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Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI)—The Hypothetical Facility 1 The Twenty-Seventh International Training Course Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI) Hypothetical Facility Exercise Data Handbook Table of Contents¶ Section Title Page Section 1. Country of Lagassi Description and Map .............................................................. 3 Section 2. City of Hashbakar Description and Map ............................................................... 4 Section 3. HARI Introduction with Environmental and Physical Conditions............................ 5 Section 4. Target Identification ..............................................................................................7 Table 1. Nuclear Materials and Their Form at HARI .................................................... 7 Table 2. Radiological Sabotage Targets ..................................................................... 8 Section 5. HARI Site Layout and Response Force Locations ................................................ 9 Section 6. Threat Assessment ............................................................................................ 10 Section 7. Alternative Threat Statement .............................................................................. 11 Section 8. Response Forces ............................................................................................... 13 Table 3. Response Force Deployment Data.............................................................. 16 Table 4. Average Response Times ........................................................................... 17 Section 9. Operations at Gates and Portals at HARI ........................................................... 18 Section 10. HARI Facility Characterization and Physical Security Areas ............................. 20 Section 11. MTR Building Floor Plan................................................................................... 21 Section 12. MTR Wall Thicknesses and Distances ............................................................. 22 Section 13. MTR Access Control Plan ................................................................................ 22 Section 14. MTR Research Reactor .................................................................................... 24 Section 15. Reactor Pools ................................................................................................... 25 Section 16. Reactor Block ................................................................................................... 28 Section 17. Reactor Core .................................................................................................... 29 Section 18. Core Instrumentation ........................................................................................ 31 Section 19. Control Rooms ................................................................................................. 32 Section 20. Reactor Control ................................................................................................ 33 Section 21. Radiation Monitoring System ............................................................................ 34 Section 22. Reactor Core Cooling ....................................................................................... 35 Section 23. Buildings and Structures................................................................................... 38 Section 24. Reactor Operation Cycles ................................................................................ 41 Table 5. General Reactor Data ................................................................................. 41 TO DO: Color scheme on drawings should be site = green, Cat III = yellow, Cat II = orange, Cat I = red(per feedback comment on Module 2) The information in this book is hypothetical and is not based on any performance tests that have been conducted by the United States Government, Department of Energy.

Transcript of Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI) Hypothetical … · 2019-11-08 · Hypothetical...

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HARI Exercise Data Handbook

Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI)—The Hypothetical Facility 1 The Twenty-Seventh International Training Course

Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI)

Hypothetical Facility Exercise Data Handbook

Table of Contents¶

Section

Title

Page

Section 1. Country of Lagassi Description and Map .............................................................. 3

Section 2. City of Hashbakar Description and Map ............................................................... 4

Section 3. HARI Introduction with Environmental and Physical Conditions ............................ 5

Section 4. Target Identification .............................................................................................. 7

Table 1. Nuclear Materials and Their Form at HARI .................................................... 7

Table 2. Radiological Sabotage Targets ..................................................................... 8

Section 5. HARI Site Layout and Response Force Locations ................................................ 9

Section 6. Threat Assessment ............................................................................................ 10

Section 7. Alternative Threat Statement .............................................................................. 11

Section 8. Response Forces ............................................................................................... 13

Table 3. Response Force Deployment Data.............................................................. 16

Table 4. Average Response Times ........................................................................... 17

Section 9. Operations at Gates and Portals at HARI ........................................................... 18

Section 10. HARI Facility Characterization and Physical Security Areas ............................. 20

Section 11. MTR Building Floor Plan ................................................................................... 21

Section 12. MTR Wall Thicknesses and Distances ............................................................. 22

Section 13. MTR Access Control Plan ................................................................................ 22

Section 14. MTR Research Reactor .................................................................................... 24

Section 15. Reactor Pools ................................................................................................... 25

Section 16. Reactor Block ................................................................................................... 28

Section 17. Reactor Core .................................................................................................... 29

Section 18. Core Instrumentation ........................................................................................ 31

Section 19. Control Rooms ................................................................................................. 32

Section 20. Reactor Control ................................................................................................ 33

Section 21. Radiation Monitoring System ............................................................................ 34

Section 22. Reactor Core Cooling ....................................................................................... 35

Section 23. Buildings and Structures ................................................................................... 38

Section 24. Reactor Operation Cycles ................................................................................ 41

Table 5. General Reactor Data ................................................................................. 41

TO DO: Color scheme on drawings should be site = green, Cat III = yellow, Cat II = orange, Cat I = red(per feedback comment on Module 2)

The information in this book is hypothetical and is not based on any performance tests that have been conducted by the United States Government, Department of Energy.

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Table 6. Standard Fuel Assembly Main Data ............................................................ 42

Table 7. Control Fuel Assembly Main Data ............................................................... 43

Section 25. Detection Component Data .............................................................................. 44

Table 8. Intrusion Detection Component Class ......................................................... 44

Table 9. Access Control Detection Component Class ............................................... 44

Table 10. Human Surveillance Detection Component Class ..................................... 46

Table 11. Contraband and CATEGORY 1 Detection Component Class .................... 47

Section 26. Delay Component Data .................................................................................... 49

Table 12. Barrier Delay Component Class ................................................................ 49

Table 13. Security Officers Delay Component Class ................................................. 50

Table 14. Penetration Times—Fences ...................................................................... 51

Table 15. Penetration Times—Gates ........................................................................ 52

Table 16. Penetration Times—Walls ......................................................................... 53

Table 17. Penetration Times—Doors ........................................................................ 56

Table 18. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using 1-Meter Bolt Cutters .............. 59

Table 19. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using Portable Oxygen/ Acetylene Cutting Torch .............................................................................................. 60

Table 20. Cutting Rates for Mild Steel Sheet & Plate Using Oxygen Acetylene Cutting Torch or Iron Oxygen Burn Bar ................................................................... 61

Table 21. Time Required to Set an Explosives Package as a Function of Package Weight ........................................................................................................ 61

Table 22. Running Rates .......................................................................................... 63

Table 23. Vehicle Rates for Experienced Drivers ...................................................... 64

Section 27. Table of Trials and Failures Giving PD for Designated Confidence Level ........... 65

Table 24. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials ............................................ 65

Table 25. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures ....................................... 68

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Section 1. Country of Lagassi Description and Map The Republic of Lagassi, the smallest of the regional republics (Figure 1), possesses large fossil fuel reserves and plentiful supplies of other minerals and metals. It also has a large agricultural sector featuring livestock and grain. Lagassi’s industrial sector rests on extracting and processing these natural resources and also on a growing machine-building sector that specializes in construction equipment, tractors, agricultural machinery, and some defense items. The country’s solid 3.5% economic growth is largely due to its booming energy sector but also to economic reform, good harvests, and foreign investment. To prevent overdependence on the oil sector, the country has embarked on an industrial policy designed to diversify the economy by developing light industry and a nuclear energy infrastructure.

Current industrial policy issues include expanding the development of the country’s emerging nuclear energy resources, achieving an export capacity of electrical energy to border countries, and strengthening relations with neighboring states and other foreign powers.

Figure 1. Country Map of Lagassi

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Section 2. City of Hashbakar Description and Map The capital of Lagassi, Hashbakar, is an ancient city that arose from the crossroads of early trading lanes (Figure 2). Today, the city is a modern metropolis of two million inhabitants. It contains a major roadway, a rail system, a private and military airport, and a limited waterway.

Figure 2. Hashbakar City Map

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Section 3. HARI Introduction with Environmental and Physical Conditions The Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI) was established to serve as the Republic of Lagassi’s premier nuclear energy research facility. HARI is operated by the Lagassi National Academy of Science and is engaged in many research activities for the Hashbakar Technical University. The purpose of HARI is to build scientific expertise and capacity for the country. The open campus Institute houses a research reactor facility (Material Test Reactor [MTR]), as well as administrative and plant support facilities for the university. The HARI site complex was originally located in a remote area on the outskirts of the capital, but over time residential areas, businesses, and university buildings were constructed around the Institute (Figure 3). Today, HARI is at the center of a thriving research park and business community in an upscale residential suburb (Figure 4).

Figure 3. Location of HARI in Residential Suburb

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Figure 4. Location of HARI Buildings

Topography HARI is located in the semi-arid steppes of Central Asia.

Vegetation Small shrubs, grass, very little vegetation.

Wildlife Very little wildlife based on urban environment.

Background Noise Regional earthquakes cause seismic disturbances occasionally. Much noise occurs because of city environment. Heavy vehicle traffic throughout the daytime.

Climate/Weather The climate is a typical high-desert environment with approximately 300 clear days of bright sunshine per year. On cloudy days, there are areas with a high light-to-dark ratio because of moving cloud shadows. Rainfall is about 15 cm per year, with the majority occurring during thunderstorms in the late July-August rainy season. The spring is very windy for 2 to 3 months, with continuous winds of 2 to 5 km/hr and gusts up to 50 km/hr. Dry debris, dust, and dead vegetation are blown about during the windy season.

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Section 4. Target Identification Theft Targets The theft target analysis, conducted in accordance with the recommendations of NSS-13, Nuclear Security Recommendations On Physical Protection of Nuclear Material And Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), identified the following target sets (Table 1).

Table 1. Nuclear Materials and Their Form at HARI

Facility Location Form of Material

Amount of Material on Site (wt% enrichment)

Total Isotope Amounts

Level of Radiation

Reactor Building

Material Test

Reactor (MTR)

U3Si2 – Al Fuel Plates in 22 Standard Fuel

Assemblies and 10 Control Fuel Assemblies

35.7 kg U (19.75% 235U) 7.05 kg 235U High >1 Gy/hr at 1m

R090 Fresh Fuel Vault

U3Si2 – Al Fuel Plates in 44 Standard Fuel

Assemblies and 20 Control Fuel Assemblies

71.4 kg U (19.75% 235U) 14.1 kg 235U Low

Irradiated Fuel Pool

Irradiated U3Si2 – Al Fuel Plates in 44 Standard Fuel Assemblies and 20 Control

Fuel Assemblies

62.3 kg U (9.1% 235U) 5.68 kg 235U High >1 Gy/hr at 1m

0.74 Kg Pu

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Radiological Sabotage Targets The sabotage target analysis, conducted in accordance with the recommendations of NSS-13, Nuclear Security Recommendations On Physical Protection of Nuclear Material And Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), identified the following sabotage target sets where an adversary with capabilities consistent with the threat assessment could cause unacceptable radiological consequences, as established by the Lagassi Competent Authority. There were no targets identified where an adversary could cause high radiological consequence, as established by the Lagassi Competent Authority.

Table 2. Radiological Sabotage Targets

Target Area 1 Target Area 1 Task Time

Target Area 2 Target Area 2 Task Time

Target Area 3

Target Area 3 Task Time

1.0 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Bridge (during CRD maintenance)

10 min None N/A None N/A

2.0 Reactor Block / Pool Tank Wall (time includes penetration of both barriers)

15 min ECCS Water Tank

5 min None N/A

3.0 Reactor Building (Near Reactor Block)

3 min Both Heat Exchanger Rooms

5 min (in each room)

ECCS Water Tank

5 min

* Note: The targets can be attacked in any order in all target sets except sets 4 and 5 where target 1 must be disabled first. The task times given do not include the time required for the adversary to penetrate any barriers surrounding the target.

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Section 5. HARI Site Layout and Response Force Locations

Figure 5. Site Layout for Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI)

Posts named here are P2, P3a, P3b (patrols), and P5 … on page 16, posts are P1 (CAS), P2 (MTR), P3 (patrols) What is LAA? What is PA? Where is Access Control Building?

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Section 6. Threat Assessment

Intelligence Sources from the National Government • Items were recently confiscated from a political terrorist group’s hiding place, which was

located less than 200 km from HARI. The items included internal engineering drawings of HARI with circles drawn around the nuclear power plant and the waste storage; various weapons, including automatic weapons; and evidence of correspondence and communication with a foreign terrorist group. Interviews with property owners and residents indicated the group consisted of three to five men.

• Surveillance of several members of the terrorist group shows extensive travel in and out of the country.

• The economic and civil strife in a neighboring country has caused many refugees, some of which are suspected terrorists, to enter Lagassi illegally.

• Plans by a political terrorist group to attack shipments of nuclear material in a neighboring country were discovered.

• The local police intelligence reports several Special Forces members had been offered large cash payments to provide special training to unidentified individuals.

• The national intelligence organization reports terrorist groups are operating in cells of four to six individuals and compartmentalizing information.

• A group of international terrorists made threats that they have the ability (skilled members and weapons) to take over or create a radiological release of a foreign nuclear facility. They demanded the release of several political prisoners. Investigation proved that they do have the weapons and equipment they claimed they have.

Crime Study An analysis of crime incidents leads to the following conclusions:

• A major bank robbery was committed in the capital two months ago. Four robbers escaped with a large amount of money. Investigation shows the bank vault was breached by the sophisticated use of high explosives stolen from the local army base.

• Nationally, many thefts of highly valuable items have occurred. The crimes do not appear to be related to each other. It is speculated that several groups committed the crimes. Organized crime may be involved.

Professional Organizations • A recent meeting of the Lagassi Atomic Energy Ministry included a special session on

analysis of threat to nuclear facilities and material. No substantiated data on threats were available. However, the general feeling among members was that a threat to nuclear facilities does exist.

• During a meeting of the Industrialists Society, some corporate managers expressed concern that some of their employees had been approached by unnamed groups to help them carry out theft of valuable equipment and materials from the corporations. The employees had been offered large amounts of money.

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Section 7. Alternative Threat Statement An alternative threat-based approach was considered for the HARI facility rather than a Design Basis Threat, because HARI uses, stores, and protects only Category II nuclear materials. Although the alternative threat statement is less rigorous, involving fewer organizations than a DBT, a formal process for developing the alternative threat-based protection was undertaken. If it becomes clear that reasonable assurance cannot be achieved through this approach, the DBT approach should then be considered. Definition of the Adversary

The adversary’s motivation is anti-nuclear terrorism. The adversary’s intention is sabotage.

Definition of Capabilities

Group Size

• Tactical team with 2 members Weapons

• Individual weapons o Submachine gun. 9mm cal. open sights. Total of 4

magazines with 30 rounds each by member of tactical team.

o Sub automatic pistol. 9mm cal. Total of 1 magazine with 15 rounds each by member of tactical team.

Explosives

• Each team member of tactical team is equipped with 4 kg of plastic explosive and a satchel charge of explosives

Communications Systems

• The team uses cellular phones and a two way radio system for communications.

Tools

• Portable manual tools available in the market. Modes of Transportation

• The team is transported by land using one vehicle. Technical Skills

• The team has enough technical skills to use their equipment, including weapons, explosives, communications, and vehicles. They are familiar and well trained in the tactics supported by such equipment.

Cyber Skills

• The adversary has no cyber skills. .

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Knowledge

• The team leader has information about target locations into the Material Test Reactor (MTR).

• The team has basic information about technical aspects of MTR, including general layout, security, nuclear safety, and radiation protection.

Funding

• Not described Insider Threat

• The tactical team would act in collusion with 1 passive or nonviolent insider.

• The insider has advanced technical knowledge about research reactors and has access authorization for protected areas.

Supported Structure

• Not supported in the nearest surroundings of the nuclear site. Tactics

• Stealth and force

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Section 8. Response Forces Types of Response Force Personnel

The response force consists of two types of security personnel:

• Unarmed guards • Armed off-site national police

Responsibilities of Guard Force

The unarmed guards are responsible for:

• Assessment of alarms • Administrative duties such as access control and key service • Routine patrol and staffing of fixed posts • Unarmed response to all intrusion alarms

All posts and patrols have defined policies and procedures with which the unarmed guards must comply.

Guard Supervisor

For each shift, one supervisor is present: • Supervises the guards that conduct administrative duties and access

control

Equipment: Guards

All guards are equipped with: • Straight baton • One set of handcuffs • Small flashlight • Handheld radio

Training: Guards All unarmed guards are provided classroom training in the following areas:

• Access control procedures • Use of force continuum • Target locations • Response procedures • Chain of command • Other administrative responsibilities

All personnel receive routine physical fitness training when in the training mode.

Responsibilities of Off-Site National Police

The National Police are responsible for providing campus security and for providing a tactical response for a security incident at the site. Two dedicated police officers are in individual patrol vehicles that provide random patrol around the entire campus. During security incidents at the site, the two dedicated police officers are the first level response. The National Police will also send additional armed patrols to the campus to assemble into a six-person tactical response team, if necessary. Note: The National Police are not allowed to enter the MTR without escort by Operations personnel. In order for the National Police to enter the Reactor Hall, they meet operating personnel at the entry control point of the

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Tactical Commander

Protected Area. The tactical response team does not have any portable radiation detection systems. The National Police tactical response team commander is responsible for the oversight and supervision of all tactical responses at the site for all security incidents.

Equipment: Off-Site National Police

The National Police members are equipped with:

• Markov pistol with a fully loaded magazine but without a round in the chamber

• Kalishnikov assault rifle with a fully loaded magazine but without a round in the chamber

• Two spare magazines of ammunition for each weapon. Both weapons are carried with a fully loaded magazine but without a round in the chamber.

• Straight baton • Handcuffs • Flashlight • Handheld radio • Body armor

Training: Off-Site National Police

All National Police are provided classroom training in the following areas: • Access control procedures • Use of force continuum • Target locations • Response procedures • Chain of command • Other administrative responsibilities

The tactical response team personnel receive additional training on:

• Close quarters combat • Recapture and recovery of nuclear material/facilities • Advanced firearms training for both the pistol and the assault rifle

o Qualify with their firearms four times a year o Firearms training each month to ensure proficiency

All personnel receive routine physical fitness training when in the training mode.

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Alarm Station and Communication

Central Alarm Station (CAS) The CAS is located within the Limited Access Area (LAA) Access Control Building. The walls are constructed of solid reinforced masonry, and there are no windows in the CAS. The door to the CAS is a metal security door, secured by both a magnetic lock and an electro-mechanical bolt. The door can be opened only by an authorized user (using a badge) along with permission of the CAS operator, who must depress a button to permit release of the electro-mechanical bolt. The operator confirms the authority of the person requesting entry through a video intercom.

The CAS is equipped with an automated digital alarm and video annunciation and assessment system. All alarms, door access notifications, and video cameras are routed to the CAS on supervised signal wires within metal conduit. The alarms annunciate on a PC-based graphical interface on which alarms display in a detailed schematic of the facility with a text description of the alarm. The alarm is supported by the automatic display of the corresponding video camera image so that the operator can quickly assess the cause of the alarm. The security software requests that the operator acknowledge incoming alarms and describe the alarm. It further provides a checklist of actions to be performed. Operators can manually select and observe any desired cameras to provide surveillance of activities.

The CAS also includes redundant communication systems to communicate with on-site guards, and off-site emergency security and safety responders. Communications include a dispatch telephone station and base radio station. Portable radio sets are provided to security posts and to security guards on post and patrol.

When an alarm is received with unconfirmed cause, the operator communicates alarm to on-site guard force by radio. Guards then are dispatched to visually investigate the received alarm. Upon assessed alarm (or the absence of communication from dispatched guards), the operator communicates alarm to security patrol, who initiate procedures to protect staff and public, and communicate alarm to local law enforcement.

In the case of duress, a silent duress button can be depressed by the operator to alert guards in the guard room and the local police station of the emergency.

Extensive testing of the communications system has shown that radio communications are good throughout the lower level of the reactor hall. It has been determined that guards inside the reactor hall are able to monitor transmissions from the CAS but are unable to transmit with their handheld radios.

During the day shift, the guard force commander is located in the Central Alarm Station.

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Table 3. Response Force Deployment Data Post

Number Description Security

Personnel Number of Personnel Workdays Non-

workdays S1 Guard Superviser Lieutenant 1 1 P1 Central Alarm Station Guard 2 1 P2 MTR Personnel Portal Guard 1 1 P3 Random Patrols Guard 2 2

NP1 National Police Campus Patrol Response Force 1 1 NP2 National Police Response Commander Response Force 1 1 NP Tactical Response Members Response Force 4 4

Totals 12 11

Response Procedure for Response Force

All alarms are received at the CAS. The CAS operator immediately notifies the guard patrol (P3) to assess the cause of the alarm. If assessed as an intrusion, the CAS immediately notifies the Police Dispatcher, who then notifies the Campus Police Officers to begin preparations for deployment. The CAS then notifies the guards to initiate actions designed to protect employees by warning them, evacuating them when appropriate, and other actions that might obstruct the adversary (locking doors, disabling power, etc.). Under no circumstances are the guards to approach or engage the adversaries.

When the first police patrol arrives, the police officers receive a quick briefing from the guard supervisor, and then begin to tactically assess the situation. Upon arrival of the second and third police patrols, they assemble as one tactical team at the MTR research reactor, then deploy as a team and proceed with operations to enter the MTR and ensure the protection of material and assets.

Response Force Performance Data

The Institute has conducted some performance testing of the guards and National Police response teams in the areas of alarm assessment, alarm communication, preparation, travel, and deployment times to alarms at the HARI MTR. The average times are listed in Table 4. All tactical responders are fully equipped with their duty gear and weapon systems.

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Table 4. Average Response Times

Description Research Reactor Time (seconds)

Alarm communication time 1 Alarm assessment time 45 Communication time to guards, police, and military

25

Guard preparation time 30 Guard travel and deployment time 45 National Police preparation time 90 National Police Campus Security travel time

300

National Police tactical team travel time 600 On-site deployment time (after arrival) 90

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Section 9. Operations at Gates and Portals at HARI

Institute Vehicle Gate The gate is unlocked and open during normal working hours and locked during off-shifts. The Institute Vehicle Gate is the only entry and exit for the Institute. Continuous vehicle traffic occurs by current students, residents, employees. A Visitor Center/Badge Office is located next to the Institute Vehicle Gate that is used for campus information and issuing authorized badges. There is no security presence at the Institute Vehicle Gate during either operational or non-operational hours.

Limited Access Area (LAA) Pedestrian Gate (P5) The LAA Pedestrian Gate uses four turnstiles for egress. A badge swipe and PIN are used to ensure proper authorization. P1 Gate is operational at all times. If an individual does not have a badge, a sign on the gate provides instruction directing him or her to the badging station in the Visitor Center at the Institute Vehicle Gate.

LAA Delivery Vehicle Gate This gate is normally closed. There are no locks at the gate. There is delivery 24 hours per day during operational and non-operational hours. Guard Force Staffing: 1 guard (P3) is present during the workday to provide key service, none is present during off-shift.

1. On entry, when a delivery truck arrives, the CAS will notice it and notify P3. 2. The guard inspects the vehicle and the authorization papers. 3. The guard inspects the badges of the driver and passengers in the vehicle. If an

individual does not have a badge, the guard directs him or her to the badging station in Administration Building.

4. If all is acceptable, the guard unlocks and opens the gate. 1. On exit, the CAS notices the vehicle approaching and notifies P3. 2. The guard unlocks the gate, inspects the vehicle, and then opens the gate and

allows the vehicle to proceed.

Protected Area (PA) MTR Reactor Hall Vehicle Portal Guard Force Staffing: Manned only in times of delivery.

1. For entry, a guard (P3) must be present to unlock and open the Roll-Up Door manually.

2. The guard manually checks the vehicle and the driver. 3. The guard unlocks and opens the roll-up door. 4. Reactor employees will use a forklift to load or unload the vehicle. 5. When delivery is finished, the guard shuts and locks the roll-up door.

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Protected Area (PA) MTR Building Personnel Portal (P2) Guard Force Staffing: 1 guard is present at all times whenever there is any person inside the MTR. At other times, the doors are locked and the guards are not present.

1. On entry, the employees, one at a time, enter through the unlocked outer door. 2. Each person presents his picture badge to the guard for badge exchange. 3. If the picture on both badges and the person’s face match, the person can

continue. 4. Under the observation of the guard, the person walks through the metal detector. 5. If there is an alarm or if a package is suspicious, the guard manually inspects the

package. 6. Once past the metal detector, the employee scans the exchanged badge and

enters his personal identification number (PIN.) 7. The turnstile will turn and allow entry into the building. 8. The guard will allow the next employee to enter the portal and repeat the process.

On exit, the process is reversed. The employees exit through the door next to the turnstile.

1. If the portal is empty, the first person scans the exchanged badge and enters a PIN.

2. If the PIN is correct, the door will open to let them enter the portal. 3. The person walks through the metal detector under the observation of the guard. 4. If there is an alarm or if a package is suspicious, the guard manually inspects the

package. Note: The person re-exchanges his badge with the guard and exits the portal. Please refer to Section 13, MTR Access Control Plan for further detail on entry and exit though P2.

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Section 10. HARI Facility Characterization and Physical Security Areas The HARI Campus is contained within three areas: Security Controlled Area, Limited Access Area, and the Protected Area. Each is described below. Security Controlled Area The Security Controlled Area is enclosed by a standard 1.5 meter 4-mm x 50-mm mesh galvanized chain-link fence that surrounds the entire campus. The fence is mainly used as a demarcation to define the boundaries of the campus. Appropriate signage is installed within certain distances of the fence line. The fence also prevents animals from entering onto campus grounds. There is only one entry point into the campus with no controls. The gates are open at all times.

Limited Access Area (LAA) The LAA is surrounded by a single standard 2.5 meter 4-mm x 50-mm mesh galvanized chain-link fence with outriggers that surrounds the MTR and a few administrative buildings. The LAA boundary prevents unauthorized personnel from gaining immediate access up to the HARI MTR. One entry control point (P2), which allows pedestrians access only into the LAA, is controlled by a turnstile with badge swipe and PIN. Only one gate allows vehicle entry into the LAA. The vehicle gate is only accessed by guard services to unlock the gate for authorized vehicles to enter the LAA.

Protected Area (PA) The PA begins at the boundary of the MTR building. The MTR building is separated into two areas (Administrative Hall and Reactor Hall).

• The Administrative Hall consists of a variety of administrative offices, classrooms, and conference rooms. The Administrative Hall has 20-cm reinforced concrete walls and ceilings with multiple windows. A large window separates the large classroom located in the administrative area and the control room for the reactor located inside the Reactor Hall.

• The Reactor Hall consists of the reactor, reactor control room, and the fresh fuel vault. The Reactor Hall has 30-cm reinforced concrete walls and ceiling.

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Section 11. MTR Building Floor Plan

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Section 12. MTR Wall Thicknesses and Distances

Section 13. MTR Access Control Plan

Map should say MTR not PTR (same as page 22) – also other inconsistencies with text

Map should say MTR not PTR (same on page 23) – also other inconsistencies with text

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Section 14. MTR Research Reactor Note: The description of this reactor is purely hypothetical.

General Description The Material Research Reactor (MTR) is a 10-MW multi-purpose, open-pool type reactor, using MTR 19.75% enriched fuel. In open pool type light water moderated reactors, the compact core is accessible from the top of the pool. It has been designed for:

• Neutron transmutation doping of silicon.

• Technetium-99m (Tc-99m) generators through the processing of Mo-99 from fission and other radioisotopes. Target materials are irradiated while sealed in capsules, loaded in simple assemblies, and lowered into predetermined core locations for irradiation.

• Neutron Beams Experiments: An advanced Cold Neutron Source (CNS) can be optionally installed to boost the range of experimental uses of the facility:

o Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA).

o In-pile fuel test loop. The test loop is designed to be loaded with fuel pellets of enriched UO2 as well as MOX (UO2 + PuO2).

Reactor Features

1. The reactor is a 10-MWth multi-purpose open-pool type reactor.

2. The reactor core consists of MTR-type Fuel Assemblies (FA) with flat plates.

3. The reactor core is located at the bottom of the stainless steel Reactor Pool, surrounded by graphite blocks as neutron reflector. The Reactor Pool is filled with de-mineralized light water acting as coolant and moderator. The biological shielding is achieved by the light water in the pool and a heavy concrete wall.

4. The Reactor Shutdown System consists of five Control Plates. The Control Plates are inserted in the Control Fuel Assembly. The Reactor Shutdown System can be triggered by both automatic and manual actions.

5. The reactor core reactivity feedback coefficients by power, temperature and void are negative.

6. The core grid has irradiation positions for bulk radioisotope production (I131, Mo99, Ir192 and I125 as requested) and also it is possible to produce among others Co60, Lu177, Sm153, Ho166, etc. Usually only Mo99, Cs137 and Ir192 are produced; the other radioisotopes are produced on demand.

7. The core design allows the production of the Mo99 radioisotope for medical imaging and diagnosis obtained from fission of U235.

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Section 15. Reactor Pools Main Reactor Pool The Main Reactor Pool is an open, cylindrical, vertical stainless steel tank (Figure 6 and Figure 7). The pool is encompassed by reinforced heavy concrete walls, which act as biological shielding (Reactor Block). The following are located inside the tank:

• Core supporting structure • Reactor core • Core grid • Associated coolant pipes • Emergency core cooling system • Nuclear instrumentation • Transport devices for irradiated samples (mechanical and pneumatic) • Temporary storage of spent fuel elements • Temporary storage of irradiation boxes • Temporary storage of silicon-block containers • Beryllium blocks for irradiation facilities (internal thermal column) • Devices for silicon-block (NTD-Si) irradiation facilities • Channels for neutron-beam extraction

Service Pool Adjacent to the reactor pool, and connected to it through a water channel (Transfer Channel) is the service pool. A watertight sluice gate isolates the pools from each other. It is primarily for temporary use to:

• Store spent fuel elements, and • Store and manipulate irradiated materials.

Materials of Pool Structures Most of the in-pool structures in the Main Reactor and Service Pools are stainless steel:

• Main and service reactor pool tanks • Cooling water inlet pipe and its related components (toroidal distributor) • Cooling water outlet pipe and its related components (e.g., flap valves) • Temporary spent fuel storage grid • Temporary irradiation box storage grid • Reactor core-supporting structure • External part of all beam tubes, etc.

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Figure 6. Main Reactor Pool

Figure 7. Core View from Pool Surface

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The following pool components are aluminum:

• Core grid • Fuel elements structural materials • Beam tubes front ends • Reflectors nozzle and handle

At the upper part of the pool, there are openings for:

• Overflow channel, and • Air injection nozzles/instrumentation channels.

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Section 16. Reactor Block The reactor block is a heavy concrete structure that surrounds the tank and is part of the biological shielding of the reactor core, as is the water in the tank. The beam tubes penetrate the block, but two features keep intact the biological shielding in the areas of the open ends of the beam tubes:

• The block is provided with movable shielding (shielded doors) • Water floods the beam tubes when not in operation

This water and the thickness of the movable shielding provide equivalent shielding to that of the heavy concrete of the rest of the reactor block.

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Section 17. Reactor Core The reactor core has different components:

• Standard Fuel Assemblies • Control Fuel Assemblies • Irradiation Positions • In-core neutron detectors • Reflector Assemblies • Shielding Block

A metallic boundary called a “chimney” surrounds the core. This chimney allows a proper flow distribution for all core components. General Reactor Core Design Criteria

1. The Reactor Shutdown System is an automatic fast-acting system capable of shutting down the reactor for all relevant design-basis fault sequences.

2. Should the reactivity of the regulating system prove insufficient, assistance will be required from the control system to compensate for changes in the core reactivity along the whole operation cycle.

3. The safety function of the Reactor Shutdown System has priority over the control function. This priority is obtained by de-energizing the electromagnet, which couples the absorber and the drive motor.

Figure 8 shows a cross-section of the core and the components outside the chimney. Standard Fuel Assembly Description Fresh Fuel Elements Storage. Fresh fuel elements are stored in dry condition in a special storage room on the reactor hall, where sub-criticality is ensured all times under any circumstance. A metal access door is normally locked. The opening key is kept according to a specified procedure outlined in the Access Control Annex. The storage racks allow storage of 75 fresh fuel elements Spent Fuel Elements Storage. The fuel racks in the service pool accommodate 30 fuel elements. In addition to this storage area, a Spent Fuel Element Storage Pool is provided at the underground level of the reactor building. The Spent Fuel Element Storage Pool is used to store decayed spent fuel elements or for storing radioisotopes or other materials that requires activity to decay.

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Figure 8. Control Rod Drive Bridge

Spent Fuel Elements Transportation Control Rod Drive Mechanism. The control rod drive mechanism consists of an electromechanical system coupled to an electromagnet with no intermediate components or parts in the coupling. The rod, once released by the electromagnet, falls by gravity. It works by means of a servomotor with gearbox, which rotates around a screw that moves a nut in a vertical position. The nut drives the electromagnet of the coupling between the mechanism and the control rod. The control rod plate contacts the electromagnet.

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Section 18. Core Instrumentation Detectors that supply information on core activity and allow the regulation and control of reactor operation are a part of the reactor internals. The detectors are:

• Three in-core fission counters, • Four out-of-core compensated ionization chambers, • Temperature detectors for pool water, and • Differential pressure detectors for core coolant.

Fission Counter (Start-up Channel). The fission counters yield information on neutron flux level at reactor start-up. Each fission counter has a hoist device, located on the mechanism bridge. As the neutron flux increases, the fission counter signal becomes saturated. The operator then lifts them away from the core. (The gear mechanisms and motors—one per fission counter—are located in the “mechanism bridge” together with the control rod drive mechanisms.) When the power range monitor is used to control the reactor, the operator lifts the fission counters away from the core to prevent them from radiation damage. Temperature Detectors. The temperature detector supplies information about the temperature of the coolants, which must be kept within the parameters of normal operation. Temperatures are measured at the plenum and reactor inlet. Pressure Drop Detectors. The pressure detector gives information on the difference in pressure between entry and exit flows of core coolant.

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Section 19. Control Rooms Main Control Room

1. The Main Control Room enables the reactor operating staff to operate the plant safely and efficiently in all its operational states. From there, measures can be taken to maintain the plant in a safe state or to bring it back into such a state after the onset of either accident conditions or design basis events.

2. The Main Control Room provides consoles, desks, racks/panels and communication interfaces with the Reactor Control and Monitoring System, Reactor Protection System, and Post Accident Monitoring System.

3. Appropriate measures are taken to protect the occupants of the Main Control Room against potential hazards such as unauthorized access, undue radiation resulting from an accident condition, toxic gases, and all consequences of fire, which could jeopardize operators or necessary operator actions.

4. The human/machine interface has a design that helps to minimize the chance of operator errors providing accurate and clear information on the plant states.

Secondary Control Room 1. The Secondary Control Room (SCR) is to be used only when the access to the Main

Control Room becomes inoperable or the operating personnel are forced to evacuate the Main Control Room due to emergency conditions. Means are available for communicating with the Main Control Room, other important points in the plant, and the emergency support teams on-site and off-site.

2. The Secondary Control Room has replications of Reactor Control and Monitoring System, Reactor Protection System, and Post Accident Monitoring System information to permit adequate supervision of the reactor.

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Section 20. Reactor Control Reactor control is accomplished with six neutron absorbers positioned by means of especially designed elements and governed by the reactor instrumentation and control system. Three of the absorbers are safety absorbers, two are control absorbers and the sixth is a shim absorber. In order to operate the reactor, the three safety absorbers are completely withdrawn from the core, so the two control absorbers and the shim absorbers are used. Should an abnormal situation arise, all the rods fall automatically by gravity, thus extinguishing the nuclear reaction. The absorbing material of the absorber plates is a Ag-In-Cd alloy One important feature for the reactor control is the fact that the temperature and void feedback coefficients are inherently negative. The safety margins for shutdown, the total value of the control and safety system, and the reactivity rate of increase are at the levels recommended by IAEA (Safety Series Nº 35). To compensate for the burning and to keep the minimum reactivity necessary for the safe operation of the reactor, each fuel elements is individually installed, moved into different positions, and withdrawn from the core - according to a fuel management strategy which foresees an average burning rate of at least 50%.

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Section 21. Radiation Monitoring System The Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) monitors radiation throughout the plant, including areas, processes involving liquid and gases, and personnel. The RMS has multiple inputs from its monitors. Real time values and automatic alarming of abnormal releases or contamination events are displayed at visual display. All monitors have appropriate audible and visual alarms that alert operating personnel to any variations from the normal operating conditions both locally and in the MCR. These alarms provide early indication of any change that could lead to a relevant radiological risk while the reactor is operating or shut down.

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Section 22. Reactor Core Cooling The pool contains of deionized water at a temperature lower than 40°C. Heat extraction is achieved by means of a cooling circuit (core cooling system), which comprises two circulation pumps (50% capacity each) and two heat exchangers (50% capacity each). Makeup water is provided to the core cooling system from the site non-potable water system. Final heat dissipation to the atmosphere is performed through another cooling circuit (secondary cooling system), which includes two circulation pumps (50% capacity each) and four cooling towers (33% capacity each).Makeup water is provided to the secondary cooling system from the site non-potable water system. To establish natural circulation cooling, two flappers (100% capacity each), are used at the water outlet pipe. To exclude the possibility of loss of coolant due to an out-of-tank pipe rupture, anti-siphon devices are used at inlet and outlet coolant pipes. In case of loss of electricity supply both primary cooling pumps have flywheels for maintain some cooling flow until the diesel generators in the Emergency Diesel Generator Building reach full power. Note: In case of loss of electricity the reactor is shutdown automatically. The Main Control Room, Secondary Control Room, Reactor Control and Monitoring System, Reactor Protection System, and Post Accident Monitoring System are equipped with small Uninterruptible Power Supply (reactor UPS System) to provide continuity of electric power during the short period of time between loss of normal power and diesel generator start. Should the diesel generators fail to start, the UPS provides sufficient power to permit an orderly shutdown of the reactor, minimizing the effect of the shutdown on ongoing experiments. Cooling Water Inlet Pipe Water coolant enters the reactor tank through a stainless steel inlet pipe. In the case of accidental rupture of this pipe, passive anti-siphon devices prevent pool drainage and core exposure. Should the pool water level descend beyond the level of this, air will start entering the broken pipe, thus interrupting the continuity of the water flow. A cap is placed over the pipe’s anti-siphon device to prevent its clogging with any object which may fall into it. Flap Valves When reactor pumps coast down, the reactor is cooled by the pool water to circulate naturally (upward cooling flow). To allow this, there are two redundant flap valves (each at 100% flow capacity) at the outlet pipe (Figure 9). The valves open by gravity when the primary flow drops below a threshold value causing the pool water to circulate through the core, moving in an upwards direction through the core and returning to the pool. The two flap valves are closed during normal operation due to the water pressure in the primary cooling system.

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Figure 9. Reactor Pool Internals Siphon Effect Breakers Pipelines of the Primary Cooling System penetrating the reactor pool are provided with siphon effect breakers (Figure 9), which prevent the accidental loss of pool water as a consequence of siphon effect in case of rupture of piping located outside the pool. The reactor pool water level is thus prevented from decreasing below this penetration level ensuring that the core remains under water. Flywheel of the Primary Cooling System Pumps The flywheel of the Primary Cooling System Pumps has the function of ensuring a pump coast-down compatible with the required reactor core cooling (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Typical Main Coolant Pumps with Flywheel

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Cooling Towers The Cooling Towers are located outside the reactor building, and then the heat is discharged to the atmosphere. Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) This system ensures core cooling in case of a LOCA that could lead to loss of water from the reactor pool. Two redundant systems comprise the emergency core cooling system:

1. The first operates by means of two sprinklers which spray water to the core from above.

2. The second consists of a pipe connected to the suction plenum which injects water beneath the core - so generating an upward flow through the fuel elements.

Both systems are passive, operating by means of mechanical devices (floats); that activate inlet valves for water supply connected to the redundant water tanks of the system. Both systems take suction from the elevated ECCS Water Tank in the Reactor Building. The ECCS Water Tank (Figure 11) is filled from the site non-potable system and equipped with a backflow preventer to prevent the Tank from draining back into the non-potable water system, in the event of a water line break.

Figure 11. Typical Storage Tank Like that used for ECCS Water

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Section 23. Buildings and Structures The research reactor facility comprises to structurally separated; but connected, buildings:

1. Reactor Building 2. Auxiliary Building.

General Specification

1. All the nuclear systems are contained in the Reactor Building built in reinforced concrete. Where applicable, systems and components are enclosed in thick concrete structures designed to provide protection to the facility personnel from radiation fields. The massive reactor block, built in high-density concrete, houses the reactor pool with the reactor core, service pool and decay tank.

2. The Auxiliary Building contains offices, non-radioactive laboratories, workshops, meeting rooms, kitchens and bathrooms. At the underground level this building houses the reactor UPS system and electrical switchboard.

3. The Reactor Building also provides the shell of the Confinement System. The air within the confinement areas is kept at a pressure below atmospheric pressure, ensuring that any potential contamination release can be adequately managed and there is no uncontrolled release of radioactive products to the environment.

4. Personnel and equipment access to the Confinement will be via airlocks equipped with doors that are interlocked to ensure that at least one door is closed whenever Confinement integrity is required.

5. The HVAC System provides Ventilation and Confinement Isolation. This system is connected to the vent stack that transfers clean reactor air to the atmosphere.

6. The reactor block contains the reactor pool and the service pool.

7. Safety Access System (SAS) doors provide access to the reactor hall.

8. The primary cooling system pump and heat exchanger located in the Reactor Building.

9. A fire detection system is installed in both buildings (reactor and auxiliary). Automatic fire extinguishing system are only installed in some rooms of the Auxiliary Building (none at the Reactor Building).

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Reactor Building The Reactor Building is shown in Figure 12.

Figure 12. Reactor Building

1. The Reactor Beam Hall room surrounds the reactor block. The hall dimensions are

approximately 22 m x 10 m. The minimum distance between the reactor block and the hall walls is 7 m.

2. The researchers normally access the reactor beam hall through the SAS portal doors.

3. Research equipment is located next to the neutron beam ports. The Reactor Hall Crane, described below, permits manipulation of research equipment weighing up to 10 tons.

4. The Reactor Hall has a vehicle portal for truck access. The Reactor Building also includes:

1. The main control room 2. Fresh fuel storage 3. Transfer Hot-Cell, to transfer irradiated material from the service pool to the

Reception Hot-Cell 4. Three Post Irradiation Examination (PIE) Hot-Cells, for post irradiation

examination of prototype fuel rods irradiated in the Test Loop 5. The reactor hall includes access ducts for the pipes, cables and ventilation ducts

that connect to the reactor and service pools, including: pneumatic transport system tubes, nucleonic instrumentation cables, reactor control and instrumentation signal cables.

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Vehicle Access Vehicle access is provided to the reactor building to transport:

• Irradiated targets in shielded containers • New fuel shipments • Spent fuel shipments using a flask on a low loader.

Reactor Hall Crane

1. The Reactor Hall Building contains an overhead traveling crane. The bridge spans over the whole Reactor Hall. This crane features one crab carrying both the main and auxiliary hoist units. The main hook hoist has 10 tons capacity.

2. The Crane is suitable for movement of: a. Irradiated targets in shielded containers b. New and spent fuel shipments c. All heavy plant and equipment which may need to be removed for repair or

replacement d. All other operational needs of the reactor facility.

An electronic lock prevents the crane from accessing the reactor pool area when the reactor is in operation.

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Section 24. Reactor Operation Cycles

For Mo99 radioisotope production, the reactor operates in a cycle of 5 days at full-power, plus 2 non-operation days for maintenance, 11 months per year. Usually, during August, the reactor is shut down for maintenance, upgrading, etc. When operation in this cycle, the fuel elements consumption is 1 fresh fuel (which replaces a spent fuel element) after 5 cycles.

When the fuel element test loop is used, the reactor operates in other cycle type; e.g., 30 days at full power; as requested by the person in charge of the irradiation.

Table 5. General Reactor Data

Parameter Reference value/material Reactor Type Open Pool Reactor Pool diameter 3000 mm Quantity of Core Grid positions 54 Maximal Total Core Fission Power 10 MWth Fuel compound dispersed U3Si2 235U Fuel enrichment 19.75% Fuel matrix Aluminium Uranium density in fuel meat 4.8 gU/cm3 No. of fuel plates in Standard Fuel Assembly 19 No. of fuel plates in Control Fuel Assembly 14 Fuel plates active length 615 mm Fuel plate total thickness 1.50 mm Aluminum clad thickness 0.40 mm Control Plate Absorber Material Ag-In-Cd (80% 15% 5%) Coolant H2O Coolant channel gap in the Fuel Assembly 2.70 mm Coolant velocity in the coolant channel. 2.7 m/s Design coolant temperature at Core inlet ≤ 40 C Pressure of coolant at core inlet. 1.8 bar(a) Pressure drop of coolant across the core 0.25 bar Type and maximum number of Reflector Graphite / 24 Assemblies Core Configuration Variable Neutron Beams 5 Thermal Column 1 Graphite Blocks 4

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Table 5. General Reactor Data (continued)

Parameter Reference value/material Reference core

Number of Standard Fuel Assembly 13 Number of Control Fuel Assembly 5 Number of Irradiation Position 7 Number of reflectors 24 Standard Fuel Assembly (Density 4.8 gU/cm3) 11 Control Fuel Assembly (Density 4.8 gU/cm3) 5

Table 6. Standard Fuel Assembly Main Data

General Data Component Quantity Inner Fuel Plate 17 Outer Fuel Plate 2 Side Plate 2 Nozzle 1

Fuel Plate Composition Enrichment 19.75% Meat composition U3Si2 – Al Cladding Al alloy U density 4.80 gU/cm-3 235U Mass Loading ~ 25.3 g235U /FP

Fuel Plate Geometry Geometrical shape Flat plate Fuel meat thickness 0.70 mm Cladding thickness 0.40 mm Plates thickness 1.50 mm Active width 60.0 mm Active length 615 mm

Fuel Assembly Geometry Fuel Assembly Length 915 mm Fuel Assembly Width 76.0 mm Fuel Assembly Depth 80.1 mm Side Plate thickness 4.5 mm Coolant channel width (mean) 2.70 mm 235U Mass Loading ~ 480 g235U/FA

Note: Each SFA has a weight of approximately 15 kg

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Table 7. Control Fuel Assembly Main Data

General Data Component Quantity Fuel Plate (FP) 14 Side Plates (SP) 2 Nozzle 1 Internal Guide Plates 2 External Guide Plates 2 Upper Guide Plates 2 Fork Assembly (CT) Stops 2

Fuel Plate Composition 235U Enrichment 19.75% Meat composition U3Si2 – Al Cladding Al alloy U density 4.80 gU/cm-3 235U Mass Loading ~ 25,3 g235U/FP

Fuel Plate Geometry Geometrical shape Flat plate Fuel meat thickness 0.70 mm Cladding thickness 0.40 mm Plates thickness 1.50 mm Active width 60.0 mm Active length 615 mm

Fuel Assembly Geometry Fuel Assembly Length 1611 mm Fuel Assembly Width 76.0 mm Fuel Assembly Depth 80.1 mm Side Plate thickness 4.5 mm Number of fuel plates 14 Coolant channel width (mean) 2.70 mm 235U Mass Loading 354 g235U/FA

Control Plate data Absorber Material Ag-In-Cd (80 %-15%-5 %) Cladding Material for absorber AISI 316

Note: Each CFA has a weight of approximately 24 kg

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Section 25. Detection Component Data Each of the following tables represents a detection component class. Within each table the component types and descriptions are listed with the probability of detection by adversary defeat method or adversary attribute.

Table 8. Intrusion Detection Component Class Component

Type Component Description

Alternative Threat

Statement PD

Land Vehicle

PD

Exterior Sensors

Seismic Buried Cable 0.5 0.9 Electric field 0.5 0.9 Infrared 0.8 0.8 Microwave 0.8 0.9 Video motion 0.8 0.9 Multiple non-complementary

0.9 0.99

Multiple complementary 0.99 0.99 Interior Sensors

Sonic 0.5 N/A Capacitance 0.5 N/A Video Motion 0.5 N/A Infrared 0.5 N/A Ultrasonic 0.5 N/A Microwave 0.5 N/A Multiple non-complementary

0.75 N/A

Multiple complementary 0.9 N/A Position Sensors

Position Switch 0.5 N/A Balanced Magnetic Switch

0.8 N/A

Fence Sensors

Taut Wire 0.5 0.85 Vibration 0.5 0.85 Strain 0.1 0.9 Electric Field 0.5 0.9 Multiple Sensors 0.75 0.9

Barrier Sensors

Vibration 0.9 N/A Glass Breakage 0.9 N/A Conducting Tape 0.8 N/A Grid Mesh 0.9 N/A Multiple Sensors 0.99 N/A

Helicopter Detector

Radar 0.1 Sonic 0.1

Table 9. Access Control Detection Component Class

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Component Type

Component Description Independent PD

Land Vehicle

PD ID Verification Casual Recognition 0.02

Credential 0.05 Credential and PIN 0.35 Picture Badge 0.1 Picture Badge and PIN 0.6 Exchange picture badge 0.5 Exchange picture badge and PIN 0.8 Retinal scan and PIN 0.99 Hand geometry and PIN 0.95 Speech pattern and PIN 0.95 Signature dynamics and PIN 0.95 Fingerprint and PIN 0.95

Personnel Access Authorization Check

General observation of authorization

0.1

Authorization verification each time location is accessed

0.6

Two Person Rule

Presence in area 0 Within sight 0.1 Dedicated observation 0.5 Dedicated observation with alarm 0.95

Vehicle Authorization Check

Authorization form check 0.35 Serial number verification 0.45 Visual check of insignia/ license plate

0.15

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Table 10. Human Surveillance Detection Component Class Component

Type Component Description

Alternative Threat

Statement PD

Small Arms

PD

Independent of threat attribute

PD SO at Post Observation

Duress, small arms protected

0.8 0.8

Duress, small arms protected:

0.8 0.8

Duress, unprotected 0.8 0.45 Duress, unprotected: small arms protected position on alert

0.8 0.45

No duress, small arms protected

0.8 0.45

No duress, unprotected 0.8 0 No duress, unprotected: small arms protected on alert

0.8 0

Small arms resistant 0.05 0.05 SO on Patrol

Random 0.02 Scheduled 0.01

General Observation

Personnel always in vicinity

0.02

Personnel generally in vicinity

0.01

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Table 11. Contraband and CATEGORY 1 Detection Component Class Threat Attribute

Component Type

Component Description

No

Equipment

PD

Hand Tools

PD

Power

Tools P

D

High

Explosives P

D

Metal

Contraband

PD

Small A

rms

PD

Radioactive

Contraband

PD

Explosives Detector

Animal Olfaction

0 0.1

Handheld vapor collection

0 0.45

Thermal Neutron

0 0.25

Vapor Collection

0 0.35

Handheld Metal Detector

Ferrous and solid lead materials

0 0.85 0.75 0.25 0.5

Ferrous materials and all forms of lead

0 0.85 0.75 0.25 0.5

Ferrous materials only

0 0.85 0.75 0.25 0.5

Item Search Cursory 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Rigorous 0 0.75 0.75 0.45 0.65

Personnel Search

Pat down 0 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.9 Strip inspection

0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9

Portal Metal Detector

Ferrous and solid lead materials

0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6

Ferrous materials and all forms of lead

0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6

Ferrous materials only

0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6

Vehicle Search

Cursory 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Rigorous including cargo

0 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.4

X-Ray Inspection

Standard 0 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.9

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Threat Attribute Component

Type Component Description

No

Equipment

PD

Hand Tools

PD

Power

Tools P

D

High

Explosives P

D

Metal

Contraband

PD

Small A

rms

PD

Radioactive

Contraband

PD

Drive thru CATEGORY 1 Monitor

Plastic Scintillator

0 0.5

Sodium Iodide Scintillator

0 0.5

Handheld CATEGORY 1 Monitor

Plastic Scintillator

0 0.75

Sodium Iodide Scintillator

0 0.75

Portal CATEGORY 1 Monitor

Plastic Scintillator

0 0.85

Sodium Iodide Scintillator

0 0.85

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Section 26. Delay Component Data Each of the following tables represents a delay component class. Within each table the component types and descriptions are listed with the delay times by adversary defeat method.

Table 12. Barrier Delay Component Class

Component Type

Component Description

No Equipment

(mm:ss)

Hand Tools (mm:ss)

Power Tools

(mm:ss)

Explosives (mm:ss) Land

Vehicle (mm:ss) Stage

1 Stage

2 Walls 60 cm reinforced

concrete wall Infinite Infinite 15:00 3:00 5:00 Infinite

30 cm reinforced concrete wall Infinite Infinite 14:00 2:00 0:54 N/A

20 cm reinforced concrete wall Infinite Infinite 10:00 2:00 0:00 N/A

Wood studs and sheetrock 1:00 0:30 0:30 0:30 0:00 N/A

Doors 60 cm steel and concrete rolling door Infinite Infinite 15:30 3:20 5:00 N/A

30 cm steel and concrete rolling door Infinite Infinite 10:40 2:40 0:54 N/A

30 cm wood door with metal sheeting Infinite Infinite 8:50 2:40 0:30 N/A

10 cm wood door with metal sheeting Infinite 5:00 3:00 1:18 0:00

0:05 for large vehicle door

5 cm wood door Infinite 0:12 N/A 5 cm wood door with glass panel Infinite 0:12 0:12 0:12 0:00 N/A

.75 cm steel plate door Infinite 5:00 0:12 0:12 0:00 N/A

Class V or VI vault door Infinite 8:00 0:30 0:30 0:00 N/A

Steel turnstile Infinite 1:12 1:00 1:00 0:00 N/A Miscellaneous Barriers

High security padlock Infinite 1:30 0:18 0:18 0:00 N/A

Concrete Block Vehicle Barrier 0:00 5:00 1:00 0:30 0:00 0:05

2.5 m chain link mesh fence 0:10 0:10 5:00 0:30 0:00 0:01

Welded wire fabric fence 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:00 0:01

2.5 m concrete panel wall 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:00 N/A

Tempered glass window 0:05 0:05 0:10 0:10 0:00 N/A

Electromagnetic Strike Lock 0:15 0:10 0:05 0:05 0:02 N/A

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Table 13. Security Officers Delay Component Class

Component Type Component Description

No Equipment

(mm:ss)

Small Arms

(mm:ss)

Light Antitank Weapons

(LAW) (mm:ss)

SO at Post Delay

Unprotected post 500:00 0:00 0:00 Small arms protected post 500:00 0:30 0:00 Unprotected post normally but moves to small arms protected position on alert

500:00 0:30 0:00

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Table 14. Penetration Times—Fences Penetration Time (mm:ss)

Barrier Description Penetration Equipment

Equipment Weight (kg)

Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation

2.5-m chain-link mesh with outriggers 4-mm x 50-mm mesh

Ladder 5.0 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

Tarpaulin 2.0 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

Pliers 1.0 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Manual bolt cutters 3.0 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Circular saw 10 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Manual bolt cutters, gloves (more cuts)

3.5 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Circular saw (more cuts) 11.0 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Gloves 0.5 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

Vinyl-coated 3-mm x 50-mm mesh

Manual bolt cutters 3.0 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Pliers 1.0 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Circular Saw 11.0 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

2.5-m chain-link mesh without outriggers vinyl-coated, 1.8-mm x 40-mm mesh

Ladder 5.0 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

No equipment 0.0 0:03 0:06 0:09 0.02

Manual bolt cutters 3.0 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Pliers 0.5 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Vise grip pliers 0.5 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07

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Table 15. Penetration Times—Gates

Penetration Time (mm:ss)

Barrier Description Penetration Equipment

Equipment Weight (kg)

Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation

Chain-link mesh pipe 2.4-m x 4-m chain-link gate on metal pipe frame, chained and padlocked

Truck 1,500 0:03 0:06 0:09 0:01

Pliers 1.0 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Chain-link mesh pipe 1.2-m x 2.4-m gate, 11-gauge x 5-cm mesh on 4.8-cm metal pipe frame, chained and padlocked

Sledgehammer 5 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

1.8-m pry bar 10 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Bolt cutters 3 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Hacksaw 0.2 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

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Table 16. Penetration Times—Walls

Penetration Time (mm:ss)

Barrier Description Penetration Equipment

Equipment Weight (kg)

Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation

Concrete-10 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-210 kg/cm2 one layer, 6.4-mm dia., 15-cm x 15-cm mesh

Sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters

10 2:00 4:00 6:00 0:49

Sledgehammer, cutting torch 30 2:30 5:00 7:30 1:01

Circular saw, sledge-hammer 5 4:18 8:36 12:54 1:46

Rotohammer, chisel, punch, sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters, generator

50 3:12 6:24 9:36 0:34

Explosives (1.0), sledgehammer, manual bolt cutters

20 2:18 3:30 5:15

Explosives (3.0), hand bolt cutters

10 1:12 2:30 3:42

Explosives (5.0), hand bolt cutters

7 1:12 2:18 3:24

Explosive (10) 10 1:00 2:00 3:00

Sledgehammer, hand hydraulic bolt cutters

20 2:24 4:48 7:12 0:59

Concrete- 210 kg/cm2 one layer No. 5 rebar, 15-cm centers

Sledgehammer, cutting torch 30 2:00 4:00 6:00 0:49

Rotohammer, chisel, hand hydraulic bolt cutters, generator

50 3:54 7:48 11:42 1:35

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Table 16. Penetration Times—Walls (continued)

Penetration Time (mm:ss)

Barrier Description Penetration Equipment

Equipment Weight (kg)

Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation

Concrete- 15cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-210 kg/cm2 one layer, No. 4 rebar, 20-cm centers

Sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters

15 4:00 8:00 12:00 1:38

Explosives (1.0), sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters

14 2:30 3:42 5:36

Explosives (3.0), hand bolt cutters

5 1:54 2:54 4:18

Explosives (5.0), hand bolt cutters

7 1:42 2:30 3:48

Concrete-20 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-210 kg/cm2 one layer, No. 5 rebar, 15-cm centers

Rotohammer, drill, sledge, chisel, punch, cutting torch, generator

65 7:00 14:00 21:00 2:52

Explosives (2.0), sledgehammer, hand hydraulic bolt cutters

30 4:18 6:30 9:42

Explosives (3.0), hand hydraulic bolt cutters

20 2:30 3:45 5:36

Explosives (5.0), hand hydraulic bolt cutters

22 2:30 3:45 5:36

Explosives (12) 12 1:30 3:00 4:30

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Table 16. Penetration Times—Walls (continued)

Penetration Time (mm:ss)

Barrier Description Penetration Equipment

Equipment Weight (kg)

Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation

Concrete-30 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete- 210 kg/cm2 one layer, No. 4 rebar, 15-cm centers

Explosives (5.0), hand bolt cutters

8 2:12 3:15 4:54

Explosives (7), hand bolt cutters

9 2:18 3:30 5:12

Explosives (12), hand bolt cutters

14 2:30 3:48 5:36

Explosives (16), hand bolt cutters

18 2:30 3:48 5:36

Concrete-46 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-350 kg/cm2 two layers, No. 4 rebar, 15-cm centers

Explosives (16), hand-held power hydraulic bolt-cutters, generator

282 5:00 7:30 11:12 1:13

Explosives (20), hand bolt cutters

22 2:30 5:00 7:30

Concrete- 60 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-350 kg/cm2 four layers, No. 6 rebar, 15-cm centers

Explosives (30), gas-powered hydraulic bolt cutters

59 7:18 11:00 16:30

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Table 17. Penetration Times—Doors

Penetration Time (mm:ss) Barrier Description Penetration

Equipment Equipment Weight (kg)

Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation

Sheet Metal Standard industrial pedestrian door, 1.6-mm metal, panic hardware, cylinder lock, rim set, butt hinges with removable pins

Explosives (1.0) 1 1:15 1:54 2:48 Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire resistant suit

171 1:36 3:12 4:48 0:39

Cordless drill 2.7 1:30 3:00 4:30 0:37

Pry bar 7 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:25

Fire ax 4.5 1:54 3:48 5:42 0:47 Hammer, suction cups, punch, chisel

4 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Suction cups, sledge, cutting torch

25 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Explosives (.5) 2.5 1:12 2:30 3:12 Lock picking tools 0.2 0:06 2:30 5:00 1:00

Pipe wrench 1 0:12 1:12 2:30

Explosives (2.0) 2.0 1:12 2:30 3:42

Standard industrial pedestrian door, hollow steel 1.6-mm narrow glass one side, louvers near bottom.

Hammer 2.0 0:09 0:18 0:27 0:04

Fire ax 4.5 0:48 1:36 2:24 0:20

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Table 17. Penetration Times—Doors (continued)

Penetration Time (mm:ss) Barrier Description Penetration

Equipment Equipment Weight (kg)

Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation

Sheet Metal Standard industrial pedestrian door, 1.3-mm half glass expanded metal 2.8-mm grill

Grappling hook, wire cable, truck

1,520 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07

Manual bolt cutters 4.5 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Standard industrial vehicle door, hollow steel panel, 1.6-mm

Explosives (0.5) 0.5 0:45 1:06 1:42 Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 0:48 1:36 2:24 0:20

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, fire-resistant gloves, water

275 1:30 3:00 4:30 0:37

Truck 2,025 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07 Pry bar, wooden plank 9 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Fire ax 4.5 1:06 2:12 3:18 0:27 Explosives (1.0) 1.0 1:15 1:54 2:48

Standard 10cm wooden vehicle door, with 1.6-mm sheeting

Explosives (0.5) 0.5 0:48 1:18 1:54

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit

171 0:39 1:18 1:57 0:16

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Table 17. Penetration Times—Doors (continued)

Penetration Time (mm:ss) Barrier Description Penetration

Equipment Equipment Weight (kg)

Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation

Sheet Metal Truck 2,025 0:21 0:42 1:03 0:08 Pry bar, wooden plank 9 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Fire ax 4.5 1:06 2:12 3:18 0:27

Explosives (1.0) 1.0 1:18 1:54 2:48

Steel Plate Magazine door, 6.4-mm steel plate, one padlock

Explosives, linear shaped charge (0.5)

0.5 0:30 1:00 1:18

Sledge hammer, cutting torch, fire-resistant gloves, water

248 2:00 4:00 6:00 0:49

Circular Saw 16 2:06 4:12 6:18 0:52 Suction cups, sledge-hammer, chisel

4.5 0:36 1:12 1:48 0:14

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 1:15 2:30 3:45 0:31

Steel Plate/Void/Steel Plate Heavy door with two large-hinged hasps for padlocking, 19-mm steel, 10-cm air space, 1.3-mm

Explosives (4) 10 1:18 1:54 2:48 Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 3:06 6:12 9:18 1:16

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant gloves

165 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07

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Table 18. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using 1-Meter Bolt Cutters

Num

ber O

f Reb

ar C

uts

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Table 19. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using Portable Oxygen/ Acetylene Cutting Torch

40 80

Time (seconds)

0

No. 5 (16-mm)

120 160 200 240 280

5

10

15

20

0

25

30

No. 4 (13-mm)

No. 6 (19-mm)

Num

ber O

f Reb

ar C

uts

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Table 20. Cutting Rates for Mild Steel Sheet & Plate Using Oxygen Acetylene Cutting Torch or Iron Oxygen Burn Bar

Th

ickn

ess

(cm

)

Burn Bar

Cutting Torch

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Table 21. Time Required to Set an Explosives Package as a Function of Package Weight

Expl

osiv

es P

acka

ge W

eigh

t (K

g)

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Table 22. Running Rates

Dis

tanc

e (m

eter

s)

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Table 23. Vehicle Rates for Experienced Drivers

Dis

tanc

e (m

eter

s)

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Section 27. Table of Trials and Failures Giving PD for Designated Confidence Level Table 24. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials

PD at designated Confidence level (sorted by number of trials)

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res Confidence Levels

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 4 0 71% 67% 62% 56% 47% 21 0 94% 93% 91% 90% 87% 4 1 46% 42% 37% 32% 25% 21 1 88% 86% 85% 83% 79% 4 2 24% 21% 18% 14% 10% 21 2 82% 81% 79% 77% 73% 4 3 7% 5% 4% 3% 1% 21 3 77% 75% 73% 71% 67% 5 0 76% 73% 68% 63% 55% 22 0 94% 93% 92% 90% 87% 5 1 55% 51% 47% 42% 34% 22 1 88% 87% 85% 83% 80% 5 2 36% 33% 29% 25% 19% 22 2 83% 82% 80% 78% 74% 5 3 19% 17% 14% 11% 8% 22 3 78% 76% 75% 72% 68% 6 0 79% 76% 73% 68% 61% 23 0 94% 93% 92% 91% 88% 6 1 61% 58% 54% 49% 42% 23 1 89% 88% 86% 84% 81% 6 2 45% 41% 38% 33% 27% 23 2 84% 82% 81% 78% 75% 6 3 30% 27% 24% 20% 15% 23 3 79% 77% 76% 73% 70% 7 0 82% 79% 76% 72% 65% 24 0 94% 94% 92% 91% 88% 7 1 66% 63% 59% 55% 48% 24 1 89% 88% 87% 85% 82% 7 2 51% 48% 45% 40% 34% 24 2 84% 83% 81% 79% 76% 7 3 38% 35% 32% 28% 23% 24 3 80% 78% 76% 74% 71% 8 0 84% 82% 79% 75% 69% 25 0 95% 94% 93% 91% 89% 8 1 70% 67% 64% 59% 53% 25 1 90% 88% 87% 85% 82% 8 2 57% 54% 50% 46% 40% 25 2 85% 84% 82% 80% 77% 8 3 44% 42% 38% 34% 29% 25 3 80% 79% 77% 75% 72% 9 0 86% 84% 81% 77% 72% 26 0 95% 94% 93% 92% 89% 9 1 73% 70% 67% 63% 57% 26 1 90% 89% 88% 86% 83% 9 2 61% 58% 55% 51% 45% 26 2 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 9 3 50% 47% 44% 40% 35% 26 3 81% 80% 78% 76% 73%

10 0 87% 85% 83% 79% 74% 27 0 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 10 1 75% 73% 70% 66% 61% 27 1 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 10 2 64% 62% 59% 55% 49% 27 2 86% 85% 83% 81% 78% 10 3 54% 52% 49% 45% 39% 27 3 82% 81% 79% 77% 74% 11 0 88% 86% 84% 81% 76% 28 0 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 11 1 77% 75% 72% 69% 64% 28 1 91% 90% 88% 87% 84% 11 2 67% 65% 62% 58% 53% 28 2 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 11 3 58% 55% 53% 49% 44% 28 3 82% 81% 80% 78% 75% 12 0 89% 87% 85% 83% 78% 29 0 95% 95% 94% 92% 90% 12 1 79% 77% 75% 71% 66% 29 1 91% 90% 89% 87% 85% 12 2 70% 68% 65% 61% 56% 29 2 87% 86% 84% 83% 80% 12 3 61% 59% 56% 52% 47% 29 3 83% 82% 80% 78% 75% 13 0 90% 88% 86% 84% 79% 30 0 95% 95% 94% 93% 91% 13 1 81% 79% 76% 73% 68% 30 1 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 13 2 72% 70% 67% 64% 59% 30 2 87% 86% 85% 83% 80% 13 3 64% 62% 59% 56% 51% 30 3 84% 82% 81% 79% 76% 14 0 91% 89% 87% 85% 81% 31 0 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 14 1 82% 80% 78% 75% 70% 31 1 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 14 2 74% 72% 69% 66% 61% 31 2 88% 87% 85% 84% 81% 14 3 66% 64% 62% 58% 53% 31 3 84% 83% 82% 80% 77% 15 0 91% 90% 88% 86% 82% 32 0 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 15 1 83% 81% 79% 76% 72% 32 1 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 15 2 76% 74% 71% 68% 64% 32 2 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 15 3 68% 66% 64% 61% 56% 32 3 85% 83% 82% 80% 78% 16 0 92% 90% 89% 87% 83% 33 0 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 16 1 84% 82% 80% 78% 74% 33 1 92% 91% 90% 89% 86% 16 2 77% 75% 73% 70% 66% 33 2 88% 87% 86% 85% 82% 16 3 70% 68% 66% 63% 58% 33 3 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 17 0 92% 91% 89% 87% 84% 34 0 96% 95% 95% 93% 92% 17 1 85% 83% 82% 79% 75% 34 1 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 17 2 78% 76% 74% 72% 67% 34 2 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 17 3 72% 70% 68% 65% 60% 34 3 85% 84% 83% 81% 79% 18 0 93% 91% 90% 88% 85% 35 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 18 1 86% 84% 82% 80% 76% 35 1 92% 92% 91% 89% 87% 18 2 79% 78% 76% 73% 69% 35 2 89% 88% 87% 86% 83% 18 3 73% 71% 69% 67% 62% 35 3 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 19 0 93% 92% 91% 89% 85% 36 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 19 1 86% 85% 83% 81% 77% 36 1 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 19 2 80% 79% 77% 74% 71% 36 2 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 19 3 75% 73% 71% 68% 64% 36 3 86% 85% 84% 82% 80% 20 0 93% 92% 91% 89% 86% 37 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 20 1 87% 86% 84% 82% 78% 37 1 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 20 2 81% 80% 78% 76% 72% 37 2 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 20 3 76% 74% 72% 70% 66% 37 3 87% 86% 84% 83% 80%

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HARI Exercise Data Handbook

Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI)—The Hypothetical Facility 66 The Twenty-Seventh International Training Course

Table 24. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials (cont’d)

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 38 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 55 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 38 1 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 55 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 38 2 90% 89% 88% 87% 84% 55 2 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 38 3 87% 86% 85% 83% 81% 55 3 91% 90% 89% 88% 87% 39 0 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 56 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 39 1 93% 93% 92% 90% 88% 56 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 39 2 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 56 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 39 3 87% 86% 85% 84% 81% 56 3 91% 90% 90% 88% 87% 40 0 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 57 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 40 1 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 57 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 40 2 90% 90% 89% 87% 85% 57 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 40 3 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 57 3 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 41 0 97% 96% 95% 95% 93% 58 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 41 1 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 58 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 41 2 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 58 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 41 3 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 58 3 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 42 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 59 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 42 1 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 59 1 96% 95% 94% 94% 92% 42 2 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 59 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 42 3 88% 87% 86% 85% 83% 59 3 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 43 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 60 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 43 1 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 60 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 43 2 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 60 2 94% 93% 92% 91% 90% 43 3 88% 88% 87% 85% 83% 60 3 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 44 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 61 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 44 1 94% 93% 93% 91% 90% 61 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 44 2 91% 91% 90% 88% 86% 61 2 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 44 3 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 61 3 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 45 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 62 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 45 1 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 62 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 45 2 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 62 2 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 45 3 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 62 3 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 46 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 63 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 46 1 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 63 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 46 2 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 63 2 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 46 3 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 63 3 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 47 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 64 0 98% 98% 97% 96% 95% 47 1 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 64 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 47 2 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 64 2 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 47 3 89% 89% 88% 86% 84% 64 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 48 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 65 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 48 1 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 65 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 48 2 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 65 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 48 3 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 65 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 49 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 66 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 49 1 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 66 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 49 2 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 66 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 49 3 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 66 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 50 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 67 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 50 1 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 67 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 50 2 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 67 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 50 3 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 67 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 51 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 68 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 51 1 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 68 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 51 2 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 68 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 51 3 90% 89% 89% 87% 86% 68 3 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 52 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 69 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 52 1 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 69 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 52 2 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 69 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 52 3 90% 90% 89% 88% 86% 69 3 93% 92% 91% 91% 89% 53 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 70 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 53 1 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 70 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 53 2 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 70 2 94% 94% 93% 93% 91% 53 3 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 70 3 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 54 0 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 71 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 54 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 71 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 54 2 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 71 2 95% 94% 93% 93% 91% 54 3 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 71 3 93% 92% 92% 91% 89%

PD at designated Confidence level (sorted by number of trials)

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Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI)—The Hypothetical Facility 67 The Twenty-Seventh International Training Course

Table 24. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials (cont’d)

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 72 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 89 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 72 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 89 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 72 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 89 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 72 3 93% 92% 92% 91% 90% 89 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 73 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 90 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 73 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 90 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 73 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 90 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 73 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 90 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 74 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 91 0 98% 98% 98% 98% 97% 74 1 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 91 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 74 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 91 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 74 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 91 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 75 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 92 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 75 1 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 92 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 75 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 92 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 75 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 92 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 76 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 93 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 76 1 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 93 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 76 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 93 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 76 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 93 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 77 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 94 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 77 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 94 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 77 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 94 2 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 77 3 93% 93% 92% 92% 90% 94 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 78 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 95 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 78 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 95 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 78 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 95 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 78 3 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 95 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 79 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 96 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 79 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 96 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 79 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 96 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 79 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 96 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 80 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 97 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 80 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 97 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 80 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 97 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 80 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 97 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 81 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 98 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 81 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 98 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 81 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 92% 98 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 81 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 98 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 82 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 99 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 82 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 99 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 82 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 99 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 82 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 99 3 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 83 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 100 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 83 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 100 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 83 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 100 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 83 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 100 3 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 84 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 84 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 84 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 84 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 85 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 85 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 85 2 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 85 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 86 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 86 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 86 2 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 86 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 87 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 87 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 87 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 87 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 88 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 88 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 88 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 88 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 91%

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HARI Exercise Data Handbook

Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI)—The Hypothetical Facility 68 The Twenty-Seventh International Training Course

Table 25. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures

Failu

res

Tota

l Trie

s

Confidence Levels

Failu

res

Tota

l Trie

s

Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95%

0 4 71% 67% 62% 56% 47% 0 72 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 0 5 76% 73% 68% 63% 55% 0 73 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 0 6 79% 76% 73% 68% 61% 0 74 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 0 7 82% 79% 76% 72% 65% 0 75 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 8 84% 82% 79% 75% 69% 0 76 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 9 86% 84% 81% 77% 72% 0 77 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 10 87% 85% 83% 79% 74% 0 78 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 11 88% 86% 84% 81% 76% 0 79 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 12 89% 87% 85% 83% 78% 0 80 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 13 90% 88% 86% 84% 79% 0 81 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 14 91% 89% 87% 85% 81% 0 82 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 15 91% 90% 88% 86% 82% 0 83 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 16 92% 90% 89% 87% 83% 0 84 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 17 92% 91% 89% 87% 84% 0 85 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 18 93% 91% 90% 88% 85% 0 86 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 19 93% 92% 91% 89% 85% 0 87 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 20 93% 92% 91% 89% 86% 0 88 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 21 94% 93% 91% 90% 87% 0 89 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 22 94% 93% 92% 90% 87% 0 90 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 23 94% 93% 92% 91% 88% 0 91 98% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 24 94% 94% 92% 91% 88% 0 92 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 25 95% 94% 93% 91% 89% 0 93 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 26 95% 94% 93% 92% 89% 0 94 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 27 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 0 95 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 28 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 0 96 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 29 95% 95% 94% 92% 90% 0 97 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 30 95% 95% 94% 93% 91% 0 98 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 31 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 0 99 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 32 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 0 100 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 33 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 1 4 46% 42% 37% 32% 25% 0 34 96% 95% 95% 93% 92% 1 5 55% 51% 47% 42% 34% 0 35 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 6 61% 58% 54% 49% 42% 0 36 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 7 66% 63% 59% 55% 48% 0 37 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 8 70% 67% 64% 59% 53% 0 38 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 9 73% 70% 67% 63% 57% 0 39 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 1 10 75% 73% 70% 66% 61% 0 40 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 1 11 77% 75% 72% 69% 64% 0 41 97% 96% 95% 95% 93% 1 12 79% 77% 75% 71% 66% 0 42 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 1 13 81% 79% 76% 73% 68% 0 43 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 1 14 82% 80% 78% 75% 70% 0 44 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 1 15 83% 81% 79% 76% 72% 0 45 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 1 16 84% 82% 80% 78% 74% 0 46 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 17 85% 83% 82% 79% 75% 0 47 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 18 86% 84% 82% 80% 76% 0 48 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 19 86% 85% 83% 81% 77% 0 49 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 20 87% 86% 84% 82% 78% 0 50 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 1 21 88% 86% 85% 83% 79% 0 51 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 1 22 88% 87% 85% 83% 80% 0 52 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 1 23 89% 88% 86% 84% 81% 0 53 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 1 24 89% 88% 87% 85% 82% 0 54 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 25 90% 88% 87% 85% 82% 0 55 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 26 90% 89% 88% 86% 83% 0 56 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 27 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 0 57 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 28 91% 90% 88% 87% 84% 0 58 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 29 91% 90% 89% 87% 85% 0 59 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 30 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 0 60 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 31 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 0 61 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 32 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 0 62 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 33 92% 91% 90% 89% 86% 0 63 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 34 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 0 64 98% 98% 97% 96% 95% 1 35 92% 92% 91% 89% 87% 0 65 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 36 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 0 66 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 37 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 0 67 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 38 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 0 68 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 39 93% 93% 92% 90% 88% 0 69 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 40 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 0 70 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 41 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 0 71 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 42 94% 93% 92% 91% 89%

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Table 25. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures (cont’d) Failures Total

Tries Confidence Levels Failures Total

Tries Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 1 43 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 2 14 74% 72% 69% 66% 61% 1 44 94% 93% 93% 91% 90% 2 15 76% 74% 71% 68% 64% 1 45 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 2 16 77% 75% 73% 70% 66% 1 46 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 2 17 78% 76% 74% 72% 67% 1 47 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 2 18 79% 78% 76% 73% 69% 1 48 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 2 19 80% 79% 77% 74% 71% 1 49 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 2 20 81% 80% 78% 76% 72% 1 50 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 2 21 82% 81% 79% 77% 73% 1 51 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 2 22 83% 82% 80% 78% 74% 1 52 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 2 23 84% 82% 81% 78% 75% 1 53 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 2 24 84% 83% 81% 79% 76% 1 54 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 25 85% 84% 82% 80% 77% 1 55 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 26 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 1 56 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 27 86% 85% 83% 81% 78% 1 57 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 28 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 1 58 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 29 87% 86% 84% 83% 80% 1 59 96% 95% 94% 94% 92% 2 30 87% 86% 85% 83% 80% 1 60 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 2 31 88% 87% 85% 84% 81% 1 61 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 2 32 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 1 62 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 33 88% 87% 86% 85% 82% 1 63 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 34 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 1 64 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 35 89% 88% 87% 86% 83% 1 65 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 36 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 1 66 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 37 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 1 67 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 38 90% 89% 88% 87% 84% 1 68 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 39 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 1 69 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 40 90% 90% 89% 87% 85% 1 70 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 2 41 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 1 71 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 2 42 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 1 72 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 2 43 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 1 73 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 2 44 91% 91% 90% 88% 86% 1 74 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 45 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 75 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 46 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 76 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 47 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 77 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 48 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 78 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 49 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 1 79 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 50 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 1 80 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 51 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 1 81 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 52 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 1 82 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 53 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 1 83 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 54 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 1 84 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 55 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 1 85 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 56 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 1 86 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 57 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 1 87 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 58 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 1 88 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 59 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 1 89 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 60 94% 93% 92% 91% 90% 1 90 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 61 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 1 91 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 62 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 1 92 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 63 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 1 93 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 64 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 1 94 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 65 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 95 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 66 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 96 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 67 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 97 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 68 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 98 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 69 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 99 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 70 94% 94% 93% 93% 91% 1 100 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 71 95% 94% 93% 93% 91% 2 4 24% 21% 18% 14% 10% 2 72 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 5 36% 33% 29% 25% 19% 2 73 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 6 45% 41% 38% 33% 27% 2 74 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 7 51% 48% 45% 40% 34% 2 75 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 8 57% 54% 50% 46% 40% 2 76 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 9 61% 58% 55% 51% 45% 2 77 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 10 64% 62% 59% 55% 49% 2 78 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 11 67% 65% 62% 58% 53% 2 79 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 12 70% 68% 65% 61% 56% 2 80 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 13 72% 70% 67% 64% 59% 2 81 95% 95% 94% 94% 92%

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HARI Exercise Data Handbook

Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI)—The Hypothetical Facility 70 The Twenty-Seventh International Training Course

Table 25. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures (cont’d)

Failu

res

Tota

l Tr

ies Confidence Levels

Failu

res

Tota

l Tr

ies Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 2 82 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 3 53 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 2 83 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 3 54 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 2 84 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 3 55 91% 90% 89% 88% 87% 2 85 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 56 91% 90% 90% 88% 87% 2 86 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 57 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 2 87 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 58 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 2 88 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 59 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 2 89 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 60 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 2 90 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 61 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 2 91 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 62 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 2 92 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 63 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 2 93 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 64 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 2 94 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 3 65 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 95 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 66 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 96 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 67 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 97 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 68 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 98 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 69 93% 92% 91% 91% 89% 2 99 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 70 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 2 100 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 71 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 3 4 7% 5% 4% 3% 1% 3 72 93% 92% 92% 91% 90% 3 5 19% 17% 14% 11% 8% 3 73 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 6 30% 27% 24% 20% 15% 3 74 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 7 38% 35% 32% 28% 23% 3 75 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 8 44% 42% 38% 34% 29% 3 76 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 9 50% 47% 44% 40% 35% 3 77 93% 93% 92% 92% 90% 3 10 54% 52% 49% 45% 39% 3 78 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 3 11 58% 55% 53% 49% 44% 3 79 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 3 12 61% 59% 56% 52% 47% 3 80 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 13 64% 62% 59% 56% 51% 3 81 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 14 66% 64% 62% 58% 53% 3 82 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 15 68% 66% 64% 61% 56% 3 83 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 16 70% 68% 66% 63% 58% 3 84 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 17 72% 70% 68% 65% 60% 3 85 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 18 73% 71% 69% 67% 62% 3 86 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 19 75% 73% 71% 68% 64% 3 87 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 20 76% 74% 72% 70% 66% 3 88 94% 94% 93% 93% 91% 3 21 77% 75% 73% 71% 67% 3 89 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 3 22 78% 76% 75% 72% 68% 3 90 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 3 23 79% 77% 76% 73% 70% 3 91 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 3 24 80% 78% 76% 74% 71% 3 92 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 25 80% 79% 77% 75% 72% 3 93 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 26 81% 80% 78% 76% 73% 3 94 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 27 82% 81% 79% 77% 74% 3 95 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 28 82% 81% 80% 78% 75% 3 96 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 29 83% 82% 80% 78% 75% 3 97 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 30 84% 82% 81% 79% 76% 3 98 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 31 84% 83% 82% 80% 77% 3 99 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 3 32 85% 83% 82% 80% 78% 3 100 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 3 33 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 3 34 85% 84% 83% 81% 79% 3 35 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 3 36 86% 85% 84% 82% 80% 3 37 87% 86% 84% 83% 80% 3 38 87% 86% 85% 83% 81% 3 39 87% 86% 85% 84% 81% 3 40 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 3 41 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 3 42 88% 87% 86% 85% 83% 3 43 88% 88% 87% 85% 83% 3 44 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 3 45 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 3 46 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 3 47 89% 89% 88% 86% 84% 3 48 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 3 49 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 3 50 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 3 51 90% 89% 89% 87% 86% 3 52 90% 90% 89% 88% 86%