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I Say to You

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I Say to You

Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya

G A B R I E L L E LY N C H

The University of Chicago Press

Chicago and London

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Gabrielle Lynch is a senior lecturer in Africa and the politics of development

in the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the University

of Leeds. She was previously a DPhil student at the University of Oxford and

then lecturer in imperial and African history at Keele University.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London

© 2011 by The University of Chicago

All rights reserved. Published 2011.

Printed in the United States of America

20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 4 5

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-49804-1 (cloth)

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-49805-8 (paper)

ISBN-10: 0-226-49804-2 (cloth)

ISBN-10: 0-226-49805-0 (paper)

CIP data to come

This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992

(Permanence of Paper).

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C O N T E N T S

List of Tables 000

Abbreviations, Swahili Terms, and Note on Ethnic Nomenclature 000

Acknowledgments 000

Map 1: Kenya: Provinces and Area of Focus 000

Map 2: Area of Focus: Kalenjin-Dominated Districts 000

I N T R O D U C T I O N / The Nature and Political Salience of

Ethnic Identity 000

O N E / Creating a Community: From Nandi Speakers

to Kalenjin 000

T WO / Popularizing the Kalenjin: Decolonization and

the First Majimbo Debate 000

T H R E E / Moi: The Making of an African “Big Man” 000

F O U R / Harambee to Nyayo: Control and Patronage in

the President’s Backyard 000

F I V E / Democratization and the “Kalenjin Vote,”

1990–2002 000

S I X / Multiparty Politics and the “Ethnic Factor,”

2002–8 000

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Conclusion: Ethnic Politics in Modern Kenya 000

Appendix: Multiparty Election and Referendum Results in

Kalenjin-Dominated Constituencies 000

Notes 000

Sources 000

Index 000

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TA B L E S

4.1 Average annual rates of real economic growth, 1965–92

5.1 Presidential and parliamentary election results, December 1992

5.2 Presidential and parliamentary election results, December 1997

5.3 Presidential and parliamentary election results, December 2002

A.1 Presidential election results, December 1992

A.2 Parliamentary election results, December 1992

A.3 Presidential election results, December 1997

A.4 Parliamentary election results, December 1997

A.5 Presidential election results, December 2002

A.6 Parliamentary election results, December 2002

A.7 Referendum results, November 2005

A.8 Presidential election results, December 2007

A.9 Parliamentary election results, December 2007

A.10 Referendum results, August 2010

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A B B R E V I AT I O N S , S WA H I L I T E R M S , A N D

N O T E O N E T H N I C N O M E N C L AT U R E

A B B R E V I AT I O N S

AAD African Affairs Department

ADC African District Council or Agricultural Development Corporation

AEM African elected member

AHS Alliance High School

AIC African Inland Church

AIM African Inland Mission

AR annual report

ASAL Arid and Semi-arid Lands Programme

BDIP Baringo District Independent Party

CAPU Coast African People’s Union

CCM Change the Constitution Movement

CDF Constituency Development Fund

CPK Church of the Province of Kenya (Anglican)

DC district commissioner

DDC District Development Committee

DFRD District Focus for Rural Development

DP Democratic Party

EATEC East African Tanning Extract Company

ECK Electoral Commission of Kenya

EIC Economic Independence Party

EMDIP Elgeyo-Marakwet District Independent Party

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x / Abbreviations and Terms

FORD Forum for the Restoration of Democracy

FORD-A FORD-Asili

FORD-K FORD-Kenya

FORD-P FORD-People

GAP Green African Party

GAS Government African School

GEMA Gikuyu, Embu Meru Association

GSU General Service Unit

HR house representative

ICC International Criminal Court

ICDC Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation

IDP internally displaced person

KACGC Kalenjin and Allies Central Governing Council

KADDU Kenya African Democratic Development Union

KADU Kenya African Democratic Union

KAF Kenya Air Force

KAMATUSA Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu

KANU Kenya African National Union

KASA Kenya African Socialist Alliance

KASU Kenya African Study Union

KATMU Kenya African Transport and Mechanics Union

KAU Kenya African Union

KCC Kenya Creameries Corporation

KDIP Kericho District Independent Party

KEDOF Kenya Elections Domestic Observation Forum

KENDA Kenya National Democratic Alliance

KFA Kenya Farmers Association

KHRC Kenya Human Rights Commission

KIC Kenya Intelligence Committee

KIM Kenya Independence Movement

KK Keith Kyle papers

KLC Kenya Land Commission

KLFA Kenya Land Freedom Army

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Abbreviations and Terms / xi

KNA Kenya National Archives

KNC Kenya National Congress

KNCHR Kenya National Commission on Human Rights

KNP Kenya National Party

KNU Kipsigis-Nandi Union

KPA Kalenjin Political Alliance

KPP Kenya People’s Party

KPU Kenya People’s Union

KSC Kenya Socialist Congress

KSh Kenyan shilling

KU Kalenjin Union

KVDA Kerio Valley Development Agency

LDP Liberal Democratic Party

LegCo legislative council

LNC local native council

LPK Liberal Party of Kenya

MLC member of the legislative council

MP member of parliament

NAD Native Affairs Department

NaRC National Rainbow Coalition

NCCK National Christian Council of Kenya

NCPB National Cereals and Produce Board

NDIP Nandi District Independent Party

NDP National Development Party

NGO nongovernmental organization

NKP New Kenya Party

NLP National Labour Party

NPP National Progressive Party

ODM Orange Democratic Movement

OP offi ce of the president

PA personal assistant

PC provincial commissioner

PCEA Presbyterian Church of East Africa

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xii / Abbreviations and Terms

PICK Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya

PNU Party of National Unity

PRO Public Records Offi ce (London)

PS permanent secretary

RBC Regional Boundaries Commission

RHL Rhodes House Library (Oxford, UK)

RVP Rift Valley Province

SBIR Special Branch Intelligence Report

SDP Social Democratic Party

SDPK Social Democratic Party of Kenya

SPK Shirikisho Party of Kenya

UDM United Democratic Movement

UmmaPPK Umma Patriotic Party of Kenya

UPPK United Peoples Party of Kenya

WKC West Kalenjin Congress

YK’92 Youth for KANU ’92

S WA H I L I T E R M S

baraza meeting

harambee pull together (self-help development or fund-raiser)

magendo black market; corruption; bribery

majimboism regionalism

mzee elder / old person

nyayo footsteps

rungu traditional club or truncheon

uhuru freedom

wananchi the (common) people

N O T E O N E T H N I C N O M E N C L AT U R E

In each case the most commonly used label is listed fi rst. These labels are used in the text except

in the case of direct quotes.

Bok Walagu

Keiyo Elgeyo

Kipsigis Lumbwa

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Abbreviations, Swahili Terms, and Note on Ethnic Nomenclature / xiii

Luhya Abaluhya, Luyia, Kavirondo

Ogiek Ndorobo

Pokot Suk

Sengwer Cherangany, Cherangani

Terik Nyangori

Tugen Kamasia

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A C K N OW L E D G M E N T S

This book is the product of research conducted at the University of Oxford,

Keele University, and the University of Leeds. At Oxford I was fortunate

enough to be supervised by David Anderson, who has provided continu-

ous encouragement, support, academic guidance, and analytic insights.

The vibrant African studies community in Oxford and Leeds provided a

stimulating work environment and helped me develop a more general un-

derstanding of African history and politics. This includes Gavin Williams,

who did much to cultivate my early interest in African politics. The argu-

ments have also benefi ted from my attendance at a number of seminars

and conferences and from feedback received for papers presented therein.

In addition, I benefi ted from excellent feedback, suggestions, and editorial

comments from David Anderson, John Lonsdale, Jocelyn Alexander, Adam

Ashforth, Stephen Orvis, Susanne Mueller, Nicholas Cheeseman, Michael

Molcher, Tania Edwards, Nadine Beckmann, Gerard McCann, Rob Blunt,

and Raphu Mustapha.

I am also grateful for the fi nancial assistance received over the years from

the British Academy, Beit Fund (Oxford), Oxford University Press Surplus

Fund, British Institute in Eastern Africa, Royal Historical Society, Depart-

ment of Politics and International Relations (Oxford), and Balliol College

(Oxford). Balliol College served as a continuous source of support, and the

British Institute in Eastern Africa served as an excellent base in Nairobi.

As a DPhil student I lived a rather nomadic life, and I owe much to the

unstinting hospitality of family and friends. Particular mention must go to

Steph Wynne-Jones, Mike Monaghan, Rob Blunt, Danielle Walters and her

family, Bishop Stephen Kewasis and his family, Claire Medard, and Father

Patrick Baraza for their warm hospitality in Kenya or the United States, and

to my parents, Daniel and Sarah Horsley, David and Lucy Smith, Geoffrey

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xvi / Acknowledgments

Smith, Sarah Longair, Daniel Branch, my sister Catherine and her husband

Simon, Ed Hughes, Pete Murphy, and Gregory Yakovlev, who all opened

their homes to me and/or my belongings in the United Kingdom.

In Kenya, Nicholas Cheeseman, Daniel Branch, Gerard McCann, Rob

Blunt, Danielle Walters, Steph Wynne-Jones, Mike Monaghan, Laragh Lar-

son, Dave Eaton, Cecilia Nalelia, Jared Nyamweya, Sarah Muhoya, Claire

Medard, Diane Mwako, Bishop Kewasis and his family, Daniel Kandagor,

Kipkorir Menjo, Paul Kurgat, Ngengi wa Njuguna, and many others, helped

provide a home away from home. Some of my fi eldwork was done with

Claire Medard, whose research experience was of great help (particularly

in the early days), and whose knowledge and understanding of local poli-

tics had a great impact on the development of the ideas and arguments of

this book. The process of conducting interviews was only made possible

by people’s unending willingness to take time out of their day to answer

my many questions. In particular I must thank interviewees who agreed

to meet with me on several occasions and also Daniel Kandagor, Albert

Mshando, Sammy Mbugua, and a litany of others who helped arrange

meetings.

Final thanks must go to my partner, Michael Molcher, my family, and

my friends in Leeds, Oxford, London, Keele, and Kenya, who have provided

endless support and light relief.

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Map 1. Kenya: Provinces and area of focus

Source: Bodleian Library, Oxford

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Map 2. Area of focus: Kalenjin-dominated districts

Source: Bodleian Library, Oxford

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I N T RO D U CT I O N

The Nature and Political Salience of

Ethnic Identity

Ethnic identities are often recent constructs, never fi xed and unchanging.

Nevertheless, they enjoy a seemingly natural or primordial appeal, and

their potential to unite and divide depends upon assumed commonalities

and differences of history and culture. Ethnic identities also enjoy global

recognition through, for example, cultural and peoples’ rights and spe-

cially designed institutional frameworks—from the right to national self-

determination, the rights of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, to

consociationalism and ethnic federalism. At the same time, there is under-

standable concern about the potential for a sense of ethnic difference to

endorse, and even demand, violent atrocities against the “other.”

This begs a host of questions regarding the origins and salience of eth-

nic identities: How are ethnic groups formed? How might a collective com-

partmentalization of “us” and “them” on the basis of an assumed shared

past lead to a situation in which politics is cast as “ethnic”? How and when

does a sense of ethnic distinction lead to a reality of ethnic competition

and violent confl ict? In seeking to address these questions, this study ana-

lyzes the construction, development, political relevance, and appeal of one

ethnic identity over time—the Kalenjin of western Kenya.

This choice of approach stems from the idea that a “specifi cally histori-

cal interpretation” can shed light on the origins and continuing appeal of

ethnic identities, since “the content of the ethnic message itself will con-

tinue to vary from people to people, as the culture brokers craft messages

that will resonate with their own clienteles” (Vail 1989, 7, 17). Some—

but not all—of the fi ndings are case specifi c. However, more generally, this

book proposes that since ethnic groups are socially constructed and rene-

gotiated over time, historical narratives of collective achievement, migra-

tion, injustice, persecution, and associated moral claims are in constant

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2 / Introduction

evolution, producing complex and contested groupings that enjoy greater

relevance to local actors. As a consequence, ethnic identities provide poli-

ticians with a means to mobilize support and for ordinary people to lay

claims and assert rights to space, power, and wealth. The problem is that

such “ethnic politics” encourages a sense of difference and competition be-

tween communities, which—in the presence of resentments, elite encour-

agement, and the absence of institutional brakes or barriers—can erupt

into violent confrontation that is legitimized by notions of defense, the

“settling” of old scores, and group rights, with some ethnic narratives being

more emotive and divisive than others.

To simplify further, this book argues that the constructed nature of eth-

nic identities is the source of ethnicity’s attraction and danger, as selective

and interpreted histories are used to unite some and differentiate others in

ways that are meaningful, contested, and unstable.

The Case Study: Kenya and the Kalenjin

Political parties in Kenya tend to be associated with particular ethnic

groups, while competitive elections have displayed strong ethnic voting

patterns. Kenya’s most recent general election was held in December 2007,

when contested results sparked a postelection crisis that left over 1,000 peo-

ple dead and almost 700,000 displaced within two months (Lynch 2009,

604). Of 1,133 recorded casualties, an estimated 405 were shot by the po-

lice, the majority killed by their fellow citizens (Kenya 2008a, 305). In a

number of foreign media reports, “poll violence” was portrayed as a bat-

tle between members of President Kibaki’s Kikuyu community and those

of his opponent Raila Odinga’s Luo community—or Kenya’s “two main

tribes” (Somerville 2009). Yet the epicenter was in Rift Valley Province,

western Kenya, where neither the Kikuyu nor the Luo predominate. It was

here that over half the deaths (KNCHR 2008, 341), the majority of dis-

placement (Lynch 2009), and “iconic moments of the confl ict” occurred

(D. Anderson and E. Lochery 2008, 328), as Kalenjin participated in tar-

geted attacks against Kikuyu and other selected communities, most notably

Kisii and Luhya. Many people were killed in these attacks, and many more

were forced to take shelter with friends and relatives or in camps for the

internally displaced.

The crisis was unexpected. Kenya is widely viewed as a bastion of peace

and stability in a volatile region, and campaigns and voting were relatively

peaceful, with high voter turnout a testament to democratic commitment.

However, while shocking, the high-handed state security response was

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The Nature and Political Salience of Ethnic Identity / 3

compatible with the origins and evolution of local policing (Africa Watch

1991; Hills 2007, 2008; Katumanga 2010) and escalation of extrajudicial

killings (KNCHR 2008). In turn, this book will argue that, intercommunal

attacks were consistent with ethnic readings of the past and present, mutu-

ally incompatible interpretations of social justice, an assumed critical junc-

ture that offered opportunities and heightened fears, high levels of popular

political skepticism, institutional decay, a culture of impunity, elite oppor-

tunism, and related strategies of action.

Most important, despite frequent media references to Kenya’s former

existence as a peaceful idyll, this was not the fi rst time that intercommu-

nal confl ict had rocked the country. The most signifi cant precursor was

the “ethnic clashes” of 1991 to 1993, when an estimated fi fteen hundred

people were killed and three hundred thousand were displaced in western

Kenya (Africa Watch 1993, 1). Most of the violence occurred on cosmo-

politan farms in and on the borders of Rift Valley Province, where Kalen-

jin and Kikuyu emerged as principal perpetrators and victims, respectively.

“Ethnic clashes” also erupted in parts of the Rift Valley and at the coast in

1997, while western Kenya has suffered from numerous localized outbursts

of intercommunal tension and confl ict. At independence the colonial gov-

ernment feared a possible war over land and majimboism (or regionalism)

between Kalenjin warriors and former Mau Mau adherents and sympathiz-

ers, and local Kikuyu residents. Two common themes emerge: (1) Sides

were ethnically delineated, with the Kalenjin cast as principal perpetrators

of attacks on Kikuyu neighbors in an ethnically cosmopolitan and agricul-

turally rich area beset by confl icting claims to land and authority. (2) The

eruption of large-scale violence correlated with electoral competition and

has been a strategy used and endorsed by political elites to secure control

of the center, and by ordinary citizens to gain access to land and other re-

sources and/or as a form of preemptive defense.

The label of “Kalenjin” is a recent construct, dating from the mid-

twentieth century, when it came to embrace a number of subgroups ad-

ministered as separate “tribes” by the colonial authorities. Groups spanned

district and provincial boundaries, the racial settlement zones of the White

Highlands, and the Kenya-Uganda border. Concentrated in western Kenya,

the Kalenjin constitute a decided majority in Bomet, Kericho, Baringo, Koi-

batek, Keiyo, Marakwet, and West Pokot Districts in Rift Valley Province

and Mount Elgon District in Western Province (see map 2). They also con-

stitute a majority in the more ethnically mixed Uasin Gishu District and

have a signifi cant presence in Trans Nzoia and Nakuru Districts, Rift Valley

Province.1

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4 / Introduction

The term Kalenjin literally means “I say to you”—a direct reference to the

linguistic similarity of its members—although signifi cant differences of dia-

lect lead to talk of Kalenjin language “clusters” (Huntingford 1944, 19–20;

Sutton 1976, 25). The catalog of subgroups is also a matter of debate. Those

commonly listed are the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen, Keiyo, Marakwet, Sabaot,

Pokot (although the latter hold a somewhat peripheral position),2 and Terik

(who are sometimes bracketed together with the Nandi [Fedders and Salva-

dori 1979, 167]). More problematic is the position of Ogiek or Ndorobo—

labels used interchangeably for dispersed groups of forest-dwelling hunter-

gatherer communities. Since, while most Ogiek speak a Kalenjin-related

dialect, some use Maasai-related dialects (Blackburn 1976, 54–56), which,

together with their ethnic history of permanent residence (rather than mi-

gration) and forest livelihoods, renders their position within the larger

Kalenjin debatable and contested (Lynch 2006b).

To confuse the ethnic landscape further, a number of authors suggest

a relationship between the Kalenjin and Tatoga in Tanzania (Ehret 1968,

122–23; Huntingford 1953b, 9; Langley 1979, 3; Sutton 1976, 34). Benja-

min Kipkorir also lists the Bongom (“now largely absorbed by the Luhyia”)

as one of the Kalenjin subgroups (2009, 392) (or alternatively as a sub-

group of the Sabaot [1975, 64]), while leaders from several small com-

munities (such as the Enderois, Sengwer, and Mount Elgon Ogiek)—which

are commonly regarded as subgroups of Kalenjin subgroups—have come

to assert their difference (Lynch 2006b). Some even deny the existence of

a Kalenjin community and talk, for example, of “a motley confederation

of some eleven Nilotic groups with separate languages and cultural prac-

tices” (Ajulu 2002, 266). Well-known Nandi politician Jackson Kibor went

further in his declaration that “the Kalenjin groupings were hatched by

an individual who wanted to use the groups to ascend to power and gain

wealth.”3

The question of “who is Kalenjin” is thus subjective, and differences of

opinion are indicative of the complex, ambiguous, and contested nature

of ethnic identities. However, for most people within and outside Kenya,

the Kalenjin constitute a recognized ethnic group. Moreover, despite their

recent progeny, complex makeup, and internal divisions, the community

has become one of Kenya’s most united in terms of electoral and referen-

dum voting patterns, while members have acted as key participants in oc-

casions of ethnic violence. Their political signifi cance is further enhanced

by the incumbency of Daniel arap Moi (a Tugen from Baringo District) as

vice president of Kenya from 1967 to 1978, and president from 1978 to

2002, and by his unsuccessful call for Kalenjin to reelect President Kibaki

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The Nature and Political Salience of Ethnic Identity / 5

in 2007. One point of interest is the way in which Moi’s leadership helped

strengthen Kalenjin unity, at the same time as it fostered internal divisions

and subgroup nationalisms. Finally, Kalenjin often self-identify as one of

Kenya’s smaller “tribes.” Yet, at the time of the 1989 population census,

they accounted for approximately 11 percent of the Kenyan population, as

compared to the Kikuyu at 21 percent, Luhya at 14 percent, Luo at 12 per-

cent, and Kamba at 11 percent (Kenya 1994, 6–2).4 Moreover, while the

1999 census omitted ethnic data (Kenya 2001), census results from 2009

reveal that the Kalenjin now constitute 14 percent of the population, as

compared to the Kikuyu at 17 percent, Luhya at 14 percent, Luo at 10 per-

cent, and Kamba at 10 percent (Kenya 2010). This numerical strength, to-

gether with their concentration in and around the cosmopolitan farming

lands of the former White Highlands (and overrepresentation of these ar-

eas in parliament) means that the community enjoys a strong presence in

the country’s politics and can act as an important swing community.

Notwithstanding their recent provenance, historical prominence, and

political signifi cance, the Kalenjin have attracted little academic attention,

and most of the existing literature consists of ethnographic (for example.

Hollis 1909; Huntingford 1953a, 1953b; Massam 1972; Orchardson 1961;

Peristiany 1939) and historical studies (for example, D. Anderson 1993,

2004; Ellis 1976; Gold 1978; Kipkorir 1972, 1973; Matson 1970, 1980;

Mwanzi 1977) of particular subgroups. In light of this relative silence and

recent political developments, this book analyzes how a sense of “being

Kalenjin” was constructed, self-consciously popularized, and adopted, how

it coexists with internal divisions and debate but has nevertheless been

used as a fulcrum around which to mobilize support, and the implications

of ethnonationalist historical narratives and memories for a popular sense

of intercommunal difference and competition and potential for violent

confl ict.

Since the aim is to look at how presentations of history and intercon-

nected interpretations of identity inform a sense of difference and com-

petition, and associated processes of political mobilization and support,

the history of the Kalenjin is outlined for the ways in which it has shaped

political institutions, cultures, and strategies rather than for its historical

veracity per se. In turn, the rationality of ethnic construction, mobiliza-

tion, and support is investigated without the constraints of a strict rational

choice theory where individuals maximize expected payoffs in a context

where preferences are consistent—in that they can be ranked, and are con-

nected and transitive (D. Green and I. Shapiro 1994). Finally, the book

stems from an assumption that—in any context—people are motivated by

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6 / Introduction

rational considerations (for example, of loss and gain) but also by more ir-

rational feelings, such as affection, frustration, anger, and hatred.

Unlike much recent political science literature (for example, Chua 2003;

Kaufman 2001; Mann 2005; Mansfi eld and Snyder 2005; Petersen 2002;

Snyder 2000), this study does not seek to offer a comprehensive analysis of

the relationship between democratization and intercommunal violence or

provide a model of ethnic violence—although it does have important im-

plications for such an endeavor and occasions of intercommunal violence

are discussed and analyzed. Instead, the study focuses on a prior question:

namely, the collective narratives and group perceptions that render a par-

ticular understanding of belonging and citizenship (and thus difference

and competition) meaningful, appealing, and politically signifi cant.

The arguments are based on a triangulation of recorded and nonre-

corded interviews, participant observations of political meetings and ral-

lies, newspaper articles, government and nongovernment reports, and sec-

ondary literature. Over 250 interviews were conducted between September

2004 and August 2009 with a range of actors from current and former cabi-

net ministers, MPs, top-level civil servants, local councillors, civil society

activists, clergy, academics, lawyers, students, businessmen, and farmers in

Nairobi, Rift Valley, and Western Provinces. Interviewees ranged in age from

their early twenties to almost one hundred. However, while interviews pro-

vided critical insight and only a few respondents requested that their com-

ments remain anonymous, direct citation has largely been avoided. This is

due to the sensitive and emotive nature of the interview content and cur-

rent political context, which demands that interview materials be handled

with caution.

Local Conclusions and General Propositions

As noted, this study aims to further our understanding of the processes of

ethnic construction and identifi cation, and of political mobilization and

support across Kenya and beyond through an analysis of the interaction

between presentations of history and interpretations of identity, and lo-

cal perceptions and elite behavior. The central argument is that—while

processes of ethnic construction and negotiation are limited by the need

for ethnicity to be rooted in “primordial” discourses of cultural similarity

and shared pasts (cf. Lentz and Nugent 2000)—the main motivation for

the construction and politicization of a Kalenjin alliance was (and contin-

ues to be) a nexus of fear of loss and potential for gain. More important,

ethnic notions of morality and assistance, and of shared pasts and justice,

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We hope you have enjoyed this short preview. I say to you: Ethnic politics and the Kalenjinin Kenya by Gabrielle Lynch can be purchased from Amazon here:

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Say-You-Ethnic-Politics-Kalenjin/dp/0226498050

Other reputable book sellers are also available.