HACKING ON EXPERIMENTSiSP 202/Phil 287 Philosophy of Science

I. Recovering Experiment A. Hacking’s 1983 book influential in renewal of philosophical attention to experiment B. What does it mean for “experiment to have a life of its own”?

1. independent of subservience to theory (cf. Popper quotation on p. 155)2. not merely a means to the production of observations or “data”

C. What is involved in the autonomous life of experiment?1. a practical understanding of equipment and materials2. a practical understanding of possible sources of error and “noise,” and ways

of overcoming them3. skill in the design, manipulation and use of apparatus (“good hands”) 4. discernment in assessing the performance and outcomes of experimental work5. a sense for what kinds of projects are interesting, do-able, and significant

(including distinctively experimental significance)6. a sense for how to get an effect, or how to do it differently, more efficiently,

more clearly, etc.D. Experiment/theory relations

1. Does experiment provide the basis for theoretical reflection, or does theory guide experimental design and interpretation? Answer: BOTH

2. Strong and weak conceptions of the theory-dependence of experiment a) weak: experimentation needs some underlying ideas/reasonsb) strong: experimentation needs to be guided by a well-articulated theory

3. Does the experiment/theory relation vary with science’s stage of development? a) Davy: perhaps in early stages of a science, there is both more leeway,

and greater need, for experiment not closely tied to theoryb) Liebig: once a theory has developed more extensively, the phenomena

to be studied may be too dependent upon a history of experimental practice and its theoretical interpretation to work independently

c) BUT, not all sciences have theoretical practices independent of experiment (theoretical physics and mathematical population genetics not typical of all science)

d) BUT, even where theory is involved, there may still be relatively autonomous experimental traditions, practices, and concerns

E. “Theory-bias”1. over-emphasis upon theories (concepts/ideas) in thinking about science2. over-emphasis upon “theoretical” spectator’s disengagement/detachment as

characteristic of scientific work and scientific understandingII. Observation

A. "Observation isn't very important" (NOT that data or evidence is unimportant!)B. Shift in emphasis from what we observe to what the phenomena show (cf. Elgin)C. Why being "observant" may be more interesting than observation

1. human senses are not the sole, or even the most important detectors2. what we “observe” is not just experimental outcome, but entire process

III. The Creation of PhenomenaA. Avoiding philological confusions from philosophical uses of ‘phenomenon’

1. Hacking’s sense: phenomena as events in the world2. philosophical sense: phenomena as appearances in/to the mind

B. Why do experiments, rather than just observe nature?1. Thomas Hobbes’ objection (1661): “Are there not enough [phenomena] shown

by the high heavens and the seas and the broad Earth?”2. Some phenomena are more revealing than others (cf. Elgin on exemplification)

C. Natural and created phenomena1. phenomena: events with clearly manifest pattern (not all events are phenomena)2. Hacking is not denying that there are “phenomena” in nature

a) e.g., astronomical phenomena (night/day, night sky, seasons, tides) 3. Hacking not distinguishing phenomena from “effects,” but noting coincidence

of terms (role of “effects” illustrate importance of creating phenomena)4. What is being “created” when we create phenomena?

a) NOT the constituents of the phenomena1) phenomena are made (manufactured), not “made up”

b) the arrangement of things such that a pattern shows up clearlyc) Hacking’s point: do NOT identify the phenomenon with the manifest

pattern, or the “law” it instantiates, while ignoring the surroundings/background that allows it to be manifest1) cf. discussions of causality, and of context for exemplification

4. Why aren’t complex events “composed” of multiple phenomena?a) because the phenomenon includes background, not just manifest patternb) an analysis of complexity doesn’t “really” decompose complex events

D. Why care about the “creation” of phenomena?1. Creating phenomena is hard (most experiments don’t work)2. We often have to reconstruct (parts of) the world to make it intelligible3. Science is a material practice, not merely intellectual analysis & representation

IV. Experimental RealismA. Two conceptions of “realism”

1. Realism about theories: some theoretical claims are (approximately) true2. Realism about entities: some “unobservable” entities are real objects with

definite causal capacities3. Boyd collapsed the two senses by treating successful reference (to entities) as a

surrogate for approximate truth (of theories)B. Why be realists about experimental entities?

1. The crucial shift: from studying a (possible) entity, to using it reliably2. N.B. that does not entail agreement with any description of the entity or its

capacities, only some practical understanding of how to interact with it3. Changing the point of realism: not about the adequacy of our theoretical

understanding, but about the robustness of some features of the worlda) a corollary: our “world” has changed now that molecular (and smaller)

entities are robust constituents of our dealings with it