

New

York

Legislature

mandated

thejailing

ofdrug

pushersin

theearly

seventies,this

panderingto

thepublic’s

fearsproved

popular.N

oone

daredvote

againstand

fewhad

thecourage

tocounsel

sense.T

heprisons

soonfilled

with

dealers,leaving

noroom

form

urderers,rapists,

robbers,or

burglars,for

whom

therew

ereno

mandated

sentences.In

theend

theeffort

hadto

beabandoned.

Given

enoughprison

space,m

aybeincapacitation

couldreduce

crime.

But,

with

abouttw

othirds

of

thestates

undercourt

ordersto

decongestprisons

(prisonscrow

dedduring

thehysteria-over-crim

e-in-the-streetsof

thesev

enties

andearly

eighties)dangerous

criminals

arenow

pouringout

of,not

into

ourpenal

institutions.

13C

omplex

publicissues

tendto

havethis

jack-in-the-boxcharacteristic—

poppingup

inunexpected

places,w

hensom

eonepresses

down

ona

pro

blem

somew

hereelse.

Street

drugoperations

indisputably“clean

up”the

areaof

focus,but

what

will

popup

elsewhere?

When

streetenforcem

entresults

inm

orearrests,

fewer

prosecutionsare

suc

cessful.A

ndw

ehave

allseen

thatpressures

toproduce

“goodcases”

have

resultedin

flaking,dropsy,

perjury,entrapm

ent,and

framing,

bycops

anx

iousto

pleasedem

andingsuperiors.

There

shouldbe

pressuresto

performand

produce,but

thesem

ustbe

accompanied

bya

sensiblesense

ofpriorities

anda

sensitivityto

becoming

counterproductive.

Street

operationsalso

areseductive.

They

developa

constituencythat

makes

shiftsdifficult

when

policem

anagersm

ostneed

flexibility.T

hepolice

needto

beflexible

toattack

othervery

realand

seriousproblem

s.T

heyshould

nothave

restrictiveassignm

entsto

Potem

kinV

illagesbuilt

todazzle

un

inform

edcitizens.

Street-leveloperations

alsodistract

usfrom

meaningful

assaultson

drugabuse.

When

we

considerthe

most

effectivew

ayof

reducingthe

availabilityof

illegaldrugs

we

oughtto

thinkof

theT

ylenolanalogy.

When

pillssuspected

ofbeing

poisonedhad

tobe

roundedup

quickly,it

became

ob

viousthat

them

ostprom

isingsources

oflarge

batchesw

erew

arehouses,not

individualm

edicinecabinets.

Not

thatthe

lattercould

beignored

butthe

programhad

tobe

guidedby

asense

of

priority.

And,

while

we’re

aboutit,

why

focuson

supplyalone?

What

became

of

de

mand?

Why

dow

ehave,

asa

nation,such

anappetite

fordrugs?

Has

the30-second

TV

comm

ercialturned

usinto

adruggy

culture?

What

shouldw

edo?

There

issom

eevidence

thatthe

currentpassion

foreducating

usto

thehorrors

of

illicitdrugs

istaking

hold.W

hite,educated

Am

ericaseem

sto

beconsum

ingless.

They

appearto

havereceived

them

essage.W

heredoes

thisleave

theexcluded,

desperate,frequently

blackand

almost

always

poorghetto

dweller?

Hooked.

His

triphas

toconsist

ofa

fixor

acheap

bottleof

wine.

Arresting

himis

notenough.

The

questionof

criticalancillary

issuessuch

asthe

availabilityof

treatment

programs

deservesm

oreconsideration.

Drug

addictionand

criminality

havetheir

rootsin

joblessness,hopelessness,

illiteracy,teenage

pregnancy,and

theinfirm

itiesof

poverty.

Hum

anbehavior

canbe

changedthrough

positiveand

negativeco

nse

quences,w

ithem

phasison

consequences.R

oundups

allowall

toslip

througha

netthat

can’tcontain

themall.

Arrests

arenot

enough—there

hasto

befollow

through,positive

andnegative.

What

we

needare

effectiveresponses

tothe

problem—

notpolitically

motivated

actions.

Public

officialshave

anobligation

toeducate

peopleand

teachthem

thedifferences

between

beingw

ellserved

andbeing

pleasedor

panderedto.

We

needto

tellthem

what

we

know—

andw

hatw

edon’t

know.

We

donot

knowenough

aboutdrug

use,drug

dealing,or

them

osteffec

tivew

aysof

combatting

theproblem

.W

eare

beginningto

getdata

andthis

isenlightening,

asw

ellas

surprising.

Street-leveldrug

enforcement

may

getheadlines,

pleasethe

neighbors,and

bringpeace

tothe

area,but

itsdisplacem

enteffects,

waste

of

resources,burdenings

of

thesystem

,inflexibility,

potentialfor

abuse,and

dy

sfun

ctional

aspectsall

arguepow

erfullyfor

skepticismas

toits

efficacy.

Kleim

an’sstudy

isuseful

forthe

lightit

castson

theissue

andfor

thediscussion

itinspires.

Itis

not,in

my

view,

thew

ayto

go.W

e,the

soupschool

graduatesw

horun

thecountry’s

policeagencies,

desperatelyneed

thereturn

of

thescholars,

toguide

ourefforts

throughtheir

analysesand

experiments.

This

isw

herethe

federalfunds

andlocal

effortsshould

beconcentrated.

Sum

mary

Focused,

saturationstreet

enforcement

will

cleanup

anarea,

butit

iscostly

andinefficient.

Itrobs

otherareas

of

theirfair

shareof

scarceresources

andit

doesnot

eliminate

theintractable

problemof

drugdealing,

butm

erelydisplaces

it.It

alsofocuses,

inefficiently,on

thelow

estlevel

of

thecrim

inalchain

andis

sureto

leadto

abusesand

repression,w

ithsw

eepsand

round-ups.

Once

installed,such

operationsare

politicallydifficult

torem

ove.B

yproducing

largenum

berso

farrests

theycreate

stresseson

afrequently

overloadedcrim

inaljustice

systemw

hichthen

findsit

more

difficultto

discriminate

between

them

enacesth

atought

tobe

incapacitatedand

thecasual

dealeror

user;usually

theyall

gofree.

“Buy

andbust”

operations,observation

arrestsand

enforcement

byuniform

edofficers

isinherently

primitive

andinefficient.

Itcreates

pressuresto

performthat

producea

disproportionaterisk

of

flaking,dro

psy,

entrapment,

orperjury.

These,

of

course,exist

inall

policeoperations,

butthey

existat

varyinglevels

of

risk.

Interdictingdrugs

requiressophisticated

enforcement,

aimed

atthe

hig

her

leveldealer,

andeducational

programs

aboutthe

dangersof

druguse.

Stabilizing

aneighborhood

requiresa

strategyth

atcreates

comm

unityco

he

sion;a

strategyw

hichcan

beextended,

with

limited

resources,city

wide.

Street-level

enforcement

ispopular,

sexy,and

producesw

onderfulp

ublici

ty.T

heonly

realproblem

isthat

itdoesn’t

work.

Pv

1iitin

otr,t

_T

l,rn

Chapter

5

CO

MM

EN

TS

ON

ST

RE

ET

-LE

VE

LD

RU

GE

NF

OR

CE

ME

NT

Kevin

M.

Burke

Iam

theperson

directlyresponsible

forthe

establishment

anddirection

of

theL

ynnD

rugT

askF

orceand

theL

awrence

Drug

Task

Forcedescribed

byM

arkK

leiman

inhis

paperon

crackdowns.

Mr.

Kleim

anclearly

andaccurately

outlinesthe

operationsof

theseefforts.

How

ever,he

concludesthat

theefforts

inL

ynnw

eresuccessful

while

thosein

Law

rencew

erenot.

Ibelieve

itis

necessaryto

judgethe

effectsof

theintensive

street-levelen

forcement

incom

parisonw

ithother

enforcement

methods.

Iw

ouldargue

thatw

hencom

paredto

previousattem

ptsto

controlthe

opendrug

market,

operationsin

bothL

ynnand

Law

renceproduced

remarkably

successfulresults.

Itw

asless

calculationof

thepossible

benefitsof


entand

more

my

senseof

frustrationw

iththe

typesof

drugenforcem

entused

previouslyin

Lynn

andL

awrence

thatled

tothe

formation

of

theT

askForces.

As

theD

istrictA

ttorneyin

Essex

County,

itis

my

responsibilityto

combat

drugabuse.

Because

of

itsdetrim

entaleffect

onusers

andits

effectof

increasingstreet

crimes,

drugshad

beenthe

targetof

everytraditional

enforcement

method.

These

methods

hadlittle

orno

visibleresults.

From

1979until

1983,I

triedundercover

operationsaim

edat

bothstreet-

levelenforcem

entand

theheads

of

relativelysophisticated

drugcon

spiracies.In

separateoperations

inL

ynnand

Law

rence,I

usedundercover

State

Police

officersto

make

drug“buys”

fromas

many

peopleas

possible.A

sa

resultof

theseundercover

operations—

some

lastingas

longas

sixm

onths—

we

simultaneously

arrestedas

many

as80

people.A

dditionally,to

targetheads

ofdrug

distributiongroups,

Iused

electronicsurveillance

(telephonetaps,

etc.)of

drugdistributors

andraids

timed

tocoincide

with

thereceipt

ofshipm

entsof

largequantities

of

drugs.A

sa

result,w

eo

ccasionally

seizeddrugs

worth

millions

of

dollarson

thestreet.

These

drugs

rin

mnt

An

ctr

t_T

gv

pl

flrii&P

nfA

rnm

Pn

tIIQ

were

destinedfor

them

arketsin

Lynn

andL

awrence.

Yet,

afterseveral

effortsof

thesetypes,

therew

asno

discernibleeffect

onthe

targetedcom

munities.

The

opendrug

marketplaces

returnedto

thepre-raid

levelof

businessw

ithina

month

of

theenforcem

enteffort.

The

upper-leveltraffickers

who

were

arrestedw

ereusually

replacedby

others,or

operationsw

erecontinued

bythe

same

groupw

itha

small

shake-upin

per

sonnel.A

lthoughI

was

usingthe

investigativeresources

availableto

me

forcom

battingdrug

trafficking,the

market

stillappeared

tobe

unaffected.

By

contrast,both

Drug

Task

Forcesthat

Kleim

andescribes

operatingin

Lynn

andL

awrence

producedobservable

changesin

thequality

of

lifein

thetargeted

neighborhoods.A

ndthat

was

theprim

arygoal

of

theprogram

.In

Law

rence,S

tateP

oliceconcentrated

enforcement

inthe

areaof

ahous

ingproject

thathad

become

infamous

forits

openheroin

market.

After

thiseffort

began,conditions

visiblyim

proved.L

ifew

ithinthe

projecthas

become

lessdisrupted

byheroin

addictsand

thejunkie-dealer

ism

uchless

likelyto

bea

visiblem

odelfor

neighborhoodchildren.

Placing

highlyvisible

policeofficers

onthe

streetsand

intensivelyenforcing

druglaw

shas

hadother

positiveeffects

inboth

comm

unities.A

com

parisonof

addresseson

carregistrations

beforeand

afterthe

taskforces

went

intooperation

clearlyshow

edthat

taskforces

reducedthe

numbers

of

nonresidentpeople

who

droveto

Lynn

andL

awrence

tobuy

heroin.T

henum

berof

newheroin

usersalso

was

reducedin

bothareas.

And

thein

for

mation

aboutdrug

distributiongathered

onthe

streetso

fL

awrence

hasbeen

utilizedby

lawenforcem

entofficials

inseveral

states.T

hesestreet

datahave

beenm

oreuseful

thaninform

ationgathered

throughundercover

investigation

becausethey

areconstantly

beingupdated

andrefined.

The

effortsin

bothL

awrence

andL

ynnresulted

innum

erousparticular

improvem

ents.B

othsuccessfully

improved

theoverall

qualityof

lifein

thetargetted

areas.H

owever,

Mr.

Kleim

ancalls

Lynn

asuccess

andL

awrence

afailure

because“street

crimes”

suchas

robberyand

burglarydeclined

inL

ynnbut

notin

Law

rence.I

believethat

sinceL

awrence

issim

ilarto

Lynn

inall

measurable

effectsbut

one,the

overalljudgm

entof

theL

awrence

ef

fortalso

shouldbe

“success.”

Moreover,

thefailure

of

theL

awrence

Drug

Task

Force

toreduce

Streetcrim

eas

Mr.

Kleim

anindicates,

may

beexplained

bythe

presenceof

drugm

arketplacesnear

toL

awrence.

Heroin,

availablein

neighboringH

averhill,L

owell,

andsouthern

New

Ham

pshire,allow

sthe

junkieto

fulfillthis

needw

ithoutconcern

forprice

oravailability.

Therefore,

theneed

tosteal

stillexists

becauseof

theavailability

of

heroinclose

toL

awrence.

Ifone

were

toexpand

thestreet

enforcement

effortsto

drugm

arketplacesadjacent

toL

awrence,

itis

fairto

speculatethat

thestreet

crime

would

bereduced

dueto

thelack

of

availabilityof

heroin.

Inany

case,w

henconducting

acom

parativebenefit

analysisof

drugfighting

efforts,it

ism

ystrong

opinionthat

intensivestreet-level

enfo

rcem

entproduces

thebest

resultsand

theL

awrence

projectdoes

notdisprove

thispoint.

cnB

iirki

Mr.

Kleim

annot

onlydiscusses

thebenefits

of

theL

ynnand

Law

renceD

rugT

askForce,

butadditionally

analyzesthe

cost.H

owever,

Iam

notsure

thatI

totallyagree

with

Mr.

Kleim

an’scost

analysis.

The

administrative

costsof

mounting

aT

askForce

operationdefinitely

arem

easurable.T

heyinclude

rentalcost

of

offices,cars,

andoffice

machinery,

asw

ellas

thecost

of

hiringclerical

help.A

dditionally,as

Mr.

Kleim

anpoints

out,officers

working

ona

Task

Forceoperation

generatem

oreo

ver

time

expensethan

officerson

generalassignm

ent.

Iw

ould,how

ever,argue

with

Mr.

Kleim

an’scontentions

thatofficers

usedfor

Drug

Task

Forcew

orkare

divertedfrom

fightingother

crimes,

andtherefore,

“alternativeuse”

of

thesepolice

becomes

acost

of

street-levelen

forcement.

This

contentionsuggests

thatspecially

assigneddrug

officersdo

notbecom

ecognizant

of

othercrim

es.To

thecontrary,

itis

my

observationthat

street-leveldrug

officersknow

more

aboutevery

categoryof

crime

thanany

othertype

ofpolice

officer.B

ecausea

largenum

berof

offendersw

hocom

mit

“streetcrim

es”are

alsodrug

offenders,drug

officersoften

canprovide

more

hardinform

ationand

evidenceon

burglaryand

vicecrim

ethan

policeassigned

totask

forcesspecializing

inthese

areas.T

heform

alassignm

entof

acop

todrugs

isvirtually

thesam

eas

aninform

alassig

nm

entto

larceny,burglary,

andm

urderinvestigations.

Iw

ouldalso

arguethat

theintrusiveness

ofthe

enforcement

effortas

acost

must

bem

easuredagainst

theintrusiveness

of

drugdealing

onyour

doorstep.

Itis

notclear

justw

hatw

eightM

r.K

leiman

would

assignthe

lattercost.

How

ever,it

seems

tom

ethat

when

balancedagainst

theenvironm

entof

anopen

drugm

arket,a

visible,active

policepresence

isnot

atrem

endous

intrusionand

thereforenot

asignificant

costof

astreet-

leveloperation.

Ifthere

isone

criticalthesis

uponw

hichthis

paperturns,

andw

ithw

hichI

would

agreecom

pletely,it

isthe

ideathat

intensivestreet-level

heroinen

forcement

canresult

ina

reductionin

streetcrim

e.T

hereasoning

Mr.

Kleim

anadvances

forthis

conclusionis

backedby

hisanalysis

of

thedata

fromthe

Lynn

Drug

Task

Forceprogram

andthe

New

York

City

Operation

Pressure

Point;

itis

notdisproven

bythe

Law

renceproject.

Mr.

Kleim

anreasons

thatthe

druguser

must

paytw

odistinct

pricesfor

heroin.F

irst,there

is,o

fcourse,

theretail

priceestablished

bythe

pusher.T

hem

arketprice

risesw

iththe

riskim

posedby

lawenforcem

entefforts.

How

ever,it

isnot

theretail

pricealone,

asM

r.K

leiman

indicates,w

hichm

ightlead

ajunkie

toabstain

fromheroin

useand

stopstealing

topay

fordrugs.

Infact,

asthe

paperpoints

out,other

studieshave

shown

thatin

creasesin

retaildrug

pricescan

leadto

more

crime.

Kleim

ancontends

thatit

isthe

non-monetary

“secondprice,”

onw

hichstreet-level

enforcement

ef

fortshave

thegreatest

effect.B

yincreasing

thetim

e,inconvenience,

andrisk

of

arrestinvolved

inm

akingheroin

purchases,street-level

enforcement

drivessom

ejunkies

toabstain

fromheroin.

Therefore,

Mr.

Kleim

anargues

thecom

ponentsof

aneffective


enteffort

are“concentration”

(geographicallyand

bydrug

type)

T....1

fl_.._

r_L

’

and“persistence.”

The

validityof

thisargum

entw

asborne

outin

Lynn

and

Operation

Pressure

Point,

where

concentrationon

heroinsales

inspecific

neighborhoodsover

arelatively

longperiod

of

time

ledto

greaterabstinence

andless

crime.

Italso

explainsthe

comparative

“failure”in

Law

rence,since

Law

rencehas

adrug

market

which

stretchesbeyond

the

jurisdictionof

thepolice

andhas

toofew

policeofficers

tom

eetthe

demands

of

evena

limited

jurisdiction.

Mr.

Kleim

an’sconclusion

thatthe

potentialgains

ofstreet-level

enforcement

“arelarge

andthe

riskslim

ited,”is

supportedin

thispaper

andhis

cautious

callto

“tryit

andsee”

isjustified.

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