Ibn Sina: Qiyas iii.1¯ - Wilfrid Hodgeswilfridhodges.co.uk/arabic22.pdf · Ibn Sina: Qiyas iii.1¯...

Ibn Sina: Qiyas iii.1

Trans. Wilfrid Hodges,based on the Cairo text ed. Ibrahim Madkour et al.

(DRAFT ONLY)

4 November 2012

125

⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ⇣Ü C£ B� @ ·” ⇣È¢ ⇣J j÷œ @ ⇣H AÉ AJ⌦ ⇣ÆÀ @ ⌦ Ø

iii.1 On mixed syllogisms with absolute and necessary 125.5

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣I K Aø @ X @� ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣I K Aø @ X @� : ⇣H AÉ AJ⌦ ⇣ÆÀ @ Ë YÎ ⌦ Ø A J ⇣Ø Y⇣Ø

[3.1.1] We have already spoken about these syllogisms when they con- 125.6sist of absoluteness propositions and when they consist of necessity propo-sitions.{Prior Anal i.9, 30a15.}

⇣I K Aø @ X @� ⇣H A¢ ⇣J j÷œ @ ⌦ Ø ’

✏Œæ⇣J J Ø . ⌦

⇣ÆK. A” ⇣È ‘g. ⌦ Ø ·�⌦K. QÂ îÀ @ ·” ⇣H A¢ ⇣J j÷œ @ ⇣IJ⌦ ⇣ÆK.

Among the remaining cases there are the syllogisms that consist of a mix-ture of the two kinds of proposition. So let us talk about the mixed syllo-gisms where

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ¯ Q k�B @ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” AÓ⇣E A” ✏Y ⇣Æ” ¯ Yg @�

one of the premises is an absoluteness proposition and the other is a neces-sity proposition.

…æ ⌘ÇÀ @ ·” » ✏�B @ H. QÂ îÀ AK.

�@ YJ. JÀ

[3.1.2] Let us begin with the first mood in 125.8

h.✏

…ø ÈÀ A⌘J” . ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï A“Î @Q�. ª ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” A“Î @Q ™ì ·�⌦⇣JJ. k. Ò” ·�⌦⇣J✏J⌦✏ ø ·” ⌦

Y✏À @ » ✏

�B @

H.

1

QIYAS iii.1 Prior Anal i.9, 30a15

first figure, which has two universally quantified affirmative premises, withthe minor premise an absoluteness proposition and the major premise a ne-cessity proposition. For example:

(1)Every C is a B, i.e. with absoluteness;and every B is an A with necessity.Then we say: Every C is an A with necessity.

, ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. @ h.✏

…ø ✏ ‡ @� : » Ò ⇣Æ J Ø . ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. @ H.✏

…ø , ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. ✏⌦�@

Å⌧⌦À A÷œ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. A÷œ ⇣È ✏” A´ ≠ É A“J⌦ Ø ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ Y g�A K A✏ Jª Y⇣Ø A✏ K @� : B ✏

�@ » Ò ⇣Æ K

[3.1.3] Our first comment is that we have been taking ‘absolute propo-sition’ in the above as including both necessary propositions and

⇣Ë ✏X A” ⇣á Ø @ÒK⌦ ΩÀ X ·” ‡ Aø A‘ Ø , ° ⇣J k @� ΩÀ Yª ‡�B @ AÎ A K Y g

�@ @ X @� , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK.

propositions that are not necessary. When we take them like that now, theyform mixtures. Some of them correspond to necessary matter;{So what does an absoluteness proposition say? }

. ≠ ⇣J k @� AÓD⌦ Ø ⇣ËP QÂ ï B ⇣Ë ✏X A” ⇣á Ø @ÒK⌦ A” , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ’∫k AÍ“∫k ‡ Aø ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @these are the ones whose content is necessary. Some of them correspond tonon-necessary matter; these are different.

·” – Q K⌦ ‡ Aø A‘ Ø . ⌦ P QÂ ï Q�⌦ ⇣H A ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ·” ‡ Aø A” , ⇣H A ⇣Æ ¢÷œ AK. A JÍÎ ·™J⌦ ØBy ‘absolute’ let us mean here those absolute propositions that are not ne-cessity propositions. When the mixture of an absoluteness proposition witha necessity one

Transcription checked 21 Jan 10. Readings checked 17 Oct 12.

2


126⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ·” ⌦

Y✏À @ ° mÃ '@ ’∫k ΩÀ X ✏ ‡

�@ ⇣I“ ´ , ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ K ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. AÍ¢ g

entails a necessary conclusion, you know that the mixture is tantamount tothe mixture of a necessity proposition and a general absoluteness proposi-tion.

⇣È ✏” A´ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣I” QÀ ⇣È ✏” A´ AÓ⇣E Y g�@ ÒÀ Ω✏ K

�@ ⇣I“ ´ , ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” AÓ D” – Q K⌦ ‡ Aø A” . ⇣È ✏” A™À @

In the case where it entails an absolute conclusion, you know that if youtake [the premises] as general [absoluteness] propositions, then what fol-lows is a general absoluteness proposition,

I. k. Ò⇣K ⇣È ✏” A™À @ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ⇣I K Aø ÒÀ È✏ K A� Ø . ⇣ÈK. Q ⇣Æ” ⇣È Ø AÇ÷œ @ ‡ Ò∫⇣K ✏’Á⌘' . ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï – Q ⇣K ’À

and no necessity proposition follows. [In each case] the distance [travelledby the syllogism] will be minimal. In fact if a general absoluteness premiseentails [with the other premise] a

⌦ Î ⌦⇣Ê

✏À @ ⇣È ✏ì A mÃ '@ Ë YÎ ⌦

Ø Yg. Ò⇣K ⇣I K Aæ Ø . AÍÀ ⌦�G Qk.

✏…ø ⌦

Ø Yg. Ò⇣K ⇣I K AæÀ , ⇣ËP QÂ ïnecessity proposition, then each individual instance of it is true, and soeach special case [of the conclusion] holds as

. ⇣È ✏” A™À @ ⇣Im⇢⇣' ⇣È✏J⌦�K Qk.an individual case under the general. 126.5

, ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ Ë YÎ ‡ Òª ·” @ÒJ. ✏j. ™⇣K A”Ò⇣Ø ✏ ‡ @� : » Ò ⇣Æ J Ø[3.1.4] We say: People have been surprised that this conclusion is a ne- 126.5

cessity proposition

✏ ‡�@ @ÒJ. Çk —Ó✏ E

�B ΩÀ X , Yg @ Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö —Î ✏Q A÷

✏ fl @� . I. Î Y÷œ @ @ YÎ @ Y™J. ⇣⌧É @�and they have regarded this way of reasoning as implausible. There is justone thing that misleads them, namely that they reckon that

, @ XÒk. Ò” ® Ò ìÒ÷œ @ ⇣H @ X – @ X A” A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ‡ Aø A”✏

…ø A JÍÎ ⌦ P QÂ îÀ @the necessary in this case is anything that is necessary for so long as theessence of the subject individual continues to be satisfied,{Here Ibn Sına gives evidence for what he says at Burhan 123.14ff and else-where, that essential and descriptional propositions are counted as abso-lute in Qiyas but necessary in Burhan. The point here is that descriptionalpropositions don’t behave like necessary ones in this kind of argument. It’snot clear what he has against essential propositions here. A common view

3


today is that the temptation to reject this mixed mood comes from readingthe modalities as de dicto. But Ibn Sına is emphatic that de dicto modali-ties should not be mentioned in the same breath as the Aristotelian modalsyllogisms, e.g. Qiyas 142.13f. A further point: his complaint is in part thatpeople don’t distinguish the essential from the descriptional, cf. 126.14ff be-low. This confirms that Theophrastus, Themistius etc. had an ambiguousformulation. }

ÒÍ Ø ëJ⌦K.�@

✏…ø ✏ ‡ @� : …J⌦⇣Ø @ X @� ˙ ✏⇣Êk . ÈK. ≠ìÒK⌦ A÷fl. A ØÒìÒ” – @ X A” A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï

�@

or that is necessary for so long as the subject individual continues to fit thedescription given for it. So when it is said that

(2)Every white thing has with necessity a colour that opens out tothe eye.

: …J⌦⇣Ø @ X @� ΩÀ Yª . A✏J⌦ ⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣Æk A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ËÒJ. Çk ,QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ” ‡ ÒÀ X ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK.they reckon it is a genuine necessity proposition. And likewise when it issaid:

@ X @� @Ò K Aø . A✏J⌦ ⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣Æk A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ËÒJ. Çk , XÒÉ�@ ëJ⌦K.

�B @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK.

(3) With necessity nothing white is black.

they reckon it is a genuine necessity proposition. But when 126.10

i. ¢ JK⌦ ’À ,QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ” ‡ ÒÀ X ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ÒÍ Ø ëJ⌦K.�@

✏…ø , ëJ⌦K.

�@ YK⌦ P : @ÒÀ A⇣Ø

they say

(4)Zayd is white;and everything white is necessarily of a colour that opens out tothe eye.

it doesn’t entail

. ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ëJ⌦K.�@ YK⌦ Q Ø B

✏@� , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ” ‡ ÒÀ X @ YK⌦ P ✏ ‡

�@ : —ÍÀ

for them that

(5) Zayd is of a colour that opens out to the eye, with necessity.

since that would say that Zayd is white with necessity.

. ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. XÒÉ�@ Å⌧⌦À @ YK⌦ P ✏ ‡

�@ XÒÉ

�B @ » A⌘J” ⌦

Ø —ÍÀ i. ⇣J ⌧K⌦ ‡ Aø A÷✏ fl @� ΩÀ Y∫ Ø

4


So likewise for them it would just follow from (3) [and the necessity of theconclusion of this mood] that

(6) Zayd is not black, with necessity.

, A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï BÒ⇣Ø✏

…æÀ @ ˙Œ´ » Ò ⇣Æ÷œ @ ⇣È ⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣Æk ⇣H AJ. ⌘J⇣⌧É A�K. @Ò ™⇣J ⌘Ç�⌦ ’À —Ó✏ E�B @ YÎ

✏…ø

All this is because they don’t take the trouble to establish the facts aboutuniversally quantified propositions that are necessity propositions.

,QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ” ‡ ÒÀ X ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ÒÍ Ø ëJ⌦K.�@

✏…ø : A JÀÒ⇣Ø ·�⌦K. ⇣ÜQ Æ À @Ò J¢ ÆK⌦ ˙ ✏⇣Êk

[If they did,] they would realise the difference between [two meanings of]the sentence 126.15

(7)Everything white is, with necessity, of a colour that opens out tothe eye.

È⇣K @ X – @ X A” È✏ K A� Ø , ëJ⌦K.

�@ È✏ K AK. ≠ì ≠J⌦ª , ëJ⌦K.

�@ È✏ K

�AK. ≠ìÒK⌦ A” Ë A J™” X @�

, @ XÒk. Ò”[The first case is] when its meaning is that whatever thing fits the descrip-tion ‘white’, regardless of how that description is given, and so long as theessence of the thing continues to be satisfied,{NB Explication by expansion. }

È✏ K�AK. ≠ìÒK⌦ A”

✏…ø

�@ .QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ” ‡ ÒÀ X ÒÍ Ø , ëJ⌦K.

�@ ·∫K⌦ ’À

�@ ëJ⌦K.

�@ ‡ Aø

ëJ⌦K.�@

and regardless of whether or not it is white [at the time], that thing has acolour that opens out to the eye. The other [meaning is that] everythingthat fits the description ‘white’


5


127⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK.

�@]] ,QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ” ‡ ÒÀ X ÒÎ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AJ. Ø ëJ⌦K.

�@ – @ X A‘ Ø ‡ Aø ≠J⌦ª

in any way, for as long as it remains white, has with necessity a colourwhich opens out to the eye; or [that every such thing, for as long as it re-mains white,] is with necessity

AÍÀ ✏�@ ≠J⌦ª , A K A⇣ØQ Ø ⇣H @P AJ. ⇣J´ B� @ ·�⌦K.

✏ ‡�@ ΩÀ ≠ É A ✏‹ÿ ’Œ™⇣K ⇣I K

�@ [[. XÒÉ

�AK. Å⌧⌦À

not black. You know from the discussion above that you can tell the twointerpretations apart by the obvious fact that the first of them{At c

Ibara 115.11 Ibn Sına describes a criterion for distinguishing interpreta-tions (viz. one of them can be doubted but the other can’t). But this criterionwasn’t used to distinguish necessary from wasfy-with-necessary-predicateas here. }

. H. X Aø

is false.

‡ ÒÀ X ÒÍ Ø ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ëJ⌦K.�@

✏…ø ✏ ‡ @� : —Î @Q�. ª ⌦

Ø @ÒÀ A⇣Ø @Ò K Aø ÒÀ[3.1.5] If they had made their major premise 127.3

(8)Everything that is white with necessity, that thing has a colourwhich opens out to the eye with necessity.

{NB Quantification over modalised subject; the mode is necessity. }

Y�J ⌧J⌦k °É�B @ ⇣ámÃ '

�@ ·∫K⌦ ’À ·∫À . A ✏⇣Æk A í�⌦

�@ ‡ AæÀ , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ”

then that too would be true. But the middle term in that case is not{I can’t interpret the ’lh

.

q. Is it ‘the truth’ or ‘attached’? }

ëJ⌦K.�B @ …K. , YK⌦ P ˙Œ´ BÒ“m◊ Å⌧⌦À ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ëJ⌦K.

�B @ ✏ ‡

�B ΩÀ X ; ÈJ⌦ Ø AøQ⇣� ⌘Ç”

common [to the two premises], because what is predicated of Zayd [in the 127.5minor premise] is not ‘white with necessity’ but ‘white

⇣I K Aø ⇣Ë X AK⌦ QÀ @ Ë YÎ @Ò Ø Yg ‡ A� Ø , †QÂ⌘Ö CK. ëJ⌦K.

�B @

�@ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. Å⌧⌦À ⌦

Y✏À @

without necessity’ or ‘white’ without any condition. If they suppressed thisaddition

Q�⌦ ™K. �@ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ëJ⌦K.

�@

✏…ø ✏ ‡ @� : » Ò ⇣Æ⇣K ‡

�@ Ω J∫÷fl⌦ B Ω✏ K

�B . ⇣ÈK. X Aø ¯ Q�. ∫À @

6


the major premise would be false, because you can’t say that

(9)Everything that with or without necessity is white has a colourthat opens out to the eye with necessity.

AÍ “ ⌘Ç�⌦ " ëJ⌦K.�@

✏…ø \ : ΩÀÒ ⇣Æ Ø . ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ” ‡ ÒÀ X ÒÍ Ø ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @

When you say ‘Every white thing’, that includes both [things that are nec-essarily white and things that are white without necessity]

.QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ” ‡ ÒÀ X ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ÒÍ Ø ëJ⌦K.�@

✏…ø : » Ò ⇣Æ K ‡

�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ C Ø , A™J⌦‘g.

together, so we can’t say

(10)Every white thing has with necessity a colour which opens outto the eye.

. È⇣J¢✏

⌦⇣Ê

✏À @ ⌦ Î ⇣È✏K⌦ P Aj. ÷œ @ ⇣Ë X A™À @ ✏ ·∫À

But the custom of using words in extended senses is what causes the error. 127.10{Cf. cIbara 101.7 on the c

adatu l-majaziyya and Aristotle’s attitude to it. AlsoQiyas 67.9 on extended senses of ‘necessary’. }

✏…ø : A J ⇣Ø ✏’Á⌘' , H. h.

✏…ø : A J ⇣Ø @ X A�

Ø[3.1.6] So when we say 127.10

(11) Every C is a B.

and then we say

A÷ �fl @ X �@ A” A⇣J⇣Ø ‡ Aø H. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ Y™K. ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ Q�⌦ ™K.

�@ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. H. ÒÎ A”

(12)Everything that is either with necessity or without necessity a B,given that it is a B, regardless of whether that is temporarily orpermanently, is an A with necessity and permanently.

✏…ø : A J ⇣Ø @ X @� ΩÀ Y∫ Ø .

✏…æÀ @ ˙Œ´ » Ò ⇣Æ÷œ @ ⌦

Ø h. … g X , A÷ �fl @ X ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. @ ÒÍ Øthen [it follows that] C is included in whatever is said of every [B]. Like-wise when we say

(13) Every B [is a C].

7


. ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. @ h.✏

…ø ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ I. k. Ò Ø , A™J⌦‘g. A“Í ✏“™K⌦ ⌦

Y✏À @ A ⇣Æ ¢” H.

as an absoluteness proposition which includes both cases together, then ithas to be that

(14) Every C is an A with necessity.

H. h.✏

…ø ÈÀ A⌘J” . ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” i. ⇣J ⌧⇣K ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ¯ Q�. ∫À @ ✏ ·∫À . ΩÀ Yª ⌦ G A⌘JÀ @ H. QÂ îÀ @

[3.1.7] The second mood is the same [as the first], except that the major 127.14premise is the one that is an absoluteness premise, and it entails an abso-luteness conclusion. An example is

(15)Every C is a B with necessity;and every B is an A with absoluteness;so every C is an A with absoluteness.

; ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. @ h.✏

…æ Ø , ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. @ ÒÍ Ø H. ÒÎ A”✏

…ø , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK.


8


128

, @ ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. È✏ K�@ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ Q�⌦

�@ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. H. ÒÎ A”

✏…ø ˙Œ´ ’∫k Y⇣Ø È✏ K

�B ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø

This is because it is given that everything that is a B is with absolutenessan A, regardless of whether it is a B with or without necessity. So

. ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. @ h.✏

…øevery C is an A with absoluteness.

H. ÒÎ A”✏

…ø AÎ A J™” ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ ✏ií�⌦ B ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ Ë YÎ

[3.1.8] It is not correct that the meaning of the absoluteness premise isthat everything that is a B is an A with absoluteness{In this paragraph he examines various possible refinements of the moodjust stated. They take the form of narrowing the major premise; since themood is valid, they will therefore be valid too. I don’t know why he doesn’tjust say this. Odd also that the rest of the paragraph seems to be based onthe assumption that the major premise is a descriptional, which is certainlynot required for validity. }

H. ÒÎ A”✏

…ø Å⌧⌦À È✏ K�B ΩÀ X . ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. @ ÒÍ Ø A÷ �fl @ X B ° ⇣Æ Ø H. – @ X A” ÒÍ Ø

but only for as long as it is a B, not permanently. That is because not ev-erything that is a B

H. ÒÎ , h. ÒÎ ⌦ Y

✏À @ ÒÎ , H. ÒÎ A” ë™K.

✏ ‡ @� : A J ⇣Ø X @� ; H. È✏ K�@ ÈÀ – YK⌦ B

fails to be a B permanently. In fact we have said [in the minor premise] thatsomething that is a B, namely what is a C, is a B

H. H. ≠ìÒK⌦ A”

✏…ø : A JÀÒ⇣Ø , » Ò ⇣ÆÀ @ ΩÀ X Y™K. ‡ X @�

✏ií�⌦ C Ø . A÷ �fl @ X ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ Ò∫K⌦

with necessity and permanently. In the light of this it is not correct for us to 128.5say

(16)Everything that fits the description B is an A at some time,namely the time during which it fits the description B.

≠ìÒK⌦ A” ë™K.✏ ‡ A�

Ø . H. H. A ØÒìÒ” È KÒª ÒÎ ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ΩÀ X , A” A⇣J⇣Ø @ ÈÀIn fact [given the minor premise,] some of what fits the description

9


⌦⇣Ê

✏À @ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣È” ✏Y ⇣Æ÷œ @ Ë YÎ Yg. Ò⇣K ‡

�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ ·∫À . A÷ �fl @ X ÈK. ≠ìÒK⌦ H. H.

B fits that description permanently. It can be that this [major] premise istrue absolutely, with the kind of absoluteness that

✏ií�⌦ B ,Q✏�⌦ ™⇣J” ÒÍ Ø º ✏Qj⇣J”✏

…ø : A JÀÒ ⇣Æª , ⇣ËP QÂ ï B ⇣ËP QÂ ï AÓD⌦ Ø ‡ Ò∫K⌦allows the premise to be either a necessary truth or not one. Thus when wesay

(17) Everything that moves changes.

it is not correct

⇣I⇣Ø ⌦ Ø …K. ; A÷ �fl @ X Å⌧⌦À Aø✏Qj⇣J” – @ X A” B , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. Q✏�⌦ ™⇣J” È✏ K @� : » Ò ⇣Æ K ‡

�@

for us to say

(18)[Everything that moves] changes with necessity, not while it con-tinues to move, nor permanently, but for the non-permanentamount of time during which it does move.

È í™K. , Aø✏Qj⇣J” È⇣K @ X – YK⌦ ΩÀ X ë™K. ‡ Aø X @� : ÈÀ – YK⌦ B ⌦ Y

✏À @ Aø✏Qj⇣J” È KÒª

This is because some moving things have a permanently moving essence 128.10and some

✏ií�⌦ C Ø . ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. B ë™K. , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. @Q✏�⌦ ™⇣J” È í™K. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ΩÀ Yª ; – YK⌦ Bdon’t. Likewise some moving things change with necessity, and some mov-ing things change but not with necessity. Nor is it correct

…K. ; ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. B ΩÀ Yª✏

…æÀ @ ✏ ‡ @� B , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ΩÀ Yª✏

…æÀ @ ✏ ‡ @� : » Ò ⇣Æ K ‡�@

for us to say

(19) Everything that moves changes with necessity.

nor

(20) Everything that moves changes without necessity.

Instead we should say that the premise holds

, ⇣È ÆíÀ @ Ë YÎ ˙Œ´ ⇣È” ✏Y ⇣Æ÷œ @ Ë YÎ ⇣I⇣Ø Yì @ X A� Ø . ✏– A™À @ ⇣Ü C£ B� @ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ . A ⇣Æ ¢” : » Ò ⇣Æ K

absolutely; this is an example of broad absoluteness. But then if this premiseis true when read as a broad absoluteness proposition,

10


AÓ✏ E�@ ©” , ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ ⇣I K Aø , Èk. ÒÀ @ @ YÎ ·” ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. @ H. ÒÎ A”

✏…ø ‡ Aø

so that every B is an A with this kind of absoluteness, the conclusion fol-lows, and moreover it is

, ⇣È ✏” A´ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ✏⌦�@ , ¯ Q�. ∫À Aø ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ‡ Ò∫⇣K ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ Ë YÎ ✏ ‡

�B . ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢”

necessarily an absoluteness proposition. This is because this conclusion 128.15will hold as the same kind of absolute as the major premise, i.e. broad ab-solute.{Appalling exegesis to use d

.

aruriyyatan this way, if my translation is cor-rect.}

, H. H. Aí✏⇣� B� @ ÈÀ – YK⌦ È✏ J∫À , H. È✏ K

�AK. A ØÒìÒ” – @ X A” @ h.

✏…ø ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø

– YJ⌦ ØThus every C will be an A so long as it continues to fit the description B.But [by the minor premise] it permanently fits the description B, so it ispermanently

Transcription checked 22 Jan 10. Readings checked 3 Sep 12.

11


129

‡ Ò K. ‡ ✏Ò ” È✏ K A� Ø ëJ⌦K.

�@

✏…ø , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ëJ⌦K.

�@ i. ⌘JÀ @ : ΩÀ X » A⌘J” . @ È KÒª ÈÀ

an A. An example of this is:

(21)

Snow is white with necessity;and everything white is coloured with a colour which opens outto the eye, with the absoluteness that we said;so all snow is coloured with a colour that opens out to the eye,permanently.

. A÷ �fl @ X QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ” ‡ Ò K. ‡ ✏Ò ” i. ⌘K✏

…æ Ø , A J ⇣Ø A“ª ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. QÂîJ. À ⇣Ü ✏Q Æ”{NB Here he uses ‘permanently’ and ‘with necessity’ as synonyms. }

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ¯ Q�. ª ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ¯ Q ™ì ·´ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ h. A⇣J K @� ·” I.✏j. ™⇣JK⌦ ·” @ YÎ … ✏“™⇣JJ⌦ Ø

Anyone who is surprised at getting a necessity conclusion from an abso-luteness minor premise and a necessity major premise should take a closelook at this.

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ¯ Q ™íÀ @ ⇣I K Aø @ X @�⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ¯ Q�. ª ·´ i. ⇣J ⌧⇣K ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ îÀ @ Ym.⇢'⌦ È✏ K A�

ØHe will find a necessity proposition derived from an absoluteness majorpremise when the minor premise is a necessity proposition.

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣ÈJ. À AÉ ⇣È✏J⌦✏ ø Ë @Q�. ª , ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣ÈJ. k. Ò” ⇣È✏J⌦

✏ ø Ë @Q ™ì : ⌘IÀ A⌘JÀ @ H. QÂ îÀ @

[3.1.9] The third mood: Its minor premise is a universally quantified 129.5affirmative absoluteness proposition and its major premise is a universallyquantified negative necessity proposition.

⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. i. ⇣J ⌧K⌦ . ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. @ H. ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B , ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. H. h.✏

…ø : ÈÀ A⌘J”For example:

(22)Every C is a B with absoluteness;and no B is an A, with necessity.It follows that with necessity no C is an A.

. ⇣I“✏ ´ Y⇣Ø A“ª , @ h. ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B

[It behaves] as you have already learned.{I.e. for the first mood. }

12


, ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. H. h.✏

…ø : ⇣Ü C£ B� @ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ⌦ Ø ÈÇ∫´ ©K. @QÀ @ H. QÂ îÀ @

[3.1.10] The fourth mood is the same but with the necessity and the 129.8absoluteness the other way round:

(23)Every C is a B with necessity;and no B is an A, with absoluteness.It entails: No C is an A.

⇣I“✏ ´ A” ˙Œ´ . @ h. ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B : i. ⇣J ⌧K⌦ ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. @ H. ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B

It behaves as you have learned

. ⌦ G A⌘JÀ @ H. QÂ îÀ @ ⌦

Øfor the second mood. 129.10

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣ÈJ. k. Ò” ⇣È✏J⌦✏ ø Ë @Q�. ª , ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣ÈJ. k. Ò” ⇣È✏J⌦�K Qk. Ë @Q ™ì Å” A mÃ '@

[3.1.11] The fifth mood: its minor premise is an existentially quantified 129.11affirmative absoluteness proposition, and its major premise is a universallyquantified affirmative necessity proposition.

. ⇣Ü C£ B� @ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ⌦ Ø AÓDÑ∫´ Ä X AÇÀ @

[3.1.12] The sixth mood is the same but with the necessity and the abso- 129.12luteness the other way round.

. ⇣È✏J⌦✏ ø ⇣ÈJ. À AÉ ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï Ë @Q�. ª , ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣ÈJ. k. Ò” ⇣È✏J⌦�K Qk. Ë @Q ™ì ©K. AÇÀ @

[3.1.13] The seventh mood: its minor premise is an existentially quan- 129.13tified affirmative absoluteness proposition, and its major is a negative uni-versally quantified necessity proposition.

. ¯ Q�. ∫ À ⇣È™K. A K l .⇢�' A⇣J JÀ @ . ⇣Ü C⇣K B� @ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ⌦ Ø ÈÇ∫´ ·” A⌘JÀ @

[3.1.14] The eighth mood is the same but with the necessity and the 129.14absoluteness the other way round. Its conclusions take their form from themajor premise.


13

QIYAS iii.1 Prior Anal i.10, 30b7

130

. ⇣Ü C⇣K B� @ © J÷ ⇣fl ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ îÀ @ ⇣È✏J⌦�K Qm.Ã '@ B , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ © J÷ ⇣fl B ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ⇣È✏J⌦�K Qm.Ã '@ ✏ ‡�@ ’Œ´ @�

[3.1.15] Know that an existentially quantified absoluteness proposition 130.1doesn’t say that [its content] is not necessary, and an existentially quantifiednecessity proposition doesn’t say that [its content] is not absolute.

‡ A™ K A“⇣J⇣K [ B] ≠J⌦∫ Ø H. Am.⇢'⌦ B� @ I. ÇÀ @ ⌦ Ø ‡ A™ K A“⇣J⇣K B A⇣J K Aø @ X @� ·�⌦⇣J✏⌧⌦�K Qm.Ã '@ ✏ ‡ A�

ØIn fact, given that neither the negative nor the affirmative existentially quan-tified propositions place such a restriction, how can we suppose that whenthey don’t place such a restriction

. ⌦ G A⌘JÀ @ H. QÂ îÀ @ ⌦

Ø P Òª Y÷œ @ ˙ Ê™÷œ @ A“ÓD⌦ Ø © J⇣J÷fl⌦ , ⇣Ü C£ B� @ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ⌦ Ø

either when they are necessity propositions or when they are absolutenesspropositions, they still deny that [their content] has the the meaning re-ferred to in our discussion of the second mood?{I take him to be saying that the existentially quantified propositions arecompatible with the descriptional reading, and using as evidence the factalready discussed, that they are compatible with the content being absoluteand with its being necessary. This requires adding a la in line 130.2 withoutms evidence, but noting that one ms omits the earlier la in the same contextearlier in the line. }

[Second figure]

⇣Ü C£ B� @ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ⌦ Ø ‡ A⇣J✏⌧⌦ í ⇣ÆÀ @ ⇣I Æ ⇣J k @� @ X @� È✏ K

�@ ÈJ⌦ Ø ✏⇣ámÃ 'A Ø , ⌦

G A⌘JÀ @ …æ ⌘ÇÀ @ A ✏”�@

[3.1.16] We consider the second figure. The truth about it is that when 130.4the two propositions differ in that one is a necessity proposition and theother is a narrow absoluteness{Prior Anal i.10, 30b7. But he starts with new material and picks up Aristo-tle only at 131.7. }

, Q£ ·” Yg @✏

…ø ˙Œ´ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. °É�B @ …J⌦ ⇣Æ Ø , ·�⌦⇣J✏J⌦

✏ ø A⇣J K Aø , ✏ê AmÃ '@

proposition, and they are both universally quantified, then the middle term 130.5is applied, with necessity, to all the individuals under one of the extremeterms,

I. k Aì Ë P ✏Òk. A” ˙Œ´ , ⇣ËP QÂ ï Q�⌦ ™K. Q k�B @ Q¢À @ ·” Yg @

✏…ø ˙Œ´ …J⌦⇣Ø ✏’Á⌘'

and then it is applied to all the individuals under the other extreme term

14


but not with necessity, according to what was allowed by a person given to

È✏ K�@ ÒÎ , ÒìÒ”

✏…ø Y J´ °É

�B @ ’∫k ·�⌦ ØQ¢À @ Yg

�B ‡ Aæ Ø , A í�⌦

�@ ✏ë ÆÀ @

detailed analysis. So for one of the two extreme terms, the content of themiddle term applies to everything that satisfies the extreme term, and itapplies to it

‡ Aø , È J” Yg @ Yg @✏

…æÀ ✏⌦�@ ÈÀ A÷ �fl @ X Å⌧⌦À È✏ K

�@ ÒÎ Q k

�B @ ˙Œ´ , ÈÀ ’Á�' @ X

permanently; and for the other extreme term, the middle term applies to[each thing that satisfies the extreme term], but in each case it doesn’t applypermanently.{So he says. But does he mean it is not asserted to apply permanently? }

·´ A“Ó D” Yg @✏

…ø I. É I. m.⇢'⌦ ‡ @ Y´ AJ. ⇣J” ·�⌦ ØQ¢À @ ✏ ‡ A� Ø . AK. Am.⇢'⌦ @�

�@ AJ. É ’∫mÃ '@

The content can be either denied or affirmed. In fact the extreme terms aredisjoint from each other, and each of them has to be denied of{NB He is confused about whether the h

.

ukm includes the quality. In 130.7the h

.

ukm was ‘the h

.

ukm of the middle term’, but now the h

.

ukm is either adenial or an affirmation.}

·´ H. Ò Ç” AÓD⌦ Ø ⌦ Y

✏À @ ë™J. À @ ✏ ‡ A�

Ø . ⇣È✏J⌦�K Qk. ¯ Q ™íÀ @ ⇣I K Aø ‡ @� ΩÀ Yª .Q k�B @

the other. And likewise if the minor premise is existentially quantified, then 130.10the ‘some’ which is in the minor premise is denied of

. ’∫mÃ '@ ⌦ Ø ÈÀ A ÆÀ A m◊ ë™J. À @ ΩÀ X ‡ Aø X @� ;Q⌘�ª

�B @ Q¢À @

the major extreme term, because this some and the major term are incom-patible with respect to the content [in the middle term].

⇣I ™k. @ X @� ⇣I K�@

[3.1.17] If you count 130.11{NB Counting the modality as part of the predicate so as to form a syllo-gism. Why? In any case it won’t work if the modalities in the two premisesare different (this being in second figure). }

H. h.✏

…ø : ΩÀÒ⇣Ø C⌘J” , ‡ @Q⇣�⇣Ø B� @ ‡ Aæ Ø » Ò“j÷œ @ ·” @ Z Qk. – @ YÀ @ Q�⌦ – @ YÀ @the permanence or non-permanence as a part of the predicate, it forms apremise-pair, as when you say

(24)Every C is a B with necessity;and every A is a B with necessity.

15


{Curious he chooses a non-productive premise-pair, twice. I suspect hewas careless about the negations. }

, H. h. ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. �@ , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. H. @

✏…ø , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK.

or

(25)With necessity no C is a B;and no A is a B, where the negation applies to each individualbut not with necessity.

✏…ø : » Ò ⇣Æ⇣K ‡

�@ ·∫”

�@ ; ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. B Yg @

✏…ø ⌦

Ø ÒÎ AJ. É H. @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö BIf you do this, you could say

È✏ K�@ ÈJ⌦ ´ …“m⇢'⌦ h. ÈÀ » A ⇣ÆK⌦ A✏‹ÿ Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B . H. A÷ �fl @ X È✏ K

�@ ÈJ⌦ ´ …“jJ⌦ Ø , @ ÈÀ » A ⇣ÆK⌦ A”

(26)

Everything which satisfies the phrase A has predicated of it thatit is permanently a B;and nothing which satisfies the phrase C has predicated of it thatit is permanently a B; This entails that no C is an A.

130.15

ÈÀ » A ⇣ÆK⌦ A”✏

…ø ⇣I ⇣Ø ÒÀ ΩÀ Yª . @ h. ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B È✏ K�@ i. ⇣J ⌧J⌦ Ø , H. A÷ �fl @ X

And likewise if you said

(27)

Everything which satisfies the phrase C is a thing of which it ispermanently denied that it is a B;and nothing which satisfies the phrase A is a thing of which it ispermanently denied that it is a B; it follows that no A is a B, andthat is with necessity.

» A ⇣ÆK⌦ A✏‹ÿ Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö Å⌧⌦À , H. È✏ K�@ È J´ A÷ �fl @ X I. Ç�⌦ Z ⌦Ê⌘ÑÀ @ ΩÀ X , Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö ÒÍ Ø h.

{NB say’ here seems to be a concrete individual, but I guess this is astraight quantifier usage. }


16


131

ΩÀ X , H. @ Å⌧⌦À i. ⇣J K�@ , H. È✏ K

�@ È J´ A÷ �fl @ X I. Ç�⌦ Z ⌦Ê⌘ÑÀ @ ΩÀ X , Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö ÒÍ Ø , @ ÈJ⌦ ´

. @ XQ Æ” A÷fiÖ @� @ Yª È J´ H. Ò Ç” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö ΩÀÒ⇣Ø » YK. …™m.⇢⇣' ‡

�@ Ω J∫÷fl⌦ Ω✏ K A�

Ø . ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK.Then you can put a single noun in place of the phrase ‘thing of which it isdenied etc.’.{NB Using a single noun as short for a phrase.}

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï i. ⇣J ⌧K⌦ , ΩÀ X ©J⌦‘g. ⌦ Ø ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ⇣ÈÍk. YK⌦ Q⇣K ‡

�@ Ω J∫÷fl⌦ Y�J ⌧J⌦k

In this way you can add the modality of necessity in all of this, and it entailsa necessity proposition.{Presumably he is describing how modalities can be thought of as beingadded to assertoric syllogisms. ?? }

È✏ K�B , ·�⌦⇣JJ. À AÉ

�@ ·�⌦⇣JJ. k. Ò” ·” i. ⇣J ⌧K⌦ ‡

�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ ’À , ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣È ✏” A™À @ ⇣H Y g

�@ @ X @� A ✏”

�@

[3.1.18] When you take a general absoluteness proposition [as premise],the syllogism with two affirmative premises or two negative premises shouldn’tbe productive, because{Read al-mut

.

laqata l-

cammata with one ms. Very possibly Ibn Sına intended

this but wrote carelessly. The paragraph frankly looks like an unfinishednote to himself. }

I. m.⇢⇣' B ⇣Ë ✏X A÷œ @ Ω ⇣K ⌦

Ø , ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ˙Œ´ ⇣Ü Yí⇣� ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ Ω ⇣K ‡ Ò∫⇣K ‡�@ ·∫÷fl⌦

that kind of absoluteness proposition can be true with a content that is 131.5necessarily true, and with that matter [in the absoluteness premise] theredoesn’t have to be

. i. ⇣J ⌧K⌦ B È✏ K�@ ˙ Ê™” @ YÎ . ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ K

a conclusion. And this means that the syllogism is not productive.

. ΩÀ X ⌦ Ø P ÒÓD⌘Ñ÷œ @ ê Aí⇣J⇣Ø @� ˙Õ @�

✏Y™ J Ø[3.1.19] Let us review precisely what is the the standard position about 131.6

[the second] figure.

·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. , ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. H. h.✏

…ø : ΩÀ X ·” » ✏�B @ H. QÂ îÀ @

The first mood of the figure is: 131.7

17


(28)Every C is a B with absoluteness;and with necessity no A is a B.

{Cesare. Proved as assertoric case, by converting major premise so as toget Celarent.}

@ YÎ . @ h. ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. È✏ K�@ : i. ⇣J ⌧J⌦ Ø , » ✏

�B @ ˙Õ @� Å∫™ JJ⌦ Ø , H. @

It converts to the first figure, and thus it entails

(29) No C is an A.

{The conversion

. ÈJ⌦ Ø ⇣È´ P A J” BThis is uncontroversial.{I.e. given the controversial position that ‘No B is an A, with necessity’converts.}

. ¯ Q ™ì ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ îÀ @ ⇣ÈJ. À AÇÀ @ …™m.⇢⇣' ‡

�@ ⌦

G A⌘JÀ @[3.1.20] The second mood is where you put the negative necessity propo- 131.10

sition as the minor premise.{Camestres, proved like the assertoric case by converting the minor premiseto get Celarent. }

⇣Ü C£ B� AK. H. @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. H. h.✏

…ø : A JÀÒ⇣Ø …⌘J‘ Ø ⌘IÀ A⌘JÀ @ A ✏”�@

[3.1.21] The third mood takes the form 131.11

(30)Every C is a B with necessity;and no A is a B, with the absoluteness which excludes necessity.

{Cesare again, but with necessity on the affirmative premise we can get anecessity conclusion. }

Å∫™ JK⌦ A” . ⇣È KP A ⇣Æ÷œ @ – A÷ ⇣fl ÈJ⌦ Ø ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ˙ ✏⇣Êk Å∫™ JK⌦ A✏‹ÿ ·∫J⌦À . ⌦ P QÂ îÀ @ Q�⌦ ™À @Suppose [the major premise] is convertible, so that the premise and its con-verse are completely parallel.

‡ Ò∫K⌦ �@ , ⇣È ØQÂîÀ @ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ·” A´Ò K B

✏@� ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ P Òm.⇢'⌦ B ⌦ P QÂ î�. Å⌧⌦À A ✏‹ÿ

˙ Ê™÷fl.Among non-necessary propositions, a proposition that converts can onlybe a kind of pure absolute, or its meaning is

18


. …J⌦⇣Ø A” Òm⇢ ' ˙Œ´ Å∫™ JK⌦ ˙ ✏⇣Êk , A” A⇣J⇣Ø XÒk. ÒÀ @ ⌦ Ø …ík A”

that something was the case at some particular time, so that it converts inthe way that was said.{Reference back to ii.1, but I haven’t yet sorted out exactly where. }

⇣HP Aì ⇣IÇ∫™ K @� @ X @� AÓ✏ E�@ ’Œ´ Y ⇣Æ Ø » ✏

�B @ ˙ Ê™÷œ AK. ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ¯ Q�. ∫À @ ⇣I K Aø ‡ @� A ✏”

�A Ø

[3.1.22] When the major premise is absolute in the first meaning, it was 131.15already known that when it converts, it becomes

⇣I“ ´ A“ª i. ⇣J ⌧J⌦ Ø , A÷ �fl @ X H. h.✏

…ø , H. È✏ K�AK. A ØÒìÒ” – @ X A” , @ H. ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B

(31) No B is an A at any time while it continues to fit the descriptionB.

But [in (30)] every C is a B permanently, and so as you know, the syllogismentails

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ïa necessity conclusion.{This is another example of the descriptional argument, though did he ac-tually mention descriptional Celarent? }


19


132

h.✏

…ø ✏ ‡�@ AÓD⌦ Ø ≠J⌦À

�A⇣JÀ @ ⇣È✏J⌦ ⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣Æk ‡ Ò∫⇣J Ø ⇣È✏J⌦ K A⌘JÀ @ ⇣ÈÍm.Ã '@ ˙Œ´ ⇣I K Aø ‡ @� A ✏”

�@

[3.1.23] We turn to the second kind of convertible absolute proposition. 132.1The essence of the composed syllogism in this case is

(32)

Everything that in any point or interval of time is a C fits thedescription B permanently for as long as its essence continuesto be satisfied, not just for as long as it continues to satisfy thedescription B;and nothing that satisfies A at a certain time has B true of it.

– @ X A” B @ XÒk. Ò” È⇣K @ X – @ X A” A÷ �fl @ X H. È✏ K�AK.

ÒìÒ” È✏ K A� Ø , ‡ A” P ⇣I⇣Ø

✏…ø ⌦

Ø

È✏ K�@ ÈÀ XÒk. Ò” A” ‡ A” P ⌦

Ø @ ·K⌦ XÒk. Ò÷œ @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B . ° ⇣Æ Ø H. È✏ K�AK. A ØÒìÒ”

⇣ÈjJ⌦m⇡ï ⇣ÈJ. À AÇÀ @ ⇣È✏J⌦ í ⇣ÆÀ @ ‡ Òª Y J´ , @ h. ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ © J⇣J÷fl⌦ ‡

�@ I. j. J⌦ Ø . H.

This is supposed to prevent there being any C which is an A under theassumption that the negative proposition is

@ YÎ ⌦ Ø , H. È✏ K

�@ ÈÀ Yg. ÒK⌦ È⇣K @ X ÈJ⌦ Ø Yg. ÒK⌦ ‡ A” P

✏…ø ⌦

Ø ‡ AæÀ B✏

@� , ⇣Ë XÒk. Ò”factually true. Otherwise [there is such a C, and] at every time in which its 132.5essence is satisfied, it satisfies B, and this includes

≠✏À

�A⇣JK⌦ ˙ ✏⇣Êk , AÇ∫´ ⇣È” ✏Y ⇣Æ÷œ @ Ë YÎ Å∫™⇣K ‡

�@ ·Çm⇢'⌦ B ‡

�@ ÈJ. ⌘Ç�⌦ . A í�⌦

�@ ‡ A” QÀ @

the time in question. But it is fair to say that it would not win approval ifwe were to convert this premise so as to compose

ÒìÒ” È✏ K A� Ø ‡ Aø ≠J⌦ª h.

✏…ø : » A ⇣ÆK⌦ ‡

�@ ⇣ÈÍk. ˙Œ´ » ✏

�B @ …æ ⌘ÇÀ @ ⌦

Ø Ä AJ⌦⇣Ø È J”a syllogism in the first figure along the lines

(33)

Everything that is a C, under any circumstances, fits the descrip-tion B permanently;and nothing that is a B, under any circumstances, has A false ofit at the given time.

¯ Q�. ∫À @ ✏ ‡ A� Ø . ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ @ YÎ ⌦

Ø @ È J´ AK. Ò Ç” ‡ Aø ≠J⌦ª H.✏

…ø , A÷ �fl @ X H. È✏ K�AK.

20


The major premise

‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ A÷

✏ fl @� …K. ; ·�⌦J. Î Y÷œ @ Yg�@ ˙Œ´ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ‡ Ò∫⇣K B ⌥ I. Çk

�@ A“J⌦ Ø ⌥ Y�J ⌧J⌦k

: » A ⇣ÆK⌦in (33), on my reckoning, isn’t an absolute of either of the two types [thatwe are considering]. [For an absolute major premise] one would have tosay

… g YK⌦ ‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ B Y�J ⌧J⌦m Ø . @ È J´ AK. Ò Ç” ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ @ YÎ ⌦

Ø XÒk. Ò” H.✏

…ø

(34) Every B which exists at the given time has A false of it.

But it doesn’t follow from this that the class C is included in 132.10{I think he probably means ‘Everything that exists and is a B at the giventime’. }

È⇣K @ X ·∫K⌦ ’À @ X @� , ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ @ YÎ ⌦ Ø H. È✏ K

�AK. A ØÒìÒ” h. ·∫K⌦ ’À A÷ ✏fl.Q Ø . H. ⇣Im⇢⇣' h.

[the subject class of the major premise], since it could be that the individualC doesn’t fit the description B at the given time, because its essence is not{For ‘the subject . . . major premise’ the text has ‘B’. This is probably IbnSına writing carelessly. }

˙Œ´ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ ‡ Ò∫⇣K B ⌥ Y�J ⌧J⌦k ⌥ —Ó ⇣D ⇣ÆK⌦ Q£ ˙Œ™ Ø . ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ @ YÎ ⌦ Ø @ XÒk. Ò”

†QÂ⌘Ösatisfied at that time. So if we did follow them in this line of reasoning, theconclusion would not be absolute, [because of the required] condition

È✏ K�@ È J´ I. Ç⌧⌦ Ø ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ @ YÎ ⌦

Ø @ XÒk. Ò” h. ‡ Aø ‡ @� —™ K . ® Ò ìÒ÷œ @ XÒk. about the existence of the subject individual. Granted, if the C exists at thegiven time then it is not{NB Here it’s explicit that he is discussing syllogisms with conditions added.In this line he seems to be returning to the form in 132.1, abandoning thepseudo-converse suggested in 132.10. }

‡ Aø @ X @� C⌘J” . ⇣I⇣Ø✏

…ø ⌦ Ø È J´ I. Ç�⌦ ‡

�@ – Q K⌦ B , ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ @ YÎ ⌦

Ø @an A at that time, but it doesn’t follow that A is false of it at every time. Forexample if

21


·” �@ ·�⌦ª✏Qj⇣J÷œ @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö ·∫K⌦ ’À ‡

�@ A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦

Ø ⇣á Æ✏⇣K @� ✏’Á⌘' , A÷ �fl @ X ëJ⌦K.�@ h.

the C is permanently white, and it happens to be true at a certain time that 132.15nothing that is moving (i.e.

ΩÀ X ⌦ Ø Z AJ. K. ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ΩÀ X ⌦

Ø XÒk. Ò÷œ @ h. ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B Y�J ⌧J⌦k ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø , ëJ⌦K.�@ ⇣H @ Z AJ. À @

an A) is white, then in this case no C which exists at the given time is an A‘at that{Correcting the two Bs to As as required by the context. This could be IbnSına’s slip since he swapped A and B around a little earlier. }

. ⇣Ü C£ B� @ —ÍÀ A“™⇣JÉ @� Òm⇢ ' ˙Œ´ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ ‡ Ò∫⇣J Ø . ⇣I⇣Ø✏

…ø ⌦ Ø B , ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @

time’ — not ‘at all times’. So the conclusion is absolute, [but only] accord-ing to their usage of the word ‘absolute’.{NB There is something not being said here. If we can take ‘A that existsat time t’ as a single term, then we have a straightforward Camestres andthere is no need to examine the form of the condition. Consider in con-nection with the question where the line between core and adjunction isdrawn. }

Å Æ K ·” I. m.⇢'⌦ Å⌧⌦À ·∫À . ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ Ë YÎ ⇣Ij. ⇣⌧ K�@ ⇣I ⇣Æ Æ✏⇣K @� @ X @� AÍ

✏ ø ⇣H A⇣Ø A Æ✏⇣K B� @ Ë YÍ Ø

[3.1.24] So if all these things happen, then when they happen they entail 132.18this conclusion. But the facts of the matter don’t necessarily


22


133

È✏ K A� Ø ÒÇª ‡ ÒÀ

✏…ø : A J ⇣Ø @ X @� A✏ K

�@ ΩÀ X . ⇣H A⇣Ø A Æ✏⇣K B� @ Ë YÎ ⇣á Æ✏⇣JK⌦ ‡

�@ Q”

�B @

happen like that. Thus if we say:

(35) Every colour in the shade is with necessity a black colour.

{NB Because of the truth of the sentence, the quantification is over a sin-gleton? No, because for Ibn Sına a ‘colour’ can be an instance of a colour.}

⇣È✏K⌦ A“ÇÀ @ – @Qk.�B @ ‡ @ÒÀ

�@ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö ·∫K⌦ ’À ‡ @� ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦

Ø ⇣á Æ✏⇣K @� ✏’Á⌘' ; X @ÒÉ ⇣ËP P YÀ AK.Then it happens that

(36) At a certain time, no colour of the heavenly bodies is a blackcolour.

X @ÒÇÀ @ I. Ç�⌦ ‡�@ @ YÎ ·” I. m.⇢'⌦ ’À , ⌦ XÒk. ⇣È ⇣ÆK⌦ Q¢À @ Ë YÎ ˙Œ´ @ YÎ X @� , @ X @ÒÉ

and this proposition in the form that it has is an impermanent proposition.But ‘black’ doesn’t have to be false{The ms that reads wa- for ’id

¯

clearly has a point, though Ibn Sına is quitecapable of writing ’id

¯

. }

·∫⇣K ’À A÷ ✏fl.Q Ø . ⇣È✏K⌦ XÒk. ⇣È✏J⌦ í ⇣ÆÀ @ ‡ Ò∫⇣K ˙ ✏⇣Êk ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ⌦ Ø ⇣Ë XÒk. Ò÷œ @ ⇣H A ØÒÇ∫À @ ·´

of things in the shade which exist at the given time in order for the proposi-tion [(36)] to be true. In fact it could be that there are no things in the shade[at that time]{Reading mawjudatan for wujudiyyatan; no ms support but I think the senserequires it, and one can see how a copyist retained wujudı from the previousline. }

: » A ⇣ÆJ⌦ Ø , Å∫™ JK⌦ ‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ ’À A í�⌦

�@ . AÓ D´ I. Ç�⌦ ˙ ✏⇣Êk ⇣Ë XÒk. Ò” ⇣H A ØÒÇª

for ‘black’ to be false of. Also (36) doesn’t have to convert to the form 133.5{NB Again the obstacle to converting lies in the choice of where to drawthe line between core and condition. Reducing the core allows more kindsof inference but it may run into difficulties with inference types not recog-nised by Ibn Sına. }

X @ÒÉ Y�J ⌧J⌦k ·∫K⌦ ’À A÷ ✏fl.Q Ø . Ω ÆÀ @ ‡ ÒÀ ÒÎ XÒk. Ò” X @ÒÉ ÒÎ A✏‹ÿ Yg @ B

23


(37)Not one black colour in existence is the colour of the heavenlysphere.

It could be in this case that there is nothing black,

✏⌦�@ , @ X @ÒÉ ‡ @ÒÀ

�B @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö Å⌧⌦À : …�K A ⇣ÆÀ @ » Ò ⇣ÆK⌦ ‡

�@ ‡ P Òm.⇢'⌦ —Ó✏ E

�B XÒk. Ò”

because they permit someone to say

(38) No colour is black, i.e. at a certain time.

{‘They’: people in general, or specifically Aristotle or his tradition? }

⇣È✏K⌦ A“ÇÀ @ ‡ @ÒÀ�B @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B : » A ⇣ÆK⌦ ‡

�@ ⇣Ü Yí�⌦ ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ΩÀ X ⌦

Ø . A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦ Ø

Then it is true that

(39) No colour in the heavens at that time is the colour black.

{I altered the order. But it seems to be needed at (133.10), since without thetime incorporated in the proposition, there is no obstacle to converting. }{NB The effect is that the time of evaluation becomes part of the proposi-tion. }

˙Õ @� ©k. QK⌦ ˙ ✏⇣Êk @ YÎ Å∫™ JK⌦ B ✏’Á⌘' . A ⇣Æ ¢” A⇣Ø X Aì Y�J ⌧J⌦k » Ò ⇣ÆÀ @ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ . X @ÒÇ�.And in this case the sentence is true and absolute. But then it doesn’t con-vert so as to reduce the syllogism to

. » ✏�B @ …æ ⌘ÇÀ @

the first figure. 133.10

‡�@ †QÂ⌘ÑÀ @ Å⌧⌦À , ⇣Ü X Aì ⌦

✏ŒæÀ @ I. ÇÀ @ @ YÎ ✏ ‡ @� : » Ò ⇣ÆK⌦ ‡

�@ …�K A ⇣ÆÀ ✏ ·∫À

[3.1.25] But one should say: 133.11

In fact this negative universally quantified proposition is true[anyway]. The condition that

⌦ Ø H. Am.⇢'⌦ B� @ ✏ ‡

�B , I. k. Ò÷œ @ ⌦

Ø B✏

@� ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ⌦ Ø @ XÒk. Ò” ® Ò ìÒ÷œ @ ‡ Ò∫K⌦

·✏�⌦™” ⇣I⇣Øthe subject term is satisfied at the time only applies if the propo-sition is affirmative, because an affirmation about a determinatetime

24


˙Œ´ ⇣Ü Yí�⌦ Y ⇣Æ Ø I. ÇÀ @ A ✏”�@ . ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ΩÀ X ⌦

Ø XÒk. Ò” ˙Œ´ B✏

@� ‡ Ò∫K⌦ BXÒk. Ò÷œ @

can only be true when its subject term is satisfied at that time,whereas a denial can be true when its subject term is satisfied{NB Affirmative sentence with specific time attached to subjectterm is only about things existing at that time. }

. ·✏�⌦™” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦ Ø ⇣Ü Yì A÷ ✏fl.P , ⇣I⇣Ø

✏…ø ⌦

Ø A“ÓD⌦ ´ ⇣Ü Yì A÷ ✏fl.Q Ø . – Y™÷œ @and also when its subject term is unsatisfied. Thus a negativestatement can state a truth about its subject term both when thesubject term is satisfied and when it isn’t, and the truth can beabout all times or about a specified time.

ÒÍ Ø A÷ �fl @ X ‡ Aø ‡ A� Ø . ® Ò ìÒ÷œ @ ˙Œ´ ’∫mÃ '@ ⇣Ü Yì ˙Œ´ P Òí ⇣Æ” P AJ. ⇣J´ B� @

, ⌦ P QÂ ïBut the thing to consider is [not whether the subject term is sat-isfied but] whether what is asserted of the subject term is true.If [the proposition states that what is asserted] is true perma- 133.15nently then the proposition is a necessity proposition;{NB The h

.

ukm here is clearly what is asserted of the subjectterm. Note also: his statement suggests he is talking about eval-uating the proposition, but his example shows that in fact he istalking about what the proposition asserts about the truth of itscore. }

✏…ø : A JÀÒ⇣Ø ✏’Á⌘' . ⌦ XÒk. ⇣á ¢” ÒÍ Ø , A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦

Ø ✏ ·∫À , @ XÒk. Ò” ‡ Aø ‡ @�if [it states that what is asserted] is true at a certain time, then itis an absolute impermanent proposition. So then if we say:

@ YÎ ⌦ Ø ⇣Ü X Aì » Ò⇣Ø , ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ @ YÎ ⌦

Ø @ È J´ H. Ò Ç” È✏ K A� Ø , ‡ Aø ≠J⌦ª H.

. ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @

(40) Every B, however it is, has A false of it at such-and-such a time.

25


the sentence [says that the negative assertion] is true at thistime.{NB True at a time?}

⇣H�@ AJ. À @ ⇣I K Aø Z @ÒÉ , @ È✏ K

�AK. A ØÒìÒ” H. ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ @ YÎ ⌦

Ø Yg. ÒK⌦ ’À @ X @�, ⇣Ë XÒk. Ò”

If at this time the term B does not satisfy the description A, thenregardless of whether there are or are not any Bs,{NB not [B] is satisfied but [THE B’s] is satisfied. }


26


134

. @ H. ≠ìÒ⇣K B ⇣H A” Y™÷œ @ ✏ ‡ A�

Ø . @ H. ≠ìÒ⇣K B ⇣È” Y™”

�@

@ X @� ⇣H @ XÒk. Ò÷œ @the term doesn’t satisfy the description A. When there are noBs, then the Bs don’t satisfy the description A. When there aresome Bs and

. @ ÒÎ H. ÒÎ Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ΩÀ X ⌦ Ø ·∫K⌦ ’À , @ H. ΩÀ X ©” ≠ìÒ⇣K ’À

I. ÇÀ @ ⇣Ü YíJ⌦ Ømoreover the Bs don’t satisfy the description A, then at thattime there is nothing that is both a B and an A. So [either way,]the negative universally quantified proposition is true

·” ⇣ÈJ. K⌦ Q⇣Ø —ÍÀ ⇣È ⇣ÆK⌦ Q£ ˙Õ @� @ YÎ ·´ @Ò ØQj JK⌦ ‡�@ —ÍÀ …K. ; ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ⌦

Ø ⌦✏

ŒæÀ @@ YÎ

at that time.

But it would be better if they left this issue to one side and pursued a paththat would be more congenial to them than this,{NB tah

.

rıf. }

ΩÀ X , —ÍÀ AÎQª Y K ‡�@ ‡

�B @ A J” Q K⌦ . ≠ É A“J⌦ Ø AÓD⌦À @� A K

�A”

�@ A✏ Jª H. AJ. À @ @ YÎ ⌦

Øand which we have already pointed out in this context. And now we needto spell it out for them,

, A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦ Ø ✏⌦

�@ , XÒk. ÒÀ AK. H. ÒÎ h.

✏…ø A J ⇣Ø @ X @� A✏ K @� : » Ò ⇣ÆK⌦ ‡

�@ —Ó D” …�K A ⇣Æ À ✏ ‡

�B

because one of them might well say: In fact when we say 134.5

(41) Every C is a B with impermanence, i.e. at a certain time.

,QÂîj À XÒk. ÒÀ @ …™m.⇢'⌦ …K. ; ⇣H A ØÒìÒ÷œ @ ·” Yg @ Yg @ P AJ. ⇣J´ A�K. XÒk. ÒÀ @ …™m.⇢'⌦ Bthis doesn’t express that what is said is true of each subject individual sep-arately; but rather it expresses that the quantified proposition is true.

. ‡ A✏J⌦ J™” È J” —Í ÆK⌦ XÒk. ÒÀ AK. H. h.✏

…ø : A J ⇣Ø @ X @� A✏ K A� Ø

27


Thus when we say

(42) Every C is a B, with truth.

this can be understood as having either of two meanings.

I. m.⇢'⌦ ’À A” Y™K. H. h.✏

…ø ✏ ‡ @� : A JÀÒ⇣Ø ÒÎ ⇣Ü YíÀ @ ‡ Aø ‡ @� Yg. Y⇣Ø È✏ K�@ , A“Î Yg

�@

[3.1.26] One of them is that if we say 134.8

(43) Every C is a B.

that is in fact the truth, though it can’t be{Where is the other? Also I read ’an for ’in. }

. Q k�@ ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦

Ø QÂîmÃ '@ @ YÎ H. Yª A÷ ✏fl.P È✏ K

�B ;Q”

�B @ Å Æ K ⌦

Ø ΩÀ Xan intrinsic truth because there could be another time when this quantifieris false.

⌦ XÒk. AÓ D” Yg @ Yg @ÒÀ ÒÎ …Î È✏ K�@ , h. ·” H. » Ag ˙Õ @� ΩÀ X ⌦

Ø ⇣I Æ⇣J K⌦ B[In this meaning] the proposition is not about the relationship of the term 134.10B to the term C, namely whether for each separate subject individual Bholds in an impermanent

B ⇣ËQ‘g B ÈJ⌦ Ø ê AJ⌦K. B ⇣H A⇣Ø�B @ ·” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦

Ø A J ⇣Ø @ X @� A✏ K�@ ÈÀ A⌘J” . ⌦ P QÂ ï

�@Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö

or a necessary sense. An example is that when we say, at some time whenthere is no white colour and no red colour or colour

’À , ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ΩÀ X ⌦ Ø @ YÎ ⇣Ü Yì , X @ÒÉ ÒÍ Ø ‡ ÒÀ

✏…ø ✏ ‡ @� : ·∫”

�@ ‡ @� † AÉ

�B @ ·”

intermediate [between white and black] (assuming this is possible):

(44) Every colour is black.

[In this meaning] this proposition would be true at that time, but not{NB Here he explicitly uses a ‘possible’ time/situation. }

È✏ K A� Ø ‡ ÒÀ È✏ K

�AK.

ÒìÒ” ÒÎ A ✏‹ÿ Yg @✏

…ø ✏ ‡�@ ·™K⌦ ’À , A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï A⇣Ø Yì ·∫K⌦

XÒk. Ò”a necessary truth. It would not be meant that every individual that fits thedescription ‘colour’ does have

28


{NB He seems to be saying that the proposition is (narrow) absolute, butnevertheless not an absoluteness proposition.}

XÒk. Ò” Yg @ÒÀ @ ΩÀ X ⌦⇣ÆJ. K⌦ ‡

�@ P Òm.⇢'⌦ ˙ ✏⇣Êk , X @ÒÉ È✏ K

�@ ⌦ P QÂ ï Q�⌦ @ XÒk. ÈÀ

‘black colour’ true of it, though not necessarily true, so that that individualcan continue to have its

A í�⌦�@ A J“∫k ✏ ‡

�Aø ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ˙ ✏⇣Êk , X @ÒÉ È✏ K

�@ È J´ » @ P Y⇣Ø A KÒÀ XÒk. Ò”

�@ ⇣H @ YÀ @

essence instantiated, and be a colour, but cease to be black. That would beas if we had judged that


29


135

@ XÒk. Ò” – @ X A” A÷ �fl @ X Å⌧⌦À ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ΩÀ X ⌦ Ø ‡ ÒÀ È✏ K

�AK. ≠ìÒK⌦ A✏‹ÿ Yg @

✏…ø ✏ ‡ @�

(45)Each thing fitting the description ‘colour’ at that time is not blackpermanently and for as long as its essence continues to be satis-fied — far from it!

Q�. ⇣J™K⌦ A÷✏ fl @� @ YÎ A JÀÒ⇣Ø ⌦

Ø ⌦ P QÂ îÀ @ Q�⌦ ™À @ XÒk. ÒÀ @ ✏ ‡ A� Ø . C

✏ø , X @ÒÉ ÒÍ Ø ⇣H @ YÀ

So in fact the non-necessary truth of this sentence of ours just has to do with

.✏

…æÀ �@ , Yg @ÒÀ ⌦ P QÂ ï Q�⌦ ™À @ » Ò“j÷œ @ ✏ ‡

�@ ⌦

Ø B ,QÂîmÃ '@ ⇣Ü Yì ⌦ Ø

the truth of the quantifier, and not with whether the non-necessary predi-cation applies to a single individual or to all of them.

⇣Ü Yì XÒk. ˙Õ @� …K. ; ® Ò ìÒ÷œ @ XÒk. ˙Õ @� I. À AÇÀ @ ⌦ Ø ⇣I Æ⇣J K⌦ B ΩÀ Yª

[3.1.27] Likewise in the negative proposition the assertion is not about 135.4whether the subject term is satisfied; rather it is about the satisfaction of thetruth{NB Here he says affirmative must have satisfied subject and negativedoesn’t need to. But unclear below. }

⇣Ü Yí�⌦ ˙ ✏⇣Êk I. k. Ò÷œ @ ⌦ Ø ® Ò ìÒ÷œ @ XÒk. ·” ✏YK. B ‡ Aø ‡ @� , ⌦

✏ŒæÀ @ I. ÇÀ @

of the universally quantified denial. Even if the subject term in an affirma- 135.5tive proposition has to be satisfied if the quantifier is to be true,

A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦ Ø ‡ @ÒÀ

�B @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B ‡ Aø @ X @� È✏ K A�

Ø . I. À AÇÀ @ ⌦ Ø ΩÀ X ·” ✏YK. B , QÂîmÃ '@

the position with the negative proposition has to be as we said. In fact if atsome particular time

‡ ÒÀ ·∫K⌦ ’À , @ X @ÒÉ AÍ✏ ø ‡ @ÒÀ

�B @ ⇣I K Aø …K. ; ⇣H A¢ ✏ÉÒ⇣J÷œ @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B , A ì AJ⌦K.

no colour is white or intermediate [between black and white], and all coloursare black and there is no [non-black] colour

; ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ΩÀ X ⌦ Ø ✏⌦

�@ , ê AJ⌦K. A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦

Ø ‡ @ÒÀ�B @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B ‡

�@ ⇣Ü Yì , ⇣È✏⇣JJ. À @

at all, it is true that

(46) No [non-black] colour is the colour white, at a certain time.

30


namely at that time.

⇣Ü Yí�⌦ ’À @ X @� . ⇣H AJ. k. Ò÷œ @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ñ�. B ê AJ⌦K. È✏ K�AK. ≠ìÒK⌦ B – Y™÷œ @ ✏ ‡

�B

This is because an unsatisfied [subject] doesn’t satisfy the description ‘whitecolour’ or have any affirmative property. When the affirmation is not true

⇣Ü YíÀ @ XÒk. ˙Õ @� A J⇣J Æ⇣JÀ @� , ÈÀÒ ⇣Æ K A” A JJ⌦ P @ X A� Ø . ⇣ËP QÂ ï I. ÇÀ @ ⇣Ü Yì , H. Ag. B� @

the [corresponding] denial must be true. If we take care about what we say, 135.10and pay regard to the satisfaction of the truth

. ⇣È✏J⌦ í ⇣ÆÀ @ Ë YÎ Å∫™ K ‡�@ A J J∫”

�@ , QÂîmÃ '@ ⌦

Øin the quantifier, it would be possible for us to convert this proposition.

Y⇣Ø ‡ Ò∫K⌦ , ⇣È ⇣ÆK⌦ Q¢À @ Ë YÎ @Ò∫ É ‡ A� Ø

[3.1.28] If they were to follow the path I have presented, they would 135.11

⇣I ✏”�A⇣K @ X @� A÷fl. , ⌦Œ⌘J÷œ @ ⇣È ⇣ÆK⌦ Q¢À @ ·´ @ X Ag , AK⌦ A í ⇣ÆÀ @ A Jì

�@ —ÓDÑ Æ K

�@ ˙Œ´ @ Q✏⌘�ª

discover for themselves the great number of different kinds of proposition,but also they would avoid the approach that is like mine which you willhave learned about if you have thought about{I’m not at all sure that this translation is correct, or that the text is. Theword al-mit

.

lı doesn’t convince. }{NB Discover for themselves the many kinds of proposition. }

Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B ‡ Aø , @ X @ÒÉ ⌦ Q‘⇣Ø ÒÇª✏

…ø ‡ Aø @ X A� Ø . ÈJ⌦ ´ ⇣I Æ⇣Ø ΩÀ ≠ É A” ë™K.

some of what was explained to you earlier. Thus when we have

(47) Every eclipse of the moon is a black colour.

and

(48) No eclipse of the moon at time t is a black colour.

, ⇣È” Y™” ⇣I K Aø ⇣H A ØÒÇ∫À @ ✏ ‡�B X @ÒÇ�. A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦

Ø ⇣È✏K⌦ Q“ ⇣ÆÀ @ ⇣H A ØÒÇ∫À @ ·”because there isn’t an eclipse of the moon [at time t],{An eclipse is anyway an event, not a colour. So there is some stretching oflanguage. In English we say that a dress ‘is a reddish colour’ etc. }

·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B ΩÀ Yª , ÒÇ∫K. A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦ Ø Q“ ⇣ÆÀ @ ⇣H A ØÒÇª ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø

Ä A JÀ @

31


then

(49) No eclipse of the moon at time t is an eclipse [of the moon].

One gets in the same way that no person 135.15{By assertoric Cesare. }

Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B Ë A J™” ✏ ‡ @� : » Ò ⇣ÆK⌦ ‡�@ ÈÀ Å⌧⌦À .P Ò”

�B @ ·” Yg @

✏…ø ⌦

Ø ΩÀ Yª , Ä A JK.is a person, and likewise with all sorts of things. One shouldn’t commentthat this means that no eclipse of the moon at time t is an existing eclipse.{Here he rejects a use of quantification over possibly nonexistent things; oris it over actual things that possibly don’t satisfy the subject description? Itlooks as if he rejects it because there is a simpler description, not becauseit’s incoherent in itself. }

Q“ ⇣ÆÀ @ ⇣H AÉÒÇª ·∫⇣K ’À È✏ K A� Ø , XÒk. Ò” ÒÇ∫K. A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦

Ø Q“ ⇣ÆÀ @ ⇣H A ØÒÇª ·” ·”

The fact is that there aren’t any eclipses of the moon


32


136

⌦✏ G @� : » Ò ⇣ÆK⌦ ‡

�@ ÈÀ ✏ ·∫À . ⇣Ë XÒk. Ò” AÓ✏ E

�@ ˙Œ´ ⇣Ë XÒ k

�A” Q�. ª

�@ @ Yg ⇣H Y g

�@ ⌘IJ⌦k

when you take this major premise [(49)] as true. What one should say israther:

‡�@ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ⇣ÈJ. À AÇÀ @ ⇣H A” ✏Y ⇣Æ÷œ @ ⌦

Ø ⌦⇣Ê

✏À @ ⇣H BÒ“j÷œ @ ⌦

Ø Q�. ⇣J´�@ A÷

✏ fl @� © ìÒ”✏

…ø ⌦ Ø

‡ Ò∫⇣KIn every topic, with negative absolute premises I only consider whethertheir predicate terms are{Why does he explicitly say ‘absolute’? }

⌦ Ø ΩÀ X Q�. ⇣J´

�@ B , I. Ç⇣�

�@ ΩÀ X Y™K. ⇣IJ. ⌘⌧⇣J Ø ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ΩÀ X ⌦

Ø ⇣H @ XÒk. Ò”⇣H A´Ò ìÒ÷œ @

are true [of their subject terms] at that time, and on the strength of that theproposition is confirmed or denied; I don’t consider whether the subjectterm of the

. ΩÀ X ÈÀ ’✏ŒÇ ⌧Ç Ø . I. Ç À

negative proposition is satisfied. In future we will take this view for granted.

⇣ËQ⌘�∫K. , ˙ Ê™÷œ @ @ YÎ ⌦ Ø @P AíJ. ⇣⌧É @� ’

✏Œ™⇣J÷œ @ YK⌦ Q �À , H. AJ. À @ @ YÎ ⌦

Ø YK⌦ XQ⇣�À @ A JÀ ✏Ò£ A÷✏ fl @�

[3.1.29] We have been lengthy and repetitious about this topic, so as to 136.5give the student a feeling for what the topic is about, by presenting themany

® AJ⌦ ì ·” ÈJ⌦ Ø A” Y™K. , I. Î Y÷œ @ @ YÎ l .⇢'⌦ Q⇣K ⌦ Ø ⌦´ @QK⌦ ‡

�@ h. A⇣Jm⇢'⌦ ⌦

⇣Ê✏À @ ⇣H @ P @Q⇣�g B� @

precautions that need to be taken into account when this approach is takenon board, even after

⇣I K Aø @ X @� È✏ K @� : » Ò ⇣Æ J Ø . …J. ⇣Ø ÈJ⌦ ´ ≠⇣Ø Y⇣Ø A✏‹ÿ , ⇣È ì A Ø ËÒk. ⇣H A” ✏Y ⇣Æ”the superfluous premises and modes have been disposed of. These arethings that you have already learned. We say: Absolute propositions

Ë YÎ ˙Œ´ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ K AÓ D” ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ ·∫”

�@ , ⇣H A ÆíÀ @ Ë YÎ ˙Œ´ ⇣H A ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @

, ⇣È ÆíÀ @of the kind under discussion can have consequences that are also absolutepropositions of this kind.

33


…K. ; ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï Q�⌦ �@ ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï AÓDÑ Æ K

�@ ⌦

Ø AK⌦ A í ⇣ÆÀ @ ‡ Ò∫⇣K ‡�AK. AÓD⌦ Ø ⌦Õ AJ. K⌦ B

It’s of no concern here whether the propositions in themselves are neces-sary or not necessary. Rather

, ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. XÒÉ�@ ‡ @ÒÀ

�B @ ë™K.

✏ ‡�@ A ✏⇣Æk ‡ Aø @ X @� ˙ ✏⇣Êk , QÂîmÃ '@ ˙Õ @� ⇣H A Æ⇣JÀ B� @ ‡ Ò∫K⌦

one must pay attention to the quantifier. Thus when it is true that some 136.10colour is black necessarily,

⇣H A K @ÒJ⌦mÃ '@ Q�K AÉ ‡ @ÒÀ�B @ Q�K AÉ ⇣I” Y™ Ø , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ AÇ � @� ‡ @ÒJ⌦mÃ '@ ë™K.

and some animal is human necessarily, and there are no other colours orother animals,

, ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ AÇ � @� ÒÎ ⌦ Y

✏À @ ‡ @ÒJ⌦mÃ '@ ·” ë™J. À @ ⌦

⇣ÆK. , ‡ AÇ � B� @ X @ÒÇÀ @ ⌦⇣ÆK.

leaving just black and human, [i.e.] leaving only those animals that arehuman necessarily,

Y�J ⌧J⌦k ‡ @ÒJ⌦k✏

…ø ✏ ‡�@ A ✏⇣Æk ‡ Aø , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. XÒÉ

�@ ÒÎ ⌦

Y✏À @ ‡ Ò

✏ À @ ·” ë™J. À @

and only those colours that are black necessarily, thereby making it truethat every animal

ΩÀ X . A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï Q�⌦ ⇣È” ✏Y ⇣Æ÷œ @ A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï …“mÃ '@ ‡ Aæ Ø , XÒÉ�@ ‡ ÒÀ

✏…ø

�@ ‡ AÇ � @�

is a human, and every colour is black — [when all this holds,] then the pred-ication is necessary but the premise is not a necessary proposition. This

: A JÀÒ⇣Ø ⇣Ü Yì …⌘J” A ⇣Æ ¢” …K. , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. B ‡ Aø A⇣Ø A Æ✏⇣K @�⇣á Æ✏⇣K @� QÂîmÃ '@ ⇣Ü Yì ✏ ‡

�B

is because the truth of the quantifier just happens to be the case and is 136.15absolute and not necessary. The truth of the sentence

Ω�JÀ�@ ·” Yg @

✏…ø ˙Œ´ ‡ AÇ � B� @ …‘g ‡ Aø ‡ @� È✏ K A�

Ø . ‡ AÇ � @� ‡ @ÒJ⌦k✏

…ø

(50) Every animal is human.

illustrates this. So even though ‘human’ is necessarily true of every singleone of those

. ⌦ P QÂ î�. Å⌧⌦À QÂîmÃ '@ ⇣Ü Yì ✏ ‡ A� Ø , A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣H A K @ÒJ⌦k AÓ✏ E AK. ⇣H A ØÒìÒ÷œ @

things that fit the description ‘animal’, the truth of the quantifier is not anecessary truth.

34


I. j. J⌦ Ø[3.1.30] At the same time, 136.18

Transcription checked 23 Jan 10. Reading checked 23 Oct 12.

35


137

I. m.⇢'⌦ X @� ; ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ …™ ÆÀ AK. º ✏Qj⇣J” ‡ @ÒJ⌦k✏

…ø : A JÀÒ⇣Ø ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ A í�⌦

�@

the sentence

(51) Every animal moves in act.

has to be necessary, since it has to be the case

‡ @ÒJ⌦k✏

…ø ✏ ‡�AK. » Ò ⇣ÆÀ @ ⇣Ü Yì ˙Õ @� …K. ; ‡ @ÒJ⌦k ‡ @ÒJ⌦k » Ag ˙Õ @� ⇣I Æ⇣J K⌦ B ‡

�@

that it is not concerned with the facts about the animals individually. Ratherit is about the truth of the statement that every animal

, ‡ A” P✏

…ø ⌦ Ø @ XÒk. Ò” ⇣Ü YíÀ @ @ YÎ ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø . A” A⇣J⇣Ø Å ✏ Æ J⇣J”

�@ A” A⇣J⇣Ø º ✏Qj⇣J” È✏ K A�

Ømoves at some time or breathes at some time. This truth holds at everytime.{NB Nested temporal quantifiers. }

È⇣K @ X – @ X A” B , ⇣ÈªQmÃ '@ ÈÀ XÒk. Ò” ‡ @ÒJ⌦k✏

…ø ✏ ‡ @� : ⇣I ⇣Ø @ X @� ‡ A” P✏

…ø ⌦ Ø Ω✏ K A�

ØAt whatever time you say

(52) Every existing animal has movement — not while its essencecontinues satisfied, but rather whenever it moves.

·” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦ Ø » Ò ⇣ÆÀ @ @ YÎ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ B . A⇣Ø X Aì ‡ Ò∫K⌦ , º ✏Qj⇣JK⌦ A” ·�⌦g …K. , @ XÒk. Ò”

it is true; this sentence is never 137.5

. Aø✏Qj⇣J” ‡ @ÒJ⌦k✏

…ø Å⌧⌦À ⇣H A⇣Ø�B @ ·” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦

Ø ‡ Ò∫K⌦ —™ K . AK. X Aø ⇣H A⇣Ø�B @

false. I grant that there could be a time when not every animal is moving.

, Aø✏Qj⇣J” ‡ @ÒJ⌦k✏

…ø Å⌧⌦À È✏ K�@ ⇣Ü Yí�⌦ ⌦

Y✏À @ ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ⌦

Ø È✏ K A� Ø . ΩÀ X ë⇣Ø A JK⌦ B @ YÎ

But (52) doesn’t contradict that. Even at the time when it is true that noanimal is moving,{NB laysa kullu. I think the sense requires here that kullu has the widerscope, though more usually it’s read the other way. }

⇣H A⇣Ø�B @ ·” A⇣J⇣Ø Å ✏ Æ J⇣J”

�@ º ✏Qj⇣J” ‡ @ÒJ⌦k

✏…ø ✏ ‡

�@ A í�⌦

�@ ⇣Ü Yí�⌦ ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ⌦

Ø ✏⌦�@

at that same time it is also true that

(53) Every animal moves or breathes at some time at which it exists.

36


, ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦ Ø º ✏Qj⇣JK⌦ B ‡ @ÒJ⌦k ‡ Aø ‡ @� , ⇣I⇣Ø

✏…ø ⌦

Ø ⇣Ü Yí�⌦ @ YÎ ✏ ‡ A� Ø , Ë XÒk. ⌦

ØThis sentence [(53)] is true at every time, even if an animal is not moving atsome time,

. ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦ Ø ⇣ÈªQk ‡ Ò∫K⌦ B ‡

�AK. ë⇣Ø A JK⌦ . ⇣I⇣Ø

✏…ø ⌦

Ø ⇣ÈªQmÃ '@ I. k. ÒK⌦ ’À @ YÎ X @�since (53) doesn’t imply that there is movement at every time. It is contra- 137.10dicted by there not being movement at any time,{Grammar! h

.

araka with masculine verb! }

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï …K. . ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣IÇ⌧⌦À ⇣È✏J⌦✏ æÀ @ ⇣È✏J⌦ í ⇣ÆÀ @ Ë YÎ ‡ Ò∫⇣K ‡

�@ ⌦ QmÃ 'AJ. Ø

so it’s reasonable to suppose that this universally quantified proposition[(51)] is not absolute but necessary.

—Î[3.1.31] But [the Aristotelians] 137.11

º ✏Qj⇣J”✏

…ø : —ÍÀÒ⇣Ø ΩÀ Yª . ⇣È✏⇣JJ. À @ ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï AÓ E Y g�AK⌦ B , ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” AÓ E Y g

�AK⌦

take it as absolute, and not as necessary at all. Lkewise the sentence

(54) Every moving thing changes.

. ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” —ÓD î™K. AÎ Y g�@ Y⇣Ø . ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï …K. , ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ‡ Ò∫⇣K B ‡

�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ Q✏�⌦ ™⇣J”

should be not absolute but necessary. But one of them took it as absolute,

@ X A‘ Ø A í�⌦�@ . ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ K i. ⇣J K

�A Ø , ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” » ✏

�B @ ⌦

Ø ¯ Q�. ª Ë YÎ …™k. ·” ⇣Ü ✏Yìand declared that a person who took it as an absolute major premise in thefirst figure, so as to derive an absolute conclusion, was right to do so. Andalso what{Reading s

.

addaqa to get a plausible sense. }

X @ÒÉ ‡ Ò✏ À @ ë™K. , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ AÇ � @� ‡ @ÒJ⌦mÃ '@ ë™K. : …�K A ⇣ÆÀ @ » Ò⇣Ø ⌦

Ø ‡ ÒÀÒ ⇣ÆK⌦do they say about someone who says the following? 137.15

(55)Some animal is a human with necessity, and some colour is blackwith necessity.

⇣È✏J⌦ í ⇣ÆÀ @ Ë YÎ ✏ ‡�AK. ‡ Ò ØQ⇣�™” —Ó ✏ D∫À ? ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢”

�@ ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⌦ Î …Î ? ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK.

37


Is this proposition necessary or absolute? They recognise that this existen-tially quantified proposition{NB I think it has to be ‘necessary’ rather than ‘necessity proposition’ here,because the proposition is explicitly a necessity proposition. Note the nestedmodality. }

. ⇣I⇣Ø✏

…ø ⌦ Ø AK. X Aø AÓD îJ⌦ ⇣Æ K , ⇣I⇣Ø

✏…ø ⌦

Ø ⇣È⇣Ø X Aì ‡ Ò∫⇣K ‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ ⇣È✏J⌦�K Qm.Ã '@

—Î Yj. J Øhas to be true at every time, and its contradictory negation is false at everytime — but we find them

✏…ø Å⌧⌦À ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. : A JÀÒ⇣Ø ΩÀ Yª . P ÒÇÀ @ ˙Õ @� ·�⌦⇣J Æ⇣J ” Q�⌦ —Í Ø P ÒÇÀ @ @ÒÇ � Y⇣Ø

forgetting the quantifier, so they are not reading it in terms of [truth of] thequantifier. The same goes when we say

(56) Necessarily not every animal is human.

©J⌦‘g. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ . ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣È✏J⌦ í ⇣ÆÀ @ Ë YÎ ✏ ‡

�AK. ‡ Ò ØQ⇣�™” —Ó✏ E A�

Ø , A K AÇ � @� ‡ @ÒJ⌦kThey recognise this as a necessary proposition. But all these propositionshave to be


38


138

·�⌦K. » AmÃ '@ P AJ. ⇣J´ @� ⌦ Ø B ,P ÒÇÀ @ ⇣Ü Yì ⌦

Ø ˙´ Q⇣K A÷✏ fl @�

⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ⇣I K Aø ‡ @� A ⇣Æ ¢” ΩÀ Xabsolute if the necessity is just taken care of in terms of the truth of thequantifier, rather than by considering the relation between{NB mura

ca is here explicitly of the necessity. }

Å⌧⌦À P ÒÇÀ @ @ YÎ ⇣Ü Yí Ø ,P ÒÇÀ @ ÒÎ P AJ. ⇣J´ B� @ ‡ Aø ‡ A� Ø . ® Ò ìÒ÷œ @ » Ò“j÷œ @

. A✏K⌦ P QÂ ïthe predicate and the subject. If the thing being considered is the quantifier,then the truth of this quantifier is not necessary.

·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B , ‡ AÇ � @� ‡ @ÒJ⌦k✏

…ø ✏ ‡�@ Q k

�@ A⇣J⇣Ø ⇣Ü Yí�⌦ Y⇣Ø È✏ K

�@ ‡ Ò“

✏ Ç�⌦ —Ó✏ E

�B ΩÀ X

‡ @ÒJ⌦mÃ '@This is because, as they grant, it can be true at different times that everyanimal is human, and that no animal

. ⇣I⇣Ø✏

…ø ⌦ Ø ËP ÒÉ ⇣ÈÍk. ·” A✏K⌦ XÒk. ·�⌦⇣J✏⌧⌦ í ⇣ÆÀ @ ·�⌦⇣K AÎ ⇣Ü Yì ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø . ‡ AÇ � A�K.

is human. So the truth of these two propositions is impermanent from theaspect of its quantifier, and this is the case at every time.

⇣È✏J⌦ í ⇣ÆÀ @ Ë YÎ ✏ ‡�AK. ‡ Ò ØQ⇣�™K⌦ —Í

✏ ø —Ó✏ E A�

Ø ‡ @ÒJ⌦k ‡ AÇ � @�✏

…ø : A J ⇣Ø @ X @� A í�⌦�@ ΩÀ Yª

Likewise also when we say 138.5

(57) Every human is an animal.

They all recognise this as{‘All’, so not just one person. }

A J“ ✏ÎÒ⇣K ÒÀ ‡ Ò∫⇣K …K. , ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ‡ Ò∫⇣K B AÓ✏ E A� Ø , —Í ì

�@ ˙Œ´ . ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï

a necessary proposition. But according to their principles it won’t be anecessary proposition. On the contrary, if we imagine

Ä A JÀ @ ·” Yg�@ ·∫K⌦ ’À ⌥ ‡ ÒÀÒ ⇣ÆK⌦ —Î ‡ Ò ™ ÆK⌦ A” ˙Œ´ ⌥ @ XÒk. Ò” ‡ AÇ � @� B

that no human exists — which is what they say they are doing — then [inthat situation] no human

, ÒÇ∫K. ⇣H A ØÒÇ∫À @ ·” Z ⌦Ê⌘Ö B Å⌧⌦À A JÀÒ⇣Ø ✏ ‡ @� : —ÍÀÒ⇣Ø Ä AJ⌦⇣Ø ˙Œ´ , A K @ÒJ⌦k

39


is an animal. This is by analogy with their statement that

(58) When we say ‘No eclipse is an eclipse’, i.e. an existing eclipse,this is a true sentence.

A JÀÒ⇣Ø ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ —Î Y J´ ✏ií�⌦ ‡ Aø @ X @� . ✏⇣ák » Ò⇣Ø , XÒk. Ò” ÒÇª ✏⌦

�@

If according to them the sentence

⇣È✏⇣JJ. À @ ‡ AÇ � @� ‡ Ò∫K⌦ B A” ·�⌦g , ⇣H A⇣Ø�B @ ·” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦

Ø A⇣Ø X Aì —j. ´�@ ‡ @ÒJ⌦k

✏…ø

(59) Every animal is dumb.

is true at some time, [i.e.] whenever there is no human at all 138.10

Y�J ⌧J⌦k ✏iíJ⌦ Ø , XÒk. Ò÷fl. Å⌧⌦À ⌦ Y

✏À @ ‡ AÇ � B� @ ·´ ‡ @ÒJ⌦mÃ '@ I. É ✏ií�⌦ X @� , XÒk. Ò÷fl.

in existence, and since it is true that no human is an animal when there areno humans, it follows that in this situation the sentence

✏…ø : A JÀÒ⇣Ø ⇣Ü Yì ‡ X @� ‡ Ò∫K⌦ C Ø . ‡ @ÒJ⌦m⇢'. Ä A JÀ @ ·” Yg

�@ Å⌧⌦À : » A ⇣ÆK⌦ ‡

�@

(60) Not one human is an animal.

is true. So the truth of the sentence (57)

Ë YÎ ‡ Ò∫⇣K C Ø , A” A⇣J⇣Ø A⇣Ø Yì ‡ Ò∫K⌦ A÷✏ fl @� …K. , A÷ �fl @ X A⇣Ø Yì , ‡ @ÒJ⌦k ‡ AÇ � @�

is not a permanent truth, but rather it is just a truth at a certain time. So thispremise is not

‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ ‡ Aæ Ø . ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï AÓ EÒ “™⇣JÇ�⌦ ⇣È J∫‹ÿ ‡ Ò∫⇣K …K. , ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣È” ✏Y ⇣Æ÷œ @

a necessary proposition but a possible one, and yet they use it as a necessaryone. They ought to

—ÍÀ ✏ ‡�@ ˙Œ´ . —ÍÀ ⌦

Y✏À @ I. Î Y÷œ @ X A ⇣Æ⇣J´ @� ©” , ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï AK⌦ A í ⇣ÆÀ @ Ë YÎ ‡ Òª @Ò™ J÷fl⌦

‡�@

deny that these propositions are necessary, though this is contrary to the 138.15doctrine of their school. Really what they should say it:

A ✏”�@ . ÈJ⌦ Ø ’

✏Œæ⇣J K ⌦

Y✏À @ ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ A JJ⌦´ @P , ⇣Ü C£ B� @ ˙Õ @� A JJ. k.

�@ ÒÀ A✏ K @� : @ÒÀÒ ⇣ÆK⌦

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If we were to accept it as absolute, we would take care of the time in whichwe are speaking. In dealing with

. —ÓDÑ Æ K�@ ˙Œ´ @Ò ⌘É ✏Ò ⌘É Y⇣Ø ‡ Ò KÒ∫J⌦ Ø ,Q k

�@ A�J⌧⌦ ⌘É ⌦´ @Q�⌦ Ø ‡ Aæ” B� @ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ⌦

Øthe necessary and the possible, [Aristotle] goes in a different direction, sothese people’s muddle is their own.{cala ’anfusihim not common, but also at 135.12 above and at c

Ibara 118.9. }


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139

˙Êî ⇣Æ⇣JÇ ⌧É , ⌦�@QÀ @ @ YÎ ˙Õ @� ⇣H A Æ⇣JÀ B� @ ·´ A J⇣J ØQÂï AÍÓD. ⌘Ç�⌦ A” ⌘H Am⇢'.

�B @ Ë YÍ Ø

[3.1.32] These and similar enquiries divert us from paying attention tothe theory that is under discussion, [namely the third mood (30)]. So weare going to put into the enquiries in the Appendices

Ë YÎ ✏ ‡�@ ‡ AK. Y ⇣Æ Ø . ⇣ák @Ò

✏ À @ ⌘H Am⇢'.

�@ ⌦

Ø Ë A J ⇣Ø A” ˙Œ´ ⇣Ë X AK⌦ QÀ @ ·” » A ⇣ÆK⌦ ‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ A”

a close study of the other things that need to be said in addition to what wehave already said about them. Anyway it is clear that this

⇣ÈJ. k. Ò” ¯ Q�. ∫À @ ⇣I K Aø @ X @� , ©K. @QÀ @ ⌦ Ø » Ò ⇣ÆÀ @ ΩÀ Yª . ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï i. ⇣J ⌧⇣K ⇣È JK⌦ Q ⇣ÆÀ @

premise-pair entails a necessity proposition. The same should be said aboutthe fourth mood, where the major premise is an affirmative

. ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢”absoluteness proposition.{This will be Camestres again. }


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Ibn Sina: Qiyas iii.1¯ - Wilfrid Hodgeswilfridhodges.co.uk/arabic22.pdf · Ibn Sina: Qiyas iii.1¯...

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