Introduction________________________________________________________________1

Background________________________________________________________________2The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty______________________________________________3

International Atomic Energy Agency_______________________________________________4

Recent History__________________________________________________________________7

Violators of the NPT_____________________________________________________________7

Other Non-Nuclear Policies______________________________________________________10

Current Status_____________________________________________________________14

Key Positions______________________________________________________________16Western Hemisphere____________________________________________________________16

Latin America and Caribbean____________________________________________________17

Africa_________________________________________________________________________17

Oceana________________________________________________________________________17

Middle East____________________________________________________________________18

NGO Positions_________________________________________________________________19

Media Positions________________________________________________________________20

Summary_________________________________________________________________22

Discussion Questions________________________________________________________24

Glossary__________________________________________________________________25

Appendix A: Strengthened Safeguards System: States with Additional Protocols_________0

Appendix B: States that Have Ratified or Acceded to the NPT as of 1 March, 2005_______2

Appendix C: IAEA Organizational Chart__________________________________________3

1

IntroductionThe concern of preventing nuclear proliferation spurred the creation of international,

regional and national safeguards to monitor nuclear activities. Verifying the proper use of

nuclear technology is entrusted on an international level to the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA), an organization created to enforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT). Signatories of the treaty agree to the terms and conditions of the treaty. The

provisions within the NPT include individual agreements with the IAEA to prevent the

proliferation of nuclear weapons, additional protocols to monitor nuclear activity, and to

deter the use of technology for non-peaceful applications. To ensure compliance, various

types of inspections are necessary on regular or irregular basis in declared and undeclared

nuclear facilities. The relationship between the IAEA and member states of the NPT is based

solely only on continued membership. Withdrawing states are no longer subjected to IAEA

safeguards or inspections.

Inspection teams from the IAEA perform two main forms of inspections: routine and

special inspections. Routine inspections simply verify nuclear activities, while special

inspections request the particular state access to declared and undeclared sites within a short

notice period. Any request can be denied, but the IAEA Board of Governors has the ability to

override this decision. In cases such as these, the issue of whether an international agency

should have more rights in a territory that a state holds sovereignty in arises. For states that

are declared Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), unrestricted access available to IAEA

inspectors also infringes upon national security and secret military programs. This concern of

states that wish to be a member of the NPT, but do not wish to give unrestricted access,

allow states that wish to be seen as non-hostile to hide behind the pretenses of the treaty.

This excuse is used to restrict access on the basis of sensitive military information. Despite

potentially invasive inspections, the benefits of permitting IAEA inspections include

increased transparency of nuclear activity and intent.

The issue of IAEA inspections infringing upon state sovereignty has been assessed

from the creation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. State sovereignty is defined as the

ability of a state to have power within its territory to rule. IAEA inspection teams require

2

access to sites within the territory of a signatory state. With increasing requests of access for

inspection teams to sites of nuclear activity and storage, states have questioned whether the

amount sovereignty it has relinquished to verify compliance with the NPT has been exceeded

through subsequent inspections on its territory.

BackgroundThe Second World War commenced a new age of warfare with the development of

the atomic bomb. From conceptualization to testing the first atomic explosion, the United

States maintained absolute secrecy about the Manhattan Project, to prevent the Germans

from obtaining technology to enrich Uranium to produce a nuclear weapon. During World

War II, the Allies crossed the finish line of the nuclear race when the United States

successfully developed and dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

Although the Allies won the war, the United States attempted to keep the atomic secret

cloaked. However, the Soviet Union obtained the technological process and materials, and

detonated its first atomic explosion in 1949. 1

Following the Soviet atomic explosion, the United States competed with the Soviet

Union by accumulating a record number of nuclear warheads and weapons, with arsenals

reaching 33,000 and 45,000 warheads respectively. Following the stockpiling of in nuclear

weapons by the Cold War’s two competitors, both Britain and France independently

developed and tested nuclear weapons by 1960. Four years later, China followed and became

one of the original nuclear club members in 1964.2 After seeing the horrific realities of

atomic warfare following the Second World War, these original members of the nuclear club

grew concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons if other state and non-state actors

obtained the technology. This concern developed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

(NPT), which became an international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

1 Mary H. Cooper, "Non-Proliferation Treaty at 25." The CQ Researcher 5, no. 4 (January 27, 1995), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1995012700, (accessed February 1, 2006).2 Ibid.

3

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyThe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968. The NPT is an

international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and technology, decrease

stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and promote the use of nuclear technology for peaceful

purposes. This treaty has a large conglomeration of member states that have entered a

multilateral agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an international

force. The main framework of the NPT aims to prevent the growth of current nuclear

programs. The treaty distinguished member states as Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and

Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) at the inception of the treaty. The five original NWS

include China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States. There are eight

known NWS to this date. These three additions to the NWS, including India, Pakistan and

Israel, are not member states of the NPT, and therefore are not bound to the terms of the

treaty.3

Of key importance is Article I of the NPT. Note that Article I of the treaty clearly

expounds that no party to the treaty should transfer or accept: nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control oveir such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive device.4

This article is especially important for both NNWS and NWS member states of the NPT

because reinforces the international resolve to prevent the growth in NWS. Article II extends

to states that have not already developed or acquired nuclear weapons by encouraging any

party to the treaty not to accept or seek the transfer of any nuclear material or technology.

Despite the restrictive natures of Articles I and II, membership to the NPT has advantages

that are stated in Article IV. Article IV discusses one of the most beneficial aspects of being

a part of the international non-proliferation regime: use of nuclear technology for peaceful

purposes. Both NNWS and NWS are permitted to research and use nuclear technology for

peaceful applications. Equipment, materials and information relating to these applications 3 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 22 April, 1970, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf, (accessed 1 February 2006).4 Ibid.

4

may be shared with other member states, including NNWS, to promote scientific

advancement. Article IV provides an incentive for NNWS to comply with the NPT because

it offers clear advantages to states that are in developing areas of the world.

While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s original intent was to prevent the

growth of nuclear arsenals, member states realized that compliance with the treaty could not

be verified without an independent agency whose sole purpose was verifying and monitoring

the use of nuclear technology and materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) became responsible for safeguarding nuclear knowledge, and insuring compliance of

all signatories.

International Atomic Energy Agency In 1957, signatory parties of the NPT created the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) as the nuclear ‘watch-dog’ to reduce qualms of nuclear proliferation. Under

the treaty, the IAEA is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty, with its responsibilities beginning March 5, 1970 despite the signatory

date of the NPT in 1968. To fulfill its goals, the IAEA developed safeguards to prevent the

proliferation of nuclear technology and materials that would facilitate the development of

nuclear weapons. These safeguards entrust the IAEA as a ‘nuclear inspectorate’. The Third

Article in the NPT states that member states agree to allow the International Atomic Energy

Agency to enforce the terms “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of

its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear

energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.5 The

article also recognizes the IAEA’s ability to create and verify safeguard agreements with

each individual state. Article III makes the IAEA responsible for monitoring all aspects of

any nuclear process, even if used for peaceful purposes, “within the territory of such State,

under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.”6 Each party of the NPT has

realizes that these safeguards are the means to achieving the goal of the treaty.

5 Ibid.6 Ibid.

5

The IAEA’s predominant role in nuclear non-proliferation is its development of

international safeguards. Safeguards encompass monitoring, verifying and protecting nuclear

activity. One hundred forty-five countries have signed individual agreements with the IAEA

to submit reports of nuclear activities. They also permit IAEA inspectors to verify the

nuclear activities, facilities and materials.7 While signatory nations agree to allow the IAEA

as ‘nuclear inspectorate’ by accepting the terms set by the treaty, the IAEA performs on-site

inspections that are part of its safeguards. Of these, routine inspections are the most common

verification method. These assessments of nuclear materials and work are done either on

schedule, or on a surprise basis. They are limited to declared sites or laboratories that work

with nuclear material or facilities where nuclear material is processed. The IAEA also has

the ability to carry out special inspections under certain circumstances in which it feels that

routine inspections have not allowed it to maintain nuclear safeguards. The Agency also

allows these types of inspections if it feels if information by the state is not adequate in

monitoring and verifying compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. Lastly the

IAEA performs safeguards inspections to monitor the development of declared facilities, and

insure that these facilities have not deviated from their original plans.8 Despite this, an IAEA

inspector’s rights are limited by the notion that findings from inspections do not allow the

IAEA to penalize violators and enforce the NPT with international law.

For any reason, signatory states of the NPT “have the right to withdraw from the

Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have

jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”9 Under the terms of the treaty, states have

most importantly agreed to the compliance with Articles I and II, and have allowed the IAEA

to ensure that these terms are being met. These clauses of the treaty realize that states are

giving up a part of their sovereignty by agreeing to the conditions set by the NPT. For this

reason, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows any state which believes that the treaty

7 International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” 02-02901 / FS Series 1/02/E, pg. 1, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf, (accessed, February 1, 2006). 8 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Factsheets & FAQs,” 2003-2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html, (accessed February 2, 2006).9 Ibid.

6

has infringed upon its ‘supreme interests’ to withdraw from the agreement with three month

notice identifying the circumstances in which its national interests are jeopardized.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has as much power as the parties of the

treaty allocate to implement its safeguards systems. While many countries sign the Treaty,

the IAEA still requires cooperation on behalf of governments to permit inspectors to perform

outlined duties. The relationship between IAEA inspectors and the state governments is

clearly defined by individually negotiated comprehensive safeguard agreements for routine

on-site inspections. As with any non-state party interfering or inspecting a government’s

activities, the NPT calls for states to ‘relinquish some sovereignty’.10 In addition to

agreements between the IAEA and governments, the IAEA is restricted while performing

routine inspections. The Agency does not have authority nor reign to go beyond the terms of

inspections by allowing inspectors to search sites that are not on the itinerary. While the

IAEA also has the ability to request access to other sites when it feels that it does not have

‘adequate’ information to ‘fulfill its responsibilities’, states maintain sovereignty over the

land they rule, and can deny the inspectors clearance. 11 This ideal relationship as agreed

upon in the Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required

in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons not only

outlines responsibilities in insuring compliance with all nuclear activities but also highlights

the limited resources the IAEA has in verification. With a constrained budget, the IAEA is

limited in its own effectiveness. IAEA spending in 1995, totaling seventy million dollars for

international inspections and verifications, clearly shows that it has to rely on state

cooperation by using States’ Systems of Accounting and Control (SSAC) because installing

and creating its own systems would go far beyond the money it already uses. 12

10 United States, Technology Assessment Board of the 103d Congress, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), June 1995, 49. 11 International Atomic Energy Agency, “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” June 1972, INFCIRC/153 pt 73b, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf153.shtml, (accessed February 2, 2006),12 “Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency,” 50.

7

Recent HistoryOne hundred eighty-eight states have agreed to the terms of the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty. From its inception, not all signatories have complied with the

stipulations and agreements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The most

notorious examples of such states include Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya. These states

have misused membership status to the NPT under the pretense of Article IV. Evoking the

right of states to share and use nuclear technology for peaceful applications, states such as

Iraq and Iran deviated from IAEA safeguards and additional protocols, and developed

clandestine nuclear programs.

Violators of the NPTOf these violators, Iraq’s non-compliance with the NPT obligations, including

acquisition of nuclear materials for building weapons, was discovered in 1991 after the Gulf

War. Iraq deceitfully developed undeclared nuclear facilities and engaged in activities that

did not fall under IAEA scrutiny during routine inspections. Inspectors did not suspect any

‘illegal’ nuclear activity outside of the declared sites. Iraq had further disregarded its

individual safeguard agreements with the IAEA by producing plutonium and uranium fuel,

both which indiscretions were discovered by inspectors after the Gulf War.13 The relationship

between Iraq and its IAEA inspectors followed a traditional agreement, but Iraq’s deceptions

did not allow inspectors to discover flagrant violations during on-site inspections. Iraq

always found ways to delay or divert inspections by both the IAEA and UN Special

Commission (UNSCOM). Later on, these inspectors found a plethora of misleading records

on Iraq’s nuclear program and nuclear weapons delivery systems. Despite the IAEA’s ability

to request access to facilities not on the inspection itinerary at short notice, the agency was

hampered from performing its duties due to Iraqi deception. Further, Iraq was accused of

“misleading and incomplete declarations, efforts at confrontation and intimidation of

inspectors, infiltration measures to ferret out inspections plans in advance… and destruction,

removal, or dispersal of evidence to conceal the purpose of key facilities.”14 The situation in

Iraq spurred the IAEA Board of Governors to resolve holes in the agency’s ability to carry 13 Ibid 38-39.

8

out inspections for safeguard agreements. From 1992-1993, the IAEA Board of Governors

proposed systems to detect and gain clearance to sites agreed upon for inspection by both

states and the Agency, as well as undeclared sites. While it approved the need to restructure

safeguard systems, the IAEA Board of Governors also recognized the need to build a

foundation for further cooperation between the Agency and the state governments, and

increased undeclared routine inspections to rule out violations.15

North Korea is under scrutiny for non-compliance with IAEA safeguards. North

Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but never came to terms with the

determined IAEA safeguards that were supposed to be fulfilled within eighteen months of

ratification. Stretching far beyond the cushion time of eighteen months to comply, North

Korea refused to fulfill these safeguards for six years following ratification. In addition to

these blatant violations, North Korea refused to allow IAEA inspectors to perform routine

inspections at declared nuclear facilities, and denied requests to inspect two nuclear waste

sites. At this point in the early 1990’s, North Korea was suspected of developing a nuclear

weapon. Evoking the article of the NPT which allows a state to withdraw from the treaty

under ‘exceptional’ circumstances with detailed explanation to the IAEA with three month

prior notice, North Korea decided to pull out from the treaty. Later on, North Korea

suspended the withdrawal process. The North Korean state insists that it has a special status

under the NPT since its withdrawal is suspended, and therefore any safeguard systems do not

apply. In response, the IAEA and its other signatory parties have refused to recognize this

special status. With the support of the parties of the NPT, the IAEA was able to uncover

North Korean violations. Through sampling its original safeguard agreements, the inspectors

found North Korea producing more plutonium than it had originally declared. Support of

member NPT states also allowed the IAEA to perform special inspections of two undeclared

sites.16

14 George L. Rueckert, On-Site Inspection In Theory and Practice (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 232.15 Ibid 207-208.16 “Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency,” 39.

9

Iran began its nuclear activities in the 1970s, by constructing nuclear power plants for

energy, but soon suspended plans in 1979. In 1995, Iran created an agreement with the

Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), to help Iran complete the unfinished plants it

had begun in the mid-1970s. These completed nuclear plants provide nuclear energy that

supplies approximately four percent of the state’s total energy.17 Although Iran’s non-

peaceful nuclear activities are featured in recent news, its history traces back to the

establishment of nuclear energy plants. While the agreement between Minatom and Iran was

contracted in 1995, work began on the plants in 2003. During the same year, Iran was

accused of, and admitted to, using undeclared research facilities for enriching uranium by the

National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an opposition group. Iran maintained it

would use natural atomic resources to produce nuclear power, which spurred international

concern over Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.18 Early in 2003, Iran admitted to IAEA

inspectors that it had imported enough nuclear materials from China to assemble a nuclear

weapon. Later on in the same year, Iran admitted failure to comply with terms of the NPT in

the 1990’s by conducting uranium conversion experiments and developing heavy water. As a

result of these findings, the IAEA set a deadline of October 31, 2003 for Iran to comply with

safeguards to stop nuclear activity. Iran additionally signed an additional protocol that allows

the IAEA to perform surprise inspections. This additional protocol to the NPT permits

inspectors greater access to any nuclear facility, as well as the ability to investigate all

nuclear activities occurring in Iran. In December 2003, Iran signed the additional protocol

on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and placed a halt on its enrichment facilities. 19

Until the US invasion of Iraq, Libya kept its nuclear activities veiled in secrecy from

the international community. Despite membership to the NPT, Libya had developed

technology to enrich uranium, but had not implemented any enrichment programs.

Additional violations of the safeguards placed by the IAEA included the import of uranium,

17 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Islamic Republic of Iran,” http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/countryprofiles/Iran/Iran2003.htm, (accessed February 3, 2006). 18 NTI, “Iran Profile: Nuclear Overview,” December 2005, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html, (accessed February 3, 2006).19 Ibid.

10

enrichment technology, and blue prints for nuclear weapons. Soon after to admitting to

having undeclared nuclear materials and facilities in December 2003, Libya signed an

additional protocol to the NPT. The protocol verified that Libya exterminated all materials,

equipment and programs leading to the development of nuclear weapons. This additional

protocol also allowed unrestricted access for inspection teams to Libyan nuclear related

facilities, and the ability to rigorously inspect any site with scheduled or unscheduled

inspections. With international pressure, Libya agreed to cooperate with the IAEA to provide

transparency in its nuclear activities through rigorous inspection and verification measures. 20

Other Non-Nuclear PoliciesAs an original member of the nuclear club, the United States sees interest in being a

staunch supporter of the IAEA and the non-proliferation regime. Given that inspections by

the IAEA are essential in verifying compliance with the NPT, the US works in close

cooperation with the IAEA secretariat to assure that safeguards are met. The bilateral

relationship between the US and the IAEA results in continuous improvements in the IAEA

inspectorate through training and development of innovative inspection technology and

techniques.21 The US projects a strong counter-proliferation stance to both members and non-

members of the NPT. It urges reforms to strengthen IAEA safeguard procedures to insure

compliance. In 2004, President Bush proposed measures to strengthen IAEA authority to

enforce the NPT. To supplement the US stance, Bush stated that the IAEA should “focus

intensively on safeguards and…ensure that nations comply with their international

obligations.”22 The United States propounds adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty by all member states through rigorous inspections that prohibits nations from shirking

away from obligations, and finding loopholes to evade IAEA scrutiny. The US is adamant

about projecting transparency in all nuclear activities to the international community.

Granting IAEA inspection teams full access to declared and undeclared sites through

20 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Annual Report 2003,” 2003 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2003/safeguards.pdf, (accessed 25 February 2006) 53-55. 21 John Simpson and Anthony G McGrew, eds, The International Nuclear Non-Proliferation System: Challenges and Choices (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 116-117.22 John R. Bolton, “The NPT: A Crisis of Non-Compliance,” 27 April, 2004 http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/31848.htm, (accessed 25 February 2006).

11

individual safeguard agreements and additional protocols is essential for member states of

the NPT. With out compliance in such inspections, parties of the treaty are in violation of

Articles I and II of the NPT.

In addition to the NPT, European States also created the Atomic Energy Community

(EURATOM), a regional agency that strengthened regional stance on nuclear non-

proliferation. EURATOM was originally based on the Rome Treaty and applies to ten states:

Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

and the United Kingdom.23 EURATOM created its own safeguards systems that would

prevent further development of nuclear technology for military purposes, and signed

agreements with the IAEA to verify these controls.

While EURATOM created a regional bond between the IAEA and states of Europe,

Europe continued further in its goal of non-proliferation by creating the EURATOM Treaty,

which creates a binding contract between the communities. While initial clauses did not

clarify relations between European states, the EURATOM treaty was later clarified by the

Court of Luxemburg in 1978. The ruling concerned the International Convention on Physical

Protection of nuclear materials. The Court of Luxemburg decried that individual or collective

action taken by member states can not “impose conditions on the exercise of prerogatives

which thenceforth belong to the Community and which therefore no longer fall within the

field of national sovereignty.” 24

Since EURATOM accepts the use of nuclear material for peaceful purposes, it allows the

transfer of nuclear materials intra-community, but imposes an inspection mechanism that

creates EURATOM safeguards. These safeguards have ‘the advantage of permanency’ since

all signatories are bound by the treaty. While the states in EURATOM are signatories of the

NPT and have individual safeguards with the IAEA, the EURATOM Treaty binds the states

to the terms of the treaty through multilateral covenants.

23 David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), 70. 24 Julien R. Goens, “The Opportunities and Limits of European Co-Operation in the Area of Non-Proliferation” in A European Non-Proliferation Policy, ed. Harald Muller, 40 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

12

Europe has taken great strides in promoting compliance with any nuclear non-

proliferation agreements entered. Starting in 1995, European states have suggested Nuclear

Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) that would commit states in ensuring counter proliferation of

nuclear weapons as an alternative to the North American Treaty Organization (NATO), and a

supplement to NPT membership. The draft for a NWFZ in Europe was proposed by Belarus

in 1990 to create a strong regional stance on nuclear non-proliferation. The NWFZ has been

especially proposed for Central and Eastern Europe, and is hoped to be approved by member

states as the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone for Central and Eastern Europe (NWFZC&EE). All

states entering into this regional agreement are subject to inspections by other signatory

parties to verifying nuclear activities. These inspection rights include short notice inspections

in a state’s respective territory as well. The Draft on a NWFZ in Europe also proposed, in

Article II, the procedures for insuring such a regional zone. The text suggested under clauses

7-9 that each signatory state is required to relinquish some sovereignty to allow inspectors

‘full and free access’ to any nuclear activity related site. In addition, it also allocates IAEA

inspectors responsibility for verifying and reporting all peaceful nuclear activities and

deviations from the proposed treaty. Lastly, if the IAEA inspection teams have found that a

‘breach of obligations’ have been committed by a state, then the accused state is obligated to

verify its activities as well as comply with the terms agreed upon. 25

In 1967 the Treaty of Tlateloco declared a NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean

by binding signatories from “testing, using, manufacturing, producing or acquiring nuclear

weapons.”26 The main highlight of the treaty states that all nuclear activities as well as

facilities are to be only used for peaceful purposes, and goes further to involve states that

have sovereign rights over territory in that region. As the NPT established the IAEA to

enforce the terms set by the treaty, the Treaty of Tlateloco established the Agency for the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) to ensure compliance by all

25 Vienna Peace Bureau, “Draft on the Treaty of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Europe,” Who is next? - The Proliferation of NATO Targets, no. 17 (August 1999), < http://www.inesap.org/bulletin17/bul17art27.htm> (accessed 24 January, 2006). 26 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Coming to Terms with Security: A Handbook on Verification and Compliance, Geneva, Switzerland: UN Publication, June 2003. 69.

13

nuclear weapon states in the region. OPANAL works in cooperation with the IAEA to fulfill

its objectives. Other regions have successfully established NWFZs.27

The African region established a NWFZ with the 1996 Penlindaba Treaty. Like the

Tlateloco Treaty, the Penlindaba Treaty bans the same nuclear activities in addition to

placing banning research on development of nuclear weapons and testing. This regional

system of reinforcing the agreements of the NPT goes further than the Tlateloco Treaty by

having a regional system of checks on nuclear activities. If any signatory party in this treaty

of the African Union (AU) suspects non-compliance, the state in question is given thirty days

to clarify its activities. If clarification is not provided within the given timeframe, the state in

question can be referred to the established African Commission on Nuclear Energy, which

determines whether IAEA involvement is necessary.28

Of the NWFZ treaties established in the major world regions, the Treaty of Rarotonga

has an exceptional stance on non-compliance by signatory parties consisting of South Pacific

states. While other regional supplements to the NPT have safeguard systems, compliance

protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga are extremely stringent. Verification of compliance

with terms set by the Treaty does not include its own ‘implementing agency’, but involves

cooperation of the IAEA. Any signatory suspected of breaching the terms of the treaty goes

through a procedural system with an established Consultative Committee created in

association. Any accusations are dealt with by the involved party by providing an

explanation of nuclear activities to the Consultative Committee within a certain timeframe. If

explanations are not sufficient, the Committee, upon its discretion, has the ability to order

on-site inspections in any suspected territory under jurisdiction of the violating state. The

state in question has the right to include inspectors to join the team of inspectors from the

IAEA, but these representatives are not in any way allowed to sway or direct the inspectors.

In addition, signatory states of the Treaty of Rarotonga, are subjected to an on-site

inspection, and are required to give IAEA inspectors “full and free access to all information

and places within its territory.”29

27 “The Opportunities and Limits of European Co-Operation in the Area of Non-Proliferation.”28 Ibid.29 Ibid 71.

14

Current StatusIran remains under close scrutiny by the international non-proliferation regime

following the 2003 agreement to accept an additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty. Although inspections following the signing of this protocol revealed

previously unavailable information to inspectors, there is a lack of transparency in Iranian

compliance and cooperation. The IAEA scheduled inspections reported Iran as non-

compliant by postponing and denying clearance to inspectors at enrichment sites.

Additionally, the IAEA reprimanded Iran for failing to declare technological know-how in

enrichment of nuclear materials, a violation of the additional protocol that Iran had signed.

The Iranian government’s failure to completely cooperate with the IAEA combined with

restrictions placed upon the IAEA inspectors to be able to inspect sites that Iran had

previously agreed to grant access, prevented inspectors from dutifully verifying safeguards.

Following these incidents, the IAEA forced Iran to place a halt on all nuclear

activities in 2004. While Iran agreed, it did so only on the terms that these activities would

be suspended until the IAEA was able to inspect all facilities it suspected of continued

nuclear activity. After inspecting the two nuclear power plants sites that had been suspected

of enriching uranium, the IAEA requested, but did not receive Iranian permission for a

second inspection in March of 2005.30 While the first round of inspections did not yield

evidence of non-compliance and deviation of original Iranian nuclear power plans, the IAEA

was unable to confirm the misuse of these facilities after inspection. In 2006 Iran broke

IAEA seals and resumed enriching uranium at its nuclear plants. An interview with the

Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, revealed that Iran is not transparent in

its nuclear activities. The IAEA set a deadline of March 6, 2006 for clarifying nuclear

activities and any connection to military involvement in these activities. 31 In addition to

pressure from the IAEA to comply, European Nations and the United States for breaking

IAEA security seals on its nuclear facilities have reprimanded Iran. These admonishments

were reaffirmed on February 1, 2006 when Great Britain, France, and Germany introduced a

30 “Iran Profile: Nuclear Overview,” Recent Developments and Current Status. 31 Mohamed ElBaradei. Interview with Christopher Dickey. Newsweek. Vienna. 23 January, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10858243/site/newsweek/, (accessed, 24 January, 2006).

15

draft resolution that called for the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Iran to the

Security Council for non-compliance with the NPT and breaking the accords of the

additional protocol agreed upon in 2004. This action, if passed through the Security Council

imposes international punishment upon Iran by the United Nations. Iranian President,

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, asserted that, “The Iranian people will continue until they master

nuclear energy, which is their right."32 Iranian officials also declared that European

accusations and referral to the United Nations Security Council lacked legal justifications,

and was infringing on its rights to use nuclear technology for energy purposes. Early in

2006, Iran threatened to end diplomacy if it were referred to the UN Security Council.

In the 2003 Annual IAEA Report, the Agency stated that verification methods of the

NPT needed to be strengthened to counter non-compliance from states such as Iran. With

forty-five NNWS that had not enforced individual safeguard agreements by the end of 2003,

the IAEA finds it difficult to carry out to verify compliance with Article III of the NPT. With

out implementation of safeguards by member states, the IAEA inspectorate is ineffective.

With out state cooperation in bringing these agreements into force, the Agency cannot

implement verification methods of compliance with the safeguards, and project a state’s

nuclear transparency. Of these forty-five cases, the IAEA was only granted international

support in the Iraqi instance where a UN Security Council resolution mandated inspections

to verify nuclear activities.33 The latest IAEA annual report, released in July 2004, reported

only forty states that had not yet implemented safeguard agreements. The decrease in states

that have not enforced safeguard agreements displays the necessity for nuclear transparency

through IAEA inspections. By enforcing these agreements, states are able to prove

compliance with the NPT despite intrusive IAEA inspections. Not enforcing individual

safeguards prevents the Agency from drawing conclusions about nuclear intentions, thus

raising concern by the international non-proliferation regime.

32 Elaine Sciolino, “In Another Threat, Iran Warns It May Block Inspections,” The New York Times, 3 February, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/03/international/middleeast/03iran.html?n=Top%2fNews%2fInternational%2fCountries%20and%20Territories%2fIran, (accessed, 2 February, 2003). 33 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Annual Report 2003,” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2003/safeguards.pdf, (accessed 25 February, 2006).

16

The IAEA 2004 Annual Report stressed the significance of additional protocols that

states individually sign with the IAEA. These protocols grant the IAEA inspectorate the

privilege of expanded access. In comparison to other safeguard agreements, these additional

privileges include access to information regarding a state’s nuclear cycle, and locations of

nuclear activity. In 2004 alone, the number of additional protocols rose from twenty-four to

sixty-two. Of these, fifteen included members of the European Union.34 Providing IAEA

access to more secure information and locations is simply not an altruistic move on behalf of

states. By relinquishing sovereignty, states benefit with their relationship with the IAEA

since the Agency disseminates verification with the NPT. Such conclusions are essential for

states to maintain credibility in respective regions as and in the international forum. Even

NWS, including the United States, have signed additional protocols to assure the

international community that it upholds the terms of the NPT.

Key PositionsWestern Hemisphere

The United States promotes the use of the IAEA as an international organization that

prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear technology for non-peaceful

purposes. The United States, one of the largest supporters of the IAEA safeguard systems,

has the support of many European countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada and

Australia. Through individual consensus between NATO nations and allies, the United States

reached many bilateral and multilateral agreements with its western proponents to prevent

the abuse of nuclear materials.35

In addition to the US stance on nuclear non-proliferation, European countries agree

with American sentiments to prevent additional states from obtaining nuclear weapons. From

its inception, Western European states have been adamant about implementation of the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Evidence of their feelings is shown through the

establishment of EURATOM and NWFZs.36 34 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Annual Report 2004,” July 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/safeguards.pdf, (accessed 25 February, 2006).35 “The Opportunities and Limits of European Co-Operation in the Area of Non-Proliferation.” 36 Ibid.

17

Latin America and CaribbeanWhile the European system of enforcing nuclear non-proliferation through regional

agreements was not adopted and ratified by members of the European community, other

regional sections have successfully adopted the notion of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.

OPANAL originally was allowed to perform inspections in the territories of signatory states,

but a 1992 amendment to the Treaty transferred that responsibility to the IAEA. All

signatory states are subjected to special inspections by the IAEA when non-compliance is

suspected with out exception.37 Therefore, this region is in compliance with the IAEA and

supports its scope.

AfricaThe role of the IAEA in this regional system is to conduct on-site inspections as per

the 1996 Penlindaba Treaty with Commission members as part of the inspection team. The

AU has been proactive in its attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation. This is evident by

allowing the IAEA the proper access to facilities to do its job. The findings of the IAEA

inspection team are then taken up to the AU to determine if the state in question will be

referred to the UN Security Council. 38

OceanaWhile other regional supplements to the NPT have safeguard systems, compliance

protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga the most rigorous of all other regional safeguards. Non-

compliance issues are dealt with directly by the regional body. In addition, signatory states

of the Treaty of Rarotonga, are subjected to an on-site inspection, and are required to give

IAEA inspectors “full and free access to all information and places within its territory.”39

The rigorous regional standards and necessary complete cooperation with the IAEA

demonstrates the efficacy of this regions view towards nuclear proliferation.

37 Ibid 71. 38 Ibid., 71-72.39 Ibid.., 71.

18

Middle East The Middle East does not have a proposed or implemented notion of a nuclear

weapon free zone in its region largely due to the lack of a unified regional stance. With a

conglomeration of states with vastly different ideologies ranging from Israel to Iran, the

entire Middle East has not been able to develop a regional system of safeguards. Scholars do

point out that as in any other region, “In the Middle East, IAEA NPT-type safeguards would

hardly be regarded by the states concerned as adequate unless they were supplemented by a

regional system of safeguards and inspections.”40 While this region remains divided on the

issue of nuclear activities and respective state transparency, there have been proposals of a

Middle Eastern nuclear weapon free zone as well as additional regional cooperation in

counter nuclear proliferation. The Director-General of the IAEA, Mohamed Elbaradei,

mentioned in an interview that in order to develop a strengthened regional safeguard regime,

it is essential for states such as Israel to become a part of the nuclear non-proliferation

regime. Without membership, the IAEA can not perform inspections other than those

requested by Israel itself. Mohamed Elbaradei explained that “the nuclear non-proliferation

regime is a voluntary regime. Israel, India and Pakistan have not acceded to the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty. As Director General and as an international civil servant, my

authority with regard to these States is basically moral and political, rather than legal.” 41

Despite hesitation, many Middle Eastern states request the IAEA to develop a means of

bringing the nuclear goals of the region on to the negotiation table to be able to discuss the

possibility of a NWFZ. These discussions facilitated by the Director General of the IAEA

included the participation of Israel despite its ideological differences from its neighbors in

regional agreements. With the additional threat of nuclear weapons and technology being

transferred to terrorist organizations in countries such as Libya and Iraq, the establishment of

a NWFZ hopes to bring peace and stability to the region.

40 David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: the First Forty Years. (Australia: IAEA Publications, 1997), 43541 ElBaradei, Mohamed. Interview with Mustafa Abdalla. Al-Ahram 27 July 2004 <http://www.iaea.org/PrinterFriendly/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2004/alahram27072004.html> (accessed 6 February, 2006).

19

NGO PositionsNon-governmental organizations have played an integral role in nuclear non-

proliferation and verifying the containment of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Age Peace

Foundation, a well known NGO in the nuclear realm, has its goals closely aligned with the

IAEA. The United Nations recognizes it as a peace messenger organization because

advocates strengthening international law and abolishing weapons of mass destruction. The

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation strongly believes in preventing the proliferation of nuclear

weapons endorsing implementation of safeguard systems set by the agency. To facilitate

methods of counter proliferation, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation holds an annual

international law symposium. The theme of the 2006 symposium revolves around

international law and response to failed compliance with the NPT. It hopes to brainstorm

innovative ideas to address non-compliance with the NPT, and develop international

response to situations like that of Iraq post Gulf War, and the current Iranian situation.

Another NGO which advocates strengthening counter-proliferation stances is

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). In a 2002 letter, the

IPPNW urged the United Nations Security Council to allow inspectors to return to Iraq to

complete inspections before militarily enforcing Iraqi disarmament. This organization urges

inspectors to be granted more rights to effectively complete their assigned tasks in disarming

and reporting nuclear activities and materials. The letter also encourages the Security

Council to allow UN inspection teams to have full access to all sites that are suspected of

nuclear activities or stockpiling. These sites do not exclude presidential palaces or any other

undeclared sites of nuclear stockpiling or activity.42 The IPPNW encourages this because it

sees inspections as an alternative to immediate Security Council referral, and international

military or economic action.

The NPPNW also supports the creation of regional nuclear weapons free zones. These

NWFZ have additional regional safeguards that member states sign in addition to agreements

with the IAEA. This double form of inspection and verification strengthens the role of the

42 Robert K. Musil, “PSR (IPPNW-US) Letter to UN Security Council,” 23 October, 2002 < http://www.ippnw.org/IraqPSRUN.html> (accessed, 7 February, 2006).

20

IAEA in enforcing the NPT. Other signatory parties bind states that enter regional

agreements. Defecting on safeguards holds repercussions for the violating state by other

members of the regional NWFZ. Since the IAEA does not have any authority to punish or

correct any violations, these regional agreements fortify international resolve to prevent

nuclear proliferation. The NPPNW encourages such agreements because it provides

reinforcement to the cornerstone agreements of the NPT with valid consequences for non-

compliance. Additionally, member states of regional NWFZ treaties explicitly agree to terms

of inspections by regional inspectorates or IAEA inspection teams. These arrangements can

not in anyway accuse inspection teams of violating state sovereignty because states are fully

aware of the terms of the treaty prior to ratification.

Media PositionsMedia positions vary with the country of origin of media companies. Geographic

location often is a determinant factor in media positions since the press projects images that

reflect the ideologies of the respective public. In the case of the recent Iranian incident, the

media has had two opposing views on the situation. It is clear that Western media, such as

CNN, clearly have western positions on Iranian non-compliance with its agreements to

suspend nuclear activities. Recent CNN reports include western suspicion of what is feared

as a development of an Iranian nuclear weapon program. Other reports have alleged Iranian

anger in response to being reported to the United Nations Security Council. Words such as

‘anger’ and Iranian threats to end diplomatic talks have been viewed by western media as

hostile actions. Other media sources, such as the New York Times, have written similar

articles on the Iranian response to possible referral to the Security Council for non-

compliance to the additional protocols.

Middle Eastern media views this incident differently. An Egyptian weekly newspaper,

the Al-Ahram, views the Iranian situation as the West versus Iran. Iran’s non-compliance of

the NPT is just a way of fighting against years of European pressure to make its nuclear

activity more transparent to assure the international community of the peaceful use of its

power plants. It sees European pressure as a western way of preventing Iran from

21

developing. A more well-known Middle Eastern media source, Al Jazeera, gives an excellent

alternative opinion. Its articles quote Iranian statements as a means of explaining the lack of

cooperation with the IAEA rather than as reasons for suspecting deviation from original

intent.

22

Summary

Signatories of the NPT are under an obligation to verify safeguards assumed under

this treaty. Despite such a utopian concept, signatory states have sovereignty over their

territory. Therefore, the International Atomic Energy Agency cannot use international force

or clout to insure compliance. The IAEA’s responsibility to perform its duty is defined solely

by the amount of sovereignty that each member state relinquishes. With growing fears of

nuclear proliferation, the IAEA hopes to reinforce the goals and statutes it was created to

uphold. Deceptive activity under pretenses of status as an NPT signatory, such as Iraq and

the self-proclaimed special status of North Korea with the IAEA, creates implications for the

lack of assertion in the inspection process and inspector rights to gain clearance to declared

and undeclared sites. Examples of such holes in the nuclear counter proliferation regime will

have profound effects on the international community.

Hans Blix, the former chairman of the United Nations Monitoring and Verification

Inspection Commission, defined the relationship between states and the IAEA in the

following statement: “the inspections are not performing espionage, nor are they an

international arms control police. It must be remembered that the government of the

inspected state retains territorial control and can at any time deny inspectors access and

withhold cooperation- but it can do so only at the price of sending warning signals to the

world.”43 The relationship between states and the IAEA can be seen as a mutual bond in

which there are both positive and negative aspects. While states may be concerned about

relinquishing some sovereignty by allowing inspectors access to sites, they ultimately have

control over the territory they rule. Additionally, states undergoing inspection have the right

to ensure that its own representatives accompany IAEA inspectors at all times. Complying

and granting clearance for inspectors is an excellent tool to provide transparency for nuclear

ambitions and activities.

43 Hans Blix, “The role of Inspection as a part of the effort to prevent the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 28 May, 2001, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/ExecChair/Blix%20in%20Ottawa.htm, (accessed 5 February, 2006).

23

For non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), the concern of inspections infringement on

national security arises with the issue of confidence of the inspectors. Many NNWS states,

such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan originally worried that inspections

would reveal patented and new nuclear technology that would otherwise be advantageous in

peaceful applications, but would place them at a disadvantage if inspections made sensitive

information public. Addressing these concerns, the IAEA maintains secrecy in reporting all

findings of inspections, thus maintaining confidentiality with respect for a states’ public and

private nuclear activities.

Additionally, regional systems of safeguards as well as bilateral agreements between

states with respective agencies in collaboration with the IAEA may serve to promote and

reinforce the authority of the agency. Inspections occurring from additional regional and

bilateral agreements between states reinforce a state’s position and fulfillment to the

obligations it signs under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Such agreements also are

formed to place a binding agreement between states to commit to what they have asserted

under international law. Any state that is suspected of non- compliance is subject to

reprimands, and expected to rectify the transgression to follow with the terms of the treaty.

The issue of inspections infringing upon state sovereignty is of both regional and

international concern. While all signatories of agreements that require inspections as a form

of monitoring and verification enter into agreements know the scope of the terms, states

become most concerned when inspections go beyond the fine line of individual sovereignty

and the extent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With one hundred eighty-eight

member states that have agreed to the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the

responsibility of ensuring compliance with such a large conglomeration of states falls upon

the IAEA, which must maintain a great amount of discretion. This discretion is required in

determining the need for pressing states for more inspectors’ rights while respecting a state’s

sovereign rule over a territory.

24

Discussion Questions If sovereignty includes the right to agree to treaties, should the terms of such

treaties bind states to compliance by force?

What are the implications of a strengthened IAEA? Should states relinquish more sovereignty to ensure peace?

Should the role of the IAEA be strengthened to be able to penalize violators of the NPT?

What aspects of inspections infringe upon the rights of states?

How should inspections be reformed to respect state sovereignty while carrying out its safeguards?

Should countries that have signed and agreed to the terms of the NPT be able to evict inspectors from their respective countries?

Should inspectors be required to have representatives of a state present while they inspect sites?

If countries are suspected of deceiving the IAEA (as in the case of Iraq), should inspectors have the right to override the state’s denial of clearance to sites?

Should states that are known to have undisclosed nuclear activities and facilities be forced to sign additional protocols to the NPT after admitting to it? Should inspectors be granted more rights to access in nuclear-non compliant states?

Why are regional systems of verification necessary if most safeguard systems established are already in cooperation with the IAEA? Why do regional systems have more clout of compliance and have more aggressive inspection rights than the IAEA alone? Should this be remedied?

Have regional positions on IAEA inspections helped or hindered inspectors?

Should the role of the IAEA be reformed to be an international enforcer of the NPT?

If a state refuses IAEA inspection teams, should the UN Security Council or member states be responsible for enforcing compliance with the NPT?

25

Glossary

Additional protocols (APs): These were designed for States having a safeguards agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global nonproliferation objectives. Other States may accept and implement those measures of the Model Additional Protocol that they choose with a view to contributing to non-proliferation aims or to the effectiveness and efficiency objectives of the Protocol.44

Ad-Hoc Inspection- an inspection that is not part of series of regular, routine inspections. Ad-Hoc inspections are also called random inspections. 45

Comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs): All non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT, as well as States party to the regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, are required to conclude CSAs with the Agency. In accordance with the terms of such agreements, a State undertakes to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities, within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere for the purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Under these agreements, the Agency has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied on all such nuclear material.46

Declared Facility- A facility that has been identified by a treaty party as being subject to the terms of a treaty. All non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are required to declare these facilities under IAEA safeguards.47

Declared Site Inspection- an inspection conducted at a relevant site to the NPT. 48

Non-Nuclear States- States that were not originally nuclear state at the signing of the NPT49

Nuclear States- States that were original nuclear states at the signing of the NPT.50

On-site Inspection (OSI)- This is a short visit by an inspection team to verify compliance with the safeguards determined by the state and the IAEA, as well as the NPT.51

44 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Annual Report 2004,” July 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/safeguards.pdf, (accessed 25 February, 2006).45 United Nations, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Coming to Terms with Security: A Handbook on Verification and Compliance. (Geneva, Switzerland: UN Publication, June 2003).46 IAEA Annual Report 200447 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.48 Ibid.49 Ibid.50 Ibid.51 Ibid.

26

Special Inspection- An inspection in which the IAEA or regional safeguards agency conducts an investigation upon credible evidence of non-compliance.52

Transparency- Openness of information regarding a state’s nuclear activities, both peaceful and military. 53

Voluntary offer agreements (VOAs): The five NPT nuclear-weapon States have concluded safeguards agreements covering some or all of their peaceful nuclear activities. Under the VOAs, facilities or nuclear material in facilities notified to the Agency by the State concerned are offered for the application of safeguards. VOAs serve two purposes: to broaden the Agency’s safeguards experience by allowing for inspections at advanced facilities; and to demonstrate that nuclear weapon States are not commercially advantaged by being exempt from safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities.54

52 Ibid.53 Ibid. 54 IAEA Annual Report 2004

27

Works Cited

Blix, Hans. “The role of Inspection as a part of the effort to prevent the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 28 May, 2001, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/ExecChair/Blix%20in%20Ottawa.htm.

Bolton, John R., “The NPT: A Crisis of Non-Compliance,” 27 April 2004 http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/31848.htm.

Cooper, Mary H. "Non-Proliferation Treaty at 25." The CQ Researcher 5, no. 4 (January 27, 1995). http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1995012700 (accessed February 1, 2006).

ElBaradei, Mohamed. Interview with Mustafa Abdalla. Al-Ahram 27 July 2004 http://www.iaea.org/PrinterFriendly/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2004/alahram27072004.html (accessed 6 February, 2006).

Fischer, David and Szasz, Paul. Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal. London: Taylor & Francis, 1985.

Fischer, Wolfgang and Stein, Gotthard, “On-site Inspections: Experiences from Nuclear Safeguarding.” Disarmament Forum- Onsite Inspections: common Problems, Different Solutions, no. 3 (1999): http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art217.pdf 50.

Fisher, David. History of the International Atomic Energy Agency : the First Forty Years. Australia: IAEA Publications, 1997.

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International Atomic Energy Agency, “Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Islamic Republic of Iran,” http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/countryprofiles/Iran/Iran2003.htm.

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International Atomic Energy Agency, “Factsheet & FAQs” 2003-2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html.

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International Atomic Energy Agency, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 22 April 1970, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf.

Mohamed ElBaradei. Interview with Christopher Dickey. Newsweek. Vienna. 23 January, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10858243/site/newsweek/.

Musil, Robert, K. “PSR (IPPNW-US) Letter to UN Security Council,” 23 October, 2002 http://www.ippnw.org/IraqPSRUN.html.

NTI, “Iran Profile: Nuclear Overview,” December 2005 http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html (accessed February 3, 2006).

Rueckert, George L., On-Site Inspection in Theory and Practice Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1998.

Sciolino, Elaine. “In Another Threat, Iran Warns It May Block Inspections,” The New York Times, 3 February, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/03/international/middleeast/03iran.html?n=Top%2fNews%2fInternational%2fCountries%20and%20Territories%2fIran .

Simpson, John and Anthony G McGrew, eds. The International Nuclear Non-Proliferation System: Challenges and Choices. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984.

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Vienna Peace Bureau, “Draft on the Treaty of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Europe,” Who is next? - The Proliferation of NATO Targets, no. 17 (August 1999), http://www.inesap.org/bulletin17/bul17art27.htm.

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Deaver, Michael V. Disarming Iraq. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001.

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0

Appendix A: Strengthened Safeguards System: States with Additional Protocols

The latest status report, as of 17 February 2006, includes: State Board Approval Date signed In Force  State Board Approval Date signed In Force

Afghanistan 1-Mar-05 19-Jul-05 19-Jul-05 Latvia 7-Dec-00 12-Jul-01 12-Jul-01Albania 16-Jun-04 2-Dec-04 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 9-Mar-04 10-Mar-04 */Algeria 14-Sep-04 Liechtenstein 16-Jun-05Andorra 7-Dec-00 9-Jan-01 Lithuania 8-Dec-97 11-Mar-98 5-Jul-00Armenia 23-Sep-97 29-Sep-97 28-Jun-04 Luxembourg 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04Australia 23-Sep-97 23-Sep-97 12-Dec-97 Madagascar 18-Jun-03 18-Sep-03 18-Sep-03Austria 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Malaysia 22-Sep-05 22-Nov-05Azerbaijan 7-Jun-00 5-Jul-00 29-Nov-00 Mali 10-Sep-02 12-Sep-02 12-Sep-02Bangladesh 25-Sep-00 30-Mar-01 30-Mar-01 Malta 28-Nov-02 24-Apr-03 12-Jul-05Belarus 3-Oct-05 15-Nov-05 Marshall Islands 1-Mar-05 3-May-05 3-May-05Belgium 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Mauritania 18-Mar-03 2-Jun-03Benin 17-Sep-04 7-Jun-05 Mauritius 14-Sep-04 9-Dec-04Botswana 20-Sep-05 Mexico 12-Mar-04 29-Mar-04Bulgaria 14-Sep-98 24-Sep-98 10-Oct-00 Monaco 25-Nov-98 30-Sep-99 30-Sep-99Burkina Faso 18-Mar-03 17-Apr-03 17-Apr-03 Mongolia 11-Sep-01 5-Dec-01 12-May-03Cameroon 16-Jun-04 16-Dec-04 Morocco 16-Jun-04 22-Sep-04Canada 11-Jun-98 24-Sep-98 8-Sep-00 Namibia 21-Mar-00 22-Mar-00Cape Verde 16-Jun-05 28-Jun-05 Netherlands 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04Chile 10-Sep-02 19-Sep-02 3-Nov-03 New Zealand 14-Sep-98 24-Sep-98 24-Sep-98China 25-Nov-98 31-Dec-98 28-Mar-02 Nicaragua 12-Jun-02 18-Jul-02 18-Feb-05Comoros 16-Jun-05 13-Dec-05 Niger 9-Mar-04 11-Jun-04Costa Rica 29-Nov-01 12-Dec-01 Nigeria 7-Jun-00 20-Sep-01Colombia 25-Nov-04 11-May-05 Norway 24-Mar-99 29-Sep-99 16-May-00Croatia 14-Sep-98 22-Sep-98 6-Jul-00 Palau 1-Mar-05 13-May-05 13-May-05Cuba 9-Sep-03 18-Sep-03 3-Jun-04 Panama 29-Nov-01 11-Dec-01 11-Dec-01Cyprus 25-Nov-98 29-Jul-99 19-Feb-03 Paraguay 12-Jun-02 24-Mar-03 14-Sep-04Czech Republic 20-Sep-99 28-Sep-99 1-Jul-02 Peru 10-Dec-99 22-Mar-00 23-Jul-01DR Congo 28-Nov-02 9-Apr-03 9-Apr-03 Philippines 23-Sep-97 30-Sep-97Denmark 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Poland 23-Sep-97 30-Sep-97 5-May-00Ecuador 20-Sep-99 1-Oct-99 24-Oct-01 Portugal 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04El Salvador 23-Sep-02 5-Sep-03 24-May-04 Republic of Korea (ROK) 24-Mar-99 21-Jun-99 19-Feb-04Estonia 1-Dec-02 Romania 9-Jun-99 11-Jun-99 7-Jul-00Fiji 16-Jun-05 Russia 21-Mar-00 22-Mar-00Finland 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Senegal 1-Mar-05France 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Serbia and Montenegro 14-Sep-04FYROM 16-Jun-05 12-Jul-05 Seychelles 18-Mar-03 7-Apr-04 13-Oct-04

1Gabon 18-Mar-03 8-Jun-05 Singapore 20-Sep-05 22-Sep-05Georgia 23-Sep-97 29-Sep-97 3-Jun-03 Slovakia 1-Dec-02Germany 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Slovenia 25-Nov-98 26-Nov-98 22-Aug-00Ghana 11-Jun-98 12-Jun-98 11-Jun-04 South Africa 12-Jun-02 13-Sep-02 13-Sep-02Greece 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Spain 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04Guatemala 29-Nov-01 14-Dec-01 Sweden 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04Haiti 20-Mar-02 10-Jul-02 Switzerland 7-Jun-00 16-Jun-00 1-Feb-05Holy See 14-Sep-98 24-Sep-98 24-Sep-98 Tajikistan 12-Jun-02 7-Jul-03 14-Dec-04Honduras 16-Jun-05 7-Jul-05 Tanzania 16-Jun-04 23-Sep-04 7-Feb-05Hungary 25-Nov-98 26-Nov-98 4-Apr-00 Thailand 20-Sep-05 22-Sep-05Iceland 9-Sep-03 12-Sep-03 12-Sep-03 Togo 22-Sep-03 26-Sep-03Indonesia 20-Sep-99 29-Sep-99 29-Sep-99 Tunisia 1-Mar-05 24-May-05Iran 21-Nov-03 18-Dec-03 Turkey 7-Jun-00 6-Jul-00 17-Jul-01Ireland 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Turkmenistan 1-Mar-05 17-May-05 3-Jan-06Italy 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Uganda 25-Nov-04 14-Jun-05 14-Feb-06Jamaica 12-Jun-02 19-Mar-03 19-Mar-03 Ukraine 7-Jun-00 15-Aug-00 24-Jan-06Japan 25-Nov-98 4-Dec-98 16-Dec-99 United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04Jordan 18-Mar-98 28-Jul-98 28-Jul-98 United States of America 11-Jun-98 12-Jun-98Kazakhstan 18-Jun-03 6-Feb-04 Uruguay 23-Sep-97 29-Sep-97 30-Apr-04Kiribati 10-Sep-02 9-Nov-04 Uzbekistan 14-Sep-98 22-Sep-98 21-Dec-98Kuwait 12-Jun-02 19-Jun-02 2-Jun-03 Totals 113 107 74

Strengthened Safeguards System: Other Parties with Additional ProtocolsOther Parties Board Approval Date signed In Force

Euratom 1/ 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04

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*/ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has pledged to apply its Additional Protocols pending entry into force.1/ The Agency also applies safeguards, including the measures foreseen in the Model Additional Protocol, in Taiwan, China. Pursuant to a decision by the Board, the relations between the Agency and the authorities in Taiwan, China are non-governmental.2/ Accession to the additional protocol with EU NNWS reproduced in INFCIRC 193/Add.8 [pdf]

Source: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html

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Appendix B: States that Have Ratified or Acceded to the NPT as of 1 March, 2005Afghanistan Congo Iceland Myanmar SloveniaAlbania Costa Rica Indonesia Namibia Solomon Islands Algeria Côte d'Ivoire Iran (Islamic Republic of) Nauru Somalia Andorra Croatia Iraq Nepal South Africa Angola Cuba Ireland Netherlands Spain Antigua and Barbuda Cyprus Italy New Zealand Sri Lanka Argentina Czech Republic Jamaica Nicaragua Sudan Armenia Democratic People's Republic of Korea* Japan Niger Suriname Australia Democratic Republic of the Congo Jordan Nigeria Swaziland Austria Denmark Kazakhstan Norway Sweden Azerbaijan Djibouti Kenya Oman Switzerland Bahamas Dominica Kiribati Palau Syrian Arab Republic Bahrain Dominican Republic Kuwait Panama Tajikistan Bangladesh Ecuador Kyrgyzstan Papua New Guinea Thailand Barbados Egypt Lao PDR Paraguay FYROMBelarus El Salvador Latvia Peru Timor-LesteBelgium Equatorial Guinea Lebanon Philippines Togo Belize Eritrea Lesotho Poland Tonga Benin Estonia Liberia Portugal Trinidad and Tobago Bhutan Ethiopia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Qatar Tunisia Bolivia Fiji Liechtenstein Republic of Korea Turkey Bosnia and Herzegovina Finland Lithuania Republic of Moldova Turkmenistan Botswana France Luxembourg Romania Tuvalu Brazil Gabon Madagascar Russian Federation Uganda Brunei Darussalam Gambia Malawi Rwanda Ukraine Bulgaria Georgia Malaysia Saint Kitts and Nevis United Arab Emirates Burkina Faso Germany Maldives Saint Lucia United Kingdom of Great Britain andBurundi Ghana Mali Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Northern Ireland Cambodia Greece Malta Samoa United Republic of TanzaniaCameroon Grenada Marshall Islands San Marino United States of America Canada Guatemala Mauritania Sao Tome and Principe Uruguay Cape Verde Guinea Mauritius Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan Central African Republic Guinea-Bissau Mexico Senegal Vanuatu Chad Guyana Micronesia (Federated States of) Serbia and Montenegro Venezuela Chile Haiti Monaco Seychelles Viet Nam China Holy See Mongolia Sierra Leone Yemen Colombia Honduras Morocco Singapore Zambia Comoros Hungary Mozambique Slovakia Zimbabwe * Announced its withdrawal on 10 January 2003. Source: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/presskit.pdf

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Appendix C: IAEA Organizational Chart

Source : http://www.iaea.org/About/org_chart.html