Husserl and Stein on the Phenomenology of Empathy ...

OriginalPaperUDC165.62:165.242.2Husserl,E.,Stein,E.ReceivedOctober3rd,2013

James JardineCenterforSubjectivityResearch,Njalsgade140–142,Building25,Floor5,DK–2300Copenhagen

[email protected]

Husserl and Stein on the Phenomenology of Empathy: Perception and Explication*

AbstractWithin the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interper-sonal understanding is rooted in a suigeneris form of intentional experience, most com-monly labeled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its defense by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. After offering in section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to some characterizations of its distinctive structure, considering, in section 3, the Husserlian claim that certain forms of empathy are perceptual in nature, and in section 4, Stein’s insist-ence that empathetic experience frequently involves explicating the other’s own intentional experiences. Section 5 will conclude by assessing the extent to which their analyses lead support to a conception of empathy as an intuitive experience of other minds.

Keywordsempathy,perception,interpersonalunderstanding,EdmundHusserl,EdithStein

Introduction

Treatmentsofinterpersonalityandintersubjectivityinthephenomenologicaltraditionhaveunanimouslyrejectedthenotionthatunderstandingandrelat-ingtoothermindsandpersonsismostfundamentallyamatterofinference,inner simulation, or projection. More positively, phenomenologists haveclassicallyattemptedtoidentifyanddescribeaformofexperience,empathy(Einfühlung),inwhichotherembodiedmindsaregraspedassuch,andwhichmorecomplexandcognitiveformsofintersubjectivitytakeastheirpointofdeparture.1Suchanapproachmayhavesignificantimplicationsforcontem-porarydiscussionsofsocialcognitionandinterpersonalunderstanding,sinceifcorrectitchallengescertainassumptionsheldbythetwodominantcampsoftheory-theoryandsimulation-theory.InthispaperIwillshowhowcertain

*I am grateful to David Carr,Adam Farley,Axel Honneth, Zhida Luo, John Michael,Alessandro Salice, Joona Taipale, and DanZahavi,eachofwhomreadanearlierdraftofthispaperandprovidedinvaluablecommentsandthought-provokingdiscussion,aswellastwoanonymousreviewers.

1

Thislineofthoughtneednotbecommittedtotheideathattheconcreteencounterwiththe

othercouldnotbeprecededbymorefunda-mental forms of intersubjectivity, but ratherthatempathyprecedesallotherformsof in-terpersonal understanding. For twoHusser-lianaccountsofpre-empathicintersubjectiv-ity,seeZahavi(2001)andSteinbock(1995).

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA58(2/2014)pp.(273–288)

J.Jardine,HusserlandSteinonthePheno-menologyofEmpathy274

analyses fromHusserl’s Ideen II andStein’sZum Problem der Einfühlungmarkoutthecontoursofanaccountofempathywhichdistinguishesitsharplyfromboth imaginativesimulationandanalogizing inference.Afterofferinginsection2somepreliminaryindicationsofhowempathyshouldbeunder-stood,Iwillturntosomecharacterizationsofitsphenomenologicalstructure,considering, insection3, theHusserlianclaimthatwithin thepersonalisticattitudeempathycanbeunderstoodasaperception,andinsection4,Stein’sinsistencethatempathyaccomplishesanexplicationoftheother’sowninten-tionalexperiences.Section5willconcludebyassessingtheextenttowhichtheir analyses lead support to a conception of empathy as experience, andmorespecificallyasanintuitivegivennessofforeignsubjectivity.

1. Empathy as a mode of experience

TowardstheendofSatyajitRay’sfilmPather Panchali,apoormanarriveshomeafterseveralmonthsaway,unawarethatinhisabsencehisyoungdaugh-terhasdied.Onhisarrival,themanencountersandcheerfullygreetshiswife,whoatfirstseemstoavoidhisgaze,untilheshowsherasariwhichhein-tendstogiveasagifttohisdaughter.Hiswifeclutchesthegifttoherchestandbeginstouncontrollablycry.Realizinghiswife’sgrief,themantries,invain,tocomforther.But,justinthisimmersedawarenessofhiswife’ssad-ness,infeelinghertremblingmovements,hearingherdesperatescreams,andseeingherhandclenchedaround thesari, the tragicevent invokedbyhiswife’smiserybecomesapparenttotheman.Indeed,thathenowrealiseshisdaughter’sdeathiscleartohiswifeandtotheirnearbyson,inthathehimselfdescendsintocriesofgrief.HusserlandSteinwouldcall theman’sawarenessofhiswife’ssadnessanempathicawareness.Characteristicofsuchawarenessisacertainformofdi-rectednesstowardsanothersubject.Empathicawarenessisthustobeconsid-eredasanintentionalawareness,andbroadlyspeakingithasasitsintentionalobjecteithertheotherherself,orsomethingbelongingtoherexperientiallife.Butwhichparticularactsarewethentopickout,fromsuchconcretelyinter-subjectiveencountersaslivedthroughbyus,andidentifyasactsofempathy?Inthispaper,Iwillworkwiththecontentionthatempathy,atleastinitsmostpregnantandprecisesense,doesnotrefertotheman’sattemptstocomforthiswife,nortohisownfeelingofgriefuponlearningofhisdaughter’sdeath,and,likewise,neithertowhateversenseofunityhemayexperiencewithhiswifewhenhehimselfbecomesoverwhelmedbysadness.Rather,hereIwillfollowHusserlandSteinandsuggestthatthesemorecom-plexoccurrencesmayonlybeclarifiedonceweattendtosomethingwhichtheyeach insomesensepresuppose.Morespecifically,whatcounts in thestrictsenseasempathyarethoseexperientialactsinwhichaforeignsubjectisnotmerelyhypothesizedorinferred,butrathergivenandexperiencedher-self.Toreturntoourexample,itissimplynotthecasethatthemanfirstseesamerelyphysicalbodywhichhethentakesasindicativeofhiswife,ratherhehasanirreducibleexperienceofthewomanherself,anexperiencewhichmoreovermakesallelsewhichoccursintheencounterpossible.A question arises here concerning, inHusserlian terms,whether empathicexperience is intuitive in character. I cannot here fully spell out the com-plexnotionofintuitiveexperience,butoneshouldnote,first,thatonlythoseintentionalactswhichpresenttheirobject,asopposedtore-presentingitinsomemanner,areintuitiveexperiences,andinthissenseintuitiveexperience



involvesacertainformofdirectorpresentationalconsciousnessofitsobject.AccordingtoHusserl,foreachbasicclassofintentionalobject(e.g.,physicalthingormathematicalequation),therecorrespondsatypeofintentionalact(e.g.,perceptualorcategorical)inwhichsuchanobjectisgivenintuitively.Andsuchintuitivegivennessisaccomplishedwhenthethingactuallypresentsitselftousasbodilypresent(leibhaftig),asopposedtoitsbeingintendedinamoreindirectfashionviaimages,signsorrepresentations(Husserl1976:11,14–15[2014:9,13]).Noteworthyalsoistheepistemicroleplayedbyintuitiveexperience,oritsev-identialcharacter.Whileanactwithonlypropositionalorimaginarycontentisintentional,inthesenseofbeingdirectedtowardsandpickingoutanobjectorstateofaffairs,whetheritcountsasaformofknowledgewithrespecttothelatterisnotanintrinsicfeatureoftheact.Rather,toachieveepistemiccontactwith theworld, judgementsmust stand in certain justificatory relations tootheracts.AccordingtoHusserl,onewayinwhichajudgementcangainaprima facie justificatorybasisisfortheobjectorstateofaffairsthatitpicksouttobedirectlygiveninintuitiveexperience(Husserl1976:51[2014:44]).Inthisregard,theexemplarycaseofintuitiveexperienceisperception.WhileIcanmerelyentertainthethoughtofsay,mybicyclebeingstolen,andwhileIcanimagineitbeingtakenfromthespotoutsidewhereIleftitthismorning,my(“empty”)intentiontowardsthisstateofaffairsgainsaratherstrongepis-temicbasis(becomes“fulfilled”)ifIlookoutthewindowandactuallyseeastrangercyclingoffwithit.2

Now,forHusserl,theterm‘empathy’denotesaspecificclassofbasicinten-tionalexperiences:“Theintentionality inone’sownegothat leads into theforeignegoistheso-calledempathy”(Husserl1962:321).Similarly,asSteinputsitinZum Problem der Einfühlung,asanirreducibleintentionalawarenessofothersubjects’livedexperiences(Erlebnisse),empathyis“akindofexpe-rientialactsui generis”,whichshedescribesastheexperience(Erfahrung)offoreignconsciousnessingeneral(Stein2008:20[1989:11]).3Inourpre-the-oreticallives,thatis,otherpeopleappeartousasexistingrealitieswhich,inaquitepeculiarway,differ intheirgivennessfromoneselfandfromthemerelyphysical.And,asSteinobserves,thebasicformofawarenessonehasofotherpeopleisnotamatterofrecollection,anticipation,orimagination,andnei-therdoesitinvolvementalimages,inferencesorcommunication(Stein2008:20[1989:11]).Indeed,ourthoughtsaboutandimagesoftheother’smentallifegainwhatevervaliditytheyhavefromthe(admittedlyoftencomplexandmediated)waysinwhichtheyarerootedinactsofempathy,inwhichforeignexperiencingisactuallyencountered(Stein2008:31[1989:19]).Thusempathyseemstobearmanyofthehallmarksofintuitiveexperience.Andyetapuzzlepresentsitselfhere.Forempathy,consideredasanaware-

2

Fora recentHusserlianaccountof theepis-temologicalimportofperception,onewhichengages in detail with contemporary philo-sophical discussions of this issue, see Hopp(2011).

3

WhenreferringtoStein,Ihaveusedthecriti-calGesamtausgabe editionofZum Problem der Einfühlung.Where possible I have pro-videdreferencestothetranslationbyWaltrautStein in square brackets, although I have at

timesdepartedfromher terminologically. Inparticular,Ihaverendered‘Erlebnis’as‘livedexperience’, ‘Erfahrung’ as ‘experience’,‘Originär’as ‘originary’,and‘Vergegenwär-tigung’ as ‘presentification’.When referringtoHusserlon theotherhand, Ihave simplyreferredtothepaginationofthecriticalHus-serlianaseries,sincetheEnglishtranslationsof these texts (whereavailable)alsocontainmarginalreferencestothelatter,withtheex-ceptionofthetranslationofIdeen I.



nessofsubjectiveexperience,clearly lacks the intimacyofself-awareness.Afterall,one’slivedexperiencesare,irrespectiveofwhethertheyaregiventoanothersubjectinempathy,manifesttooneselfinadistinctiveandimmediateway.4Andifthisimmediacywerecharacteristicofempathythenitwouldnotbeanexperienceoftheothersince,asHusserlremarks,theotherhimselfandImyselfwouldthenbethesame(Husserl1950:139).OrinStein’sformula-tion,whileanempatheticexperienceisself-giveninanoriginary(i.e.directand immediate) fashion, theother’sexperiencesas thecontentofempathyare not given in such an originary fashion (Stein 2008: 19 [1989: 10]; cf.Husserl1976:11[2014:10]).Butthisinsightcanbereformulatedinmorepositiveterms.ConsiderthefatherreturninghomeinPather Panchali:priortohisownexperienceofmiseryuponcomprehending the situationhehasuncovered,andindeedpresumablycontinuingtoexist,althoughundoubtedlyastransformed,duringhismisery,isanumericallyandqualitativelydistinctawarenessofhiswife’smisery.One’sownmiseryisbroughttogivennessinaradicallydifferentmannertotheother’smisery–butessentiallyso,sincethisdifferenceiswhatpermitsmyownmiserytopresentitselfasgenuinelymine,andtheother’smiseryasgenuinelyother(Stein2008:54[1989:38]).Itfollowsthatempathyisbothanirreducible,directandintuitiveexperienceofothersubjects,yetoneessentiallycharacterizedbyitsdistinctionfromthebasicintimacyoftheselftoitself.IwilltrytoshowinthefollowingthatsuchformulationslosemuchoftheirparadoxicaltastewhenoneconsidersmorecloselyHusserlandStein’sposi-tive account of empathy. But first, it should be emphasized that this con-ceptionofempathydifferssignificantlyfromthatofferedbycontemporary“simulationist”theorists.5ConsiderdeVignemontandJacob,whoappeartoresonatewiththeaccountpresentedabovewhentheydescribeempathyasan“other-directed”experienceofanothersubject’saffectivestate(deVignemontandJacob2012:304).Butindescribingempathyasanexperiencetheymeanthatitrequirestheempathizingsubjecttoimaginativelyenactandfirst-per-sonally“feel”anaffectivestate,soastounderstandthemindoftheother(deVignemontandJacob2012:297;deVignemont2010:290).Andwhentheyemphasizetheother-directednessofempathytheymeanthattheempathizerrecognizesthatherfirst-personalaffectivestateisbothcausedbyandsimilartoanaffectivestatefirst-personallyexperiencedbythe“target”subject(deVignemontandJacob2012:305).ForHusserlandStein,ontheotherhand,empathyshouldpreciselybeunderstoodasanintentionalactwhichimmedi-atelygrasps theotherembodiedmind, irrespectiveofwhether thecompre-hendedexperiencesarecurrentlyfirst-personallylivedthroughbytheempa-thizingsubject,imaginativelyorotherwise.Andinthissensetheyendorseanotionofempathicexperienceasnotonlymediatelyorprojectivelyother-di-rected.Unlikethosetheoristswhoassumethatthemindsofotherpeopleareultimatelyunexperienceabledomainsthatcanbepositedonlythroughimagi-nationorinference,theaccountofferedbySteinandHusserlhasthestrengthof being attentive to the subtle anduniquemanner inwhichour everydayfamiliaritywithothersarisesandisgroundedinexperientiallife.

2. Empathic perception and expressivity

Inilluminatingcertainsalientaspectsofthisaccount,Iwillbeginbyfocussingon a claimwhichone finds fairly frequently inHusserl’swork, andocca-sionallyinStein’s,namelythatinatleastacertainmodeofaccomplishmentempathymustbeunderstoodasperceptual.6Perceptionshouldherebeunder-



stoodasanintuitiveexperienceofatranscendentobjectinone’ssurround-ingworldthatisexperientiallygraspedassuch,althoughasweshallseeapeculiarityinthecaseofempathyisthattheother’sbodyisperceivedasanexpressiveforeignsubject,andthusasnotsimplyanentity“in”theworld.Beforeconsideringthislineofthoughtmoreclosely,itshouldbenotedthatontheHusserlianaccount,perceptioninvolvestwointerrelatedformsofpres-ence,whichmustbothnecessarilybeoperative,andhenamestheseprimalpresence(Urpräsenz)andappresence(Appräsenz).Totakeanexample,Imayonlyperceiveahouseassomethingtherebeforemeinitsbodilypresenceifacertain limitedsetof thehouse’sspatialaspectsarecurrentlysensuouslypresenttome,saythesideofitwhichfacesthestreetandtheinteriorofcer-tainroomswhoseouterwindowsIpeerthrough.Theobjectpresent,however,isonlyatranscendentobjectinasmuchasitssensuouslyappearingaspectsareaccompaniedbyprofileswhicharenotcurrentlysensuouslypresent,butwhichareratherpresentifiedorappresented(Husserl1950:150–151;1952,§44).7Thatis,whatisgenuinelygivensensuouslyascurrentlyorientedto-wardsmybodyonlyappearsperceptually,isonlyexperiencedastheexteriorofahouseIamwalkingpast,invirtueofaco-givenhorizonofotheraspectswhichdonot currently appear sensuously, butwhich are taken in theper-ceptualactitselfas possiblesensuouspresencesforsomeone.Theseaspects,whicharesensuouslyabsentbutneverthelessco-intendedasaspectsof theobjectbodilypresent,donotonlyenablethetranscendenceoftheperceivedobject,butalsoplayanessentialroleindeterminingwhattheperceivedobjectisexperiencedas:“fromtheverybeginning,what this experience presents must belong to the unity of the very object appresented.”(Husserl1950:151)ThusforHusserl,bothprimalorsensuouspresenceandappresencearefun-damentalcomponentsofallperception,andthesamestructureappliesinthecaseofempathy.

4

Fordetailedelucidationsofthisself-manifes-tation or pre-reflective self-awareness, andargumentstotheeffectthatitshouldinformphilosophical discussions of selfhood andconsciousness,seeZahavi(1999,2014b).

5

Zahavi(2014b)hasrecentlyarguedindetailforthecontemporarysignificanceoftheposi-tiveaccountsofempathyofferedbyphenom-enologistssuchasHusserl,Stein,Scheler,andSchutz,offeringadetailedcriticalanalysisofthe discussion between theory-theorists andsimulationists.Therehasbeen somethingofanupsurgeofworkonthephenomenologyofempathyinrecentyears,muchofitengagingwiththesocialcognitiondebate.Alongwiththearticlesreferredtoelsewherehere,seee.g.Thompson(2001),DePreester(2008),Smith(2010),Zahavi(2010),ZahaviandOvergaard(2012), Overgaard (2012), Ratcliffe (2012),Gallagher (2012), Ingerslev (2014), Walsh(2014),andTaipale(Forthcoming).

6

Seee.g.Husserl1973c:514,641;1973b:352;1950: 150–151; and Stein 2008: 15, 19–20,31,75,78[1989:58,61].

7

Presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) shouldnotbetakenasstrictlyidenticaltoappresenta-tion.Husserlusestheformertermtodenoteadistinctactwhichintuitivelygivessomethingnotperceptuallypresent–thusmemorypre-sentifiesthepast,imaginationtheimaginary,etc–andassuchistobedistinguishedfromthe co-givenness of the absent profiles ofanobject,which isnon-intuitive andoccursonlyasapartialintentionwithinapresenta-tiveact (Husserl1966:4,68–69).However,whendescribingempathyHusserlalsochar-acterizesappresentationas“apresentificationcombinedbyassociationwithpresentation…intheparticularfunctionof‘co-perception’”.(Husserl 1950: 150)Thismay be due a pe-culiarfeatureofempathicperception,namelythatherethepresentificationoftheother’sex-periencesfunctionsinanappresentativeway,sinceitisconstantlyintertwinedwiththesen-sorygivennessofhisorherbody, insuchamannerthatbotharegivenasactuallypresentaspectsofaperceivedunity.



Aphenomenologicalelucidationofthenotionofempathyasaformofper-ceptioncanbefoundinHusserl’sanalysesofthepersonalisticattitudeinthesecondbookofIdeen,anditwillfirstbenecessarytobrieflyspelloutwhatthisattitudeamountsto.AsHusserlarguesinSections1and2ofIdeen II,thenaturalisticattitude,which is theorientation towards theworldadoptedbythenaturalscientistinhisorherresearchactivities,isguidedbytheunderly-ingmotiveofdeterminingthe‘objective’,substantialpropertiesofphysicalorpsychophysicalentities,thosewhicharemanifestinthealteringstatesofphysicalthingsandcreaturesintheirrelationtocausalcircumstances.8Butthismotivecanberealizedonlyafteracertainabstractionisaccomplished,inwhichtheaxiological,practical,andaestheticpredicateswhichare,inor-dinarylife,immediatelyexperiencedasbelongingtoworldlyobjectsaredis-regarded,orasHusserlalsoputsit,inwhichcertainintentionalitiesbelong-ingtothepersonalspherearetemporarily“neutralized”andtherelativityofperceptualobjectstothebodilypeculiaritiesoftheirperceiverovercome,sothatthe‘Objectivelyreal’canbecomeintoviewassomethingtobestudiedthroughmathematical natural science (Husserl 1952: 8–10, 27, 76, 84–90,186–8).Thepersonalisticattitude,ontheotherhand,isjustthepriorattitudeof everyday life, inwhich subjects donot adopt an abstractive orientationtowards the objects of their surroundingworld (Umwelt), but rather expe-rience them in their life-worldly concreteness, a concretenesswhich refersinitssensetoone’sownandothers’personalevaluations,motivations,andpastexperiences(Husserl1952:§§50–51).Husserlthusmaintainsthat“thenaturalisticattitudeissubordinatedtothepersonalistic”,andthatthenaturalscientistmayonlytakehisorhertheoreticalactivitytobearanexhaustive,absoluteandunconditionedcognitive relation to theworldbymeansof“akindof self-forgetfulnessof thepersonalEgo”,only if theabstraction justdescribedhas become amatter of habit (Husserl 1952: 183–184).He alsoinsiststhatitisforsubjectsofthepersonalisticasopposedtothenaturalisticattitudethatsocialityoperates,andinwhichcultureandsocietycanblossom,sinceitisinthisattitudethatothersareencounteredaspersonsandengagedwithcommunicatively(Husserl1952:§51).Themannerofgivennessofother peopleforsubjectsinthepersonalisticat-titude,then,providesanappropriatebasisfromwhichaphenomenologyofempathymayat leastgainan initial footing.AndforHusserl, thepersonalsubject “sees” in its surrounding world other personal subjects, “personswhoareengagedintheirownsurroundingworld”(Husserl1952:190).Moreprecisely,otherpersonsarenotcomprehendedthroughtheseeingofthings,ratherwhatisfirstandforemostseenoftheotherpersonisthepersonherself,as “intrinsically one” (Husserl 1952: 320).According toHusserl,wemayonlytakeotherpersonsasmerethingsthroughanaturalisticapprehension,inwhichtheirlivedbody(Leib)isabstractedfromthisunityandregardedasamaterialthinglikeanyother,astepwhichforcesnaturalisticpsychologytopositafurthernaturalstrataintheformofapsyche(Seele)boundtoandde-pendentuponthematerialbody–adoublemovementwhich,whilelegitimateforcertaintheoreticalpurposes,certainlydoesnotleadtothepersonassuch(Husserl1952:139–140,190–191).Ontheotherhand,Husserlcharacterizestheotherpersonasgiveninthepersonalisticattitudeasaunityinwhichalivedbodyisgivenasimmediatelyexpressiveofmental(geistig)–thatis,personal-subjective–attributesorexperiences,andhemaintainsthatthispe-culiar,yet“thoroughlyintuitive”unityisexperiencedmostfullyandthemati-callyinactsofempathy(Husserl1952:236,244).



Husserlmorepreciselycharacterizesthephenomenologicalstructureofsuchexperienceinthefollowingpassage:

“Inacertainway,Ialsoexperience(and there isaself-givennesshere) theother’s livedex-periences;totheextentthatempathy(comprehensio)accomplishedasonewiththeoriginaryexperienceofthelivedbodyisindeedakindofpresentification[Vergegenwärtigung],onethatneverthelessservestogroundthecharacterofco-existenceintheflesh.Tothatextent,whatwehavehereisthusexperience,perception.Butthisco-existence(“appresence”…)doesnot,inprinciple,allowitself tobe transformedinto immediateoriginaryexistence(primalpresence[Urpräsenz]).”(Husserl1952:198)

Husserlindicatesherethattheexperienceoftheotherpersonsimultaneouslyinvolvesa two-foldappresence.Given inappresenceherearebothaspectsofwhatisphysical(namelytheabsent“sides”oftheother’sbody)andnon-physical aspects (namely the other’s lived experiences). It is only throughbeing co-intendedwith both such sorts of appresented aspects that the as-pectoftheotherwhichissensuouslygiven,appearsasaspectoftheother.Noteworthyhereisthatwhiletheother’sappresentedphysicalaspectsmaycometoprimalorsensuouspresencethroughamovementonbehalfofeithertheempathizingortheempathizedsubject,theexperientiallifeoftheothernecessarilyremainsinappresence.OnHusserl’sview,thelivedexperiencesoftheothermayonlybeempathicallyexperiencedinsuchawaythattheyremain–inacertainsense–continuallyabsent,asthisiswhatgroundstheother’sphenomenologicalcharacterasco-existing,asasubjectwithhisorherownlivedexperiences.Itisthisdoubleappresenceofempathywhichmakesitanexperienceofanexpressivewhole,and tograsp thecharacterofempathicperception itwillbeimportanttodwellonthisnotionoftheobjectofempathyassomethingexpressive.Husserlmeansbythis,first,thattheother’sspatiotemporalbeingisonlyexperiencedassuchinsofarasitimmediatelymanifeststheexistenceofforeignlivedexperience,andlikewisethattheother’ssubjectivityisonlydirectlyexperiencedinitsembodiment.Whileitistheother’sbodilypresencewhichaffordsthepossibilityofhisorherbeingconcretelyexperienced,thisbodilypresenceisalwaysalreadyanembodied-subjectiveone,orasHusserlexpresses thepoint, theotherhumanbeingwhich I seebeforeme,“inhismovements,inhisaction,inhisspeakingandwriting,etc.,isnotamerecon-nectionorlinkingupofonething,calledasoul,withanotherthing,alivedbody.Thelivedbodyis,aslivedbody,filledwithsoulthroughandthrough.”(Husserl1952:240)Moreover,inempathyonedoesnotintendanaggregateoflivedexperiences,noraunifiedphysicalbody,butrathertheobjectispreciselyaperson:“Inem-pathyweapprehendpersons”(Husserl1952,320).Andthispersonappearsasaunitywhich“hascorporeality[Leiblichkeit],ithasabodywhichisaphysi-calthingwithsuchandsuchqualities,andithaslivedexperiencesandliveddispositions”(Husserl1952:240).Husserl’spoint,then,isnotmerelythattheotherofempathyisaspecialsortofexpressiveobjectwithbothmentaland

8

Seee.g.Husserl(1952:§11,§15–17,§32).In-cidentally,Steinherselfplayedasignificancerole in theformationofwhatwenowknowas Ideen II, since she elaborated and editedthemanuscriptswhichultimatelyfoundtheirwayintothisposthumouslypublishedwork,and it is undoubtedly the case that some ofthepassagesinthistextarejustasmuchher

ownworkastheyareHusserl’s.Thetrueex-tentofthiswillbecomemuchclearerwiththepublication of the original manuscripts thatHusserlintendedforuseinIdeen II andIIIinaHusserlianavolume,editedbyDirkFonfaraandDieterLohmar,thatisexpectedtoappearin2015.



materialstrata,butratherthatthoseaspects,astheyaregiventothesubjectempathizing,manifesttheunityandtranscendenceofanotherpersonallife.Theotherexperientiallifewhichexistsfortheempathizingsubjectas,and“in”,thisexpressiveunity,alsoexistsinandforitselfinamannerwhichdif-fersfromitsexistence-for-me,andHusserlthuswritesthatother’sownself-presenceisreferredto,butnotoriginally accomplished,intheactofempathy(Husserl 1952: 198).But empathy is nevertheless a “thoroughly intuitive”experienceofanotherperson,onewhichfrequentlyincorporatesnotonlyarecognitionofthebarepresenceofanotherexperientiallife,butalsoanim-mediategraspofthetypeofexperientialepisodetheotherisundergoing,andinthisrespectsomethingoftheother’spersonalitymayevenannounceitself(Husserl1952:235,273–274).Finally,thattheotherofempathyisgivenasexpressivemeansthatanexpres-sive relationpertainsbetweentheother’sbodyandthepersonallifeexperi-enced“therein”.Butoneshouldavoidthetemptationtounderstandthisastheideathat,while theother’sbodyisaperceivedphysicalreality,hermentallifeissomethingmerelyintendedsignitively,asifherbodywereasignforadistinctandabsentobject–rather,Husserlinsiststhatwhatisexperiencedinempathyis the“unityof the‘expression’andthe‘expressed’”, theotherpersonherself (Husserl1952:236).WhileHusserl in Ideen II does indeedspeakoftheother’smind(Geist)asthesenseofthelived-body,andclaimsthatempathyistheapprehensionofthelivedbodywhichgraspsthissense,hemeansbythisthatempathyisanapprehensionwhichdisclosesthatbodyaswhatitconcretelyis(i.e.,astheembodimentofaperson),andhestressesthatthisoccursinasinglestroke,anddoesnotpermitoftemporaldifferentiation(Husserl1952:240–241,244).Theother’sfacialexpressions,forexample,“areseenfacialexpressions,andtheyare immediatelybearersofsensefortheother’sconsciousness,e.g.,hiswill,which,inempathy,ischaracterizedastheactualwillofthispersonandasawillwhichaddressesmeincommu-nication”(Husserl1952:235).Inthisvein,Husserlnotesthattheempathyinwhichsuchimmediateexpressivity is laidbareinvolvestheother’smerelybodilyappearancesbeingarticulated in suchamanner that theyconstitute“acertaincorporeality[Leibliches]withacertainmentality[Geistigen]–acertainone,which,ashorizonofexperience,istobedeterminedfurtherbyexperience.”(Husserl1952:242)Husserlindicatesherethatthereisasingleapprehensionwhich, ingrasping its sense as an embodiedmind,gives thebodybothitsparticularsenseasthislived-bodyandas thispersonalsubject,andmoreover,thatthis“horizonal”givennessoftheotherpersonisopentofurtherdetermination,iscontinuallymodifyingandenrichingitself.Inshort,in personalistic empathy the ‘merely physical’ is at no stage given, ratherwhatpresentsitselfisawhole,theperson,withtwointertwineddimensions,thelivedbodyasessentiallypersonallysignificant,andthepersonalsubjectasessentiallymanifesting itself in the livedbody.Expressivity thenmeansthatthepersonisaunityoftwodimensions–bodily“expression”ofmind,mind“expressed”bodily–eachofwhichgaintheirparticularsenseinrela-tiontotheother(Husserl1952:325).9

Tosummarize,Husserl’sanalysisof thepersonalisticattitudesuggests thatone can speakof at least a certain typeof empathy asperceptual, so longasonerespectsseveralcrucialnuances.First,whatisperceivedinempathyisnota spatiotemporal thing,but ratheranotherperson.Second,while thephenomenological structuresof empathyand theperceptionof thingsbothinvolveahighlystructuredinterplayofspatiotemporalaspectsdynamicallycomingtopresenceandappresence,empathicintentionalityalsoinvolvesthe



appresenceoftheother’smentallife.Orrather,inempathytheother’sbodyisgivenasimmediatelyexpressive,thatis,asconstitutingamentallyinfusedbodilydimension,thisdimensionbeingintertwined,inpersonalunity,withasubjective lifemanifestingitselfbodily.Third,andin lightof thisbodily‘articulated’subjectivedimensionoftheotherperson,theobjectofempathyhasamoreprofoundtranscendencethandoestheperceivedspatiotemporalobject,sincetheother’sexperientiallifeisgraspedintheactofempathyasgiventoitselfinawaywhichdiffersradicallyfromitsempathicgivenness.

3. Empathic explication and foreign intentionality

Thereis,however,acertaindangerinunderstandingempathyintermsofper-ception,sinceonemaythenendupoverlookingacrucialaspectofempathy.InthescenefromPather Panchaliintroducedearlier,themanisawareofhiswifeasaworld-directedsubjectofintentionalacts.Onlyifitincludesthislat-terawarenessdoesempathyplayaroleintheman’srealizationthathiswifeis,inhersadness,awareofthealltooworldlyeventoftheirdaughter’sdeath.Itisunclear,perhaps,justhowthisrealizationisreached–perhapsaprocessof deliberation or imagination, or through a comprehension of the signifi-cancewhichthesarihegivestohiswifehasforher,playanimportantrole.Butinanycasetherealizationhasasitsbasisanexperiencethemanhasofhiswifeinwhichherownexperientialworld-directednessisexplicated,andinamannercontinuouswithhisperceptionofher.Hisempathicgrasp,then,doesnotsolelyconsistinacomprehensionofsomething“abouttheother”,butcru-ciallyinvolvesacomprehensionoftheother’sself-transcendingexperiences.Empathyisthenabletoachieveagraspoftheother’sexperientiallifewhichuncoversaspectsofthecontent,structure,andobjectsofthatlife.Ifitwerenotthecasethattheseaspectscouldbeempathicallycomprehended,thatis,iftheother’sintentionalexperiencescouldnotbemanifestedintheirspecifi-city,thentheotherwouldatbestbeindeterminatelytakenasasubject,andatworst,asareifiedpsychophysical“thing”ofthenaturalorculturalworld.Inherattempttoclarifythisaspectofempathy,Steinhelpfullydistinguishesbetweenempathyasperceptualexperienceoftheotherperson,inwhichtheother is the intentionalobject, andwhat she takes todifferent levelof em-pathicaccomplishment (Vollzugsstufe).10AsSteinnotes,while in the initialapprehensionoftheother’ssadness“in”herface,thatsadnessfacesmeasanobject,

9

MichaelTheunissenhasargued that,despiteoccasionallystressingtheimmediacyofper-sonalisticalienexperience, themodeofem-pathy which Husserl takes to underlie suchexperience ismediate and reifying, and thathis account is therefore ultimately unableto do justice to the direct character of life-worldly alien encounters (Theunissen 1965:§§21–22). It seems to me, however, thatTheunissen’s presentation of Ausdrucksver-stehen fails todo justice toHusserl’s insist-ence that personalistic empathy is first andforemostanintuitiveexperienceoftheotheras unitary embodied Geist, and that the ex-pressive relation is locatedwithin thisorigi-naryunity.Thepassagesreferredtoaboveap-peartoadducegreatertextualsupporttothis

readingthanTheunissen’sown,ofwhichthefollowingformulationistypical:“DerfremdeLeibkörperistjasozusagendasvorgegebeneMaterial,dasichaufseinegeistigeBedeutunghin interpretiere.” (Theunissen 1965: 120)On the issue of expressivity inHusserl, seeHeinämaa(2011).

10

Stein’sdescriptionsofthislevelormodalityof empathy are highly suggestive but couldprobablybenefitwithmoreprecision.Unsur-prisingly,onefindsavarietyofinterpretationsinthesecondaryliterature.Cf.Zahavi(2014:137–138);Shum(2012:185–195);Dullstein,(2013:343–346).



“whenIinquireintoitsimpliedtendencies(trytobringanother’smoodtocleargivennesstomyself),thecontent,havingpulledmeintoit,isnolongerreallyanobject.Iamnownolongerturnedtothecontentbuttotheobjectofit,amatthesubjectofthecontentintheoriginalsub-ject’splace.Andonlyaftersuccessivelyexecutedclarification,doesthecontentagainfacemeasanobject.”(Stein2008:19[1989:10])

In Stein’s example, the perception of the other as undergoing a particularmoodalreadycontainstendenciestowardsafulfillingexplication,bymeansofwhich the(other’s)experientialcontext inwhich thatmoodis livedcanbemadethematicandexplicated,insuchamannerthatthecontentsoftheother’sexperiencesare incorporatedwithinthecontentof theactofempa-thy(Stein2008:20[1989,11]).Steinclaimsthatsuchempathicexplicationconstitutesaclarificationandfulfilmentoftheperceptualphase,andthisim-pliesthatinoptimalcasesempathyhasacertainteleologicalstructure,thatitunfoldstowardsanidealstateofcomprehensioninwhich,asSteinwrites,theempathizedjoyisthesameastheother’soriginallylivedjoy“ineveryrespect”,having“thesamecontentandonlyadifferentmodeofgivenness.”(Stein 2008: 25 [1989: 15])Butwhat precisely does empathic explicationamount to, if it isneitherexactlyempathicperceptionandyetdoesnot in-volvetheexperiencebeinggivenasifitwereone’sown?Steindescribesexplicationas“thenon-originalparalleltothehavingoftheexperience”, bywhich shemeans thatwhile the empathic act is, like anyexperience, one originally had, the empathized content,while being givenasthecontentofanoriginalexperience,isnotgiveninthemannerinwhichone one’s own experiences aremanifest as one lives through them, but israthergivenasthecontentofanexperienceoneisnotoriginallyaccomplish-ing.Empathicliving-inisnotanoriginalself-presentation,butratherasortof“presentificationoflivedexperiences”,thatis,abringingtogivennessofwhat isoriginallypresent inexperienceswhich thesubject isnotcurrentlyundergoing.Thatis,thisstageofempathyismorecloselyanalogoustoimagi-nationormemorythanperception,inthattheempathizingsubjectbecomesmomentarilyawareofanexperientialcontext in its livedconcreteness,butone that differs in certain essentialways from her own current perceptualsphere.However,Stein emphasizes thathere tooempathy remainsdistinctfromimaginationandmemory, targetingadifferentdomainofexperiences(namely, thoseof theother,notapastor imaginedself),andhavingadif-ferent typeofepistemic importandmotivation (Stein2008:19–20, [1989:10–11]).Empathicexplicationthusgivesitscontentasthecontentoforiginalexperiencesbeinghadbyanothersubject“hereandnow”,butnotbytheem-pathizingsubject.Andthecontentbroughttogivennessinthiswayisnoneotherthanthatemptilyintendedinempathicperception,justasthesubjectforwhomthiscontentisoriginally“had”istheotherpersonalsubjectempathi-callyperceived.MonikaDullstein(2013)hasrecentlyarguedthat,inlightofhercharacteriza-tionofthisexplicatorystageasinvolvinganon-originalbringingtogivennessoftheother’sexperiences,Stein’sanalysisgivessupporttowhatdeVigne-montandJacob(2012)callintheirownaccounttheisomorphismconditionofempathy.Thisconditionstatesthat,atleastinthemostenhancedandidealformofempathy,boththeempathizingandtheempathizedsubjectmustshareamentalstate,inthesenseoftheempathizingsubjecthavingarepresentationof thementalstateempathized,a representationwhichmoreover issimilarin its content and intentional object to the actual mental state represented(Dullstein 2013: 346–348). Dullstein correctly acknowledges that Stein’sdescriptionofempathicexplicationasaVergegenwärtigung–atermwhich



Dullstein,perhapsmisleadinglyinthiscontext,translatesas‘representation’–doesnotcommithertotheideathattheempathizingsubjectmustimagina-tivelysimulatetheother’sexperience,soastoexperienceitinafirst-personalorprimordialmanner,apositionwhichdeVignemontandJacobdefend intheirownaccount(Dullstein2013:348).Butifcorrectlyunderstood,itseemstomethatthisinsightofStein’srendersinappropriateanytalkofempathyasinvolvingisomorphism,andindeed‘representation’inDullstein’ssense.Forifitisonlytheother’sexperiencethatispresentified,andnotmyown,theninsuccessfulcasesofempathicexplicationtheexperiencepresentifiedisnotmerelysimilartotheother’sactualexperience,butitisthatexperienceitself,giveninthemodeofempathyasopposedtothatofself-awareness.IndeedforSteinthemomentonepresentifiesanexperiencewhichonepositsassome-thingsimilarto,asopposedtosharinganidentitywith,theother’sexperience,wenownolongerhaveacaseofempathy.Rathersuchacasewouldinvolveanactofimaginationwhosecontentispresumedtocorrespondtothereal-ityoftheother’sexperience,acorrespondencewhichcouldonlybedirectlyconfirmedonthebasisofagenuineactofempathy.11

ForStein,thatis,theonlyonewhoactuallyhastheexperiencewhichIem-pathicallyexplicateistheotherwhoIseebeforeme.ThusinsuchexplicationthecontentIgraspisoriginalcontentfortheother,contentwhichIdonotorigi-nallylivethroughmyself,orputdifferently,whileinempathicperceptiononeapprehendsaforeignsubjectasembodied,empathicexplicationthematisesthisverysamesubjectinthenexusofherworld-directedintentionalacts.Tobemoreprecise,theother’sintentionalityisemptilymeantinempathicper-ception,butitmayonlybedeterminatelyandfulfillinglyuncoveredthroughapositionalshiftonbehalfoftheempathizingegoinwhichthe‘I’ceasestointendtheotherasobjectandratherallowsthecontentandobjectsoftheoth-er’sownintendingtobecomemanifest.AsSteinnotes,thepeculiarityofthismodeofempathy,thatitisneitherintuitivenorrepresentational,shouldnotcompelthephenomenologisttodeclareitunintelligible,buttestifiesonlythat“itrefusestobeclassifiedinoneofthepigeonholesofpsychology”(Stein2008:33[1989:20]).Moreover,whilebeinganon-objectifyingexperience,itneverthelessmakespossibleasubsequentpositionalshiftinwhichtheexperi-enceisagainintendedasobject,butnowwitharicher(and,wemightadd,potentiallytransformed)sense(Stein2008:19–20[1989:10–11]).Husserl,on theotherhand,doesnotappear toconceiveof therelationbe-tweenempathicperceptionandempathicexplicationintermsofatemporalprogressionfromtheformertothelatter.Rather,inapassagealreadyquoted,Husserlmaintainsthatempathyasapresentificationoftheother’slivedex-perienceis unifiedwiththeoriginarypresentationofthelivedbody,andhe

11

Stein maintains that, despite differing fromthing-perception in itsmaking presentwhatmaynotbestrictlybodilygiven(butonlyco-given),itispreciselythenon-representationalcharacter and evidential import of empathythat makes it comparable to the outer per-ception ofmaterial objects (Stein 2008: 31,37–38 [1989: 19, 24]).Given this, it seemstome thatwhenDullstein stipulates that, inoccasionallycharacterizingempathyasaper-ceptionSteinmerely“triedtotakehersuper-visor’s views into account and topoint to apossiblewayofcombiningherandHusserl’s

ideas”(Dullstein2013:343),sheunderplaysthe structural similarities which Stein oftenstresses between thing-perception and em-pathy.Moreover,itisalsoworthwhilenotingthatwhenSteindistinguishes empathy fromperception, she alwaysdistinguishes it fromthe perception of material objects. Conse-quently,IseenobasisforsupposingthatSteinwould reject theHusserlian analysis of sec-tion3,and itsconclusion thatempathymayberegardedasperceptual-intuitiveexperienceoftheotherperson,understoodasirreducibletotheperceptionofmaterialobjects.



describestheexperiencewhichinvolvesbothapprehensionsasaperception(Husserl 1952: 198).Andhewrites that in the “comprehensive experience of the existence of the other”heorsheisunderstood,“withoutfurtherado,asapersonalsubjectandtherebyasrelatedtoObjectivities”(Husserl1952:191).Husserl’spositionwouldthenseemtobethatempathicperceptiondoesnotmerelyemptilyandindeterminatelygraspthecontentoftheother’slivedexperiences,soastorequireafulfillingexplication,butratherthatitalreadyhasthoselivedexperiencesasco-giveninanon-objectifyingmanner,thatitalreadypresentifiesthemintheirowndirectedness,andwiththeirowninten-tionalcontentsandobjects,andthatthisinformsthesenseoftheotherpersonasperceived.12

Husserloccasionallygoessofarastoclaimthatempathyisanon-experien-tialformofawareness,aclaimwhichcouldbeunderstoodasthesuggestionthat sensorygivenness is in fact inessential for empathy.Ashewrites, theempathicapprehensionoftheotheraspersonalego

“whichherecannolongerbeconsideredan‘experientialconsciousness’oran‘apperception,’stilldoesnotinvolvemymakingthenaturalrealityoftheothermythematicObject,i.e.,takingahumanbeingasamemberofnature.RatherIam,inempathy,directedtotheotherEgoandEgo-lifeandnottopsychophysicalreality,whichisadoublerealitywithphysicalrealityatthefoundinglevel.Theother’sbodyisformeapassageway(in‘expression,’inindication,etc.,)towardstheunderstandingoftheEgothere,the‘he:’hemoveshishand,hereachesforthisorthat,hestrikes,heconsiders,heismotivatedbythisorthat.Heisthecentreofasurroundingworldappearingtohim,presenttohiminmemory,thoughtabout,etc.,andincludedinitisacorporealsurroundingworld,whichtoagreatextenthehasincommonwithmeandwithoth-ers.”(Husserl1952:347)

Husserlseemsinthispassagetoidentifyempathywiththecomprehensionoftheother’ssubjectivityinitsownconcreteintentionaldirectedness,tosuchanextentthatsuchempathiccomprehensionisdistinguishedfrom,andevengainsacertainpriorityover,thesensoryexperienceoftheother’sbody.How-ever,ItakeitthatHusserlshouldnotbeunderstoodhereasdenyingthatem-pathyisanexperientialawarenessofforeignsubjectivity.Rather,hisclaimisthatempathicexperiencehasasanessentialcomponentacomprehensionofwhatcannotbegivenmerelysensuously,namely,theother’ssubjectivelifeanditsownintentionalcorrelates.Furthermore,thiscomprehensionissofun-damentalthatinempathythesensuouslygivenisimmediatelyencounteredasthat which expressesthissubjectivelife.Expressivity,then,isforHusserlessentiallyconnectedwithintentionality,andtheperceptionofthepersonalsubjectalways involvesanelementofcomprehensionof theother’s inten-tionaldirectedness.It seems tome thaton thispointHusserl’sandStein’s respectiveaccountsarenot in factmutuallyexclusive.WithStein,onecanmaintain that therearemanycasesinwhichone’simmediateapprehensionoftheotherinvolvesa certain emptiness of content, which then becomes determinate and fullthrough theother’s intentional experiencesbeing explicated.Thismayoc-cur, for example,whenone sees themiserable face of a homeless person,which(perhapsduetotheintolerablenormalityofsuchencounters)onefirstapprehendsas“thefaceofabeggar”,andthenonlysubsequentlygraspsasembodyingapresentifieddesperation.Ontheotherhand,onecanmaintainwithHusserlthatempathydoesnotsimplytaketheotherasintentionalobject,thatfromthebeginningtheempathizingsubjectfacesthepresenceofforeignintentional experiencing, anddoes sowith somedegreeof insight into thestructureandcontentsofthelatter.13



Conclusion

InSection2Idescribedempathyintermsofanintuitivegivennessofforeignsubjectivity,anditmaynowbeconsideredhowsuchacharacterisationbearsuponthetwodistinctmomentsofempathy,namelyperceptionandexplica-tion,broughttolightinHusserl’sandStein’sanalyses.Letme first considerwhetherempathycanbeunderstoodasawarenessofforeignsubjectivity.ItwassuggestedinSection3that,forHusserl,empathicperceptionisanawarenessofanotherperson.Characteristicofthisotherper-sonisthatheorsheisaunifiedwhole,onethatisneverthelessanexpressivewhole,thatis,thatbearstwointertwineddimensions,abodily“expression”ofsubjectandasubject“expressed”bodily.Furthermore,IsuggestedinPart4thatthesubject“expressed”inthepersonalwholeperceivedcomes,ormaycomethroughanexplicatoryshift,tothematicfocusinsuchamannerthathisorherlivedexperiencesmaybethematicallygraspedintheirowncontentsandtheirownspecificcharacterasintentionalconsciousacts.Butinnoneoftheseaccomplishmentsdoes theempathizingsubjectcoincidewith theoneempathized.AsHusserlunderlines,allthatIempathizeintheotherreferstoan‘I’whichismanifesttoitselfinessentiallythesamemannerwhichIamtomyself.Butthisself-manifestation,however,isutterlytranscendentofmyown,andthatthistranscendentself-manifestationisintendedinempathy,andinamannerwhichfundamentallydeterminesitscharacterasanact,under-linesboththealterityandthesubjectivityoftheotherofempathy.ButtowhatextentdoHusserl’sandStein’sanalysespermittalkofempathyasamodeofintuitive experience?Iftheperceivedmaterialobjectis,inasense,relativelyunproblematicasanexampleoftheintuitivelygiven,invirtueofthesensuouslyapparentbeingpartofathethingitself,andthelatterbeingatotalitywhichcouldinprincipleshowitselffullybymeansoffuturalper-spectivalappearances,theotherpersonal-subjectivelifeisintuitivelypresentonlyinasomewhatenigmaticsense.Empathyisintuitiveinsofarasitisthatmodeofexperiencebywhichthesubjectachieves,throughthetwomomentsofperceptionandexplication,asui generisgraspofatranscendentpersonal-subjectivelife,initstranscendenceandyetalso,toacertainextent,itsdeter-minatecomportment.Yetwhatthisintuitivegivennessoftheotheressentiallyrequires is a persistently non-originalmoment.While the other is directlygraspedasaself-manifestingintentionallife–inthesensethatthisgraspingisanessentialaspectoftheintuitiveexperienceoftheotherperson–theoth-er’sexperientiallifemayneverbelivedthroughinthemostbasicandorigi-narysense.Butthisisanecessaryabsencesince,aswesawinSection2,ifitweresolivedthroughtheotherwouldceasetobeotherandwouldbecome

12

Cf.Carr1987:270.

13

In fact, both Husserl and Stein distinguishbetween different levels of empathy, withthe most basic experiential achievement be-ingapassivelyoccurringapperceptionoftheother’sbodyasa livingbodywhich senses,and theymaintain that on this primitive ex-perientiallevelthereisnotyettheexpressionof Geist, that the other is not here encoun-teredasasubjectofintentionalactivity(Stein2008: 74–79 [1989: 56–61],Husserl 1973a:455–457).Buttherecognitionofsuchlevels

need notmotivate the denial of the claim Ihave been attributing to them here, namelythat in personalistic empathy the other isexperienced as an embodied and intentionalmind“withoutfurtherado”,sincethisthesisis entirely compatiblewith amore nuancedunderstanding of the various intentions andmotivational relationships inherent withinpersonalistic empathy. Indeed a completeaccount of the phenomenology of empathywouldcertainlyneed to incorporate suchanunderstanding.Forfurtherdiscussionof thisissue,seeZahavi(2014a).



onewithme.Thusfortheother’sself-presencetobegraspedasthe other’sitcannotbegivenbutonlycomprehendedorrecognized,yetthisrecognitionisalreadyachievedintheexperienceoftheotherperson’sexpressivity.14Itthusseemsthatempathyachievesacoincidencebetweenexperientialinsightandtherecognitionoftranscendence,orbetweendirectintuitionandalterity,andthatHusserlisonfirmgroundwhenhewritesasfollows:“Justaswhatispastcanbeoriginallygivenaspastonlythroughmemory,andwhatistocomeinthefuturecanassuchonlybeoriginallygiventhroughexpectation,theforeigncanonlybeoriginallygivenas foreign throughempathy.Originalgivenness in this sense is thesameasexperience.”(Husserl1959:176)

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14

Foracloserlookattherelationshipbetweenempathyandrecognition,seeJardine(Forth-coming).



James Jardine

Husserl i Stein o fenomenologiji empatije: percepcija i eksplikacija

SažetakU fenomenološkoj tradiciji često se nalaze hrabre tvrdnje da je interpersonalno razumijevanje uko-rijenjeno u suigeneris obliku intencionalnog iskustva, koji se najčešće naziva empatijom (Einfüh-lung). Ovaj rad istražuje te tvrdnje, naglašujući njihov specifičan karakter, te ispituje fenomenološ-ka razmatranja u obrani tih tvrdnji koje su ponudili dva istaknuta zagovaratelja, Edmund Husserl i Edith Stein. U drugome dijelu, nakon iznošenja nekih uvodnih indikacija kako bi se empatija uopće trebala razumijevati, pažnju pridajem nekim karakterizacijama specifične strukture empatije, uzi-majući u obzir u trećemu poglavlju huserlovsku tvrdnju da su neki oblici empatije opažajne naravi, te u četvrtome poglavlju inzistiranje Edith Stein da empatičko iskustvo često uključuje eksplici-ranje intencionalnih iskustava drugih. Peto poglavlje zaključujem s procjenom razine do koje njihove analize podupiru shvaćanje empatije kao intuitivnog iskustva drugih umova.

Ključneriječiempatija,percepcija,interpersonalnorazumijevanje,EdmundHusserl,EdithStein

James Jardine

Husserl und Stein zur Phänomenologie der Empathie: Perzeption und Explikation

ZusammenfassungInnerhalb der phänomenologischen Tradition findet man häufig die gewagte Behauptung, das interpersonale Verständnis sei in der Sui-generis-Form der intentionalen Erfahrung verwurzelt, die meistens als Empathie (Einfühlung) bezeichnet wird. Die vorliegende Arbeit erforscht diese Behauptung, indem sie ihren distinktiven Charakter hervorhebt und phänomenologische Betrach-tungen examiniert, die zu ihrer Verteidigung deren zwei Hauptbefürworter, Edmund Husserl und Edith Stein, vorgebracht haben. Nachdem ich im zweiten Teil einige vorbereitende Hinweise ange-bracht habe, darüber, wie man Empathie auslegen sollte, widme ich mich danach einigen Charak-terisierungen ihrer distinktiven Struktur, indem ich im dritten Teil die husserlsche These betrachte, bestimmte Formen der Empathie seien in ihrer Natur perzeputell, und im vierten Teil Steins Beste-hen darauf, dass die empathische Erfahrung oftmals Explikationen eigener intentionaler Erfah-rungen anderer enthält. Teil fünf schließt mit der Beurteilung ab, in welchem Umfang ihre Analysen die Auffassung der Empathie als einer intuitiven Erfahrung anderer Verstande unterstützen.

SchlüsselwörterEmpathie,Perzeption,interpersonalesVerständnis,EdmundHusserl,EdithStein

James Jardine

Husserl et Stein sur la phénoménologie de l’empathie : perception et explication

RésuméDans la tradition phénoménologique, on trouve souvent qu’il est audacieux d’affirmer que la compréhension interpersonnelle soit enracinée dans une forme suigeneris de l’expérience inten-tionnelle, désignée généralement comme empathie (Einfühlung). L’article suivant explore cette affirmation, en soulignant son caractère distinctif et en examinant les considérations phénomé-nologiques que proposent en sa défense deux de ses principaux partisans, Edmund Husserl et Edith Stein. Après avoir proposé dans la partie 2 quelques indications préliminaires sur comment l’empathie devrait être comprise, je me tourne ensuite vers quelques descriptions de la structure caractéristique de celle-ci, en considérant, dans la partie 3, l’affirmation husserlienne d’après laquelle certaines formes d’empathies sont de nature perceptive, puis dans la partie 4, l’insis-tance d’Edith Stein sur le fait que l’expérience empathique implique souvent l’explication des expériences intentionnelles propres à l’autre. La partie 5 conclura en évaluant jusqu’où leurs analyses soutiennent une conception d’empathie comme expérience intuitive des autres esprits.

Mots-clésempathie,perception,compréhensioninterpersonnelle,EdmundHusserl,EdithStein

Husserl and Stein on the Phenomenology of Empathy ...

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Transcript of Husserl and Stein on the Phenomenology of Empathy ...