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IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency
Lessons Learned from the Tailored IRRS Module on
Regulatory Implications of the Fukushima Accident
Presentation to the Workshop on Lessons Learned from IRRS Missions
Moscow, Russian Federation
9-11 December 2014
IAEA Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima 2
Outline
• Development and Approach• Principle• Topics addressed• Approach
• Implementation• Missions• Appearance in the report
• Actions performed, lessons learned• Immediate actions• Technical and other issues considered• Plans for upcoming actions• Modular review
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DEVELOPMENT AND APPROACH
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The Guiding Principle
“The IAEA should include consideration of the implications of the Fukushima accident in its peer reviews of regulatory frameworks […], and should seek to ensure that the lessons learned from the accident and resulting good practices developed by the Member States are widely shared.”
IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear SafetyChair Persons’ Summaries
Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima 4
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The Initiative
The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety requires from the IAEA Secretariat
to strengthen existing peer reviews by incorporating lessons learned
to enhance transparency by providing summary information on the peer reviews and publish results if agreed
to assess and enhance effectiveness of the peer reviews
to enhance IRRS for peer review of regulatory effectiveness
Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima 5
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The Main Topics Addressed
The tailored module was designed to conduct a targeted review of the national regulatory infrastructure against IAEA Safety Standards, in the light of the Fukushima accident.
The review concentrates on Regulatory independence Regulatory role in Emergency Preparedness and
Response Communication issues Technical issues to be considered in core regulatory
processes
Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima 6
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The Approach
STRUCTURE OF THE FUKUSHIMA CHAPTER:1) Immediate actions taken by the RB2) Technical and other issues considered3) Plans for upcoming actions to further address
regulatory implications of the accident4) Review of technical issues related to the
accident (performed as part of each module review) A single additional question to pose:
Do the IRRS findings rise concerns in the Modules reviewed on the ability of the current regulatory framework to prevent the occurrence of regulatory related shortcomings as identified in the light of the Fukushima accident? Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima 7
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IMPLEMENTATION
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Missions with Fukushima Module
Korea (initial) July 2011
Germany (follow-up) September 2011
Slovenia (initial) September 2011
Switzerland (initial) November 2011
Canada (follow-up) November 2011
Sweden (initial) February 2012
Slovakia (initial) May 2012
Finland (initial) October 2012Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima 9
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Missions with Fukushima Module (cont)
Bulgaria (initial) April 2013
UK (follow-up) October 2013
Russia (follow-up) November 2013
Czech Republic (initial) November 2013
Belgium (initial) December 2013
USA (follow-up) February 2014
The Netherlands (initial)November 2014
France (2nd initial) November 2014
Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima 10
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Appearance in the Mission Report
By the reviewer responsible for the Fukushima Module
By the reviewers responsible for the
respective Modules)
(Unified) Conclusions
summarize the findings of the
review in uniform terms
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ACTIONS PERFORMED, LESSONS LEARNED
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1) Immediate actions taken by the RBs
• All RB reacted promptly by activating emergency / expert teams and kept the team active for several weeks
• Fukushima plant status analysed, information and expert advise were provided to the governmental agencies
• Information provided to the public, frequent media appearances
• Many RBs kept interactive communication with the public
Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima 13
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1) Immediate actions (cont.)
• Most RBs requested NPP operators to conduct immediate investigations on the capabilities to withstand events similar to those in the accident
• Many RBs conducted immediate inspections• Some RBs provided expert advice to citizens
and embassy in Japan• Some proposing control of goods imported from
Japan
LESSONS LEARNED:• More EPR exercises are needed• Communication practice to revise• RBs generally reacted well to the accident
Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima 14
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2) Technical and other issues
• Requesting a targeted safety reassessment of NPPs and spent fuel pools from the operators (in EU countries: “Stress Test”) including Action Plans for necessary measures
• Some RBs also requested reassessment of other facilities
• Requiring re-evaluation of seismic, flood and other natural hazards
• Requesting revision of EPR and severe accident management (long and multi-unit events with exotic initiators)
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2) Technical and other issues (cont)
• The RBs prepared summary reports on the safety status and actions foreseen (ST Report in EU)
LESSONS LEARNED:• Investigations did not raise significant
safety concerns for nuclear installations• After a number of upgrading measures
the nuclear installation will be able to cope with the technical challenges similar to those faced in Fukushima
• No major change in the working methods of the RBs deemed necessary
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3) Plans for upcoming actions
• In most countries a detailed Action Plan shall be performed under the supervision of the RBs
• In some countries the accident accelerated further improvement of independence of the RB
• RBs requested a great number of safety improvement measures to cope with so far not foreseen beyond design basis accidents
• In some countries the regulations and legislation related to nuclear energy shall be revisedLESSONS LEARNED:
Further effective steps are needed in order to make sure that the regulatory body is capable of delivering its emergency response responsibilities in a long lasting nuclear emergency within or in the vicinity of the country
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4) Modular review of technical issues
Review by IRRS Modules• Short summary of relevant
implications• Brief Conclusion
LESSONS LEARNED:• The Conclusions can be
expressed in terms of unified statements:
Unified conclusions
1 - no concern raised 2 - existing status appropriate 3 - necessary action recognised 4 - committed to act 5 - further actions planned 6 - further actions initiated 7 - appropriate action taken 8 - exemplary action taken 9 - stress test 10 - further action suggested
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Modular review – grouping of conclusions
• The Fukushima Chapter included 12 Conclusions:• s1 and s2 for the first three Sections (Immediate
actions, Technical and other issues, Plans)• m1, m2, …, m10 for the ten Modular reviews of IRRS
Modules
• The Conclusions are grouped as• Positive (+1): evaluates positively the activity of the RB
in the field• Neutral (0): does not commend neither raises concerns
(RB acts as expected)• Negative (-1): points to non-conformances or gives
important recommendations for improvement
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Modular review – distribution of conclusions
• On average of all missions 71% neutral, 26% positive (60% for EPR), 4% negative
• Average number of positive conclusions per missions is 2.8 Neutral average = 8.40%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
s1 s2 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 av
Num
ber o
f Co
nclu
sion
s
Modules
Fukushima-related conclusionspositive negative neutral
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
ROK GFR-fu SLO SWI CAN-fu SWE SLR FIN BUL UK-fu2 CZR RUS-fu BEL USA-fu
Number of positive conclusions
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
ROK GFR-fu SLO SWI CAN-fu SWE SLR FIN BUL UK-fu2 CZR RUS-fu BEL USA-fu
Number of positive and neutral conclusions
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Modular review – lesson learned
LESSON LEARNED 1: The results of the tailored IRRS Module in the IRRS missions in 2011-2014 suggest that in the overwhelming majority of the cases the nuclear regulatory bodies act according to or above the expectations raised by the implications of the Fukushima accident. Apart from a very few cases no need for further development of the regulatory regime was identified as a consequence of the accident
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Modular review – unified conclusions
Unified conclusions S1 - no concern raised 33
2 - existing status appropriate 493 - necessary action recognised 10
4 - committed to act 295 - further actions planned 226 - further actions initiated 157 - appropriate action taken 518 - exemplary action taken 6
9 - stress test 2010 - further action suggested 22
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Num
ber o
f app
eara
nce
Unified conclusion sequence no.
No. of unified conclusions
Unified conclusions1 - no concern raised
2 - existing status appropriate3 - necessary action recognised
4 - committed to act5 - further actions planned6 - further actions initiated7 - appropriate action taken8 - exemplary action taken
9 - stress test10 - further action suggested
done
to be done
sum
82
76
77
22
nothing to do
will be done
0102030405060708090
distribution of conclusions
nothing to do
will be done
done
to be done
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Modular review – lesson learned
• LESSON LEARNED 2: The detailed analysis of the conclusions of the tailored Fukushima module suggests that the peer review has not revealed important issues related to the implications of the accident in the regulatory regime of the host countries.
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
Photo: V. Friedrich