Hussain (Ed) 2007 - West Europe & the United
Transcript of Hussain (Ed) 2007 - West Europe & the United
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WEST EUROPE, & THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA:
COMPETITION, GRAVITATION, OR INSULATION?
Imtiaz Hussain
Department of International StudiesUniversidad Iberoamericana
Mexico [email protected]
Word Count:Abstract: 165
Text: 6178Appendices: 3393
Prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association annual convention,Chicago, February-March 2007
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Abstract:
With the 2006 Vienna EU-LA summit failing to enhance the 1999 Ro de Janeiro
summits inter-regionalism spirit, the place of Latin America in transatlantic trade is
reassessed from the familiar competition (Adler & Barnett 1998; Balassa 1961; Belous &
Hartley 1990; Deutsch, et al., 1957; Haas 1958; Nye 1971, et al.), gravitation (Tinbergen
1962; Head 2003; et al.), and insulation (Cardoso & Faletto 1979; Evans 1979; Cockcroft,
Frank, & Johnson 1972; ODonnell 1973) theses. Respectively articulating inter-bloc
rivalry, strongest economy pulls, and state introversion, these show (a) the United States
still remains the largest Latin trading partner, though with diminishing claims; (b) West
European countries collectively match the United States, though not under a European
Union label; (c) Latin countries trade more with each other; and (d) emerging Asian
economies show the fastest Latin trade growth rates. If these 1995-2004 patterns persist,
global trade restructuring would capture Latin America at its most diversified moment, in
turn attenuating gravitation and insulation theories while reformulating competition
counterparts.
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Introduction:
Perennially treated in the global political economy as an up-for-grabs arena, Latin
Americas unfolding 21st Century transformation could wreak empirical and theoretical
havoc. European influence, US dominance, and such unfolding forces as globalization,
diversification, and banding together not only demand empirical attention, but also impose
theoretical concerns. How do we explain these twists of events at the start of the 21st
century? What do they predict for the remainder of the century?
Previewing Findings:
A study of Latin trade directions between 1995 and 2004 finds the underlying
argument of intense inter-bloc rivalry during the 1990s (a) shifting trade from the United
States towards the increasingly larger and more confident European Union (EU) only
marginally; (b) US dominance as the largest Latin trading partner diminishing; and (c)
Latin trade increasingly remaining within Latin America. Yet, the sum of all these parts still
does not fully explain the trading whole. With booming Asian trade as the startling finding,
emerging economies like China, South Korea, and to some extent India, seem to be on a
pace to challenge their established counterpart, Japan, in Latin America, not to mention
West European countries and the US. Growing Latin independence from historically
dominant partners is a not too unimportant finding.
Theoretical Identity: The Long and Winding Road
Understanding developments on the ground necessitates appraising the drawing
board flux. Downsizing paradigms mirrors the trade diversification underway better.
Latin America did not become the theoretical melting pot, or even a playground, by
chance or choice. Dependence theory, for example, evolved in the 1950s, to explain
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European colonialism and US corporations,1 only to be modified as dependent development
or bureaucratic authoritarianism in the 1970s.2 US neorealism also entered Latin America to
account for the Cuban deviation, and, in the diluted form of interdependence,3 the Central
American wars of the 1980s. Once the Cold War was over, a reinvigorated European
Commnity (EC) not only resurrected Latin Americas failed integrative efforts of the
1960s, but also invoked applications from neofunctionalism,4 regional economic
integration,5 and security community paradigms,6 and from all of the above, various forms
of inter-bloc rivalry. In the final analysis, none of these theories unfolded on the ground as
they were depicted on the drawing board: Integration during the Cold War failed because
the US was disinterested, and later owing to openness, both in domestic politics and foreign
economic policy, unleashing too many forces to be adequately captured; neorealism lacked
a sufficiently strong countervailing force in the region, not only with too many dictators,
but also dictators elevating other agendas than systemic power rivalry; and dependence
owing to the growth of nationalized industries under import substitution industrialization
(ISI).7 Of these, integration carries more mileage at the turn of the century, not because it is
1See Ferdinand Enrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto,Dependency and Development in Latin America,trans. Marjory Mattingly Urquidi (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979); James D. Cockcroft,Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin Americas Political
Economy (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972).2Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in
Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Guillermo ODonnell, Modernization andBureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of CaliforniaPress, Institute of International Studies, 1973).
3One example is Mexico-US cooperation over drug control. See Guadalupe Gonzlez Gonzlez,The drug connection in U.S.-Mexican relations:introduction, The Drug Connection in U.S.-Mexican
Relatsions, eds., Gonzlez Gonzlez and Marta Tienda, Papers prepared for the Bilateral Commission on theFuture of United States-Mexican Relations (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University ofCalifornia, San Diego, 1989), ch. 1. Also see Jorge Chabat, The making of Mexican policy toward theUnited States,Foreign Policy in the U.S.-Mexican Relations, eds. Rosario Green and Peter S. Smith, vol. 5,Bilateral Comsission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations series (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1989).
4Term coined by Ernst B. Haas. See The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces,1950-1957(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958).
5Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, IL: R.D. Irwin, Inc. 1961).6Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998).7See Ren Villarreal, The policy of import-substituting industrialization, 1929-1975,
Authoritarianism in Mexico, eds., Jos Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinhart (Philadelphia, PA: Institute for
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the empirically and theoretically most vibrant, but because it serves the rebounding board
of alternate forces.
Behind integration lay the tenets of neofunctionalism,8 as well as Jacob Viners
customs union theory,9 especially as extended into stages of regional economic integration
by Bela Balassa in 1961.Ernst B. Haass explanation of European economic developments
of the 1950s adjusted David Mitranys corporate-based functionalism,10 but still failed to
account for the security substructure, evident through North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). As others brought him to task,11 increasing theoretical gaps and mismatches
obscured and segmented the central phenomenon addressed by each paradigm, eroding our
explanatory power: By assuming political and security considerations away,
neofunctionalism and regional economic integration simply became castles in the air, and
by not specifically pinning down the essence of realism and neorealism, which belittled
economic dynamics, security community tenets simply blew in the wind, at times towards
military security, at times in the functionalist economic directions.12 Neofunctionalism is so
wrapped up in explaining endogenous dynamics, Henry Nau argues,13 it completely misses
out on exogenous and external developments; while security community depends so much
the Study of Human Issues, 1977), 67-108.8On its updated characterization, see Joseph S. Nye, Comparing common markets:a revised neo-
functionalist model, Regional Integration: Theory and Research, eds. Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A.Scheingold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 192-231.
9Jacob Viner, Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950);and -----, Trade Relations Between Free-Market and Controlled Economies (Geneva: League of Nations,1943).
10Mitrany, Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of InternationalOrganization (London: Royal Institute for International Affaire, 1944).
11Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1957).
Haas, The Uniting of Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organizationin the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
12For realism, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).On neorealism, see the authoritative works of Kenneth N. Waltz,Man,the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). This was latersurpassed by The Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
13From integration to interdependence: gains, losses, and continuing gaps, International Organization33, no. 1 (Winter 1979):119-147.
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on such idiosyncratic tenets as values, we ultimately fail to distinguish between domestic
and regional integration, in spite of the elaborately demarcated amalgamated and pluralistic
community models in the literatures.14 Robert O. Keohanes and Jospeh S. Nyes proposal
of interdependence signals the kind of a hybrid we need today, but it is too simplistic to
survive the post-Cold War explosion of unaccountable dynamics: environmental protection,
human rights promotion, immigration, drug trafficking and money laundering, terrorism--
all demanding greater overall attention, but more so in the United States and West Europe
than across Latin America, where social inequities, political darwinism, and economic
stratification still rule the day.
Creeping segmentation was matched by a policy-making pot pourri. The United
States was smuggling security considerations into all kinds of non-security policy arenas
even before 9/11, as if some political order had to prevail before any economic
programming.15 NATO, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the South East
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) illustrate this against the hindsight of the purposes and
rationales of the Marshall Plan, the US Agency of International Aid (USAID), and the US
Alliance for Peace pursuits. For its own part, the EU expanded both membership and policy
controls during the 1990s without means matching the ends, with the result of increasing
social protests against the collective entity. Latin countries faced the post-Cold War
maelstrom as they were recovering from a marginalizing lost decade in the 1980s,16
meaning they could neither absorb the political economic reforms nor make the necessary
14My own treatment of North American integration shows this in Elections, political integration, andNorth America:exploring the unknown,Norteamrica 1, no. 1 (January-June 2006):163-202.
15Argument most vociferously conveyed by Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the MultinationalCorporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment(New York: Basic Books, 1975), ch. 1.
16On the symptoms behind the malaise and roads to recovery, see Sebastin Edwards, Crisis andReform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope (New York: Oxford University Press, for the InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995).
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socio-cultural adaptations necessitated by globalization, liberalization, and democratization
(GLAD).17
When multilateralism broke down at the Uruguay Round,18 attention turned to trade-
bloc rivalry.19 ECs 1986 Single European Act and the US acceptance of the free trade
agreement (FTA) proposals from Canada and Mexico in 1986 and 1989,20 respectively, bred
potential transatlantic rivalry, Latin America became one of its first playgrounds: The US-
sponsored 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas (SOA) substantiated the visionary 1989
Enterprise of the Americas Initiative (EAI),21evolving into the meticulously elaborated Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) after the 1998 Santiago SOA; 22 while the EU launched
an equally grandiose Latin integration program through the 1999 Ro de Janeiro summit,23
which, by the May 2006 EU-Latin America (EU-LA) Vienna summit, was sputtering more
than progressing.24 Nitty-gritty bureaucratic-level negotiations and streamlinings
characterized both endeavors, suggesting the outcomes may not be as barren as they appear
17Acronym utilized and explained in Imtiaz Hussains Parochial globalism? The rock of liberalism,the hard place of democratization, and the Mexico in between, Paper presented in workshop on Democracy
and Globalization,International Studies Association, annual convention, Chicago, February 2001.18See, for example, John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay
Round (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1995); Ernest Preeg, Traders in a Brave New World: TheUruguay Round and the Future of the International Trading System (Chicago, IL: University of ChicagoPress, 1995); and Yash Tandon and Megan Allardice,Paved With Good Intentions: Background to the GATT,Uruguay Round, and WTO (Newlands, Harare, Zimbabwe: SEATINI, 2004).
19Among others, see Richard S. Belous and Rebecca S. Hartley, eds., The Growth of RegionalTrading Blocs in the Global Economy (Washington, DC: National Planning Association, 1990).
20On the SEA, see Andrew Moravscik, Negotiating the Single European Act:national interests andconventional statecraft in the European Community,International Organization 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991):19-56; on the North American FTA proposals, see Michael Hart, with Bill Dymond and Colin Robertson,
Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-US Free Trade Negotiations (Vancouver, BC: University of BritishColumbia Press, 1994); and Gilbert R. Winham, Trading With Canada: The Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement(New York: Priority Press, 1988); and Frederick Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA: The Science andArt of Political Analysis (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998).
21Roy E. Green, ed., The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: Issues and Prospects for a FreeTrade Agreement in the Western Hemisphere (New York, NY: Praeger, 1993).
22Richard Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas: A Progress Report (Washington, DC: Institute ofInternational Economics, 1997); and Paulo Vizenti and Marianne Weisebron, eds., Free Trade for the
Americas: The United States Push for the FTAA Agreement(London: Zed Books, 2004).23European Commission,A Stronger Partnership: The European Union and Latin America (Brussels,
Belgium: European Commission External Relations, 2006).24EU/LAC Vienna Summit,4th EU-Latin American/Caribbean summit in Vienna (Austria), 12 May
2006: Declaration of Vienna, July 2006, from: http://ec.europa.eu/world/lac-vienna/
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at first sight; but as a wider Europe reached the waters edge, questions multiplied as to
how a collective policy could embrace any given single policy area, for example, monetary
policy, the currency, immigration, foreign and security policy, and so forth, for so many
countries. Thus, with the US fully committed to the war against terrorism and the EU
undergoing another identity crisis, rather than wait for the dust to settle, many countries not
only revitalized their own neighborhood relations, but also looked outside North America,
West Europe, and their own neighborhoods.
Latin countries were no exception. As Brazil and others challenged not just FTAA
but also the multilateral order in the Cancn World Trade Organization (WTO) summit,25
the stage was set to confront at least three new packages of old theories: competition,
gravitation, and insulation.
Competition Arguments:
Reflecting the conditions of complex interdependence and trade-bloc rivalry today,
competition remains consistent with the underlying thrusts of both neoliberalism,26 such as
welfare-enhancement and cooperation, and neorealism,27 such as self-help and systemic
power distribution. This mixture does not have a name, but competitiveness is common to
them all. Competition, in turn, may be viewed from specific-country and collective levels.,
Trade, unfortunately, does not flow between collective entities, and although adding up the
trade flows of individual countries is the most realistic collective picture we can draw,
second-best as it is, it at least profiles regional trading possibilities.
Methodologically (a) competition in Latin America is being measured through the
proportion of trade of any given Latin country with the United States and West European
25I have dwelled on this in After Cancn:G21, WTO, and multilateralism, Journal of Internationaland Area Studies 11, no. 2 (December 2004):1-16.
26David Baldwin, ed., Neoliberalism and Neorealism: The Contemporary Debate (New York, NY:Columbia University Press, 1993).
27Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, CA: Addison Wesley, 1979); andKeohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986).
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countries compared to its overall trade; and (b) not every Latin American or West European
countries can be included. For reasons of Latin trade size and geographical representation,
the following fit the bill: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela on the western hemisphere side of the
equation, and France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, on the West European side, since, in many cases, they remain the only
Latin traders, while two possessed colonies. Even though Mexico is not traditionally
counted as a Latin American country, it shares many Latin idiosyncrasies about the United
States, West Europe, and Asia, and is grouped under this rubric.
Significant implications abound. First, the study shows, in terms of trade flows, the
collective European Union label is less meaningful than the individual countrys identity:
With each West European country depicting too different trade patterns and volumes,
invoking the EU label seems to be more sentimental than substantive. Second, a country-
specific analysis exposes the survival-of-the-fittest essence of neorealism: The dominant
West European traders with Latin countries remain the larger economies today, while the
colonial powers, Spain and Portugal, exert greater socio-cultural impacts than political
economic. Finally, the absence of any EU trading footprint and the unequal trading patterns
between West European and Latin countries questions the relevance of the previously
seductive West European regionalism model for Latin America: Postulated from as early as
the 1960s, the West European regional model influenced the Latin American Free Trade
Agreement (LAFTA) arrangements in the early 1960s, even to the point of pushing the
doyen of regional theory-making, Haas himself, to examine LAFTA in its infancy,28while
even MERCOSUR tiptoed the West European regional model to become the worlds
28Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, Economics and differential patterns of politicalintegration:projections about unity in Latin America, International Organization 18, no. 4 (Autumn1964):705-37.
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second customs union in 1995.29 Formidable internal incorrigibilities within LAFTA and
MERCOSUR made the West European regional model irrelevant. On the one hand, the US
neglect of both LAFTA and MERCOSUR contributed/contributes to their
underperformance, yet without enhancing FTAA.
Without a robust Latin presence, formal regional integration cannot automatically
cultivate transatlantic inter-bloc rivalry. A rivalry probably exists, but not through blocs, as
Latin and West European countries pursue their interests individually--very much like the
United States does whether in Latin America, West Europe, or any other part of the world.
Here is an element of realism/neorealism lost in the worlds of neoliberalism, integration,
and globalization. Yet, if the competition balance sheet shows muddling on the drawing
board and in the trenches, how does gravitation fare? After all, the US still exerts more
influence than any other country over Latin America.
Gravitation Arguments:
Gravitation presumes competition, but competition need not necessarily produce
gravitation. Much in newtonian style, gravitation trade theory originated with Jan
Tinbergens 1962 trade-flow indexing reflecting the economic mass of any two countries
and the geographic distance between them.30 The realist/neorealist expectation of the larger
the size, the more the trade flows, crept in. 31 With the United States serving as the worlds
largest economy, gravitation theory carries a built-in US bias: In the absence of an EU
trading entity, at least on the ground where trade flows, transatlantic comparisons with the
29On MERCOSUR, see Jaime Behar, Cooperation and Competition in a Common Market: Studies onthe Formation of MERCOSUR (New York, NY: Physica Verlag, 2000); Francesco Duina, SocialConstruction of Free Trade: The European Union, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2006); and Riordan Roett,Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets (Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner, 1999).
30The seminal piece, in my research, turned out to be Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions foran International Political Economy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), appendix 6.
31Also see Keith Head, Gravity for beginners, Class presentation, University of British Columbia,January 2003. See: www.economics.ca/keith/gravity.pdf, or email: [email protected]
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United States cannot be meaningful. If we then review routine EU and US trading
restrictions, gravitation theory becomes even less useful: With Great Britains market-
driven and Frances supply-controlled approaches to the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), for example, EU agricultural restrictions cannot speak for all members. With fewer
restrictions than the EU in an export-driven age, the US attracts more exporters than the
EU: As evident in trade statistics compiled each year by the International Monetary Fund,
US ranks higher than any single EU member for more countries of the world. If
individually no EU member can match the US, speaking in one voice seems to be more a
EU problem than waging a collective crusade against a trade rival.
Gravitation theory faces its greatest potential obstacle in globalizing processes:32
These are too many, too varied, and far too unpredictable to render overpowering authority
to any single paradigm, or, as Peter Gumbel postulates, any single country. 33 Before their
growth into formidable economies, no paradigm predicted the rise of China, India, and
other Asian economies; even as an established economy, Japan was admitted into the
theoretical plane only reluctantly, and fruitlessly: It was supposed to have anchored a
regional trading bloc,34 for example, which was a ludicrous idea given Japans hostile
neighborhood, while alignment with the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN),
enhanced, not regionalism, but Japans bilateral trading preferences elsewhere. Japan also
seriously threatened the US economy in the 1980s, as many contended,35 only to sink
economically during the 1990s just when Chinas unpredictable surge began cresting.
Certainly across Latin America, where Japan was better established as a trading partner
32James N. Rosenau, Turbulence In World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), especially ch. 1.
33His example is the United States. See Peter Gumbel, The global question:who needs the U.S.?Time, January 29, 2007, 48-9.
34See Richard Gibb and Wieslaw Michalak, Continental Trading Blocs: The Growth of Regionalismin the World Economy (New York: John Wiley, 1994).
35Clyde Prestowitz is one. See Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead(New York:Basic Books, 1988).
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than any other Asian country, China, India, and South Korea, for example, show more
impressive growth rates than Japan, which, in fact, is facing more negative growth rates
than positive. Once the worlds second largest economy, Japan never really exerted the
second largest gravitational impact--a lesson not lost on China as it ascends to that rank. If
Japans Latin fate is consistent with gravitation theory because of the greater distance, why
is Chinas more difficult to assert when it is navigationally even farther away?
There may be many explanations of the differences between China and Japan in
their rise to economic superpowerdom.36 Heavy government regulation vaulted both Japan
and China up the global economic ladder. Unfortunately for Japan, deregulation produced
the longest recession in the industrialized world, from 1989 to at least 2003.37 Unfortunately
for neoliberalists, it was not the private sector but the public responsible for Chinas ascent
in an age of neoliberalism. Whether some misfortune awaits China or not, one observation
is clear: Without effectively distinguishing private sector catalysts from the public, it
becomes less suitable in a world of (a) government intervention, and (b) globalization
processes, whose very definition must reflect how distance is being conquered.
Trading with Asia is theoretically rattling. In addition to challenging gravitation
theory, it also strengthens the competition thesis as more trading partners demand a share of
each Latin countrys trading pie. Yet, by shifting Asian production to Latin America to
36Joshua A. Fogel, ed., Teleology of the Modern Nation State: Japan and China (Philadelphia, PA:University of Pennsylvania, 2004); Hanns Gnther Hilpert and Ren Haak, Japan and China: Cooperation,Competition, and Conflict (Houndsmills, Basington, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2002); Jeong-Pyo Hong,
Regional Integration in Northeast Asia: Approaches to Integration Among China, Korea, and Japan (Seoul,Korea: Korea Institute of internacional Economic Policy, 2004); Saadia M. Pekkanen and Kellee S. Tsai, eds.,
Japan and China in the World Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2005); and Edith Ferry,How Asia GotRich: Japan, China, and the Asian Miracle (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).
37Junichiro Koizumis deepening reforms may become the dividing line between the Japaneserecession and renewed long-term growth. He did not initiate the reforms, but became their most vociferouslysupporting leader. On the nature of the reforms, see Charles W. Calomiris and Joseph R. Mason, How torestructure failed banking systems:lessons from the United States in the 1930s and Japan in the 1990s,Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region, eds., Takatoshi Ito and Anne Krueger(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 375-424; and Tsuruhiko Nambu, What has been achievedin the Japanese telecommunications industry since 1985, ibid., 343-74.
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access US markets, as the Japanese have done with automobiles in Mexico (and Canada
from 1965), and inspired China and South Korea to emulate in other industries, do the
breakdown of gravitation and growth in competition increase or decrease Latin insulation?
Introversion Arguments:
Given the communications revolutions (not just highways, ships, and aeroplanes,
but also the internet), introversion is no longer synonymous with nationalism, though it
could be, inviting more like-minded countries within its contours than hitherto. Intra-Latin
trade seems to be expanding, first, because the lack of appropriate infrastructures prevented
any conscious collective action previously; second, dictators before reflected narrower
geographical horizons than Latins foreign-educated and more cosmopolitan leaders today;
third, trade with partners outside the hemisphere established some of the werewithals with
which to build intra-regional trade, a factor not sufficiently present before; and fourth, trials
and errors from past regional experiences, such as LAFTA, provided the foundations.
Sparking these secular developments seems to be a fractious leftist resurgence, with
a different, more pragmatic breed embracing a number of neoliberal policy positions their
radical counterparts previously rejected. Many of Latins economic heavyweights belong
here: Argentinas Nestor Kirchner, Brazils Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, and Chiles Michelle
Bachelet in Chile. Under leftist governments at the start of the new century, all
MERCOSUR members have gone out of their way to invite Hugo Chvezs Venezuela by
extending his countrys membership, while Bolivias Evo Morales and Ecuadors Rafael
Correa, also leftist presidents, in spite of bilateral policy differences with Brazil, remain
eager membership applicants.
As a market for 250m people, MERCOSURs US$1tr gross domestic product
represents 76% of South Americas (Mexico excluded), and between its creation in 1990 to
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2006, intra-MERCOSUR trade went up from US$4b to US$30b. Michael Astor, who
supplies these figures, might be right in contending, at the time of MERCOSURs January
2007 summit in Ro de Janeiro, South Americas lunge towards the left is overshadowing
the goal of free trade . . . . Chvezs November 2006 re-election put beef into his 21 st
century socialism pledge by announcing a 6-year nationalization plan for key industries,
thereby challenging free trade commitments.38 Whether MERCOSUR transforms into a
political stage of Western-style free trade, as Astor puts it, or a political forum for
bashing the market economy in Michael Shifters words, or even take increasingly anti-
globalization, anti-Doha positions, as Riordan Roett fears, or contain Chvez through
membership before he dilute[s] Mercosur, in Agustin Cornejos view, remains the critical
questions.39 Behind them all lies indisputable latinization, and emerging desires to explore
Asia--the continent expanding trade more rapidly with Latin America than any other. For
example, behind the brouhaha, the January 2007 MERCOSUR summit also signed an
agreement authorizing trade discussions with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates,40 thus bringing other dynamic Asian economies into the Latin fold.
Summary:
All these clusters profile emerging trading patterns. Given the overlaps between
them, it is more probable than not no single cluster will dominate: Simultaneous claims not
38See Venezuella:with Marx, Lenin and Jess Christ,Economist, January 13, 2007, 33-4.39All quotes from Michael Astor, What price free trade for South, The Standard: Chinas Business
Newspaper, January 19, 2007, from:http://thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_at_=9&art_id=36377&sud=11794063&con_type=3&d_str=20070119; and -------, Unification remains elusive at Mercosur,Daily Democrat(Woodland, CA), January 20,2007, from:http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/B/BRAZIL_MERCOSUR_SUMMIT?SITE=CAWOO&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2007-01-19-09-53-46
40See South American leaders refocus Mercosur trade bloc on needs of poor,International HeraldTribune, January 17, 2007, from: http://iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/18/ame3rica/LA-GEN-Brazil-Mercosur-Summit.php
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http://thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_at_=9&art_id=36377&sud=11794063&con_type=3&d_str=20070119http://thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_at_=9&art_id=36377&sud=11794063&con_type=3&d_str=20070119http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/B/BRAZIL_MERCOSUR_SUMMIT?SITE=CAWOO&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2007-01-19-09-53-46http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/B/BRAZIL_MERCOSUR_SUMMIT?SITE=CAWOO&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2007-01-19-09-53-46http://iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/18/ame3rica/LA-GEN-Brazil-Mercosur-Summit.phphttp://iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/18/ame3rica/LA-GEN-Brazil-Mercosur-Summit.phphttp://thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_at_=9&art_id=36377&sud=11794063&con_type=3&d_str=20070119http://thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_at_=9&art_id=36377&sud=11794063&con_type=3&d_str=20070119http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/B/BRAZIL_MERCOSUR_SUMMIT?SITE=CAWOO&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2007-01-19-09-53-46http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/B/BRAZIL_MERCOSUR_SUMMIT?SITE=CAWOO&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2007-01-19-09-53-46http://iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/18/ame3rica/LA-GEN-Brazil-Mercosur-Summit.phphttp://iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/18/ame3rica/LA-GEN-Brazil-Mercosur-Summit.php -
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only befit todays complicated world facing neoliberalism, globalization, and regionalism,
but also predict the increasing paradigm irrelevance.
Empirical Evidence:
Data in nine appendices assess the abovementioned arguments along three
theoretical clusters:41 Appendix 1 presents US dollar values of Latin imports over time, with
Appendix 2 placing these figures in proportional terms; appendices 3 and 4 do likewise to
Latin exports; appendices 5 and 6 repeat the same exercises for Latin imports from and
exports to Asian and Latin American countries, respectively, with both absolute and
relative data on the same appendix; appendices 7 and 8 respectively place aggregate Latin
imports from and exports to the United States, eight prominent West European countries,
three emerging Asian countries, four Asian countries (the same three with Japan), and Latin
America; and Appendix 9 aggregates US-EU performances between 1998 and 2004.
Discussions begin with gravitation, shift to competition, and conclude with insulation.
Gravitation Argument:
Posting proximity and economic size as the salient determinants of trade expansion,
appendices 1, 2, 3, and 4 show only Mexico supporting this argument: An astounding 88%
of its exports in 2004, up from 83.6% in 1995, went to the United States; while US imports
as a proportion of total Mexican imports actually fell from 74.5% in 1995 to 55% in 2004--
a decline sharp enough between two-next door neighbors of two top-ten economies to
question gravitation, were it not for the 2004 figure still accounting for more than half of
Mexican imports. Imports from the US as a proportion of total imports, however, declined
between 1998 and 2004 in every country south of Mexico, as Appendix 9 reveals, with
Paraguays 16.3% being the steepest and Argentinas 2.6% the most modest. As appendices
41I have relied on the 2001 and 2005 volumes of the following for all data: International MonetaryFund,Direction of Trade Statistics: Yearbook(Washington, DC: 2001 and 2005), check appropriate countrypages. All figures rounded to the nearest full number in all appendices.
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1-4 indicate, increases were posted in Argentina (of .2%), Brazil (2.8%), Costa Rica (5%),
Paraguay (8%), Peru (5.8%), Uruguay (2.1%), and Venezuela (.9%) between 1998 and
2004, suggesting a number of contending explanations: gravitation was unchallenged until
the EU embraced LA in 1998; they reflect a brief 1994 SOA-sparked US honeymoon with
the US; global challenges were still brewing and not threatening; or Latin recovery from the
lost decade could no longer be sustained.
The gravity theory scores its points largely by default. Of the above plausible
explanations, the 1998 EUs Latin initiative did not bring desired results: Appendix 9
reaffirms imports from the eight West European countries declined for all Latin countries
between 1998 and 2004, except Costa Rica and Mexico; yet Costa Ricas and Mexicos
increases were paltry (.3% and .6%, respectively) and more than offset by declines as large
as Colombias 6.8% or as low as Paraguays and Perus 2.2%. Between 1995 and 2004,
Asian trade and Latin insulation boomed, shown in Appendix 7, and discussed later.
If imports from the US and West Europe did not enhance gravity model claims for
Mexico and Latin countries, exports to both the US and West Europe show a better, though
quite mixed picture--invoking yet other theoretical propositions. Exports to the US between
1998 and 2004 declined (by .3% for Chile and 3% for Peru), remained unchanged
(Mexico), or increased for all other countries (by as much as 11.5% for Uruguay, to as low
as .8%, for Paraguay). Similar increases were posted for European destinations by
Argentina (.9%), Chile (.2%), Peru (2.6%), and Uruguay (5.4%), while others registered
declines: Brazil (by 2.2%), Costa Rica (4.1%), Guatemala (4.9%), Colombia (7.1%),
Mexico (1.0%), and Paraguay (15.5%).
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One might argue US markets were more open to imports than the European
counterparts because of its world leadership claim,42 supplying a collective good;43 and how,
when it comes to trade, even the most organized regional trading bloc, the EU faces too
many different commercial needs and priorities to make a single policy sustainable. The
slightly better 2005 EU trading positions, compared to 1995, or 1998, in addition to the
slightly worse US position for those same years, further dilute the relevance of the
gravitational thesis.
Competition Arguments:
Appendices 5 through 9 support competition arguments. By and large, they show (a)
the eroding positions of the United States and the 8-country West European average over
time; (b) the increasing Asian presence; and (c) the US-EU trade rivalry, though the most
important across Latin America, losing its bite over time due to the Asian entry. Like their
gravitation counterparts, competition theses also face limits: Gravitation necessitates
competition, as previously observed, but a competition in which the fittest trading economy
explicitly and robustly emerges. Without a clear and single leader, gravitation dissolves into
full-blown competition. In other words, competition does not always require gravitation, as
21st Century Latin experiences reveal.
Except for Peru, every Latin country tabulated imported proportionally less from the
United States in 2004 than in 1995; while, with the exceptions of Chile and Paraguay, every
Latin country tabulated exported more to the US in 2004 than in 1995. Appendices 7 and 8
provide the numbers and proportions, respectively for Latin imports and exports. With the
42As shown in the works of hegemonic stability theorists, Charles Kindleberger, The World inDepression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley, 1973); and Gilpin, U.S. Powerand the Multinational Corporation.
43On this concept, see William Poehr, Collective goods and international cooperation:comments,International Organization 27, no. 3 (Summer 1973):421-30; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); andKindleberger, World in Depression.
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exception of Mexico, Latin imports from the 8-country West European aggregate declined
during the same years, while Latin exports to West Europe, inverting the US pattern,
declined for all Latin countries with the exception of Chile (increase from 15.2% to 18.4%),
Peru (from 22.9% to 28.6%), and Uruguay (from 19.6% to 19.8%). Both oil-exporters,
Mexico and Venezuela, depended on the US for more than half of their exports, in both
1995 and 2004, while coffee-exporting Colombia remained the next most dependent on the
US export market (increasing from 34.1% in 1995 to 42.0% in 2004). If the 1999 EU-LA
Ro Summit heralded the EU-US competition in Latin America, at least on paper, Appendix
9 does not deliver the theoretical expectations: Latin imports from both the United States
and West Europe fell between 1998 and 2004 (with Costa Ricas and Mexicos above-
mentioned exceptions); while Latin exports showed, at best, a mixed picture (falling US
trade for Chile and Paraguay showing a reduction with the United States, and falling West
European trade for Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela). Clearly, neither
the United States nor the EU could knock the other out of the trading ballpark, or profit
from the others constraint to strengthen its own claim. Neither gravitation nor competition
proves robust.
If a EU-US knockout appears less likely than more in 2004, compared to 1995, one
reason could be increasing Asian presence. Appendix 7 again shows how imports from the
3 emerging Asian countries selected for this study, China, India, and South Korea,
expanded between 1995 and 2004 for all Latin countries with the exception of Venezuela,
and when Japan is added to this Asian list, Asian countries actually accounted for more
exports in proportional terms than their West European counterparts for Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, and Paraguay, while closely trailing West Europe in Peru and Uruguay. Exports to
the 3 emerging Asian countries climbed during that time, as Appendix 8 shows, for all
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Latin countries except Colombia (from 1.8% in 1995 to 1.5% in 2004); and when Japan is
added to the Asian list, Chile ends up selling proportionally more to Asia than to West
Europe (28.5% versus 18.4% in 2004, as against 25.8% to 15.2% in 1994), with Paraguay
closely trailing Chile (4.8% in 2004 versus 5.9%). In fact, Paraguay was selling more to
these Asian countries than even to the United States in 2004 (4.8% to 3.4%), a situation
also echoed in Argentina (12.7% versus 10.1%) and Chile (28.5% versus 14.0%) in the
same year. Only Paraguay was importing proportionally more from these Asian countries
than from the United States in 2004 (19.1% versus 4.0%), with Uruguays 8.4% imports
from Asia closely behind its 9.2% from the United States in 2004. That two landlocked
countries trade more with distant Asian countries than their hemispheric giant, the United
States, not only strengthens the competition thesis over gravitation, but also challenges two
popular refrains: of Latin America belonging to the US sphere of influence, or becoming
the key playground of transatlantic market access rivalry.
Surging Asian trade, furiously led by China, blatantly defies any trading bloc
identities. The highest growth rate in Latin America belongs to China, that is, both Hong
Kong and the Peoples Republic of China put together. Except with landlocked Uruguay,
Chinas imports increased from Latin America and Mexico as a proportion of overall Latin
and Mexican trade spiraled significantly between 1998 and 2004, from 2.8% to 9.2% for
Argentina, 2.6% to 6.4% for Brazil, 3.2% to 10.3% for Chile, .1% to .9% for Colombia,
.2% to .6% for Mexico, .5% to 3.3% for Paraguay, and 4.8% to 10.1% for Peru. Uruguay is
not a steadfast exception, since in 2001 the 1998 figure of 4.4% shot up to 6.2% before
collapsing to 3.8% in 2004. Except in Mexico, Chinese exports also increased in all Latin
countries between 1998 and 2004: from 3.8% of Argentinian imports to 5.1%, from 2.4%
to 6.4% for Brazil, 3.8% to 7.8% for Chile, 1.8% to 6.6% for Colombia, 9.0% to 17.5% for
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Paraguay, 1.7% to 4.4% for Peru, and 3.3% to 6.7% for Uruguay. Mexicos 1998
proportion of 1.6% of Chinese imports actually climbed to 2.6% in 2001 before retreating
to .9% in 2004. In other words, there is no stopping the Chinese trading machine, no matter
which country the partner--a factor devastating theoretical formulations right, left, and
center. Chinas market search, and not free-trade agreements nor regional trading
arrangements in the western hemisphere and West Europe, undermines gravitation theses
and spheres-of-influence interpretations.
Chinas exceptional Asian case, both with the volumes of trade and the robust
increases, is paralleled only on a miniscule scale by India: Imports remained static at 1.3%
for both years with Argentina, and also with Peru (.4%); they climbed from .2% to .7%
with Brazil, from .3% to 1.3% with Chile, from .02% to .04% with Colombia, from .02 to
.2 with Mexico, from .03% to .2% with Paraguay, and from .04% to .2% with Uruguay.
Indian exports mirrored these patterns, remaining static for the same years at .6% with
Uruguay, and increasing from .5% to .8% with Argentina, from .4% to .9% with Brazil,
from .3% to .4% with Chile, from .3% to 1.0% with Colombia, from .2% to .4% with
Mexico, from .2% to .6% with Paraguay, and from .3% to .5% with Peru. Though
theoretically and empirically not worrisome at this time, Indias trade growth rates echo the
China-effect, and if it continues, may also attenuate existing Latin trading patterns with the
Untied States and West Europe even more.
One Asian country not fitting the new Asian pattern any more is Japan. Decades
ago, Japan itself became synonymous of a trading snowball, swallowing markets with
cheap products. Today, it is not only not matching Chinas market access in Latin America,
but is also falling behind China in actual volumes traded. In 2004, for instance, Chinas
exports accounted for more than Japans in Argentina (5.1% versus 2.1% of overall
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Argentinian trade), Brazil (6.4% versus 4.6%), Chile (7.8% versus 3.3%), Colombia (6.6%
versus 3.8%), Paraguay (17.5% versus 3.3%), Peru (4.4% versus 1.6%), and Uruguay
(6.7% to 1.6%). The only exception was Mexico (.9% versus 5.3%), which signed a 2005
trade agreement with Japan. China also purchased more from all Latin countries than Japan
in 2004, with the exception of Chile (10.3% versus 11.4%), Colombia (.9% versus 1.6%),
and Mexico (.6% versus .6%). Japan is not only tip-toeing the fading Latin pattern of the
United States, but in the last 12 years, was also displaced as the second largest US trading
partner, after Canada, by Mexico in 1993, and then China in this century. Is this a sign of
emerging countries slowly displacing their more established counterparts? A rough test
could be across South America.
Insulation Argument:
With the exception of Mexico, intra-Latin trade has been robust and, in some cases,
getting stronger--showing signs of country-specific growth spilling into increasing regional
identities. If a trading bloc is evolving, it will not be in the FTAA image, laden with all
kinds of arrangements, but one exclusively Latin, either formal, such as MERCOSUR, or
informal, such as the concurrent leftist surge, showcasing not just trading arrangements but
also cultural components and, of course, an ideological difference, no matter how
marginally, with the United States. Argentina led the 2004 list of intra-Latin imports, with
62.3% of its overall imports originating in the same continent. It was followed by fellow
MERCOSUR partners, Paraguay with 59.8% and Uruguay with 55%. The other partner,
Brazil, was surprisingly, last on the intra-Latin import list, with only 16.6% of its trade
originating in the same continent, and in fact falling from the 1998 figure of 21.7%. Here
may be a case of a Latin emerging economy making waves not only in Latin America and
the western hemisphere, but as far and wide as possible--an international player, and
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thereby defiant of gravitational pulls or pushes at this initial stage of rank-climbing. If so,
Brazil may be the Latin leader in this diversification game, going heavily international
before others. Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay all showed higher 2004 figures than in
1998. Chile, Colombia, and Peru also showed increasing intra-Latin imports, respectively,
from 24.7% to 37.1%, 24.3% to 28.9%, and 28.4% to 31.6%.
Intra-Latin export performances were not so clear-cut. Paraguay was the leader with
72.1% of its exports headed for other Latin destinations, an increase from its 66.9% 1998
figure. Argentina came next with 38.3% of its exports going to other Latin markets, but this
was significantly lower than the 50% in 1998. Uruguays 2004 figure of 37.2% fell from
1998s 62.9%, while Brazils 24.3% also fell from 27.9% in 1998, as too did Chiles 16.7%
from 22.3% in 1998. Only Colombia and Peru showed increases, from 29.9% to 33.8% and
17.9% to 19.4%, respectively.
Mexicos pathetically single digit figures convey two messages: the lesser
importance of Latin over North American trade; and at least the growth rate of its Latin
imports, from 2.3% in 1998 to 5.6% in 2004, suggests an overdue reconnection underway.
Mexicos northern orientation interestingly matches Brazils global outlook.
Although the leading member of MERCOSUR, Brazils trading pattern suits its UN
permanent Security Council membership claim, and how Mexicos isolation in Latin
America also cuts into its own half-hearted UN permanent Security Council membership
claim. Both orientations undermine regionalism: Brazils by suggesting there is more than
just regionalism as a policy option, and Mexicos by isolating itself from not only the rest
of the world but also Latin America, unlike its two other NAFTA partners. Trade figures
and patterns suggest Brazil and Mexico may be learning their respective lessons--Brazil not
abandoning nor sacrificing regionalism, and Mexico, at least in its imports, seeking
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diversification. While these feed into Latin introversion, as previously defined, they also
serve as stepping stones towards greater trading competitiveness and globalization--two
additional options in case of future need in an unpredictable global political economy. So
far Brazil is farther ahead.
Conclusions:
A quick survey of recent trade figures offers a fairly convincing response to the first
question asked in this study: Can any paradigm explain the clustered trading field today?
With no as the obvious answer, the study, by clustering traditional theoretical arguments of
Latin trade into gravitation, competition, and insulation, shows all three offer useful, albeit
partial, insights, replete with strengths and weaknesses.
Double-edged Observations:
Built as it was on proximity of the United States to Latin America, gravitations
strengths are in the prominent example of Mexicos openness, NAFTA, and NAFTAs
extension to the FTAA, as logical consequences of the US western hemispheric weight.
With its diversifying import tendencies, Mexico is too firmly footed in the US sphere to
stray too far too quickly; and in NAFTAs initial years, both US neighbors became its top
two trading partners, a development solid enough to augment the FTAA pursuit.
Yet, latinization was neglected, as too the increasing Asian role in Latin America.
FTAA could not steamroll idiosyncratic Latin developments: Not taking Brazils initial
complaints against US farm subsidies too seriously culminated in the WTO Cancn
breakdown first, then the FTAA breakdown; and instead of utilizing MERCOSUR as the
instrument to win other South American countries, the US injudiciously utilized those other
countries to outweigh MERCOSUR. Just as George W. Bushs competitive liberalism
policy unsuccessfully sought to platform Latin America to galvanize African and Asian
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economies against the European Union,44 Asias newly emerging economies platformed
Latin America for accessing US markets and opening Latin markets. Latin countries found
the trade diversification opportunity more profitable than consolidating US options.
Competition theses bring their own advantages and shortfalls. Among the strengths:
they received a refurbished lease of life in Latin America after the Cold War; and in the
process, led European Union to experiment with collective trade policy-making.
Neofunctionalism and regional economic theories could be profitably applied to NAFTA
and MERCOSUR, among other Latin regional arrangements; and unlike in the 1960s, more
mileage could be accumulated in the 1990s, illustrated most vividly with MERCOSUR
becoming the first customs union among less developed countries, and the second overall,
after the European Community. Amidst the much-heralded EU-US trade rivalry, there was
also the lesser known EU-LA trade bloc cooperation, an occasion utilized by the EU to
develop a panoply of trading arrangements collectively with the external world. Although
constrained, EU-LA summits have not been abandoned: Too much has been invested;
finessing those arrangements through trials and errors is consistent with the very evolution
and development of the EU.
Inherent weaknesses include the failure of collective EU action to translate into
trade; and with the growth of independent Asian economies, the EU and US no longer
remain the only competitors, in fact, the proliferation of competitors invites more disorder
than order in the global political economy.45 As the Latin cases show, trade with West
European countries is more individualized than collectivized; and though EU members can
collectively match, even surpass, the US trade weight, this is not a serious concern at all
since trade volumes, arrangements, and priorities show no collective patterns. Trade ties
44Richard E. Feinberg, Bilateral trade arrangements in the Asia-Pacific:origins, evolution, andimplications,Berkeley APEC Study Center(BASC) March 21-22, University of California, Berkeley, 2003.
45Argument consistent with themes in Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in theWorld Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), ch. 1.
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with Asias emerging countries highlight this individualized, country-to-country approach,
a feat more remarkable in the absence of a regional trading bloc between China, India,
Japan, and South Korea.
Turning to those Latin countries themselves, insulation carries its own beauty spots
and warts. Among the strengths: No longer just a nationalistic notion, insulation is bringing
like-minded countries together, in the process becoming a synonym of regionalism; it offers
the most untapped Latin safeguard against dependency, especially US dependency.
Regional arrangements reached a higher threshold across Latin America after the lost
decade; and though irreversibility is still a long way away, increasing intra-Latin trade is an
encouraging sign and catalyzer. With industrializing pockets either sprouting as
maquiladoras or deepening, the hitherto parallel Latin economies complement each other
increasingly, making intra-Latin trade more virtuous than vicious.
Behind this growth lie inevitable weaknesses: development differentials also breed
dependence; and flavoring economic growth with political or ideological colors could, as in
the past, undermine development. MERCOSUR illustrates the developmental differentials
between the two larger and two smaller economies, one reason why integration has been
slowed. With Brazil more interested in diversifying globally, regional efforts would not
only play second-fiddle, but also encourage nationalism. Be that as it may, if Latin
Americas current leftist surge becomes more trade unionist than pragmatist, balancing both
fringes may become too tough a nut to crack--and another Latin Achilles Heel.
Summary:
Given the strengths and weaknesses of all three clusters, diversification may still hold the
magic formula for Latin America. It builds upon competition, thwarts gravitation, and
facilitates insulation. Its exact opposite of survival-of-the-fittest builds upon competition
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until a single winner emerges, exerting greater gravitational pulls and discouraging
insulation. Having experienced more instances of the latter than the former, Latin America
could avoid inter-bloc rivalry and adjust to the variegated propensities of globalization by
accelerating diversification. Against the threats and opportunities of unfolding
globalization, diversification may be more viable over the long-term and predict a safer exit
from cut-throat competition--the soundest investment Latin countries may make today.
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APPENDIX 2: SOURCES OF LATIN IMPORTS (in % of overall country imports):
LatinCountries: United
States:France: Germany
:Italy:
TheNeth-
erlands:Portugal
:Spain: Sweden: United
Kingdom:
Argentina:1995:1998:2001:2004:
19.019.218.616.6
5.25.03.63.4
6.36.05.15.7
6.45.02.01.6
1.1.7.7
1.3
.02.2.2.2
4.34.23.52.7
1.21.1.9
1.0
2.02.52.01.6
Brazil:1995:1998:2001:2004:
21.224.023.418.3
2.83.53.73.6
10.09.18.68.0
5.85.63.93.3
1.11.21.01.0
.3
.3
.3
.3
1.62.02.21.9
1.11.92.21.9
2.02.62.22.2
Chile:1995:1998:2001:2004:
24.520.316.014.0
2.93.43.22.0
5.14.03.93.7
3.33.42.41.9
.7
.5
.61.0
.2
.2
.3
.3
2.93.32.61.8
1.21.21.01.0
1.61.31.11.0
Colombia:1995:1998:2001:2004:
39.132.134.729.0
2.43.22.71.8
5.95.34.44.0
2.12.73.11.9
.8
.8
.7
.7
.02.1
.04
.03
2.13.01.91.5
1.41.11.0.5
1.62.31.41.2
Costa Rica:1995:1998:2001:2004:
45.350.322.946.1
1.01.01.11.1
3.12.11.92.1
1.91.41.01.1
1.3.8
1.61.6
.03
.06
.09
.04
1.81.61.61.3
.2
.4
.2
.3
.8
.8
.71.6
Guatemala:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
44.938.234.134.0
.6
.8
.7
.9
3.52.72.52.0
1.11.61.61.2
.9
.81.61.6
.03
.04
.07
.03
.91.11.51.3
.3
.3
.3
.7
1.21.3.9.6
Mexico:1995:1998:2001:2004:
74.574.466.055.0
1.41.1.9
1.2
3.73.63.53.6
1.11.31.21.4
.3
.2
.3
.1
.03
.03
.05.1
1.01.01.01.4
.3
.2
.5
.4
.7
.8
.8
.7Paraguay:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
12.320.35.94.0
1.2.9
1.01.3
2.61.72.51.7
2.12.21.3.7
.4
.2
.5
.1
.04
.05
.03
.01
.71.21.0.7
.4
.9
.41.0
3.21.81.81.1
Peru:1995:1998:2001:2004:
26.732.524.030.3
1.22.01.81.0
3.84.33.03.0
2.52.11.91.4
.91.1.4.9
.01
.03
.05
.04
4.27.42.31.1
1.31.0.7.6
1.31.61.21.2
Uruguay:1995:1998:2001:2004:
9.912.08.99.2
3.54.74.22.4
3.63.33.12.6
5.14.63.33.0
.9
.7
.8
.8
.1
.1
.1.07
3.73.73.32.0
.8
.6
.5
.5
1.41.51.21.6
Venezuela:1995:1998:2001:2004:
42.643.530.228.8
2.32.21.51.1
4.84.83.03.1
3.03.92.92.5
1.31.21.1.9
.07
.08.1
.05
2.32.22.52.2
.3
.8
.4
.3
2.02.11.82.2
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APPENDIX 3: LATIN EXPORT DESTINATIONS (in US$m):
LatinCountries: United
States:France
:Germany
:Italy
:
TheNeth-erlands
:
Portugal:
Spain:
Sweden:
UnitedKingdom
:
Argentina:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
1497/203632057/260042884/265433697/36415
313320273388
635571455
1119
7237468531097
116211118131038
84157135180
67382410931589
20202163
302256291454
Brazil:1995:1998:2001:2004:
8799/466059899/5115514379/5898020342/97671
1038125616652235
2158300625024036
1713193118092904
2918274428635917
413439506962
877105610421984
159189175503
1324133917052117
Chile:1995:1998:2001:2004:
2398/165382360/164433428/185544568/32548
4044516031286
583570518901
3596758011338
3464065351653
12112129
219280345730
6711180
169
52311571232857
Colombia:1995:1998:2001:2004:
3365/98594163/108735345/123077042/16730
261237140211
734684417265
185215196361
345289114386
586671113
187151141211
89873329
194239287361
CostaRica:1995:1998:2001:2004:
1085/27022674/5528814/5006
2957/6302
52853135
173215106236
1321389370
8820484
332
1294
11
26992026
25544574
10122041128
Guatemala:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
606/19362011/38282497/45652669/5032
2242189
1131177861
23362729
38495042
5722
12183220
2624104
13361713
Mexico:1995:1998:2001:2004:
66475/79541103306/117494140564/158899164522/187812
483403373335
515115215941689
197182240235
242399508246
7987149154
77971512712027
30463780
504655673840
Paraguay:1995:1998:2001:2004:
228/91933/126429/990
55/1625
20125
10
105
1314
29254225
902072933
3.15
5.113.45
920119
--.1.93.5
7231
Peru:1995:1998:2001:2004:
956/55131873/56991772/6944
3682/12468
648869
106
279232208383
199191140284
23214397
385
48
266
77154213422
481126
402281941
1120
Uruguay:1995:1998:2001:2004:
126/2121160/2770177/2057565/3264
24211734
1191129673
667971
108
56543280
464
21
545564
117
109614
89946673
Venezuela:1995:1998:2001:2004:
9646/190938775/1705412849/2693623924/43027
976853
243
345239289308
158116169275
318369289251
34131019
78243555368
1041013
141
532317103355
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APPENDIX 4: LATIN EXPORT DESTINATIONS (in % of overall country exports):
LatinCountries: United
States:France: Germany
:Italy:
TheNeth-
erlands:Portugal
:Spain: Sweden: United
Kingdom:
Argentina:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
7.37.910.810.1
1.51.21.01.1
3.12.21.73.0
3.62.83.23.0
5.74.21.72.8
.4.6
.5
.4
3.33.14.14.3
.09.07
.07.2
1.5.91.01.2
Brazil:1995:1998:2001:2004:
18.919.324.320.8
2.22.42.82.2
4.65.84.24.1
3.73.73.02.9
6.25.34.86.0
.9
.8
.8
.9
1.92.01.72.0
.3
.3
.2
.5
2.82.62.82.1
Chile:1995:1998:2001:2004:
14.514.318.414
2.42.11.11.2
3.53.42.82.7
2.24.14.34.1
2.12.42.85.0
.07
.06.1
.08
1.31.71.82.2
.4
.6
.4
.5
3.27.06.62.6
Colombia:1995:1998:2001:2004:
34.138.243.442.0
2.62.11.11.2
7.46.23.41.6
1.82.01.62.1
3.52.6.9
2.3
.6
.6
.5
.7
1.91.31.11.3
.9
.8
.2
.1
2.02.22.31.7
Costa Rica:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
40.248.316.246.9
1.91.5.6.6
6.43.92.13.7
4.92.51.91.1
3.23.71.75.3
.4
.2.08.2
1.01.8.4.4
.91.0.9
1.2
3.74.0.82.0
Guatemala:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
31.352.554.753.0
1.11.1.4.2
5.83.01.71.2
1.2.9.6.6
2.01.31.1.8
.3
.2.04.04
.6
.5
.7
.4
1.3.6.2
.08
.7
.9
.4
.3
Mexico:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
83.6888888
.6
.3
.2
.1
.6
.9
.9
.9
.2
.1
.2
.1
.3
.3
.3
.1
.1.07.09.08
1.0.6.8
1.1
.04
.03
.02
.04
.6
.5
.4
.4Paraguay:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
24.82.62.93.4
2.2.9.5.6
1.1.3
1.3.8
3.22.04.21.5
9.816.32.92.0
.3.01.5.2
1.01.61.1.5
--.007.09.2
.8
.1
.3.06
Peru:1995:1998:2001:2004:
17.333
25.530
1.21.5.9.8
5.04.03.03.1
3.63.42.09.0
4.22.51.43.1
.07.1.3
.04
1.42.73.03.4
.07.1.1.2
7.34.9
13.59.0
Uruguay:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
5.95.88.617.3
1.1.7.8
1.0
5.64.04.76.3
3.12.93.53.3
2.61.91.52.4
.2
.2
.2
.6
2.52.03.13.6
.5
.3
.3
.4
4.23.43.22.2
Venezuela:1995:1998:2001:2004:
50.551.547.755.6
.5
.4
.2
.6
1.81.41.1.7
.8
.7
.6
.6
1.72.21.1.6
.2.08.04.04
.41.42.0.9
.5.06.05.3
2.81.9.4.8
APPENDIX 5: LATIN IMPORTS FROM ASIA & LATIN AMERICA
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LatinCountries:
China: India: Japan: South Korea: Latin America:
Argentina:1995:1998:2001:2004:
667: 3.6%1216: 3.8%1109: 5.5%1151: 5.1%
61: .3%143: .5%151: .7%171: .8%
674: 3.5%1442: 4.5%767: 3.8%479: 2.1%
347: 1.8%639: 2.0%410: 2.0%263: 1.2%
6021: 31.2%12901: 40.7%12243: 60.2%13947: 62.3%
Brazil:1995:1998:2001:2004:
1473: 3.2%1393: 2.4%1676: 3.0%4047: 6.4%
166: .4%202: .4%543: 1.0&556: .9%
3279: 7.0%3253: 5.7%3064: 5.5%2868: 4.6%
1322: 2.8%992: 1.7%
1574: 2.8%1730: 2.8%
10185: 21.9%12486: 21.7%10157: 18.3%10407: 16.6%
Chile:1995:1998:2001:2004:
498: 3.2%759: 3.8%1042: 5.8%1953: 7.8%
--67: .3%75: .4%
101: .4%
1013: 6.5%995: 5.0%556: 3.1%818: 3.3%
527: 3.4%562: 2.8%540: 3.0%540: 2.2%
4145: 26.8%4907: 24.7%6057: 34.0%9271:37.1%
Colombia:1995:1998:2001:2004:
93: .7%269: 1.8%517: 4.0%1110: 6.6%
22: .2%55: .3%73: .6%
181: 1.0%
1046: 7.5%990: 6.7%559: 4.4%644: 3.8%
184: 1.3%300: 2.0%266: 2.0%453: 2.7%
3511: 25.3%3570: 24.3%3258: 25.4%4836: 28.9%
Costa Rica:1995:1998:2001:2004:
40: 1.2%89: 1.4%118: 1.8%331: 4.0%
2: .06%5: .08%6: .09%8: .09%
123: 3.8%385: 6.2%215: 3.3%484: 5.9%
3: .09%6: .1%
3: .05%126: 1.5%
1004:31.3%1232:19.8%1421:21.6%2181:26.4%
Guatemala:1995:1998:2001:2004:
27: .8%171: 3.0%214: 3.5%713: 7.5%
3: .09%5: .08%21: .3%47: .5%
121: 3.7%248: 4.4%171: 2.8%417: 4.4%
35: 1.0%293: 5.2%518: 8.6%648: 6.8%
1103: 33.5%1840: 33.0%2073: 34.3%2848: 30.1%
Mexico:1995:1998:2001:2004:
680: .9%2034: 1.6%4469: 2.6%1845: .9%
121: .2%232: .2%392: .2%868: .4%
3608: 5.0%4553: 3.6%8086: 4.7%
10583: 5.3%
974: 1.3%1951: 1.6%3532: 2.0%5228: 2.6%
2154: 3.0%2919: 2.3%5541: 3.2%11193: 5.6%
Paraguay:1995:1998:2001:2004:
123: 4.4%347: 9.0%231: 11.6%464: 17.5%
8: .3%6: .2%7: .6%16: .6%
236: 8.4%99: 2.6%86: 4.3%87: 3.3%
182: 6.5%60: 1.6%24: 1.2%27: 1.0%
1283: 45.9%2024: 52.5%1226: 61.7%1585: 59.8%
Peru:1995:1998:2001:2004:
213: 2.8%134: 1.7%383: 5.3%429: 4.4%
17: .2%26: .3%41: .6%53: .5%
382: 5.0%344: 4.3%393: 5.5%156: 1.6%
177: 2.3%240: 3.0%245: 3.4%190: 2.0%
2838: 37.72261: 28.4%2637: 36.6%3082: 31.6
Uruguay:1995:1998:2001:2004:
73: 2.5%124: 3.3%146: 4.8%257: 6.7%
16: .6%24: .6%23: .8%24: .6%
73: 2.5%93: 2.4%50: 1.6%60: 1.6%
50: 1.7%82: 2.2%45: 1.5%44: 1.1%
1492: 52.0%1864: 48.9%1654: 54.3%2121: 55.0%
Venezuela:1995:1998:2001:2004:
62: .6%124: 1.0%524: 2.5%72: .4%
14: .1%24: .2%53: .3%50: .3%
431: 4.4%600: 4.6%782: 3.8%496: 2.9
93: .9%189: 1.5%
----
2411: 24.6%2924: 22.6%6304: 30.4%5508: 31.8%
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APPENDIX 6: LATIN EXPORTS TO ASIA & LATIN AMERICA
LatinCountries:
China: India: Japan: South Korea: Latin America:
Argentina:1995:1998:
2001:2004:
562: 2.8%745: 2.8%
1224: 4.6%3368: 9.2%
152: .7%359: 1.3%
435: 1.6%471: 1.3%
438: 2.2%660: 2.5%
351: 1.3%404: 1.1%
118: .6%126: .5%
390: 1.5%383: 1.1%
9728: 47.8%12901: 50%
12243: 46%12947: 38.3%Brazil:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
1609: 3.5%1312: 2.6%2371: 4.0%6208: 6.4%
320: .7%145: .2%285: .5%652: .7%
3102: 6.7%2202: 4.3%1986: 3.4%2768: 2.8%
827: 1.8%467: .9%736: 1.2%
1429: 1.5%
10739: 23.0%14278: 27.9%13536: 23.0%23764: 24.3%
Chile:1995:1998:2001:2004:
375: 2.3%524: 3.2%1049: 5.7%
3344: 10.3%
86: .5%54: .3%
111: .6%426: 1.3%
2906: 17.6%2074: 12.6%2134: 11.5%3696: 11.4%
897: 5.4%422: 2.6%553: 3.0%
1804: 5.5%
3089: 18.7%3668: 22.3%4119: 22.2%5450: 16.7%
Colombia:1995:1998:2001:2004:
128: 1.3%16: .1%36: .3%156: .9%
4: .04%2: .02%3: .02%8: .04%
364: 3.7%269: 2.5%165: 1.3%262: 1.6%
45: .5%35: .3%44: .4%93: .6%
2924: 29.7%3253: 29.9%4352: 35.4%5652: 33.2%
Costa Rica:1995:1998:2001:2004:
55: 2.0%79: 1.4%18: .3%
301: 4.8%
1: .04%2: .04%1: .02%8: .1%
28: 1.0%64: 1.2%15: .3%41: .7%
----
.05: --11: .2%
573: 21.2%949: 17.2%869: 17.4%1571: 24.9%
Guatemala:1995:1998:2001:2004:
34: 1.8%.8: .02%1.5: .03%1.4: .02%
--1: .03%
.3: --.23: --
54: 2.8%76: 2.0%66: 1.4%28:.6%
2: .1%60: 1.6%136: 3.0%40: .08%
777: 40.1%905: 23.7%1193:26.1%1799: 35.7%
Mexico:1995:1998:2001:
2004:
543: .7%323: .2%402: .3%
1159: .6%
25: .03%25: .02%160: .1%
446: .2%
928: 1.2%856: .7%621: .4%
1191: .6%
89: .1%73: .06%293: .2%
219: .1%
4505: 5.7%5584: 4.8%6578: 4.1%
8482: 4.5%Paraguay:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
7: .8%6: .5%
23: 2.3%54: 3.3%
--.5: .03%28: 2.8%3.4: .2%
1: .1%59: 4.7%11: 1.1%18: 1.1%
2: .2%--
.26: .02%4: .2%
612: 66.6%845: 66.9%711: 71.9%1172: 72.1%
Peru:1995:1998:2001:2004:
405: 7.3%274: 4.8%446: 6.4%
1269: 10.1%
2: .04%24: .4%36: .5%50: .4%
501: 9.0%217: 3.8%375: 5.4%
548% 4.4%
159: 2.9%42: .7%
109: 1.6%202: 1.6%
941: 17.0%1018: 17.9%1384: 19.9%2421: 19.4%
Uruguay:1995:1998:2001:
2004:
173: 8.2%122: 4.4%127: 6.2%
124: 3.8%
6: .3%1: .04%2: .1%
5: .2%
19: .9%22: .8%12: .6%
57: 1.7%
10: .5%4: .1%5: .2%
13: .4%
1131: 53.3%1741: 62.9%1050: 51:0%
1214: 37.2%Venezuela:
1995:1998:2001:2004:
6: .03%1: .01%48: .2%575: .6%
6: .03%3: .02%4: .01%3: .01%
293: 1.5%188: 1.1%148: .5%215: .5%
36: .2%14: .01%6: .02%85: .2%
6505: 34.0%5325: 31.2%8205: 30.5%8407: 19.6%
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APPENDIX 7: LATIN IMPORTS: SOURCES IN AGGREGATGE AND RELATIVE TERMS
Countries:United States:
8-CountryWest European
Average:
3-CountryAsian
EmergingCountry
Average:
4-CountryAsian Average
(includesJapan)
LatinAmericanAverage:
Argentina:1995:2005:
19.0%16.6%
26.5%17.5%
5.7%7.1%
9.2%9.8%
31.2%62.3%
Brazil:1995:2004:
21.2%18.3%
24.7%22.2%
6.4%10.1%
13.4%14.7%
21.9%16.6%
Chile:1995:2004:
24.5%14.0%
17.9%12.7%
6.6%10.4%
13.1%13.7%
26.8%37.1%
Colombia:1995:2004:
39.1%29.0%
16.3%11.6%
2.2%10.3%
9.7%14.1%
25.3%28.9%
Costa Rica:
1995:2004: 45.3%46.1% 10.1%9.1% 1.4%5.9% 5.1%11.8% 31.3%26.4%Guatemala:
1995:2004:
44.9%34.0%
8.5%8.3%
1.9%14.8%
5.6%19.2%
33.5%30.1%
Mexico:1995:2004:
74.5%55.0%
8.5%8.9%
2.4%3.9%
7.4%9.2%
3.0%5.6%
Paraguay:1995:2004:
12.3%4.0%
10.6%6.6%
11.2%19.1%
19.6%22.4%
45.9%59.8%
Peru:1995:2004:
26.7%30.3%
15.2%9.2%
5.3%6.9%
10.3%8.5%
37.7%31.6%
Uruguay:1995:2004:
9.9%9.2%
19.1%13.0%
4.8%8.4%
7.3%10.0%
52.0%55.0%
Venezuela:1995:2004:
42.6%28.8%
16.1%12.2%
1.6%.7%
6.0%3.6%
24.6%31.8%
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APPENDIX 8: LATIN EXPORTS: DESTINATIONS IN AGGREGATGE AND RELATIVE TERMS
Countries: United States:8-Country
West EuropeanAverage:
3-CountryAsian
EmergingCountry
Average:
4-CountryAsian Average
(includesJapan)
LatinAmericanAverage:
Argentina:1995:2005:
7.3%10.1%
19.2%16.0%
4.1%11.6%
6.3%12.7%
47.8%38.3%
Brazil:1995:2004:
18.9%20.8%
22.6%20.7%
6.0%8.6%
12.7%11.4%
23.0%24.3%
Chile:1995:2004:
14.5%14.0%
15.2%18.4%
8.2%17.1%
25.8%18.5%
18.7%16.7%
Colombia:1995:2004:
34.1%42.0%
20.7%11.0%
1.8%1.5%
5.5%3.1%
29.7%33.2%
Costa Rica:
1995:2004: 40.2%46.9% 22.4%14.5% 2.1%5.1% 3.1%5.8% 21.2%24.9%Guatemala:
1995:2004:
31.3%53.0%
13.0%3.6%
1.9%.1%
4.7%.7%
40.1%35.7%
Mexico:1995:2004:
83.6%88.0%
3.4%2.8%
.8%
.9%3.0%1.5%
5.7%4.5%
Paraguay:1995:2004:
24.8%3.4%
18.4%5.9%
1.0%3.7%
1.1%4.8%
66.6%72.1%
Peru:1995:2004:
17.3%30.0%
22.9%28.6%
10.2%12.1%
19.2%16.5%
17.0%19.4%
Uruguay:1995:2004:
5.9%17.3%
19.6%19.8%
9.0%4.4%
9.9%6.1%
53.3%37.2%
Venezuela:1995:2004:
50.5%55.6%
8.7%4.5%
.3%
.8%1.8%1.3%
34.0%19.6%
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APPENDIX 9:
PROPORTIONAL TRADE TRENDS (1998 versus 2004):
LATIN AMERICA, WEST EUROPE, AND THE UNITED STATES
Latin Countries: Imports from US: Exports to US: Imports from
Europe:
Exports to
Europe:Argentina: Down (2.6%) Up (2.1%) Down (3.4%) Up (.9%)
Brazil: Down (5.7%) Up (1.5%) Down (5.6%) Down (2.2%)Chile: Down (6.3%) Down (.3%) Down (4.6%) Up (.2%)
Colombia: Down (3.1%) Up (3.8%) Down (6.8%) Down (7.1%)Costa Rica: Down (4.2%) Down (1.4%) Up (.3%) Down 4.1%)Guatemala: Down (4.2%) Up (.5%) Down (.3%) Down (4.9%)
Mexico: Down (19%) Same Up (.6%) Down (1.0%)Paraguay: Down (16.3%) Up (.8%) Down (2.2%) Down (15.5%)
Peru: Down (3%) Down (3%) Down (2.2%) Up (2.6%)Uruguay: Down (2.8%) Up (11.5%) Down (6.2%) Up (5.4%)
Venezuela: Down (14.7%) Up (4.1%) Down (3.9%) Down (3.6%)
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