ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004 DNSSEC and the Zone Enumeration Andreas Baess DENIC eG [email protected].

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ICANN - Cape Town 11/3 0/2004 DNSSEC and the Zone Enumeration Andreas Baess DENIC eG [email protected]

Transcript of ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004 DNSSEC and the Zone Enumeration Andreas Baess DENIC eG [email protected].

Page 1: ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004 DNSSEC and the Zone Enumeration Andreas Baess DENIC eG baess@denic.de.

ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004

DNSSECand the

Zone Enumeration

Andreas BaessDENIC eG

[email protected]

Page 2: ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004 DNSSEC and the Zone Enumeration Andreas Baess DENIC eG baess@denic.de.

ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004

Abstract

• Known Facts• Claimed problems• Way ahead

Page 3: ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004 DNSSEC and the Zone Enumeration Andreas Baess DENIC eG baess@denic.de.

ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004

Facts

• The introduction of DNSSEC with the current form of the specification provides Zone Enumeration:– http://josefsson.org/walker/

• An authoritative denial of existence of a given domain name delivers as a proof the next existing domain name.

• There were protocol changes to refuse AXFR

Page 4: ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004 DNSSEC and the Zone Enumeration Andreas Baess DENIC eG baess@denic.de.

ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004

Facts

• Some key players for a successful widespread deployment of DNSSEC consider this as a problem:– Security problem?– Policy problem?– Legal problem?

Page 5: ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004 DNSSEC and the Zone Enumeration Andreas Baess DENIC eG baess@denic.de.

ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004

Security problem?

• An attack begins by identifying your target:http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/dnshack.pdf

• “But domain names can be gathered by other means, for instance, dictionary attacks”– German + English dictionary + John the Ripper = 1%

of the de-zone– Brute force on all 8-characters delivers 13% of the

de-zone.– com-zone as a dictionary = 42% of the nl-zone

Page 6: ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004 DNSSEC and the Zone Enumeration Andreas Baess DENIC eG baess@denic.de.

ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004

Policy problem?

• DNS information is public...• ...there’s a qualitative difference between:

– Making data available as a query/response mechanism

– Making data available as a compilation• DENIC’s policy: http://www.denic.de/en/faqs/

allgemeine_faqs/index.html#section_185

Page 7: ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004 DNSSEC and the Zone Enumeration Andreas Baess DENIC eG baess@denic.de.

ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004

Legal problem?

• IANAL• Nominet’s position:

http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2004/msg00687.html

• DENIC’s position:– In conflict with Germany’s Federal Data

Protection Act

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Way ahead

• IETF dnsext wg decided to advance the current specification as a proposed standard

• Inmediately started to work on the problem following The Engineering Way (TM):– Listing the requirements for a denial of

existence– Weighting their relevance, since sometimes

trade-offs exist– Evaluating proposals

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ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004

Working documents

• http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-signed-nonexistence-requirements-01.txt

• http://www.links.org/dnssec/requirements-matrix3.htm• http://www.links.org/dnssec/draft-laurie-dnsext-nsec2-0

2.txt• http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-arends-dnsnr-

00.txt• http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-

dnssec-trans-01.txt

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ICANN - Cape Town 11/30/2004

Many thanks for your attention!

Any questions?