I Say to You · PDF file · 2013-11-22KNA Kenya National Archives ... RHL Rhodes...
Transcript of I Say to You · PDF file · 2013-11-22KNA Kenya National Archives ... RHL Rhodes...
I Say to You
C5516.indb iC5516.indb i 2/23/11 12:27:42 PM2/23/11 12:27:42 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
C5516.indb iiC5516.indb ii 2/23/11 12:27:43 PM2/23/11 12:27:43 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
I Say to You
Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya
G A B R I E L L E LY N C H
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago and London
C5516.indb iiiC5516.indb iii 2/23/11 12:27:43 PM2/23/11 12:27:43 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
Gabrielle Lynch is a senior lecturer in Africa and the politics of development
in the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the University
of Leeds. She was previously a DPhil student at the University of Oxford and
then lecturer in imperial and African history at Keele University.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
© 2011 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 2011.
Printed in the United States of America
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 4 5
ISBN-13: 978-0-226-49804-1 (cloth)
ISBN-13: 978-0-226-49805-8 (paper)
ISBN-10: 0-226-49804-2 (cloth)
ISBN-10: 0-226-49805-0 (paper)
CIP data to come
This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992
(Permanence of Paper).
C5516.indb ivC5516.indb iv 2/23/11 12:27:43 PM2/23/11 12:27:43 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
C O N T E N T S
List of Tables 000
Abbreviations, Swahili Terms, and Note on Ethnic Nomenclature 000
Acknowledgments 000
Map 1: Kenya: Provinces and Area of Focus 000
Map 2: Area of Focus: Kalenjin-Dominated Districts 000
I N T R O D U C T I O N / The Nature and Political Salience of
Ethnic Identity 000
O N E / Creating a Community: From Nandi Speakers
to Kalenjin 000
T WO / Popularizing the Kalenjin: Decolonization and
the First Majimbo Debate 000
T H R E E / Moi: The Making of an African “Big Man” 000
F O U R / Harambee to Nyayo: Control and Patronage in
the President’s Backyard 000
F I V E / Democratization and the “Kalenjin Vote,”
1990–2002 000
S I X / Multiparty Politics and the “Ethnic Factor,”
2002–8 000
C5516.indb vC5516.indb v 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM2/23/11 12:28:00 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
Conclusion: Ethnic Politics in Modern Kenya 000
Appendix: Multiparty Election and Referendum Results in
Kalenjin-Dominated Constituencies 000
Notes 000
Sources 000
Index 000
C5516.indb viC5516.indb vi 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM2/23/11 12:28:00 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
TA B L E S
4.1 Average annual rates of real economic growth, 1965–92
5.1 Presidential and parliamentary election results, December 1992
5.2 Presidential and parliamentary election results, December 1997
5.3 Presidential and parliamentary election results, December 2002
A.1 Presidential election results, December 1992
A.2 Parliamentary election results, December 1992
A.3 Presidential election results, December 1997
A.4 Parliamentary election results, December 1997
A.5 Presidential election results, December 2002
A.6 Parliamentary election results, December 2002
A.7 Referendum results, November 2005
A.8 Presidential election results, December 2007
A.9 Parliamentary election results, December 2007
A.10 Referendum results, August 2010
C5516.indb viiC5516.indb vii 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM2/23/11 12:28:00 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
C5516.indb viiiC5516.indb viii 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM2/23/11 12:28:00 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
A B B R E V I AT I O N S , S WA H I L I T E R M S , A N D
N O T E O N E T H N I C N O M E N C L AT U R E
A B B R E V I AT I O N S
AAD African Affairs Department
ADC African District Council or Agricultural Development Corporation
AEM African elected member
AHS Alliance High School
AIC African Inland Church
AIM African Inland Mission
AR annual report
ASAL Arid and Semi-arid Lands Programme
BDIP Baringo District Independent Party
CAPU Coast African People’s Union
CCM Change the Constitution Movement
CDF Constituency Development Fund
CPK Church of the Province of Kenya (Anglican)
DC district commissioner
DDC District Development Committee
DFRD District Focus for Rural Development
DP Democratic Party
EATEC East African Tanning Extract Company
ECK Electoral Commission of Kenya
EIC Economic Independence Party
EMDIP Elgeyo-Marakwet District Independent Party
C5516.indb ixC5516.indb ix 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM2/23/11 12:28:00 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
x / Abbreviations and Terms
FORD Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
FORD-A FORD-Asili
FORD-K FORD-Kenya
FORD-P FORD-People
GAP Green African Party
GAS Government African School
GEMA Gikuyu, Embu Meru Association
GSU General Service Unit
HR house representative
ICC International Criminal Court
ICDC Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation
IDP internally displaced person
KACGC Kalenjin and Allies Central Governing Council
KADDU Kenya African Democratic Development Union
KADU Kenya African Democratic Union
KAF Kenya Air Force
KAMATUSA Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu
KANU Kenya African National Union
KASA Kenya African Socialist Alliance
KASU Kenya African Study Union
KATMU Kenya African Transport and Mechanics Union
KAU Kenya African Union
KCC Kenya Creameries Corporation
KDIP Kericho District Independent Party
KEDOF Kenya Elections Domestic Observation Forum
KENDA Kenya National Democratic Alliance
KFA Kenya Farmers Association
KHRC Kenya Human Rights Commission
KIC Kenya Intelligence Committee
KIM Kenya Independence Movement
KK Keith Kyle papers
KLC Kenya Land Commission
KLFA Kenya Land Freedom Army
C5516.indb xC5516.indb x 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM2/23/11 12:28:00 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
Abbreviations and Terms / xi
KNA Kenya National Archives
KNC Kenya National Congress
KNCHR Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KNP Kenya National Party
KNU Kipsigis-Nandi Union
KPA Kalenjin Political Alliance
KPP Kenya People’s Party
KPU Kenya People’s Union
KSC Kenya Socialist Congress
KSh Kenyan shilling
KU Kalenjin Union
KVDA Kerio Valley Development Agency
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
LegCo legislative council
LNC local native council
LPK Liberal Party of Kenya
MLC member of the legislative council
MP member of parliament
NAD Native Affairs Department
NaRC National Rainbow Coalition
NCCK National Christian Council of Kenya
NCPB National Cereals and Produce Board
NDIP Nandi District Independent Party
NDP National Development Party
NGO nongovernmental organization
NKP New Kenya Party
NLP National Labour Party
NPP National Progressive Party
ODM Orange Democratic Movement
OP offi ce of the president
PA personal assistant
PC provincial commissioner
PCEA Presbyterian Church of East Africa
C5516.indb xiC5516.indb xi 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM2/23/11 12:28:01 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
xii / Abbreviations and Terms
PICK Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya
PNU Party of National Unity
PRO Public Records Offi ce (London)
PS permanent secretary
RBC Regional Boundaries Commission
RHL Rhodes House Library (Oxford, UK)
RVP Rift Valley Province
SBIR Special Branch Intelligence Report
SDP Social Democratic Party
SDPK Social Democratic Party of Kenya
SPK Shirikisho Party of Kenya
UDM United Democratic Movement
UmmaPPK Umma Patriotic Party of Kenya
UPPK United Peoples Party of Kenya
WKC West Kalenjin Congress
YK’92 Youth for KANU ’92
S WA H I L I T E R M S
baraza meeting
harambee pull together (self-help development or fund-raiser)
magendo black market; corruption; bribery
majimboism regionalism
mzee elder / old person
nyayo footsteps
rungu traditional club or truncheon
uhuru freedom
wananchi the (common) people
N O T E O N E T H N I C N O M E N C L AT U R E
In each case the most commonly used label is listed fi rst. These labels are used in the text except
in the case of direct quotes.
Bok Walagu
Keiyo Elgeyo
Kipsigis Lumbwa
C5516.indb xiiC5516.indb xii 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM2/23/11 12:28:01 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
Abbreviations, Swahili Terms, and Note on Ethnic Nomenclature / xiii
Luhya Abaluhya, Luyia, Kavirondo
Ogiek Ndorobo
Pokot Suk
Sengwer Cherangany, Cherangani
Terik Nyangori
Tugen Kamasia
C5516.indb xiiiC5516.indb xiii 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM2/23/11 12:28:01 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
C5516.indb xivC5516.indb xiv 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM2/23/11 12:28:01 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
A C K N OW L E D G M E N T S
This book is the product of research conducted at the University of Oxford,
Keele University, and the University of Leeds. At Oxford I was fortunate
enough to be supervised by David Anderson, who has provided continu-
ous encouragement, support, academic guidance, and analytic insights.
The vibrant African studies community in Oxford and Leeds provided a
stimulating work environment and helped me develop a more general un-
derstanding of African history and politics. This includes Gavin Williams,
who did much to cultivate my early interest in African politics. The argu-
ments have also benefi ted from my attendance at a number of seminars
and conferences and from feedback received for papers presented therein.
In addition, I benefi ted from excellent feedback, suggestions, and editorial
comments from David Anderson, John Lonsdale, Jocelyn Alexander, Adam
Ashforth, Stephen Orvis, Susanne Mueller, Nicholas Cheeseman, Michael
Molcher, Tania Edwards, Nadine Beckmann, Gerard McCann, Rob Blunt,
and Raphu Mustapha.
I am also grateful for the fi nancial assistance received over the years from
the British Academy, Beit Fund (Oxford), Oxford University Press Surplus
Fund, British Institute in Eastern Africa, Royal Historical Society, Depart-
ment of Politics and International Relations (Oxford), and Balliol College
(Oxford). Balliol College served as a continuous source of support, and the
British Institute in Eastern Africa served as an excellent base in Nairobi.
As a DPhil student I lived a rather nomadic life, and I owe much to the
unstinting hospitality of family and friends. Particular mention must go to
Steph Wynne-Jones, Mike Monaghan, Rob Blunt, Danielle Walters and her
family, Bishop Stephen Kewasis and his family, Claire Medard, and Father
Patrick Baraza for their warm hospitality in Kenya or the United States, and
to my parents, Daniel and Sarah Horsley, David and Lucy Smith, Geoffrey
C5516.indb xvC5516.indb xv 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM2/23/11 12:28:01 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
xvi / Acknowledgments
Smith, Sarah Longair, Daniel Branch, my sister Catherine and her husband
Simon, Ed Hughes, Pete Murphy, and Gregory Yakovlev, who all opened
their homes to me and/or my belongings in the United Kingdom.
In Kenya, Nicholas Cheeseman, Daniel Branch, Gerard McCann, Rob
Blunt, Danielle Walters, Steph Wynne-Jones, Mike Monaghan, Laragh Lar-
son, Dave Eaton, Cecilia Nalelia, Jared Nyamweya, Sarah Muhoya, Claire
Medard, Diane Mwako, Bishop Kewasis and his family, Daniel Kandagor,
Kipkorir Menjo, Paul Kurgat, Ngengi wa Njuguna, and many others, helped
provide a home away from home. Some of my fi eldwork was done with
Claire Medard, whose research experience was of great help (particularly
in the early days), and whose knowledge and understanding of local poli-
tics had a great impact on the development of the ideas and arguments of
this book. The process of conducting interviews was only made possible
by people’s unending willingness to take time out of their day to answer
my many questions. In particular I must thank interviewees who agreed
to meet with me on several occasions and also Daniel Kandagor, Albert
Mshando, Sammy Mbugua, and a litany of others who helped arrange
meetings.
Final thanks must go to my partner, Michael Molcher, my family, and
my friends in Leeds, Oxford, London, Keele, and Kenya, who have provided
endless support and light relief.
C5516.indb xviC5516.indb xvi 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM2/23/11 12:28:01 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
Map 1. Kenya: Provinces and area of focus
Source: Bodleian Library, Oxford
C5516.indb xviiC5516.indb xvii 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM2/23/11 12:28:01 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
Map 2. Area of focus: Kalenjin-dominated districts
Source: Bodleian Library, Oxford
C5516.indb xviiiC5516.indb xviii 2/23/11 12:28:02 PM2/23/11 12:28:02 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
I N T RO D U CT I O N
The Nature and Political Salience of
Ethnic Identity
Ethnic identities are often recent constructs, never fi xed and unchanging.
Nevertheless, they enjoy a seemingly natural or primordial appeal, and
their potential to unite and divide depends upon assumed commonalities
and differences of history and culture. Ethnic identities also enjoy global
recognition through, for example, cultural and peoples’ rights and spe-
cially designed institutional frameworks—from the right to national self-
determination, the rights of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, to
consociationalism and ethnic federalism. At the same time, there is under-
standable concern about the potential for a sense of ethnic difference to
endorse, and even demand, violent atrocities against the “other.”
This begs a host of questions regarding the origins and salience of eth-
nic identities: How are ethnic groups formed? How might a collective com-
partmentalization of “us” and “them” on the basis of an assumed shared
past lead to a situation in which politics is cast as “ethnic”? How and when
does a sense of ethnic distinction lead to a reality of ethnic competition
and violent confl ict? In seeking to address these questions, this study ana-
lyzes the construction, development, political relevance, and appeal of one
ethnic identity over time—the Kalenjin of western Kenya.
This choice of approach stems from the idea that a “specifi cally histori-
cal interpretation” can shed light on the origins and continuing appeal of
ethnic identities, since “the content of the ethnic message itself will con-
tinue to vary from people to people, as the culture brokers craft messages
that will resonate with their own clienteles” (Vail 1989, 7, 17). Some—
but not all—of the fi ndings are case specifi c. However, more generally, this
book proposes that since ethnic groups are socially constructed and rene-
gotiated over time, historical narratives of collective achievement, migra-
tion, injustice, persecution, and associated moral claims are in constant
C5516.indb 1C5516.indb 1 2/23/11 12:28:03 PM2/23/11 12:28:03 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
2 / Introduction
evolution, producing complex and contested groupings that enjoy greater
relevance to local actors. As a consequence, ethnic identities provide poli-
ticians with a means to mobilize support and for ordinary people to lay
claims and assert rights to space, power, and wealth. The problem is that
such “ethnic politics” encourages a sense of difference and competition be-
tween communities, which—in the presence of resentments, elite encour-
agement, and the absence of institutional brakes or barriers—can erupt
into violent confrontation that is legitimized by notions of defense, the
“settling” of old scores, and group rights, with some ethnic narratives being
more emotive and divisive than others.
To simplify further, this book argues that the constructed nature of eth-
nic identities is the source of ethnicity’s attraction and danger, as selective
and interpreted histories are used to unite some and differentiate others in
ways that are meaningful, contested, and unstable.
The Case Study: Kenya and the Kalenjin
Political parties in Kenya tend to be associated with particular ethnic
groups, while competitive elections have displayed strong ethnic voting
patterns. Kenya’s most recent general election was held in December 2007,
when contested results sparked a postelection crisis that left over 1,000 peo-
ple dead and almost 700,000 displaced within two months (Lynch 2009,
604). Of 1,133 recorded casualties, an estimated 405 were shot by the po-
lice, the majority killed by their fellow citizens (Kenya 2008a, 305). In a
number of foreign media reports, “poll violence” was portrayed as a bat-
tle between members of President Kibaki’s Kikuyu community and those
of his opponent Raila Odinga’s Luo community—or Kenya’s “two main
tribes” (Somerville 2009). Yet the epicenter was in Rift Valley Province,
western Kenya, where neither the Kikuyu nor the Luo predominate. It was
here that over half the deaths (KNCHR 2008, 341), the majority of dis-
placement (Lynch 2009), and “iconic moments of the confl ict” occurred
(D. Anderson and E. Lochery 2008, 328), as Kalenjin participated in tar-
geted attacks against Kikuyu and other selected communities, most notably
Kisii and Luhya. Many people were killed in these attacks, and many more
were forced to take shelter with friends and relatives or in camps for the
internally displaced.
The crisis was unexpected. Kenya is widely viewed as a bastion of peace
and stability in a volatile region, and campaigns and voting were relatively
peaceful, with high voter turnout a testament to democratic commitment.
However, while shocking, the high-handed state security response was
C5516.indb 2C5516.indb 2 2/23/11 12:28:03 PM2/23/11 12:28:03 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
The Nature and Political Salience of Ethnic Identity / 3
compatible with the origins and evolution of local policing (Africa Watch
1991; Hills 2007, 2008; Katumanga 2010) and escalation of extrajudicial
killings (KNCHR 2008). In turn, this book will argue that, intercommunal
attacks were consistent with ethnic readings of the past and present, mutu-
ally incompatible interpretations of social justice, an assumed critical junc-
ture that offered opportunities and heightened fears, high levels of popular
political skepticism, institutional decay, a culture of impunity, elite oppor-
tunism, and related strategies of action.
Most important, despite frequent media references to Kenya’s former
existence as a peaceful idyll, this was not the fi rst time that intercommu-
nal confl ict had rocked the country. The most signifi cant precursor was
the “ethnic clashes” of 1991 to 1993, when an estimated fi fteen hundred
people were killed and three hundred thousand were displaced in western
Kenya (Africa Watch 1993, 1). Most of the violence occurred on cosmo-
politan farms in and on the borders of Rift Valley Province, where Kalen-
jin and Kikuyu emerged as principal perpetrators and victims, respectively.
“Ethnic clashes” also erupted in parts of the Rift Valley and at the coast in
1997, while western Kenya has suffered from numerous localized outbursts
of intercommunal tension and confl ict. At independence the colonial gov-
ernment feared a possible war over land and majimboism (or regionalism)
between Kalenjin warriors and former Mau Mau adherents and sympathiz-
ers, and local Kikuyu residents. Two common themes emerge: (1) Sides
were ethnically delineated, with the Kalenjin cast as principal perpetrators
of attacks on Kikuyu neighbors in an ethnically cosmopolitan and agricul-
turally rich area beset by confl icting claims to land and authority. (2) The
eruption of large-scale violence correlated with electoral competition and
has been a strategy used and endorsed by political elites to secure control
of the center, and by ordinary citizens to gain access to land and other re-
sources and/or as a form of preemptive defense.
The label of “Kalenjin” is a recent construct, dating from the mid-
twentieth century, when it came to embrace a number of subgroups ad-
ministered as separate “tribes” by the colonial authorities. Groups spanned
district and provincial boundaries, the racial settlement zones of the White
Highlands, and the Kenya-Uganda border. Concentrated in western Kenya,
the Kalenjin constitute a decided majority in Bomet, Kericho, Baringo, Koi-
batek, Keiyo, Marakwet, and West Pokot Districts in Rift Valley Province
and Mount Elgon District in Western Province (see map 2). They also con-
stitute a majority in the more ethnically mixed Uasin Gishu District and
have a signifi cant presence in Trans Nzoia and Nakuru Districts, Rift Valley
Province.1
C5516.indb 3C5516.indb 3 2/23/11 12:28:03 PM2/23/11 12:28:03 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
4 / Introduction
The term Kalenjin literally means “I say to you”—a direct reference to the
linguistic similarity of its members—although signifi cant differences of dia-
lect lead to talk of Kalenjin language “clusters” (Huntingford 1944, 19–20;
Sutton 1976, 25). The catalog of subgroups is also a matter of debate. Those
commonly listed are the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen, Keiyo, Marakwet, Sabaot,
Pokot (although the latter hold a somewhat peripheral position),2 and Terik
(who are sometimes bracketed together with the Nandi [Fedders and Salva-
dori 1979, 167]). More problematic is the position of Ogiek or Ndorobo—
labels used interchangeably for dispersed groups of forest-dwelling hunter-
gatherer communities. Since, while most Ogiek speak a Kalenjin-related
dialect, some use Maasai-related dialects (Blackburn 1976, 54–56), which,
together with their ethnic history of permanent residence (rather than mi-
gration) and forest livelihoods, renders their position within the larger
Kalenjin debatable and contested (Lynch 2006b).
To confuse the ethnic landscape further, a number of authors suggest
a relationship between the Kalenjin and Tatoga in Tanzania (Ehret 1968,
122–23; Huntingford 1953b, 9; Langley 1979, 3; Sutton 1976, 34). Benja-
min Kipkorir also lists the Bongom (“now largely absorbed by the Luhyia”)
as one of the Kalenjin subgroups (2009, 392) (or alternatively as a sub-
group of the Sabaot [1975, 64]), while leaders from several small com-
munities (such as the Enderois, Sengwer, and Mount Elgon Ogiek)—which
are commonly regarded as subgroups of Kalenjin subgroups—have come
to assert their difference (Lynch 2006b). Some even deny the existence of
a Kalenjin community and talk, for example, of “a motley confederation
of some eleven Nilotic groups with separate languages and cultural prac-
tices” (Ajulu 2002, 266). Well-known Nandi politician Jackson Kibor went
further in his declaration that “the Kalenjin groupings were hatched by
an individual who wanted to use the groups to ascend to power and gain
wealth.”3
The question of “who is Kalenjin” is thus subjective, and differences of
opinion are indicative of the complex, ambiguous, and contested nature
of ethnic identities. However, for most people within and outside Kenya,
the Kalenjin constitute a recognized ethnic group. Moreover, despite their
recent progeny, complex makeup, and internal divisions, the community
has become one of Kenya’s most united in terms of electoral and referen-
dum voting patterns, while members have acted as key participants in oc-
casions of ethnic violence. Their political signifi cance is further enhanced
by the incumbency of Daniel arap Moi (a Tugen from Baringo District) as
vice president of Kenya from 1967 to 1978, and president from 1978 to
2002, and by his unsuccessful call for Kalenjin to reelect President Kibaki
C5516.indb 4C5516.indb 4 2/23/11 12:28:04 PM2/23/11 12:28:04 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
The Nature and Political Salience of Ethnic Identity / 5
in 2007. One point of interest is the way in which Moi’s leadership helped
strengthen Kalenjin unity, at the same time as it fostered internal divisions
and subgroup nationalisms. Finally, Kalenjin often self-identify as one of
Kenya’s smaller “tribes.” Yet, at the time of the 1989 population census,
they accounted for approximately 11 percent of the Kenyan population, as
compared to the Kikuyu at 21 percent, Luhya at 14 percent, Luo at 12 per-
cent, and Kamba at 11 percent (Kenya 1994, 6–2).4 Moreover, while the
1999 census omitted ethnic data (Kenya 2001), census results from 2009
reveal that the Kalenjin now constitute 14 percent of the population, as
compared to the Kikuyu at 17 percent, Luhya at 14 percent, Luo at 10 per-
cent, and Kamba at 10 percent (Kenya 2010). This numerical strength, to-
gether with their concentration in and around the cosmopolitan farming
lands of the former White Highlands (and overrepresentation of these ar-
eas in parliament) means that the community enjoys a strong presence in
the country’s politics and can act as an important swing community.
Notwithstanding their recent provenance, historical prominence, and
political signifi cance, the Kalenjin have attracted little academic attention,
and most of the existing literature consists of ethnographic (for example.
Hollis 1909; Huntingford 1953a, 1953b; Massam 1972; Orchardson 1961;
Peristiany 1939) and historical studies (for example, D. Anderson 1993,
2004; Ellis 1976; Gold 1978; Kipkorir 1972, 1973; Matson 1970, 1980;
Mwanzi 1977) of particular subgroups. In light of this relative silence and
recent political developments, this book analyzes how a sense of “being
Kalenjin” was constructed, self-consciously popularized, and adopted, how
it coexists with internal divisions and debate but has nevertheless been
used as a fulcrum around which to mobilize support, and the implications
of ethnonationalist historical narratives and memories for a popular sense
of intercommunal difference and competition and potential for violent
confl ict.
Since the aim is to look at how presentations of history and intercon-
nected interpretations of identity inform a sense of difference and com-
petition, and associated processes of political mobilization and support,
the history of the Kalenjin is outlined for the ways in which it has shaped
political institutions, cultures, and strategies rather than for its historical
veracity per se. In turn, the rationality of ethnic construction, mobiliza-
tion, and support is investigated without the constraints of a strict rational
choice theory where individuals maximize expected payoffs in a context
where preferences are consistent—in that they can be ranked, and are con-
nected and transitive (D. Green and I. Shapiro 1994). Finally, the book
stems from an assumption that—in any context—people are motivated by
C5516.indb 5C5516.indb 5 2/23/11 12:28:04 PM2/23/11 12:28:04 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
6 / Introduction
rational considerations (for example, of loss and gain) but also by more ir-
rational feelings, such as affection, frustration, anger, and hatred.
Unlike much recent political science literature (for example, Chua 2003;
Kaufman 2001; Mann 2005; Mansfi eld and Snyder 2005; Petersen 2002;
Snyder 2000), this study does not seek to offer a comprehensive analysis of
the relationship between democratization and intercommunal violence or
provide a model of ethnic violence—although it does have important im-
plications for such an endeavor and occasions of intercommunal violence
are discussed and analyzed. Instead, the study focuses on a prior question:
namely, the collective narratives and group perceptions that render a par-
ticular understanding of belonging and citizenship (and thus difference
and competition) meaningful, appealing, and politically signifi cant.
The arguments are based on a triangulation of recorded and nonre-
corded interviews, participant observations of political meetings and ral-
lies, newspaper articles, government and nongovernment reports, and sec-
ondary literature. Over 250 interviews were conducted between September
2004 and August 2009 with a range of actors from current and former cabi-
net ministers, MPs, top-level civil servants, local councillors, civil society
activists, clergy, academics, lawyers, students, businessmen, and farmers in
Nairobi, Rift Valley, and Western Provinces. Interviewees ranged in age from
their early twenties to almost one hundred. However, while interviews pro-
vided critical insight and only a few respondents requested that their com-
ments remain anonymous, direct citation has largely been avoided. This is
due to the sensitive and emotive nature of the interview content and cur-
rent political context, which demands that interview materials be handled
with caution.
Local Conclusions and General Propositions
As noted, this study aims to further our understanding of the processes of
ethnic construction and identifi cation, and of political mobilization and
support across Kenya and beyond through an analysis of the interaction
between presentations of history and interpretations of identity, and lo-
cal perceptions and elite behavior. The central argument is that—while
processes of ethnic construction and negotiation are limited by the need
for ethnicity to be rooted in “primordial” discourses of cultural similarity
and shared pasts (cf. Lentz and Nugent 2000)—the main motivation for
the construction and politicization of a Kalenjin alliance was (and contin-
ues to be) a nexus of fear of loss and potential for gain. More important,
ethnic notions of morality and assistance, and of shared pasts and justice,
C5516.indb 6C5516.indb 6 2/23/11 12:28:04 PM2/23/11 12:28:04 PM
Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only