Ian Apperly University of Birmingham
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Transcript of Ian Apperly University of Birmingham
What is belief reasoning? (And why do researchers from the “theory of mind” and social
cognition traditions find it so hard to talk to each other?)
Ian Apperly
University of Birmingham
• Collaborators– Dana Samson– Elisa Back– Jason Braithwaite– Dan Carroll– Glyn Humphreys– Kevin Riggs– Andrew Simpson
• Funding– British Academy– Leverhulme Trust– ESRC– MRC
Overview
• Background
• Recent behavioural data on theory of mind in adults
• Observations, problems and questions about the link between theory of mind and social cognition
What is “Theory of Mind”?
• Folk psychology, mentalising, social cognition
• False belief tasks (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983)– Ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view
Background on ToM
• We know a lot about development
• We know something about the cognitive and neural basis in adults
• Yet we know almost nothing about the basic operating characteristics of theory of mind processes
– What kinds of mental representations?– Specialised versus generic functional and neural processes?– Automatic versus controlled processing?– What role in on-going cognitive activity (social cognition, communication)?
Why is it important to study ToM in adults?
• Neuroscience research
– Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)
– What do they do?
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
Lateral view
TPJ
TP
Medial view
mP
FC
ToM (or “mentalizing”, or “perspective-taking”, “mind reading” etc…….)
is not a unitary ability
ToM inferences
Sometimes we must infer mental states
Non-inferential “holding in mind”
Sometimes we are told what someone thinks(and should not confuse this with what we know)
All George needs is the guiding hand of a trusted
friend
ToM Use
Well, I was caned in my time and I’ve concentrated all my life
e.g., Interpreting what people say in terms of what they know
Do you not think, Sir Rhodes, if you get caned in school you can’t concentrate?
You was caned?
Respect man, respect
Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes
Are ToM inferences automatic?
• Rationale:– In a situation where there is no particular reason to make ToM inferences, will the
inferences nonetheless be made?
Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson (2006) Psych. Sci.
Are ToM inferences Automatic?Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson (2006) Psych. Sci.
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Condition 1:Incidental False
Belief Task
Condition 2:Explicit belief and
reality tracking
Condition 3:Explicit belief
tracking
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Belief
Reality
Condition 1: Monitor Reality Is belief monitored too?
Condition 2: Track Reality and Belief
Condition 3: Track Belief
Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes
• ToM inferences are not automatic: They require cognitive control
• But this may not always be true
Automatic perspective taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite & Andrews, submitted)
You / He
You / He
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Self / Other Consistent
Self / Other InconsistentDisc position varies
1,2, or 3 discs
Automatic perspective taking?
Main effect of consistencySignificant interaction
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Self Other Self Other Self Other
Discs vary Figure varies Blocked
Consistent
InconsistentRT
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Egocentric interference
Automatic perspective taking?
Main effect of consistencySignificant interaction
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Self Other Self Other Self Other
Discs vary Figure varies Blocked
Consistent
InconsistentRT
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Altercentric interference
Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes
• ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control
Non-inferential ToM:The cost of holding false beliefs in mind
Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition.
Rationale: Tell participants what the target character thinks Measure difficulty of making judgements about this information
“He thinks the object on the chair is red”
“Really the object on the chair is yellow”
PICTURE PROBESENTENCE 2SENTENCE 1
“He thinks the object on the chair is red”
“Really the object on the table is yellow”
“He thinks the object on the chair is red”
“Really the object on the chair is yellow”
PICTURE PROBESENTENCE 2SENTENCE 1
“He thinks the object on the chair is red”
“Really the object on the table is yellow”
False belief + reality
Unrelated belief + reality
Non-inferential ToM:The cost of holding false beliefs in mind
Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition.
Rationale: Tell participants what the target character thinks Measure difficulty of making judgements about this
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Belief Probe Reality Probe Belief Probe Reality Probe
Information in Sentence 1 Information in Sentence 2
Experiment 1: Self-Paced Reading
False B/R
Unrelated B/R
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Non-inferential ToM:The cost of holding false beliefs in mind
Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition.
“He thinks the object on the chair is red”
“Really the object on the chair is yellow”
PICTURE PROBESENTENCE 2SENTENCE 1
“He thinks the object on the chair is red”
“Really the object on the table is yellow”
“He thinks the object on the chair is red”
“Really the object on the chair is yellow”
PICTURE PROBESENTENCE 2SENTENCE 1
“He thinks the object on the chair is red”
“Really the object on the table is yellow”
False belief + reality
Unrelated belief + reality
Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes
• ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control
• To “hold in mind” a false belief we must resist interference from what we know (and vice versa)
ToM Use
• Rationale– Very easy ToM inference
– Can this inference be used to guide interpretation of speech?
– E.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr (2003)
Apperly, Carroll, Samson & Humphreys (under submission).
Instructor: Experimental
Instructor: Control
No-instructor: Experimental
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Ambiguous Relational Ambiguous Relational
Experimental Experimental Control Control
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ToM UseApperly, Carroll, Samson & Humphreys (under submission).
Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes
• ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control
• To “hold in mind” a false belief we must resist interference from what we know (and vice versa)
• Using ToM information can be a difficult task-set to maintain
Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM
– ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment
• Neuroscience research
– Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)
– What do they do?
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
Lateral view
TPJ
TP
Medial view
mP
FC
ToM processing model: (after Leslie, 1992, 2005)
ToMM
Observed Behaviour
Modular: Fast, automatic, domain-specific….
SP
“Executive selection”: Slow? Controlled? Domain-General?
Perceptualinformation
ActionSchemas
Contention scheduling(includes semantic memory)
Stage 1: strategy selection
Stage 2:implementingthe schema
Stage 3: assessingthe implementedschemaProblem
orientation
Goal setting
Episodicmemoryretrieval
Spontaneousschema
generation
Level ofaspiration
setting
Progressivedeepening
phase
Solutionchecking
phase
Delayedintentionmarker
realisation
Strategygeneration
phase
Special-purposeworking memory
Control ofmonitoring
andchecking
Rejection ofschema
Intention
(after Shallice & Burgess, 1996)
Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM– ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to
have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment
– Need to be more precise when asking about the neural basis of “mentalising”
• Neuroscience research
– Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)
– What do they do?
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
Lateral view
TPJ
TP
Medial view
mP
FC
Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM
– ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment
– Need to be more precise when asking about the neural basis of “mentalising”
– Important role for cognitive control processes
– Understanding ToM will require more than understanding the functional and neural basis of ToM-specific processes
– Some of the “social network” may be concerned with control processes
– Some processes critical for ToM are almost certainly subtracted out in existing analyses
– Caution when interpreting meta-analyses of imaging data
• Neuroscience research
– Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)
– What do they do?
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
Lateral view
TPJ
TP
Medial view
mP
FC
The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions
• “Beliefs” in the ToM tradition are usually transitory states closely linked to epistemic access
• But enduring beliefs surely play a similar causal role in explaining and predicting behaviour
– “Transitory versus enduring” is an important dimension– I’m not sure if it can discriminate different kinds of mental states in a clear way
The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions
• The ToM tradition studies beliefs as the causal consequences of epistemic access. Any rational, sentient agent will have such beliefs.
– Contrast with social cognition tradition which tends to see beliefs as characteristics of the target - the “kind of person” they are
– Target characteristics are irrelevant for typical ToM problems– Self-other similarity is irrelevant to these typical ToM problems
• Is it nonetheless an influence?
The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions
• Self-reflection and projection (or egocentric anchoring and adjustment) are possible but not necessary processes in ToM reasoning
– We can make ToM judgements even when we don’t have to infer hidden mental states, when we don’t know reality and when we don’t care about the content of the mental state
Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM
Clever new methods
+ Careful task analysis
= plenty of interesting work
• Neuroscience research
– Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)
– What do they do?
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
Lateral view
TPJ
TP
Medial view
mP
FC
Functional and neural processes specific to ToM?
• Step 1: Simpler tasks with tighter controls– Very short stories
– False belief vs. False photograph – identifies similar range of regions to earlier studies
• Step 2: Which regions respond only to ToM stimuli?
Functional and neural processes specific to ToM?
• Step 1: Simpler tasks with tighter controls– Very short stories
– False belief vs. False photograph – identifies similar range of regions to earlier studies
• Step 2: Which regions respond only to ToM-related stimuli?
Left hemisphere
L-TPJ
Right hemisphere
R-TPJ
Responds selectively for thinking about beliefs, desires, intentionsNot for people’s appearance or background social information, (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005)or non-social perspective-taking (e.g., Perner et al. 2006)
Responds selectively for thinking about false beliefs and non-social perspective-taking (e.g., Perner et al. 2006)
So what have we found?
• Perspective-taking in left-TPJ? – (Perner et al. 2006)
• ToM is specific to right-TPJ and is independent of processes for inhibition and cognitive control? – (e.g., Saxe, Carey & Kanwisher, 2004)
• We can accept that these findings are informative, but still think that other processes are equally interesting and equally necessary for ToM