INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussions and critical comments

Keywords: Kenya; violence; ethnicity; 2007 election: power sharing; constitutional reform

JEL classification: * Senior Research Fellow, African Studies Group, Area Studies Center, IDE (Miwa_Tsuda@ide.go.jp). This paper is

a translated and revised version of Miwa Tsuda, “‘2007nen Senkyo-go Boryoku’gono Kenia: Zantei Kempo

Wakugumi no Seiritu to Kadai”, Africa Report (2010: 10-15).

IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 381

Kenya after the 2007 “Post-Election Violence”: Constitutional Reform and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act Miwa TSUDA* January 2013

Abstract Immediately after the announcement of the re-election of President Kibaki on the evening of 30

December 2007, Kenya was thrust into the worst civil unrest experienced by the country since

independence – a development that became known as the “Post-Election Violence” (PEV). However,

after a subsequent process of reconciliation, the PEV came to an end within a relatively short period.

The present-day politics of Kenya are being conducted within the framework of a provisional

Constitution that took shape through peaceful mediation. How did Kenya manage to put a lid on a

period of turmoil that placed the country in unprecedented danger? This paper traces the sequence of

events that led to mediation, explains the emergency measures that were needed to maintain law and

order, and indicates the remaining problems that still need to be solved.

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1

Kenya after the 2007 “Post-Election Violence”

Miwa TSUDA

Abstract

Immediately after the announcement of the re-election of President Kibaki on the

evening of 30 December 2007, Kenya was thrust into the worst civil unrest

experienced by the country since independence – a development that became known

as the “Post-Election Violence” (PEV). However, after a subsequent process of

reconciliation, the PEV came to an end within a relatively short period. The present-

day politics of Kenya are being conducted within the framework of a provisional

Constitution that took shape through peaceful mediation. How did Kenya manage to

put a lid on a period of turmoil that placed the country in unprecedented danger? This

paper traces the sequence of events that led to mediation, explains the emergency

measures that were needed to maintain law and order, and indicates the remaining

problems that still need to be solved.

2

Introduction

Early on the morning of 27 December 2007, a day of nation-wide elections in Kenya,

the usual long queues of voters had already formed in front of the polling stations.

Among the Kenyans waiting to cast their votes were many with memories of the

defeat meted out in the election of 2002 to an administration that had ruled the country

since independence. Many of those waiting to vote, moreover, were implicitly

confident in the role of elections as a means of supervising and monitoring the

performance of national government. In some people’s minds, almost certainly, was

the defeat in a referendum held in 2005 of the government’s notorious proposals for a

new constitution. Confident that elections formed a well-established feature of the

democratic process, Kenyans waited to vote, many with the above thoughts running

through their minds.

However, any optimistic hopes that voters may have entertained were dashed three

days later when, on the evening of 30 December, in the midst of mounting suspicions

of vote rigging, the re-election of President Kibaki was formally announced (Kibaki is

a Kikuyu, and at the time of the election he was the presidential candidate of the Party

of National Unity, or PNU). Immediately after the announcement, Kenya was thrust

into the worst civil unrest the country had experienced since independence – a

development that became known as the “Post-Election Violence” (hereafter referred to

3

as PEV). To begin with, the violence was associated with the discontent that erupted

over fear that the election results may have been rigged, and that Raila Odinga (a Luo

and presidential candidate of the Orange Democratic Movement, or ODM) might have

been robbed of his rightful election victory. Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and the other

major cities of Kenya were the main centres of the unrest. In rural areas, violence

against the Kikuyu (Kibaki’s ethnic group) broke out with arson attacks and killings,

while in retaliation, groups claiming to be Kikuyu youth organizations – the so-called

Mungiki – launched revenge attacks against non-Kikuyu people in rural districts of the

Rift Valley as well as in Nairobi.

The author received many heartrending reports over her cellular phone from Kikuyu

families telling her how they had chosen to sleep outside because of their fears of

arson attacks on their homes. As the unrest grew, the security forces blocked the main

roads that ran through Nairobi, while elsewhere newly organized vigilantes, acting on

their own initiative, threw up barriers across the roads to screen traffic for “hostile

communities”. As a result, the circulation of traffic came to a complete halt. In urban

areas, food shortages occurred and there was a rapid escalation in the prices of daily

necessities such as milk, bread and vegetables. Pre-paid cards for cell phones

disappeared from the shops. The author found herself unable to make contact with

Kikuyu families in both Mombasa and Nairobi. The violence, the most severe and

4

widespread since independence, continued at a quickening pace. Over a thousand

people died, and at its height, the figure for homeless refugees exceeded 600,000.1

However, within a relatively short period, a process of reconciliation was able to bring

the PEV to an end (at least when judged by external appearances). Kenya’s present-

day politics are being conducted within the framework of a provisional Constitution

that took shape through peaceful mediation. How did Kenya manage to put a lid on a

period of turmoil that placed the country in unprecedented danger? This paper, written

in January 2010, was put together less than two years after the upheaval that followed

the 2007 election, and in the midst of a somewhat fluid reality. It traces the sequence

of events that led to mediation, explains the emergency measures needed for the

maintenance of law and order (as of the time of writing) and indicates the remaining

problems that still need to be solved.

1. The path to mediation

Kibaki and Odinga, the two rival contenders for power, clashed head on from the day

that violence erupted. On 30 December, Kibaki forced through a presidential

swearing-in ceremony in an attempt to solidify his position as the declared winner. For

their part, the Odinga side held a press conference immediately after the ceremony, 1 For a detailed account of the Post-Election Violence, see Tsuda (2009).

5

and while making allegations of misconduct in the way that the election results had

been calculated, indicated that they themselves would hold a swearing-in ceremony in

which Odinga would be declared president. Thereafter the PEV continued unabated

into January 2008.

Details came out of an incident in the Rift Valley in which over 30 women and

children, mainly Kikuyu, had taken refuge inside a church which was then attacked

and set alight, killing everyone inside (BBC News, 2 January 2008). In all, the number

of reported deaths increased to several hundred per week.

Despite the worsening violence and the mounting suspicion of election vote rigging by

the government, on 7 January Kibaki made it clear that the Tenth Parliament would be

convened,2 and on 8 January he appointed seventeen cabinet members from his own

faction, including the ministers for finance, defence, internal security, and justice. The

Kibaki faction showed no sign of making any concessions whatsoever. Odinga and his

supporters, meanwhile, made it clear that as a precondition for their cooperation in a

mediation meeting, Kibaki had to resign. On 9 January, John Kufuor, head of the

African Union (AU) at the time, attempted to arrange meetings with Kibaki and

Odinga in an effort to mediate between the two men. His initiative failed.

2 Power to convene the parliament rested exclusively with the president.

6

In the end, the body that succeeded in arranging mediation was the Panel of Eminent

African Personalities, headed by Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the

United Nations and the Panel’s chairman. Annan arrived in Kenya on 22 January and

set up the panel with himself as chairman and assisted by two eminent members –

Benjamin Mkapa (former president of Tanzania) and the world-famous activist and

international advocate of women’s and children’s rights, Graça Machel, wife of

Nelson Mandela, then South Africa’s president. These three persons were joined by

four representatives from Kibaki’s PNU and four from Odinga’s ODM, thus

establishing an organization known as the Kenya National Dialogue and

Reconciliation (KNDR) committee.

Thereafter, the KNDR pursued negotiations through a series of meetings which

explored the possibilities for compromise between the PNU and the ODM camps. As

Kenya grew increasingly ungovernable, the meetings of the KNDR provided the only

forum for conducting mediation between the two sides.

On 24 January 2008, encouraged by Annan, and in front of a large press conference,

Kibaki and Odinga shook hands. By 1 February, agreement had been reached under

KNDR auspices on a broad plan for ending the violence and for achieving

rehabilitation. Specifically, this entailed Agendas One to Three, under which steps

7

would be taken to end the political crisis within a short period of between seven and

fifteen days. Agenda Four was devoted to the resolution of longer term problems.

The immediate focus of the mediation effort was to find a short-term resolution of the

political crisis, and this lay in two issues: a temporary sharing of power between

Kibaki and Odinga, and the introduction of amendments to the Constitution to make

this power sharing possible. Midway through February, the Odinga side withdrew its

insistence that Kibaki should resign (see Daily Nation, issue of 19 February 2008), but

the Kibaki side found it difficult to reach agreement because of its insistence on

maintaining the present Constitution unchanged.

On 14 February, as part of the short-term agenda for settling the issue over the

outcome of the 2007 presidential election, it was agreed to set up an independent

review committee whose membership would include foreigners as well as Kenyans.

This committee, it was finally agreed, should issue recommendations without delay

with a view to reaching mutual agreement on a comprehensive reform of the electoral

system.

2. Towards a resolution of the political crisis

8

At the end of February, the Kibaki side yielded and made concessions. On 28 February

2008, Kibaki and Odinga at long last reached an agreement to establish a coalition

government consisting of the PNU, the ODM, and associated political parties. One of

the key agreements between the two leaders was the establishment of the post of Prime

Minister which, it was agreed, was to be taken by Odinga. They also agreed to bring

about other necessary political changes including amendments of the Constitution that

would make possible the establishment of a coalition government. Kibaki and Odinga

formally signed the agreement in the presence of Kofi Annan and the other members

of the Panel of Eminent Personalities.

From this point onwards the PEV began to end. In the Tenth Parliament, which

convened on 6 March 2008, the members of parliament who were present

unanimously approved the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2008 and passed

the National Accord and Reconciliation Bill, 2008, that gave substance to the power

sharing arrangements that Kibaki and Odinga had agreed on. Having been duly signed

by the president, the Bill became the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, 2008.

The parliament that reconvened on 6 March reflected the anticipated coalition between

the PNU and the ODM. Kibaki, the leader of the PNU, became the first president of

Kenya to take his seat among the members of parliament as leader of the government

9

party next to Odinga, leader of the ODM.3 The vice president (a member of the ODM-

Kenya, a party associated with the PNU) ) who had occupied the place next to Kibaki,

surrendered his seat to Odinga and moved to a seat that had been occupied by a

member of the opposition parties. Meanwhile MPs from both the PNU and the ODM

sat not in party groups, as hitherto, but amongst each other, a development indicative

of the mood of reconciliation prevailing in parliament.

In this setting, the amended Constitution and the National Accord and Reconciliation

Act provided the framework for the provisional coalition government. Let us now

examine in brief the contents of the framework. According to the Constitution of

Kenya ( Amendment) Act of 2008 (section 15A [6]), should there be a conflict of

regulations between the National Accord and Reconciliation Act and the contents of

the Constitution, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act should take precedence.

Moreover, as regards the sections of the Constitution dealing with the office of vice

president, the amended Constitution contained regulations relevant to the new

positions of prime minister and deputy prime minister (section 15A). It was further

made clear that matters such as the appointment, dismissal, functions and powers of

the prime minister and deputy prime minister, and the rules of establishing the

coalition government, would be determined by a law passed by parliament (the

3 The President of Kenya usually sits in a chair next to the Speaker of the Parliament.

10

National Accord and Reconciliation Act). It was also made clear that as regards the

composition of the cabinet, the prime minister and the deputy prime minister would

automatically be members of cabinet (section 17).

The support of over 65 percent of all the members of parliament is needed to approve

the amendment of Kenya’s Constitution. This is far more stringent than that needed to

change other national laws. The latter can be changed by a vote of over half of the

parliament members present. In this regard, by amending the Constitution, the contents

of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act were written into the Constitution to

preserve the contents of the agreement signed on 28 February 2008. The preservation

of the Act by amending the Constitution itself also had been agreed to as part of the

accord between Kibaki and Odinga on 28 February.

Until early 2008 the legal system in Kenya contained no explicit regulations

concerning coalition government and the president had the right to appoint and dismiss

cabinet ministers and the vice president. These features could not be retained

unchanged after the accord of 28 February, and the National Accord and

Reconciliation Act necessitated the introduction of some temporary but detailed

provisions. Three of these were especially important. First, the Act stipulates that the

prime minister is the leader of the party with the largest number of members in

parliament; second, the deputy prime ministers are chosen by each of the parties that

11

make up the coalition; and third, the heads of the parties that make up the coalition

nominate the members of the cabinet. Moreover the composition of the cabinet reflects

the relative parliamentary strengths of the coalition member parties in parliament. That

said, in appointing cabinet ministers, not just party representation but also the

importance of particular ministerial portfolios must be taken into account. Under the

terms of the amended Constitution, the power of the president to appoint and dismiss

cabinet ministers became purely nominal. That power is no longer vested in the

president, and the president no longer retains his right to unilaterally appoint and

dismiss members of the government. Instead, changes in the composition of the

cabinet are made on the basis of a written agreement and signed, following prior

consultation, by the head of the coalition party that has nominated the concerned

minister and by the president.

Moreover, the amended Constitution and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act

make it clear that the prime minister is not simply a minister who takes his orders from

the president, but has the authority to co-ordinate and supervise the execution of the

government, including the work of the ministries . Regarding the dissolution of the

coalition government, it was agreed that such action can occur only in the following

circumstances, namely, at the time when the Tenth Parliament is dissolved; or when

the parties that make up the coalition agree in writing to a dissolution; or when one

coalition partner withdraws from the coalition by a resolution of the highest decision-

12

making organ of that party and confirms the withdrawal in writing. It was also agreed

that the National Accord and Reconciliation Act can expire in only one of the

following three circumstances, depending on which comes first: in the event of the

Tenth Parliament being dissolved; in the event of the coalition being disbanded; or in

the event of a new Constitution being formally promulgated.

Relatively swift progress was made in implementing the above drastic legal changes.

In April 2008 the coalition cabinet was formed with Kibaki as president, Odinga as

prime minister, and with appointees of the PNU and the ODM serving as the

respective deputy prime ministers (the PNU man was the leader of the KANU (Kenya

African National Union), a PNU-associated party). However in order to allay

differences of opinion over the distribution of cabinet positions, eight new ministerial

posts had to be created, and the membership of the new cabinet, including the

president, the prime minister, the two deputy prime ministers, and the various

ministers and assistant ministers, expanded to no less than 94 individuals, equivalent

to over 40 percent of the 222-strong membership of the parliament. Not surprisingly,

keeping the coalition intact and preserving its maneuverability became major

preoccupations. Nevertheless, thanks to the various changes outlined above, a political

crisis in Kenya was successfully avoided.

13

3. Radical changes in the electoral system

On 4 March 2008 agreements were reached between Kibaki’s PNU and Odinga’s

ODM on the need for an enquiry into the circumstances underlying the accusations of

vote rigging in the 2007 presidential election and into the need for a thorough change

in the electoral system. It was also agreed that there should be a comprehensive

revision of the Constitution as well as an investigation into the PEV, to include

recommendations for dealing with the perpetrators of the violence. It was further

agreed to set up a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission. Kofi Annan had

strongly recommended that the PEV be investigated, and that a Truth, Justice, and

Reconciliation Commission be established. One of the points in this area of enquiry

was the involvement of politicians in the instigation of the violence, but because of the

fluidity of the situation at the time of writing, this topic will have to be left for a later

paper.4

First, let us consider the radical changes that occurred in the electoral system. In

March 2008, Kibaki appointed the South African senior judge Johan Kriegler to head

an eight-member independent commission of enquiry (hereafter the Kriegler

Commission) to investigate the electoral process that was in operation at the time of

the 2007 election. The Kriegler Commission presented its report on schedule in mid-

3 For developments up to this point, see the paper by Matsuda (2010).

14

September 2008. The report’s main conclusion was that it was not clear who had won

the 2007 presidential election. Parliament unanimously endorsed the report’s

conclusion in December 2008 and thus the argument concerning the identity of the

presidential election’s victor formally ceased to exist, confirming the legitimacy of the

coalition government with Kibaki as president and Odinga as prime minister. The

general elections of 2007 had been organized by the Electoral Commission of Kenya

(ECK, whose chairman and members were appointed by the president). The Kriegler

Commission recommended the wholesale reorganization of the ECK. On 1 October

2008, only a few weeks after the submission of the Kriegler Commission report, the

then the ECK chairman announced his effective resignation, and at the end of October,

a cabinet committee was organized with the aim of carrying out the Kriegler

Commission’s proposals. It was agreed to dissolve the ECK and to set up a provisional

electoral administration committee.

When the related bill came up for approval in parliament, following a detailed

discussion of how best to make appointments to the provisional electoral

administration committee, agreement was reached, and in December 2008, the

proposed amendment of the Constitution to enable the dissolution of the ECK was

approved in a vote by 169 MPs.

15

With the amendment of the Constitution, an Interim Independent Election

Commission of Kenya (IIEC), immune from the erstwhile power of the president to

appoint and dismiss commission members, was set up along with an Interim

Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC). As their titles indicate, the

IIEC and the IIBRC were established as temporary bodies. Section 41 (13) of the

amended Constitution made it clear that both the IIEC and the IIBRC should be

regarded as dissolved twenty four months after commencement of the amended

Constitution or three months after the promulgation of a new Constitution, whichever

being the earlier. Initially, the IIEC experienced a rough passage that was related to

controversial personnel appointments, but in due course the IIEC and the IIBRC

settled down to work, and have survived until the present day.

4. Towards the enactment of a new Constitution

In the “National Dialogue and Reconciliation” agreement, it was recognized that as

well as dealing with the causes of the PEV, it was necessary to address key issues of a

long-standing nature identified on 1 February 2008 (issues that lay within the remit of

“Agenda Four”) and to proceed towards the enactment of a new Constitution. The

final accord of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee, on 4 March 2008,

called for a) the setting up, within a period of eight weeks of the meeting, of a legally

16

binding timetable for a review of the Constitution; b) the completion of this review

within a year of the publication of the timetable; and c) the holding of a national

referendum to approve proposals for a new Constitution.

Thereafter, progress lagged behind schedule, and in November 2008 parliament passed

the Constitution of Kenya Review Act 2008, which made provision for the formation

of an expert committee to steer the process of constitutional revision and which

involved a detailed schedule for the period up to the national referendum.

Members of the Committee of Experts, a body created according to the regulations of

the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (2008), were appointed via parliamentary

recommendation and comprised three non-Kenyans and six Kenyans (the chairman,

Nzamba Kitonga, was a senior lawyer and a Kenyan). In November 2009, this

committee published the Harmonized Draft Constitution, based on the main drafts that

had been made hitherto.

At the time of writing (January 2010), the Committee of Experts, having obtained

communications and proposals from all over the country, had forwarded its revised

draft to a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC). After the PSC has given its views to

the Committee of Experts, the draft will have to be further amended before being sent

forward for consideration by parliament. It is possible for parliament to propose

changes to the Committee of Experts’ draft, but approval of a proposed change to the

17

draft would require the support of not just a simple majority of the members of

parliament present but of over 65 percent of all the parliament members (see Section

47A of the Constitution).5

If parliament agrees to a revision of the Harmonized Draft Constitution by a 65%

majority, the Committee of Experts again revises the draft and re-submits it.

Thereafter, apart from technical changes, the draft cannot be altered. Although the

attitude of parliament towards the draft Constitution cannot be predicted with certainty,

the outlook is for the final draft to be submitted by parliament to the attorney-general

sometime during the first half of 2010. Within a period of 30 days following receipt of

the draft, the attorney-general will submit the bill for a new Constitution of Kenya and

5 This procedure was introduced at the time of the amendment of the Constitution on 29 December

2008 (which also established the IIEC and the IIBRC as mentioned above). The procedure was adopted

in wake of the experience of the 2005 referendum on a draft constitution. In 2005, a national-level

meeting of representatives of the government and opposition parties and of NGOs examined a draft for

a new constitution (which was known as the “Bomas Draft”) that won widespread agreement. The

Bomas Draft tried to reduce the power of the president drastically. However, political maneuvering by

those supporting the president and who were anxious to avoid this dilution of power resulted in

changing the contents of the Bomas Draft to maintain the power of the president. Because the then

“Constitution of Kenya Review Act” and Constitution of Kenya had no special clauses protecting the

Bomas Draft, changing clauses of the Draft was possible with a simple majority of the parliamentary

members present.

18

within 60 days of the issuance, and by way of the IIEC, the new Constitution will be

put to the people of Kenya in a national referendum.6

As of 1January 2010 (the time of writing), the draft Constitution prepared by the

Committee of Experts incorporates contents of the Bomas Draft of 2005, and contains

a number of key elements such as the establishment of the executive post of prime

minister, a substantial reduction in the power of the president, and the decentralization

of government through a binary system and a devolved government consisted of

national and county governments. If the new Constitution is enacted, its introduction

will signify the achievement of a substantial change from the framework of the

previous Constitution of Kenya. However the future of the proposals cannot be

predicted with certainty. As has been pointed out above, the IIEC’s term of office

expires at the end of December 2010 at the latest, and if the process for establishing

the new Constitution runs out of time, yet more revisions of the current Constitution

will become necessary. At the time of writing, it is not yet possible to be wholly

optimistic about whether or not the contents of the draft Constitution will take into

6 A revision of the Constitution that came into effect in December 2008 laid down a new rule for

interpreting the results of the referendum, namely that the proposed new constitutional draft had to be

approved by not only over half of the votes cast in the referendum, but also by over 25 percent of the

votes cast in five of the eight provinces of Kenya.

19

account the dilution of presidential power, nor even about whether the new

Constitution will actually be promulgated.

Conclusion

Even though developments are running somewhat behind the planned schedule, Kenya

after the PEV can be said to have succeeded in escaping from the political dangers that

confronted it in early 2008. Among the accomplishments are the inauguration of the

coalition government, with Kibaki as the President and Odinga as the Prime Minister,

the dissolution of the ECK, and the setting up of the IIEC and the IIBRC.

Unfortunately, however, all of these changes amount to little more than temporary

expedients. As we have seen, Kenya managed to put a lid on the period of turmoil that

followed the elections of December 2007. But as has been made clear, that lid

consisted of the constitutional amendment of 2008 and the National Accord and

Reconciliation Act of the same year. Both of these measures will shortly expire – in

other words the lid will soon cease to do the job that it was designed for – and what

happens then is impossible to predict.

Moreover, no one can predict what will happen after the IIEC’s tenure expires at the

end of December 2010, and after the Tenth Parliament reaches the date of mandatory

20

dissolution. Even the enactment of the crucially important new Constitution cannot be

taken for granted.

More than anything else, the memories of the killing and maiming that arose out of

suspicions of vote rigging in the 2007 election, and of the reversion to the ethnic

question of “Are you, or are you not a Kikuyu?”, will not easily disappear. Moreover,

for the refugees who cannot at present return to their homes, the problem is not so

much one of “memories” as of fear and mistrust of progress – a feeling that originated

in the mayhem that followed the election. Directly caught up in that issue is the very

slow pace – slow to the point of serious delay – of the work of both the Truth, Justice

and Reconciliation Commission, and the CIPEV, a body set up on the

recommendation of the Independent Review Commission to enquire into the PEV.7

Old acquaintances, still homeless after the PEV, have told the author that “the

criminals who attacked our houses and burned us out of our homes are still living on

the land that belongs to us. There has been no apology. How can this be allowed?

When the next election comes round there will be even worse trouble.”

“Kenya is on the way to becoming a failed state.” “There will be worse trouble in the

next election.” “2007 was an exception in that the unrest was a prepared unrest.”

7 The Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence is often abbreviated to the Waki Commission.

For details, see Matsuda (2010).

21

These are some of the opinions of Kenyan intellectuals who are still sharply divided in

their views. Should the “2007 post-election violence” be understood as a “one off”

event that was successfully contained? In fact, two hurdles still have to be overcome to

achieve a lasting settlement. The first is the planned national referendum on the new

Constitution. The second, and it is a hurdle of very great importance, is the next

general elections scheduled for the end of 2012. Kenyan politics is setting out across a

wasteland that was created by the great unrest that followed the 2007 election. The

challenge is a substantial one, but it behoves everyone, us researchers included, to

avoid viewing the government’s problems with a pessimism that may prove excessive.

References

Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation website: http://www.dialoguekenya.org

Tsuda Miwa (2009) “Bōryokka shita ‘Kikuyu Girai’: Kenia 2007-nen sōsenkyo ato no

konran to fukusū seitō-sei seiji” (Dislike of the Kikuyu that turned into violence: the

disorder that followed Kenya’s general election of 2007 and the system of multi-party

politics), Chi-iki Kenkyū Vol.9, No.1, pp.3-9.

Matsuda Motoji (2010) Rifujin na shūgō bōryoku wa ika ni shite sabakareru ka: 2007-

nen Kenia senkyō ato bōdō no kiseki (How should unreasonable collective violence be

22

judged: the locus of the rioting that followed Kenya’s election of 2007, Afurika

Repōto No.50, pp.3-9.

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China’s Inter-regional Spillover of Carbon Emissions and DomesticSupply Chains 2012

366 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA Impacts of FTA Utilization on Firm Performance 2012

365 Kuo-I CHANG and KazunobuHAYAKAWA

Selection and Utilization of the Early Harvest List: Evidence from theFree Trade Agreement between China and Taiwan 2012

364 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA Does the Use of Multiple FTAs Force Firms to Raise Local InputShare?: Evidence of the Spaghetti Bowl Phenomenon 2012

363 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA Firms' Use of FTA Schemes in Exporting and Importing: IsThere aTwo-way Relationship? 2012

362 Bo MENG, Yong FANG, NorihikoYAMANO

Measuring Global Value Chains and Regional Economic Integration:An International Input–Output Approach 2012

361 Tadashi ITO New Aspects of Intra-industry Trade in EU Countries 2012360 Ho Yeon Kim Shrinking Population and the Urban Hierarchy 2012

359 Bo MENG, Yaxiong ZHANG,Jiemin GUO, Yong FANG

China’s Regional Economies and Value Chains: An InterregionalInput-Output Analysis 2012

358 Koji KUBO Real Exchange Rate Appreciation, Resource Boom, and PolicyReform in Myanmar 2012

357 Maki AOKI-OKABEIncreasing Popular Participation in the Treaty-making Process : TheLegislative Process of Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution ofThailand

2012

356 Tadashi ITO Revisiting the Determinants of Unit Values 2012

～Previous IDE Discussion Papers ～

No. Author(s) Title

355

Susumu (Shin) ABE, RyoTAKAHASHI, Akiko HARUNA,Eiji YAMAJI, and ToshiyukiWAKATSUKI

Farming Strategy of African Smallholder Fermers in Transition fromTraditional to Alternative Agriculture 2012

354 Kiyoyasu TANAKA and YoshihiroHASHIGUCHI

Spatial Spillovers from FDI Agglomeration: Evidence from theYangtze River Delta in China 2012

353 Takeshi INOUE Central Bank Intervention and Exchange Rate Behaviour: EmpiricalEvidence for India 2012

352 Rajnish KUMAR, Arup MITRAand Mayumi MURAYAMA Toiling Children: The Gender Dimension 2012

351 Chizuko SATO Casting a Voice for Rural Struggles during Apartheid: The Case ofAFRA 2012

350 Hisao YOSHINO Backward-bending of Labor Supply Function and Free Riders 2012

349 Miwa YAMADA

Comparative Analysis of Bilateral Memoranda on Anti-humanTrafficking Cooperation between Thailand and Three NeighboringCountries:What Do the Origin and the Destination States Agree Upon?

2012

348 Nobuhiro AIZAWA The Inverted Chinese/China Problem in Indonesia: A Preliminaryanalysis on the 2011 Surabaya incident 2012

347 Manabu IWAMOTO and KaoruNABESHIMA

Can FDI Promote Export Diversification and Sophistication of HostCountries? Dynamic Panel System GMM Analysis 2012

346 Kenmei TSUBOTA Multiplant Strategy under core-periphery structure 2012

345 Wakana KUSAKA, MichikazuKOJIMA, Mariko WATANABE

Consciousness, Value and Consumer Choice of Energy EfficientAppliance: Case of Thailand, China and India 2012

344 Yuka KODAMA Young Women’s Economic Daily Lives in Rural Ethiopia 2012

343 Etsuyo MICHIDA and KaoruNABESHIMA

Roles of Supply Chains in Adopting Product Related EnvironmentalRegulations: Case of Vietnam 2012

342 Shunsuke MANAGI Trade, Economic Growth and Environment 2012

341 Keiichiro HONDA The Effect of EU Environmental Regulation on International Trade:Restriction of Hazardous Substances as a Trade Barrier 2012

340 Yasushi HAZAMA Non-Economic Voting and Incumbent Strength in Turkey 2012

339 Yoshihiro HASHIGUCHI andKuang-hui CHEN

Assessing Agglomeration Economies in the Yangzi River Delta,China: A Bayesian Spatial Econometric Approach 2012

338 Koichiro KIMURA Diversified Boundaries of the Firm 2012

337 Mami YAMAGUCHI Migration as a Rural Development Strategy and the MigrantsInvolved: An Account of a Migrants' Hometown in Sichuan, China 2012

336 Junko MIZUNO Technology Network for Machine Tools in Vietnam 2012

335 Fernando GONZALEZ-VIGIL andTatsuya SHIMIZU The Japan-Peru FTA: Antecedents, Significance and Main Features 2012

334 Yuko TSUJITA and Hisaya ODA Caste, Land, and Migration: A Preliminary Analysis of a VillageSurvey in an Underdeveloped State in India 2012

333 Hisaya ODA Progress and Issues in Rural Electrification in Bihar: A PreliminaryAnalysis 2012

332 Koichi FUJITA Development Strategy in Bihar through Revitalizing the AgriculturalSector: A Preliminary Analysis 2012

331 Chirashree Das GUPTA Growth and Public Finance in Bihar 2012330 Zhe Ren The Confucius Institutes and China’s Soft Power 2012

329 Ikuko OKAMOTO Coping and Adaptation againsｔ Decreasing Fish Resources:CaseStudy of Fishermen in Lake Inle, Myanmar 2012

328Takeshi INOUE, YukiTOYOSHIMA, and ShigeyukiHAMORI

Inflation Targeting in Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines:The Impact on Business Cycle Synchronization between EachCountry and the World

2012

327 Yoko IWASAKIThe Business Management Strategy of Iran's Large Apparel Firms:Overview of Results from a Questionnaire Survey and Interviews2009-2011

2012

326 Koji KUBO Trade Policies and Trade Mis-reporting in Myanmar 2012

325 Momoko KAWAKAMI Innovating Global Value Chains: Creation of the Netbook Market byTaiwanese Firms 2012

No. Author(s) Title

324 Shawn ARITA and KiyoyasuTANAKA

Heterogeneous Multinational Firms and Productivity Gains fromFalling FDI Barriers 2012

323 Hisatoshi HOKEN Development of Land Rental Market and its Effect on HouseholdFarming in Rural China: An Empirical Study in Zhejiang Province 2012

322 Yuya KUDO Returns to Migration: The Role of Educational Attainment in RuralTanzania 2012

321 Miwa TSUDAThe Gap between Recognition and the ’Compensation Business’: TheClaim against Britain for Compensation by Kenya’s Former Mau MauFighters

2012

320 Koji KUBO Restructuring the State Budget System for Disinflation and exchangeRate Unification in Myanmar 2012

319 Momoe MAKINO Effects of Birth Order and Sibling Sex Composition on HumanCapital Investment in Children in India 2012

318Kazunobu HAYAKAWA, KiyoyasuTANAKA, and Yasushi UEKI

Transport Modal Choice by Multinational Firms: Firm-level Evidencefrom Southeast Asia 2011

317 Yuko TSUJITA Factors that Prevent Children from Gaining Access to Schooling: AStudy of Delhi Slum Households 2011

316 Hiroko UCHIMURA Health System Reforms in China: Progress and Further Challenges 2011

315 Daisuke HIRATSUKA Production Networks in the Asia-Pacific Region: Facts and PolicyImplications 2011

314 Kaoru NABESHIMA Growth Strategies in a Greener World 2011

313 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA, Hyun-Hoon LEE, and Donghyun PARK Do Export Promotion Agencies Increase Exports? 2011

312 Mariko WATANABE Competition of Mechanisms: How Chinese Home Appliances FirmsCoped with Default Risk of Trade Credit? 2011

311 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA How Serious Is the Omission of Bilateral Tariff Rates in Gravity? 2011

310 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA andKiyoyasu TANAKA

Export Platform FDI and Firm Heterogeneity2011

309 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA, FukunariKIMURA, Kaoru NABESHIMA

Non-conventional Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Do TheyEnhance International Trade? 2011

308 Koichi KAWAMURAConcensus and Democracy in Indonesia: Musyawarah-MufakatRevisited 2011

307 Kumudinei DISSANAYAKELow Workforce Participation of Educated Female and the Role ofWork Organizations in Post-war Sri Lanka 2011

306 Nay Myo AungAgricultural Efficiency of Rice Farmers in Myanmar: A Case Study inSelected Areas 2011

305 Takeshi KAWANAKA and YukiASABA

Establishing Electoral Administration Systems in New Democracies2011

304 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA Bilateral Tariff Rates in International Trade: Finished Goods versusIntermediate Goods 2011

303 Shuji UCHIKAWAKnowledge Spillover in Indian Automobile IndustryThe Process and the Coverage 2011

302 Ke DING and Jiutang PAN Platforms, Network Effects and Small Business Dynamics in China:Case Study of the Shanzhai Cell Phone Industry 2011

301 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA andKenmei TSUBOTA

Location Choice in Low-income Countries: Evidence from JapaneseInvestments in East Asia 2011

300 Tatsufumi YAMAGATA and YokoASUYAMA

The Rise and Fall in the Price of Food, Fuel and ManufacturedGoods: Interdependency between Prices and Technology DeterminingComparative Advantages and Development Paths

2011

299 Takeshi INOUE and ShigeyukiHAMORI

Financial Permeation As a Role of Microfinance: Has MicrofinanceActually been Helpful to the Poor? 2011

298 Tatsuya SHIMIZU Development of Broiler Integration in Peru 2011

298 Kaoru NABESHIMA and KiyoyasuTANAKA

Innovation Networks among China, Japan, and Korea: FurtherEvidence from U.S. Patent Data 2011

296 Shawn ARITA and KiyoyasuTANAKA Simulating Heterogeneous Multinational Firms 2011

295 Abu S. SHONCHOY and Seiro ITO Ramadan School Holidays as a Natural Experiment:Impacts ofSeasonality on School Dropout in Bangladesh 2011

No. Author(s) Title

294 Abu S. SHONCHOY Seasonal Migration and Micro-credit in the Lean Period: Evidencefrom Northwest Bangladesh 2011

293 Futaba ISHIZUKA Economic Restructuring and Regional Distribution of Enterprises inVietnam 2011

292 Miki HAMADA

Market Discipline by Depositors: Impact of Deposit Insurance on theIndonesian Banking SectorMarket Discipline by Depositors:Impact of Deposit Insurance on the Indonesian Banking Sector

2011

291 MURAKAMI Kaoru Negotiating Social Assistance: The Case of the Urban Poor in Turkey 2011

290 Kazuhiko OYAMADA and YokoUCHIDA

Domestic, Vertical, and Horizontal Multinationals: A GeneralEquilibrium Approach using the “Knowledge Capital Model” 2011

289 Miwa YAMADA Is the Anti-Trafficking Framework Really for the 'Victims'? 2011288 Yasushi HAZAMA Determinants of Political Tolerance: A Literature Review 2011

287 Hisao YOSHINO Strategic Trade Policy and Non-Linear Subsidy -In The Case of PriceCompetition- 2011

286 Natsuko OKA Neither Exit nor Voice: Loyalty as a Survival Strategy for the Uzbeksin Kazakhstan 2011

285Ikuo KUROWA, KaoruNABESHIMA, and KiyoyasuTANAKA

Innovation Networks among China, Japan, and Korea: Evidence fromJapanese Patent Data 2011

284 Hitoshi SUZUKI Preliminary Discussions on the Urbanization of Rural Areas inModern Iran 2011

283 Kozo KUNIMUNE A Model of Economic Growth with Saturating Demand 2011

282 Etsuyo MICHIDA, Cemal Atici, andMichikazu KOJIMA Does Quality Matter in the Iron and Scrap Trade? 2011

281 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA, FukunariKIMURA, and Hyun-Hoon LEE How Does Country Risk Matter for Foreign Direct Investment? 2011

280 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA andNobuaki YAMASHITA

The Role of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in FacilitatingGlobal Production Networks 2011

279 Noriyuki YANAGAWA and MarikoWATANABE

Ex ante barganing and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply:Theory and Evidence from China 2011

278 Yoko ASUYAMA Skill Sorting, Inter-Industry Skill Wage Premium, and ProductionChains: Evidence from India 1999-2000 2011

277 Yoko ASUYAMA Skill Distribution and Comparative Advantage: A Comparison ofChina and India 2011

276 Bo MENG, Norihiko YAMANO andColin WEBB

Application of Factor Decomposition Techniques to VerticalSpecialisation Measurement 2011

275 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA Measuring Fixed Costs for Firms’ Use of a Free Trade Agreement:Threshold Regression Approach 2011

274 Kenmei TSUBOTA,Yujiro KAWASAKI

Myopic or farsighted:Bilateral Trade Agreements among threesymmetric countries

2011