Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010.

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Hydrogen Fluoride Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010

Transcript of Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010.

Page 1: Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010.

Hydrogen Fluoride Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine IncidentPyridine Incident

25-June-2010

EHS Coordinator Meeting14 December 2010

Page 2: Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010.

Basic InformationBasic Information24 June, 6:30 PMBiological researchThree individuals work in lab

◦Heard a loud bang◦Saw under-hood chemical storage cabinet

doors fly openSensed acid-like odorNo visible smoke or haze

Page 3: Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010.

Basic InformationBasic InformationWaited about five minutes after hearing

bang to investigate areaDonned nitrile gloves and safety glassesLooked into cabinet and containers within

to determine if any were damagedFound metal canister with a dislodged

cover and bowed-out bottom (likely ruptured and caused noise, door movement)

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Basic InformationBasic InformationLabel on container indicated

◦ 70% hydrofluoric acid◦ 30% pyridine◦ Mixture is called Olah’s Reagent

Lab occupants were not trained in HF use and were not aware HF was in lab

Occupants moved damaged container into nearby fume hood

Powdery substance coated other containers within cabinet

Moved many coated containers to fume hoodNo other containers were damaged

Page 5: Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010.

ReportingReportingLab occupants did not report at time of

incident ◦Did not want to cause alarm or building evacuation

at time of incident, so did not reportContacted lab EHS Rep the following dayEHS Rep contacted Coordinator after thatCoordinator contacted EHS Office at

approximately 10:30 AM the next dayIHP on-call representative arrived on-scene at

approximately 10:45 AM

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Response & Initial InvestigationResponse & Initial Investigation

IHP rep examined MSDS for HF pyridine◦Appeared to mimic effects of HF

Tested residue within ruptured canister and on surfaces of other canisters in cabinet (now in hood) for HF with Spilfyter strips.◦Fluorine present

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Response & Initial InvestigationResponse & Initial InvestigationIHP rep contacted EMP on-call rep to help

with clean-up◦Triumvirate called in

IHP rep spoke to lab occupants about potential effects of HF exposure◦Recommended that they visit MIT Medical

Urgent Care – all did, but weren’t seen right away

◦Contacted Occupational Health Nurse & Physician at MIT Medical via email to alert them to incident

Page 8: Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010.

Response & Initial InvestigationResponse & Initial Investigation

Occupational Health Physician contacted Chemistry professor (R. Danheiser) for additional info on HF Pyridine◦Determined that pyridine binds HF and is not as

biologically active as HF◦Physician transmitted this info to IHP rep via

email the next day◦Medical did not directly relay this information to

lab occupants - timing issue?

Page 9: Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010.

Initial Lessons LearnedInitial Lessons LearnedDon’t store what you don’t need

◦Incident may have never happened◦Many, many containers became contaminated

and complicated clean-upKnow what you are storing in your labReport incident right away

◦Although no one was hurt, results could’ve been more serious if HF compound was more biologically active

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Initial Lessons LearnedInitial Lessons LearnedCommunication between EHS, MIT

Medical, & involved individuals needs to be better

Do not clean up spills without proper PPE◦ Lab occupants wanted to do the right thing by

handling spill/rupture themselves, but this may have required more PPE than they had available

Page 11: Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010.

Things Done Well

Lab used opportunity to get rid of unneeded chemicals and improve housekeeping

Communication lines, once established, were very strong between lab occupants, EHS Rep, & EHS Coordinator

Page 12: Hydrogen Fluoride Pyridine Incident 25-June-2010 EHS Coordinator Meeting 14 December 2010.

Questions? Comments? Discussion?